Insular Government vs Frank

Facts:
In the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois, United States, George I. Frank, through a respective
of the Insular Government of the Philippines, entered into a contract for a period of two years with
the plaintiff to serve as a stenographer.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the
defendant, the latter will inucur liability to the plaintiff. Frank worked for only 6 months. As a
result, plaintiff sued him for damages.
Frank invoked minority as defense, stating that
he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under
the Philippine law.
ISSUE:
WON defendant is liable for damages.
RULING:
Yes, defendant is liable for damages. Record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered
into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and is fully capacitated to
execute the said contract.
No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and
validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Lex loci
celebrationis applies.

Germann & Co.vs. Donaldson

Facts:
Germann and Co. is a German company with office in Berlin, Germany. Max Leonard Tornow
A power of attorney was executed in Berlin, Germany is the sole operator of the said business with
operations carried out in Germany and Manila.
February 1900, Tornow executed an instrument conferring several powers of attorney in favor of
Fernando Kammarzell. Both Tornow and Kammerzell are citizens of Germany. Tornow is a
resident of Berlin and Kammerzell of Manila.
October of the same year, Tornow executed a general power of suits as a substitute of the first
instrument conferring powers to Kammerzell. Under this instrument, Kammerzell sued the
defendants, Donaldson, Sim & Co, to recover a sum of money.

Aznar vs. Christensen-Garcia

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California and domiciled in the Philippines,
executed a will in Manila, Philippines. The said will states that Mr. Christensen declared only
ONE (1) legitimate child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney),
that he bequeathed Php 3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen ("Helen") ( declared acknowledged
natural daughter), and that the remainder of all his estate shall be given to his legitimate daughter.
The executor, Adolfo C. Aznar, drew a project of partition in accordance with the said will.
Helen Christensen Garcia opposed contending that said will deprives her of her legitime.
It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of California, the
internal law thereof, should govern the will. Appellant, on the contrary, insists that Article 946
(California Civil Code) should be applicable, and in accordance of it and the doctrine of the
renvoi, the question of the provisions of the will in question should be referred back to the law of
the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the succession in question is governed by Philippine laws or California laws.
RULING:
Philippine law governs.
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions are
governed by the national law of the decedent, in this case, California law.
The provision in the laws of California provides that California internal law prescribed is for its
citizens residing therein, on the other hand, California conflict-of-laws rule applies for citizens
residing abroad.
The domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
his acknowledged natural child, HELEN, should therefore be governed by the Philippine Law, the
domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California.

Mecano vs COA
FACTS:
Antonio A. Mecano, petitioner, was a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
He was hospitalized for cholecystitis, on account of which, he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, so, he claims reimbursement from the COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director he requested reimbursement on the ground that he is
entitled to the benefits under Section 6991 of the RAC.
Claim was forwarded, however, it was returned after having considered the statements of the
Chairman of the COA that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of
1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 19912 of then Secretary
of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate
to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular
Section 699 of the latter".
Claim was resubmitted for several times, but again denied on the ground that Section 699 of the
RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC.
RULING:
No.
Before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the
intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear
and manifest; otherwise, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and
not a substitute for, the first act.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new
and old laws.
Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.

Miciano vs. Brimo

FACTS:
Joseph G. Brimo, a Turk (alien testator) executed his will in the Philippines which stated that his
property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not of Turkish law.
The judicial administrator of the estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of deceased Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 16 of the Civil Code.
The appellant further argues that as the deceased was a Turkish citizen, thus, his will should be in
accordance with the laws of his nationality not with the laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disposition of the will in question shall be made in accordance with Philippine
Laws.
RULING:
No, Turkish law should govern the disposition of the said property pursuant to Article 16 of NCC.
The condition of the testator in his will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws
of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines is void, being contrary to law
pursuant to article 792 of the civil Code.
Moreover, said condition is again contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code, national law of the testator is the one
to govern in his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, is considered unwritten.

