1

K
The strategy of territorialization that is employed today allows for immense biopower and
genocide.
Houtum & Naerssen 01 ( Henk Van Houtum and Ton Van Naerssen. Henk is a Research Professor Geopolitics of Borders at the University of Bergamo. Ton is a Senior
Research Fellow at Radboud University Nijmegen. "Bordering, Ordering And Othering". Published October 2001 by the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research . http://henkvanhoutum.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/TESG2002.pdf )

Bordering processes do not begin or stop at demarcation lines in space. Borders do not represent fixed point in space of time, rather they
symbolize a social practice of spatial differentiation. Semantically, the word 'borders' unjustly assumes that places are fixed
in space and time, and should rather be understood in terms of bordering, as an ongoing strategic effort to make a difference in space among
the movements of people, money or products. In
democratic societies borders are not 'made from above', rather they
represent an implicit, often taken-for-granted, agreement among the majority of people. Put differently, territorial
borders continuously fixate and regulate mobility of flows and thereby construct or reproduce places in space. Territorial
strategies of ordering, bordering and othering often take place, although certainly not necessarily, at the spatial scale
of states. For example, Sanjay Chaturvedi's paper in this issue, exemplifies the discourses and strategies practiced between India and Pakistan,
where practices of inclusion and exclusion are framed by nation-building projects of the two countries, discursively uttered through differences
in religion. He demonstrates how on both sides of the border national education programmes reproduce and reinforce otherness. Spaan et al.
(this issue) focus on the borders between Malaysia and Indonesia. Recently, although not comparable in intensity to the case of India and
Pakistan, tensions have increased in association with the redefining of Malay identity and massive immigration of Indonesians to Malaysia.
Knippenberg (this issue) shows that practices of othering and cultural fragmentation are not merely practices or
interstate affairs, but also take place within states. He argues that a state territory hardly ever covers a homogeneous
population, yet it claims to represent and imagine one. In this claiming and producing of a unity out of subcultures and
different populations, some groups are ( voluntarily) assimilated while others are or remain
marginalized as semi-aliens. Such bordering processes sometimes go as far as political practices or
elimination, of the cleansing of the other that lives inside an imagined community. The making of a place
must hence be understood as an act of purification, as it is arbitrarily searching for a justifiable, bounded cohesion of people and their activities
in space which can be compared and contrasted to other spatial entities. It can be seen as a spatial strategy (de Certeau 1980). According to de
Certeau a strategy presupposes a place that can be circumscribed as one's own (unpropre), and that can serve as the base from which to direct
relations with an exteriority consisting of targets or threats such a clients, competitors, enemies and strangers. What
territorial human
strategy does is classify space, communicate a sense of place and enforce control over a place (Sack
1986). In doing so, territorial strategy reifies power, displaces others, and depersonalizes , neutralizes, fills
and contains space (Sack 1986).

Territorialization justifies elimination of the other; Fear becomes the standard

England 06 ( Marcia Rae England, grad candidate in the University of Kentucky for Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences. "CITIZENS ON
PATROL: COMMUNITY POLICING AND THE TERRITORIALIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON". Published in 2006.
http://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1363&context=gradschool_diss )

This dissertation shows how organizations, including local government and police, and residents within
Seattle, Washington’s East Precinct define and police the contours of community, neighborhoods and
public space. Under the rubric of public safety, these players create territorial geographies that seek
to include only those who fit the narrowly conceived idea of a “neighbor.” Territoriality is exercised
against the social Other in an attempt to build a cohesive community while at the same time excluding
those who are seen as different or as non-conformant to acceptable behaviors in the neighborhood.
This research provides a framework through which to examine how community policing produces an
urban citizen subject and an idea of who belongs in public space. This work also combines discourses of
abjection and public space showing how the two are linked together to form a contingent citizenship.
“Contingent citizenship” describes a particular relationship between geography and citizenship. As I
frame it, contingent citizenship is a public citizenship where one must conform to a social norm and act
in a prescribed, appropriate way in the public sphere or fear repercussions such as incarceration, public
humiliation or barring from public parks.

The quest to obliterate all that differs and replace it with the image of the same leads uncontestably
to the destruction of everything.
Baudrillard ’96 (Jean, Professor of Philosophy of Culture and Media Criticism at the European
Graduate School, 1996, The Perfect Crime, p. 112-14)
In German, there are two apparently synonymous terms with a very significant dis -
tinction between them. ‘Verfremdung’ means becoming other, becoming estranged from
oneself— alienation in the literal sense. ‘Entfremdung’, by contrast, means to be dispossessed
of the other, to lose all otherness. Now, it is much more serious to be dispossessed of the
other than of oneself. Being deprived of the other is worse than alienation: a lethal change, by
liquidation of the dialectical opposition itself. An irrevocable destabilization, that of the subject
without object, of the same without other — definitive stasis and metastasis of the Same. A tragic
destiny for individuals and for our — self-programming and self-referential — systems: no
more adversaries, no more hostile environments — no environment at all any longer, no
more exteriority. This is like wresting a species away from its natural predators . No longer
threatened by them, it cannot but destroy itself (by ‘depredation’, as it were). Death being the
great natural predator, a species we attempt at all costs to immortalize and wrest away from death —
as we do with all our replacement technologies for the body’s organs — is doomed to disappear. The
best strategy for bringing about someone’s ruin is to eliminate everything which
threatens him, thus causing him to lose all his defence s, and it is this strategy we are applying
to ourselves. By eliminating the other in all its forms (illness, death, negativity, violence,
strangeness), not to mention racial and linguistic differences, by eliminating all singularities in
order to radiate total positivity, we are eliminating ourselves. We have fought negativity
and death, rooting out evil in all its forms. By eliminating the work of the negative, we have
unleashed positivity, and that is what has become lethal today. By setting off the chain reaction of the
positive, we have at the same time — by a perverse, but perfectly coherent effect — released an intense
viral pathology. For a virus, far from being negative, is the product, rather, of an ultrapositivity of
which it is the lethal embodiment. This had escaped us, as had the metamorphoses of evil which follow
the advances of reason about like a shadow. This paradigm of the subject without object, of the
subject without other, can be seen in all that has lost its shadow and become
transparent to itself. Even in devitalized substances: in sugar without calories, salt without sodium,
life without spice, effects without causes, wars without enemy, passions without object, time without
memory, masters without slaves, or the slaves without masters we have become. What becomes of a
master without a slave? He ends up terrorizing himself. And of a slave without a
master? He ends up exploiting himself. The two are conjoined today in the modern form
of voluntary servitude: enslavement to data systems and calculation systems – total
efficiency, total performance. We have become masters – at least virtual masters – of this world, but
the object of that mastery, the finality of that mastery, have disappeared.

Normalization leads to the eradication of Otherness, the ethnic cleansing by means of

communication
Baudrillard ‘96 (Jean Baudrillard, French philosopher, The Perfect Crime, First Printed by Verso 1996, pages 109-110, Print)
With the Virtual, we enter not only upon the era of the liquidation of the Real and the Referential, but
that of the extermination of the Other. It is the equivalent of an ethnic cleansing which would not just
affect particular populations but unrelentingly pursue all forms of othernes s. The otherness of death- staved off
by unrelenting medical intervention. Of the face and the body- run to the earth by plastic surgery. Of the world- dispelled by Virtual Reality. Of
every one [chacun]- which will one day be abolished by the cloning of individual cells. And quite simply, of the other, currently undergoing
dilution in perpetual communication. If
information is the site of the perfect crime against reality,
communication is the site of the perfect crime against otherness. No more other: communication . No
more enemy: negotiation. No more predators: conviviality. No more negativity: absolute positivity. No more death: the immortality of
the clone. No more otherness: identity and difference. No more seduction: sexual in-difference. No
more illusion:
hyperreality, Virtual Reality. No more secret: transparency. No more destiny. The perfect crime.

