For the betterment of society, I proudly Negate the resolution resolved:

States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

First, some definitions:

Morality: The extent to which an action is right or wrong.-Merriam Webster

I value morality due to the resolution’s use of ought which Marriam Webster defines as a moral
obligation. Also, the resolution asks what a just government ought to do.
The value criterion is protecting the overall well-being of the citizenry also known as utilitarianism,
Utilitarianism should be preferred for the following reasons:

1. The only thing that is always good is pleasure, this means that the only
moral ought has to be focused on maximizing this intrinsic good and thus the
government should maximize pleasure of their citizens.
2. Pain is intrinsically bad, the government ought to prevent bad things like
death, oppression, suffering, etc. because those impacts result in a lot of pain.
3. In order to decide whether or not a government action is a good idea, you
should look at whether or not the policy will result in a net-good or more
pleasure than pain.

The only morally relevant part of an action are consequences

Hanes 16
Haines, William. "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. University of Hong Kong, n.d. Web. 04 Mar.
2016.
Actions are transient and things, soon gone forever. Hence, one might think, in the long run only the results
remain, so the only thing that really matters about an action is its results. So consequentialism must be true

Second, All government policies entail tradeoffs, that means governments

specifically must aggregate consequences.

Gooden 95
Robert Gooden [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,”
pgs 141-142, BE

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there

is something special about the situation of public officials that
makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals . Before proceeding with the large argument, I
must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more
desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public
officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that.
All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the
nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of
their own circumstances. and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them.
Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on
individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates . They know
what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public
policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

Even if their framework is more theoretically true, the only one that the government can use is
mine as policy will always have trade offs between good and bad. Eliminating nuclear arsenals will
cause more good impacts than bad.

C1:The Affirmative Fails

Disarmament fails if nations are motivated by security

dilemmas--- they'll cheat because they can't trust
adversaries.
Doyle, Thomas. "Moral And Political Necessities For Nuclear Disarmament: An Applied
Ethical Analysis." Strategic Studies Quarterly. June, 2015. Web. December 09, 2019.
<https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=766701>.

The case of Gorbachev is once again illustrative. He had exposure to the new thinking
of the Palme Commission and the antinuclear thinking of the Pugwash Conferences.39
In light of the various and severe economic and political challenges facing the
Soviet Union at the time, Gorbachev began to see Soviet security not in terms of
constantly being against the United States but with it on matters of joint concern. And
although Soviet economic decline weighed heavily on his mind, it was this new thinking
that enabled Gorbachev to act contrary to conventional national-security wisdom, to
initiate conciliatory policies towards the United States at the very time Reagan was
undertaking a significant arms buildup, and eventually to persuade Reagan of the
necessity of eliminating nuclear weapons from the world.40 The upshot is that it is
dangerous and morally irresponsible to compel the NWS’s adherence to the 13 points
and ultimately nuclear disarmament in the absence of new security thinking. Any leader
who remains committed to the old security thinking is likely to look for opportunities to
cheat or subvert an imposed disarmament mandate. In contrast, leaders motivated by
new security thinking are not likely to look for such opportunities but rather seek to fulfill
their disarmament commitments.

Steps toward nuclear disarmament require states to send

costly signals that induce their own vulnerability, which is
morally wrong.
Doyle, Thomas. "Moral And Political Necessities For Nuclear Disarmament: An Applied
Ethical Analysis." Strategic Studies Quarterly. June, 2015. Web. December 07, 2019.
<https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=766701>.

However, each decision about sending costly signals to rivals or enemies and inducing
vulnerability of one’s state is made in the context of uncertainty about some future act of
reciprocation. Unless several rounds of confidence-building measures have already
been completed, it is extremely difficult for a state leader to estimate the risks of
betrayal by rivals or enemies if one is the first to send a costly signal. Moral
consequentialists who are risk averse would likely argue that inducing state vulnerability
by acceding to the CTBT or committing to a principle of irreversibility is politically and
morally irresponsible. Consequentialists who are not risk averse would likely argue the
opposite. Kantian deontologists might apply one or more of the preliminary articles for
perpetual peace to say that state vulnerability is morally required, and yet some
measure of prudence must be retained in deciding on the kind of signal sent and the
means of sending it.60 Regarding this approach, a costly signal that corresponds with
moral responsibility is a function of a nonideal coordination between moral duty and
ends-means rationality. Accordingly, suppose an organized and irresistible global
antinuclear movement succeeded in raising the political costs of NSW's disarmament
avoidance beyond tolerable levels, and suppose also that not all NWS leaders have
begun to exercise security-dilemma sensibility. The political pressures on NWS to
induce a virtuous cycle of cooperation or to reciprocate in turn on nuclear disarmament
policies will introduce the risks of state vulnerability. Any costly signal that one NWS
sends carries the risk that other NWS or key NEWS will not reciprocate in relevant
ways. It seems only Kantian deontology can ground an argument that inducing such
vulnerabilities is morally responsible. Moral consequentialist arguments most likely will
argue that making states vulnerable in such ways is morally irresponsible because the
risks of betrayal are too great. Thus, even if these consequentialists accept that a world
free of nuclear weapons is morally preferable to a world of nuclear-armed states, the
risk of acquiring such a world makes inducing state vulnerability morally irresponsible.
This conclusion is decisive if it is true that morality follows rationality.61 It follows from
the immediately preceding paragraphs that the question of the morality of inducing state
vulnerability for the purpose of achieving conformity to the 13 steps and to the broader
moral requirement of nuclear disarmament is morally dilemmatic. Unless a virtuous
cycle of cooperation has already been initiated, the chances of moral failure are
significant for leaders who take the first step of sending a costly disarmament signal.
Additionally, in the absence of reliable future knowledge, the moral arguments for or
against inducing state vulnerability might be reduced to questions of risk aversion. At
any rate, it cannot be unambiguously argued that compelling state vulnerabilities in the
name of compliance with the 13 steps or ultimately nuclear disarmament is morally
responsible.

Is a World Without Nuclear Weapons Really Possible?-

Brooking19
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-a-world-without-nuclear-weapons-really-possible/
That, however, is a dangerous vision of a nuke-free world because it would
deprive us of deterrent options we may someday need. Even once we
eliminate nuclear weapons, in other words, we will have to accept the fact that
we may not have done so forever. At a practical level, we will most likely still
be living in a world full of nuclear power plants, as well as nuclear waste from
nuclear bomb and energy programs to date. Neither the knowledge nor the
nuclear materials will disappear.

Outlawing nuclear weapons in a way that increased the prospects of other

types of immoral warfare would be no accomplishment at all. Even as we
strive for dismantling nuclear weapons, we need practical options for
rebuilding them should even greater perils present themselves. Those might
be pursuit of nuclear arms by a country bent on violating the accord, the
development of advanced biological pathogens (the Obama administration’s
2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report follows this line of thought), and even an
especially threatening conventional military buildup by a future extremist state.
That is the broad, strategic argument in favor of preserving options for nuclear
reconstitution under a temporary withdrawal from the treaty, even after nuclear
disarmament might someday be a reality.

recognizing the impracticality of trying to abolish nuclear weapons quickly is

importnat.

Countries can jut opt out

Penn law 13
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2456&context=faculty_scholarship

reservations, or unilateral rejections of portions of the treaties, so long as the

treaties do not provide otherwise and these reservations are compatible with the
treaties’ object and purpose. Treaty reservations are a favorite subject of study
for international law scholars, including some applying a rational choice
approach.11 Importantly, however, this Article also considers other forms of treaty
options that are prevalent in practice but largely neglected by the scholarship—
namely, options that treaty negotiators explicitly write into the treaties and
associated documents. Such options, which I will call “negotiated options,”
include opt-in clauses and optional protocols, which allow states to opt in to
additional commitments, and opt-out clauses, which allow states to opt out of
otherwise-required commitments.

Withdrawal. Treaties are not necessarily permanently binding upon the signatory
parties. As obligations in international law are traditionally viewed as arising only
from the consent of states, many treaties expressly allow a state to withdraw as
long as it follows certain procedures of notification.

