FIRST DIVISION a.
Teaching Faculty member, given a tenure track appointment upon hiring
G.R. No. 211273, April 18, 2018
RAYMOND A. SON, RAYMOND S. ANTIOLA, AND WILFREDO E.
POLLARCO, Petitioners, v. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, FR. ROLANDO DELA
ROSA, DR. CLARITA CARILLO, DR. CYNTHIA LOZA, FR. EDGARDO ALAURIN,
AND THE COLLEGE OF FINE ARTS AND DESIGN FACULTY
COUNCIL, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the September 27, 2013 Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 128666 setting aside the August 10, 2011
Decision3 and October 30, 2012 Decision4 and January 22, 2013 Resolution5 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC Case No. 04-001131-11 and reinstating
the March 26, 2012 Decision6 of the NLRC, as well as the CA's January 29, 2014
Resolution7 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.8
Factual Antecedents
Respondent University of Santo Tomas (UST) is an educational institution operating under the
authority of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The rest of the herein respondents
are impleaded as officers and administrators of the school.
Petitioners Raymond A. Son (Son), Raymond S. Antiola (Antiola), and Wilfredo E. Pollarco
(Pollarco) are full time professors of the UST Colleges of Fine Arts and Design and
Philosophy, and are members of the UST Faculty Union, with which UST at the time had a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Son and Antiola were hired in June, 2005, while Pollarco was employed earlier, or in June,
2004. Under their respective appointment papers, petitioners were designated as "faculty
member[s] on PROBATIONARY status," whose "accession to tenure status is conditioned by
[sic] your meeting all the requirements provided under existing University rules and
regulations and other applicable laws including, among others, possession of the [prerequisite]
graduate degree before the expiration of the probationary period and by your satisfactory
performance of the duties and responsibilities set forth in the job description hereto attached."9
The UST-UST Faculty Union CBA provided that –
ARTICLE XV
TENURE
Section 1 .Tenured Faculty Member. - He is:
who has rendered six (6) consecutive semesters of satisfactory service on a
full-time basis, carrying fifteen-unit load (15) or more. Although a
master's degree is an entry requirement, a faculty member admitted to
serve the University without a master's degree shall finish his master's
degree in five (5) semesters. If he does not finish his degree in five (5)
semesters, he shall be separated from service at the end of the fifth
semester; however, if he is made to serve the University further, in spite of
the lack of a master's degree, he shall be deemed to have attained tenure.10
The CBA provision relative to the requirement of a Master's degree in the faculty member's
field of instruction is in line with the requirement laid down in the 1992 Revised Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools issued by then Department of Education, Culture, and Sports
(DECS), and the CHED's Memorandum Order No. 40-08 - or Manual of Regulations for
Private Higher Education of 2008 - stating that:
Section 35.Minimum Faculty Qualifications. - The minimum qualifications of a faculty in a
higher education institution shall be as follows:
1. For undergraduate program
a. Holder of a master's degree; to teach mainly in his major field and where
applicable, a holder of appropriate professional license requiring at least a
bachelor's degree for the professional courses. However, in specific fields
where there is dearth of holders of Master's degree, or a holder of a
professional license requiring at least a bachelor's degree may be qualified
to teach. Any deviation from this requirement will be subject to regulation
by the Commission.
Petitioners did not possess the required Master's degree, but were nonetheless hired by UST on
the condition that they fulfill the requirement within the prescribed period. Petitioners enrolled
in the Master's program, but were unable to finish the same. In spite of their failure to obtain
the required Master's degree, they continued to teach even beyond the period given for
completion thereof.
On March 3, 2010, then CHED Chairman Emmanuel Angeles issued a
Memorandum11 addressed to the Presidents of public and private higher education institutions,
directing the strict implementation of the minimum qualification for faculty members of
undergraduate programs, particularly the Master's degree and licensure requirements, as
mandated by Memorandum Order No. 40-08, "to ensure the highest qualification of their
faculty."
Acting on the March 3, 2010 Memorandum, UST wrote the petitioners and other affected
faculty members, informing them of the university's decision to cease re-appointment of those
who failed to complete their Master's degrees, but allow a written appeal from the concerned
faculty members who are due for thesis defense/completion of their Master's degrees.12
Petitioners did not make a written appeal, operating under the belief that they have been vested
tenure under the CBA for their continued employment despite failure to obtain the required
Master's degree.13
14
On June 11, 2010, petitioners received termination/thank you letters  signed by respondent
Dr. Cynthia Loza, Dean of the College of Fine Arts and Design. The reason given for non-
renewal of their appointments is their failure to obtain the required Master's degree.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
Petitioners filed a labor case against the respondents for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
and recovery of money claims. In their joint Position Paper and other pleadings,15 petitioners
claimed that since they have already acquired tenure by default pursuant to the tenure
provision in the CBA, they could not be dismissed for failure to complete their respective
Master's degrees; that the UST-UST Faculty Union CBA is the law between the parties, and its
provisions should be observed; that in spite of the CBA provision on tenure, respondents
illegally terminated their employment; that they were illegally terminated for their refusal to
send the prescribed appeal letter, which is tantamount to an undue waiver and unlawful
surrender of their tenurial rights, and is against the law and public policy; that in terminating
their employment, respondents did not comply with the required "twin-notice rule"; that
respondents are guilty of bad faith and unfair labor practice on account of their violation of the
CBA; that respondents are guilty of bad faith when they re-hired the other professors even
when they did not possess the required Master's degree, while they (petitioners) were
discriminated against and terminated from work just because they did not file the prescribed
appeal letter; and that they should be paid backwages and other money claims. Thus,
petitioners prayed for reinstatement with full backwages, allowances and other benefits; moral
and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees and costs of suit.
In their joint Position Paper and other pleadings16 respondents countered that there is no unfair
labor practice committed, because the CBA provision adverted to is not an economic
provision; that the implementation of Memorandum Order No. 40-08 takes legal precedence
over the parties' CBA; that the CBA provision granting tenure by default may no longer be
enforced on account of the requirement under Memorandum Order No. 40-08, an
administrative regulation that is equivalent to law and has the effect of abrogating the tenure
provision of the CBA; that Memorandum Order No. 40-08 is a police power measure for the
protection and promotion of quality education, and as such, the CBA should yield to the same
and to the broader interests of the State; that petitioners could not have acquired tenure since
they did not possess the minimum qualification - a Master's degree - prescribed under
Memorandum Order No. 40-08; that the CBA provision on tenure by default has become
illegal as it is contrary to law, and for this reason, it may not be enforced; that said CBA
provision, being contrary to law, cannot be the object of estopppel, and produces no effect
whatsoever and need not be set aside nor declared ineffective by judicial action; that in not
renewing petitioners' probationary appointments, respondents observed due process and the
provisions of the Labor Code, particularly Article 281, which provides that a probationary
employee may be terminated from work "when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the
time of his engagement"; that petitioners are not entitled to monetary awards as they were
dismissed for cause, paid their correct salaries, and are not entitled to damages and attorney's
fees; and that the case against the individual respondents should be dismissed as well, as they
were acting within their official capacities. Thus, they prayed for the dismissal of petitioners'
complaint.
On March 17, 2011, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria rendered his Decision17 in NLRC Case Nos.
NCR-07-09179-10, 07-09180-10, and 07-09181-10, finding for petitioners and declaring
respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, as well as malice and bad faith
in illegally dismissing the former. The Labor Arbiter upheld the CBA provision granting