Engaging Otherness is the precondition to ethical politics and should be first priority
Jones 9 
(Rachel, University of Dundee, “On the Value of Not Knowing: Wonder, Beginning Again and Letting Be,”
As presented at ‘On Not Knowing’, a Symposium hosted by Kettle’s Yard and New Hall College,
Cambridge, 29th June 2009, to accompany the exhibition ‘Material Intelligence’, Kettle’s Yard, 16 May –
12 July 2009)

Thus described, wonder is the passion that can accompany not knowing , providing we recognize that the object we encounter is not the same as what we already
do know. Wonder arises before we know enough to make any utilitarian calculation about whether an
object might be pleasing or useful to us (or not). For Descartes, as for Aristotle, it could therefore be said that philosophy begins in wonder, for this passionate
state of not knowing is what makes us think , ask questions, and seek to understand. Wonder is the ‘first of all the passions’ not only
because it is our initial response to something new and unknown, but because it implies that other passions will follow , as we find out more about what we have encountered. 3.

Although she critiques Descartes’ model of a self-founding subject, Luce Irigaray takes up his notion of wonder in a short essay where she writes (second quote): ‘ In order for it [wonder] to affect

us, it is necessary and sufficient for it to surprise, to be new, not yet assimilated or disassimilated as known . Still
awakening our passion, our appetite, our attraction to that which is not yet (en)coded, our curiosity (but perhaps in all senses: sight, smell, hearing? etc) vis-à-vis that which we have not yet encountered or made ours.’ 3 The
as-yet-unknown is here aligned with that which we have ‘not yet encoded’, not yet translated into the
conceptual and symbolic frameworks we use to make sense of the world; at the same time, the passage hints at
an entirely different way of coming to know someone or something, involving an attunement of the
senses to that which is other and irreducible to those frameworks. While we may still go on to grasp and appropriate the unfamiliar, Irigaray calls on
us to cultivate the sense of wonder that can inhabit all our encounters , 4 providing we remain attentive to the unique singularity of others, to the ways

in which, no matter how much we know about someone else, they remain irreducibly different from us. Wonder thus remains the first of all the passions , not simply

because it is the first we experience, but because it has an ethical priority . Cultivating wonder is a way of remaining open to

the otherness of the other without seeking to appropriate or assimilate them. For Irigaray, the difference to which wonder holds us
open is first and foremost the difference between the sexes; sexuate difference is for her the first difference in the same sense as wonder is the first passion. Wonder is thus essential to the possibility of an erotic encounter in

which each desires the other without seeking to own or appropriate. However, as well as love, the wonder that arises from not knowing is , she says, ‘the passion
that inaugurates … art. And thought .’ 5 4. Art, thought, and not knowing are linked in a long and complex history, from which I have selected only one particular moment here, albeit a
particularly influential one. In Kant’s account of genius, he emphasises that genius works without knowing what it is doing, insofar as no rule could be formulated in advance for producing a truly original artwork. Rather, the rule

while the artist

must be abstracted after the fact, to the extent that works of genius come to serve as examples for others. In fact, Kant’s genius works in a delicate balance between knowing and not knowing, for

is unable to use concepts or rules to fully determine what will emerge from their creative activities, for
these to be productive of more than mere nonsense, they must nonetheless draw on other kinds of
knowledge. This includes the technical knowledge or skills required to work with their materials as well as knowledge of preceding aesthetic traditions – which true genius will always both break and reinvigorate. For
those of us not blessed with what Kant calls genius however, not knowing remains an essential component of what he describes as the most intense kind of aesthetic experience, that of the sublime. One trigger for the sublime is

Our faculties struggle to grasp such apparent

the encounter with something which seems infinite to us – an ever-receding mountain range or the vastness of the ocean.

infinities, for the moment we try to take them in and represent them in a single image, we place a limit
on them and thereby lose the suggestion of infinity which attracted us to them in the first place . In ways that recall
the poster for this symposium, we experience sublimity when we are all at sea (though the image also pokes gentle fun at the overly serious language of the sublime, as it shows someone all at sea in a pedal-boat). On Kant’s

even though we cannot represent infinity, our very failure to grasp it makes us all the more aware
account,

of our ability to think that which we cannot know , to have an idea of that which goes beyond anything we can take in via the senses. Thus he writes: ‘[N]othing that can be
an object of the senses is to be called sublime. [What happens is that] our imagination strives to progress toward infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so [the imagination], our power of estimating
the magnitude of things in the world of sense, is inadequate to that idea. Yet this inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power … Sublime is what even to be able to think proves
that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense.’ 7 Note the movement that characterises Kant’s account of the sublime, which begins with a sense of awe at nature’s apparent infinities, but ends with a similar sense of
awe at our own rational faculties. On Kant’s model, the disruptive moment of not knowing is recuperated in ways that re-affirm the powers of the subject, and reinforce his ability to separate himself from and transcend the
material world of the senses. 5. Despite this, the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, writing nearly 200 years after Kant, recognises the potential in Kant’s account of the sublime for a more radical challenge to the knowing

subject. For Lyotard, as for Kant, the sublime occurs when we encounter something we cannot represent , but unlike for Kant, this does not have
to be the grand horizons of seemingly limitless oceans or mountain ranges. Rather, the infinite is contained within the most immediate and subtle of

sensations, insofar as any sensation is infinitely unique, irreplaceable by any other. Hence, any attempt to grasp a sensory event, to make it present
to ourselves by re-presenting it, will inevitably erase that which we were seeking to capture. Rather than recoup this
inability via our power to think the infinite, Lyotard places the emphasis more on the value of this temporary incapacitation. It is only when we are thus undone as knowing

subjects that we are able to remain open to the singularity of the material event , which Lyotard describes in terms of: ‘a singular,
incomparable quality – unforgettable and immediately forgotten – of the grain of a skin or a piece of wood, the fragrance of an aroma, the savour of a secretion or a piece of flesh, as well as a timbre or a nuance. All these

terms … designate the event of a passion, a passability for which the mind will not have been prepared,
which will have unsettled it’. ‘Nuance or timbre are the distress and despair of the exact division … From this aspect of matter, one must say that it must be immaterial. … The matter I’m talking
about is ‘immaterial’, anobjectable, because it can only ‘take place’ or find its occasion at the price of suspending [the] active powers of the mind.’ 8 Though Lyotard does not describe the sublime in terms of wonder here, perhaps

wonder is still present in the ‘passion’ and ‘passability’ that allow us to remain open to the material
event. Such events are immaterial to the knowing subject who can only betray their incomparable uniqueness by trying to grasp them via familiar forms and concepts. For Lyotard, as for Irigaray, the moment
of not knowing thus holds an ethical promise, that of being able to do justice to the singular by letting
go of the desire to know, and allowing ourselves to be unsettled into bearing witness to the
incomparable and irreplaceable. 6. Allowing oneself to be thus undone is, for Lyotard, the very condition of
thought , and hence, the condition of doing philosophy. Learning how to think means letting go of
everything one thought one knew, so as to think again with an open and questioning inventiveness; teaching someone how to think means learning how to unlearn, so as to enter with them
on the journey of a question. 9 Teacher and pupil both must be prepared to return to a state of unpreparedness and