There is no actual way for the aff to enforce any sovency what so ever

The aff breaks the nuclear umbrella and collapses alliances – causes Japan and
SoKo prolif – extinction
Roehrig 17 [Terence Roehrig, Ph.D., Professor of National Security Affairs and the
Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group. He has been a Research Fellow at the
Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program and the
Project on Managing the Atom and a past President of the Association of Korean
Political Studies. He has published numerous books, articles and book chapters on
Korean and East Asian security issues, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the
U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Japan, South Korea,
and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War. 2017.
Chapter 7. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/roeh15798]
In the face of these credibility problems, does the nuclear umbrella have any value,
or should it be withdrawn? Indeed, does the nuclear umbrella even exist? The United
States does possess the necessary capability, and the military trains to carry out an
order for a nuclear strike. Thus, regarding capability, there is no doubt the United
States possesses a credible nuclear umbrella. The questions arise with the other part
of credibility, namely resolve and the likelihood the United States would ever be
willing to carry out a nuclear strike in defense of an ally. Though significant
credibility questions persist, the nuclear umbrella will remain in place because of the
political and symbolic benefits it provides. The affirmation of the nuclear umbrella
plays a central role in reassuring allies. Japan and South Korea have not always been
involved in nuclear planning or been certain how it might work, but the nuclear
umbrella furnishes a strong pronouncement of the U.S. commitment to defend
those allies. To withdraw the nuclear umbrella would be to change the regional
security architecture in a way that would be difficult for Tokyo or Seoul to
understand and accept, and would likely lead to a reassessment regarding
acquisition of their own nuclear weapons. Thus, Patrick Morgan argues, “American
extended nuclear deterrence is woven into East Asian international politics and US
relations with East Asia [italics in the original]. In the eyes of various governments, it
is one of the salient characteristics of a satisfactory status quo.”9 The 2010 NPR notes
that "enhancing regional security architectures is a key part of U.S. strategy for
strengthening regional deterrence.” Moreover, “these regional security architectures
include effective missile defense, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional power-
projection, and integrated command and control—all underwritten by strong political
commitments.”10 Thus, the nuclear umbrella sends an important political signal of
support that reinforces the overall credibility of the alliance. Despite questions of
credibility, given the overwhelming power of nuclear weapons, an uncertain
umbrella retains value as a deterrent. As Robert Jervis notes, “the argument that
the American threat to use nuclear weapons is not very credible glosses over the point
that only a little credibility may be required.”11 As former British secretary of state
for defence Denis Healey remarked, regarding deterrence in Europe, “it takes only 5
percent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but 95 percent
credibility to reassure the Europeans.”12 Given the devastation and risks involved
with nuclear weapons, even small amounts of credibility may be useful to deter
adversaries. In addition, no one knows how a crisis that escalates to nuclear use
would play out, raising a host of unnerving possibilities that are likely to evoke
caution, even with leaders who are judged to be minimally rational. Washington
and Pyongyang have so little trust in each other that the nuclear umbrella, even with
its credibility questions, likely has an impact on the North Koreans because they can
never be certain the United States might not use nuclear weapons. No doubt, one of
the chief motivations behind the DPRK’s nuclear program is to counter any perceived
vulnerabilities Pyongyang believes it has in the face of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Thus, while allies may see a lack of credibility and reassurance, enemies will see it
differently. Adversaries conducting threat analyses tend to view security
challenges from a worst case perspective, and the possibility that the defender
might use nuclear weapons makes credibility stronger in their eyes. Do nonnuclear
states recognize the existence of the norms that constrain nuclear-armed states and
discount the chance of nuclear use in a crisis? Phrased another way, have leaders like
Kim Jong-un read Tannenwald and Paul and come to believe the United States will
never use nuclear weapons? In a study on the impact of nuclear weapons on decision
makers in nonnuclear states, Paul Avey found that when involved in confrontations
with nuclear-armed adversaries, “non-nuclear state leaders took their opponents’
nuclear arsenals very seriously and sought to reduce the risks of nuclear war.”13
Thus, despite low levels of credibility, there is evidence that nuclear deterrence
may still be effective. These credibility questions are also tied to the Obama
administration’s reluctance to provide a “no first use” guarantee and its willingness to
go only so far as a negative security assurance. There is merit in providing a “no first
use” guarantee, particularly in regard to China. While these guarantees are suspect,
they can contribute to overall strategic stability, particularly in a crisis. However, in
the case of North Korea, Pyongyang is unlikely to believe it regardless. Even if the
United States rescinded the nuclear umbrella in a formal declaration, North Korea and
other adversaries could never be certain whether Washington would use nuclear
weapons. As long as the United States possesses a nuclear arsenal, the DPRK will
likely have little trust in a U.S. commitment not to use nuclear weapons first or a
declaration that removes the nuclear umbrella from Japan and South Korea.14 U.S.
skeptics place little faith in the “no first use” statements of North Korea and China,
and the reverse would also likely be the case. Given widespread doubts about the
credibility of the nuclear umbrella, why do U.S. allies continue to call for this
commitment? Surely, officials and analysts in Japan and South Korea have read the
same literature that raises these credibility questions? Despite the long-standing
credibility questions, Japan and South Korea continue to place a high value on the
U.S. nuclear umbrella as a sign of the U.S. security commitment to defend them
and an important statement of reassurance. The credibility of the nuclear
umbrella is tied to the overall credibility of the individual alliance. Again, Healey
maintained, “Europe’s concern with the credibility of American deterrence is a
function of its general confidence in the wisdom and consistency of American
leadership rather than changes in the relative military power of the United States
and the Soviet Union.”15 A strong alliance buttresses the nuclear umbrella, and
vice versa. Thus, the political aspects of the nuclear umbrella are as important as the
security dimensions. Moreover, though Japan and South Korea have separate bilateral
alliances with the United States, their security has always been linked; both Tokyo
and Seoul watch closely their counterpart’s alliance with the United States and the
impact it may have on their own security. The U.S. nuclear umbrella helps Japanese
and South Korean leaders demonstrate that they are doing something to respond
to rising threat levels and helps them avoid contentious domestic debates over
acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Though the credibility questions linger and
resurface periodically, the symbolic and political value of the nuclear umbrella,
accompanied by an assessment that the credibility of the U.S. commitment is
sufficient, motivates leaders in Japan and South Korea to continue their calls for
reasserting the nuclear umbrella and to rely on the commitment for their security.
NONPROLIFERATION GOALS The U.S. nuclear umbrella plays an important security
role for Japan, South Korea, and other U.S. allies, but it has an equally important
function for U.S. efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whenever
nuclear threats have arisen in Asia, the United States has been quick to reassert that
its allies are under the nuclear umbrella while continuing to provide regular
pronouncements of this commitment in a variety of venues, both formal and informal.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states squarely that strong security ties with U.S.
allies “can also serve our non-proliferation goals ... by reassuring non-nuclear allies
and partners that their security interests can be protected without their own nuclear
capabilities.”16 Calls have been particularly strong in South Korea for the acquisition
of nuclear weapons, with surveys indicating as much as 60 percent support after North
Korea’s 2013 nuclear test. The ROK government has been steadfast in maintaining its
nonnuclear status, but the issue will resurface, particularly when North Korea
succeeds in disrupting the security environment again, as it certainly will. Though
Japanese leaders have long considered the nuclear option privately, public sentiment
continues to be far more restrained than in South Korea. Japanese politicians are a bit
freer to raise the subject now than in the past, but while Japan will continue to keep
the option open by maintaining a civilian nuclear energy program, it will refrain for
the time being from developing nuclear weapons. Thus, in the wake of the March 2011
tsunami and the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, former
Japanese defense minister Ishiba Shigeru remarked, “I don’t think Japan needs to
possess nuclear weapons, but it’s important to maintain our commercial reactors
because it would allow us to produce a nuclear warhead in a short amount of time.
It’s a tacit nuclear deterrent.”17 To the surprise of many, the nonproliferation issued
surfaced in the 2016 U.S. presidential primary season. Republican nominee Donald
Trump stated in a New York Times interview,18 and later in a CNN-sponsored town
hall meeting,19 that he believed nuclear proliferation was inevitable and suggested it
would not be such a bad idea if Japan and South Korea, among others, acquired their
own nuclear weapons. These views were accompanied by assertions that Japan and
South Korea were not contributing sufficientiy to support the alliance and U.S. troops
in their respective countries. Should they balk at increasing their contributions,
Trump suggested, the United States could withdraw its forces, and possessing their
own nuclear weapons could fill the gap left by the departure of the U.S. military. Ben
Rhodes, deputy national security adviser, responded emphatically: The entire
premise of American foreign policy as it relates to nuclear weapons for the last 70
years is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states.
That’s the position ... of everybody who has occupied the Oval Office. It would be
catastrophic were the United States to shift its position and indicate that we
support somehow the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries.20
Despite the headlines generated by Trump’s campaign comments, U.S.
nonproliferation policy and the role of the nuclear umbrella in that policy are likely to
remain the same. So long as Tokyo and Seoul view the nuclear umbrella as
sufficiently reliable, they are unlikely to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Yet
herein lies the conundrum of the nuclear umbrella. Extended nuclear deterrence is a
central part of alliance relations that helps reassure allies of the U.S. defense
commitment. The nuclear umbrella bolsters allied confidence, and as a result, they
do not seek their own nuclear weapons. Yet despite these dynamics, serious questions
remain regarding the credibility of the nuclear commitment. The U.S. alliances with
Japan and South Korea are strong, and there is little doubt the United States would
defend these two allies if attacked, but it is unlikely to do so with nuclear weapons,
regardless of the circumstances. In the final analysis, there will always be credibility
questions regarding extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella. But despite these
concerns, the nuclear umbrella will be “good enough” when it is part of a strong,
credible alliance. Moreover, from an adversary’s perspective, even if U.S. credibility
is low, it will never be zero, providing a tangible degree of deterrence that will
make challengers hesitate. So long as both allies retain confidence in the overall
U.S. defense commitment and the costs of going nuclear are sufficiently high, Japan
and South Korea will continue their nonnuclear status.
Alliance collapse causes great power war and risks extinction.
Beauchamp 18 (Beauchamp, Zack. "How Trump is killing America’s alliances." Vox, 6-
12-2018, https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17448866/trump-south-korea-
alliance-trudeau-g7. Zack Beauchamp is a senior correspondent at Vox, where he
covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on foreign
policy and international relations. His work focuses on the rise of the populist right
across the West, the role of identity in American politics, and how fringe ideologies
shape the mainstream. Before coming to Vox, he edited TP Ideas, a section of Think
Progress devoted to the ideas shaping our political world. He has an MSc from the
London School of Economics in International Relations.)
There has never, in human history, been an era as peaceful as our own. This is a hard
truth to appreciate, given the horrible violence ongoing in places like Syria, Yemen,
and Myanmar, yet the evidence is quite clear. Take a look at this chart from the
University of Oxford’s Max Roser. It tracks the number of years in a given time period
in which “great powers” — meaning the militarily and economically powerful
countries at that time — were at war with each other over the course of the past 500
years. The decline is unmistakable: Max Roser/Our World In Data This data should give
you some appreciation for how unique, and potentially precarious, our historical
moment is. For more than 200 years, from 1500 to about 1750, major European
powers like Britain and France and Spain were warring constantly. The frequency of
conflict declined in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the wars that did break out —
the Napoleonic conflicts, both world wars — were particularly devastating. The past
70 years without great power war, a period scholars term “the Long Peace,” is one of
history’s most wonderful anomalies. The question then becomes: Why did it happen?
And could Trump mucking around with a pillar of the global order, American alliances,
put it in jeopardy? The answer to the second question, ominously, appears to be yes.
There is significant evidence that strong American alliances — most notably the
NATO alliance and US agreements to defend Japan and South Korea — have been
instrumental in putting an end to great power war. “As this alliance system
spreads and expands, it correlates with this dramatic decline, this unprecedented
drop, in warfare,” says Michael Beckley, a professor of international relations at
Tufts University. “It’s a really, really strong correlation.” A 2010 study by Rice’s Leeds
and the University of Kentucky’s Jesse C. Johnson surveyed a large data set on
alliances between 1816 and 2000. They found that countries in defensive alliances
were 20 percent less likely to be involved in a conflict , on average, than countries
that weren’t. This holds true even after you control for other factors that would
affect the likelihood of war, like whether a country is a democracy or whether it has
an ongoing dispute with a powerful neighbor. In a follow-up paper, Leeds and Johnson
looked at the same data set to see whether certain kinds of alliances were more
effective at protecting its members than others. Their conclusion is that alliances
deter war best when their members are militarily powerful and when enemies
take seriously the allies’ promise to fight together in the event of an attack. The
core US alliances — NATO, Japan, and South Korea — fit these descriptors neatly. A
third study finds evidence that alliances allow allies to restrain each other from
going to war. Let’s say Canada wants to get involved in a conflict somewhere.
Typically, it would discuss its plans with the United States first — and if America
thinks it’s a bad idea, Canada might well listen to them. There’s strong statistical
evidence that countries don’t even try to start some conflicts out of fear that an ally
would disapprove. These three findings all suggest that NATO and America’s East
Asian alliances very likely are playing a major role in preserving the Long Peace —
which is why Trump’s habit of messing around with alliances is so dangerous. US
Troops Participate In Estonia Exercises Estonian and US troops participate in a joint
NATO military exercise in March 2017. Sean Gallup/Getty Images According to many
Russia experts, Vladimir Putin’s deepest geostrategic goal is “breaking” NATO. The
member states where anyone would expect him to test NATO’s commitment would be
the Baltics — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — small former Soviet republics that
recently became NATO members. We can’t predict if and when a rival like Putin
would conclude that America’s alliances seemed weak enough to try testing them.
Hopefully, it never happens. But the more Trump attacks the foundations of
America’s allies, the more likely things are to change. The absolute risk of a Russian
invasion of a NATO state or a North Korean attack on the South is relatively low,
but the consequences are so potentially catastrophic — nuclear war! — that it’s
worth taking anything that increases the odds of such a conflict seriously. The
crack-up of the West? The world order is a little like a game of Jenga. In the game,
there are lots of small blocks that interlock to form a stable tower. Each player has to
remove a block without toppling the tower. But each time you take out a block, the
whole thing gets a bit less stable. Take out enough blocks and it will collapse. The
international order works in kind of the same way. There are lots of different
interlocking parts — the spread of democracy, American alliances, nuclear
deterrence, and the like — that work together to keep the global peace. But take out
one block and the other ones might not be strong enough to keep things together on
their own. At the end of the Cold War, British and French leaders worried that the
passing of the old order might prove destabilizing. In a January 1990 meeting, French
President François Mitterrand told British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he
feared a united Germany could seize control of even more territory than Hitler. Some
experts feared that in the absence of the external Soviet threat, Western
European powers might go back to waging war with each other. Thankfully, those
predictions turned out to be wrong. There are multiple reasons for that, but one
big one — one that also helped keep relations between other historical enemies,
like South Korea and Japan, peaceful — is a shared participation in US alliance
networks. The US serves as the ultimate security blanket, preventing these
countries from having to build up their own armaments and thus risk a replay of
World War I. But if American alliance commitments become and remain less
credible, it’s possible this order could crack up. America’s partners aren’t stupid.
They understand that Trump is the product of deep forces in American politics, and
that his victory might not be a one-off. If they think that this won’t be the last
“America First” president in modern history, depending on America the way that they
have in the past could quickly become a nightmare. The worst-case scenarios for a
collapse in the US alliance system are terrible. Imagine full Japanese and German
rearmament, alongside rapid-fire proliferation of nuclear weapons. Imagine a
crack-up of NATO, with European powers at loggerheads while Russia gobbles up
the Baltic states and the rest of Ukraine. Imagine South Korea’s historical tensions
with Japan reigniting, and a war between those two countries or any combination
of them and China. All of this seems impossible to imagine now, almost absurd. And
indeed, in the short run, it is. There is no risk — zero — of American allies turning on
each other in the foreseeable future. And it’s possible that the next president after
Trump could reassure American allies that nothing like this could ever happen again.
But the truth is that there’s just no way to know. When a fundamental force for world
peace starts to weaken, no one can really be sure how well the system will hold up.
Nothing like this — the leader of the world’s hegemon rounding on its most important
allies — has ever happened before. What Donald Trump’s presidency has done, in
effect, is start up another geopolitical Jenga game. Slowly but surely, he’s removing
the blocks that undergird global security. It’s possible the global order survives Trump
— but it’s just too early for us to say for sure. Given the stakes, it’s a game we’d
rather not play.
 C2:Detternce
Nuclear weapons deter Russia and China from carrying out
major attacks on the US. Because adversaries don't want to
risk Armageddon, nuclear weapons ensure crisis stability.
Huessy, Peter. "The Case For A 21st Century Deterrent." Gatestone Institute. March
22, 2016. Web. December 09, 2019. <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7628/modern-
nuclear- deterrent>.