Sergio Amonoy vs Spouses Jose Gutierrez

FACTS:
In payment of the Attorney's fees charged by Sergio Amonoy amounting P27,600.00, Asuncion
Pasamba and Alfonso Formida executed a deed of real estate mortgage on two (2) lots adjudicated
to them. However the said estate adjudicated was declared closed and terminated.
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Fornilda passsed away. Among the heirs of the Alfonso was his
daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.
Because his Attorney's fees, secured by the two lots were not paid, Amonoy filed for their
foreclosure. The heirs opposed, contending that the attorney's fees charged were unconscionable
and that the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy
requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage. Failing in that,
the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction. The heirs failed to pay.
In the auction, Amonoy was the highest bidder and included were the lot where the house of the
Gutierrez’s was built.
Thereafter, the CFI issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate. On
Amonoy's motion, the orders were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots,
including the house of the Gutierrez spouses.
Petition was passed by the respondents, the court granted TRO for the suspension of the
demolition, but the houses have already been demolished. A complaint for damages was filed by
respondents which was denied by RTC but granted by CA.
Petitioner invokes damnum absque injuria in arguing that he has no liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages?
RULING:
Yes.
Petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria. It was evident that the demolition ordered by
petitioner, despite of his receipt of the TRO, do not only constitute an abuse but also an unlawful
exercise of his right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated the Court’s Order and
willfully caused the destruction of respondents’ house.
Set forth in Article 19 of NCC, are standards which set the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights. Thus, in inflicting damage
to another, the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

15
university of the east vs jader
Facts:
Romeo A. Jader, respondent, was enrolled in the petitioner College of Law from 1984 to 1988. In
the first semester of his last year he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I
for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year
law student and filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given to him which
was approved by the Dean after payment of the required fee. He took the examination and same
professor submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5).
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law deliberated on who
among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the
Tentative List of Candidates for graduation as of Second Semester.
Commencement exercises came, as his name appeared on the foot of the invitation as one of the
candidates for graduation, plaintiff attended and was thereafter handed by Dean a rolled white
sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. He tendered blow-out in the evening where his
relatives celebrated and wished him good luck for the bar.
After which, he prepared for the bar and enrolled law review class. However, Having learned of
the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination.
Respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral damages when he was not
able to take the bar examinations because of the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of
moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff can claim for moral damages.
Ruling:
No. While petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual
damages, the court hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages.
Respondent has the task to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements
to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have been
responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, are in order. On these grounds, the court failed to
see how respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites,
enrolling review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed
humiliated, he brought this upon himself. Thus, he cannot claim for moral damages.

16 nikko hotel manila garden vs reyes

Facts:

Respondent Roberto Reyes, more popularly known as "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00
o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel
Nikko, he was spotted by his friend Dr. Violeta Filart, who approached him. Mrs. Filart invited
him to join her in a party in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager. Mr. Reyes then
went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket as latter’s present for the celebrant. Mr.
Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready,
Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was
stopped by petitioner, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for the Hotel as Executive Secretary, in a
loud voice and within the hearing of the other guests, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party for he
is not invited, Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, however, he was
completely ignored. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of
the hotel. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.
Mr. Reyes claimed for a sum of money for
actual damages, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Ruby Lim, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstance painted by the latter. She narrated that she was just serving her function, one of
which is organizing the intimate party of the former general manager of the hotel.

When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there
were no other guests in the immediate vicinity. When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to
eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said that the latter, after eating, should leave considering that he
is not invited. She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to
leave, but to her surprise, he began making a big scene.
Dr. Filart denied that he did not invite Mr. Reyes stating that he thought Mr. Reyes already left
after helping him in carrying the gift basket.
ISSUE: W/N Hotel Nikko is liable under Art 19 & 21 of Civil Code/ Liable for damages
Ruling:
Petitioner assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not
invited. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he
himself was at fault.
Considering the closeness of defendant to petitioner the request was meant to be heard by him
only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was
plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired
between them.
Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law but it is not applicable herein as
Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.

17 Capitle et al vs. vda de Gaban et al

Facts:
Fabian Correjado (Fabian) inherited from his father two parcels of land subject of the case at bar.
Fabian died intestate in 1919. He was survived by four children, namely: Julian, Zacarias,
Francisco and Manuel, all surnamed Correjado.
After Fabian’s death in 1919, his son Julian occupied and cultivated the two subject parcels of
land (the property) until his death in 1950. He was survived by the three respondents.
Julian’s brother Francisco died in 1960. He was survived by the petitioners.
Julian’s brother Zacarias died in 1984. He was survived by the other petitioners.
On November 26, 1986, petitioners filed a complaint for partition of the property and damages
against respondents, alleging that Fabian contracted two marriages, the first with the mother of
Julian, and the subsequent one the mother of Zacarias, Manuel and Francisco. They further alleged
that the property remained undivided even after the death of Julian, the respondents herein having
arrogated unto themselves the use and enjoyment of the property, to the exclusion of petitioners;
and that respondents refused to deliver petitioners’ share in the property despite demands for
partition.
Petitioners in their answer contend that petitioners were not adjudicated of any share in the
property, the mother Francisco and Zacarias, was just a mistress, hence, they were illegitimate
who were not entitled to inherit under the old Civil Code.
RTC dismissed the complaint so it was appealed in CA. However, CA also denied the appeal.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision upon the ground
that “THIS CASE HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS, PARTICULARLY ART. 19 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE”.
Finding the invocation of Art. 19 misplaced, the appellate court, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RELIANCE ON ART. 19 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS MISPLACED.
Ruling:
The petition fails.
Article 19 of the Civil Code is a statement of principle that supplements but does not supplant a
specific provision of law.
With respect to rights to the inheritance of a person who died before the effectivity on August 30,
1950 of the Civil Code like Fabian who died in 1919.
Assuming that petitioners’ fathers were legitimate and, thus, were co-owners of the property:
From the moment co-owner Julian occupied in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute owner of the
property and denied his brothers any share therein up to the time of his death in 1950, the question
involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership in which case imprescriptibility of the
action for partition can no longer be invoked. The adverse possession by Julian and his successors-
in-interest- herein respondents as exclusive owner of the property for about 67 years at the time of
the filing of the case at bar, ownership by prescription had vested in them.