unknowing that he calls infancy: ‘You cannot open up a question without leaving yourself open to it. You cannot scrutinize a ‘subject’ ... without being scrutinized by it. You cannot do any of
these things without renewing ties with the season of childhood, the season of the mind’s possibilities.’ 10 The inventiveness of infancy allows us to judge without

criteria, where there are no rules to follow and no one to tell us what to d o. Lyotard counsels us to nurture and renew the potency of infancy,
the ‘childhood of thought’ that remains with us in adulthood and that grants human beings a capacity to begin again, to find new ways of thinking and being. Such infancy, he argues, is at odds with
the contemporary emphasis on ‘performance’ which insists that our inventiveness must be quantifiably
productive and refuses to tolerate a questioning that does not know where it is going or whether
answers will be found. What Lyotard calls ‘the stifling busyness of performativity’ 11 cannot bear the idea of not making progress, nor find any value in the possibility of failure: from this perspective,
having to begin again is a sign of time wasted, rather than of a capacity for renewal. Yet without the risk of failure, of getting lost or ‘being adrift’, 12 there

is no real openness to the unknown, to the new thoughts that might emerge from the as yet unthought :
‘We write before knowing what to say and how to say it, and in order to find out, if possible. … We recommence, but we cannot rely on it getting to the thought itself, there, at the end. For the thought is here, muddled up in the

To foreclose this impertinent time of infancy is to foreclose the

unthought, trying to sort out the impertinent babble of childhood.’ 13

possibility of recommencing, of thinking again and beginning anew .

The impact is literally infinite violence in the name of social order. It causes unending bloodshed
and is the reason for all large scale conflict and any attempt to deescalate the violence is contained,
which makes extinction by statism and terrorism inevitable. Neocleus 2
But there is more to territory than just space. The notion of ‘territory’ is ¶ derived from a complex of terms: from terra (of earth, and thus a domain) and ¶ territ -orium, referring to a place from which people are warned off, but is
also has¶ links with terr -ere, meaning to frighten. And the notion of region derives from the ¶ Latin regere (to rule) with its connotations of military power. Territory is land ¶ occupied and maintained through terror; a region is

space ruled through force. ¶The secret of territoriality is thus violence: the force necessary for the production¶ of space and the terror crucial to the creation of boundaries. It is not just
that¶ sovereignty implies space, then, but that ‘it implies a space against which¶ violence, whether latent or overt, is directed – a space established and constituted¶ by
violence’ (Lefebvre, 1974: 280). As macrosociologists have pointed out time¶ and again, it is the use of physical force in controlling a territory that is
the key¶ to the state, for without it any claim to the territory would mean nothing. Put¶ more simply: ‘borders are drawn
with blood’ (General Mladić, cited in Campbell, ¶ 1998: 45). A founding violence, and continuous creation by violent means, are ¶ the hallmarks of the state.¶ Part of the construction of the

state’s territory took the form of defining the¶ legitimate use of violence – this is the key to Weber’s famous definition of the¶ state as
involving a monopoly over the means of violence. To do this, the distinction ¶ between the ‘legitimate’ use of force by the state and ‘illegitimate’ use of force ¶ by non-state actors had to be made coherent and acceptable to the
members of¶ states. During its early history, the state exercised violence alongside and often in ¶ conjunction with a range of ‘non-state’ or ‘semi-state’ organizations. (These terms ¶ are misleading because ‘state’ itself had not
been fully developed, but for the sake¶ of the argument we will leave that issue aside.) Piracy and banditry, for example, ¶ were once entirely legitimate practices within the state system, bringing, as they ¶ did, revenue to both
the sovereign and private investors and weakening enemies ¶ by attacking their ships. Piracy on the seas was conducted with the full cooperation ¶ and support of cities and states, while banditry, as a form of terrestrial ¶ piracy,
was conducted with the continual aid of lords. International agreements ¶ now have it that piracy, as an act of violence divorced from the authority of any ¶ state, is a crime. To reach this state of affairs required a campaign against
piracy¶ which relied on a change in the state’s attitude from one in which non-state ¶ violence was an exploitable resource to one in which it was a practice to be eliminated. ¶ The catalyst appears to have been a clash ¶ any state.
The condottieri hired by the 15th-century Italian city-states were essentially ¶ contractors – a condotta was a contract to make war for a particular ¶ sovereign. The German Unternehmer conveys the same commercial tone, while ¶
etymologically ‘soldier’ means ‘one who serves in an army for pay’ not ‘one who ¶ serves his country’. The extent of mercenarism and its significance to the state is ¶ illustrated by the fact that in the 18th century, all the major
European armies ¶ relied heavily on foreign mercenaries for troops, as Janice Thomson (1994: 10, ¶ 88) has shown:¶ Half the Prussian army was comprised of mercenaries. Foreigners constituted onethird ¶ of the French army.
Britain used 18,000 mercenaries in the American war for ¶ Independence and 33,000 mercenaries in its 1793 war with France . . . The last ¶ instance in which a state raised an army of foreigners was in 1854, when Britain hired ¶
16,500 German, Italian, and Swiss mercenaries for the Crimean war. ¶ For several reasons, however, states gradually stopped hiring their soldiers and ¶ sailors from anywhere, and began substituting them with standing armies
based¶ on conscription. Following the example of the French Revolution and Napoleon, ¶ in which huge effective armies were raised from within France, the practice of ¶ mercenarism gradually died out through the 19th century.
One factor was sheer¶ cost: states began to realize that fighting forces could be constructed more cheaply ¶ from its ‘own’ citizens. But a further factor was reliability: states realized that an ¶ armed force whose relation to the

To form mass national armies states therefore

state was purely contractual often dragged its ¶ feet and was always ready to rebel; its ‘own’ citizens, however, were more reliable. ¶

had to lay claim to a monopoly on the acts of military violence carried out by its own citizen s. The US Neutrality¶
Act of 1794, for example, prevented citizens of the United States from enlisting ¶ in the service of a foreign state, and prohibited all persons in the US from ¶ ‘setting on foot’ military expeditions against states with which the US
was at¶ peace. Such practices of neutrality soon became the standard for other states. In ¶ other words, to prevent the enlistment of those individuals increasingly seen as ¶ being the state’s ‘own’ citizens, states prevented their
citizens from either joining ¶ the armies of foreign states or of forming their own armies.1 On the one side, ¶ then, states began to develop an international code on mercenarism. Only at this ¶ point does mercenarism become
mercenarism – just as ‘contraband usually ¶ becomes contraband when rulers decide to monopolize the distribution of the ¶ commodity in question’ (Tilly, 1992: 54), so mercenarism only becomes mercenarism ¶ when states
decide to use and monopolize the exercise of violence by ¶ its own citizens. This was crucial to the states’ claim to a monopoly over the ¶ means of legitimate violence within its own borders. (It is also one reason, though ¶ by no
means the only reason, why states felt threatened by the International ¶ Brigade in Spain in the 1930s.) On the other side, however, to legitimize this ¶ monopoly, each state had to foster a national consciousness among its
citizens,¶ in order that they would more easily imagine that allegiance to the state of which ¶ one is a member is stronger than any allegiance formed through contract. Perry ¶ Anderson (1975: 30) suggests consolidation of the
notion of territory. They¶ were the unwitting instruments of history, as Carlo Levi comments on the bandit ¶ (1947: 137), in that their existence acted as a major catalyst in the shaping of the ¶ state, a process in which they