The weapons or military assets of one's adversaries -- the weapons one would need to
hold at risk or target -- are precisely the instruments of state power on which these
enemies rely for their status as global or regional powers and prestige. Holding such
assets at risk gives the U.S. president the ultimate "stick" with which to threaten to take
away the adversary's power: his military assets. Today, non-state terrorist organizations
also have such assets, as seen from fighting ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hamas Hezbollah, the
FMLN and FARC. Thus, holding at risk, or being able to destroy a significant number of,
say, Russian submarines, missile silos, bomber bases, and other instruments of military
power, thereby leaving Russia unable to act as a major power, is not an attempt to "go
first" in a crisis or "get the jump" on one's enemies. Instead, it merely places at risk all
the instruments of state power -- consisting of hundreds of militarily critical targets --
upon which, for instance, a Russian or Chinese head of state relies for world power
status. This plan requires a nuclear deterrent capable of striking back at an enemy with
sufficient surviving nuclear warheads, even after absorbing an enemy's initial strike
against one's own military assets. A deterrent strategy such as the U.S. has
today leaves nuclear-armed adversaries with only one sound choice
in a crisis. Either they risk "Armageddon" and use all their nuclear weapons early in a
crisis, to avoid seeing any of their military assets destroyed by the U.S. in a subsequent
retaliatory strike; or they stand down, not launching their nuclear weaponry, and instead
seek to end any crisis through diplomatically. This is the essence of deterrence. It is one
that the late American diplomat Paul Nitze described as the "Not Today, Comrade"
option.[10] Today it would be, "Not Today, Jihadi." Such a deterrent strategy, as
advocated here and reflected in America's current nuclear modernization plans, stands
the test of logic. If an adversary used all its nuclear forces against the U.S. in a first
strike, such an attack would invite a massive retaliatory strike from the U.S. that would
leave an attacker completely destroyed. But that, of course, requires a survivable U.S.
deterrent force to begin with; not one subject to being eliminated by an enemy's first
strike because the U.S. deterrent was so small that it was no deterrent at all. According
to the Obama administration, to guarantee maximum flexibility in a crisis so that a
president can be confident he has a survivable deterrent, a robust deployment of 1550
warheads is required, on a mixture of 12 submarines, 400 ICBMs and 40-60 bombers.
Fortunately, this is the number the U.S. can field under the 2010 New Start Treaty with
Russia. Having a nuclear deterrent strategically dispersed among over 500 nuclear
assets -- submarines, land-based missiles, and bombers -- means that any enemy
attempt to destroy the U.S. nuclear arsenal before the U.S. could use it, would require
an unambiguous attack. If an

Nuclear weapons may not have coercive effects, but they're

still an effective deterrent
Petrucelli, Joe. "Book Review, Nuclear Weapons And Coercive Diplomacy By Todd S.
Sechser And Matthew Fuhrmann." Strategic Studies Quarterly 11:3. October, 2017.
Web. December 10, 2019. <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Book-
Reviews/Display/Article/1285489/nuclear-weapons-and-coercive-diplomacy/>.

