SY 2018-2019
FACTUM PROBANDUM V. FACTUM PROBANS
Gomez v. Gomez
To prove the allegation that the deeds of donations were forgeries, the plaintiff
introduced evidence that the Donor’s Tax was only paid after the death of the
donor.
The factum probans which the plaintiffs introduced to establish their factum
probandum is insufficient.
(a) Factum probandum is that the deeds of donations were forgeries, and
(b) Factum probans was that the donor’s tax was only paid after the donor’s
death.
RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
It does not necessarily follow that just because the donor’s taxes were paid
after the death of the donor, the donor did not sign the deeds of donation.
After all, it is not always a requirement that the donor’s taxes be paid during
the donor’s lifetime.
RELEVANCY AND COMPETENCY
State of Missouri v. William Arthur Bull
Arthur Bull was arrested for robbery weeks after the occurrence of the crime.
During his arrest, the police were able to recover from his possession some
dollar bills and coins which were used as evidence during trial. Bull objects to
the cash recovered from him as “immaterial and irrelevant”, neither tended to
prove nor disprove any of the issues involved in this case.
In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money
in Bull’s possession at the time of his arrest came from or had some connection
with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness
before the robbery and his sudden affluence, the evidence was not in fact
relevant. There is no logical connection between the fact of possession of the
dollar bills on one hand and robbery on the other. The mere possession of a
quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of
money charged as taken, because in general, all money of the same
denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found
is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be
receivable.
Lopez v. Heesen
Due to an accident while hunting, a case for damages was filed against Mr.
Heesen and the storeowner who sold the rifle to the former. The complaint
alleged that the rifle that Sears sold to Heesen was negligently designed or
manufactured and that the safety mechanism moved readily and in a
dangerous manner from a “safe” to a “fire” position. By way of defense, the
storeowner presented an expert witness on gun-making to testify on the good
reputation of two manufacturers: (1) manufacturer of the rifle, and (2)
manufacturer of the safety mechanism – that during their entire corporate
existence, they never had a complaint for accidental firing. The admission of
this evidence was objected to on the ground of irrelevancy.
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Anything that throws light upon an issue should be admitted by the court as
relevant. The reputation of the manufacturers is relevant to the issue of
whether the safety device of the rifle involved is really defective. If they had a
good reputation, then it throws light upon the issue.
Elements of admissibility: Section 3, Rule 128
(a) Relevancy – It is relevant when it has tendency in reason to prove or
disprove a fact in issue. It is governed by logic, common sense, and human
experience.
(b) Competency – It is competent when it is not excluded by the rules.
People v. Marti
Defendants went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages
to Switzerland. Before delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the
proprietor of the courier company, following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened the box, a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. He took samples of the contents thereof. He reported this
to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the
presence of the NBI agents, the proprietor opened the suspicious package and
found dried-marijuana leaves inside.
WON the marijuana leaves found inside the package is admissible in evidence?
YES
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals. It will be recalled that the proprietor was the one who opened the
box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere
presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
People v. Salanguit
Before application of SW, a poseur-buyer had a transaction with the accused.
The sale took place in accused's room, and the poseur-buyer saw that the
shabu was taken from a cabinet inside his room. The police, then armed with
SW, went to the house of the accused to seize undetermined quantity of shabu
and other drug paraphernalia. saw that the shabu was taken by accused-
appellant from a cabinet inside his room. In the course of the search, they
recovered shabu and drug paraphernalia. They conducted further search which
led to the discovery of dried marijuana leaves wrapped with newspaper, which
is not included in the list of items to be seized in the SW.
WON the marijuana leaves seized are admissible? NO
When the purpose of the search warrant is accomplished, any further searches
cannot be justified under plain view doctrine. The discovery of dried marijuana
leaves cannot be considered valid under the plain view doctrine because the
police has no prior and valid justification for the intrusion. It can validly be
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
presumed that the shabu was first discovered because the police has
knowledge of the location being the applicant of the warrant.
Homar vs. People
Petitioner was accosted by a police officer and a civilian agent when the latter
saw petitioner crossing a “No jaywalking” portion of Roxas Boulevard and was
told to cross at the designated area by pointing to him the right place for
crossing. Upon crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped and
frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused him of being
a holdupper, and forced him to go with them. They also confiscated the kitchen
knife, which he carried to cut cords. He was likewise investigated for alleged
possession of shabu and detained for one day. The petitioner did not timely
object to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In addition, he
actively participated in the trial of the case.
Search incidental to lawful arrest? NO
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, 2 requisites must concur:
1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and
2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting
officer.
The prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime.
The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner
allegedly crossed. Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner "crossed the
street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing."
The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The
waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the accused. Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest,
its inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and justifies the acquittal of
the petitioner.
People vs. Musa
A Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team planned a buy-bust operation to arrest
Musa. Ani, the poseur buyer, approached Musa, who came out of his house,
and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave
Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Musa went back
to his house and came back and gave Ani 2 newspaper wrappers containing
dried marijuana. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back
towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams on
standby sped towards the location and arrested Musa. When Musa was frisked,
the P20.00 marked money was no longer with him. Musa was then asked where
it was and he told the team he has given the money to his wife. They then
searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized what was
described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of
the kitchen." They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a
response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves.
Admissible under plain view doctrine? NO
SY 2018-2019
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest,
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence. However, the plastic bag in this case
was not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant since the
team had to move from one portion of the house to another before they
sighted the plastic bag. Moreover, the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the
seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the "plain view" of the object. What may be said to be the object
in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. It cannot
be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE
Waterous Drug Corp. v. NLRC
A pharmacist was terminated after she was found to be receiving kickbacks
from a supplier. One of the evidence presented against her were checks placed
inside an envelope delivered by the supplier to her but was seen by another
employee. According to the employee, the envelope was already opened when
he took possession. This check was used as evidence and as basis for the
termination. The pharmacist claimed violation of her constitutional right to
privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
WON the evidence is admissible? YES
The constitutional protection on privacy of communication and against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person
from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
People vs. Damaso
The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA
members in Dagupan City. When they reached the house, Damaso was not
around. But his alleged helper, Luz Morados, allowed the group to enter inside
the house. When the helper opened one of the rooms, they saw subversive
materials and one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions which they confiscated.
They claimed that the search and seizure was valid pursuant to waiver of the
right and plain view doctrine.
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. In the
case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time.
There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed
the appellant's helper, or if it was true that she was his helper, that the
appellant had given her authority to open his house in his absence. As a
consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal.
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Padilla vs. CA
Enrique Manarang noticed Padilla’s car running fast. After a while, a screech of
tires was heard and thus, made the officer run out and investigate. Not so long,
the car continued to run, so a hot-pursuit took place. Manarang then radioed
the incident to the Police. When the car was put to a stop, the driver rolled
down the windows with his hands raised. While apprehended, because of the
hit-and-run incident, the police saw the revolver tucked in the left waist of
Robin. So, the police insisted that the gun be shown in the office if it was legal.
The crowd had formed and Robin was shaking their hands and pointing to the
police while saying “iyan kinuha ang baril ko”, as if it was in the movies. The
gesture then revealed a magazine clip of a rifle which made the police suspect
that there is a rifle inside the vehicle. Then the rifle was seen. The other
firearms were voluntarily surrendered by Robin.
WON the search and seizure of the firearm and ammunitions was valid? YES
There was a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. In flagrante
delicto requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while
he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in
the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both elements
concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a
hit and run – an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private
person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. The policemen's warrantless
arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under hot pursuit as he had in
fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan
bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves
the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number, and the
dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police
officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was
indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. The seizure of the
revolver and the M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain
view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies
to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent
to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle
lying horizontally near the driver's seat. With respect to the Berreta pistol and
a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered
them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his
right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the
information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. Even assuming
that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by
the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a
search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a
protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle
which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the
offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item
to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate
control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. Another
justification is a search of a moving vehicle. In connection therewith, a
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or
cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the
proceeds of some criminal offense.
People v. Aminnudin
The police, 2 days before the date of the arrest already received confidential
reports that the accused would be arriving in the port of Iloilo City, on board
M/V Wilcon, transporting drugs. The information of the police included the
identity suspect, the vessel, and the time of the arrival. Acting on the
confidential report, the police positioned themselves waiting for the vessel to
arrive. When the confidential informant identified Aminnudin, the police
apprehended him and effected a warrantless arrest and as an incident thereto,
a search was effected on his body and his bag which yielded dried marijuana.
The case presented no urgency as it is clear that they had at least 2 days within
which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who
was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle
was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information
they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary." Here, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had
just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel.
People v. Zenaida Quebral
A day before the arrest, the police received confidential information that 2 men
and a woman were to make a drug deal somewhere, but at no specific time.
This led to a surveillance the following day where a jeepney with the identified
plate number was followed to a nearby gasoline station. A Tamaraw FX arrived,
where a man alighted and approached the woman from the jeepney. In the
course of their conversation, the woman handed a white envelope to the man.
It was at this precise moment that the police swooped down and seized the
envelope and opened it which yielded illegal drugs. Arrest then ensued.
This was more a search preceding an arrest. Probable cause was established
through the confidential report of the police informer corroborated with what
the police witnessed before the search and arrest. The police acted on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed. Since the seized shabu
resulted from a valid search, it is admissible in evidence against the accused.
For purposes of search (NOT arrest), tipped information is enough, provided
that it coincides with the actual condition in the field as witnessed by the
arresting officer.
SY 2018-2019
MIRANDA RIGHTS
People v. Eric Guillermo
At around noontime, Guillermo looked through the holes in the dividing wall
and calmly told Campos, the security guard, that he killed his employer.
Campos then called the police to report the incident. The police brought
Guillermo to the PNP Station for further investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted
the investigation, without apprising the appellant about his constitutional
rights and without providing him with the services of counsel. But while he was
detained, he was interviewed by Gus Abelgas and Karen Davila where he was
remorseless and even took pride in admitting that he killed his abusive
employer.
Appellant’s alleged confession to the police lacks the safeguards required by
the Bill of Rights. However, the prosecution has amply proven the appellant’s
guilt in killing Keyser with the following:
(a) Spontaneous and out-of-court admissions he made to Campos and the
two media reports, Abelgas and David and
(b) Positive evidence, including the instruments of the crime, together with
the medical evidence and testimonies of credible prosecution witness.
Miranda rights do not apply to situations where confession is made to a private
citizen – security guard and media.
People v. Bokingco
This involves a brutal murder of an employer. The 2 accused, Bokingo and Col,
were arrested, and during the PI before the public prosecutor, Bokingo made
an extrajudicial admission detailing how they planned and executed the killing.
He admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the
killing several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion. During pre-
trial, Bokingo entered a guilty plea while Col opted for a not guilty plea.
In as much as Bokingo’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him
(Miranda Rights violation), it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically
where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration
or omission of another (res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet).
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is
not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay
against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made
by a conspirator. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received
against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission
relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant
was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have previously discussed,
we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is
inadmissible in evidence against Col.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
People v. Adrian Guting
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On the rainy afternoon, while PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi were standing in front
of the Camiling Police Station, accused Guting, all wet from the rain and with a
bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly approached them. He proclaimed that his
father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who killed accused-
appellant's father. Accused- appellant answered, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay
ko! Napatay ko na po!” Accused argues that his oral confession without the
assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in
blatant violation of his constitutional right.
Guting was not under custodial investigation (requisites). Moreover, the verbal
confession falls under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the notion that
no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true. Accused-
appellant's declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae. A
declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when these three requisites concur: (1) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. All the requisites are present in this case.
People vs. Andan
This involves the rape and slay of a 19 year old student. When the suspect was
arrested and while detained in the police precinct, the mayor paid him a visit.
The suspect requested to confer with the mayor, where he broke down and
confessed. The mayor opened the room in order that the public and media may
witness the confession. Since no lawyer was available, the mayor ordered the
proceedings to be photographed and videotaped. He was again interviewed by
reporters wherein he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the
crime.
WON the confession to the mayor is admissible? YES
It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over
the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.
However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. When appellant talked with him as a confidant and
not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not
violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the
crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude
the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth.
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
Villaflor vs. Summers
In an adultery case, the prosecution wanted to examine the accused to
determine if she’s pregnant so she was subjected to pregnancy test.
The kernel of the privilege was testimonial compulsion. The constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of
the body of the accused is permissible.
Pascual v. Medical Board of Examiners
An administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. was filed for alleged
immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, the plaintiff’s counsel announced
that he would present respondent Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected,
relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against
himself.
WON a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case
can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself?
YES
The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine
while administrative in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An
unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the license of the
respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take the
witness stand. While a crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must
be revealed, such desirable objective should not be accomplished according to
means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the
human personality.
Cabal v. Kapunan
This involves an administrative complaint against a member of the military. He
was accused of graft and corruption, unexplained wealth and gross misconduct
before the Office of the Secretary of National Defense. During the hearing, the
complainant moved that their first witness be the respondent himself. The
respondent objected invoking the right against self-incrimination.
In this case, while it is an administrative proceeding, it is criminal in nature in
the sense that if he be found guilty, he stands the risk of his property being
forfeited and be dismissed from service. Thus, he may not be forced to take
the witness stand like an accused in a criminal case.
Beltran v. Samson
During an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it, the
accused was compelled to produce a sample of his handwriting for purposes of
comparing the same with the document allegedly falsified by the accused.
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man
accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred,
and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is
strong and the evidence obscure, that it is the duty of courts liberally to
construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any
steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well- established
doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of
oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means
SY 2018-2019
than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused
has a right to hold secret. Writing is something more than moving the body, or
the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical and attention.
Writing means that the petitioner is to furnish a means to determine or not he
is the falsifier.
US v. Tan Teng
This involves a prosecution for rape where the victim, as a result of the
molestations, was shown to be suffering from gonorrhea. In order to affirm
that the accused was the one responsible for the sexual offense, he was forced
to submit himself to a medical examination. There were substances discharged
from his body which were subjected to a medical examination which yielded a
positive result that the accused was suffering from gonorrhea.
An inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, cannot violate
the privilege because it does not call upon the accused as a witness — it does
not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Evidence
obtained in this way from the accused, is not testimony but his body itself.
Rosete vs. Lim
Respondents Lim filed a civil case (Annulment, Specific Performance with
Damages) and 2 criminal cases (BP 22 and estafa) involving the same set of
facts. Respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of
petitioners Mapalo and Rosete. In response, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion and Objection to Take Deposition, arguing that, since there are 2
criminal cases pending involving the same set of facts, to permit the taking of
the deposition would be violative of their right against self-incrimination
because by means of oral deposition, respondents would seek to establish
allegations of fact in the complaint which are also the allegations of fact in the
complaint affidavits in the said criminal case.
As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse outright to
take the stand as a witness. An ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action), on
the other hand, may not disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the
court or to refuse to testify altogether. His right against self- incrimination can
be claimed only when a specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually
put to the witness. However, this rule admits of an exception and that is when
such civil or administrative proceeding partakes of the nature of a criminal
proceeding. In this case, the case is civil, it being a suit for annulment, specific
performance with damages. The fact that there are 2 criminal cases pending
which are allegedly based on the same set of facts as that of the civil case will
not give them the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their
depositions as they are not facing criminal charges in the civil case.
People v. Bokingo
This involves a brutal murder of an employer. The 2 accused, Bokingo and Col,
were arrested, and during the PI before the public prosecutor, Bokingo made
an extrajudicial admission detailing how they planned and executed the killing.
He admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the
killing several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion. During pre-
trial, Bokingo enetered a guilty plea while Col opted for a not guilty plea.
4 | Page| K.D.Alianza
In as much as Bokingo’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him
(Miranda Rights violation), it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically
where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration
or omission of another (res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet).
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is
not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay
against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made
by a conspirator. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received
against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission
relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant
was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have previously discussed,
we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is
inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Jaime dela Cruz v. People
The accused is a policeman who was arrested for alleged extortion. When he
got arrested, he was brought to the police precinct where he was forced to
produce urine sample for drug testing. When subjected to confirmatory test, it
yielded the result of the presence of shabu. Consequently, he was charged,
prosecuted and convicted of illegal possession of drugs under Sec. 15, Art2 of
RA 9165. RTC and CA ruled that the extraction of petitioner's urine for purposes
of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept
of a custodial investigation."
Despite the fact that petitioner never raised the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment, this does not mean that he has waived his right to question
the inadmissibility of evidence taken during an illegal warrantless arrest. The
drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. There are
cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed, however, the
pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of the
arrest. However, in the case, there is no connection of obtaining a urine sample
to the charge of extortion.
De Castro v. People
Matugina and Cornejo left their passbook with de Castro as instructed by her.
Eventually, Branch Manager discovered that their accounts had withdrawal
slips containing signatures radically different from the specimen signatures.
Upon notification, the depositors denied that it was their signature affixed to
the withdrawal slips. The findings were reported to the superiors which
ultimately led to de Castro confessing her guilt. She then executed 3 more
statements in response to the investigation conducted by the bank’s internal
auditors. She also gave a list of the depositors’ accounts from which she drew
cash and which were listed methodically in her diary. Using her statements as
evidence, she was convicted with 4 counts of estafa through falsification of a
commercial document by forging the signatures of bank depositors.
Admissible? Yes
The accused is not under custodial investigation. She was not even being
investigated by any police or law enforcement officer. She was under
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
administrative investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely
voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She
was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or pressured
to say anything. It was an act of conscience that compelled her to speak, a true
mental and moral catharsis that religion and psychology recognize to have
salutary effects on the soul.
US v. Ong Siu Hong
The accused was forced to discharge the morphine from his mouth.
Admissible? YES
The main purpose of the constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial
compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from
prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime. It is just a mechanical
act – an object evidence, not testimonial evidence.
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES ON EVIDENCE
PDIC vs Casimiro
After the BSP Monetary Board ordered BDBI's closure, PDIC started to perform
its functions as statutory receiver, which includes, among others, the control,
management, and administration of BDBI as well as investigating the causes of
BDBI's closure. In the course of the receivership, Gomez — a former Cashier,
Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI — came forward and through her
affidavit, reported the purported scheme perpetrated by private respondents
that fraudulently concealed BDBI's true condition as a banking entity. The
Ombudsman found Gomez's affidavit showing Apelo as the source of the
"advance warnings" received by Cu in connection with the BSP examinations to
be inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.
WON the Ombudsman was correct in discrediting Gomez’s affidavit as
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay? NO
Owing to the initiatory nature of PIs, the technical rules of evidence should not
be applied in the course of its proceedings. Hearsay evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because such
investigation is merely preliminary and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties. Further, the determination of probable cause can rest
partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence, as long as the person making
the hearsay statement is credible.
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Azolla Farms vs. CA
In need of funds for a certain project, Azolla Farms obtained a loan from a bank.
When the loan was approved, the bank did not release the entire proceeds of
the loan at once but released on installment basis. The bank learned that the
president diverted the proceeds of the loan for purposes other than the project
for which the loan was applied. Thus, the bank refused to release the remaining
SY 2018-2019
proceeds of the loan, resulting in the eventual failure of the project. A
complaint was then filed by Azolla Farms and the President against the bank.
In the complaint, they admitted that the loan transactions and other collateral
agreements that they entered into were all legal. Their only complaint was the
malicious refusal by the bank to release the remaining proceeds of the loan.
However, during trial, one of the witnesses of the bank testified and disclosed
some facts establishing that the transactions were somehow invalid. Taking cue
from the disclosures made by the witness, Azolla Farms and the President tried
to amend their complaint to now include an allegation that the transaction was
invalid and prayed that it be declared null and void.
JUDICIAL vis-a-vis EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
People v. Lauga
The accused father raped his own daughter. The family sought the assistance
of Banting who is a “bantay bayan” in the barangay. After he was invited to
police station for an investigation regarding the charge, Banting testified that
the accused admitted to him that he indeed raped his daughter because he was
unable to control himself.
WON the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a
counsel, to Banting inadmissible in evidence? YES
Barangay- based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in
the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the LGU to perform functions
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Banting, and the specific
scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly
on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has
the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of
a suspect to his Miranda Rights is concerned.