One effect of this ideological isolation of non-state violence from other

themselves were (almost) swept from history. ¶

modalities¶ of violence has been to endow[ed] state violence with a special sanctity. Since¶ the Peace of Westphalia, the
state system has seen non-intervention in a state’s ¶ domestic affairs as the corollary of the ideological commitment to the protection ¶ of state sovereignty. As Cynthia Weber has shown, in modern global political ¶ discourse,
‘intervention’ generally implies a violation of state sovereignty. ‘Intervention ¶ discourse begins by positing a sovereign state with boundaries that might ¶ be violated and then regards transgressions of these boundaries as a
problem’¶ (1995: 4, 27).2 In violating sovereignty, intervention violates the norms of the ¶ international state system and the sanctity of the state. As a consequence, intervention ¶ comes to function as an alibi for the actions
carried out in the name of¶ the sovereign state, to such an extent that states use their claim to territorial sovereignty ¶ to legitimize genocidal practices against peoples under its rule. The United ¶ Nations (UN) has generated for
itself a humanitarian air, refusing a seat on theGeneral Assembly to such states, but in accepting the state’s claim to sovereign ¶ territorial control the UN has effectively condoned the sacrifice of human beings ¶ to the demands of

the territorial state and thus accepted genocide as regular tool ¶ of sovereign power (Kuper, 1981: 161–85). Conversely, while state violence has been endowed with a special sanctity, nonstate violence is
either ignored entirely or is invested with a unique danger. Identifying¶ 120 wars in 1987, Bernard Nietschmann found that only 3 per cent¶ involved
conflict between two sovereign territorial states; the vast bulk of the wars were struggles between states and insurgent groups or

nations. Yet these struggles¶ receive very little media or academic attention. One reason for this is that the¶ statist imaginary is so deeply entrenched in our
political and intellectual culture ¶ that [makes] the predominant tendency is to consider struggles against the state to be illegitimate ¶ or invisible. They are hidden from view because the struggles are against ¶ peoples,
movements, formations and countries that are often not even on the map. ¶ In this war, as Nietschmann (1987) puts it, only one-half of the geography is ¶ shown and only one side of the fighting has a name. This last point is only
half¶ the story, however, since the ‘other’ side of the fighting, when it is mentioned, ¶ often does go under a generic name intended to capture the unique danger of¶ non-state violence: ‘terrorism’. ¶ ‘Terrorism’ retains part of the
original double meaning of territory, in that it¶ refers not only to violence, but to space too. Things are usually labelled terrorist ¶ when the acts of violence in question are not sanctioned by the state. Where they ¶ have been

terrorism’
sanctioned by a state, then they always take place outside of that ¶ particular state’s territories (and usually result in the state in question being ¶ labelled a ‘rogue state’). What this means, in effect, is that ‘

is in fact¶ generated by the international state system; it is the ‘other’ generated by the system¶ of states. As William Connolly notes (1991: 207), terrorism ‘allows the
state and¶ the interstate system to protect the logic of sovereignty in the international sphere¶ while
veiling their inability to modify systemic conditions that generate violence by non-state agents ’. Thus while
terrorism appears to threaten the state, any such ¶ threat is ultimately superficial, since the production of ‘terrorism’ by the state in¶ fact protects the identity of

particular states and the state system as a whole . The¶ statist political imaginary uses terrorism to effect a political rationalization of ¶ violence under the firm control of the state. The declaration
of a war on terrorism ¶ by the US state and its allies in 2001 proves nothing other than the state’s ¶ own misunderstanding of the world it has created. (And note that such a declaration ¶ was immediately expanded to include
designated states which it could then¶ properly confront.)

The alternative is to embrace de-territoriality and the death of the state. The alternative solves – the
nation state and borders are not inevitable, but only a function of our contingent representations.
De-bordering is as simple as an alteration in the way you think. Neocleus 3
The map, then, has been an instrument of power. On a superficial level it is¶ easy to see why the map appears to be a graphic representation of some aspect of¶ the
real world, for it presupposes the existence of borders and boundary lines. ¶ Logically this would appear to mean that boundary lines must exist before [after] the¶ map. But in reality the

reverse has been true. As Thongchai Winichakul ¶ comments, ‘it is the concept of a nation in the modern geographical sense that¶ requires the

necessity of having boundary lines clearly demarcated. A map may¶ not just function as a medium; it could well be the creator of the supposed

reality.’¶ Sovereignty does not just imply space, it creates it; left to itself, the earth has no political form. We need to therefore appreciate
the political function of maps in¶ constructing rather than merely reproducing the world and in
creating rather than¶ merely tracing borders. Borders are constructed through a socio-political
process;¶ to the extent that the map helps create the borders, so it helps create the thing¶ which is being bordered: the geo-body created literally on paper (Winichakul,¶ 1998: 56; also see Black, 1997: 18; Ferguson,
1996: 177; Turnbull, 1996: 5–23;¶ Wood, 1992: 17–19). \

And, it solves your aff, the nation state is the cause of nuclear war. The alternative solves why those
things happen so it solves the root cause.

The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best deterritorializes states and deconstructs the
system of Biopowers.
 2
Interpretation: Debaters must include a picture of themselves and a sheet of paper listing the online
tourney name in the first speech of the round.
Violation: They don’t

Standards:
[1] Identity impersonation: It’s the only way to verify we are who we say we are – otherwise I could
have a random debater impersonating me who is really good. The picture verifies that I am the
person behind the screen. Key to fairness otherwise debaters could have really good debaters
represent them before round. Fairness is a voter constitutive of any competitive activity. Lack of
fairness means I can’t engage with their position because I don’t have
the capability to do so, so it comes prior.
Fairness is a voter
1. the judge can’t accurately make a decision if the round is unfair
2. Vote for fairness because fairness is constitutive of any competitive activity, it prevents the
judge from evaluating the better debater, and it determines my ability to engage so it
precludes other impacts
 what we are debating about which prevents me from making arguments

Education is a voter
1. Only long term benefit we get out of debate which allows for portable skills and better
critical thinking
2. Reasons why schools fund debate in the first place
3. I wouldn’t be here in the first place if it wasn’t for the education we got out of debate

Drop the debater

1. I had to irreversibly alter my strategy to run theory in the first place
2. it deters future abuse and drop the argument encourages debaters to run abusive
arguments and kick them if they’re called out
3. the ballot says vote for the better debater so if I debate better on the highest layer of the
flow vote for me.