In their timely analysis of nuclear coercion theory, Sechser and Fuhrmann convincingly
argue that in today’s world nuclear states do not possess more coercive power than
other nonnuclear states. The lessons they identify in their study of nuclear coercion
have important implications, not just for nonproliferation efforts but also for deterrence
theorists, particularly in the analysis of nuclear signaling challenges. Importantly, lest
any nuclear critics try to use their work as evidence for disarmament, they point out that
many of the challenges with coercion are not an issue for deterrence and “it would be a
mistake to assume that nuclear weapons are irrelevant just because they do not have
coercive effects.”

Nuclear deterrence is a legitimate means of self-defense and

conflict prevention. States have an obligation to protect their
citizens.
Tertrais, Bruno. "In Defense Of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality, And Cost-
Effectiveness Of Nuclear Weapons." Security Studies Center. October, 2011. Web.
December 10, 2019.
<https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/48/009/48009684.pdf>.

By contrast, deterrence, which aims at preventing major State aggression, can be

considered as one of the most ethical conflict prevention devices. At the very least, it
can claim the moral high ground. In the name of what should it be considered immoral
to prevent the materialization, for instance, of a major biological threat – the effects of
which on populations could be as extreme and indiscriminate as a massive nuclear one
– by the promise of retaliation? Deterrence and International Law That said, is nuclear
deterrence in conformity with international law? The practice of States has made it part
of customary law: for several decades, most great powers have assured their security –
and that of their allies – through nuclear weapons.45 Nuclear Weapons, Self-Defense
and Belligerent Reprisals But what about use? Even though deterrence is about the
threat and not the actual employment of nuclear weapons, the legal characterization of
such use is not without consequence on the credibility and the political sustainability of
nuclear deterrence in Western societies based on the rule of law. Self-defense is part of
natural law. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter only recognizes this principle. It
specifies that nothing in the Charter should impair this inherent right. Traditional criteria
for self-defense include necessity and proportionality. The necessity condition – If faced
with a major aggression – whatever the means employed by the adversary – the
defending party might have no option other than to employ nuclear weapons to
stop it, especially if he is the weaker party from a military standpoint. The necessity
condition can thus be fulfilled. If its survival was at stake, international law should not
prevent a State from defending itself with nuclear weapons: this is what an ICJ judge
has called the “absolute defense” [excuse absolutoire].46 The “Responsibility to Protect”
(the principle according to which any UN member has the responsibility to protect its
own population) could be used to support the concept of nuclear deterrence.47

Nuclear deterrence has been one-hundred-percent

successful since 1945.
Chilton, Kevin. "On US Nuclear Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly. November,
2017. Web. December 12, 2019.

<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-

4/Chilton.pdf>.

Historical evidence and reason lead me to believe that the US nuclear deterrent has
successfully accomplished its purpose since 1945. In fact, nuclear weapons are the one
set of military systems that have been 100 percent successful in their assigned mission.
They have deterred attack on the United States and its allies, assured our allies, and,
though not specifically called out in US policy, deterred major nuclear powers from
engaging in global conventional warfare on the scale we witnessed in the first half of the
last century. However, there is no evidence that our self imposed policies and
constraints have constrained any other nuclear armed or nuclear-aspiring power.
Simple prudence now demands that we take steps necessary to ensure the continued
health of our current nuclear deterrent. We must recapitalize all elements of the triad
and make the appropriate investments in the Department of Energy infrastructure and
human capital to ensure that presidents in 10, 20, 30, 40 years and beyond have the
necessary tools at hand to effectively deter against all existential threats.

Cyber attacks are just as, if not more, dangerous than

nuclear attacks- -they are even harder to detect and track.
Straub, Jeremy. "A Major Cyber Attack Could Be Just As Deadly As Nuclear Weapons,
Says Scientist." ScienceAlert. August 18, 2019. Web. December 13, 2019.
<https://www.sciencealert.com/a-major-cyber-attack-could-be-just-as-damaging-as-a-
nuclear-weapon>.
People around the world may be worried about nuclear tensions rising, but I think
they're missing the fact that a major cyberattack could be just as damaging – and
hackers are already laying the groundwork. With the US and Russia pulling out of a key
nuclear weapons pact – and beginning to develop new nuclear weapons – plus Iran
tensions and North Korea again test- launching missiles, the global threat to civilization
is high. Some fear a new nuclear arms race. That threat is serious – but another could
be as serious, and is less visible to the public. So far, most of the well-known hacking
incidents, even those with foreign government backing, have done little more than steal
data. Unfortunately, there are signs that hackers have placed malicious software inside
US power and water systems, where it's lying in wait, ready to be triggered. The US
military has also reportedly penetrated the computers that control Russian electrical
systems.including mass injury and death rivaling the death toll of a nuclear

Nuclear weapon possession has inherent safeguards--the

alternative is uninhibited cyber warfare.
Straub, Jeremy. "A Major Cyber Attack Could Be Just As Deadly As Nuclear Weapons,
Says Scientist." ScienceAlert. August 18, 2019. Web. December 13, 2019.
<https://www.sciencealert.com/a-major-cyber-attack-could-be-just-as-damaging-as-a-
nuclear-weapon>.

Mutual assured destruction My concern is not intended to downplay the

devastating and immediate effects of a nuclear attack. Rather, it's to point out that
some of the international protections against nuclear conflicts don't exist for
cyberattacks. For instance, the idea of "mutual assured destruction" suggests
that no country should launch a nuclear weapon at another nuclear-armed nation:
The launch would likely be detected, and the target nation would launch its own
weapons in response, destroying both nations. Cyber Attackers have fewer inhibitions.
For one thing, it's much easier to disguise the source of a digital incursion than it is to
hide where a missile blasted off from. Further, cyberwarfare can start small, targeting
even a single phone or laptop. Larger attacks might target businesses, such as banks or
hotels, or a government agency. But those aren't enough to escalate a conflict to the
nuclear scale

C3:Weapons of Mass Destruction

Nuclear weapons deter biological and chemical attacks, as

well as terrorist actions by a State.
Tertrais, Bruno. "In Defense Of Deterrence: The Relevance, Morality, And Cost-
Effectiveness Of Nuclear Weapons." Security Studies Center. October, 2011. Web.
December 10, 2019.
<https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/48/009/48009684.pdf>.

Regarding the chemical or biological threat that may be posed by regional powers,
the experience of the First Gulf War (cf. supra.) seems to validate the idea that nuclear
deterrence can play a useful role.100 Several countries, including France, the United
States and India, explicitly consider that a biological attack, in particular, would entail
the risk of nuclear retaliation. (Michael O’Hanlon has a point when he claims that
such a response “might possibly be done in a more humane way than the biological
attack” 101 Nuclear weapons also play a residual role to prevent a State from
using terrorist means to attack vital interests (such as, precisely, an act of nuclear
terrorism). Such a role has been publicly stated by the United States, France and the
United Kingdom.

Substitution occurs without nuclear weapons--nuclear

weapons deter states from pursuing biological or chemical
weapons.
Horowitz, Michael C. "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring The Relationship Between
“Weapons Of Mass Destruction.” Stanford Center for International Security and
Cooperation. November 13, 2013. Web. December 13, 2019. <https://fsi-live.s3.us-
west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Journal_of_Conflict_Resolution-2013-Horowitz-
0022002713509049.pdf>.