Republic of the Philippines v. Kenrick Development Corporation
The OSG filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of
certificates of title in behalf of the Republic against Concepcion and Kenrick.
Kenrick filed an answer which was allegedly signed by its counsel Atty. Garlitos
Jr. A congressional hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land
registration and titling was conducted. Atty. Garlitos, as respondent’s former
counsel, was summoned. He testified that he prepared respondent’s answer
and transmitted an unsigned draft to Kenrick’s president, Mr. Ong. However,
the signature appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no one to
sign in his behalf either, and he did not know who finally signed it.
Republic
Since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty.
Garlitos nor even known to him, it was effectively an unsigned pleading.
RTC: ordered the answer to be stricken from the records; declared Kenrick in
default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte. It was argued
5 | Page| K.D.Alianza
that Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the legislative hearing is unreliable since they
were not subjected to cross-examination.
WON the
By the principle of adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes the
admission of the party embracing or espousing it. This may occur when a party:
a) Expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another
b) Hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it
c) Utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertions of another
d) Replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but
ignores further points which he or she has heard the other maker
e) Reads and signs a written statement made by another
Kenrick accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on
them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsel's
statements. Kenrick completely adopted Garlitos’ statements as its own. The
adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on
it.
ANTI-WIRETAPPING ACT
Gaanan vs. IAC
Atty. Pintor and his client Montebon were in the living room of Pintor’s
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault against Laconico. After they finalized the conditions, Pintor called
Laconico. Laconico’s regular lawyer Atty. Gonzaga was on a business trip. Thus,
Laconico called Atty. Gaanan and asked him to come to his office. There, he
requested Gaanan to secretly listen to his phone call with Pintor, using a
telephone extension. Gaanan overheard Pintor give numerous demands for
money, public apologies and secrecy. Laconico insisted that he and Pintor
should meet to exchange the money. Pintor was later arrested and Gaanan
executed an affidavit stating that he heard Pintor demand P8k for the
withdrawal of the case. This was attached to the complainant for robbery /
extortion against Pintor. Since Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation
without his consent, Pintor charged the former and Laconico with violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The law refers to a ‘tap’ of a wire or cable or the use of ‘device or arrangement’
for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording
communication. There must either be:
1. Physical interruption through a wiretap, or
2. Deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record spoken words.
The secretly overhearing of the conversation using a telephone extension line
does not fall in the first mode because there is no tapping as a telephone
extension is part of the telephone mechanism and it is there for a legitimate
purpose. It also does not fall under the second mode. Applying ejusdem
generis, a telephone extension line is not of same category as dictaphone,
dictagraph, or other devices enumerated in the Act.
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
Salcedo-Ortañez v. CA
Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against
Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological
incapacity. Among the exhibits offered by Ortanez were 3 cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between Salcedo-Ortanez and unidentified
persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when Rafael allowed
his friends from the military to wiretap his home telephone.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory.
Ramirez v. CA
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil
case alleging that Garcia vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and
furious mood and in a manner offensive to her dignity and personality, contrary
to morals, good customs and public policy. Garcia then filed a criminal case for
violation of RA 4200. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information,
arguing that the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.
Section 1 of R.A. 4200: It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any".
People vs. Navarro
Jalbuena and Lingan went to the police station to report an incident in the night
club. The floor manager and the security guard also went there and were met
by Policeman Navarro. Another altercation however ensued but now against
Navarro. As Lingan was about to turn away, he hit him with the handle of his
pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his
face. He tried to get up, but Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which
floored him. Navarro turned to the other media man and said: Kita mo yan ha,
buhay kang testigo, si Lingan ang naghamon. He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: Ilagay
mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon. He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made
him sign his name on the blotter. Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His
right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print. Lingan died.
Unknown to Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange
SY 2018-2019
between petitioner and the deceased. This was challenged as inadmissible for
violating the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The tape is admissible since the law prohibits only the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private communications. The exchange between
Navarro and Lingan occurred in a public place (police station). As such, its
recording is not prohibited.
FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS ACT
Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court
This concerns the impeachment trial of then CJ Corona, who was accused of
maintaining various bank deposits not included in his SALN. The Senate
Impeachment Court issued a subpoena to PSB commanding it to disclose some
foreign currency deposits allegedly owned by CJ Corona. PSB scrambled to get
a TRO from the Supreme Court.
Under the Foreign Currency Deposits Act, there is only a single exception to the
secrecy of foreign currency deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon
the written permission of the depositor.
MULTIPLE ADMISSIBILITY
People vs. Yatco, et al.
Consunji, Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were
charged with having conspired together in the murder of Ramos. During the
trial, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, who is Atty.
Arturo Xavier of the NBI, in connection with the making of an extra-judicial
confession by accused Consunji to him, the counsel for the other accused
Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession
on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the
other accused. According to the transcript, the following remarks were made:
1) Fiscal Lustre: May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the
admissibility of the confession of Consunji as against the accused Consunji
himself?
2) Court: That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the
Court that you cannot prove a confession unless yon prove first conspiracy
thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required
by law.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's
confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being
hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the
conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji
was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant’s own guilt and
should have been admitted as such. Section 12 of Rule 123, provides: "The act
or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration."
6 | Page| K.D.Alianza
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court provides that “The declaration of an
accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense
charged, may be given in evidence against him." Under the rule of multiple
admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent
as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other
evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence
of the declarant's own guilt. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have
allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties
who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in
order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant
evidence at its disposal to prove the charges.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Atienza v. Board of Medicine
A surgeon was sued for malpractice, medical negligence. Attached to the
formal offer of documentary evidence are certified photocopies of x-ray
request forms with varying dates, which she offered for the purpose of proving
that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she
was operated. The problem there was that only photocopies were offered.
Photocopies were objected to by the respondent under the BER.
It is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in
proceedings before administrative bodies such as the Board of Medicine. In
addition, the photocopies or even the original of these documents are not even
necessary to prove that fact because the anatomical location of the kidneys is
a matter that the court should take mandatory judicial notice. Under the laws
of nature, kidneys are always found in the place where they are supposed to
be – the right in the right and the left in the left.
Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Caloocan City where he was then residing,
leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
P300K more or less. The respondents are his children with common law wife.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, allegedly the wife of Sy Kiat in China, and
her children. However, Yao Kee did not present any competent evidence
relative to the law and custom of China on marriage but only by her self-serving
testimony.
Rule 130 section 45 states that:
Sec. 45. Unwritten law. — The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also
printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign
country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Rule 132 section 25, thus:
An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative
to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan
Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not
only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no
showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure
to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the
marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee
and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be
alleged and proved as any other fact. Accordingly, in the absence of proof of
the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours
pursuant to doctrine of processual presumption. Since Yao Kee admitted in
her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the
Philippines when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated, it therefore
follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
People v. Cabigquez
The accused robbed and raped the owner of a sari-sari store. Other than the
criminal liability, the court also adjudged him civilly liable for the value of the
items illegally taken. On appeal, aside from questioning his criminal liability,
the accused also questioned the award of P10,000 representing the value of
the items subject of the robbery – soap, canned goods, sugar, coffee, milk and
cigarettes—common items that can be found in a sari-sari store. The accused
argued that it as error for the trial court to award P10,000 pesos because the
private complainant failed to prove the actual value of the items taken.
The trial court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of stolen goods
because these are matters of public knowledge or capable of unquestionable
demonstration. Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of
expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being equivalent to
proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve. Surely,
matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume are
undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable
demonstration.
Elayda v. CA
In the complaint, Elayda alleges that the defendants owed her P90k, who
despite demand, failed to pay. During trial, while admitting that they were
indeed indebted, defendants however introduced evidence that they already
paid. Such payment were in fact more than the alleged obligation sued upon
by Elayda. Upon realizing this defect, Elayda belatedly presented a document
which was a statement of her accountant that, contrary to the allegations in
her complaint, the total debt was supposedly 186k instead of P90k.
SY 2018-2019
"Familiar doctrine" – an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him,
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent
therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or
not.
Section 2, Rule 129 reads as follows:
Judicial admissions. — Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in
the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and cannot be
contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable
mistake.
Nothing in the record shows that Elayda's admissions in her complaint were
indeed "made through palpable mistake."
Azolla Farms vs. CA
Azolla Farms embarked on certain project. In need for case, it obtained a loan
from a bank, through its President. When the loan was approved, the bank did
not release the entire proceeds of the loan at once, but released the same on
installment basis. It came to the attention of the bank that the president
diverted the proceeds of the loan for purposes other than the project for which
the loan was applied. Thus, the bank refused to release the remaining proceeds
of the loan, resulting in the eventual failure of the project. A complaint was
then filed by Azolla Farms and the President against the bank. In the complaint,
they admitted that the loan transactions and other collateral agreements that
they entered into were all legal. Their only complaint was the malicious refusal
by the bank to release the remaining proceeds of the loan. However, during
trial, one of the witnesses of the bank testified and disclosed some facts
establishing that the transactions were somehow invalid. Taking cue from the
disclosures made by the witness, Azolla Farms and the President tried to
amend their complaint to now include an allegation that the transaction was
invalid and prayed that it be declared null and void.
SEC. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence —
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in
the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to
at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings,
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Legaspi
Legaspi contended that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the action
because the complaint, a real action, failed to allege the assessed value of the
subject property. As an opposition to respondent Legaspi's additional
contention, petitioner BSP claimed that since the subject property contains an
7 | Page| K.D.Alianza
area of 4,838,736 square meters, it is unthinkable that said property would
have an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 which is within the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts. Petitioner BSP further stated that a tax
declaration showing the assessed value of P28,538,900.00 and latest zonal
value of P145,162,080.00 was attached to the complaint.
WON it is proper for the court to take judicial notice that the subject matter of
the case has an assessed value exceeding P20k? YES
Annexes to a complaint are deemed part of and should be considered together
with the complaint. Being an annex to BSP's complaint, the tax declaration
showing the assessed value of the property is deemed a part of the complaint
and should be considered together with it in determining that the RTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction. In connection therewith, the RTC, therefore,
committed no error in taking judicial notice of the assessed value of the subject
property. A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same
case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the
authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of
the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the
same court. Since a copy of the tax declaration, which is a public record, was
attached to the complaint, the same document is already considered as on file
with the court, thus, the court can now take judicial notice of such.
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION
People v. Newman
Recovered from the accused Newman at the time of his arrest by the police
officers was a watch borrowed by the victim from his close friend; on the other
hand, taken from the accused Tolentino was the Driver's license of the
deceased Bantillo but whose picture was replaced with the picture of
Tolentino. The victim, before he died, told Police Investigators Yanzon and
Rosita Empio that he was held-up by two men — one was tag and stout and
the other was a short fellow with long hair — descriptions which fit the two (2)
accused; that he was stabbed twice; and that P60.00 were forcibly taken from
his person.
The 2 accused were positively identified as the persons in possession of the
stolen properties — the watch and the driver's license. Both accused offered
no satisfactory explanation as to the fact of their possession of the stolen
properties. Such evidence abundantly incriminates them and proves that they
took them with animus lucrandi. A disputable presumption exists that a person
found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act. Appellants offered no evidence to
overcome or contradict such presumption. The ante-mortem statement, taken
together with the other evidence, especially, the stolen watch and the driver's
license of the victim found in the possession of the accused, points to a
conclusive finding that indeed the accused are guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide.
Edu v. Gomez
Edu, a buyer of a second-hand vehicle, was flagged down by the police. The
vehicle was seized from her on the ground that it was a hot car, stolen from a
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
military officer. The buyer, possessor of the allegedly stolen vehicle, went to
court and filed an action for replevin (recovery of personal property).
The acquirer or the purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable property is
entitled to be respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true
owner thereof until a competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as
the true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to surrender
possession nor to be required to institute an action for the recovery of the
chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor. The filing of an
information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa
from its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not
warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the
possessor.
Celedonio v. People
Celedonio was charged in an information with Robbery with Force Upon
Things. He allegedly destroyed the backdoor of De Guzman and took away
several pieces of jewelry and other items, amounting to P223k. Marquez
witnessed the robbery which happened when no one was left in the house of
De Guzman. He identified Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the
incident, he reported it to the police. A follow-up operation was conducted by
police officers, accompanied by Marquez. On their way, Marquez pointed to a
man on a motorcycle and said, " Sir, siya po si Eduardo Celedonio." They
immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him if he was
Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui informed
Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still remained
silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where are the stolen
items?" Celedonio then alighted from his motorcycle and opened its
compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen items, as per report of
the incident, such as the portable DVD player and a wristwatch, among others.
PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter
answered, "Iyan po." Thus, Celedonio was arrested and was informed of his
constitutional rights. More items were seized from Celedonio at the police
station.
The accused was caught in possession of stolen items when his motorcycle was
flagged down during follow-up operations. He could not explain how he got
into possession of such items. Under Sec. 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing
of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise,
that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is
owned by him. In this case, the accused never claimed ownership of the subject
items. When the alleged stolen items were found in his motorcycle
compartment which he had control over, the disputable presumption of being
the taker of the stolen items arose. He could have overcome the presumption
but failed to give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible
scenario that could be inferred therefrom was that he took the items. When
the police asked him about the stolen items, this was a mere general inquiry as
apart of follow-up operations. He was not frisked and there were no signs of
intimidation or force on the part of the police. They had no hint that the items
were in his motorcycle. Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle
compartment. He even confirmed it to the police. At that time, the police had
probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. Taking also into
SY 2018-2019
consideration that the items were taken form a moving vehicle so the police
had to immediately act upon it.
Concepcion v. CA
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married. They had a son, Jose. Gerardo filed a
petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy. 9 years before
their marriage, Theresa was married to Mario and found out that Mario is still
alive. Ma. Theresa did not deny but averred that the marriage was a sham and
never lived with Mario at all. It was contended that Ma. Theresa was
legitimately married to Mario when Jose was born. Under the law, Jose is the
legitimate child of the legal subsisting marriage between Mario and Theresa.
Consequently, Gerardo can neither claim custody nor visitorial rights over the
child and cannot impose his name upon the child. It brushed aside the common
admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose was their son. During the
period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon
City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview
and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart. Not only did both
Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all
was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these
circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband,
Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to
engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no
such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose
Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Presumption of Legitimacy
Article 167, FC: The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy. To overthrow this presumption, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the
husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by
evidence to the contrary. The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be
refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child.
Blue Cross Health v. Olivares
In the health care agreement, ailments due to “pre-existing conditions” were
excluded from the coverage. Barely 38 days from the effectivity of her health
insurance, Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted to an accredited hospital
of petitioner and incurred expenses. Subsequently, she filed a claim with the
insurer for the insurance proceeds but the latter refused to pay because
allegedly, the reason for the hospitalization was a pre-existing illness, an
excepted peril. In support of the claim of the insurer, it would have wanted to
8 | Page| K.D.Alianza
present the medical records of Neomi that would show that the ailment was a
pre–existing one. But upon the direct and express instruction of Neomi, the
doctor however refused to make the medical record available to the insurer.
Petitioner contends that the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced should apply in its favor.
Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides for a disputable
presumption (satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence) that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced. However, this presumption does not apply if:
a. The evidence is at the disposal of both
b. Suppression was not willful
c. Merely corroborative or cumulative
d. The suppression is an exercise of a privilege
Hence, respondent’s refusal to allow the presentation of the physician’s report
was justified as it is a privileged communication between physician and patient.
BPI vs. Reyes
Reyes is an existing depositor of a bank. Enticed by the advertisement given by
the bank of giving incentives to new opened accounts, Reyes went to the bank
to open a new ATM account. In the bank, she said that she was willing to open
an account with an initial deposit of P200,000. Reyes claims that she had with
her P100k cash and intended to withdraw another P100k from her existing
account. Reyes realized few days after that the amount reflected in her new
account is only P100k. The Bank claims, however, that Reyes first intended to
withdraw P200k from her old account as evidenced by a withdrawal slip signed
by Reyes showing P200k. But her account was insufficient thus, she only
withdrew 100k, which amount she transferred to her new account. The Bank
alleges that there was no actual cash involved in the transaction.
Every person is presumed to take care of his ordinary concerns.
Victoria Shipping v. Workmen’s Compensation
The crew was in deep slumber but was awaken by fire of unknown origin that
engulfed the vessel. The crew instinctively jumped off the vessel and since
then, was never found again. The father of a seaman, who was the son’s only
surviving heir, filed his application for the death benefits of his son. However,
the employer refused to release the benefits explaining that the law requires 4
years before the missing crew can be presumed dead.
Eastern Shipping v. Lucero
Mr. Lucero was the captain of the vessel which capsized. However, minutes
before the vessel disappeared and lost contact with the employer, he was able
to send radio messages describing their conditions (waves, winds, etc.). So the
vessel capsized and all the crew perished with it. After the incident, the wife of
Capt. Lucero came forward and demanded for payment of Mr. Lucero’s salary.
She claimed that the law requires 4 years before her husband can be presumed
dead. Thus, before the expiration of the 4-year period, her husband is “still
alive” and therefore, he should continue to receive his salary and that being
the wife, she should be allowed to claim
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION
Datalift Movers v. Belgravia Realty
Phil National Railways (PNR) entered into a lease contract with Sampaguita.
Sampaguita, instead of using the leased property, subleased it to its sister
company, Belgravia. The latter in turn subleased the premises to Datalift
Movers. The contract continued for several years, until such time that Belgravia
and Datalift had disagreement as to the amount of rentals. Datalift refused to
pay rentals which prompted Belgravia to file an ejectment suit against the
Datalift. Datalift argued however that Belgravia has no cause of action or legal
personality being neither the owner nor the lessee of the property of PNR.
Section 2 (b), Rule 131, of the Rules of Court provides that the tenant is not
permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement
of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. Conclusive presumptions
have been defined as inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it
will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. As
long as the lessor-lessee relationship between Datalift and Belgravia exists as
in this case, the former, as lessee, cannot by any proof, however strong,
overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better
right of possession to the subject leased premises than they have.
Ermitaño vs Paglas
A contract of lease was executed between the landlord and the tenant. During
the existence of the lease, the landlord obtained a loan from a third party
creditor and mortgaged the leased property as guaranty. The landlord failed to
pay the loan and subsequently, the property was foreclosed in favor of the
creditor, who in turn sold the same to the tenant. The tenant now became the
new owner of the property. The original owner filed a suit against the creditor
alleging that the property was illegally foreclosed. In the meantime, the original
owner is still demanding payment of rentals from the tenant.
Is estoppel by tenant applicable? NO
Sec. 2, Rule 131 (Estoppel by tenant) – The tenant is not permitted to deny the
title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them.
If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to
the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence,
the tenant may show that the landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to
another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has
been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case, what
respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she
acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation
between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court does not apply. However, even though the
presumption does not apply against Paglas, her subsequent acquisition of the
property does not justify her refusal to pay the rentals due to Ermitaño. Under
Act No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale only has an inchoate right and
not the absolute right to the property with all the accompanying incidents.
SY 2018-2019
Ownership becomes full only upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the
property during the redemption period.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
People v. Abriol
Circumstantial evidence is that which indirectly proves a fact in issue. For
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the theory
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other
possible, rational hypothesis, except that of guilt. An accused can be convicted
on the basis of circumstantial evidence where all the circumstances constitute
an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the culprit.
In this case, the prosecution’s evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of
events leading to the inevitable conclusion of guilt on the part of appellants.
(1) the fatal shooting of Alejandro Flores occurred at around 11:50 P.M. of
June 5, 1993 in front of the ABS-CBN compound in Cebu City. The gunman,
who was tall and thin, alighted from a red Jiffy, pumped several bullets into
the prone victim, and got back aboard the Jiffy which then sped towards
Leon Kilat Street.
(2) Eyewitness’s description of the gunman as tall and thin perfectly matches
the physique of appellant Abriol.