3
DA
Modi’s popularity is at an all time high – elections boosted his mandate
Safi 19 [(Michael Safi, International Affairs Correspondent ) “India election results 2019: Modi claims
landslide victory,” Guardian, 5-23-2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/23/india-
election-results-narendra-modi-bjp-victory], (vikram)]
India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi,
has claimed a landslide victory in national elections that cements the Hindu
nationalist leader as the country’s most formidable politician in decades. Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata party (BJP)
had been expected to easily form a governing coalition with smaller allies, but official results showed the party ahead in at least 300
seats, comfortably beyond the 272 seats required for a majority in the lower house of parliament. Its main national opponent, Congress, was leading in just 50
constituencies and its party president, Rahul Gandhi, was turfed out of his family’s bastion seat of Amethi in Uttar Pradesh state. “Together we grow,” Modi said on
Twitter as the results came in. “Together we prosper. Together we will build a strong and inclusive India. India wins yet again!” In a later televised address, he was
critical of those who had doubted the BJP could increase its majority. “The political pundits of India have to leave behind their ideas of the past,” he said. This year’s
polls, held over seven phases starting on 11 April, have been described as a contest for the soul of India. They pitted Modi’s Hindu nationalist government against a
disparate group of opposition parties including Congress, whose secular vision has defined the country for most of the past 72 years. Votes from 542 lower-house
constituencies – one fewer than usual after authorities discovered £1.3m in unaccounted cash in a south Indian party leader’s home and cancelled the poll there –
started being counted at 8am local time (3.30am GMT), and results were released progressively throughout the day. BJP supporters in Bangalore on Thursday.
FacebookTwitterPinterest BJP supporters in Bangalore on Thursday. Photograph: Jagadeesh Nv/EPA By early Thursday evening the BJP had won in close to 20
constituencies in the crucial state of West Bengal – up from just two seats in 2014 – while holding off a co-ordinated challenge from opposition parties in the Hindi
heartland states of north India, where its support had been expected to fall from the high watermark of five years ago. Now
it appears 2014 was no
aberration, and that Indian politics has likely entered a new era of Hindu nationalist hegemony fuelled by
Modi’s extraordinary popularity. “We are in an era where you have, once more, a central gravitational force around which Indian politics
revolves,” said Milan Vaishnav, the director of the south Asia programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “I think 2019 will confirm that the BJP
has replaced the Congress as that.” Nationalist agenda The
emphatic victory will be greeted with dismay among some
members of religious minority groups, who have voiced fears that a returned BJP government would be
further emboldened to prosecute its Hindu nationalist agenda, including controversial citizenship-status
checks to root out unauthorised migrants in border states. The BJP’s president, Amit Shah, described illegal migrants in the country’s
north-east as “termites” in one speech that was widely condemned by opponents. Among the BJP candidates who won on Thursday was Pragya Singh Thakur, a
Hindu nun and terrorism accused who is still facing trial for involvement in a 2008 bombing plot that killed six Muslims and injured scores of others. Beware of the
lions: a comedian's guide to the Indian election Read more Alongside nationalism and Modi’s personal magnetism, the BJP’s victory was also fuelled by a relentless,
data-driven and highly disciplined style of campaigning. The party sent up to 20 campaigners to manage the area around each polling booth, ensuring they knew their
possible voters and what messages would resonate with them, an evolution from the older style of courting or inducing local chieftains to bring out their villages to
vote. “We had organisations sitting in every booth and that’s unprecedented,” said Rajat Sethi, a BJP strategist. Modi the master The decisions of voters in the vast
country of 1.3 billion people have been driven by innumerable local concerns, caste and religion, or rumours and opinions traded over WhatsApp or cups of chai at a
tea stand. But the figure of Modi has towered over the contest like no prime minister since Indira Gandhi in the 1970s. “There
is no match for Modi
among the opposition parties,” said Rahul Verma, a fellow at the Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research.
“He’s running at nearly an all-time high popularity. He’s charismatic, and people still repose faith in him
despite not being very happy with the economic side of the government’s performance.” A survey released this
week by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies found that nearly one-third of people who voted for the BJP did so in support of Modi, rather than the party
or their local candidate. Modi’s popularity had actually grown compared with 2014, when he led his party to the first majority victory in 30 years, the researchers said.
The months leading to the election were bumpy for the BJP. A government survey revealed unemployment to be the highest in 45 years. Data showing that farming
incomes had plummeted to their lowest point in 18 years confirmed the distress of agricultural workers, some of who had marched on Delhi carrying skulls that they
said belonged to farmers who had committed suicide due to drought and mounting debt. Modi’s promise on the 2014 campaign trail that “good days are coming”
threatened to turn into a millstone around his neck. Is India the frontline in big tech’s assault on democracy? John Harris John Harris Read more Then a bombing in
the disputed territory of Kashmir on 14 February helped to transform the contest. Rather than dent Modi’s strongman image, the killing of 40 Indian paramilitaries by
a Pakistan-based militant group became the stage for his response, an airstrike deeper in neighbouring territory than Indian jets had ever struck. “It really put a
premium on leadership,” said Vaishnav. “It spoke to the attributes that Modi often touts about himself: decisiveness, muscularity, nationalism and to a certain extent
people started to see the vote not about a choice between political alternatives but a vote for the nation.” Modi
styled himself as “chowkidar” –
Hindi for watchman – and made national security the dominant message of the early part of his
campaign.

Disarmament when India currently has a superior arsenal looks like weakness– Modi’s bases leaves
him
Irfan Husain 19 [(Irfan Husain, ) “Wag the dog,” DAWN, 3-2-2019,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1467116?fbclid=IwAR1mPiQpUBG3hYhKsmL2kNF-
Qg8StAeHLUsDT7Lg_vj4Alrmx23D7n_LZnU], (vikram)]
IN the 1997 movie Wag the Dog, a US president’s re-election prospects look dim as a sex scandal
threatens to dominate media coverage of the campaign. Enter Conrad Brean (played by Robert De Niro),
a spin doctor who commissions film producer Stanley Motss (Dustin Hoffman) to fabricate a war with
Albania to divert public attention from the scandal. News clips of ‘Albanian brutalities’ shot in a
Hollywood studio are fed into the mainstream media, and soon, a shrill jingoism dominates the public
discourse. Of course there’s no fighting, but such is the power of fake news that people soon believe
America to be locked in a life or death struggle against tiny Albania. Read: When truth is the first casualty Does any of this
sound familiar? While the scenario could apply to Donald Trump, it is currently more relevant to Narendra