Critically, we also find some evidence of substitution in the relationship between

chemical and nuclear weapons, as the actual possession of nuclear weapons and
biological weapons are both negatively associated with initiating chemical weapons
pursuit in models 3 and 4. Once states finally acquire a nuclear or biological weapon,
the risk that they will start to pursue a chemical weapon at any given moment in the
data drops to virtually zero. This negative relationship between nuclear weapons
acquisition and chemical weapons is demonstrated by several nuclear-capable states
that have signed the CWC and eliminated their chemical weapons arsenals, including
Great Britain, France, India, and the United States. Even Russia is beginning to come
into compliance with its CWC obligations by eliminating its chemical weapons arsenal, a
task aided by American funding beginning in 1997 with the Nunn–Lugar Act. More
generally, these results are consistent with the notion that chemical weapons behave as
a ‘‘poor man’s atomic bomb,’’ since nuclear weapons appear to systematically satisfy
demand for chemical weapons almost entirely. Also, this relationship has become
stronger in recent decades. Early in the cold war, many states possessed both chemical
weapons and nuclear weapons—now, most states appear to have decided that nuclear
weapons are enough. This could be due to changing norms of acceptability concerning
chemical weapons or further evidence concerning the battlefield utility—or lack thereof
—of chemical weapons. What may be particularly surprising, however, is that chemical
weapons appear to behave as a poor man’s biological weapon as well. Regardless of
model specification, possessing a biological weapon reduces the risk of chemical
weapons pursuit to virtually zero. This finding in particular is surprising and deserves
further investigation.

absence of nuclear weapons is the most significant factor in

whether or not states pursue other forms of weapons of
mass destruction.
Horowitz, Michael C. "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring The Relationship Between
“Weapons Of Mass Destruction.” Stanford Center for International Security and
Cooperation. November 13, 2013. Web. December 13, 2019. <https://fsi-live.s3.us-
west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Journal_of_Conflict_Resolution-2013-Horowitz-
0022002713509049.pdf>.

Elliott Negin
The United States hasn’t built a new nuclear warhead or bomb since
the 1990s

Nuclear weapons can only viable substitute for chemical and

bioweapons--never the other way around.
Horowitz, Michael C. "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring The Relationship Between
“Weapons Of Mass Destruction.” Stanford Center for International Security and
Cooperation. November 13, 2013. Web. December 13, 2019. <https://fsi-live.s3.us-
west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Journal_of_Conflict_Resolution-2013-Horowitz-
0022002713509049.pdf>.

These results are also interesting when combined with the nuclear results because they
demonstrate that the substitution only goes one way. The fact that acquiring chemical or
biological weapons does not decrease the risk of nuclear pursuit, but acquiring
nuclear weapons decreases the risk of chemical and biological pursuit suggests
that nuclear weapons appear to substitute for biological weapons, but CBWs do
not substitute for nuclear weapons.

Chemical and bioweapons are worse than nuclear weapons--

cause extinction.
Ochs, Richard. "Biological Weapons Must Be Abolished Immediately." Free From
Terror. June 09, 2002. Web. December 13, 2019.
<http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>.

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological

weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the
continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in
comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories.
While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could
also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future
generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can
get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There
is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny
amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to
horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in
comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical
weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright,
their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or
more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future
generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a
localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons,
the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years
and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-
engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater
calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are
just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can
we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW
POSSIBLE.The effects of chemical weapons on humans can be not only
extensive but quite hazardous. Therefore, having preparations in place to protect
yourself from such hazardous health effects is vital. The FAST-ACT Chemical
Decontamination Kit provides ultimate protection from both surfaces and vapors
chemical threats. FAST-ACT utilizes a proprietary technology that is highly
reactive against a broad spectrum of chemicals including chemical warfare
agents. The quick and easily deployed chemical decontamination products
ensure that you are ready for every and all chemical threats in your environment.

Contention 4: US imperialism
The aff is an imperialist move meant to deny smaller countries the
capability to defend themselves through nuclear weapons.
Shellenberger 19
[Shellenberger, Michael. “Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons They Need For Self-Defense?” Forbes. Accessed July 5, 2019.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/06/who-are-we-to-deny-weak-nations-the-nuclear-weapons-they-need-for-self-defense/./ghs-az]

Nuclear Bombs As Weapons of the Weak How does a weak nation-state like France level the playing field with a
By obtaining a weapon capable of wiping out its
more powerful adversary like Germany?
major cities. Twice victimized and humiliated by its neighbor, France after World
War II set off to build a nuclear bomb that, had it been available before 1940,
would have deterred the German invasion. Can anyone blame France for getting
the bomb? Of course not. After all, Germany’s war upon its neighbors resulted in the deaths of 50 million
people. But that didn’t stop the U.S. government from trying to prevent France from building a nuclear weapon. Senior Kennedy administration officials in 1962
How could the U.S. deny France the means
described France’s nuclear program as “foolish, or diabolical — or both.”

with which to defend herself? By promising to protect France with its own
nuclear weapons through what is called “extended deterrence.” French President Charles
de Gaulle didn’t buy it. He felt that “the United States would not risk New York or Detroit to save Hamburg or
Lyons,” noted the New York Times, “if faced with a choice between the destruction of Western Europe and a Soviet-
American missile exchange.” A nuclear-armed France, U.S. officials warned, “could lead to a proliferation of nuclear
powers,” reported Ronald Steel in Commentary, “that is, to demands by other allies, especially Germany, for nuclear status.” The identical argument
was later made against China, India and Pakistan, and is now being made against allowing North Korea and Iran to
possess nuclear weapons. The widespread assumption is that the more nations have nuclear weapons, the more
dangerous the world will be. But is that really the case? I don’t ask this question lightly. I come from a long line of Christian pacifists and
conscientious objectors and earned a degree in peace studies from a Quaker college. I have had nightmares about nuclear war since I was a boy and today live in
No
California, which is more vulnerable to a North Korean missile than Washington, D.C. — at least for now. But it is impossible not to be struck by these facts:
nation with a nuclear weapon has ever been invaded by another nation. The number of deaths in battle worldwide
has declined 95 percent in the 70 years since the invention and spread of nuclear weapons; The number of Indian
and Pakistani civilian and security forces’ deaths in two disputed territories declined 90 percent after Pakistan’s
first nuclear weapons test in 1998. In 1981, the late political scientist Kenneth Waltz published an essay titled, “The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: More May Be Better.” In it he argued that nuclear weapons are revolutionary in allowing weaker nations to protect
themselves from more powerful ones. International relations is “a realm of anarchy as opposed to hierarchy… of
self-help… you’re on your own,” Waltz explained. How do nuclear weapons work? Not “through the ability to defend but
through the ability to punish...The message of a deterrent strategy is this ,” explained Waltz. “‘Although we are
defenceless, if you attack we will punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains.’” Does anybody
believe France should give up its nuclear weapons? Certainly not the French. After President Barack Obama in
2009 called for eliminating nuclear weapons, not a single other nuclear nation endorsed the idea.

Eliminating nuclear arsenals cements US military dominance through

conventional power which guarantees military invasions and continued
warmaking abroad.
Michael Shellenberger [I am a Time Magazine “Hero of the Environment,” Green Book Award Winner, and President of Environmental Progress, a research
and policy organization. My writings have appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, Scientific American, Nature Energy, and
PLOS Biology. My TED talks have been viewed over 1.5 million times.], Aug 6, 2018, “Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons They Need For
Self-Defense?”, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/06/who-are-we-to-deny-weak-nations-the-nuclear-weapons-they-need-for-self-
defense/#76e65b58522f ghs//hz

The end of extended deterrence provided by the U.S. to Europe should not come as a surprise. Its temporary nature was foreseen as early as 1962, when André
Fontaine wrote in Le Monde: “It is inconceivable, unless we are resigned to an interminable cold war, that Europe forever relies on America for its security and for
the orientation of its diplomacy.” As to be expected, the usual fears are being drummed up against why a militarily-weak nation like Germany shouldn’t get the
bomb. “If Germany was to relinquish its status as a non-nuclear power, what would prevent Turkey or Poland, for example, from following suit?” a former German
In
ambassador to the U.S., wrote in response to Hacke’s essay. “Germany as the gravedigger of the international nonproliferation regime? Who can want that?”
truth, it’s remarkable the nonproliferation regime has lasted as long as it has. It made sense for nuclear-armed
nations in the 1950s and 60s to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. After all, nations weren’t accustomed
to the revolutionary new technology, and the likelihood was far higher back then that a weapon could get used
accidentally or fall into the wrong hands. But 60 years later, in a multipolar world where the dominant power, the
U.S., has grown tired of its role as global hegemon, the non-proliferation regime is falling apart under the weight of
its own contradictions. The division of the world into nuclear-armed and unarmed nations has long been arbitrary
and unfair. Nuclear-armed nations, except for France, hypocritically punished India for decades with trade
sanctions for acquiring a weapon. People rightly worry about accidental or unauthorized use of weapons, such as
by terrorists, but nations today safeguard their weapons and materials far better than they did in the past . After the
fall of the Soviet Union, the United States spent $10 billion to help Russia maintain control of and destroy many of
its nuclear weapons, and intelligence agencies around the world work together to prevent nuclear materials from
falling into the hands of non-state actors. As for terrorism, why would a nation like Iran go to all the trouble of getting a bomb only to give it to a
non-state actor like Hamas or Hezbollah? Not only would doing so risk retaliation from Israel, but the bomb could be used by those groups to gain leverage over
Iran itself. Today, the greatest opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons to weak nations like North Korea and Iran comes from militaristic figures like U.S.
national security advisor John Bolton, who advocated the disastrous invasion of Iraq, and who now advocates “the Libya model” for North Korea. It’s easy to
U.S. nuclear weapons designer explained,
see why. “In a world without nuclear weapons,” a
“the U.S. would have uncontested military dominance.” In other words, a world
without nuclear weapons would be a world where relatively weak nations — like
France and Britain before World War II and North Korea and Iran today — are
deprived the only power on Earth capable of preventing a military invasion by a
more powerful adversary. Who are we to deny weak nations the nuclear weapons
they need for self-defense? The answer should by now be clear: hypocritical, short-sighted, and imperialistic.
The total number of chemical weapons casualties during the First World War was
1.3 million.