tenure by default to petitioners, and declared that petitioners were not accorded due process
prior to dismissal. Thus, petitioners were awarded money claims, damages, and attorney's fees.
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
Respondents appealed before the NLRC. On August 10, 2011, the NLRC issued its Decision
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It held that
the UST-UST Faculty Union CBA took precedence over CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-
08; that by said CBA provision, petitioners acquired tenure by default; that UST continued to
hire faculty members without the required Master's degree in their field of instruction even
after petitioners were dismissed from work; and that the only cause for petitioners' dismissal
was their refusal to submit a written appeal, which is not a valid ground for dismissal or non-
renewal of their appointment.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. The case was re-opened as the handling
Commissioners inhibited themselves from the case.
On March 26, 2012, the Special Division of the NLRC issued a new Decision which set aside
the earlier August 10, 2011 Decision and dismissed petitioners' labor case. It held that CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 took precedence over the parties' CBA; that the CBA should
conform to the said Memorandum, which had the force and effect of law; and that since the
CBA provision on tenure by default did not conform to the CHED Memorandum, it is null and
void.
Petitioners moved to reconsider.18 Meanwhile, the case was re-assigned to the Second Division
of the NLRC which, on October 30, 2012, promulgated a Decision granting petitioners' motion
for reconsideration. It set aside the March 26, 2012 Decision of the Special Division and
reinstated the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It held that the CBA superseded the CHED
Memorandum; that CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 requiring a Master's degree of
professors in the undergraduate programs is merely directory, and did not provide that the lack
of a Master's degree was a ground to terminate the professor's services; that CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 was issued only in 2008, while the CBA was concluded in
2006 - thus, it may not be retroactively applied in the absence of a specific provision
authorizing retroactivity; and consequently, petitioners acquired tenure.
Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration,19 but in a January 22, 2013
Resolution,20 the NLRC denied the motion for lack of merit.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Petition for Certiorari21 before the CA, respondents questioned the adverse NLRC
dispositions and prayed for dismissal of the labor case or NLRC Case Nos. NCR-07-09179-10,
07-09180-10 and 07-09181-10.
On September 27, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed Decision granting the Petition,
decreeing thus:
Private respondents22 contend that they already attained tenureship by reason of their
continuous employment service on a probationary status to petitioner University, invoking the
provision of the 2006-2011 Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), particularly
Article XV, Section 1 thereof, which was signed on July 18, 2008. According to them, when
the petitioner University and the UST Faculty Union of which private respondents are
members agreed to the terms and conditions set forth in the UST Faculty CBA, the former
explicitly and unequivocally intended to vest tenure to those professors without master's
degrees who served for at least six (6) semesters.
Private respondents' reliance on the collective bargaining agreement is not tenable. 'While
every individual has autonomy to enter into any contract, the contractual stipulations,
however, must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. In
a case involving the observance of a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court,
in Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM) vs. Abiera, had the occasion to pronounce:
'It is a fundamental postulate that however broad the freedom of contracting parties may be, it
does not go so far as to countenance disrespect for or failure to observe a legal prescription.
The statute takes precedence; a stipulation in a collective bargaining agreement must yield to
it. That is to adhere to the rule of law.'
The above principle was likewise reiterated in Escorpizo, et al. vs. University of Baguio, et al.,
from which We quote:
"...Indeed, provisions of a CBA must be respected since its terms and conditions constitute the
law between the contracting parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its
provisions. And in the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved
party has the right to go to court for redress. xxx xxx xxx
...Nevertheless, the aforecited CBA provision must be read in conjunction with statutory and
administrative regulations governing faculty qualifications. It is settled that an existing law
enters into and forms part of a valid contract without the need for the parties expressly making
reference to it. Further, while contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may see fit, such right to contract is subject to limitation that the
agreement must not be contrary to law or public policy."
It should be borne in mind that the operation of educational institutions involves public
interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of
sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions.
Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the
students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required
scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to possess
postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that private respondents failed to meet the standards for
regular employment provided under Memorandum Order No. 040-08 issued by CUED. The
termination of their contract was based on their failure to obtain [a] master's degree and
cannot, therefore, be regarded as illegal. In fact, the services of an employee hired on
probationary basis may be terminated when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the
time of his engagement. There is nothing that would hinder the employer from extending a
regular or permanent appointment to an employee once the employer finds that the employee
is qualified for a regular employment even before the expiration of the probationary period.
Conversely, if the purpose sought by the employer is neither attained nor attainable within the
said period, the law does not preclude the employer from terminating the probationary
employment on justifiable ground. Mere, no vested right to tenureship had yet accrued in
private respondents' favor since they had not complied, during their probation, with the
prerequisites necessary for the acquisition of permanent status. It must be stressed that herein
private respondents were given more than ample opportunities to obtain their respective
master's degree since their first appointment in 2004 or 2005 as a prerequisite to tenure status.
But they did not take advantage of such opportunities. Justice, fairness, and due process
demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had little or no
participation or control.
In addition, the petitioner University as an educational institution enjoys academic freedom - a
guarantee that enjoys protection from the Constitution. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional
academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Indeed, the Constitution
allows merely the State's regulation and supervision of educational institutions, and not the
deprivation of their rights.
The essential freedoms subsumed in the term 'academic freedom' encompasses the freedom to
determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3)
How it shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study. Undeniably, the school's
prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and to determine whether or not these
standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom that gives the educational
institution the right to choose who should teach. In Peña v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the Supreme Court emphasized:
'It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since
quality education is a mandate of the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are
reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside.'
The authority to choose whom to hire is likewise covered and protected by its management
prerogative - the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring,
the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, process to be followed,
regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline,
and dismissal and recall of workers. This Court was more emphatic in holding mat in
protecting the rights of the laborer, it cannot authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the
employer.
All told, We are satisfied that private respondents' termination from employment was valid
and legal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions dated August 10, 2011 and October
30, 2012 as well as the Resolution dated January 22, 2013 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-LAC Case No. 04-001131-11 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the Decision dated March 26, 2012 that dismissed the complaints of