Modi’s India where the incumbent faces a tough re-election battle in a few months. In an increasingly
jingoistic country, a ‘pre-emptive attack’ plays well with the electorate . Never mind that Indian bombs
managed to blow up a few trees, damage a small wheat fiel d and slightly hurt an elderly resident near Balakot. Take a look: Experts
question India’s claim of destroying militant camp near LoC For a day, Indian euphoria was something to behold . Following events
on Twitter, I was taken aback by the amount of hatred and bile, combined with a hysterical triumphalism,
that Indians were posting. Pakistani Twitterati were more restrained, apart from some gung-ho keyboard warriors. On NDTV, the Indian news
channel, a veritable parade of retired generals, air marshals and diplomats vented their fury, and
repeatedly demanded that ‘Pakistan be taught a lesson’. Any moderate voices were immediately drowned
out by anchors baying for blood. It is doubtful if the PM’s offer for talks will be accepted by India. But this
chest-thumping has been scaled back following the downing of an Indian jet and the capture of its pilot over Azad Kashmir. For the time being, Indian triumphalism
has been deflated, particularly after the truth about the Balakot raid has emerged. So what now? I don’t often agree with Prime Minister Imran Khan, but I thought his
recent speech to the joint session of parliament struck the right note of gravitas. His decision to return the captured Indian pilot was entirely appropriate, and has given
Pakistan the high moral ground. But
I doubt if his invitation for talks will be accepted by India: with Modi in full
election mode, any steps towards peace might lose him votes among Hindu nationalists who form the
bulk of his supporters. And in a tight contest against a resurgent Congress, the Indian prime minister is
unlikely to show any flexibility. The best outcome would be for both sides to declare victory and de-
escalate. The risk of cross-border incursions spiralling out of control is too awful to contemplate. Already,
the cost to Pakistan in terms of cancelled flights due to the closure of our airspace has been very high.
Tens of thousands of passengers have been stranded, and the mobilisation of troops on the border is a
very expensive business.
Modi cracks down and detains millions of Muslims to restore popularity, endorses mob violence,
and refuses to protect Muslims and Dalits
Bruenig 19 [(Matt Bruenig, ) “Modi’s Mass Muslim Detention Scheme,” No Publication, 9-27-2019,
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/09/india-narendra-modi-bjp-assam-bengali-muslims-displaced], (vikram)]
The instrument stripping 1.9 million people of rights is the National Register of Citizens (NRC), a now-
arcane institution that was created in 1951 to identify who belonged to India at the time. It was
reincarnated in 2014 and completed its work in Assam this year. 1.9 million people amounts to 6 percent of the total population
of Assam and is two times the number of Rohingya refugees in neighboring Bangladesh. The current incarnation of the NRC’s purpose
was to identify undocumented immigrants from neighboring, Muslim-majority Bangladesh. But its reach
goes far beyond. The new NRC forced all of Assam’s residents to submit documentation like passports, land records, or birth certificates to show they had
been in the country or were descended from people who were in the country on or before midnight of March 24, 1971, the day when Bangladesh went to war for
independence from Pakistan, with India’s eventual armed support. Given the paucity of paper documentation in India and the cumbersome nature of its bureaucratic
machinery, an unsurprisingly large number of people have been adversely affected. 1.9 million people, including those as old as sixty-five, are now legally forced to
go to tribunals and the courts to prove that the only country they have ever lived in should not detain them. Nativist and Nationalist Roots The
modern-day
NRC’s roots lie in the two projects of Assamese nativism and Hindu nationalism in India. The small
northeastern state of Assam has been a hotbed of opposition for more than forty years. The Assam
movement from 1979 to 1985 began as an effort to exclude the non-Assamese from the state. In 1985, the
Congress-led central government signed the Assam Accord with student groups and the state government
committing to the expulsion of alleged foreigners. It is important to note that Assam’s student movement was not at first focused on
undocumented migrants from Bangladesh but on those coming from other parts of India. However, the Hindu right paramilitary organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) that forms the social base for the BJP helped shift the focus of the student-led movement from the non-Assamese in general to specifically Bangladeshi
undocumented migrants. As a result, a movement that began as an effort to preserve the northeastern state’s cultural identity from outsiders — whatever one might
think of such an enterprise — morphed into something far more noxious under the auspices of the RSS: a project to define Bengali Muslims as “infiltrators,” a fifth
column of Muslims who were attempting to undermine the Hindu right’s conception of India. The
Hindu right’s project in Assam is part of
a broader effort typified by the desire to cast doubt on the loyalties of Indian Muslims (they also target
their animosity toward Christians) and their place in the country. The BJP, RSS, and their associated
Hindu right organizations — known collectively as the Sangh Parivar — are seeking to rest rict their
rights as far as possible and transform India into a Herrenvolk democracy. As the rabidly xenophobic Shah put it recently,
the alleged Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh are “termites” to them. “Every infiltrator,” he said, “will be expelled.” The true measure of the NRC’s impact has not
yet been felt. The BJP intends to expand the NRC to a nationwide initiative. Forebodingly, the rollout of the program in Assam was accompanied by instructions from
the central government to states to start building detention centers as part of a nationwide campaign to uproot undocumented immigrants from the country. At least
two are known to be in the works in addition to nearly a dozen in Assam, including a megacomplex, and many more are likely to be built. Political Context With a
second consecutive electoral victory, Hindu nationalists in India are emboldened. They sense an opening
for the establishment of some of their most cherished nightmares. Not only are Muslim residents of
Assam being uprooted, but India is stripping Muslim-majority Kashmir of statehood and its special
autonomous status, leaving it fully occupied, with an unsurprising escalation in reports of human rights
violations by the Indian Army. In schools, the BJP is engaged in the time-honored Indian political tradition of rewriting textbooks, this time with the
noxious agenda of Hindutva at its heart. This has now extended to dictating the syllabus in universities. The attack on universities as spaces for open debate has also
escalated with the Sangh’s recent election victory. The student wing of the Hindu right, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), is slowly but surely gaining
control of student unions. At
the grassroots level, mobs are assaulting with impunity Muslims and Dalits, the
lowest on the caste hierarchy. In some cases, the victims are being forced to recite Hindutva slogans or
are being lynched, and in most cases the perpetrators are not charged. In one particularly heinous case,
they were feted by a government minister. Given the relatively deep roots the secular tradition has among sections of the population, one
might expect the equivalent of “the Resistance,” if not an effective, organized political force, to fight the dominance of Hindutva. But if you can imagine Trump
instituting his agenda without the organizing work of groups like the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) to combat it, or the presence of a strong social-
democratic left to oppose it, that’s what India looks like today. The opposition Congress party, long a dynastic relic that has no real center to its politics, shows little
inclination to stand up to Hindutva’s agenda. While it opposed the NRC in Assam, it has supported it in the central state of Haryana. Congress official and the former
chief minister of the state B. S. Hooda said that “Foreigners have to leave, it is the responsibility of the government to identify them.” The mainstream left in India,
meanwhile, headed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), is thoroughly disorganized, having lost one of its major bases of power, in West Bengal, in the last
election. In its stead rose the BJP in that eastern state for the first time in modern memory. What’s left are a handful of local figures like West Bengal chief minister
Those
Mamata Banerjee, who admirably stood and won against the implementation of the NRC in the state (for now), but who is widely seen as an opportunist.
in India who oppose the right-wing agenda are appalled at what is happening to their country. But with
rarely seen organized opposition on a national scale, it may be too late by the time a resistance gets
mobilized to stop Modi and his henchmen. In the absence of a repatriation treaty with Bangladesh, it is unclear what will eventually happen to
those who are held in detention for ostensibly being undocumented migrants from Bangladesh; there is currently no legal avenue for deportation. Concurrently, the
government has ordered states to build detention centers across the country in places as far flung as Assam in the northeast, Karnataka in the south, and Maharashtra in
the west (all states that have BJP majority governments, incidentally). It has indicated that its inclination is to round up Bangladeshi undocumented migrants across
the country. A Wrench in the Machinery Because this Kafkaesque effort was overseen by the Supreme Court, the project has retained a level of statistical integrity,
actually identifying more Hindus than Muslims to be stripped of their rights. By September 9, it had become clear that the vast majority of those left out of the NRC
were Bengali Hindus who form the traditional voter base for the BJP in Assam and part of its vision for a Hindu nation. Home minister Amit Shah then announced
that the government would be reintroducing the Citizenship Amendment Bill, which would allow for asylum-seeker status for only the non-Muslims excluded from
the NRC. Thus,
the BJP’s true agenda behind the project was again revealed; this was never about identifying
undocumented people at all for the Hindu right. The targets are the 200 million Muslims living in India.

Weak Modi lashes out to shore up his support – empirics prove

Panda, 19
(Panda, Ankit (Adjunct Snr. Fellow@Defense Posture Project and Federation of American Scientists, Snr. Editor@Diplomat, Director of
Research@Diplomat Risk Intelligence, Contributing Editor@War on the Rocks, BA Wilson School of Public Affairs@Princeton University).
“Ending the India-Pakistan Crisis Requires a Courageous Narendra Modi,” The Atlantic, February 28, 2019.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/02/india-modi-pakistan-crisis/583840//SHL)

