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###Ralph McInerny - ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS
###Ralph McInerny - ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS
###Ralph McInerny - ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS
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† Ralph McInerny
6. A r i s t o t l e a n d Aqu i na s
There are some men who seem venerable even in their youth, and
Ken Schmitz was one of them. When I was young and he was already
venerable, a function of wisdom, not of age, we met mainly at meetings.
He moved often on the academic checkerboard, although many will per-
haps imagine that he was in Toronto throughout his career. Not so. He
taught in California, he taught in Indiana, but when he was called to To-
ronto it must have seemed a homecoming. There was something deeply
fitting about it. Surely Ken is one of the finest flowers of the Pontifical In-
stitute of Mediaeval Studies, a worthy student of his master Etienne Gil-
son. In these last years he seems, like Bede, to wear “venerable” as a title;
of course the beard helps. In recent years, we have met in Argentina, in
Taiwan, even in Chicago, a wonderful town; to hear Ken lecture, to dine
and talk with him and with others of those strong survivors for whom
seventy years did not suffice, is one of the deep pleasures of the twilight
years. It seems to me that Schmitz has published more in his age than
in his youth. His glosses on the teaching of John Paul II—doubtless the
fruit of his long association with the Institute on Marriage and Family—
are mandatory reading. I wish I had something more fitting with which
to honor him. I am afraid my essay may seem sweepings from a deplet-
ed mental warehouse. Would that it were straw in the Thomistic sense.
Nonetheless, I offer it as my poor tribute to Ken Schmitz. Ad multos annos!
115
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116 Ralph McInerny
himself at the outset of the novel. But then, suggesting the effect the
events about to be narrated have had on him, he adds: “Life is much bet-
ter looked at from a single window after all.”
That is my text. There is much talk nowadays about a dialogue of
cultures. Nick Carraway might be taken as describing the contrast be-
tween, on the one hand, occupying a plurality of points of view, embrac-
ing diversity, one might say, and on the other, having a single unifying
point of view. But the object of each is presumably the same.
I wonder if those engaged in present dialogues of culture might not
learn a thing of two from an earlier. The dialogue I shall speak of is be-
tween the culture of the Greeks, as represented by Aristotle, and that of
the Christian, represented by St. Thomas Aquinas.
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Aristotle and Aquinas 117
In one of those surprising asymmetries of history, it was the dia-
logues of Aristotle that then dropped out of the picture, only to be re-
constructed in the manner of the writings of the pre-Socratics over the
last century and a half.
Boethius, in the fifth century of our era, knew Greek. He may have
studied in Alexandria, whither the school of Athens had fled, and there
he would have listened to Hellenistic Aristotelians—most of them neo-
Platonists—and have read the treatises. In the previous century, St. Au-
gustine had lamented the dying of the light of learning as the barbar-
ians—our forebears, perhaps—continued to sweep down on the hapless
Roman Empire. In book VIII of The City of God, Augustine gives a sketch
of Greek philosophy.2 Aristotle is notable by his absence from the ac-
count. Socrates is there, mention is made of some of the pre-Socratics,
but Plato occupies pride of place. Platonism is presented as the pagan
philosophy most akin to Christianity. It is in this account that Augustine
rejects one possible explanation of this kinship, an explanation he had
previously held: namely, that Plato had access, direct or indirect, to the
Bible. Now he realizes that this could not have been. All the more amaz-
ing, then, the affinity of Platonism with Christianity. Augustine tells us
he had little Greek. His knowledge even of Plato seems filtered through
intermediaries. Augustine’s account is largely a borrowed one—high-
level hearsay. My main point is that he seems not to have heard of the
Aristotelian treatises.
In the next century, Boethius (480–524), linguistically equipped for
the task, conceived a great project. He would translate into Latin the
whole of Plato and the whole of Aristotle, and he would add commen-
taries on them, of the kind that Ammonius had written on Aristotle. All
this was undertaken with an eye to showing the fundamental agreement
of Plato and Aristotle.3 Boethius was of an ancient Roman family; many
of the traditional imperial offices were retained by Theodoric, the Ostro-
goth king of Italy, an Arian reigning from Ravenna. Boethius and his sons
served their terms as consul. His was a busy, active life, but for all that, he
remained a student, a scholar. Even if he had lived to a biblical longev-
ity, it is difficult to see how he could have completed the task he had set
himself. In any event, it was only begun when Boethius was suspected of
2. Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 1981),
299–342.
3. See Ralph McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Univer-
sity of America Press, 1990), 1–6.