(3) PO3 Alexander Rustela, who was close to the crime scene, heard the
gunshots and ran towards the place where the sound of gunshots
emanated. A red Jiffy with 3 persons aboard whizzed by him and abruptly
turned at Leon Kilat Street. After Sta. Cruz, Jr. informed him that the
gunmen were aboard a red Jiffy, Rustela boarded patrol car No. 201,
radioed an alarm, and commenced a pursuit of the fleeing vehicle. Police
car no. 208 received the alarm, and on turning into Leon Kilat Street,
encountered the speeding red Jiffy. They immediately chased the Jiffy but
failed to catch it. Police cars Nos. 208 and 205 cornered the vehicle in front
of the Don Bosco building near BBRC. PO2 Gerald Cue, on patrol car no.
205 fired a warning shot at the vehicle and directed all those aboard to
disembark. Three men got out, with their hands raised. SPO1 Abrigana, on
patrol car no. 208 and PO2 Cue approached the trio. Abrigana frisked the
man who was seated in the front passenger seat, who turned out to be
appellant Abriol, and recovered from his waist a .38 caliber revolver with
six empty shells. Cue searched the red Jiffy and found two loaded .45
caliber pistols under the front seat where Abriol had sat. Other police
officers immediately went to the crime scene where they found the victim
barely alive. PO3 Seville retrieved four .45 caliber slugs and two deformed
slugs at the spot where the victim was shot. The autopsy of the victims
remains showed that he died of cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and
hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds. A deformed metal jacket of a
.38 caliber slug was recovered from the corpse. Ballistics tests showed that
the bullets and cartridges had identical individual characteristics with those
of the test bullets and cartridges. Paraffin tests conducted on each of the
9 | Page| K.D.Alianza
appellants, one day after the incident, revealed that all were positive for
gunpowder residues. The subject firearms were also chemically examined
and found positive for gunpowder residue. Before the shooting incident,
appellants were seen at Navales house until around 7:30 P.M., when they
left aboard Navales red Jiffy with Astellero driving, Abriol in the front
passenger seat, and Dosdos in the back seat.[53] Appellants seating
arrangements were exactly the same, several hours later, after they were
pursued and cornered by police cars near BBRC. Appellants admitted that
they dropped by the Navales residence at around 7:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M.
These unbroken chain of events prove not only appellants identities but also
their participation and collective responsibility in the murder of Alejandro
Flores. They reveal a unity of purpose and concerted action evidencing their
conspiracy to kill him. Against this matrix of facts and circumstances, appellants
bare denials cannot stand. Their story of chasing a red Jiffy is merely a
disingenuous diversion of no evidentiary value for the defense.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Gabatan vs CA
The respondent alleges that she is the sole owner of a land which she inherited
from her mother, Hermogena, the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife,
Laureana Clarito. However, petitioner alleged that Hermogena is not Juan and
Laureana’s daughter and Juan died single. The witnesses of the respondent
were very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena
was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and
Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s birth. These witnesses based their
testimony on what they had been told by others. Aside from these testimonies,
a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale was presented by respondent and
which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan
Gabatan. Such was objected to by petitioners’ counsel for being a mere
photocopy and not being properly authenticated.
Our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of
birth appearing the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment
– in the absence of these, any proof that the child enjoyed the continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child – only in the absence of these two
classes of evidence is the anyone allowed to present other proof admissible
under ROC of the proof of paternity and filiation
To prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, the best
evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of
these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence
of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other
proof admissible under ROC of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Although the BER admits of exceptions and there are instances where the
presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, the basis for the
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. A party must first
present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-
production of the original instrument. In the case at bar, the testimony of the
witness who identified the Deed of Absolute Sale plainly shows that she gave
no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or
whether it was recorded in any public office.
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
NPC vs. Codilla
An action for damages was filed when a vessel rammed against the power
barges of NPC. During trial, NPC presented bundles of photocopies of
documents. Most of these contained the manual signatures of the purported
sender of these letters. The admission of these photocopies was objected to
under BER.
WON the photocopied documents are considered originals?
"Electronic document" includes:
1) digitally signed documents
2) any printout, readable by sight
3) other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document.
What differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is
the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
Not all of the contents in the photocopies may be recorded or produced
electronically, such as the signatures of the persons. Having thus declared that
the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is
consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional
equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Photocopies are deemed as any other Documentary Evidence, subject to the
Best Evidence Rule (BER). Under BER, the original should be the ones presented
in court. Since they were mere photocopies, they are inadmissible.
MCC Industrial Sales v. Ssanyong Corp.
MCC, a domestic corporation, is engaged in the business of importing and
wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is Ssangyong, an
international trading company. The two corporations conducted business
through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong
would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product
order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his
signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.
Following the failure of MCC to open a letter of credit to facilitate the payment
of imported stainless steel products, Ssangyong filed a civil action for damages
due to breach of contract. Ssangyong, however, failed to present the original
copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
SY 2018-2019
WON the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic
evidence and admissible in evidence as such? NO
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for
evidentiary purposes. An electronic document is the equivalent of an original
document under the BER, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other
means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based
information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed
at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional
equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents.
Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original
copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all
respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of
"electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with
"electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which
have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as
received. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the
BER and is not admissible as electronic evidence. Since a facsimile transmission
is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot
be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a
photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence.
Maliksi v. COMELEC
Saquilayan was proclaimed as Mayor. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, brought an election protest. In resolving the
appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties,
decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot
images from the CF cards. Maliksi argued that the resort to the printouts of the
ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because
there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been
preserved.
WON Comelec First Division erred in dispensing with the physical ballots and
resorted to digital images? YES
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded
as the equivalents of the original official ballots themselves. The picture images
of the ballots are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic
form the votes cast by the voter. As such, the printouts thereof are the
functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may
be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest. That the two
documents—the official ballot and its picture image—are considered "original
documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight.
In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as
weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the
Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the
picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without
10 | Page| K.D.Alianza
notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight, the rules for the
revision of ballots still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best
evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are
to be used only after the proper Revision/Recount Committee has determined
that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not preserved.
In the present case, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC
exercising original jurisdiction over the protest that made the finding that the
ballots had been tampered, but the First Division in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, the parties should have been given a formal notice thereof.
CHATO v. HRET
Chato lost to Panotes who was proclaimed the winner on 2010 elections. She
filed an electoral protest before the HRET. In its Resolution, the HRET directed
the copying of the picture image files of ballots relative to the protest. The 2010
elections used a paper-based technology that allowed voters to fill out an
official paper ballot by shading the oval opposite the names of their chosen
candidates. Each voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the
PCOS machine which scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously,
meaning, in just one pass. As established during the required demo tests, the
system captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format which, when
decrypted for verification, were found to be digitized representations of the
ballots cast. The digital images of the ballots captured by the PCOS machine are
stored in an encrypted format in the CF cards.
WON the picture images of the ballots may be considered as the "official
ballots" or the equivalent of the original paper ballots which the voters filled
out? YES
The picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are
likewise “official ballots” that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes
cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the
printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out
by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an
electoral protest.
Sec. 11 of HRET’s Guidelines on the Revision of Ballots provides that unless it
has been shown that the integrity of any of the Compact Flash (CF) Cards was
not preserved or the same was violated, as when there is proof of tampering
or substitution, the Tribunal, in lieu of photocopying of ballots upon any motion
of any of the parties, shall direct the printing of the picture image of the ballots
of the subject precinct stored in the data storage device for the same precinct.
The Tribunal shall provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct
the necessary authentication process to ensure that the data or image stored
is genuine and not a substitute. In this case, when Chato was required to
present testimonial and/or documentary evidence to show proof that the
integrity of the CF cards was not preserved or was violated, the evidence
presented was found insufficient. The testimonies of her witnesses were
declared irrelevant and immaterial as they did not refer to the CF cards used in
the 20 precincts he questioned having substantial variances.
People v. Enojas
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
Policemen were patrolling when they spotted a suspiciously parked taxi. They
approached the driver, Enojas, and asked for his documents. Having
entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents, they invited him in
their mobile car to the police station for further questioning. He complied
leaving his taxi behind. As one policeman approached a store, he came upon
two suspected robbers and a shootout ensued. One robber was shot and died
but the other managed to escape. But the policeman was hit causing his death.
When the other policeman went back to the patrol car, Enojas already fled.
Suspecting that Enojas was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched
his abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone. The police officers monitored
the incoming messages and posed as Enojas and an entrapment operation was
conducted.
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party
to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as
the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order
to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and
to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of
such messages and was competent to testify on them. The accused lament that
they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming that this
was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged. At any
rate, a crime had been committed — the killing of PO2 Pangilinan — and the
investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
persons they were to arrest had committed it. The text messages to and from
the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on
the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them
in an entrapment using this knowledge.
People vs Navarro
Supra.
WON the audio recording was validly authenticated? YES
A voice recording (difft sa photos and text message) is authenticated by the
testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2)
that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices
on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Yu Tek & Co v. Gonzales
A contract was entered into between Yutek and Co. and Gonzales whereby
Gonzales undertook for a consideration to deliver an agreed quantity of sugar
in favour of the said company within the stipulated period. It was further
agreed that should he fail to deliver the sugar within the stipulated period, he
shall return the amount received by him from the company as payment of the
sugar. Gonzales failed to deliver the sugar which prompted Yutek and Co to file
suit against Mr. Gonzales to recover the amount. Gonzales argued that the
filing of the complaint is premature because accordingly it was their agreement
that the sugar he undertook to deliver in favour of Yutek and Co were to be
sourced from his own sugar cane plantation. Since the plantation failed to give
him sufficient harvest he was not able to deliver on time. This testimony was
SY 2018-2019
objected to under PER because there is no stipulation in the contract between
Mr. Gonzales and Yutek that the sugar he undertook to deliver were to be
sourced from his own plantation.
WON the testimony is objectionable by parol evidence rule? YES
Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of
their contract. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain
the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating
into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. In the
case at bar, Gonzales wanted to show that the sugar was to be obtained
exclusively from the crop raised by him. However, the contract placed no
restriction upon him in the matter of obtaining the sugar. He was equally at
liberty to purchase it on the market or raise it himself. It may be true that he
owned a plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself, but he did not limit
his obligation to his own crop of sugar. The rights of the parties must be
determined by the writing itself.
Baluyut vs. Poblete
This involves a contract of loan between the lender and the borrower. Under
their contract, the borrower promised to pay the loan within one month. The
borrower failed to pay the loan within one month, thus, the creditor foreclosed
the mortgage. The borrower then filed a complaint to nullify the foreclosure of
the mortgage on the ground that the foreclosure proceedings was prematurely
instituted given that the period for payment of the loan obligation was actually
one year.
WON such testimony of the borrower can be objected to under the PER? YES
When the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, it is deemed to
contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be
admitted other than the contents of the agreement itself. In the present case,
the promissory note and the real estate mortgage are the law between
petitioner and private respondents. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous
verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into
the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned
at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. In the instant case,
aside from the testimony of Atty. Mendoza, no other evidence was presented
to prove that the real date of maturity of the loan is one year. In fact there was
not even any allegation in the Complaint and in the Memorandum filed by
petitioner with the trial court to the effect that there has been fraud or mistake
as to the date of the loan’s maturity as contained in the PN.
Cruz v. CA
There is a sub-lease contract involving a fish pond between Cruz and Salonga.
One day, Cruz received the amount of P35K from Salonga evidenced by a
written acknowledgement receipt:
5/4/82
Received the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Cash from Rodrigo Quiambao and
Conrado Salonga on the day of May 4, 1982.
Sgd. Lucio Cruz
11 | Page| K.D.Alianza
Salonga alleged that the P35K was actually a loan advanced to Cruz. Despite
demand, Cruz failed to pay the loan which led to the filing of this collection
case. During the trial and by way of defense, Cruz, while admitting that he
received the amount of P35K from Mr Salonga and had signed a receipt
acknowledging the same, contended that such amount was actually a payment
of Salonga’s obligation to him. This obligation arose from pakyaw arrangement
between them representing the rentals of their sublease contract involving a
fish pond. This testimony was objected to under PER because nowhere in the
receipt was it stated that it represents payment of Mr. Salonga’s obligation to
him.
WON the objection should be sustained? NO
The reason for the PER is the presumption that when the parties have reduced
their agreement to writing they have made such writing the only repository
and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be
understood to have been waived or abandoned. The rule, however, is NOT
applicable in this case since the acknowledgment receipt in the first place is not
a contract. Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a document
embodying the terms of an agreement, but the receipt presented does not
contain such an agreement. A distinction should be made between a statement
of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The
former may be varied by parol evidence but not the latter.
Lechugas v. CA
Heirs of Pacres v. Heirs of Ygona
Pacres owned a piece of land. When Pacres died, he was survived by 6 children.
4 out of the 6 children sold their respective shares to a third party, Ygona. The
2 other surviving children did not. One of those who did not sell his share was
Mario. Years later, the heirs of Mario instituted an action to compel the heirs
of the buyer Ygona to comply with the conditions allegedly agreed upon by the
4 selling heirs and Ygona. According to the heirs of Mario, as part of their
agreement, Ygona undertook to pay all the real estate taxes due on the land
subject of the sale, cause the survey and subdivision of the land, and the
issuance of individual titles covering the respective shares of all the 6 surviving
heirs, including the shares of Mario, their predecessor-in-interest. Since Ygona
did not comply with the undertaking, they sued for specific performance, to
comply compliance with the conditions. During the trial, the plaintiffs tried to
prove that at the time the 4 surviving heirs sold their respective shares to
Ygona, there were these conditions agreed upon. Unfortunately, these alleged
conditions were not incorporated in the deed of sale executed in favor of
Ygona.
Can the testimony of the heirs be objected to under the PER? YES
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs. Consequently, petitioners, not being parties to
the contracts of sale between Ygoña and the petitioners’ siblings, cannot sue
for the enforcement of the supposed obligations arising from said contracts. It
is true that third parties may seek enforcement of a contract if it contains
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
stipulations pour autrui, or stipulations for the benefit of third parties.
However, the written contracts of sale in this case contain no such stipulation
in favor of the petitioners.
While petitioners claim that there was an oral stipulation, it cannot be proven
under the PER. While the Rule admits of exception, no such exception was
pleaded, much less proved, by petitioners. The PER applies to "the parties and
their successors in interest." Conversely, it has no application to a stranger to
a contract. A third party who avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a
contract becomes a party to that contract. A beneficiary of a stipulation pour
autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore cannot claim to
be a stranger to the contract and resist the application of the PER.
Silvano Gaje v. Patricia Vda de Dalisay
Husband Sr. and wife purchased a land from a seller. It was agreed in the deed
of sale that the name to be reflected is the name of their son as the purported
buyer. When the senior died, wife took over as administratix. The son learned
that the deed of sale was placed in his name, so he sold it to a third party. When
the wife learned of such sale, she sued for recovery of land against the son and
succeeding buyers. During trial, she testified that while the deed of sale
contains the name of the junior, the real party who bought the property was
the senior. Such testimony was objected under the PER.
PER does not apply because the rule excluding extrinsic evidence in the
construction of writings is inapplicable in a case where one of the parties to the
case is a stranger to the contract. In this case, the widow is a stranger to the
said Deeds of Sale.
Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos
This involves a certain hacienda owned by Zacarias Sr. When Zacarias Sr. died,
his widow took over as the administratrix of the estate of Zacarias. Zacarias Sr.
was survived by 6 children, including Zacarias Jr. (Junior). During the
administration by the widow, she entered into a contract with Junior for the
lease of the hacienda for a period of 6 years. Pursuant to the lease and by
authority of the lease contract, Junior introduced some improvements on the
hacienda. But during the 4th year in their contract, a third party, Lizarraga,
came forward and offered to buy the hacienda from the surviving heirs of
Zacarias Sr. The problem was, the hacienda was still under the lease contract
between the estate as represented by the widow and Junior. So Lizarraga had
a hard time closing the deal. In order to convince Junior to give up the
remaining portion of the lease contract, Lizarraga allegedly undertook to
compensate Junior of the value of the improvements that he introduced into
the hacienda. This undertaking convinced Junior to give up the lease contract
and the sale of the hacienda was done. Subsequently however, Lizarraga
refused to comply such agreement. Junior then instituted an action in court to
collect the value of the improvements as allegedly promised by Lizarraga.
During the trial, he tried to prove the existence of such promise but the
problem was that this undertaking of Lizarraga was not incorporated in the
Deed of Sale that was executed by the heirs of Zacarias Sr. and Lizarraga.
Is the testimony objectionable by PER? NO
SY 2018-2019
General Rule: The execution of a contract in writing is deemed to supersede all
oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and the subject-matter
which preceded the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident,
fraud or mistake of fact.
Exception: Proof is admissible of any collateral, parol agreement that is not
inconsistent with the terms of the written contract, though it may relate to the
same subject-matter.
As expressed in a standard legal encyclopedia, the doctrine here referred to is
as follows: "The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing
does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to
show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the
parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the
written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and
whether the action is at law or in equity."
The verbal contract which Zacarias Jr. has established in this case is clearly
independent of the main contract of conveyance, and evidence of such verbal
contract is admissible under the doctrine above-stated. The rule that a
preliminary or contemporaneous oral agreement is not admissible to vary a
written contract appears to have more particular reference to the obligation
expressed in the written agreement, and the rule had never been interpreted
as being applicable to matters of consideration or inducement. In the case
before us the written contract is complete in itself; the oral agreement is also
complete in itself, and it is collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding
the fact that it deals with related matters.
Spouses Amoncio v. Benedicto
The spouses entered into a lease contract with Garcia involving one of their
parcels of land. They also entered into another lease contract involving another
piece of land with Benedicto. Garcia vacated the property and subsequently,
Benedicto started constructing buildings on the land he rented as well as that
of Garcia’s and other portions of the land owned by the spouses. Subsequently,
Benedicto stopped paying the rentals. The Spouses filed an action to recover
the possession of those portions or pieces of land which were occupied by
Benedicto where buildings were constructed. By way of defense, Benedicto
argued that his construction was actually with the authority of the owners.
Their agreement was that Benedicto would construct 5 buildings on the
property owned by the Spouses and 1 building would be given to Garcia, 2
buildings would be given to the spouses and the other 2 buildings would be
given to him. It was further agreed that once the construction of the buildings
was completed, the Spouses would pay him the value for the 2 buildings given
to them. The testimony of Benedicto was objected to by the Spouses because
their written agreement was only a plain lease contract and that such
authorized constructions were not indicated in the lease contract.
The so-called parol evidence forbids any addition to or contradiction of the
terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or
before the signing of the document, other terms were orally agreed on by the
parties.
12 | Page| K.D.Alianza
Exceptions: (VII-A)
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The present case does NOT appear to fall under any of the given exceptions.
Additional exception given by this case: A party to a contract may prove the
existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter which is not
inconsistent with its terms. This may be done if, from the circumstances of the
case, the court believes that the document does not convey entirely the whole
of the parties’ transaction. In this case, there are signs that petitioners and
respondent had other agreements aside from those established by the lease
contract. The construction by respondent is not disputed by spouses and it was
even the husband who procured the building permit. Further, spouses have
chosen to adopt inconsistent positions, thus, are barred by estoppel.
Palanca v. Wilson & Co.
Palanca is engaged in the business of distilling liquor, Kulafu. In its efforts to
improve production, he entered into a contract with Wilson & Co. for the
supply and installation of distilling apparatus that would improve production
for P10,000. The contract states that the apparatus should have a capacity of
6,000 liters per day. Wilson and Co. installed the apparatus. It was tested and
it treated and accommodated 6,000 of raw materials per day. But contrary to
the expectation of Palanca and his company, they expected that the capacity
of the distilling apparatus is to produce 6,000 liters per day of finished product.
Liters of raw materials or liters of finished product?
SC resolved the issue from 2 directions:
1. By taking up the meaning of the words themselves.
2. By evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made.
Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing that a written agreement
shall be presumed to contain all the terms, nevertheless "does not exclude
other evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made, or
to which it relates, or to explain an intrinsic ambiguity." In this case, Wilson &
Co. in their offer to Palanca, while mentioning capacity, only did so in express
connection with the name and description of the machine as illustrated in the
catalogue. They furnished Palanca with plans and specifications of the distilling
apparatus; and these describe a capacity of 6,000 liters of jus (ferment). Wilson
& Co.'s order to manufacturer, while mentioning a capacity of 6,000 liters per
day, does so again in connection with the description in the maker's catalogue.