Due to a shift in the status quo more countries will use chemical
warfare as they will feel vulnerable and powerless.

Despite this The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), or the
Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty, is the first legally binding international agreement to
comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons, with the goal of leading towards their
total elimination. It was passed on 7 We still have nukes so in turn for chem
weapons. Proves aff has no solvency.

Scope: passing the aff would affect every single person.

Time frame: According to Pacus 19 we can become extinct by 2050

from global climate issues alone. If we pass the aff that timeline could
be sped up an unimaginable amount, 20 years from today.

Reversibility:You can not reverse the cruel punishment of chemical

and biological weapons, war, and chaos, and exponential harms.

Magnitude:The aff causes more suffering even though it attempts to

solve it because it stops the use of nuclear deterrence and makes way
for chemical weapons which are far more deadly and escalate the risk
of war. This would have a much more painful war and a highly
probable extinction.

Because of the damage evident from passing the affirmative world I

urge you to vote neg.
 Blocks

CX

If you are going in for a surgery for a deadly disease and your doctor
says you have 2 options, 1 where you have a 90 percent chance of
survival but you will proabaly loose your hair or a 60 percent surival
but if you survial youll keep your hair which one will you take?

How does the aff prove that no one ever for the rest of human
existance ever make nuclear wepaons again?

How will the aff make sure that countries don't have
these things because now we know because of non
proliferation treaty that countries inform about nuke
weapons, if they do it secretly it becomes mro
dangerous.

Deterrence Doesn't Work

Limited uses of nuclear deterrence are just---a maxim permitting low-yield nukes against military
targets can be
universalized. Threatening massive loss of life is impermissible, and the negative can agree on
that point. .......68

If nuclear deterrence is limited to military targets, the problem of wrongful intentions does not
apply..............73
Nuclear deterrence is far less bad than actually using nukes, and this is because consequences
should matter to
some
extent...............................................................................................................................................
.............74
Nuclear deterrence will save millions of lives. States have a duty to pursue
it......................................................75
Nuclear deterrence doesn't amount to genuine hostage-
holding. ........................................................................76
Nuclear deterrence means that civilians are being exposed to less
harm. ............................................................77
Nuclear deterrence prevents great power wars, both conventional and nuclear. The impact is millions of
deaths. ...........................................................................................................................................................
.................

Impossible for the aff to solve first card

Nuclear War:

Tepperman 10 (Jonathan; 3/13/10; “How Nuclear Weapons Can Keep You Safe”

; http://www.newsweek.com/how-nuclear-weapons-can-keep-you-safe-78907)

The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple

observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never
been a nuclear, or even a non nuclear, war between two states that possess[Nuclear
weapon] them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it
is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century . As Kenneth Waltz, the leading
"nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of

experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there

has not been any war among nuclear states."

To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing

that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but
they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight
only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars
they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and
underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price.

Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly,

when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button —and
everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that
war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you
can't win and might lose everything?"

Extinction:
Brian 15 Martin, Brian [Brian Martin is emeritus professor at the University of Wollongong, Australia.]. “Critique of
Nuclear Extinction.” Critique of Nuclear Extinction, 2015, www.bmartin.cc/pubs/82jpr.html.

The idea that global nuclear war could kill most or all of the world's population is
critically examined and found to have little or no scientific basis. A number of possible reasons
for beliefs about nuclear extinction [and the results]are presented, including exaggerat[ed] to justify
inaction, fear of death, exaggeration to stimulate action, the idea that planning is defeatist, exaggeration to justify
concern, white western orientation, the pattern of day-to-day life, and reformist political analysis. Some of the ways in
which these factors inhibit a full political analysis and practice by the peace movement are indicated. Prevalent ideas
about the irrationality and short duration of nuclear war and of the unlikelihood of limited nuclear war are also briefly
examined.

evidence suggests that a major global nuclear war, one involving the
The available
explosion of [all] of the nuclear bombs that exist, would kill only 400 to 450 million
people, mostly in the US, Europe and Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent China and Japan, through both
direct and indirect effects.

There are currently 7.53 billion people, the impact of nuclear war is no where near
extinction, and Aff failed to

Uranium Mining:
Eliminating nuclear arsenals will not stop uranium mining. Most of the
energy from uranium mines go to nuclear power, not weapons. Nuclear
power has huge benefits that far outweigh the impacts of uranium mining.

Rhodes 19 Rhodes, Richard. “Why Nuclear Power Must Be Part of the Energy Solution.” Yale E360, Yale School
of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 19 July 2019, e360.yale.edu/features/why-nuclear-power-must-be-part-of-the-
energy-solution-environmentalists-climate.

What are nuclear power’s benefits? First and foremost, since it produces energy via nuclear
fission rather than chemical burning, it generates baseload electricity with no output of carbon,
the villainous element of global warming. Switching from coal to natural gas is a step toward
decarbonizing, since burning natural gas produces about half the carbon dioxide of burning
coal. But switching from coal to nuclear power is radically decarbonizing, since nuclear power
plants release greenhouse gases only from the ancillary use of fossil fuels during their
construction, mining, fuel processing, maintenance, and decommissioning — about as much as
solar power does, which is about 4 to 5 percent as much as a natural gas-fired power plant.
Nuclear power releases less radiation into the environment than any other major energy source
Second, nuclear power plants operate at much higher capacity factors than renewable energy
sources or fossil fuels. Capacity factor is a measure of what percentage of the time a power
plant actually produces energy. It’s a problem for all intermittent energy sources. The sun
doesn’t always shine, nor the wind always blow, nor water always fall through the turbines of a
dam.

My opponent has to prove that elimination will stop mining. But even if it did, it would be
a bad thing, as it would cause more suffering. Nuclear power is the best option we have
for efficiency and the environment. Since climate change is one of the biggest risks of
human extinction, getting in the way of this power source would hurt more in the long
run.

Miscalculations:

NFU is key to maintaining deterrence and solving miscalc – elimination timeframe

is too long.
Ashley, 17 – is the Nuclear Security Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy
(YPFP). John received a Master of International Policy from the University of
Georgia, where he concentrated in CBRN nonproliferation and international
security [John Ashley, "No First-Use will be a Stronger Nuclear Deterrence", 9-7-
2017, HuffPost, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/no-first-use-will-be-a-
stronger-nuclear-deterrence_us_59b15a18e4b0c50640cd6529]
On the January 24, 2017, Senator Ed Markey (D-Mass) introduced the Restricting
First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017 (S. 200) to the Senate, which would
“prohibit the conduct of a first-use nuclear strike absent a declaration of war by
Congress” if passed into law. The idea of a first strike is nothing new; it is a relic
of the Cold War, when the world’s two competing superpowers were always on
the verge of nuclear annihilation. Despite emerging victorious in the Cold War, the
United States never relinqished its right to strike first with its nuclear arsenal. In
fact, of the nuclear-armed states, only China and India practice an official no first-
use doctrine. If S. 200 were passed into law and signed by President Trump, it
would constitute a major policy shift for the United States. But is it a good idea?
Well, it is not a terrible idea if it is done correctly. Adopting a no first-use
doctrine would go a long way in promoting global nonproliferation while not
necessarily endangering the United States, as many in the defense establishment
fear. However, while S. 200 lays the major groundwork for a US no first-use
doctrine, it must be paired with the enactment of a robust modernization program
in order for it to truly be credible. No First-Use in Practice With regard to nuclear
security, the United States’ principal state-level concerns today are North Korea
and Iran. The JCPOA, entered into force on January 16, 2016, has effectively
halted Iran’s nuclear ambitions. North Korea, however, plunged ahead with its
nuclear and ballistic missile programs, recently testing a missile that could
theoretically hit Los Angeles. In the face of such a threat, many in the United
States government feel that adopting a no first-use strategy would only embolden
Kim Jong-un. This thinking misses the point of the North Korean nuclear program.
Kim Jong-un is interested not in global domination, but in his regime’s survival.
The purpose of his nuclear arsenal is not to achieve “final victory” over South
Korea and the United States, but rather to prevent a conventional attack by the
aforementioned countries. Kim Jong-un knows that if he launched a nuclear strike
against the United States, North Korea would effectively become a nuclear
wasteland. But, if Kim Jong-un felt as if the United States were about to launch a
nuclear first strike, he would have nothing to lose by launching a strike of his own.
Adopting S. 200 would drastically reduce the chances of a miscalculation by
clearly defining the circumstances under which the United States would launch a
nuclear attack. The bill clearly outlines these circumstances as either after a
declaration of war or if a nuclear strike on the United States is imminent. In
practice, then, a no first-use doctrine has the effect of limiting nuclear
deterrence to deterring nuclear strikes, rather than conventional attacks. To
many, adopting such a policy would only embolden the United States’ rivals and
frighten its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. This need not be the case.
Section 3 of S. 200 states that, absent a declaration of war, a nuclear strike
cannot be launched “without the President determining that the enemy has first
launched a nuclear strike against the United States or an ally of the United
States.” This caveat allows the United States to adopt a no first-use policy while
still maintaining its extended deterrence obligations. Furthermore, the United
States’ rivals have already been behaving more aggressively in the face of US
power, particularly in Ukraine and the South China Sea. Adopting a no first-use
doctrine would not significantly change this status quo. Modernize, Modernize,
Modernize A no first-use doctrine is only as credible as the deterrent behind it. If
the promised retaliatory strike cannot be launched, then the doctrine falls apart.
In conjunction with adopting a no first-use doctrine as outlined in S. 200, the
United States must make a concerted effort to modernize the nuclear triad. The
defense establishment has been advocating for such an upgrade since at least the
hearing before the United States House Armed Services Committee on March 8,
2017. Furthermore, Russia and China, the nuclear rivals of the United States, have
already begun modernization programs. The idea of the no first-use doctrine is to
make the world safer from nuclear war. To do so, the threat of a retaliatory strike
must be 100 percent credible in order to eliminate any chance of a miscalculation.
There is no quick way to eliminate nuclear weapons from the Earth. It will likely
take several generations to reduce and decommission the thousands of warheads
stockpiled around the planet. In the meantime, nuclear armed states must do
what they can in order to prevent nuclear armageddon, and adopting a
predictable and reliable deterrence doctrine, while preserving the ability to inflict
mutually assured destruction, is the surest way the United States can do its part.
Adopting S. 200 with a commitment to arsenal modernization is the optimal way
for the United States to do its part to lessen the danger of nuclear annihilation.