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118 Ralph McInerny
treason, of plotting with the Emperor, in Constantinople, against The-
odoric. He was condemned to death. To this we owe that classic of prison
literature, The Consolation of Philosophy, in which Boethius, in verse and
prose, considers his plight over the course of five books. Why do the in-
nocent suffer; why do the wicked prosper? Under the tutelage of Dame
Philosophy, the whining Boethius of the outset of the work becomes the
resigned philosopher who accepts his fate. Boethius was a Christian; he
was also the author of theological tractates of enormous pith and profun-
dity. But there is no appeal in the Consolation to Christ, the innocent vic-
tim par excellence.4 Taking note of this, Dr. Johnson, dropping into Lat-
in, marveled that in such a plight Boethius proved himself to be magis
philosophus quam Christianus.5 I will return to this.
Because Boethius’ project was brought to so untimely an end, Aris-
totle throughout the early Middle Ages is represented in the liberal arts
curriculum by the few logical works of his that Boethius had put into
Latin. It is not until the twelfth century that the treatises begin to find
their way into Latin, beginning with the Nicomachean Ethics, to be fol-
lowed at the beginning of the thirteenth century with more and more
until, after Thomas’s death in 1274, it became complete. Thomas did not
know The Poetics of Aristotle, for example.
This belated arrival of Aristotle in Latin divides into two streams:
the Arabo-Latin and the Greco-Latin. The first stream consists of trans-
lations made from Arabic translations of the Greek, perhaps through in-
termediary translations. These Latin versions were often accompanied
into the university system with Muslim commentaries attached, some-
times literally surrounding the text of Aristotle on the page. Averroes,
Avicenna, and others were thus introduced to the West along with Aris-
totle. This is a fact fraught with significance.
The Greco-Latin stream, as the term suggests, consists of transla-
tions made directly from the Greek, in Venice, in Sicily, elsewhere. As is
well known, William of Moerbeke, contemporary with and fellow Do-
minican of Thomas, provided translations of Aristotle directly from the
Greek, whose faithfulness to the original has led some modern editors
to consult them as an alternate Greek text. He ended, fittingly, as bishop
of Corinth.
4. Ibid., 14–17.
5. James Boswell, Life of Johnson, ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1980), 444; “Speaking of Boethius, who was the favorite writer of the middle ages, he
said it was very surprizing, that upon such a subject, and in such a situation, he should be
magis philosophus quam Christianus.”
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Aristotle and Aquinas 119
Thomas Aquinas, as a student, first in Naples, then in Cologne, then
in Paris, and later as a master, had the benefit of the now fairly complete
Aristotelian corpus.
With these familiar matters recalled, I turn now to the dialogue be-
tween Thomas and Aristotle.
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120 Ralph McInerny
But this ban came to be more honored in the breach than in the obser-
vance. Early on in Thomas’s writings there is criticism of Avicenna’s and
Averroes’ readings of Aristotle. It was a decade later, when Thomas was
summoned back to Paris in 1268 to occupy one of the chairs allotted to
Dominicans, that serious controversy over the matter had broken out.
The controversy was prompted by what has been called, variously, Latin
Averroism and heterodox Aristotelianism.7
Lists of the errors of Aristotle were drawn up, three of which were
of greatest moment. Aristotle taught—did he not?—that God did not
know what was going on in the created world, since that would be de-
meaning; that there is a single soul for all men; that the world is eternal.
In what sense would these be errors? Well, they conflicted with Christi-
anity, with belief in God’s providence, in the destiny of each soul to be
united with God, as well as with the clear statement of Genesis that in
the beginning God created heaven and earth. In short, they were in con-
tradictory opposition to truths of the faith.
This seemed not to bother certain feisty masters in the Faculty of
Arts, now, effectively, the Faculty of Philosophy. There is controversy
about the so-called two-truth theory attributed to the Latin Averroists,
but neither Thomas nor Bonaventure had any doubt that it was being
maintained that one need not worry that a position attributed to Aristot-
le was in conflict with the faith. One simply did philosophy and let theo-
logians worry about its relation to the faith. This was taken to mean that
something could be true in philosophy and false in theology.8
Unsurprisingly, Bonaventure became a foe of Aristotelianism, so
understood, and in sermons preached in Paris went after such philoso-
phers. Thomas’s reaction was more complicated, and it is his reaction
that provides my theme.9
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Aristotle and Aquinas 121
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122 Ralph McInerny
God could not do or because such a world is impossible in itself. If the lat-
ter, this would be based on the nature of becoming and the role of passive
potency in it, or because an eternal world is conceptually incoherent.