And, finally, it was stated during the trial, and it has not been denied, that a
machine capable of producing 6,000 liters of rectified alcohol every 24 hours
from nipa ferment would cost between P35,000 and P40,000. The proper
construction of the provision in the contract in question in connection with the
conduct of the parties and surrounding circumstances, is that Wilson & Co.
were to furnish a distilling apparatus capable of receiving or treating 6,000
liters every 24 hours of work. Otherwise they would have stipulated a higher
purchase price
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
Enriquez v. Ramos
This involves a contract of sale covering 20 parcels of land. Ramos was the
buyer while Enriquez was the seller. Ramos could not pay the entire purchase
price. To guarantee the remaining balance, a REM was executed covering the
parcels of land subject of the contract of sale. When Ramos failed to pay the
balance, Enriquez foreclosed the REM. This was opposed by Ramos contending
that such action was premature because the obligation to pay the balance was
conditioned upon the construction of some feeder roads. Defendant has
specifically pleaded in his answer to the complaint that the contract of sale in
question does not express the true intent of the parties with regard to the
construction of the roads. Without Enriquez constructing the feeder roads,
Ramos’s obligation to pay the balance did not arise. The contention was then
objected under PER as it was not contained in the deed of sale.
If there is an allegation that the agreement does not express the intent of the
parties and such claim is in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the subject
of parol evidence. The fact that such failure has been put in issue in this case is
patent in the defendant’s answer. It appearing that plaintiffs have failed to
comply with the condition precedent relative to the construction of the roads
in the subdivision in question, it follows that their action is premature.
Land Settlement Development v. Garcia
Complaint: for the recovery of unpaid balance of the purchase price of 2
tractors bought by Garcia Plantation. Salud (wife) executed 2 PNs for the
balance.
Answer: seek its dismissal because while admitting the execution, they claimed
that the complaint is premature since the 2 notes have been novated by a
subsequent agreement contained in a letter sent by Mr. Kintanar, the manager
of LASEDECO, giving Salud an extension to pay up to May (complaint was filed
on February)
Reply: such agreement did not express the true intent of the parties.
At trial, defendants admitted all the documentary evidence adduced by the
plaintiff, showing that they were indebted. However, upon objection by
defendants’ counsel, the testimonies of Atty. Guinto, Mr. Kintanar as well as
the letter-agreement were prevented from being introduced as evidence by
the judge under the PER.
(THE LETTER) November 20, 1956
Mrs. Salud de Garcia Tacurong, Cotabato
Dear Madam;
Please be advised that the Board has granted you an extension up to May
31, 1957, within which to pay your account.
This matter has been the subject of agreement between your husband
and this office.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) FILOMENO C. KINTANAR
When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of
an event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be
SY 2018-2019
established by parol evidence. This is not varying the terms of the written
contract by extrinsic agreement, for the simple reason that there is no contract
in existence; there is nothing to which to apply the excluding rule. This rule
does not prevent the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that a
supposed contract never became effective by reason of the failure of some
collateral condition or stipulation, pre-requisite to liability. The rule excluding
parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing, does not extend so far as to
preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or
contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such
evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement
contains reference to such collateral agreement.
Reference is made of a previous agreement, in the second paragraph of letter,
and although a document is usually to be interpreted in the precise terms in
which it is couched, Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may admit
evidence of surrounding circumstances, in order to arrive at the true intention
of the parties. The testimonies of Atty Guinto and Mr. Kintanar supposedly will
show the true intent in the 2nd paragraph, where the extension is pre-
conditioned on the fact that the spouses will make a substantial down payment
immediately. If they fail to do so, then the agreement is deemed not granted.
Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta
Alfonso had a lot of properties. He was convinced by his son to avoid payment
of estate taxes when he dies. It was made to appear that properties were sold
to the children during his lifetime. He then executed deed of conveyances
including 4 parcels of land which was made to appear to be sold to Policrionio.
In the settlement of Alfonso’s estate, the properties conveyed to Policrionio in
a fictitious deed of conveyance were included in the inventory of propertied.
Policrionio subsequently died and so his heirs, knowing that the 4 lands were
still included in the list of inventory of estate of Alphonso, sued for declaration
of ownership of the lands. The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties and the validity of such Deed of Sale were
clearly put in issue in the Answer of the Heirs of Alfonso to the Complaint. It
was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the payment of
estate and inheritance taxes and not meant to transfer ownership. During trial,
Policrionio’s heirs objected since the deed explicitly states that it was for a valid
consideration. They argued that based on the PER, the Heirs of Alfonso were
not in a position to prove the terms outside of the contract because they were
not parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of Sale in question.
The operation of the PER requires the existence of a valid written agreement.
It is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding where the validity of such agreement
is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract may be void for lack of
consideration. Considering that the Deed of Sale has been shown to be void for
being absolutely simulated and for lack of consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso
are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement. Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence
rule requires that the case be between parties and their successors-in-interest.
In this case, both the Heirs of Alfonso and the Heirs of Policronio are
successors-in-interest of the parties to the Deed of Sale as they claim rights
under Alfonso and Policronio, respectively.
13 | Page| K.D.Alianza
Canuto v. Mariano
This case involves a sale of land with a right to repurchase. Under the contract,
the seller, Canuto, is given 1 year to repurchase. Anticipating he cannot
repurchase, he went to the buyer and asked for a grace period. The buyer
agreed but such was done orally. Canuto then went to buyer before expiration
of the grace period and expresses intention to repurchase property but the
buyer refused. Canuto then filed an action to compel buyer to accept payment
and execute deed of reconveyance. In trial, Canuto testified and tried to prove
that she was given grace period by the buyer. Testimony objected under the
PER since said grace period was not stated in the deed of sale with right to
repurchase.
The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary,
or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the
establishment by parol of an agreement between the parties to a writing,
entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was
executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to,
changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties
as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way deny
that the original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports
to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right
to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract.
QUALIFICATION OF A WITNESS
AFP vs. Republic of the Phils.
AFP, in its application for land registration, presented its VP of Asset
Enhancement Office to testify that subject properties were legally acquired by
it pursuant to a land grant under PD 1218. RTC initially granted but
subsequently denied the land registration upon the MR of the OSG on the
ground of failure to prosecute for the lack of authorization of the witness to
testify on behalf of AFP.
No substantive or procedural requirement requires a witness for a party some
sort of authorization to testify as witness for the party presenting him or her.
All the Rules require is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided therein.
DISQUALIFICATION OF A WITNESS
Alvarez vs. Ramirez
Alvarez was married to the sister of Ramirez. 6 months before the incident,
they separated de facto. As Maximo could not move on, he followed his wife
who was then staying with her sister, and set the house on fire. A case of arson
was filed against him. During trial, the principal witness was his wife who
claimed that she saw her husband set the house on fire. Maximo moved for her
disqualification to testify under the marriage disqualification rule because the
marriage was then still subsisting.
Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed,
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case,
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on
that identity is non-existent.
Guerrero vs. St. Claire
Father (+) – Andres (son; +) – Cristina (sister; for possession ra unta but
conveyed such) – Manuel (+) – Manuel’s relatives – St. Claire
During trial, Andres’ heirs presented witnesses to prove that Manuel did not
acquire ownership over the property, such that Christina who purportedly
executed a deed of sale in favor of Manuel, was not the real owner as the real
owner was Andres. Also, they tried to prove that the actual transaction entered
into was not sale but a mortgage to guarantee the loan obligation of Cristina.
The testimonies of these children were objected to under the DMS because
Manuel was already dead and the children testifies as to the fact that occurred
prior to the death of Guerrero.
The objection was overruled. DMS applies only if the defending party is sued in
his representative capacity. In this case, the defendants were sued not as an
administrator, executor, heir, or representative of Manuel Guerrero. But they
were sued in their personal capacity having acquired the property by purchase
from Manuel. As a matter of fact, the suit was not filed against the estate of
Manuel. So, since the action was filed against the defendant in their personal
capacity, DMS does not apply. Moreover, take note that not all witnesses are
disqualified under DMS, only the plaintiff, his assignor, or person in whose
behalf the suit is prosecuted. In this case, the 2 children of Cristina testified as
ordinary witnesses who had nothing to do with the case. Hence, they are not
disqualified to testify, supposing DMS applies.
Tongco vs. Vianzon
During the lifetime of the husband, Sps Tongco participated in the cadastral
proceedings where they claimed ownership over certain parcels of land. Their
application for titling was granted. After the death of the husband, the
surviving spouse filed a motion for amendment of the title praying that the title
be declared under her own name contending that the properties were her
exclusive property which motion was granted. Subsequently, the administrator
(husband’s niece) of the estate initiated the proceedings in the intestate estate
of the husband. In the process, she discovered that the properties owned by
the spouses as their conjugal properties were now claimed by the wife as her
own exclusive property. And so, the administrator instituted an action to
recover such from the surviving spouse. During the trial, the surviving spouse
testified that the properties were acquired by her, solely and exclusively, and
so these properties were not conjugal properties. The testimonies of the wife
were objected to under DMS because the case was filed after the death of the
husband and the wife testified to a fact that occurred prior to the death of the
husband.
Can DMS be applied? NO
DMS applies only if the estate is the party defendant. In this case, the estate
itself as represented by the administrator, initiates the action for the recovery
of the property. Hence, DMS does not apply.
SY 2018-2019
Razon vs. IAC
Mr. Chiudian subscribed to a number of shares from the corporation but for
lack of resources, he agreed with Mr. Razon that the latter would advance
funds to purchase the shares of stock with the agreement that the certificate
of stocks would be placed in the custody of Razon until Chiudian reimburses
him the money that he advanced as payment for the purchase of the shares of
stock. Mr. Chiudian died without reimbursing Mr. Razon of the payment made.
When it was the time of the administrator of the estate to settle the intestate
estate, the administrator demanded from Mr. Razon to turn over the
possession of the certificates of stocks, claiming that the shares of stock
representing Mr. Chiudian’s shares in the corporation forms part of the estate
of the deceased. Mr. Razon refused to turn over the certificates of stock on the
ground that his agreement with Mr. Chiudian was that he should be
reimbursed for the money that he advanced for the purchase of the shares of
stock. The testimony of Mr. Razon was objected to on the ground of DMS
because Mr. Chiudian is already dead and Mr. Razon testified as to the fact that
occurred prior to the death of Mr. Tudian specifically referring to that alleged
transaction.
WON DMS can be applied? NO
DMS applies only in a case filed against the estate not when the estate is the
one initiating the action. In this case, it is the estate of Mr. Chiudian
represented by its administrator that initiated the action to recover the
possession of the certificate of stock in the possession of Mr. Razon.
Garcia vs. Robles
Witness: Amanda
This involved a piece of agricultural land owned by a spinster who died and
survived by his niece and nephews, one of whom was a girl named Amanda.
Acting as the administrator of the estate of his aunt, Amanda entered into an
agreement with a certain Pedro where Pedro is given tenancy over the land.
Pedro died and survived by his wife and daughter. The 2 sisters of Pedro came
forward and claimed that they are also entitled of the tenancy right over the
same property. But the wife and daughter of Pedro refused to allow the 2
sisters to participate in the tenancy of the property which prompted the 2
sisters to file an action to revoke or otherwise declare null and void the
transaction of Amanda and Pedro. During the trial, the 2 sisters presented the
affidavit of Amanda wherein Amanda testified that during the lifetime of
Pedro, Pedro acknowledged before her that he is tilling the property under
tenancy agreement along with his 2 sisters. IOW, Amanda testified in the
affidavit that Pedro acknowledged or admitted that the tenancy relationship
belongs to Pedro and his 2 other sisters. The testimony of Amanda in this
respect was objected to under DMS because Pedro is already dead. But the
sisters argued that such rule cannot be applied as Amanda was not the plaintiff,
the plaintiffs being the sisters.
DMS disqualifies the plaintiff, the assignor of plaintiff, or persons in whose
behalf the action is prosecuted. Amanda falls under an assignor of the plaintiff
because the right asserted by the 2 sisters emanated from the tenancy
agreement that she executed with them. Being the source of that right,
Amanda is deemed to be an assignor of the plaintiffs.
14 | Page| K.D.Alianza
Lichauco vs. Atlantic Gulf
During the lifetime of Fitzsimmons, pres of the corp, he made some cash
advances to the corporation but he failed to pay these advances until he died.
Upon his death, his administrator, Lichauco, initiated a settlement of his estate.
One of the claimants of the action is the corporation, Lichauco and Company,
to recover the advances Fitzsimmons made when he was still alive. To prove
the existence of the claim, Lichauco and Company presented its accountant
and assistant accountant. This is to establish that at the lifetime of
Fitzsimmons, he made some cash advances. However, the testimonies of these
accountants were objected to on the ground of the DMS because Fitzsimmons
is already dead and the witnesses testified as to matters that occurred prior to
his death.
WON DMS can be invoked? NO
The objection was overruled. DMS only works to disqualify the (1) plaintiff, (2)
assignor of plaintiff, or (3) person in whose behalf the action is prosecuted. The
witnesses (accountants) are officers or employees of the company. They have
a personality separate and distinct from the corporation. Since the accountants
were not plaintiffs, assignors of plaintiff, or persons in whose behalf the action
is prosecuted, they are NOT disqualified from testifying.
Mendezona vs. Viuda de Goitia
Benigno was authorized by plaintiffs who were out of the country to manage
the partnership business and to collect and remit the profits to them. Long
after, he stopped remittance of the plaintiffs’ shares. After his death, and when
settlement of the estate was instituted, the plaintiffs came forward with their
claims against the estate. The plaintiffs presented their depositions taken in
Spain, containing the testimony that the deceased did not anymore remit their
shares of profits in the partnership. This deposition was objected to under DMS
by the widow.
DMS only covers testimonies on facts that occurred – a positive act on the part
of the decedent. In this case, what was testified upon was the non-occurrence,
a negative act – the non-payment of the defendant. Thus, DMS does not apply.
Goñi vs. CA
3 haciendas, owned by a corporation, were sold to Villanueva by Tabacalera.
Villanueva didn’t have enough funds to buy such so Tabacalera wanted
someone to stand as guarantor of Villanueva. So, Vicente came into picture.
The purchase price was not fully paid. Villanueva, through Goñi, entered into a
promise to sell 3 lots of one of the haciendas with Vicente. However, when
Villanueva died, such rice fields he sold to Vicente were included in his estate.
Vicente then filed a case to claim ownership. His testimony was objected to
under DMS.
Is the DMS applicable? NO
When Vicente testified, he did it as a party-plaintiff insofar as the counterclaim
is concerned. The estate of Villanueva cannot invoke DMS in disqualifying
Vicente from testifying. Take note that the purpose of DMS is to level the
playing field. While Villanueva is dead, it was established that the transaction
was entered into by Villanueva through Goñi. He is his agent who can very well
protect his interest.
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
People vs. Carlos
Carlos was prosecuted for killing Dr. Sityar for taking advantage of his wife.
Prosecution presented as evidence a letter from the wife of Carlos which was
sent 2 days before the killing addressed to the husband, the contents thereof
were on the wife’s fear that Carlos would exercise physical violence against the
Doctor. This was recovered by the police authorities during the arrest. This was
used by the prosecution to convince the Court that there was premeditation in
the killing of the doctor to qualify the killing to murder, and not just homicide
as contended by the accused. The letter was objected on the ground of
privileged communication.
Shall it be sustained? NO
If documents were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they are
privileged; but if they were obtained surreptitiously or OW without the
addressee's consent, the privilege should cease.
Uy Chico vs. Union Life
At the time of the fire, "Uy Layco" (the business the plaintiff took over after his
father’s death) was heavily indebted. The administrator, who instituted the
settlement of the estate of the father, included the insurance proceeds
covering the insured goods. However, the son disagreed, claiming that he was
the owner of the business and was therefore entitled to such proceeds. It was
established that the son who instituted action to recover insurance proceeds
instructed his lawyer to negotiate with the insurance company to obtain its
proceeds. The insurance policy was given to his lawyer, who then gave it to the
administrator, who in turn entered into a compromise with the insurance
company at half the value. The son, displeased, now disowned the
compromise, saying that he is not bound. The insurance company tried to proie
that the compromise was authorized by the son, who even presented the
lawyer as witness claiming he was instructed by the son to effect the
compromise, giving the policy to him, to deliver them to the administrator of
the estate. This was objected to under PCR.
Was the testimony in question privileged? NO
The element that the information must be given in confidence is lacking.
Communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its
being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the
confidential relation and cannot be classified in a legal sense as a privileged
communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a
communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is
a communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney
simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.
The testimony of the plaintiff’s attorney was to the effect that when the
attorney delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood that there
was a compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of
the surrender of the policies for that purpose, the plaintiff made no objection
whatever. The evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the
compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed to the compromise, he
SY 2018-2019
cannot now disavow it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face
value.
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan
A complaint was filed by PCGG before the Sandiganbayan for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth. This involves the coco levy fund during Marcos. Coco
levy is a tax imposed on the farmers in the coconut industry. There was an
allegation that funds obtained in the coco levy were taken by Marcos and his
cronies. They deposited this into various accounts in the names of various
corporations, one of which is ACCRA. The names reflected in its AOI were its
lawyers. When Aquino took over and when the PCGG was created to run after
Marcos and his cronies, they investigated ACCRA because they believed that
these stocks, represented by the lawyers of ACCRA, really belonged to
Cojuanco and other Marcos cronies. The lawyers are being compelled to
disclose the identities of their clients. The lawyers refused citing right against
self-incrimination and PCR. It was argued by the government that the identity
of clients is not a privileged communication as it is not asking for information
or disclosure of communication between clients and lawyers. It only seeks for
the identity of the clients.
WON the lawyers should be compelled to disclose the identities of their clients?
NO
GENERAL RULE: A lawyer may NOT invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
the name or identity of his client.
EXCEPTION: Information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the
ambit of the privilege when the client’s name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. In the
case at bar, the disclosure of the alleged client’s name would lead to establish
said client’s connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which
is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the
subject matter or the substance. The revelation of the client’s name would
obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where
none otherwise exists. It is the link that would inevitably form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict the client of a crime. If the disclosure of their
identity is the very possible cause of their prosecution or liability, then that is
confidential. Because had the lawyers of ACCRA disclosed the identity of their
clients, then their clients would be impleaded as respondents in the case. TN
that in this case, the lawyers were the ones impleaded. If i-disclose nila ang
clients, ma implead na ila clients.
Barton vs. Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co.
Leyte Asphalt owns Lucio Mine, a valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and
other asphalt products. Anderson, the GM of Leyte Asphalt, wrote a letter to
Barton authorizing him to sell their products in several countries upon prices
indicated. Barton had full authority to sell for any sum he saw fit in excess of
the prices quoted and such was to be his extra and additional profit and
commission. Barton sought to recover damages from Leyte Asphalt for breach
of contract. Among the evidence presented was a carbon copy of a letter
written by Barton to Atty. Ingersoll, his lawyer. When the attorney for the
Leyte Asphalt offered the letter in evidence, Barton’s lawyer said that unless
15 | Page| K.D.Alianza
the defendant’s counsel explained how the letter came to the defense’s
possession, he proposed to object the letter’s admission on the ground that it
was a confidential communication between client and lawyer.
WON the letter should be excluded? NO
When papers are offered in evidence, a court will take no notice of how they
were obtained, whether legally or illegally, properly or improperly; nor will it
form a collateral issue to try that question. Even supposing that the letter was
within the privilege which protects communications between attorney and
client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse
party and it makes no difference how the defense acquired possession.
According to Wigmore: “Since the means of preserving secrecy of
communication are entirely in the client's hands, and since the privilege is a
derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly construed,
it would be improper to extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain
knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the communication,
whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of
the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or
obtains possession of a document in original or copy.”