herein private respondents is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.23 (Citations omitted)
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same via its January 29,
2014 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
In a February 3, 2016 Resolution,24 the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.
Issue
Petitioners claim simply that the CA erred in ruling that they were not illegally dismissed.
Petitioners' Arguments
In their Petition and Reply25 seeking reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and, in lieu
thereof, the reinstatement of the August 10, 2011 and October 30, 2012 NLRC Decisions and
the January 22, 2013 NLRC Resolution, petitioners insist that they were illegally dismissed;
that the CBA and its provision on tenure by default prevail over CHED Memorandum Order
No. 40-08, as they constitute the law between the parties; that since they acquired tenure by
application of the CBA provision, they may not be removed except for cause; that contrary to
the provisions of said CHED Memorandum, respondents were never prohibited from
maintaining faculty members without a master's degree, as in fact they continued to hire such
faculty even after they were separated from UST; that respondents' continued hiring of non-
Master's degree holders constitutes estoppel - respondents are estopped from claiming that
they (petitioners) are not qualified to teach in UST, and so should not have been dismissed
therefrom; that instead of treating their respective cases with harshness, respondents should
have instead allowed them to finish their Master's degrees, since the only requirement missing
is their thesis defense; that the true reason for their removal is their obstinate refusal to make
the required appeal letter in waiver of their acquired tenure, which manifestly indicates
respondents' malice and bad faith in dealing with petitioners - especially considering that they
(petitioners) were the only professors whose appointments were not renewed out of the 70
faculty members without Master's degrees who were notified of the strict implementation of
CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 and required to file a written appeal; that respondents
violated the twin-notice rule as petitioners were not given notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to their separation; that the right of academic freedom does not give respondents
the unbridled right to undermine petitioners' right to security of tenure; and finally, that the
CHED itself did not direct the removal of faculty members without Master's degrees, but only
the strict implementation of the schools' faculty development programs.
Respondents' Arguments
In their joint Comment26 to the Petition, respondents argue that a Master's degree in the
undergraduate program professor's field of instruction is a mandatory requirement that may
not be the subject of agreement between the school and the professor, citing Herrera-Manaois
v. St. Scholastica's College,27 where the Court held that full-time faculty status may be
extended only to those who possess, among others, a master's degree in the field of instruction,
and this is neither subject to the prerogative of the school nor the agreement of the parties, and
this requirement is deemed impliedly written in the employment contracts between private
educational institutions and prospective faculty members; that the Herrera-Manaois doctrine
was reiterated in University of the East v. Pepanio,28 where it was held that government had a
right to ensure that only qualified individuals with sufficient academic knowledge and
teaching skills are allowed to teach in educational institutions, whose operation involves
public interest; that the CBA provision on tenure by default has been superseded by CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08, which for all intents and purposes is deemed law to which the
CBA must yield as it conflicts with the former; that the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes of government, as into every contract is read the
provisions of existing law; that the operation of educational institutions involves public
interest, and to this end, these institutions have the obligation to the public to ensure that only
those individuals who possess the required academic knowledge, training, and qualifications
may teach; that CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 is a police power measure which may
impair the CBA provision on tenure by default for the protection of the public; that the strict
implementation of CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 is not subject to compromise or
leniency, contrary to what petitioners believe - in claiming that they should be allowed to
finish their master's degrees even while the Memorandum is already in effect, which places
UST in a precarious position of active violation of law; that petitioners cannot claim tenure as
they remained probationary teachers even if their appointments/contracts were repeatedly
renewed - so long as they do not obtain their master's degrees, they continue to remain
probationary employees of the university; that petitioners were given ample opportunity to
finish their master's degrees, but they did not do so; and that UST's decision not to renew
petitioner's appointments is a valid exercise of academic freedom and management
prerogative. Thus, respondents pray for denial of the instant Petition.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate program
professor's field of instruction has been in place, through DECS Order 92 (series of 1992,
August 10, 1992) or the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Article IX,
Section 44, paragraph 1 (a) thereof provides that college faculty members must have a master's
degree in their field of instruction as a minimum qualification for teaching in a private
educational institution and acquiring regular status therein.
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its mle-
making power as provided for under Section 70 of Batas PambansaBlg. 232, otherwise known
as the Education Act of 1982.29 As such, it has the force and effect of law.30 In University of
the East v. Pepanio,31 the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers was
held to be not unreasonable but rather in accord with the public interest.
Thus, when the CBA was executed between the parties in 2006, they had no right to include
therein the provision relative to the acquisition of tenure by default, because it is contrary to,
and thus violative of, the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that was in
effect at the time. As such, said CBA provision is null and void, and can have no effect as
between the parties. "A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it
does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation."32 Under the Civil Code,
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy;
x xxx
When CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 came out, it merely carried over the requirement
of a masteral degree for faculty members of undergraduate programs contained in the 1992
Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. It cannot therefore be said that the
requirement of a master's degree was retroactively applied in petitioners' case, because it was
already the prevailing rule with the issuance of the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools.
Thus, going by the requirements of law, it is plain to see that petitioners are not qualified to
teach in the undergraduate programs of UST. And while they were given ample time and
opportunity to satisfy the requirements by obtaining their respective master's degrees, they
failed in the endeavor. Petitioners knew this - that they cannot continue to teach for failure to
secure their master's degrees - and needed no reminding of this fact; "those who are seeking to
be educators are presumed to know these mandated qualifications."33
From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for
maintaining professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to
be employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications. Petitioners cannot
therefore insist to be employed by UST since they still do not possess the required master's
degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and maintain professors without the necessary
master's degrees is not a ground for claiming illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as
the law is concerned, respondents are in violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the
practice of hiring unqualified teaching personnel; but the law cannot come to the aid of
petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties herein, they are in pari delicto.
Latin for 'in equal fault,' in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are
guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties,
when an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto. Under
the pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall
have no action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds them. This
doctrine finds expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto
potior est conditio defendentis."
x xxx