In the first sense, for something to come into being, it might be
thought that there must always have been something that could become
that thing. But before an angel was created there was not some prior
thing that could become an angel. Thus, to hold that there was always
something that could become the world is to be rejected. What is be-
ing adumbrated here is the distinction between creation and the becom-
ing that presupposes a passive potency that is actualized when a thing
comes to be.
It is no limitation on God’s omnipotence that he cannot cause what
makes no sense—for example, create something that does not depend
on him, or that what happened didn’t happen. Is an eternal world like
that? It is this that Bonaventure affirmed and Thomas denied. Why did
Thomas deny it? Well, an eternal world could be said to be impossible,
either because the efficient cause must precede its effect in duration, or
because nonexistence must precede existence. Thomas proceeds to show
that neither of these alone or both together establish the impossibility of
an eternal world.
The second sense may surprise. Isn’t creation precisely bringing
something into being out of nothing? Indeed it is. So how does Thomas
escape the seeming result that an eternal world is possible if nothing did
not precede? First he says that we must not be governed by our imagina-
tion, and think that nothing is some previous state of affairs, as it were,
prior in duration to the created thing. On the supposition of an eternal
world, which of course is created by God, and thus from nothing, the ex
nihilo here can be understood as what you have if God’s causality were
removed.
Let this suffice as a taste of this polemical opusculum on the eter-
nity of the world directed contra murmurantes. Doubtless among these
murmurers are those seeking to discredit Aristotle by means of the ar-
guments Thomas rejects. There is not, however, any overt mention or
defense of Aristotle in the opusculum.
It is easy to see that such subtle argumentation in favor of an unre-
alized possibility—the world was after all created in time—seemed to
some to align Thomas with those pesky masters in the Faculty of Arts.
Shortly after his death, teachings of Thomas would be among those con-
demned by his fellow masters.
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Aristotle and Aquinas 123
An unstressed aspect of the discussion of the eternity of the world is
this: if the contradictory of a truth of faith could be definitively proved
false, would one thereby have established the truth of an article of faith?
If one of contradictories is false, the other is true. But that would seem to
be a claim to know that a mystery of the faith is true.
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124 Ralph McInerny
cy, not to mysteries of the faith, which can only be believed, never in
this life fully comprehended, but to truths that are in the public domain,
available to believer and nonbeliever. Philosophy thus provides a kind of
lingua franca for Christian and pagan. As one can see, this presupposes
that philosophy and theology are distinct because their starting points
or principles are distinct.
Forgive me for dwelling so long on matters both familiar and ob-
vious. I recall them because they can be seen as providing some guid-
ance to dialogue between cultures. If the believer’s attitude toward pa-
gan philosophy were simply to juxtapose it to Christian doctrine, with
the suggestion that they are simply different outlooks, adding that the
pagan must cede to the Christian, that would not be much of a dialogue.
Perhaps it exemplifies Nick Carraway’s notion of the well-rounded man.
Thomas, by contrast, when doing philosophy, looks out the same
window that Aristotle did. This is not to be borne back ceaselessly into
the past. It is not the study of Aristotle without concern for where the
truth lies. Rather, it is to occupy the same window, appeal to principles
common to believer and nonbeliever, and come to see how much one
has in common with the pagan or the nonbeliever. Dialogue is no lon-
ger stopping at the surprising surface differences, but seeking truths that
can be recognized as such by believer and nonbeliever alike.
I mentioned Dr. Johnson’s expression of surprise, in Latin, that Bo-
ethius did not invoke his Christian belief in seeking consolation. This
is a vexed question. One answer to it, one that justifies calling Boethius
the first of the Scholastics, is that the work thereby exhibits the distinc-
tion between philosophy and theology.
To say that Thomas baptized Aristotle is as silly, at least as it is of-
ten understood, as to say that in the Commedia what Dante did was to
put Thomas into verse. Thomas’s defense of Aristotle, even when an Ar-
istotelian tenet is ruled out by one’s faith, makes clear how the dialogue
can continue. It also is conducive to modesty in what one thinks can be
established philosophically. Sometimes the only thing the believer can
say about something that contradicts his faith is that it is at most prob-
able, or not impossible. Most philosophical arguments establish opinion,
not knowledge in the strong sense. Grounded opinion, no doubt, more
or less firm opinion, but for all that short of apodictic truth. Aristotle
wrote that the adverb of old, perhaps wise, men is “perhaps.” I think that
is true—perhaps.
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