Orient Insurance vs. Revilla
Respondent filed a case for recovery of 2 fire insurance policies issued by Orient
Insurance. A clause in the policy stated that in case of loss and such claim is
rejected by the insurer and action is not commenced within 3 months, all
benefits will be forfeited. Petitioner alleges that the claim was rejected on April
but the action was not instituted till August, more than 3 months after
rejection. Respondent claims they delayed in instituting an action because
petitioner requested such in hopes of a compromise agreement. However,
during trial, witness for defendant alleged that he received a letter from their
attorney on July to file a case. When asked to produce such letter, defendant’s
counsel refused to reveal the whole letter but only revealed parts to support
their statement, stating that it contained private matters between attorneys
and defendant such as contract fees etc.
Does the presentation of part of the letter constitute waiver to present the
whole document? YES
Are contract fees and other terms of employment between client and attorney
privilege in nature? NO
Although contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and
considered private matters, contracts relating to fees are essentially not
privileged in nature. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the letter
contained privileged matters, such was waived by introduction in evidence of
part of the letter. The excerpt in question must be considered as proof
submitted by defendant, and there can be no question that, part of the letter
having been introduced, the whole letter could be properly examined by
Orient.
People vs. Sandiganbayan
This case involves a prominent politician in Mindanao, Paredes, who was
formerly the provincial attorney, then governor, then congressman. A case was
filed against him for using his position as Provincial Attorney to influence the
Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent.
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
Someone came forward and accused him of committing fraud in his application
for titling. The Bureau of Lands even moved for cancellation of the title on the
ground of misrepresentation. Because of this, a case for perjury was filed
against Paredes which was then dismissed. Another case was filed in court
against him for violation of the provisions in anti-graft and corrupt practices
act. By way of defense, Paredes contended that the second complaint filed
arose from the same subject and same act or omission with the earlier perjury
case and so, double jeopardy has already attached. However, take note that
for double jeopardy to attach, there must be arraignment and the case was
dismissed WITHOUT the consent of the accused. To support such defense, the
accused falsified and presented court records and transcripts as proof that the
perjury case was dismissed by the MTC after he was arraigned when in truth
and in fact, it was dismissed before he could be arraigned. This was done in
conspiracy with the lawyer of Paredes and clerk of court where the perjury case
was filed. Because of this, another case was filed against the 3 for falsification
of judicial records. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, the lawyer offered to testify against his client. He was suggested by
the prosecution to be a state witness against Paredes but the Sandiganbayan
denied the motion on the ground of client-lawyer privilege.
WON such is protected by the lawyer-client privileged communication? NO
There is no PCR to talk about. The privilege applies only if the information was
relayed by the client to the lawyer respecting a past crime. In the case of Atty.
Sansaet, the information involving the specifics and circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crime of falsification was acquired by him while the
crime was being perpetrated or while his client was about to commit such act
of falsification. The reckoning point in determining the application of PCR is
when the communication was given, not when the lawyer was made to testify.
Moreover, the communication does not only cover oral or written
communication but even physical acts.
US vs. Gordon-Nikkar
This involves conspiracy to possess and traffic cocaine, where several
accused/conspirators were present. One of them, Brenda March, pleaded
guilty to the charge and testified for the prosecution. On appeal, Ana
exclaimed that her conviction be reversed because Brenda was permitted to
testify on allegedly privileged conversations between her attorney, Atty.
Estrumsa, and such attorney’s clients. Brenda testified that they had 2
meetings in the office of the said lawyer and the said lawyer suggested to give
cover-up testimonies that none of them possessed the cocaine, but merely
happened to be at a party where the cocaine was discovered. Brenda, however,
was not a client of Atty. Estrumsa, and it is unclear as well whether all co-
defendants were his clients.
WON the statements in Estrumsa's office were protected by attorney-client
privilege? NO
Lawyer-client PCR covers only information made or advice given in the course
of professional employment – IOW, for a legitimate purpose. Brenda’s
testimony in this case is admissible since the conversations dealt with plans to
commit perjury so as to hide criminal activity. Attorney-client privilege does
not extend to communications regarding an intended crime.
SY 2018-2019
PCR applies only when there is the existence of a lawyer-client relationship. In
this case, Brenda was not the client of the lawyer. Moreover, a communication
divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be considered as confidential
communication between attorney and client.
US vs. McPartlin
This involves a criminal prosecution for conspiracy to commit fraud against the
government of US and obstruction of justice. This was filed against some
government officials, one of those was Cong. McPartlin. This involves a
government contract for sludge hauling project with a private corporation,
Ingram Corp. The star witness for the prosecution was the former VP of the
contractor of a private corporation. He was part of the series of negotiation
where conspiracy took place. In the course of these negotiations and series of
meetings, the star witness claims that he kept a diary of all the meetings
specifying the details which includes incriminating information – conspiracy
between Mcpartlin and Ingram. To the best interest of Mcpartlin and Ingram,
they came up with a common defense against the star witness – to their mutual
interest to destroy the star witness’ testimony. During that interview
conducted by the investigator hired by Ingram’s counsel, Mcpartlin made some
admissions which turned out to be more beneficial to Ingram. So, Ingram
attempted to make use such admission to exonerate himself. It now proposes
to introduce the admission in evidence by using the investigator. His testimony
was objected to under the PCR between lawyer-client.
The privilege covers instances where the common/joint defense exists. When
a client communicates with the lawyer of the other party pursuant to a
common defense, the lawyer of the other party is deemed the lawyer of the
other. Therefore, it cannot be disclosed without the consent of the accused
concerned.
Lim vs. CA
Juan filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Nelly on the ground
that the latter has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the present."
During trial, Juan's counsel announced that he would present as his next
witness Dr. Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said
counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum. She would be presented as an expert witness and would not
testify on any information acquired while attending to Nelly in a professional
capacity. She was then asked hypothetical questions related to her field of
expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated Nelly for
nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had
prescribed.
Was the information given by the physician in her testimony in open court a
privileged communication? NO
Was there a waiver of the privilege? YES
In order that the disqualification by reason of physician-patient privilege be
successfully claimed, the following requisites should concur: (1) the privilege
is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person against whom the privilege is claimed
is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (3) such
person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
16 | Page| K.D.Alianza
professional capacity; (4) the information was necessary to enable him to act
in that capacity; (5) the information was confidential and if disclosed, would
blacken the reputation of the patient.
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when
he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus,
only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him
"safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is
to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is
privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged
from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." IOW, what
is prohibited by the rule is the disclosure of the specific information –
treatment given or procedure administered, diagnosis, information relayed by
the patient to the physician but NOT THE FACT OF CONSULTATION. So, the
physician may disclose that indeed a certain patient is under his care or under
his medical treatment.
In this case, Dr. Acampado did not disclose anything obtained in the course of
her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner. As an expert
witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded.
Moreover, even the disclosure involves a specific information regarding the
treatment, it will not be covered by the privilege if it is established that during
the interview, the patient was always accompanied by a third party. One
requisite for the application of this PCR is that information must be given in
confidence.
Krohn vs. CA
Edgar filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz. In his
petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in which Ma.
Paz merely denied in her Answer as unfounded or irrelevant. At the hearing,
Edgar testified on the contents of the report, and not the physician who
prepared it. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient.
WON the evidence offered may be admitted? YES
A patient’s husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by a
medical practitioner may be admitted though without the force and effect of
the testimony of the physician. The person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics.
He is the patient’s husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by
medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed
prohibition.
Blue Cross Health vs. Olivares
Supra
Refusal to present or allow the presentation of Dr. Saniel's report was justified.
It was privileged communication between physician and patient. Since
petitioner had the burden of proving exception to liability, it should have made
its own assessment of whether Neomi had a pre-existing condition when it
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
failed to obtain the attending physician's report. It could not just passively wait
for Dr. Saniel's report to bail it out.
Chan vs. Chan
Josielene filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Johnny on the ground of mental incapacity due to incessant drinking and
excessive use of prohibited drugs. During the pre-trial conference, she pre-
marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer as proof
that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form
carried a physician's handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Josielene then filed a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering
Johnny's medical records when he was confined there. Josielene claimed that
the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the
"testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged.
WON the medical records subject of the subpoena duces tecum are covered by
physician-patient privilege communication? YES
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a
physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot
in a civil case be examined without the patient's consent as to any facts which
would blacken the latter's reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the
patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and
give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis
of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. To allow the disclosure of the
hospital records would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible
without the patient's consent. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of
compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while
dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior consent.
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability
DOTC entered into contract with ZTE for the supply of broadband network
project, to be financed by China. Senate Committee invited cabinet officials
involved including Neri. He testified that Abalos of COMELEC offered him 200M
in exchange for his approval of the said project; that then President Arroyo
instructed him not to accept it. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) WON she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) WON she directed him to approve.
The Senate Committee then contended that such privilege being invoked
violates the constitutional right of the people to public information.
WON the executive privilege was properly invoked? YES
There is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters.
The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged
information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings. President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise
SY 2018-2019
such power. In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive
Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific matter
involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which
was the subject of the three (3) questions.
The elements of the said privilege are: 1) the communication relates to a non-
delegable power of the President (power to enter into executive agreements
without Legislature's concurrence); 2) communication is received by a close
advisor (Neri as cabinet member); 3) no compelling need to limit the privilege.
This right is subject to limitations provided by law. One of the limitations is
Section 24 (e) of Rule 130, Rules of Court.
Clearly, the right to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated
with right to public information, the former, when exercised, does not follow
that the people are exercising the right to information. The delicate interplay
of executive-legislative must prevail over the right to information. The
information sought by the committee might impair our diplomatic and
economic relations with China given the confidential nature.
Lee vs. CA
Spouses Lee and Keh entered the Philippines as immigrants from China. They
had 11 children. Years later, Lee brought from China a young woman (Tiu), as
housemaid. Spouses’ children believed that Tiu left the household and had a
relation with their dad. Shortly after Keh died, the children learned that Tiu’s
children with Lee claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This
prompted the children to request the NBI to investigate the matter. After
conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report that the
mother is not KEH, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU, because in
the hospital records, Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age
when she supposedly gave birth to such other children. On the basis of this
report, the children filed 2 separate petitions, for the deletion from the
certificate of live birth of Emma Lee, one of Lee’s ‘other’ children, the name
Keh and for the replacement of the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true
mother’s name. The children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu to testify in the case.
However, later on, the subpoena was quashed by the RTC as it was oppressive
and violated the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.
WON the court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case? YES
Under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, “No person may be
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or
other direct descendants.” Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she
is the stepmother of Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because
the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie
connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by
her stepmother.
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA
Estrada vs. Desierto
17 | Page| K.D.Alianza
Cross-examination
The case revolves around the admissibility of the Angara Diary. The Angara
Diary may be a hearsay evidence, but it is admissible. Evidence is called hearsay
when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it. The right to cross-examination is fundamental against whom an
evidence is offered. If a witness comes forward with a testimony adverse
against a person whom the testimony has been offered, that person has the
right to cross-examine the source of that information. Without the cross-
examination, evidence is hearsay. In Sec. 26, there is really no cross-
examination because the source of the information is the declarant himself.
Res inter alios acta
It was argued that the Angara Diary should not be admissible because he was
not the one who wrote the entries, violating Res Inter Alios Acta rule. However,
such rule has several exceptions [Partner-SPC]. One of them is provided in Sec.
29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. Angara was
then the Executive Secretary, the alter ego of Estrada. Hence, the former was
authorized to act for the latter.
Adoptive Admission
Adoptive Admission is defined as a party’s reaction to the declaration or act of
another wherein it is reasonable to treat such reaction as an admission to what
was stated or implied by another. In this cae, when Estrada realized his support
was dwindling, especially when the AFP withdrew their support from him,
Angara suggested to Pres Estrada to consider graceful exit by resigning. Instead
of expressing his protest or objection, he simply commented that he does not
want to go out of the country. When Estrada questioned the swearing on of
GMA as successor, the issue came out as to whether he really resigned from
presidency. Since resignation is a matter of intention, SC had to grapple with
the issue as to WON the acts of Estrada prior, during and after leaving
Malacañang indicates intention to resign. The SC had to sift to the entries found
in Angara diary which contains the details of their discussions including the
suggestions to Estrada and his reactions to the suggestion. Estrada argued that
he never resigned. It was suggested to him but he never accepted such
proposal. Based on the Angara diary, it was obvious that his reaction to the
suggestion was anything but NOT protest. He did not object. By simply saying
that he does not want to get out of the country or by his silence about it
constitutes adoptive admission. He was in effect accepting the suggestion to
resign.
Bank of Commerce vs. Manalo
Manalo installed a water pump at the residence of Ramos, president of XEI, and
proposed that he would purchase a lot in the subdivision with the cost of the
service to be deducted from the downpayment. However, Manalo failed to pay
a part of the downpayment for failure of Ramos to prepare the Contract to Sell,
prompting XEI to issue a statement of account for the full amount plus
interests. Manalo filed a complaint for specific performance to execute and
deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale. Manalo presented the contracts of other lot
owners, allowing the payment of the price in 120 months at fixed amounts to
be XEI’s business usage. There is no evidence that all the lot buyers in the
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
subdivision had executed contracts of conditional sale containing uniform
terms and conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts of
conditional sale executed by XEI and 3 lot buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed
to grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of the purchase price to
2 of them, but granted 180 months to the other one. There is no evidence on
record that XEI granted the same right to buyers of 2 or more lots.
Under Section 34, Rule 130, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time
is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time,
although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of
conduct or the intent of the parties.
In this case, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a
matter of business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers
the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months
of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests. Habit, custom, usage or pattern
of conduct must be proved like any other facts. The offering party must allege
and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit.
The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must
be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere
similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar
circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
Francisco vs. People
Pacita stole jewelries from her employer. She then sold such to Francisco’s
store. Francisco is then charged with violation of Anti-Fencing Law. The
following are the evidence presented against Francisco in the Anti-Fencing
case:
- declaration of Pacita’s employer during the PI stage of the criminal case
against Pacita for qualified theft, saying that Pacita confessed to her that
she sold the jewelries to Francisco. However, the ER was not presented as
witness in the anti-fencing case
- testimony of a police officer saying that Pacita pointed to Francisco as the
person who bought the jewelry from her.
WON such pieces of evidence are admissible against Francisco?
The testimony of the ER in the qualified theft case is inadmissible. Only parties
to the case are bound by the judgment of the trial court. Strangers to the case
are not bound by the judgment of the said case. Acts or declarations of a person
are not admissible in evidence against third party as accused will then be
deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine a witness
against him.
The testimony of the police officer is only admissible to prove the fact that
Pacita identified Francisco. It is inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacita’s
declaration to the policeman that accused was the purchaser of the stolen
goods. The policeman had no personal knowledge of the sale, and more
importantly, Pacita was not presented as witness.
People vs. Irang
2 robberies were committed in one night. One suspect was identified by the
victim as having pockmarks or scars on the face. On the prosecution of the
SY 2018-2019
second robbery, a witness testified that one of the suspects has pockmarks on
the face as well. The purpose of the testimony was to establish that the same
assailant was guilty of the 2 robberies. It was objected pursuant to similar act
or prior conduct rule. It was argued that the fact that one may have been guilty
at one time does not necessarily follow that he is also guilty at another time.
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution
for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to
identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show
his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or
when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.
US vs. Pineda
The customer bought a certain medicine to treat his sick horses but instead,
the horses ended up being dead. It turned out, the medicine he bought was
poisonous. He reported the incident to the BFAD. To validate the report, the
personnel of BFAD also bought the same medicine from the Accused and tested
it. It was confirmed to be poisonous, hence the Accused was prosecuted for
violation of the anti-illegal dispensation of drugs. The evidence of the
purchases made by the personnel of BFAD was objected to because he was
prosecuted for the specific transaction that the Customer-Complainant filed. It
was argued that the evidence that the personnel of BFAD bought a poisonous
substance is not evidence that the Complainant also bought the same
poisonous substance from the Accused, under the Similar Conduct Rule.
While this may not be admissible under the prior or similar conduct rule, it was
ruled as admissible to prove intent or knowledge because if it can be
established that a person repeatedly performed the same wrong doing, this
repeated act may prove intent or negligence or even malicious intent.
Cruz vs. CA
H and W own several parcels of land. The husband died and survived by the
wife and children. The surviving wife and children entered into an extra-judicial
partition. Around the same time that they executed the Deed of Partial
Partition, they also executed a MOA. In that MOA, they agreed that although
each of them were adjudicated their respective shares in the estate of the
deceased father, if any one of them decides to sell or dispose of their respective
shares all the rest of the heirs shall be entitled to the proceeds of the sale of
the properties adjudicated to each of them. IOW, while they were adjudicated
their shares in estate of the deceased, they remained to be co-owners of the
proceeds of the properties adjudicated to each of them. One of the children,
Nerissa, got sued for collection for sums of money. She lost the case and
obtained a writ of execution. To satisfy the money judgment, the creditor
levied on execution the properties, 7 parcels of land which were previously
adjudicated to Nerissa by virtue of the deed of partial partition. After the
execution sale, the properties were awarded to the creditors who consolidated
ownership over the properties. When the properties were transferred to the
creditors, the other heirs filed a petition for partition against the creditors
because the creditors became co-owners of the properties. They filed a petition
for partition so that the 7 parcels of land, previously owned by Nerissa now
owned by the creditors, be partitioned among the creditors and among the co-
heirs of Nerissa.
18 | Page| K.D.Alianza
To support the allegation that the the co-heirs of Nerissa are co- owners of the
properties along with the creditors who now own the shares of Nerissa, they
presented a copy of the MOA where the parties, including Nerissa, agree that
where the property is sold they shall remain co-owners of the proceeds. IOW
they tried to prove that by virtue of the MOA, the intention of the parties was
to remain co-owners of the properties subject of the agreement.
By way of defense, the creditors presented deeds of sale and REM executed
by the co-heirs of Nerissa where the co-heirs (in their personal capacity) sold
or OW encumbered the properties which were adjudicated to them by virtue
of the deed of partial partition. In these deeds of sale and REM, the other heirs
declared that they owned the properties subject of the documents in fee
simple, absolutely, on their own, as their exclusive properties. IOW, the
creditors wanted to prove that the properties adjudicated to them were their
exclusive property and were not under co-ownership. But the admission of the
deeds of sale and REMs was objected to by the co-heirs under res inter alios
acta of the second branch. They said that what the person did or did not do at
a particular time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same
act at another time.
While evidence of prior or similar acts are not admissible to prove that one did
or did not do the same act at one time or another time, this may be admissible
to prove specific intent, knowledge, identity, scheme, design, plan, usage,
custom, and the like. These deeds of sale and REMs were obviously offered to
prove the heirs’ state of mind, their specific intent, such that when they
executed the deed of partial partition, what they had in mind is really to
adjudicate the properties to each of them in their personal capacity and not to
keep the properties under a perpetual state of co-ownership. The properties
owned by Nerissa and transferred to the creditors were her exclusive
properties and therefore by virtue of the judgment against here, these
properties were validly acquired by the creditors.
Rep. Of the Phil v. Kenrick Dev.
Kenrick Dev’t Corporation constructed a perimeter fence around some parcels
of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) and as a result, ATO was dispossessed of some
square meters of prime land to which the former justified its action with a claim
of ownership over the property represented by (TCT) issued in its name which
allegedly originated from TCT registered in the name of Concepcion. However,
when it was verified, the Registrar of Deeds had no record of said title. In fact,
respondent's title was also found to be within Villamor Air Base. OSG filed a
complaint for revocation, cancellation of certificates of title to which
respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Garlitos as
counsel which later on he revealed that the signature appearing above his
name was not his.
First, there was a petition for declaration of nullity of the title of Kendrick over
a parcel of land. A piece of land where there is a transfer of title to the name
of Kendrick Development but same land is also being claimed by the
government, Air Transportation Office. The title of the land was fraudulently
obtained so the Congress initiated an investigation of the fraudulent
procurance of fake title. During the investigation, Kenrick Development’s
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
lawyer, Atty. Garlitos, admitted that while he drafted the Answer, he did not
sign it. Taking cue that he never signed, the OSG filed a motion for declaration
of default against the corporation in the action for nullity of title because the
rule in Civil Procedure is that an unsigned pleading is a mere scrap of paper. It
is as if Kenrick Development did not file any answer to the complaint of the
State.