History shows that miscalculations are unlikely

Sokolski 16 Sokolski, Henry [Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center] “Should We Let
the Bomb Spread?” Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College, November 2016,
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1021744.pdf.

Accidental or Inadvertent Detonation. A common concern has been that the weapons would somehow go off by
accident or miscalculation, devastating the planet in the process. In 1960, a top nuclear strategist declared it “most
unlikely” that the world could live with an uncontrolled arms race for decades. Moreover, in 1979, political scientist
Hans J. Morgenthau declared: The world is moving ineluctably towards a third world war—a strategic nuclear war. I
do not believe that anything can be done to prevent it. The international system is simply too unstable to survive for
long. In addition, Eric Schlosser remains deeply concerned about that danger today. In a 1982 New Yorker essay and
best-selling book, both titled The Fate of the Earth, Jonathan Schell passionately, if repetitively, argued the not
entirely novel proposition that nuclear war would be terrible, and he concluded ominously: One day—and it is hard to
believe that it will not be soon—we will make our choice. Either we will sink into the final coma and end it all or, as I
trust and 80 believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril . . . and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons.
As it happened, both options were avoided: Neither final coma nor nuclear cleansing ever took place. The
common alarmist prognostications assuming that, because the weapons exist, sooner or later
one or more of them will necessarily go off, has now failed to deliver for 70 years—this suggests
that something more than luck is operating.

Kant
Kaunt 97
According to Kant, one must ‘act as if the maxim of your action were
to become by your will a universal law of nature’. This Formula of
Universal Law is used to determine if a maxim could regulate our
conduct without contradiction or exception.
If I can prove a scenario in which possessing nuclear weapons would
be justifiable, it cannot be made into a maxim as it should not be a
universal law of nature.
Block economy:
It is good for nuclear weapons to be expensive, because it will control the amount
of weapons states can make. States have the option to reduce nuclear spending
if their budgets can’t handle it. A world with no nuclear weapons would be
dangerous, but price deterring countries from vertical proliferation would be a
good thing, as deterrence would remain intact with a reduced risk.
https://www.wired.com/2017/03/thank-goodness-nukes-expensive-complicated/

All the economy impact is under

Elliott Negin
The United States hasn’t built a new nuclear warhead or bomb since
the 1990s

Nuclear Testing:
GPS can be used to track illicit nuclear testing
Dan Nosowitz, 08.29.2011, GPS Data Could Help Track and Monitor Secret Nuclear Tests From Rogue Nations

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists may have found a new way to track secret nuclear tests
from those rogue nations (For example North Korea) who are trying to keep those tests
under wraps. Surprisingly enough, that new solution may be possible with analysis of regular old GPS
data, along with some clever mathematics. In May 2009, North Korea detonated a clandestine
nuclear test a kilometer underground. That's worrisome for obvious reasons, and more worrisome
because performing the test underground severely limits our ability to measure the size and specifics of
the blast--no radioactive gas or dust was let into the air, as it usually would. But that doesn't mean there
are no signs of radioactive explosions. When a nuclear blast that large goes off underground, it
sends a shockwave of disturbed air into the ionosphere . That shockwave is typically hard to
measure, but these scientists may have found a way, using regular GPS. GPS, see, relies on timing
more than anything else to determine location: it measures the time the signal takes to rebound from a
device to the satellite, and vice versa. But disturbances in the air can change those measurements, so
GPS units have sophisticated algorithms to sense and adjust to that kind of disturbance--so why not the
nuclear shockwave? The scientists performed some tests after the 2009 blast, and found that they
were able to nail down the location and timing of the blast using eleven different
satellites. They're optimistic that this tech could be used to supplement other ways of
confirming that a [nuclear test] took place . They even hope that this technology might compel the
U.S. to reconsider its refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which I personally am skeptical about
but would certainly be great if it was true
It is proven that the illegal nuclear testing will be able to get track down easily, so
states won’t have the power or ability to do nuclear testing under cover.

Nuclear Proliferation:

Turn: Proliferation is good

Nuclear proliferation encourages diplomacy rather than conflict

Gartzke and Jo 09: Gartzke, Erik, professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego,
and Dong-Joon Jo. "Bargaining, nuclear proliferation, and interstate disputes." Journal of Conflict Resolution (2009).
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6aa1/48e918a23a55adefdf3013ccffee63a1115b.pdf?
_ga=2.62841647.208004842.1575952617-1072108062.1575952617

nuclear
Even if only some of the substantial increase in lethality from “going nuclear” can be converted into political leverage,
capable nations are bound to increase their influence in international affairs and. Greater
influence amounts to getting what states want without having to use force. To the degree that nuclear
capabilities lead to bargains that approximate the outcomes states expect from fighting,
aggression becomes less appealing and the anxieties of opponents are reduced. Diplomacy
serves as a tool for smoothing the bumpy road of world politics. The decision to proliferate is also
endogenous to conflict. Nations are not assigned nuclear weapons at random, but select into nuclear status despite high costs, long
delays in development, and international opprobrium. Countries with significant security problems or
responsibilities, and substantial governmental resources are more prone to seek nuclear
weapons (Jo & Gartzke 2007). These same nations fight more often, not because they possess a
nuclear arsenal, but because the causes of conflict also prompt states to proliferate. Nations
with few enemies, modest resources, limited technology, or little dissatisfaction about world affairs are unlikely to
pursue nuclear capabilities and also are less inclined to fight. Thus, nominal nuclear status
probably overstates the empirical effect of proliferation in propagating interstate disputes.

Miscalculations:
History shows that miscalculations are unlikely
Sokolski 16 Sokolski, Henry [Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center] “Should We Let
the Bomb Spread?” Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College, November 2016,
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1021744.pdf.

Accidental or Inadvertent Detonation. A common concern has been that the weapons would somehow go off by
accident or miscalculation, devastating the planet in the process. In 1960, a top nuclear strategist declared it “most
unlikely” that the world could live with an uncontrolled arms race for decades. Moreover, in 1979, political scientist
Hans J. Morgenthau declared: The world is moving ineluctably towards a third world war—a strategic nuclear war. I
do not believe that anything can be done to prevent it. The international system is simply too unstable to survive for
long. In addition, Eric Schlosser remains deeply concerned about that danger today. In a 1982 New Yorker essay and
best-selling book, both titled The Fate of the Earth, Jonathan Schell passionately, if repetitively, argued the not
entirely novel proposition that nuclear war would be terrible, and he concluded ominously: One day—and it is hard to
believe that it will not be soon—we will make our choice. Either we will sink into the final coma and end it all or, as I
trust and 80 believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril . . . and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons.
As it happened, both options were avoided: Neither final coma nor nuclear cleansing ever took place. The
common alarmist prognostications assuming that, because the weapons exist, sooner or later
one or more of them will necessarily go off, has now failed to deliver for 70 years—this suggests
that something more than luck is operating.

Terrorism:

Nuclear Terrorism is extremely unlikely

Chapman 08 Steve Chapman, 2-14-2008, "Why nuclear terrorism is so unlikely," No Publication,
https://theweek.com/articles/516801/why-nuclear--terrorism-unlikely
But the chances of al Qaeda or another terrorist group carrying out a nuclear attack here,
nuclear experts say, are “vanishingly small.” Terrorists would first have to steal about 100
pounds of bomb fuel from a government, and then transport the material hundreds of miles
across borders without detection. Even if that were possible, [to] building a bomb isn’t
something you can do in a garage or a cave; you need specialized, high-tech equipment,
and people with training and skills. Any weapon would then have to be smuggled into the
U.S. without detection—and without anyone in the expanding circle of conspirators screwing
up.