As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and
1412 of the Civil Code, which state that:
Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the
contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall
have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
xxxx
Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
xxxx
1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has
given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking;
x x x x.34 (Citations omitted)
The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's field of
instruction has been cemented in DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and
respondents have been violating it. The fact that government has not cracked down on
violators, or that it chose not to strictly implement the provision, does not erase the violations
committed by erring educational institutions, including the parties herein; it simply means that
government will not punish these violations for the meantime. The parties cannot escape its
concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew the overwhelming importance of
the said provision and the public interest involved -as they now fiercely advocate to their favor
- they should have complied with the same as soon as it was promulgated.
It cannot be said either that by agreeing to the tenure by default provision in the CBA,
respondents are deemed to be in estoppel or have waived the application of the requirement
under CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08. Such a waiver is precisely contrary to law.
Moreover, a waiver would prejudice the rights of the students and the public, who have a right
to expect that UST is acting within the bounds of the law, and provides quality education by
hiring only qualified teaching personnel. Under Article 6 of the Civil Code, "[r]ights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law." On the other hand,
there could be no acquiescence - amounting to estoppel - with respect to acts which constitute
a violation of law. "The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is
otherwise null and void or ultra vires."35 "[N]o estoppel can be predicated on an illegal act."36
It cannot be said either that in requiring petitioners to file a written appeal, respondents are
guilty of bad faith and malice for practically forcing the former to renounce their tenure. There
is no tenure to speak of in the first place.
Just the same, as correctly argued by the respondents, the crucial issues in this case have been
settled. In the case of University of the East v. Pepanio,37 the Court held that –
Three. Respondents argue that UE hired them in 1997 and 2000, when what was in force was
the 1994 CBA between UE and the faculty union. Since that CBA did not yet require a
master's degree for acquiring a regular status and since respondents had already complied with
the three requirements of the CBA, namely, (a) that they served lull-time; (b) that they
rendered three consecutive years of service; and (c) that their services were satisfactory, they
should be regarded as having attained permanent or regular status.
But the policy requiring postgraduate degrees of college teachers was provided in the Manual
of Regulations as early as 1992. Indeed, recognizing this, the 1994 CBA provided even then
that UE was to extend only semester-to-semester appointments to college faculty staffs, like
respondents, who did not possess the minimum qualifications for their positions.
Besides, as the Court held in Escorpizo v. University of Baguio, a school CBA must be read in
conjunction with statutory and administrative regulations governing faculty qualifications.
Such regulations form part of a valid CBA without need for the parties to make express
reference to it. While the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions, as they may see fit, tine right to contract is still subject to the limitation that
the agreement must not be contrary to law or public policy.
The State through Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 (The Education Act of 1982) delegated the
administration of the education system and the supervision and regulation of educational
institutions to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (now Department of Education).
Accordingly, in promulgating the Manual of Regulations, DECS was exercising its power of
regulation over educational institutions, which includes prescribing the minimum academic
qualifications for teaching personnel.
In 1994 the legislature transferred the power to prescribe such qualifications to the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED). CHED's charter authorized it to set minimum
standards for programs and institutions of higher learning. The Manual of Regulations
continued to apply to colleges and universities and suppletorily the Joint Order until 2010
when CHED issued a Revised Manual of Regulations which specifically applies only to
institutions involved in tertiary education.
The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The
operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to
ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and
teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of
human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-
prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may
be required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to
employment.
Respondents were each given only semester-to-semester appointments from the beginning of
their employment with UE precisely because they lacked the required master's degree. It was
only when UE and the faculty union signed their 2001 CBA that the school extended
petitioners a conditional probationary status subject to their obtaining a master's degree within
their probationary period. It is clear, therefore, that the parties intended to subject respondents'
permanent status appointments to the standards set by the law and the university.
Here, UE gave respondents Bueno and Pepanio more than ample opportunities to acquire the
postgraduate degree required of them. But they did not take advantage of such opportunities.
Justice, fairness, and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for
situations where it had little or no participation or control. (Citations omitted)38
In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica 's College39 that –
Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot legally acquire
a permanent status of employment. Private educational institutions must still supplementarily
refer to the prevailing standards, qualifications, and conditions set by the appropriate
government agencies (presently the Department of Education, the Commission on Higher
Education, and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority). This limitation on
the right of private schools, colleges, and universities to select and determine the employment
status of their academic personnel has been imposed by the state in view of the public interest
nature of educational institutions, so as to ensure the quality and competency of our schools
and educators.
The applicable guidebook at the time petitioner was engaged as a probationary full-time
instructor for the school year 2000 to 2003 is the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools (1992 Manual). It provides the following conditions of a probationary employment:
Section 89. Conditions of Employment. Every private school shall promote the improvement
of the economic, social and professional status of all its personnel.
In recognition of their special employment status and their special role in the advancement of
knowledge, the employment of teaching and non-teaching academic personnel shall be
governed by such rules as may from time to time be promulgated, in coordination with one
another, by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Conditions of employment of non-academic non-teaching school personnel, including
compensation, hours of work, security of tenure and labor relations, shall be governed by the
appropriate labor laws and regulations.
Section 92. Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to compliance with Department and
school requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than
three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary
levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary
level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level
where collegiate courses are offered on the trimester basis.
Section 93. Regular or Permanent Status. Those who have served the probationary period shall
be made regular or permanent. Fulltime teachers who have satisfactorily completed their
probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent.
Considering mat petitioner ultimately sought for the position of a permanent full-time
instructor, we must further look into the following provisions under the 1992 Manual, which
set out the minimum requirements for such status:
Section 44. Minimum Faculty Qualifications. The minimum qualifications for faculty for the WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 27, 2013 Decision and January 29,
different grades and levels of instruction duly supported by appropriate credentials on file in 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 128666
the school shall be as follows: are AFFIRMED in toto.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