By way of opposition to the motion to declare Kenrick in default, Kenrick did
not deny the allegation of Atty. Garlitos that he did not sign the Answer. IOW,
it impliedly admitted the allegation that Atty. Garlitos did not sign the answer.
But instead of denying, Kenrick offered an explanation or justification to the
effect that even if it was not signed by Atty. Garlitos, Atty. Garlitos practically
allowed someone to sign the answer on his behalf.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another's
statement. Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented
to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is
admissible against him. This is the essence of the principle of adoptive
admission. In this case, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty.
Garlitos and built its case on them which amounts to an adoptive admission.
By adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes the admission of
the party embracing or espousing it. In this case, Kenrick did not deny the
allegation that its counsel did not sign the pleading but instead offered a
justification for the failure of Atty. Garlitos to sign the pleading by way of
avoiding adverse consequence arising from the non-signing of the answer.
Applying the principle of adoptive admission, by failure to deny the allegation
of Atty. Garlitos and by offering an explanation or justification for such failure,
Kenrick was in effect adopted the statement of Atty. Garlitos that he did not
sign the answer. Therefore, since it is settled that Atty. Garlitos did not sign the
answer, then the answer is deemed to be an unsigned pleading. Hence, under
the rules, Kenrick can be validly declared as in default.
The Learning Child vs. Ayala Alabang
Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the Sps Yuson, which was also sold
to Sps Alfonso with the annotation in the TCT that the property shall be used
exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory
(nursery and kindergarten) school. The Deed Restrictions expressly state that:
Compliance with the said restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions
may be enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or
the AAVA, their respective successors and assigns, or by any member of the
AAVA.
When all the units were sold out, ALI as developer, turned over the
management of the subd to the subd homeowners, Ayala Alabang
Homeowners Association. After the turnover of the management, Spouses
Alfonso who happened to purchase a unit or two within the subd thought of
expanding the school from preschool to now include grade school. And
because of the expansion, the homeowners subd were afraid that this would
worsen the traffic in the area – more students, more vehicles. This would call
for traffic congestion and so they objected to the expansion of the school. They
sued for injunction to prevent the expansion.
SY 2018-2019
By way of defense, Spouses Alfonso of the Learning Child Inc argued that their
expansion was already approved by the Ayala Land Inc., the developer and
previous owner of the subd. And as proof of the previous approval, they
presented a letter coming from Ayala Land Inc. that purports to approve their
application for expansion.
The Ayala Alabang Homeowners Assoc, argued that the admission of Ayala
Land Inc. contained in the letter is inadmissible under the res inter alios acta
rule because Ayala Land Inc. is not a party to the case. Its admission may not
be admissible against the Homeowners Assoc.
WON ALI’s statements were binding on AAVA? YES
Under the res inter alios acta rule, the admission of one cannot prejudice
another UNLESS they are persons jointly interested with the party. Estoppel
cannot be sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference; it must be clearly
proved in all its essential elements by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.
Considering the provisions in the deed of restrictions, it appears that Ayala
Corporation is jointly interested with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of
Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following exception to the res
inter alios acta rule: admission by co-partner or agent (Sec. 29).
There was a provision that affords the right to enforce by Ayala Corporation
and/or the AAVA, their respective successors and assigns, or by any member of
the AAVA. This makes ALI as a person jointly interested with the party and
therefore under one of the exceptions or res inter alios acta rule the admission
made by Ayala Land Inc to the effect that it approves the intended expansion
is admissible against the Homeowners assoc. Although the SC said that while it
ruled the admission of the ALI as admissible against the Homeowners, it
however ruled that such admission is not sufficient to support the argument of
the Learning Child Inc that they are authorized to expand the school. Because
going over the letter of Ayala, it was shown that while Ayala was amenable to
the expansion there was however a caveat that this should be subject to the
approval of the Homeowners Assoc. which approval was not obviously
obtained in the case. To our purposes, we just have to emphasize the rule that
Ayala Land Inc was deemed to be a person jointly interested with the party
whose admission is admissible against the Homeowners.
Narra Nickel vs. Redmont Consolidated
Petitioners applied for MPSA with the DENR for permission to engage in mining
activities in Palawan. Redmont, a competitor, filed petitions for the denial of
the petitioners’ applications because 60% of its capital stock were owned by
MBMI Resources Inc., a 100% Canadian Corporation. In support of their
allegations that these 3 applicants are owned by a Canadian Corporation,
Redmont presented the corporate records of this Canadian Corporation which
records show that this Canadian Corporation entered into JVA with these 3
mining corporations which are applicants for mining permit. It was argued that
the admission made by the Canadian Corporation is admissible against the 3
mining companies but the latter argued that the admission of the former is not
admissible against them under the res inter alios acta rule since this Canadian
Corporation is not a party to the case. But it was argued that this case falls
19 | Page| K.D.Alianza
under the exceptions particularly under the first exception referring to
admission of a person jointly interested with a party.
WON the exception to res inter alios acta rule applies? YES
The exception to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule on “admissions by co-partners”
and “admissions by privies” may be applied to admissions made by a
corporation. Although the law prohibits corporations from entering into
partnerships, said corporations may still be deemed as partners for the purpose
of applying the exception to the Res Inter Alios Acta rule if the ventures
executed between them is designed to circumvent the legal prohibition against
corporations entering into partnerships.
In this case, the conversion of the MPSA’s into FTAA’s were admissions that the
corporation was of foreign nationality and that it was not capable of conducting
large scale mining operations without financial and technical assistance. This
admission is thus binding to petitioners since they are deemed partners.
Consequently, it should not be granted MPSA. Even the fact that the Canadian
Corporation entered a JV with these 3 Filipino mining corporations, it is obvious
that this Canadian corporation is interested in the approval for applications for
mining permits. Being interested with this JV, the admission made by the
Canadian is admissible against the 3 Filipino corporations, which are the
applicants for the mining. What makes their interest joint is the fact that they
have an existing JVA.
OFFER TO COMPROMISE
People vs. Bokingco
supra
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received
against his or her co-conspirators:
(1) conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
(2) the admission relates to the common object; and
(3) made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
City of Manila vs. Del Rosario
This involves an action to recover a piece of land owned by del Rosario (Roco –
Lorenzo Del Rosario – Jacinto Del Rosario). City of Manila on the other hand
claims ownership. To prove its allegations, the City presented 2 documents. (1)
A petition signed by Lorenzo who offered to buy the said land from the City of
Manila and (2) a letter also signed by Lorenzo which he delivered to the City
Council of Manila to offer again to buy the said property. In both documents,
Lorenzo admitted that the City owns the land. The City of Manila argues that
the admission by Lorenzo falls under the exception of admission by privies that
must also bind Jacinto.
The critical criteria that would determine the application of the exception was
the time when the admission was made – it must be done while title was still
with the predecessor. In this case, the exception could not apply because both
admissions happened while Lorenzo no longer has the property. First, before
he became the owner and second, when he had already sold the property to
Jacinto.
Gevero vs. IAC
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
This involves a property bought by Del Monte in 1964 (Gevero – Lancero – Del
Monte). It turned out that the mother lot from which the property is a part was
not yet subdivided and still owned by Gevero’s mother. When Gevero’s mother
died, her children executed an extrajudicial partition of the property which
included the same portion now owned by Del Monte. Del Monte filed a case to
quiet their tile because the extra-judicial settlement casted doubt on its title
on that specific portion. In that case, the heirs who executed the extrajudicial
partition presented a document entitled Settlement to Prevent or Avoid
Litigation purportedly signed by Lancero in 1968 which recognizes that his title
to the property is defective. This was objected to because Lancero was not
presented. It was argued by the heirs that this was an exception as admission
made by privies because Lancero is a predecessor in interest of Del Monte.
The primary factor to consider is the time when the admission was made. In
1968, 4 years had already lapsed when he sold the same property to Del Monte.
Thus, the admission was made when he is no longer a holder of the title to the
property. Hence, admission by privies cannot be applied. Neither can the
declarations against interest be applied since the declaration must be done at
the time when it was against the interest of the declarant. If he is no longer the
owner, he no longer has interest on the property, and thus the declaration is
not actually against his interest.
People vs. Godoy
Private complainant alleged that her teacher, Godoy, had raped her. In order
to dissuade complainant from filing a case, the Muslim leader of Godoy’s
community had offered to the victim that Godoy would marry her. His parents
and sisters-in-law also went to the family of the offended party to dissuade
them from initiating the complaint for rape.
WON this offer to compromise in the form of an offer of marriage and an offer
to pay money is an implied admission of guilt? NO
Generally, an offer of compromise in a criminal case is admissible as an implied
admission of guilt. However, it only applies if the offer came from the accused
himself or if he is present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was
made.
People vs. De Guzman
De Guzman was filed a case for rape and his family had offered to pay money
to the family of the victim. It was established that the accused knew about it
and he never did anything to stop it. Their offer was rejected and evidence was
produced to establish the rejected offer.
WON such evidence is admissible? YES
The offer of money constitutes an offer of compromise; therefore, admissible.
His inaction amounts to ratification of the offer and therefore, admissible.
San Miguel vs. Kalalo
Kalalo had been a dealer of beer products and she pays through checks. In the
course of the dealings of Kalalo, an agent of SMC requested her to issue several
postdated checks to secure her credit overdraft for the delivery of SMC beer
SY 2018-2019
products over the Christmas season. However, because of the increased
volume of deliveries, Kalalo failed to keep track of the transactions. To protect
herself, she ordered the bank to stop payment on the last 7 checks she issued
to SMC, which was required to cope with the probable increase in orders during
the busy Christmas season. SMC sent demand letters. Kalalo’s counsel made in
return an Offer of Compromise which SMC did not accept but instead, it filed a
case for violation of the Bouncing Check Law. During the testimony of Kalalo
and after her receipt of the Statement of Account from SMC, she recanted the
contents of the Offer of Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had
the letter prepared, the final amount owed to SMC was yet undetermined; and
that she was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from SMCs agents.
WON the Offer of Compromise may be considered in evidence against Kalalo?
NO
The Offer of Compromise was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint
against her for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. It only acknowledged
the receipt of the statement of account and not the existence of her liability to
petitioner. It was clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and,
therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt.
People vs. Yparraguirre
Accused allegedly raped his housemaid. Before a case was filed, his wife
offered the victim's mother to dissuade her from filing the complaint.
An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed
before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is
required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative
makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
PRESENTATION OF WITNESS
US vs. Mercado
Defendant was charged with the crime of coercion and during the trial, the
private prosecutor asked a WITNESS “How many times have you been
convicted of assault upon other persons?”, which the defendant had objected
on the ground that the question was impertinent.
Should it be sustained? YES
Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom
he has been called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory
statements; or (b) by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty,
or integrity is bad. In this case, the question to which the defendant objected
neither attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory
statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was
bad. HOWEVER, you may still show by an examination of the witness himself
or from the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a high crime.
In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was
not a high crime, as that term is generally used. High crimes are generally
defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt
to felonies.
Civil Service Commission vs. Allyson Belagan
20 | Page| K.D.Alianza
Magdalena charged Belagan (superintendent of DepEd) with sexual indignities
and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various
malfeasances. By way of defense, Belagan tried to prove the bad moral
character of the complainant, and the evidence presented were evidence of
the numerous cases filed against the complainant. It was established that the
complainant was charged with 22 various cases with MTC and 23 cases with
the office of the brgy captain (grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust
vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc.). Most of such cases filed
were related to acts committed in the 70s and 80s and one was in 1994. Most
of such cases filed were related to acts committed in the 70s and 80s and one
was in 1994.
WON the character evidence was admissible? NO
There exist 2 provisions in the ROC that deals with the introduction of character
evidence: Sec. 51, Rule 132 on character evidence and Sec. 14, Rule 132 on the
impeachment of a witness.
Sec. 51, Rule 132 on character evidence (WON the crime has been committed)
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in
determining a controversy. One statutory exception – the good or bad moral
character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
The character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics
involved in the type of offense charged. Thus, on a charge of rape — character
for chastity, on a charge of assault — character for peacefulness or violence,
and on a charge of embezzlement — character for honesty. In the present
administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence
that has a bearing on Magdalena's chastity. The prior cases invoked were cases
of defamation, slight physical injuries, libel — all of which has no relation to a
sexual harassment case.
Sec. 14, Rule 132 on the impeachment of a witness (WON he is credible)
The ROC provides that a witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he was called by evidence (among others) that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad. The character or reputation of a complaining
witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of inquiry. Evidence of one's
character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the
time in question. What is to be determined is the character or reputation of
the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit. Surely, those cases and complaints are no
longer reliable proofs of Magdalena’s character or reputation. Every person can
change.
People vs. Noel Lee
The victim and the mother were watching television when a gun was inserted
through their window and then shot the victim. The mother was able to identify
the accused. However, the accused denied such contending that he was at a
party with his friends during the time of the killing. He also interposed the
defense that the VICTIM had a bad reputation as a thief and drug addict. By
way of defense, the accused presented a letter sent by the victim’s mother to
the mayor of the city. In that letter, the mother of the victim pleaded with the
mayor that his son be brought to a rehabilitation center being a drug addict.
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
The obvious purpose in presenting the letter of the victim’s mother was to
establish his defense that because the victim was a drug addict, it is very likely
for him to commit so many crimes, like theft and robbery, and these will very
well offer a possibility that the one who killed the victim was any of those
against whom the victim could have committed the crimes.
WON the character evidence is admissible in this case? NO
Insofar as the character evidence of the offended party is concerned, it could
only be admitted if it would tend to prove or establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged. The charge here is murder. His being a
drug addict, according to the SC has nothing to do with a violent crime of
murder.
Besides, SC added that establishing the bad moral character of the offended
party in crimes involving violent deaths, character evidence tending to prove
that the private offended party is a person of violence or a troublesome person
is immaterial for prosecution for murder. It is only material in prosecution for
homicide; because in murder, the character of the victim is immaterial if it is
qualified by treachery or evident premeditation.
So, the violent character of the private offended party in crimes involving
violent deaths will only be relevant in a prosecution for homicide especially
when the accused interposes the defense of self-defense where unlawful
aggression is one of the requisites. Self-defense is not plausible in a prosecution
for murder because it is usually done with treachery or evident premeditation.
People vs. Resabal
Defendant was accused of killing Primo Ordiz by means of a shot from a caliber
revolver. Orit testified that the accused, armed with a revolver, invited him to
Primo Ordiz's house in order to kill the latter, and on arriving at said house
entered the same. Subsequently, said witness heard an explosion allegedly
coming from a gun. Orit's testimony as to the explosion is corroborated by the
declaration of the boy Jose Ordiz, who slept with his uncle Primo Ordiz, to the
effect that early in the morning of that day he was awakened by the noise of
an explosion and saw his uncle Primo Ordiz vomiting blood and unable to
speak. The defense argues that Orit is not a credible witness having been
excluded from the information to be used as a witness for the prosecution; and,
because of the contradictions in his testimony at the PI and during the trial.
Having been excluded from the information to be a witness does not preclude
a witness from telling the truth. The mere fact that the witness was an accused,
excluded from the information in order to be used as a witness for the
prosecution, does not prevent him from telling the truth, especially in the
absence of proof showing his interest in testifying against the appellant.
The mere fact of having been excluded from the information to be used as a
witness for the Government does not prevent a witness from telling the truth
in this case, especially in the absence of proof showing the interest he might
possibly have in testifying against the accused. Neither is the apparent
contradiction which may be noted in his declarations before the court of the
justice of the peace, and before the court of first instance sufficient to discredit
his testimony, for the simple reason that this witness was not given ample
opportunity, by a reading to him of his declarations before the court of the
SY 2018-2019
justice of the peace, to explain the discrepancies noted by counsel for the
accused.
The defense also impeaches Carmelo Ordiz's testimony considering the
invitation which the accused extended to him as improbable, knowing that he
was a cousin of the deceased Primo Ordiz. Under ordinary circumstances, such
an attitude would appear improbable, but not so if it is considered that the
accused invited the witness in the belief that the latter was still an enemy of
the deceased, on account of certain disagreements they had over some land.
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
People vs. Cortezano
Sometime in 1990, Joel and Bernardo ordered their niece Leah to sleep in their
parents’ room. Leah suddenly awoke, seeing her uncles Joel and Bernardo
holding her hands and feet as she was being undressed. Joel inserted his penis
into her vagina, while Bernardo stood by the window to serve as a lookout.
After Joel dismounted, Bernardo went on top of Leah and inserted his penis
into her vagina. Momentarily, Boyet arrived and inquired what Joel and
Bernardo were doing to Leah. The 2 ordered Boyet to rape Leah and threatened
to box him if he refused. Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill her and the
members of the family if she told anyone about what happened to her. Leah
did not reveal to her grandparents what happened to her. After that first
harrowing incident, Joel and Bernardo subjected her to sexual abuse daily.
After every sexual intercourse they had with Leah, Joel and Bernardo would
threaten to kill her and her family if she told anyone what they had been doing
to her. In 1994, her mother learned from Boyet that her daughter Leah had
been sexually abused by Joel and Bernardo way back in 1990. A case was then
filed.
On appeal, the accused asserted that Leah’s testimony is barren of probative
weight. In her sworn statement to the police authorities, she claimed that she
was raped 36 times, but her testimony in the trial court tends to show that she
claimed to have been raped only on May 6 and June 10, 1990.
The barefaced fact that the public prosecutor opted to charge the appellants
with only 4 counts of rape on May 6 and June 10, 1990, but Leah, in her sworn
statement to the police authorities, stated that she had been raped by the
appellants on a daily basis and testified thereon, does not render her testimony
implausible. Even the municipal trial court which conducted the preliminary
investigation of the cases found probable cause against the appellants for
thirty-six counts of rape.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that assessment of the
credibility of witnesses lies within the province and competence of trial courts.
Whatever inconsistencies or lapses there were, the same relate to trivial
matters and do not in any manner affect her credibility and the veracity of her
statements. Furthermore, such minor lapses are to be expected when a person
is recounting details of humiliating experience which are painful to recall. No
woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be
subjected to a public trial, unless she is motivated solely by the desire to have
the culprit apprehended and punished. Considering that the young victim had
not been exposed to the ways of the world, it is most improbable that she
21 | Page| K.D.Alianza
would impute a crime so serious as rape to any man, if the charge were not
true. All told, the proffered alibi of accused-appellant cannot stand against the
positive identification by the complainant that he is the defiler of her
womanhood. Indeed, the revelation of an innocent girl not even into her teens
whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as the willingness of
complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and
humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint.
Gonzales vs. People
The accused is the alleged culprit of the crime of arson. The lower court gave
credence to the testimony of Canlas, stating that he saw the accused ignite a
flame and throw it on a pile of clothes in the middle of the living room where
he also placed an M-Gas (LPG) tank. The accused argued that the sworn
statements of Canlas before the investigating officer of the fire department
and before the city prosecutor, were inconsistent, and must therefore not be
given credence.
WON the discrepancies in the affidavit and the court testimonies of a witness
are sufficient to exculpate the accused of the crime of arson? NO
Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being
almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.
Solinap vs. Locsin
Locsin, Jr. applied to be appointed as the administrator of the decedent’s
estate. He claimed he is an acknowledged natural child and thus falls under
those “interested person” entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.
To support his claim, he submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of Live
Birth found in the office of the LCR which contained the information that his
father is the decedent who was the informant of the facts stated therein, as
evidenced by his signatures. It was recorded in a Revised Form dated 1958, but
the birth was filed to the registry on 1957. It is merely pasted with the bound
volume, not sewn like the other entries. The information therein was
typewritten, while the records of all other certificates in that volume were
handwritten.
Decedent’s nieces and nephews, however, claimed that the signatures were
forgeries. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth found
in the Civil Registrar General indicating that the birth of Locsin was reported by
his mother and that the same does not contain the signature of the decedent.
The entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the LCR have glaring
discrepancies from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil
Registry General which overturned the genuineness of the former. Although a
birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil
Code and the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation, such offers
only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. As was in this case, the certificate
of live birth has glaring irregularities.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
People vs. Victor Padit
During the trial, the prosecution presented the victim and the victim was cross-
examined by the defense. The victim narrated and testified on the details of
the crime of rape and after the testimony of the victim was completed, the
prosecution next presented the mother of the victim. The testimony of the
mother of the victim tried to establish that after the commission of the rape,
the daughter confided to her about the rape committed by the accused on the
daughter its harrowing details. The mother has no personal knowledge of the
commission of the rape. She was merely told about it by the daughter, the
victim. The mother’s testimony was objected to under hearsay.
The reason why hearsay evidence is excluded is because of the absence of
cross-examination. There is absence of cross-examination because in a hearsay
setting, the source of the information is not presented in court and therefore
cannot be cross-examined by the adverse party against whom the witness or
the evidence is offered. But in this case, while the mother has no personal
knowledge of the assertion of the statement relayed to her by the victim, the
victim was already presented as a witness and she was already cross-examined
by the defense before the mother was presented. Obviously the source of the
statement the victim herself was cross- examined and therefore the accused
has no cause to complain on the violation of due process because in the first
place, the very source of the statement has been cross-examined by the
accused.
Miro vs. Mendoza
Mendoza et al were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct for the
alleged selling of confirmation certificates supposed to be issued by the LTO
for free. However, the complainant had not actually witnessed the transactions
made. The only pieces of evidence presented by the complainants are: (1) their
complaint-affidavits and the (2) NBI/Progress report.
The affidavit provides:
That in doing my job, I have noticed and witnessed the following anomalies
concerning the processing of vehicle registration:
“That in order to secure the forms of Confirmation of Certificates, you have
to buy the same at the present price of P2,500.00 per pad from Alingasa, an
LTO personnel, who will remit her collections to a certain Mendoza …”
The NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO Manila also revealed that the
confirmation certificates were given to the representatives of car dealers.
Pertinent provision of said report reads:
“Submitted Affidavits of…”
SY 2018-2019
WON the evidence are objectionable? YES
Both are hearsay evidence.
The affidavits described the anomalous scheme and arrangement but had no
recount of any events that transpired regarding the execution of the crime.
While the payment to Alingasa might be considered based on personal
knowledge, the alleged remittance to Erederos and Mendoza – on its face – is
hearsay. The NBI/Progress report should not also be given any weight as it was
based on complainants’ affidavits as well. It constitutes double hearsay
because the material facts recited were not within the personal knowledge of
the officers who conducted the investigation. Reports of investigations made
by law enforcement officers or other public officials are hearsay unless the 3
requisites for admissibility are present: (a) that the entry was made by a public
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was
made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the
public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
Patula vs. People
Patula, sales representative, was charged with estafa. Upon trial, the
prosecution presented 2 witnesses:
(1) Lambert Go – branch manager of the company where Patula works. He
summoned an accounting clerk and a company auditor. It was found out
that that there were some erasures on the collection receipts and that a
customer had already paid his outstanding balance but it appeared unpaid
in the records of the company.
(2) Karen Guivencan – company’s auditor; discovered that the amounts
appearing on the original copies of the receipts in the possession of around
50 customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of
the receipts Patula submitted to the office. For this information, the
auditor submitted a written report to Go. However, she admits that she
has no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by Patula
from customers. She based her testimony on the entries found in the
receipts issued, the ledgers, and the unsworn statements from customer.
Was the testimony of Karen objectionable on the ground that such is hearsay?
YES
Section 36, Rule 130 provides that the personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes
the truth of a disputed fact. Karen, being the only witness, deprived RTC to test
and validate the veracity of the entries as evidence of Patula’s guilt.
Razon v. Tagitis, et al
Engr. Tagitis, Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development
Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with his student Kunnong, an IDB
scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at a pension house. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him
a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong
returned, Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist said that Tagitis went
22 | Page| K.D.Alianza
out to buy food at around 12:30pm and even left his room key with the
desk. Kunnong reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Police Station.
Tagitis’ wife
She filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo more than a month later from the
disappearance, alleging that Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take
his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to
be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a
motor vehicle then sped away. When Kunnong reported the matter to the
police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr.
Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups
known to be fighting against the government. And when the wife filed a
complaint with the PNP in the ARMM, she was told of an intriguing tale by the
police that her husband was not missing but was with another woman having
good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to
help and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband. In her direct
testimony, the wife pointed to 2 sources of information as her bases for her
allegation that Tagitis had been placed under government custody: (1) Col.
Ancanan, a friend in Zamboanga, who occupied a high position in the military
and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands; and (2) Col.
Kasim, (high ranking PNP), whom she met in Camp Katitipan with Mrs.
Talbin). They testified that Kasim (Kasim Evidence) read to them a "highly
confidential report" that contained the "alleged activities of Engr. Tagitis" and
informed her that her husband was abducted because "he is under custodial
investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or Jema'ah Islamiah". The report
indicated that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group. She
then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic taking maintenance
medication, and asked that he’d relay to the persons holding him the need to
give him his medication.
Kasim never denied such meeting and that he provided them information
based on the input of an unnamed asset. However, such "informal letter" he
received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was indeed in
the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided was
merely a "raw report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed
confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity.
WON hearsay evidence is admissible in a petition for writ of Amparo? YES
Hearsay evidence is admissible given the nature of the case where the
complainant there is up against military where no witness is normally willing to
come forward and testify against them.
The respondent's and Mrs. Talbin's testimonies cannot simply be defeated by
Col. Kasim's plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his informant's
letter, the critical piece of evidence that supports or negates the parties'
conflicting claims. Col. Kasim's admitted destruction of this letter – effectively,
a suppression of this evidence – raises the presumption that the letter, if
produced, would be proof of what the respondent claimed.
This case involves an evidence whose probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col.
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness
stand (the informant). To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and
inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge that in
the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. An
immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that the
Amparo Rule is ineffective. To give full meaning to our Constitution and the
rights it protects, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence
to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence — even of those
usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence — taking
into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can
use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should
at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and
meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with
other evidence in the case.
The fair and proper rule is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence OW inadmissible under our usual
rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.
IOW, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason — i.e., to the
relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other
pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it
satisfies this basic minimum test.
Ariate vs. People
In a case for murder, findings showed that the victim was attacked by the
assailant from behind and the place was not illuminated. The crime happened
along the road. After the attack, one of the victim’s family members rushed to
him and the victim made a dying declaration, identifying the alleged assailant.
This family member was presented by the prosecution as the sole witness to
identify the assailant, applying the DMS.
A dying declaration is admissible if the following circumstances are present: (a)
it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is
under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is
offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s death.
In this case, even if the victim survived, he was not competent to testify. Even
if the declarant was alive, he could not have identified the assailant because he
was not in the position to see or identify the assailant. Thus, dying declaration
does NOT apply.
People vs. De Joya
Diamse was found by her grandson, lying on her own blood. He then asked,
“Apo, Apo what happened?” and her last words were “Si Paqui.” This led her
grandson to file against Pioquinto de Joya a charge of robbery with homicide.
WON dying declaration is admissible? NO
Doctrine of Completeness means that a statement as offered must not be
merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant in this case.
The dying statement “si paqui” in this case while referring to the accused is not
a sensible sentence in itself. It has been held that a dying declaration to be
SY 2018-2019
admissible must be complete in itself. It does not mean that the declarant must
recite everything that constituted the res gestae of his statement, but that his
statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended
to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.
Fuentes vs. CA
This involves a prosecution for murder, a stabbing incident. Before the
deceased succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen, he muttered that
Fuentes stabbed him. Fuentes claims on the other hand that it was his cousin
who stabbed the victim. During the trial, the uncle of the accused testified that
the cousin of the accused admitted to him that he was the one who killed the
victim. The defense sought for the acquittal of the accused based on that
declaration made by the cousin of the accused. The defense argued that such
admission made by the cousin is a declaration against interest therefore
admissible against the declarant and consequently, the accused must be
acquitted. The cousin was not presented in court to testify since apparently, he
fled before any case was filed against him. However, it does not show that
Fuentes had exerted earnest effort to locate his cousin.
WON the declaration against interest attributed to the cousin is admissible
against him, as an exception to hearsay? NO
Declaration against penal interest attributed to the cousin is not admissible
against him, as an exception to hearsay – declarant is not unable to testify. Sec.
38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if
the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary
to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.
The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and
trustworthiness. There are 3 essential requisites for the admissibility of a
declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify;
(b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the
circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
In this case, it was not proven that the cousin is unable to testify. There is no
showing that he is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically
incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the
jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule.
People vs. Babiera
This involves a hacking incident, murder. Immediately after the incident, the
victim was rushed to the hospital and while confined there, he was interviewed
by the authorities. During such interview, he identified his assailants but he
expressed his confidence that he would survive. An affidavit was taken. A few
days later, his condition worsened. He was again interviewed by the
authorities. This time around, he expressed his belief that he would die as a
result of the injury. He again reiterated the earlier statement contained in the
affidavit. When offered as evidence in court, this was objected to under
hearsay but the prosecution sought admission of this affidavit under dying
declaration. It was argued that at the time the victim executed his affidavit he
23 | Page| K.D.Alianza
did not believe that he would die, meaning, the affidavit was made not under
consciousness of an impending death
When a witness made certain statements at a time when he was not conscious
of an impending death BUT later on confirms it at a time when he was already
conscious of an impending death, he is deemed to have ratified the earlier one.
While the first affidavit could not be admitted under dying declaration because
at the time it was made, the declarant still believed he would survive, the
second affidavit which reiterates the earlier one is admissible.
Parel vs. Prudencio
Prudencio claims that he is the owner of a 2-storey residential house. He
allowed the father Parel to live there and supervise the construction until the
construction was finished. Prudencio, however, sent a notice to vacate the
house since he needed a place to stay after his retirement. Parel heeded and
relocated abroad. However, his son, together with his family, surreptitiously
took possession of the ground floor, claiming that his parents were co-owners
of the building and that he occupied the ground floor upon instructions of the
parents. This prompted Prudencio to sue for recovery of possession. Father
Parel’s affidavit, which categorically acknowledged that Prudencio was the true
owner of the house, was submitted as evidence. This affidavit was executed by
the father because in the past, prior to the controversy, the government
through the assessor’s office served him a notice of the assessment of real
estate tax and the treasurer’s office attempted to collect such from him. he
then executed the said affidavit so that he may not be compelled to pay the
said taxes. The affiant (father Parel) was not presented in court. So, such
affidavit was objected to as hearsay.
WON such declaration is admissible? YES
While the said affidavit is hearsay, it falls under the exceptions – declaration
against interest. The requirements for its applicability are all present: (a) the
declarant is already dead or unable to testify (he was abroad); (b) the
declaration was made before the controversy arose; and (c) it was against the
interest of the declarant, since the father was admitting that he was not the
owner of the said building. The theory of this exception is that the necessity of
the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that
the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own
pecuniary or moral interest. Based on the affidavit, it is safe to presume that
he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it
is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests as his heirs.
People vs. Alegado
The accused was prosecuted for statutory rape (below 12 yo) but he argued
that he could not be convicted of such as there was no clear and convincing
evidence that the child was below 12 yo as the birth certificate could not be
presented. The grandfather of the victim only testified that his daughter told
him when she entrusted the child to him that the latter has to be sent to school
because she was already 7 yrs old. She said to him that her child was born on
September 5, 1976. The offended party also stated in open court that she was
born on September 5, 1976. The testimony of the lolo was objected to under
hearsay.
Admissible? YES
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
The testimony of the grandfather was family tradition as an exception to
hearsay. All 3 requisites are present: (Sec 39, Rule 130)
(1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members
of a family;
(2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned
existed previous to the controversy; and
(3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the
pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person.
Declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the
principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the
truth. Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of
the case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such
proof than from its admission.
In this case, (1) the date of birth of the rape victim is being put in issue. The
declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to (2) tradition (sending a child
to school upon reaching the age of 7 existed long before the rape case was
filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the (3) maternal
grandfather of the rape victim. Moreover, another evidence in so far as the age
of the child is concerned was the testimony of the child herself. Obviously, the
child had no personal knowledge on the date of her birth because she was only
informed about it by her mother and the other family members. However, it is
long-settled that the date and place of one’s birth or marriage or death are
matters of family reputation existing in the family which can be testified to by
any member of the family because of the premise that being a member of the
same family, they should know.
Tison vs. CA
Deceased Teodora owned several parcels of land. She was survived by her
husband and 2 nieces and nephews who succeeded by right of representation.
However, the husband adjudicated unto himself all the property left by
Teodora to the prejudice of the nieces and nephews of Teodora. Husband then
sold the property to Domingo. The husband died thereafter. The nieces and
nephews then filed a case for recovery. Domingo filed a demurrer to evidence
on the ground that the nieces and nephews failed to prove their relationship
as nephew and niece of Teodora. One of the nieces, Corazon, testified that,
during her lifetime prior to the controversy in question, Teodora admitted to
her that they are her nephews and nieces.
WON the testimony can be objected on the ground that the relationship must
be proved by evidence other than such act or declaration of the declarant? NO
Such requisite is only required if the claimant seeks recovery against a relative
through the declaration of another relative. In the case at bar, there were only
2 relatives involved. The claimant was seeking recovery against the estate of
the declarant himself and thus no independent evidence of pedigree was
needed.
Mendoza vs. CA
This involves an action for compulsory recognition of filiation filed by Teofista
who claims to be the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza. To prove the
SY 2018-2019
fact that indeed she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro, Teofista presented
witnesses, among whom was Isaac who happens to be the nephew of Casimiro.
Thus, Teofista is the claimant, Casimiro is the defendant, Iasac was the witness.
Isaac said that sometime long ago, before the controversy arose, he was told
by his father, Hipolito, and his grandmother, Brigida, that Teofista is the
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro. So, the witness here has no personal
knowledge that Teofista is really the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro but his
knowledge was from the information that he got from his father and
grandmother, who are both dead already. Teofista also presented in court an
extrajudicial partition involving the estate of Brigida’s husband, Florencio,
where it states that his only surviving heirs are Brigida, Hipolito and Casimiro.
WON the testimony of Isaac may be received in evidence to establish filiation?
YES
Requisites for the application of act or declaration about pedigree rule:
(1) The declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) The pedigree must be in issue;
(3) The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue;
(4) The declaration must be made before the controversy arose; and
(5) The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is
in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in this case.
(1) The declarants, Brigida and Hipolito, were both dead at the time of
Isaac’s testimony;
(2) The declarations referred to the filiation of Teofista and the paternity of
Mendoza;
(3) The declarations were made before Teofista filed the complaint;
(4) The relationship between the declarants and the person whose pedigree
is in question has been established by evidence other than such
declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Florencio, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs. This
establishes the fact that indeed, Casimiro and the declarants are
relatives by consanguinity.
Jison vs. CA
This involves an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation filed
by an illegitimate daughter, Monina, against her illegitimate father, Francisco
Jison. However, Francisco denied it up his dying day. Thus, Monina filed an
action to compel Francisco to recognize her. During the trial, some of the pieces
of evidence presented by Monina were the letters sent to Monina by the
siblings of Francisco. In these letters, they acknowledge that Monina is really
the illegitimate daughter of their brother. The authors of these letters,
however, were not presented in court. Monina, being the recipient of the
letters, testified and identified these letters as coming from her uncles and
aunts, the siblings of her illegitimate father, Francisco. The admission of these
letters was objected to against hearsay but Monina argued that such could be
presented in court pursuant to Sec. 39, Rule 130 – Acts or Declarations
regarding the Pedigree.
As to the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's relatives, allegedly
attesting to MONINA's filiation, Rule 130, Section 39 provides that the contents
of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the
24 | Page| K.D.Alianza
declarants were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship
between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the
documents in question.
Section 40, Rule 130
Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
The scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles which represent,
in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.
Plainly then, the various letter as private documents not constituting "family
possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted. The letters cannot also
be admitted under the 1st part os the said provision because such only
contemplates of a testimony of a family member. However, in this case, the
authors of the letters were not presented.
Ferrer vs. De Ynchausti
Ferrer siblings filed a complaint praying that their mother, Rosa, be declared to
have the right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez in the same
proportion and capacity as the other 4 children of the latter. As the only and
legitimate heirs of Rosa, they are entitled to the aforementioned share. It was
alleged that Isabel was first married to Ramon and from this marriage begot 2
children, Roman and their mother, Rosa. After the death of Ramon, Isabel
contracted a second marriage with de Inchausti, and begot 3 children.
defendants herein. Defendants’ answer admits that Isabel Gonzalez and her
first husband were survived by a child named Ramon but denied that Rosa was
also a child of that marriage. The day book of Ramon which he kept during his
lifetime was presented as evidence to show that a child named Rosa, “born of
unknown parents”, was baptized and delivered to his mother Isabel as
evidenced by a baptismal certificate. The day book was testified to by Joaquin
(half-brother) since Ramon was already dead.
WON such testimony may be used to prove Rosa’s lack of filiation? YES
In view of the fact that Ramon is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin is
admissible, for they are members of the same family, in accordance with the
provisions of section 281 of Act No. 190 (now Rule 130, Section 39). The
declaration, act, or omission of a member of a family who is not living, or is
outside the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands, is admissible as evidence of
pedigree or relationship, or family genealogy in cases where pedigree,
relationship, or family genealogy are questions at issue. Even if the testimony
of Joaquin was hearsay, the day book partakes of a nature of a family book or
chart which falls under the same category as family bible, family portrait or the
so-called family possessions.
In Re Mallari
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
Mallari was disbarred on the ground that he is not a Filipino. His parents were
found to be Chinese nationals and under the Constitution, only Filipino citizens
can practice law. During the reopening of the case, he presented testimony of
residents of the same community where his parents lived. They had no
personal knowledge of the citizenship of his grandmother but they all uniformly
testified that his grandmother was unmarried and a Tagalog-speaking woman.
They had personal knowledge and were one in their declaration that Ana
(grandmother) is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that
Esteban (father) was reputedly born out of wedlock. This is based on the
existing reputation of Mallare’s grandmother in their community.
WON such declarations are admissible? YES
The grandmother was a Filipino and thus her son Estaban is Filipino and thus
Esteban’s son which is Atty. Mallari is Filipino. The latter was reinstated based
on common reputation.
DBP Pool v. RMN
RMN owns several broadcasting stations all over the country, one of which was
razed by fire. RMN sought recovery under 2 insurance policies issued by DBP
Pool, but the claims were denied on the ground that the cause of loss was an
excepted risk. In fire insurance policy, there are standard excepted risks. The
most common excepted risk is fire by rebellion. The insurance companies
maintained that the evidence showed that the fire was caused by members of
the NPA. The only evidence presented to support their claim was the
testimonies of witnesses Lt. Col. Torres and SPO3 Rochar, who were not
present when the fire occurred and were only informed by bystanders that
"heavily armed men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline in it,
lighted it and went out shouting ‘Mabuhay ang NPA!’ and such were reflected
in their fire investigation report.
Objected: Hearsay
Insurance company: Admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, being part
of res gestae.
WON the testimonies of the bystanders are admissible in evidence? NO
Res gestae of the first form (spontaneous statement)
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those exclamations
and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement. The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not
testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant
complies with the following requisites:
(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
(2) the statements were made BEFORE the declarant had the time to contrive
or devise a falsehood; and
(3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.
The testimonies of the bystanders cannot be considered as part of res gestae.
While it may be conceded that these statements were made by the bystanders
SY 2018-2019
during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said however, that these utterances
were made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood. Both witnesses received the bystanders'
statements while they were making their investigations during and after the
fire. It is reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted down,
the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk
to one another and exchange information, not to mention theories and
speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting situations where hysteria
is likely to take place.