The standoff between India and Pakistan would be hard enough to resolve if the two countries did not have nuclear weapons. That’s before you
factor in a
jingoistic media scene, the rapid spread of rumors and disinformation on messaging and social-media apps,
and the fact that India’s nationalist prime minister is heading into parliamentary elections. The result: the
worst military crisis between the countries in nearly two decades . Stepping back from the brink now will require political
courage in New Delhi and reciprocity in Islamabad. This latest dispute has several causes. First, there’s the historical, territorial, and fundamental
national-identity issues that remain unresolved between them. Then there’s the Pakistani military-intelligence complex’s use of non-state actors
against India over a span of several years. And finally, there’s the proximal cause of today’s crisis—that after years of absorbing terrorist attacks
conceived and planned on Pakistani soil, India chose to say enough was enough. The Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammed has claimed
responsibility for an attack two weeks ago that struck a convoy of Indian paramilitary personnel, killing 40 Indians. New Delhi promised
with air strikes against what it said was a terrorist camp near the Pakistani town of Balakot—
retaliation, and delivered
the first such move involving the use of conventional airpower by one nuclear-armed state against the
territory of another. The Indian foreign ministry claimed the strikes were “preemptive” and the targets “non-military.” The choice of
target, similarly, was based on what the Indian foreign secretary said was credible intelligence. Above all, the Indian side emphasized the status
of Jaish-e-Mohammed as a repeat offender. India had endured a 2001 attack on its parliament planned by the group and a January 2016 assault on
an airbase—both without retaliating, even as the 2001 incident brought both sides to the brink of war. Other attacks, in July 2015 and September
2016, had been carried out by Pakistan-based militants, with the latter prompting India to take limited military action in the form of what it called
“surgical strikes.” In November 2008, most infamously, terrorists belonging to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba staged an attack on civilians in
Mumbai. Given this history, India’s latest strike was not, in the country’s view, an act of war, but one of self-defense. India’s broad practice of
strategic restraint since the 2002 crisis had, in a way, allowed it to accumulate years of credibility on the international stage that was, in effect,
“spent” this week with its strike at Balakot. Nevertheless, the ingress into Pakistani territory for the first time since the 1971 war between the two
countries left the Pakistani military embarrassed. Swift retaliation was promised—and Pakistan delivered with strikes of its own across the Line
of Control, the de facto border. Indian jets pursued the Pakistani fighters that had conducted the strikes, suffering losses in the process. One
Indian pilot was captured alive and remains in Pakistani custody. The ingredients are now present for an all-out conflagration. Headlines the
world over have emphasized the countries’ status as nuclear powers, underscoring the stakes. But there’s a choice now over how this might end—
and it is largely India’s to make. Pakistan’s response has reset the onus for retaliation on New Delhi, and finding a way out that’s acceptable to
both countries will not be easy. India’s action is without precedent since the nuclear age began in South Asia. True, the two countries fought a
war in 1999 under the nuclear overhang, but that conflict took place within politically proscribed limits, with then–Indian Prime Minister Atal
Behari Vajpayee having specifically instructed the military to not cross the Line of Control at any cost. While New
Delhi’s latest decision to
retaliate was based on national security, its leadership had to concern itself with more mundane questions of political
expediency too. India is just weeks away from a general election that will once again see the world’s largest exercise in
democracy take place. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his nationally dominant Bharatiya Janata Party could have faced
electoral trouble if they mismanaged the response . And though much about the current crisis has its roots in familiar issues,
what is different this time for the two countries rattling sabers, after their respective nuclear breakouts, is the proliferation of social media and the
growth of nationalistic television-news networks—primarily in India. The
Indian government is culpable too for egging on
the sort of public opinion that now corners it ahead of the election ; the 2016 “surgical strikes” were immortalized in a
Bollywood film recently. Unlike in previous cases, a bout of American shuttle diplomacy may not be an option, either; the U.S. State
Department’s South Asia desk remains manned largely by acting officials, and the United States has no permanent ambassador to Pakistan. Other
powers such as China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran lack the credibility to serve the “honest broker” role that Washington was once able to play
adeptly in South Asia. Pakistan’s envoy in Washington has called for American involvement, but New Delhi may favor bilateral resolution.
India’s best course of action would be to focus its diplomatic energy on a long-standing campaign to isolate Pakistan until it systematically
changes its ways on the use of proxy groups, and its military energy on denying Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba access to their targets.
Yet for Modi, an avowed nationalist, the safer course of action in the short term appears to be erring on
the side of strength and resolve. This may have been the underpinning of why India took the sort of action it
did, instead of retaliating in a less escalatory manner —such as into Pakistan-administered Kashmir, a disputed territory. Since
the 1971 war, the use of air forces between the two countries has been seen as uniquely escalatory .

https://www.nei.org/fundamentals/nuclear-waste

Turns the case

Pifer 16
(Steven Pifer is director of the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and a senior fellow in the
Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. He served more than 25 years as a career Foreign Service
officer, including assignments as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and special assistant to the president and senior
director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia on the National Security Council, and with the U.S. delegation to the
negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces., Nuclear Arms Control Choices for the Next Administration,
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series Paper 13 • October 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/acnpi_20161025_arms_control_choices_final.pdf, JKS)

In May 2002, Bush and Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). A two-page agreement with
no agreed definitions, counting rules or verification measures, SORT constrained each side to no more than 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed
strategic warheads, the Bush administration’s planned number for U.S. strategic forces.8 SORT was set to expire by its terms on December 31, 2012—the day that the
limits were scheduled to take effect. Moreover, the treaty did not limit the number of strategic missiles and bombers (though
those were still constrained by the START I Treaty, whose terms lasted until 2009). Under SORT, the United States counted the actual
number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs plus the number of bombs and nuclear-armed ALCMs at
nuclear-capable bomber bases as “operationally deployed.” It is not clear that the Russians employed
the same counting rules; some analysts suggested that Moscow did not count bomber weapons as those weapons were not deployed on the aircraft.
START I remained in force until December 2009. Toward the end of the Bush administration, U.S. and Russian experts discussed whether some arrangement in
addition to SORT might be agreed as START I lapsed in order to maintain some of START I’s monitoring provisions. The
U.S. side, however, was
not prepared to consider limits on strategic delivery vehicles, which the Russian side sought. No
agreement was reached.

UV
 No 1AR Theory
Don’t vote on 1AR theory-

1. Response skew- if they make bad 2AR responses to the counter-interp I can’t respond to them.

2. Harms debate structure- if the 1AR is conclusively losing they can go for new theory to make the
round a toss-up

3. Increases abusive theory- judges intervene against 2NR metatheory because it becomes irresolvable.
That means the aff can read a ton of abusive shells in the 1AR.

4. I can’t respond to 2AR weighing arguments- this means they’ll go for whatever standards I
undercover.

5. Strat skew- the 2NR can’t cover everything because the 2AR can always dump on the RVI debate
preventing strategic decisions in the 2NR.

6. Weighing- the abuse from reading 1AR theory outweighs the abuse on the shell because they could
have substantively responded to the NC but responses on 1AR shells are skewed

7. Risk of any of these standards comes before the shell- even if there’s abuse of the NC treat it as
inadmissible evidence because it was read in an abusive way.

8. The 2AR has to line-by-line these arguments otherwise they’re just proving my point of nullifying the
2NR speech time if they can gloss over these arguments and still win.

9. If any of these reasons go conceded its automatically enough to reject the shell- I did everything I
could to beat 1AR theory- you have to err neg on this issue because if they don’t respond on the line by
line I’ve done everything I can do to win this debate.

Case
Misclac

History shows that miscalculations are unlikely

Sokolski 16 Sokolski, Henry [Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center] “Should We Let
the Bomb Spread?” Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College, November 2016,
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1021744.pdf. 