c. Tertiary

(1) For undergraduate courses, other than vocational:

(a) Holder of a master's degree, to teach largely in his major field; or, for professional courses,
holder of the appropriate professional license required for at least a bachelor's degree. Any
deviation from this requirement will be subject to regulation by the Department.

Section 45. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. As a general rule, all private schools shall employ
full-time academic personnel consistent with the levels of instruction.

Full-time academic personnel are those meeting all the following requirements:

a. Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications prescribed by the Department
under this Manual for all academic personnel;

xxxx

All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing qualifications are considered part-time.

xxxx

Thus, pursuant to the 1992 Manual, private educational institutions in the tertiary level may
extend 'full-time faculty' status only to those who possess, inter alia, a master's degree in the
field of study that will be taught. This minimum requirement is neither subject to the
prerogative of the school nor to the agreement between the parties. For all intents and
purposes, this qualification must be deemed impliedly written in the employment contracts
between private educational institutions and prospective faculty members. The issue of
whether probationers were informed of this academic requirement before they were engaged
as probationary employees is thus no longer material, as those who are seeking to be educators
are presumed to know these mandated qualifications. Thus, all those who fail to meet the
criteria under the 1992 Manual cannot legally attain the status of permanent full-time faculty
members, even if they have completed three years of satisfactory service.

In the light of the failure of Manaois to satisfy the academic requirements for the position, she
may only be considered as a part-time instructor pursuant to Section 45 of the 1992 Manual. In
turn, as we have enunciated in a line of cases, a part-time member of the academic personnel
cannot acquire permanence of employment and security of tenure under the Manual of
Regulations in relation to the Labor Code. (Citations omitted)
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 226727, April 25, 2018
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST AND DR. ESTER GARCIA, Petitioners, v. VERONICA
M. MASANGKAY AND GERTRUDO R. REGONDOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the February 19, 2016 Decision1 and August 26, 2016 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132774, entitled "Veronica M. Masangkay
and Gertrudo R. Regondola v. University of the East, Dr. Ester Garcia and The National
Labor Relations Commission. "
Respondents Veronica M. Masangkay (Masangkay) and Gertrudo R. Regondola (Regondola)
were regular faculty members, Associate Professors, and Associate Deans of petitioner
University of the East (UE) – Caloocan Campus, prior to their dismissal on November 26,
2007.
While holding said positions at UE, respondents submitted three (3) manuals, namely:
Mechanics, Statics, and Dynamics, requesting said manuals' temporary adoption as
instructional materials. Respondents represented themselves to be the rightful authors thereof,
together with their co-author, a certain Adelia F. Rocamora (Rocamora). Accompanying said
requests are certifications under oath, signed by respondents, declaring under pain of perjury,
and openly certifying that the manuals are entirely original and free from plagiarism. Said
certification reads:
We hereby certify that the contents of the manual MECHANICS FOR ECE AND COE by
Gertrudo R. Regondola, et al. to be used in the subjects ECE 311N are entirely original and
free from plagiarism.
(SGD.)
Gertrudo R. Regondola
 
(SGD.)
Veronica Masangkay2
After review, UE approved the requests for use of said manuals by students of the College of
Engineering.
Thereafter, petitioners received two (2) complaint-letters via electronic mail (e-mail) from a
certain Harry H. Chenoweth and Lucy Singer Block. Chenoweth and Block's father are
authors, respectively, of three books, namely: Applied Engineering Mechanics, Engineering
Mechanics, 2nd Edition, 1954, and Engineering Mechanics: Statics & Dynamics, 3rd Edition,
1975. They categorically denied giving respondents permission to copy, reproduce, imitate, or
alter said books, and asked for assistance from UE to stop the alleged unlawful acts and deal
with this academic dishonesty.
Prompted by the seriousness of the allegations, UE investigated the matter. After a thorough
evaluation of the alleged plagiarized portions, petitioner conducted an investigation in which
respondents actively participated and filed their Answer. Eventually, UE's Board of Trustees
issued Resolution No. 2007-11-84 dismissing respondents. Notices of Dismissal effective
November 26, 2007 were sent to respondents and Rocamora via registered mail.
Unlike herein respondents, Rocamora sought reconsideration of the decision to the Board of
Trustees. Respondents, however, did not appeal the decision terminating them and instead
opted to claim their benefits due them, which consisted of leave credits, sick leave, holiday
pay, bonuses, shares in tuition fee increase, COLA, and RATA. For her part, respondent
Masangkay requested that a portion of her benefits be applied to her existing car loan. For the
amounts that they received, they signed vouchers and pay slips. These were duly acted upon
by UE.
Rocamora's case
It appears that after the Board of Trustees denied reconsideration of Rocamora's dismissal, the
latter filed a case against UE for illegal dismissal. Eventually reaching this Court, the illegality
of her dismissal was upheld by the Court through a resolution in University of the East and
Dr. Ester Garcia v. Adelia Rocamora, G.R. No. 199959, February 6, 2012.
Meanwhile, almost three years after having been dismissed from service and after collecting
their accrued benefits, respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on July 20,
2010, docketed as NLRC NCR No. 07-09924-10, entitled "Veronica M. Masangkay and
Gertrudo R. Regondola v. University of the East (UE), President Ester Garcia."
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In its February 28, 2011 ruling,3 the labor arbiter held that respondents were illegally
dismissed and ordered their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other benefits
and full backwages inclusive of allowances until actual reinstatement. UE was directed to pay
a total of P4,623,873.34 representing both respondents' backwages, allowances, 13th month
pay, moral and exemplary damages. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainants to
have been ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. Respondents are ordered to immediately reinstate
complainants to their position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and full
backwages inclusive of allowances until actual reinstatement. Respondent University of the
East is directed to pay complainants the following:
VERONICA M. MASANGKAY 7. MORAL DAMAGES   P 50,000.00
1. BACKWAGES:     8. EXEMPLARY DAMAGE   P 25,000.00
  11/1/07 - 2/28/11         TOTAL: P 2,252,041.67
  50,000 x 39.93 = P1,996,500.00        
  13th MO. PAY:     10% Attorney's Fees 462,287.33  
  P1,996,500/12 = P 166,375.00          
  ALLOWANCE: 41741     GRAND TOTAL: P4,623,873.34
  P3,000.00 x 39.93 = P 119,790.00 P2,282,665.00
th
SO ORDERED.4
2. 13  MO. PAY  
  7/20/2007 - 10/31/2007   NLRC Decision