India Pak turn

It is only a specific example but we are banning all so it doesn't justify

NO fire agreement

Countries have turn

We must first put lives ahead of these problems

because it would cause extinction which is the worst
harm, then after solving for this we can move to
solving these problems. The maximize pleasure in
round is keeping people alive.

Nuclear weapons are key to deterrence.

Chilton, Kevin. "On US Nuclear Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly. November,
2017. Web. December 12, 2019.

<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-

4/Chilton.pdf>.

Fundamentally, we have nuclear weapons to deter attack on the United States and our
allies. Further, with regard to our allies, the US nuclear deterrent is meant to assure
them that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal to deter adversary
aggression against them as well. We offer this “nuclear umbrella” so as to
strengthen our alliances and also encourage our allies to not develop their own
nuclear deterrent. We have a moral obligation to protect our citizens. In essence,
nuclear assurance is a fundamental and demonstrably effective part of the US
nonproliferation policy.

Effects of Chemical Weapons-FA17

https://fast-act.com/effects-of-chemical-weapons-on-humans/
Chemical weapons can be categorized into four general categories, according to
the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Each of these four
categories presents different hazards and possible effects to humans as a result
of exposure to these dangerous chemical weapon agents. Below are the chemical
weapons and their effects on the human body.

1. Blood Agents: Blood agents contain agents such as cyanogen

chloride, hydrogen cyanide, and arsine. These agents work by
preventing a person’s blood and tissue cells from accepting oxygen
intake and can lead to organ failure.
2. Choking Agents: Choking agents consist of phosgene, chlorine, and
diphosgene. These chemicals are absorbed through the lungs and will
result in a build-up of fluid that will potentially lead to choking.
3. Blister Agents: Lewisite, sulfur mustard and nitrogen mustard are all
forms of blister agents. The chemicals that are blister agents will burn
 a person’s mucous membranes, skin, and eyes, and cause blistering.
4. Nerve Agents: Sarin, tabun, soman, and VX are all known nerve agents.
Nerve agents can cause muscle paralysis, as well as seizures and loss
of body control.

Figure 2 plots the survival curve for the pursuit of chemical weapons. It demonstrates
the dramatic effect of nuclear weapons acquisition on the demand for CBWs. Countries
possessing nuclear weapons are at essentially zero risk of initiating pursuit of
chemical over time, along with countries that have a biological weapon (these two
survivor functions appear as one overlapping line). Countries pursuing biological
weapons, on the other hand, still have a large desire for chemical weapons. They ‘‘fail’’
and pursue chemical weapons at a significantly higher rate. The effects of our
covariates on chemical weapons pursuit are similar to nuclear weapons pursuit in
direction, though they often fall short of significance. For example, there is weak
evidence that GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared are positively associated
with a greater risk of chemical weapons pursuit (the former is statistically insignificant,
while the latter is significant at the 10 percent level). However, no other covariate
appears to have a statistically significant effect on chemical weapons pursuit, even
though the direction on each variable fits with conventional wisdom. For example,
membership in the CWC appears to be associated with a lower risk of chemical
weapons pursuit, while a more dangerous external security environment and greater
domestic unrest are both positively related to the risk of chemical weapons pursuit.

Warming

Nuclear war is the only effective

way to stop worldwide global
warming. Sayani cites Oman :
Daniel Sayani Staff Writer/Journalist at The New American, “Govt Scientists Propose
Nuclear War to Curb Global Warming” (03 March 2011), citing Oman, Luke Research Physical
Scientist at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Earth Sciences Division, Atmospheric
Chemistry and Dynamics Laboratory “How Would Nuclear War Affect The Climate?”
http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/nuclear-climate.html
NASA’s latest announcement ...AND... research report’s projections.
Deternce
 Empirics prove deterrence works—the aff removes a critical pillar of deterrence and
sparks conventional wars.
Zimmerman 17 (Zimmerman, Peter D. “Nuclear weapons deter conventional wars.” Gulf
News, 09-16-2017, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/nuclear-weapons-deter-
conventional-wars-1.2091053. Peter D. Zimmerman is a nuclear physicist. He was a
former chief scientist of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a former chief scientist
of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and science adviser for arms control in
the Department of State. He is a professor emeritus at King’s College London and is based
in Northern Virginia.)
This month, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will open for signature at
the United Nations. Signatories will promise never to “develop, test, produce,
manufacture ... possess or stockpile nuclear weapons”; never to transfer weapons to
other parties nor to receive them; and never to “use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons”. The treaty’s aims, if they could be universally effected, are noble. After all,
the prospect of nations — including an international pariah like North Korea — facing off
with their respective nuclear arsenals is horrific. Their renewed use in war would be
catastrophic. But there is a risk in aiming for total nuclear disarmament, because
deterring nuclear war isn’t their only legitimate use. Nuclear weapons also deter
conventional war. In recent decades, great powers have fought proxy wars, but since
1945, they have not come into direct armed conflict. Through the Cold War, nuclear
weapons kept the peace in Western Europe. Only once, during the Cuban missile crisis,
did deterrence come close to breaking, but the then United States president, John F.
Kennedy, and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and the rest of the world learned well.
India and Pakistan have skirmished in recent decades, but the realisation that a conflict
could escalate to nuclear catastrophe has contributed to the rival nations eventually
standing down. The probability that Israel has nuclear weapons is the ultimate guarantor
of its existence. Since the Soviet Union’s first atomic test in 1949, the existence of
nuclear weapons in many hands has not only deterred the use of nuclear weapons, but
also made nuclear possessors and their adversaries think carefully about the desirability
of going to war at all. When conflict has broken out, the nuclear deterrent has limited war
aims to those short of total destruction of adversary nations or regime change. That’s why
North Korea has sought nuclear capability so fervently. This is the “porcupine theory”,
advanced by, among others, the late strategist Kenneth Waltz: After Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, many states wanted nuclear weapons, not for offensive purposes, but as a
hedge against attack by other nations. If peace is desirable, and it is, this seems, at first,
philosophically unappealing; non-proliferation and nuclear elimination sound so much
safer. But with obvious limits, this hedge has served as a practical solution to an
intractable problem. It’s a good thing, then, that the United Nations nuclear treaty is
probably going nowhere. For starters, the nuclear powers aren’t on board: When
negotiations concluded on July 7, 122 nations voted for the treaty. But the Netherlands,
the only Nato country to participate in negotiations, voted against it. As CBS News notes,
none of the countries “known or believed to possess nuclear weapons” — the US, Russia,
Britain, China, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — supports the treaty.
Sweden was the only country with long-standing, close ties to Nato that voted for it. Most
states voting for the treaty lack the capability, or significant interest, in acquiring nuclear
weapons. If the proverbial mice decide to bell the cat, success will depend upon the cat’s
consent to wear a bell. And the agreement was rushed: Other international arms-control
agreements, such as the prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons, on nuclear
testing, and on strategic arms reduction have taken years and even decades to negotiate.
The nuclear ban was completed after only a few days of negotiation in March and a few
 weeks in June and July. The treaty’s language is unhelpful. The preamble includes
references to an assortment of humanitarian causes, bearing only the most tangential
relationship to the topic at hand: “Disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities
on indigenous peoples”, “disproportionate impact on women and girls”, and the role of
the “Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement”. Though “trust but verify”, as former US
president Ronald Reagan often put it, remains the core of any international arms-control
agreement, the UN treaty presents a nebulous mention that weapons states shall
cooperate with a “competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and
verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons programmes”. A “State Party that
owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons ... shall immediately remove them from
operational status” and later “submit to the secretary-general of the United Nations a
declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations”. The mechanics by which nuclear possessor
states rid themselves of their weapons are undefined. For now, the agreement relies on
the honour system, rather than enforceable penalties for noncompliance — critical details
kicked down the road to a document that doesn’t yet exist. Even if the document had
been perfectly drafted, and had the leaders of the effort gained a measure of buy-in from
nuclear states about their interests, total nuclear abolition remains a bad idea. As former
British prime minister Margaret Thatcher had said, 30 years ago, in a speech delivered in
Russia: “Conventional weapons have never been enough to deter war. Two world wars
showed us that. They also showed us how terrible a war fought even with conventional
weapons can be. Yet, nuclear weapons have deterred not only nuclear war but
conventional war in Europe as well. A world without nuclear weapons may be a dream,
but you cannot base a sure defence on dreams. Without far greater trust and confidence
between East and West than exists at present, a world without nuclear weapons would be
less stable and more dangerous for all of us.” The planet would be safer with far fewer
nuclear weapons, but more dangerous with none; and would be a way to prove all such
weapons have been eliminated. Some hydrogen bombs are small enough to hide in a coat
closet — verification of their destruction, in the absence of a yet-to-be-determined
mechanism, and in the absence of a strong international consensus, is impossible. And the
loss of the barrier to conventional escalation would be ruinous. Nuclear weapons cannot
be un-invented. If the treaty’s proponents had their way, the world would eventually
regret it.