Accidental or Inadvertent Detonation. A common concern has been that the weapons would somehow go off by
accident or miscalculation, devastating the planet in the process. In 1960, a top nuclear strategist declared it “most
unlikely” that the world could live with an uncontrolled arms race for decades. Moreover, in 1979, political scientist
Hans J. Morgenthau declared: The world is moving ineluctably towards a third world war—a strategic nuclear war. I
do not believe that anything can be done to prevent it. The international system is simply too unstable to survive for
long. In addition, Eric Schlosser remains deeply concerned about that danger today. In a 1982 New Yorker essay and
best-selling book, both titled The Fate of the Earth, Jonathan Schell passionately, if repetitively, argued the not
entirely novel proposition that nuclear war would be terrible, and he concluded ominously: One day—and it is hard to
believe that it will not be soon—we will make our choice. Either we will sink into the final coma and end it all or, as I
trust and 80 believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril . . . and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons.
As it happened, both options were avoided: Neither final coma nor nuclear cleansing ever took place. The
common alarmist prognostications assuming that, because the weapons exist, sooner or later
one or more of them will necessarily go off, has now failed to deliver for 70 years—this suggests
that something more than luck is operating.

Prempt/escalation

War stays contained

Dyer 2 [(Gwynne, independent journalist, syndicated columnist and military historian) “Nuclear war a
possibility over Kashmir,” Hamilton Spectator, May 24, 2002]

damage would be largely confined to the region. The Cold War

For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the

is over, the strategic understandings that once tied India and Pakistan to the rival alliance systems have all
been cancelled, and no outside powers would be drawn into the fighting. The detonation of a hundred or so relatively small
nuclear weapons over India and Pakistan would not cause grave harm to the wider world from fallout.

Odds of the war going nuclear are ZERO. Their high probability assessment is media hype
Enders 02 [David Enders, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” Michigan Daily, January 30th, 2002, pg. http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-
say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely.

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear
war between India and Pakistan.

"Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and
Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of
leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."
The world"s two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous.

"The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said.

the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul
"Watching
Huth said.
Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war.

"India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first
strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."

Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a
country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction,"
Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal.

since September 11, it is that the

"American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened
command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands."
But the low probability of nuclear war does not mean tensions between the two countries who have fought three wars since they were created
in 1947 will not erupt. "The possibility of conventional war between the two is higher. Both sides are looking for ways out of the current tension," Lieberthal
said.

aims.23

option.26

Offensive-defensive military doctrine prevents quick escalation

Lavoy 03 - Senior Lecturer of National Security Affairs @ Naval Postgraduate School. [Peter R. Lavoy (Former Director for
Counterproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense & Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley) and MAJ Stephen A.
Smith, “The Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear Use Between India and Pakistan,” Strategic Insight, February 3, 2003, pg.
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/feb03/southAsia2.asp]

Both India and Pakistan have offensively oriented conventional military doctrines.India has developed an offensive-defensive military
doctrine that calls for aggressive offensive action to pre-empt or counter-attack the enemy. Currently, India is exploring the concept of limited
conventional war based on the notion of strategic space between low-intensity conflicts and full-scale conventional war.
This concept is fueled by political and public pressure within India to launch conventional military strikes against Pakistan in retaliation for Pakistan's alleged support
The Pakistani army also relies on an offensive-defensive strategy, which is characterized by retaining
of terrorism.[3]
adequate reserves at successive force levels, surprise, and aggressive leadership. This strategy calls for the Pakistan army to detect the initial
enemy thrust, take effective counter measures to limit penetration, and simultaneously attack the adversary to capture or threaten a strategic

terror
Nuclear Terrorism is extremely unlikely
Chapman 08 Steve Chapman, 2-14-2008, "Why nuclear terrorism is so unlikely," No Publication,
https://theweek.com/articles/516801/why-nuclear--terrorism-unlikely
But the chances of al Qaeda or another terrorist group carrying out a nuclear attack here,
nuclear experts say, are “vanishingly small.” Terrorists would first have to steal about 100
pounds of bomb fuel from a government, and then transport the material hundreds of miles
across borders without detection. Even if that were possible, [to] building a bomb isn’t
something you can do in a garage or a cave; you need specialized, high-tech equipment,
and people with training and skills. Any weapon would then have to be smuggled into the
U.S. without detection—and without anyone in the expanding circle of conspirators screwing
up. 

Also Last card in K proves it solves because terrorist would have no state to resist against.

US RuSSian stuff
No link on how Indo Pak leads to US Russia drop the arg
No U.S.-Russian war—they’ll never risk it
Ted Galen Carpenter 18, senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 7-28-
2018, "Russia Is Not the Soviet Union," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-not-
soviet-union-27041?page=0%2C1)
and capabilities to match. It controlled an empire in Eastern Europe and cultivated allies and clients around the world, including in such far-flung places as Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola. The
USSR also intensely contested the United States for influence in all of those areas. Conversely, Russia is merely a regional power with very limited extra-regional reach. The Kremlin’s ambitions
are focused heavily on the near abroad, aimed at trying to block the eastward creep of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.-led intrusion into Russia’s core security zone.
 It would be difficult for Russia to execute anything more than a very
The orientation seems far more defensive than offensive.

geographically limited expansionist agenda, even if it has one. The Soviet Union was the world’s number two economic power, second only to the United
States. Russia has an economy roughly the size of Canada’s and is no longer ranked even in the global top

ten . It also has only three-quarters of the Soviet Union’s territory (much of which is nearly-empty Siberia) and barely half
the population of the old USSR. If that were not enough, that population is shrinking and is afflicted with an
assortment of public health problems (especially rampant alcoholism). All of these factors should make it evident that Russia is not a
credible rival, much less an existential threat, to the United States and its democratic system . Russia's power is a pale shadow
of the Soviet Union's. The only undiminished source of clout is the country's sizeable nuclear arsenal. But while nuclear weapons are the
ultimate deterrent, they are not very useful for power projection or warfighting, unless the political
leadership wants to risk national suicide. And there is no evidence whatsoever that Putin and his
oligarch backers are suicidal. Quite the contrary, they seem wedded to accumulating ever greater
wealth and perks.

Kashmir
1960s disputes empirically deny conflict
Deterrence solves
Ganguly 2008, Professor of Political at Indiana University, (Sumit “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security, Volume 33,
Number 2, 11/21/8, Muse AS)

As the outcomes of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises show, nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Both
crises were contained at levels considerably short of full-scale war . That said, as Paul Kapur has
argued, Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may well have emboldened its leadership,
secure in the belief that India had no good options to respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an
effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while
containing the possibilities of conflict escalation, especially to the nuclear level.78 organization.80
Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did multiply during the 1990s, it is difficult to
establish a firm causal connection between the growth of Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of
a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Second, India did respond with considerable force once its
military planners realized the full scope and extent of the intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite
the vigor of this response, India did exhibit restraint. For example, Indian pilots were under strict
instructions not to cross the Line of Control in pursuit of their bombing objectives.81 They adhered to
these guidelines even though they left them more vulnerable to Pakistani ground fire.82 The Indian
military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a wider attack into Pakistan-
controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident at another level.
During the last war in [End Page 66] Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its onset, the Indian Army
horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces
successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the regional to attack across
the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these significant differences and advantages, the Indian
political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope of the conflict to the Kargil region. As K.
Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political commentator, wrote in 1993: [End Page
67] The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble
nuclear weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of
India. In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its "Operation Gibraltar" and sent in infiltrators, India sent its
army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly points of the infiltrators. That escalated into a
full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained
in Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send its army into
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.87 Subrahmanyam's argument takes on additional significance in light of the
overt acquisition of nuclear weapons by both

Impacts
We already took out all impacts proving there is imperically
no chance of conflict inany situation.

Star 15- Gerneal about nuke war doesn’t specifically pertain

to Indo Pak reject the impacts.

We win on timeline meaning DA outweighs as it comes faster

that the aff.