  P50,000 x 3.40 / 12 =   P 14,166.67

The case reached the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), where the Commission
3. MORAL DAMAGES   P 50,000.00 reversed the labor arbiter's ruling and disposed of the case in this wise:

4. EXEMPLARY DAMAGE   P 25,000.00 WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondents is GRANTED and the labor arbiter's Decision is
    TOTAL: P2,371,831.67 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

        SO ORDERED.5
GERTRUDO R. REGONDOLA  
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,6 respondents elevated the case to the
5. BACKWAGES: November 1, 2007 -February 28, 2011 CA.
  50,000.00 x 39.93 = P1,996,500.00  
CA Ruling
  13th MO. PAY:  
  P1,996,500/12 P 166,375.00   The appellate court reinstated the labor arbiter's ruling that petitioners failed to prove that
indeed a just cause for respondents' dismissal exists. Too, it emphasized, among others, that
  ALLOWANCE:     the instant petition is bound by this Court's Decision in the Rocamora case, calling for the
application of the doctrine of stare decisis. The CA thus disposed of the case in this manner:
  P3,000.00 x 39.93   P2,162,875.00
6. 13th MO. PAY   IN VIEW OF ALL THESE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June
29, 2012 and Resolution dated September 17, 2013 of public respondent National Labor
  July 20, 2007 - October 31, 2007   Relations Commission are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 28, 2011 of the Labor
Arbiter is REINSTATED.
  P50,000 x 3.40 / 12 =   P 14,166.67

SO ORDERED.

The CA denied reconsideration of the questioned Decision in the assailed Resolution of

August 26, 2016, prompting petitioners to file the instant petition, raising the following issues,
to wit:
1) Whether or not respondents' misrepresentation, dishonesty, plagiarism and/or copyright
infringement which is considered academic dishonesty tantamount to serious misconduct is a
just and valid cause for their dismissal.
2) Whether or not the CA erroneously applied the principle of stare decisis.
3) Whether or not respondents are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages, and other
monetary awards despite the fact that they were dismissed for valid cause under the Labor
Code.
4) Whether or not the award of damages and attorney's fees have factual and legal basis.
Petitioners argue, among others, that the instant case cannot be bound by the Rocamora case
via application of the doctrine of stare decisis because of substantial differences in Rocamora's
situation and in that of respondents, as noted by the NLRC. Too, petitioners maintain that
plagiarism, a form of academic dishonesty, is a serious misconduct that justly warrants herein
respondents' dismissal.
This Court's Ruling
We resolve to grant the petition.
The principle of stare decisis requires that once a case has been decided one way, the rule is
settled that any other case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the
same manner.7 It simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.8
Applying said principle, the CA held that Our ruling in University of the East v. Adelia
Rocamora9 is a precedent to the case at bar, involving, as it does, herein respondents' co-author
and tackling the same violation—the alleged plagiarism of the very same materials subject of
the instant case.
In this petition, UE, however, asserts that the case of respondents substantially varies from
Rocamora so as not to warrant the application of said rule.
Indeed, the CA erred when it relied on Our ruling in University of the East v. Adelia
Rocamora in resolving the present dispute. Our decision in Rocamora, rendered via a Minute
Resolution, is not a precedent to the case at bar even though it tackles the same violation—the
alleged plagiarism of the very same materials subject of the instant case, which was initiated
by respondents' co-author. This is so since respondents are simply not similarly situated with
Rocamora so as to warrant the application of the doctrine of stare decisis.
A legal precedent is a principle or rule established in a previous case that is either binding on
or persuasive for a court or other tribunal when deciding subsequent cases with similar issues
or facts.
Here, We find that the Rocamora case is not on all fours with the present dispute, thereby
removing it from the application of the principle of stare decisis. First, herein respondents
categorically represented to UE under oath that the Manuals were free from plagiarism—an
act in which their co-author Rocamora did not participate. Second, respondents benefited
financially from the sale of the Manuals while Rocamora did not. Third, respondents
acquiesced to UE's decision to terminate their services and even requested the release of and
thereafter claimed the benefits due them.
Aside from these, respondents executed a Certification categorically stating under oath and
declaring under pain of perjury that the manuals are entirely original and free from
plagiarism. To reiterate:
We hereby certify that the contents of the manual MECHANICS FOR ECE AND COE by
Gertrude R. Regondola, et al. to be used in the subjects ECE 311N are entirely original and
free from plagiarism.
(SGD.)
Gertrudo R. Regondola
 