18 US vs Limcangco
Facts:
The following facts have been proven: (1) That the accused, had in a considerable time courted
Urbana del Rosario, a young woman under 20 years of age; (2) that he had carnal intercourse with
her; (3) that he had promised to marry her; (4) that about the month of September, 1906, she had
been pregnant for some five months.
The defense consisted in that the promise of marriage was subsequent, and not prior to the carnal
knowledge, and that therefore there was no deceit employed in the seduction of the girl.
The conclusion of the judgement appealed from is that the time when the accused became aware
that the girl was pregnant he abandoned her and refused to fulfill his promise to marry her.
The lower court sentenced Ponciano Limcangco of arresto mayor and to pay the costs, reserving
"the plaintiff's right to recover for damages suffered by reason of the nonfulfillment of the promise
of marriage, and for subsistence. Both parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, appealed
conclusion/ judgment.
Issue:
WON Urbana can claim for damages in non-fulfillment of promise to marry
Ruling:
Decision in cassation stated that a promise of marriage, in order to constitute that deceit which
leads to the consummation of the crime of seduction, needs no solemnity nor any other formality
except that of making it in such manner that it may reasonably be believed by the injured party,
the persistence and repetition of the offer, and other similar circumstances which give to the offer
the appearance of sincerity.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with three months of arresto mayor
with the accessories imposed on the defendant; and Limcangco to indemnify Urbana del Rosario
in the sum of P500, to recognize the offspring, and to pay the costs of both instances.

19 Bunag vs CA
Facts:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant
to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse which was against the girls will. Later that
evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother,
where they lived as husband and wife for 21 days, On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license.
On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an
affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
Plaintiff had to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973 with all humiliation. Plaintiff was
ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against
her by defendants-appellants.
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private
respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father.

On a finding, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent, the trial court
rendered a decision ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent for moral damages,
exemplary damages, temperate damages, and for attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit.
Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability, this was appealed by the
plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to comply with the promise of marriage of the defendant considered
contrary Art. 21 of NCC
Ruling:
Article 21of the NCC was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes.
The grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions of the petitioner, which indisputably
abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to
paragraphs 3 and 10. Petition is denied.

20 hing vs choachuy
Facts:
Petitioner-spouses filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Injunction and
Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case and raffled against the respondents.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land Basak, City of Mandaue,
Cebu, that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located
adjacent covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) situated in the property of petitioners; that
respondents constructed an auto-repair shop (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) ; that Aldo filed a case
against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, that
case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the
said construction would destroy the wall of their building, which is adjacent to petitioners’
property; that the court denied Aldo’s application for failure to substantiate its allegations; that,
in order to get evidence respondents illegally installed on their shop of two video surveillance
cameras facing petitioners’ property; that respondents, through their employees and without the
consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction; and that the acts
of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy. Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be
ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal
surveillance.
In their counterclaim, respondents stated that they did not install cameras nor ordered their
employees to take pictures, also they stated that they were only stockholders of Aldo.
RTC ru-ed in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondents to remove the surveillance cameras.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration but it was denied.
The CA, on its decision explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a
residence.The CA also said that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could
not have installed video surveillance cameras. Thus, they are not the proper parties.
Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the private
lives of others.
Respondents, on the contrary, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right
to privacy since the property involved is not used as a residence. They again contended that they
did not install the cameras.
Issue: WON petitioners were deprived of their right to privacy putting in consideration Art 26 (1)
of NCC
Ruling:

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in the Constitution and in our laws.
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public
are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.
The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," (Article 26 (1) therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his
right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. Petition
was granted.