People vs. Estibal
This involves the rape of a minor child by her own father. Less than 24 hours
from the time of the last sexual molestation, the child victim confided to her
cousin that her father sexually abused her. The cousin, then, reported the
sexual molestation to the mother, who raised hell. Furious, the mother
confronted the victim-daughter and the latter revealed that the father has
been sexually abusing her since she was in Grade III. The mother brought the
daughter to the office of the barangay captain where the daughter was
interviewed by a barangay tanod, to whom she disclosed the details of her
harrowing experience at the hands of her own father. From the office of the
barangay captain, the daughter was brought to the police precinct where she
was again interviewed by the police officer on duty. A criminal case for rape
was filed against the father, but during the trial, the mother and the daughter
desisted from further prosecuting the case, obviously taking pity on the father.
But the prosecutor, overzealous in his duty to prosecute crimes, insisted to
proceed with the trial even in the absence of the victim herself because both
the mother and the daughter were gone without a trace. But the prosecutor
persisted. He was left with the testimony of the barangay tanod and the police
officer who interviewed the victim. This was objected under hearsay.
Whether or not res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, must be
appreciated from the factual circumstances of the case? NO
The barangay tanod and the police officer had no personal knowledge as to the
truth or falsity of the statements of the victim, but the prosecution sought
admission of the hearsay testimonies under Res Gestae because the
statements of the victim were made within 24 hours after the commission of
the crime of rape. The essence of Res Gestae of the first form, spontaneous
statement, lies in the absence of the opportunity to contrive one’s statement.
The slightest indication that the statement made by the declarant was
influenced by external factors negates the application of Res Gestae. The
Supreme Court particularly took note of the factor that before the victim was
brought to the barangay hall, before she was interviewed by the barangay
tanod and the police officer on duty, she was already with her mother, who at
that time, obviously being a mother, had the objective in mind to bring the
father to justice. Obviously, the statements made by the child during her
interviews must have already been influenced by the aggrieved mother, who
was so hell-bent on prosecuting the offending father, thus, the testimonies of
the tanod and the police officer cannot be admitted under Res Gestae. The
child’s statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify as part
of res gestae in view of the missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an
25 | Page| K.D.Alianza
appreciable time between the rape and the declarations which afforded her
sufficient opportunity for reflection.
Canque vs. CA
Canque is a contractor who was awarded with various government projects,
one of which involved construction of roads from Naga to Toledo. In connection
with this project, she engaged the services of SOCOR Construction Corp. under
their subcontracting agreement, SOCOR would undertake certain aspects of
the project and it would juat send Canque a progress billing depending on the
amount of materials delivered and the extent of services rendered.
Unfortunately, Canque refused contending that she will not pay until the
delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items
purchased is presented and the document manifesting the acceptance of the
government. SOCOR filed a suit for the recovery of payment from Canque.
Since SOCOR could not present the said delivery receipts, it presented instead
its Book of Collectible Accounts, which was testified by its bookkeeper who was
the entrant himself of the said book.
Objection: hearsay
Defense: admissible under Entries in the Course of Business.
WON the entries admissible? NO
The admission of entries in the corporate books requires of the following: [UP-
TOP]
1. Person who made such entries must be unable to testify; he may be dead,
or outside the country (absent)
2. Entries were made at or near the time of transactions referred to
3. Entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries (personal
knowledge) (absent)
4. Entries were made in his professional capacity or in performance of duty
(legal, contractual, moral, or religious)
5. Entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty
In this case, the entrant which is the bookkeeper herself actually took the stand
and testified. Furthermore, she doesn’t have personal knowledge as to the
truth or falsity of the facts in the bills by the fact that she only based her entries
on the report provided by the project engineer.
Wallen Maritime v. NLRC
Macatuno and Gurimbao, Filipinos, were on duty, checking the manifold of the
vessel and looking for oil leakages, when Mr. Sason approached them. A heated
altercation arose. The cadet/apprentice challenged the 2 to a fight but then
cried daddy to the captain, having the same nationality as his, who
coincidentally happened to witness the incident. As a result, the captain
terminated the 2 Filipinos, told them to pack up their things as their services
were being terminated. They attempted to explain their side of the incident
but the captain ignored them and firmly told them to go home.
Wallen Maritime
It alleged that the incident was not the first infraction committed by the 2
Filipinos. It presented copies of the entries of captain’s log book stating the
facts of the alleged incident which occurred in Japan.
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
The logbook itself was not presented as evidence, nor authenticated copies of
pertinent pages thereof. What was offered in evidence was merely a
typewritten collation of excerpts. The aforequoted entry was so sketchy that,
unsupported by other evidence, it leaves so many questions unanswered.
WON the evidence was admissible? NO
It is undisputed that the ship captain's logbook is a vital evidence as the same
requires him to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as the vessel's
head. In fact, a copy of an official entry in the logbook is legally binding and
serves as an exception to the hearsay rule. However, in this case, no
investigation was conducted by the ship captain before repatriating the 2. The
contents of the logbook have to be duly identified and authenticated in case
an injustice result from a blind adoption of such contents which merely serve
as prima facie evidence of the incident in question. Moreover, the logbook
itself was not presented as evidence, which could have been easily
photocopied considering the present technology on reproduction of
documents.
Northwest Airline vs. Chiong
Chiong was hired as 3rd engineer but he was not allowed to board a plane and
was not able to work because he was not on the list of confirmed passengers.
He filed breach of contract against the airlines. By way of defense, the airlines
argued that Mr. Chiong was a no-show at the airport. It presented as evidence
a passenger manifest and a passenger name record of the airlines and testified
by the supervisor on-duty on that day. However, he did not supervise the
preparation of the said documents. The officers responsible for them were not
presented in court. Thus, this was objected on the ground of hearsay. But the
airlines argued that it is an exception to hearsay under Entries in the Course of
Business.
WON the objection shall be sustained? NO
Reqts: [UP TOP]
OW stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it is
necessary that: (a) the person who made the entry must be dead or unable to
testify; (b) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer; (c) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in
the entries; (d) the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty; and (e) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
The manifest and passenger name record are mere hearsay evidence. While
there is no necessity to bring into court all the employees who individually
made the entries, it is sufficient that the person who supervised them while
they were making the entries testify that the account was prepared under his
supervision and that the entries were regularly entered in the ordinary course
of business. In the case at bench, however, the supervisor on duty has no
personal knowledge of the entries. More importantly, no evidence was
presented to prove that the employee who made the entries was dead nor
were there circumstances set forth to show the employee's inability to testify.
SY 2018-2019
Caltex vs. Africa
This involves an action for damages arising from a fire that occurred in a
gasoline station owned by Caltex. The plaintiffs are the owners of the
neighboring houses that were gutted down by such fire. The fire started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right
at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted.
The defense of Caltex is that the cause of the fire was not of their own making
but it was somebody else’s, a stranger, not related to Caltex, who threw the
matchstick into the underground tank of the station after lighting his cigarette.
The following reports were presented as evidence: Police Department Report,
the Fire Department Report and by a certain Capt. Tinio of the AFP. The report
of Capt. Tinio reproduced the information given by a certain Morales regarding
the history of the gasoline station and what the chief of the Fire Department
had told him. The admission of these reports was testified to by the
investigating fire marshal. It was objected on the ground of hearsay since it
was based on the interviews gathered from those who claimed to have
witnessed the incident, the witness has no personal knowledge. But Caltex
argued that that it falls under entries in the official record because it’s a report
prepared by a government officer.
WON the reports are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule? NO
Section 35, Rule 123, provides that “entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated.”
3 requisites for admissibility under Section 35, Rule 123:
a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law; and
c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.
The third requisite is not present in this case. The material facts recited in the
reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the
personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. The
sources of some facts were not identified while some facts were attributed to
an employee of Caltex, the driver of the tank truck, and spouses Africa. To
qualify their statements as “official information acquired by the officers who
prepared the reports”, the persons who made the statements not only must
have personal knowledge of the facts but must have the duty to give such
statements for record. The facts stated in the reports were not given by
informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
People vs. Gabriel
This involves a case of murder, a stabbing incidient in the pier. Immediately
after the incident, an eyewitness reported the incident to the police station and
police on duty entered it in the Advance Information Sheet (blotter). In that
police blotter, Ramon Doe was identified as the assailant. But when the case
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was eventually filed, the one charged was not Ramon Doe but Gabriel. During
the trial, Gabriel in his defense presented a copy of the AIS, identified by the
custodian of the said document. The accused tried to convince the court that
the eyewitness, Camba, who reported to the police immediately after the
incident, identified somebody else; thus, he should be acquitted. This was
objected by the prosecution under hearsay. But the accused argued that it falls
under entries in the official records.
WON the AIS falls under the Hearsay Rule Exception, for being an ‘Entry In
Official Records’? NO
3 requisites for admissibility (supra. – public, performance, knowledge)
In this case, Casimiro, who prepared the document had no sufficient and
personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by
him was acquired from Camba which therefore could not be categorized as
official information because in order to be classified as such the persons who
made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts
stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the record. TN:
Eyewitnesses are not specifically enjoined by law to report the incident to the
police.
Barcelon vs. CIR
Barcelon Roxas Securities filed its Annual ITR. After an audit investigation
conducted by the BIR, CIR issued an assessment for deficiency income tax. This
assessment was covered by a FAN, which, CIR alleges, was sent to petitioner
through registered mail. However, petitioner denies receiving such. Petitioner
alleges that it only knew about it when it was served with the Warrant of
Distraint and Levy. Respondent offered (1) the entry in the BIR record book
(reflecting the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax assessed, the registry
receipt number and the date of mailing) and (2) the testimony of its record
custodian as ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS. The record custodian did not
attest to the fact that she personally prepared and mailed the assessment
notice. Nor was it stated in the TSN how and from whom she obtained the
pertinent information. Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she
acquired the reports from persons under a legal duty to submit the same.
WON the record custodian’s testimony qualifies as an exception to the rule
against hearsay evidence? NO
3 requisites for admissibility (PPK.)
For entries in the official record to be admissible, it is important that the
entrant of the entries must have either personal knowledge of the facts therein
stated or acquired the facts through official information. But it was established
that the entrant, the record keeper, had no personal knowledge of the facts
therein stated particularly the fact that the notice of assessment was served
and the date it was served. It was also established that he was not the one who
caused the mailing of the notice of assessment. It could have been different if
the post office testified as to the fact of mailing.
Talidano vs. Falcon Maritime
A seaman was terminated from employment for gross neglect of duty. He was
supposed to be on guard during his duty. Because he failed to report to his
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
post, the vessel intruded into another lane. The incident was reported in the
ship captain's book. He was terminated, and then sued for illegal dismissal in
the Philippines. As proof, the employer presented a copy of a fax message, sent
to it from the Japanese port authorities on the date of incident, reporting the
vessel's deviation from its course due to petitioner's neglect of duty at the
bridge, as well as a copy of the report of crew discharge issued by the master
of the vessel 2 days after the incident. But the admission of the photocopy of
the report was objected to under HER because the ship captain was not
presented; only the photocopy was submitted (since this is a labor case where
parties are only required to submit position papers and affidavits; no trial). The
Ship Captain’s report does not bear a date as to when the entries were
recorded. Moreover, the ship master, who is the author of the fax messages,
did not witness the incident himself. He obtained such information only from
the Japanese port authorities. However, the respondent argued that such is
admissible under res gestae rule.
Sec 42, Rule 130 mentions 2 acts which form part of the res gestae, namely:
spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res
gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res gestae are the
statements accompanying the equivocal act.
In the first form, it is essential to establish that the statement has been made
in the course or during a startling occurrence, or immediately prior or
subsequent. In this case, however, the Ship Captain’s report does not bear a
date as to when the entries were recorded so it cannot be established when
the statements found in the Ship Captain’s logbook were made. This cannot
also establish that the statements were made during the time when the
Complainant was absent from his post, or immediately prior, or immediately
after the time of the incident. So, it cannot be determined whether the
statements found in such book were made accompanying the verbal act, which
is the Complainant’s absence from his post. Failure to establish these
requirements, it cannot fall under the first nor the second form of Res gestae.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The ship
master, who is the author of the fax messages, did not witness the incident.
Verily, the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.
Malayan Insurance vs. Reyes
An accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue involving 4
vehicles. A Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator SPO1 Dungga
was presented as evidence, showing the cargo truck at fault. Malayan
Insurance, insurer of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, paid the
damages. The insurance company then sent several demand letters to the
registered owner and the driver of the cargo truck. However, they controverted
the Police Report, asserting that it was based solely on the biased narration of
the bus driver. It was not even clear if SPO1 Dungga had sufficient knowledge
over the incident. However, respondents failed to make a timely objection.
WON the police report is admissible? YES
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court,
among which are entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides that
entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
SY 2018-2019
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Notably,
the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented
in court, as long as the 3 requisites could be adequately proved (ppk). Here,
there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator, prepared
the report, and he did so in the performance of his duty. However, what is not
clear is whether he had sufficient personal knowledge of the facts contained in
his report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking. Respondents failed to make a
timely objection to the police report's presentation in evidence; thus, they are
deemed to have waived their right to do so. As a result, the police report is still
admissible in evidence.
PNOC Shipping vs. CA
There was this collision between 2 vessels; one of the vessels involved was
subsequently assigned to PNOC. PNOC then sued for damages claiming that the
other party was the cause of the incident. It claimed for damages representing
the replacement value of the vessel and the paraphernalia installed in the
vessel. The manager of the corporation wrote letters to various suppliers and
asked for the citations of what is really the prevailing value of these gadgets
and paraphernalia. To prove the actual damages, such price quotations
obtained by the plaintiff from various suppliers were presented and objected
to because the sources of the quotation were not presented. Plaintiff argued
that they should be admissible under commercial list exception to hearsay.
WON the evidence should be admissible? NO
To apply the exception, it must be established that (1) the list was published
for the use of the persons engaged in that particular trade or business of that
profession AND (2) generally relied upon by these people. In this case, the 2
requisites are absent. As a matter of fact, such were just private
communications between the complainant and suppliers. The price quotations
cannot be considered as standard handbook published for the use of people
engaged in that particular trade or business. They partake of the nature of
hearsay evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not
presented as witnesses in this case.
Tan vs. CA
Petitioner, through their mother, Celestina as guardian ad litem, sued Tan for
acknowledgement and support, alleging him to be the illegitimate father of the
minors Carmelita and Rodolfo. After petitioners had presented oral and
documentary evidence and were about to rest their case, they moved to
dismiss the foregoing civil case upon the ground that the parties had come to
an amicable settlement. On the same day, the mother subscribed before the
clerk of court an affidavit categorically stating that Tan “is not the father of my
said minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo, but another person whose
name I cannot divulge”. After the case was dismissed, petitioners, through their
maternal grandfather Servillano as guardian ad litem, commenced another
action for acknowledgement and support, involving the same parties, causes
of action, and subject matter. Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial
were subpoenaed by the Court. However, they never appeared to testify. The
plaintiffs presented evidence, among others, testimonies of plaintiffs’
witnesses in the former case.
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WON such testimonies are admissible? NO
Section 41, Rule 130 provides that the testimony of a witness (1) deceased or
(2) out of the Philippines, or (3) unable to testify, given in a former case
between the same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse party
having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in evidence. In
the present case, however, the witnesses whose testimonies (from the former
trial) were offered into evidence, were neither dead, nor were they outside of
the Philippines. Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only they
refused to testify. Petitioners are not bereft of remedy. They could have urged
the court to have said witnesses arrested, punished for contempt – but they
however failed to avail such. Mere refusal of the witness to testify is not a
justification for invocation of the exception. It must be due to some grave cause
that disabled the witness to testify again (ex. physical infirmity, mental inability,
old age resulting to loss of memory).
Manliclic v. Calaunan
Calaunan, together with Mendoza, on board his jeep collided with a bus driven
by Manliclic. A criminal case was then filed charging the bus driver with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
During the pendency of the criminal case, Calaunan filed a complaint for
damages against Manliclic and his employer PRBL. Among those who testified
in the criminal case were Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos. When the civil case
was heard, it was prayed that the TSNs of the testimonies of the said 3 people
in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these
witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case. Tuliao testified that his
brother-in-law, Calaunan, left for abroad and has not returned since then.
Rogelio took the stand and said that his brother, Ramos, left for Amman,
Jordan, to work. Rosalia testified that her husband, Mendoza, left their
residence to look for a job but has not returned home yet. However, PRBLI did
not make any objection.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
[UP-SIC]
(a) the witness is dead or unable to testify;
(b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing
the same interests;
(c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although on different causes of action;
(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue
involved in the present case; and
(e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
former case.
In this case, PRBLI was not a party in the Criminal Case; hence, it had no
opportunity to cross-examine the 3 witnesses. However, hearsay evidence
alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the
importance it deserves. In the case at bar, it is too late for PRBLI to object.
People vs. Victor Padit
O R A E T L A B O R A
EVIDENCE DIGEST
In the morning of May 5, 2006, the victim, AAA, went out of their house to buy
bread. But on her way to the store, she was called by accused-appellant, Victor
P. Padit (Padit), who is their neighbor and the uncle of her mother. After
allowing her to play inside his house, Padit then brought her upstairs, caused
her to lie down and removed her short pants while he also removed his and
proceeded to rub his penis against AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain but was
rendered helpless and prevented from making any sound as Padit covered her
mouth with his hand. Padit then threatened to hurt AAA with his knife if she
tells anybody about the incident.
Come lunch time, AAA’s mother went looking for her. Padit told her that AAA
is in his house and brought her outside. Back at their house, AAA told her
mother about what Padit did to her. AAA's parents filed a complaint and caused
AAA to undergo physical/medical examination on May 8, 2006 where it was
found that the child's vulva showed a slight hymenal abrasion.
In the Information, the Office of the Public Prosecutor charged Padit of the
crime of Rape penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial
ensued, both the RTC and CA found Padit guilty of consummated rape on which
Padit, through his counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal.
At the outset, the Court notes that in the Information filed, petitioner is
specifically charged with rape under Article 335 of the RPC. Considering that
the crime was committed on May 5, 2006, the applicable law is under the new
provisions on rape now found in Articles 266-A to 266-D of the RPC as amended
by RA 8353. Hence, the prosecution as well as the RTC and the CA committed
an error in specifying the provision of law which was violated. Nonetheless, it
is settled that the failure to designate the offense by statute or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law
violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly
recite the facts constituting the crime charged.
Accused-appellant's arguments harp on the alleged loopholes, inconsistencies
and improbabilities in the testimonies of the victim and her mother which
supposedly cast doubt on their credibility as witnesses. Settled is the rule that
testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has, in fact, been committed.
When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to
give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter
to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges
of truth and sincerity. Considering that AAA was only four (4) years old when
she was raped and was only five (5) years old when she took the witness stand,
she could not have invented a horrible story. For her to fabricate the facts of
rape and to charge the accused falsely of a crime is certainly beyond her mental
capacity.
As to the guilt of accused-appellant, the Court does not agree with the
contention that the prosecution failed to prove carnal knowledge on the
ground that AAA explicitly stated in her testimony that Padit merely rubbed his
penis against her vagina. AAA, who was then four years old, was not expected
to be knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof. Rape is
committed on the victim's testimony that she felt pain. This kind of pain could
not have been the result of mere superficial rubbing. Furthermore, the
SY 2018-2019 EVIDENCE DIGEST
testimony of AAA is corroborated by the findings of the physician who
examined her.
Padit also contends that the testimony of AAA's mother is nothing but hearsay.
The Court does not agree. The term “hearsay” as used in the law on evidence,
signifies evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the
witness from whom it is elicited. The reason for its exclusion is that the party
against whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or
opportunity to cross-examine and the court is without opportunity to test its
credibility by observing the demeanor of the person who made them. In the
instant case, AAA herself, was sworn as a witness to the fact testified to by her
mother. Padit's counsel even cross-examined AAA. Moreover, the trial court
had the opportunity to observe AAA's manner of testifying. Hence, the
testimony of AAA's mother on the incident related to her by her daughter
cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.
As to the penalty, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua
in lieu of death, but it should be specified that it is without eligibility for parole.
The Court additionally orders accused-appellant to pay interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until all the monetary awards
for damages are fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated July 19,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR- H.C. No.00888 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (I) accused-appellant VICTOR P.
PADIT is sentenced to suffer the penalty or reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole; and (2) that said accused-appellant is additionally ordered
to pay the victim interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

O R A E T L A B O R A
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