(SGD.)
Veronica Masangkay10
As correctly noted by the NLRC in its September 17, 2013 Resolution,11 Rocamora made no
such undertaking with respect to the subject materials. This Certification is crucial in
determining the guilt of herein respondents and cannot simply be disregarded.
By expressly guaranteeing to UE that their Manuals were entirely original, coupled by their
omission to attribute the copied portions to the original authors thereof, as per the
Memorandum submitted by Chancellor Celso D. Benologa, it is apparent that respondents
represented said copied portions as their own.
More importantly, We find that the CA erred in disregarding the evidence presented by
petitioner as regards the issue of plagiarism.
In the assailed ruling, the CA held that petitioner UE failed to prove that respondents were
indeed guilty of the charge of misconduct or dishonesty through plagiarism—a form of
academic dishonesty. It found that the evidence does not show that respondents were
motivated with wrongful intent in publishing the manuals.12 In ruling thus, the appellate court
heavily relied on the approval of the manual by the Textbook Evaluation and Publishing
Office (TEPO) and the Board of Trustees m exculpating respondents from liability.
The CA also found that their act of allegedly plagiarizing the books of Chenoweth and Singer
was not duly proven since the two (2) e-mails from Chenoweth and Block were not verified
such that, therefore, such e-mails afford no assurance of their authenticity and reliability.13 The
CA went on to state that "[h]aving issues on their authenticity and reliability, the allegations in
the e-mails are mere speculations that, therefore, such fact renders such e-mails inadmissible
in evidence against petitioners."14
The CA, in its Resolution, thereafter ruled that the evidence charging respondents with
plagiarism was inadmissible, viz:
Be that as it may, We reiterate that private respondents failed to sufficiently prove that
petitioners were guilty of plagiarism that would warrant the latter's dismissal from service. In
order to prove petitioners' act of plagiarizing the books of Chenoweth and Ferdinand Singer,
private respondents only presented the following: unauthenticated and unverified e-mails from
Chenoweth and Block and the Lecture Guides/Manuals. The e-mails from Chenoweth and
Block, being unauthenticated, are, therefore, inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
Private respondents cannot merely rely on the Lecture Guides/Manuals in order to show that
petitioners were guilty of plagiarism. The reason is that such Lecture Guides/Manuals were
duly scrutinized and evaluated by the TEPO, through its Board of Textbooks Review, and
were eventually approved by the UE Board of Trustees. It would be absurd for private
respondents to declare the Lecture Guides/Manuals as plagiarized documents when in the first
place, private respondents, through TEPO and the UE Board of Trustees, had initially
scrutinized and approved the same.15
In labor cases, the deciding authority should use every reasonable means to ascertain speedily
and objectively the facts, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure. Technical rules
of evidence are not strictly binding in labor cases such as the instant one.16 Thus, it was error
on the part of the CA to disregard the evidence presented by petitioners to establish the act of
plagiarism committed by respondents.
It is worthy to note that the CA failed to examine the actual text written in the manual and
compare the same with the work claimed to have been plagiarized. However, after a thorough
review of the records of the case, the Court finds that respondents, indeed, plagiarized the
works of Chenoweth and Singer. It is glaring from a comparison of the subject text that
respondents heavily lifted portions of the said books, as reported in the Memorandum
submitted by Chancellor Celso F. Bebologa,17 thus:
FINDINGS:
1. In his Memorandum dated March 15, 2007, Dean Constantino T. Yap verified Mr.
Chenoweth's claim that he is one of the authors of the textbook "Applied Engineering
Mechanics". (EXHIBIT "1")
2. At least three (3) books containing the names of Masangkay, Rocamora, Regondola,
and Tolentino were copied verbatim or with slight modifications from the following
original engineering books:
- Engineering Mechanics, Second Edition, by Ferdinand L. Singer
- Applied Engineering Mechanics, Metric Edition, by Alfred Jensen, Harry H.
Chenoweth, adapted by David N. Watkins
Another author, Hibbeler, is also mentioned as a source of the "reproduction" but the
specific book is not identified (EXHIBITS "2," "3," "4," & "5")
Tolentino's name appeared only in one of the three books copied from the original
(EXHIBITS "6" TO "6-B," "7" TO "7-B" & "8" TO "8- B").
3. No publisher is indicated in the "copied" volumes which are made of low quality
paper.
OTHER INFORMATION
- "Reproduced" copies are sold to students. Copies bought by students are retrieved
by professors at the end of the school term. Records of students who failed to
return the "reproduced" copies bought by them are marked LFR and/or NC.
- Students interested to buy the "reproduced" book are referred to specific
bookstores. A bookstore – Special & Journal – with address at No. 76 Samson
Road, Caloocan City is selling the "reproduced" books.
- Some professors reportedly own or operate printing press facilities. Others are
holding personal review classes or having their own review centers.
- There are pending lapsed applications for removal of LFR at the Engineering
Department. Professors alleged their class records were lost when required to
present them to support the applications.
In a letter requiring respondents to provide the basis of their appeal of their dismissal, Dr.
Ester A Garcia quoted the findings of the Faculty Disciplinary Board:
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. From the books of Singer, 558 sentences/figures were plagiarized and used in the
manuals of Respondents, either verbatim or with modification; while from the
book of Jensen-Chenoweth, 52 sentences and figures were likewise taken and used
in Respondents' manuals.
2. Respondents did not mention, as required in Section 184 of the Intellectual Property
Law, the sources and the names of the authors of the textbooks from where they lifted
passages, illustrations, and tables used in their manuals.
3. In their request to TEPO for temporary adoption of the manuals, Respondents certified
under oath that the manuals are all original and free from plagiarism. Other
investigation, however, shows otherwise. (emphasis ours)
To this Court, the bulk of the copied text vis-a-vis the said Certification clearly shows
wrongful intent on the part of respondents. We cannot subscribe to the CA ruling that
respondents were in good faith since, being the principal authors thereof, they had full
knowledge as to what they were including in their written work. In other words, they knew
which portions were truly original and which were not.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that there is sufficient basis for dismissing respondents
from service, considering the highest integrity and morality which the profession requires from
its teachers. Respondents plagiarized the works of Chenoweth and Singer by lifting large
portions of the text of the works of said writers without properly attributing the copied text,
and, to make matters worse, they represented under oath that no portion of the Manuals were
plagiarized when, in truth and in fact, huge portions thereof were improperly lifted from other
materials.
Lastly, it is well to emphasize that Rocamora strongly opposed her dismissal from service as
contained in her December 3, 2007 Letter,18 where she invoked denial of due process in her
termination, denied having committed plagiarism or benefiting from the printing of the
materials in question, and "sincerely hop[ing] that the [Board of Trustees] x x x, will see the
injustice [she] got which ought to be reversed and reconsidered."19
Such, however, is not so for herein respondents. It is well to emphasize that in her June 2,
2008 Letter,20 respondent Masangkay requested the recomputation of the amounts due in her
favor after said termination, as well as the application of said amounts to her car loan balance.
She was even cooperative with the procedure, asking the management to advise her should
there be a need for her to prepare and accomplish her time records for purposes of
recomputing her salary.
UE's decision. Furthermore, there is no showing that respondents did not receive or received
less than what is legally due them in said termination.
In sum, We are of the view that their acceptance of UE's decision is voluntary and with full
understanding thereof, tantamount to a waiver of their right to question the management's
decision to terminate their services for academic dishonesty. It is as though they have waived
any and all claims against UE when they knowingly and willingly acquiesced to their
dismissal and opted to receive the benefits due them instead.
We also find that they genuinely accepted petitioner University's decision at that time and that
their filing of the complaint almost three (3) years later was a mere afterthought and, in their
own words, inspired by their colleague's victory.25
In the light of the foregoing, the Rocamora case cannot be used as a precedent to the case at
bar. In view of the substantial evidence presented by petitioner UE that respondents committed
plagiarism, then the complaint for illegal dismissal must, therefore, be dismissed for utter lack
of basis.

As to Regondola, aside from the cash and check vouchers21 that he signed after receiving the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
amounts due him after said termination, it does not appear that he made any similar letter February 19, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 132774 and its August 26, 2016 Resolution are
request or appeal, unlike Masangkay or Rocamora, respectively. hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for illegal dismissal is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Indeed, rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right to be recognized by SO ORDERED.
law.22 Within the context of a termination dispute, waivers are generally looked upon with
disfavor and are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar
claims for the measure of a worker's legal rights. If (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (b) the terms of the settlement are
unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims must be struck down as invalid or
illegal.23

Thus, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement
was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only
where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to
annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver
did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking.24

In the case at bar, We find no reason to rule that respondents did not waive their right to
contest UE's decision. Based on their actuations subsequent to their termination, it is clear that
they were amenable to UE's decision of terminating their services on the ground of academic
dishonesty. Nowhere can we find any indication of unwillingness or lack of cooperation on
respondents' part with regard to the events that transpired so as to convince Us that they were
indeed constrained to forego their right to question the management's decision. Neither do we
find any sign of coercion nor intimidation, subtle or otherwise, which could have forced them
to simply accept said decision. In fact, based on their qualifications, this Court cannot say that
respondents and UE do not stand on equal footing so as to force respondents to simply yield to
 ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, PETITIONER, V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is an appeal[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution[3] dated
March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.
The facts are as follows:
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband,
Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).[4] The allegations of the petition read:
1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a resident
of 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
2. [Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was
assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]
3. The [petitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in
Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal
home at 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City;
5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out
from their conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;
6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979
and he never made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;
7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police
Commission, [Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news
regarding [her] beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no
answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they
know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army;
9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up
hope, and after more than three (3) decades of waiting, the [petitioner is still hopeful, but
the times had been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with
her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her
in order to survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death
or at least a declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the
benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac
City RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic
of the Philippines (Republic).[5]
On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision[6] in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the
petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:[7]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N.
MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines for purposes of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari.[8]
On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the
Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:
WFIEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision
dated January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special
Proceeding no. 4850 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.
The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:
1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article
41 of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not apply to the instant petition as
it was clear that petitioner does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking
the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and
not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.
2. Be that as it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have
been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition
whose sole purpose is to have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article
390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to
presume that a person is dead—which presumption may be invoked in any action or
proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an independent action or proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence, this appeal.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal.
I
The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the
petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's
decision must, therefore, be set aside.
RTC Erred in Declaring the Presumptive
Death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of the
FC; Petitioner's Petition for the Declaration
of Presumptive Death Is Not Based on Article
41 of the FC, but on the Civil Code
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.
It can be recalled that the RTC, in the fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the
petitioner's petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC."
By doing so, the RTC gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of presumptive
death filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.[9] This is wrong.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that
would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not
seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law. Thus:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive
death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of
presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other
purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended."[10]
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose
of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either
Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code[11] as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil
purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has
not been known for four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of
Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41
of the FC.
Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective
is to Declare a Person Presumptively Dead
Under the Civil Code, Like that Filed by the
Petitioner Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable
Suit in Our Jurisdiction
The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The
decision itself is objectionable.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is
because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any
authority to take cognizance of the same.
The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the
Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw.[12] In the said case, we held that a rule creating a
presumption of death[13] is merely one of evidence that—while may be invoked in any action
or proceeding—cannot be the lone subject of an independent action or
proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume
that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had
been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an
action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption
of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special
proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for
by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the petition
does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a
declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If
there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a
pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration
that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if
judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even
if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable.
It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the
parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact,
out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is
decided by a final judgement, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact
established, by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the
decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res
judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by
law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. (Citations omitted
and emphasis supplied)
The above ruling in Szatraw has since been used by the subsequent cases of Lukban v.
Republic[14] and Gue v. Republic[15] in disallowing petitions for the declaration of presumptive
death based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicitly, also those based on Article 391
of the Civil Code).
Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the
considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code
was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:[16]
1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only
allow a court or a. tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of
certain facts.
2. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an
action brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of
the said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In
such action, there would be no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor
any status to be established.
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390
or Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never
really become "final" as the same only confirms the existence of a prima facie or
disputable presumption. The function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to
be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.
4. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is
already established by law.
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a
petition that—like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench—only seeks to have a
person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by
law.[17] Hence, by acting upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the
declaration of presumptive death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby
committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside the
RTC's decision.
II
Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is
minded to make.
It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the
misconception that a court declaration is required in order to establish a person as
presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman under
pertinent laws.[18] This misconception is what moved petitioner to file her misguided petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to
unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for death benefits either
before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office (PVAO) or the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP).
What the Court finds deeply disconcerting, however, is the possibility that such misconception
may have been peddled by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such
agencies, as a matter of practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to first
secure a court declaration of presumptive death before processing the death benefits of a
missing serviceman.
In view of the foregoing circumstance, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following
guidelines—culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements—to aid the public,
PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to
that of the petitioner:
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier
without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the
presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make
their own determination, on the basis of evidence presented by the claimant, whether the
presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code arises by operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual
conditions mentioned in the said articles are established.[19] Hence, requiring the claimant
to further secure a court declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a
missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter.[20]
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before
the PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence" which
shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and/or under
the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the
"evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.
3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted
by the claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions
specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death
to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the
claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and
pay the latter's claim. 4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted
by the claimant is not sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code
and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the
Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with
the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court. And finally, should such recourse still fail, the
claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by
the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be
replicated in the future.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and
Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467
are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not a requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines can grant and pay the benefits under Presidential Decree No.
1638.
Let a copy of this decision be served to the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.
SO ORDERED.