G.R. No.

L-27033 October 31, 1969

POLYTRADE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTORIANO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Suit before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on four causes of action to recover the
purchase price of rawhide delivered by plaintiff to defendant. Plaintiff corporation has its principal
office and place of business in Makati, Rizal. Defendant is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper venue. He claims that by contract suit may
only be lodged in the courts of Manila. The Bulacan court overruled him. He did not answer the
complaint.

In consequence, a default judgment was rendered against defendant ordering him to pay plaintiff for
four different cause of action In addition, defendant shall pay plaintiff attorney's fees amounting to
25% of the principal amount due in each cause of action, and the costs of the suit. The amount of
P400.00 shall be deducted from the total amount due plaintiff in accordance with this judgment. Hence,
Defendant appealed contending that they parties agreed to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila.
Agreement being valid defendant says that he can only be sued in the courts of Manila an anchored on
Section 3 of Rule 4 which provides that venue may be stipulated by written agreement.

Issue: whether or not venue was properly laid in the province of Bulacan where defendant is a resident.

Ruling: The court clarified the meaning from the terms of the agreement of the parties. First to the
facts. No such stipulation appears in the contracts covering the first two causes of action. The general
rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue was properly
laid in Bulacan, the province of defendant's residence.
According to the court, the stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements covering the third
and fourth causes of action. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound
themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or exclusively in
Manila. Hence, agreement did not change or transfer venue. The parties solely agreed to add the courts
of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort and they did not waive their right to pursue remedy in
the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.

G.R. No. L-4472 May 8, 1952

ESPIRIDION RONE, CLUADIA AGUZAR, DIONISIA GORDOLAN, GUILLERMO AND
AMABLE, both surnamed VENTURA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
VICTOR CLARO and SIMEON BAQUIRING, defendants-appellees.

Facts:
Plaintiffs were or claimed to be the owners of lot 4651 of the Cadastral Survey of Asingan, Pangasinan,
However, it was alleged that in that year, the defendants through fraud, deceit and breach of faith,
succeeded in getting the Owner's Duplicate Original Certificate of Title from one of the plaintiffs and
succeeded in having the plaintiffs execute a deed of sale of the lot in question in their favor, but it was
only in the year 1941 that this fraud, including the possession and enjoyment of the lot by defendants,
was discovered by the plaintiffs. Unfortunately, because of poverty, plaintiffs were unable to take the
necessary steps to recover the land;when they had their chance they filed a complaint to annul the deed
of sale of petitioner to defendant in the trial court only on February 20, 1950. However, instead of
answering the complaint defendants filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it
stated no cause of action and that it was barred by the statue of limitations.

The Trial court ruled in favor of the defendant and granted the motion to dismiss. Since, plaintiffs
failed to bring the action within four years after the discovery of said fraud. Hence, the action has
already prescribed in accordance with Section 44 of Act 190.
Upon such, the plaintiffs appealed to the decision insisting that their action was not to annul the deed of
sale on the basis of fraud, but to recover the title and possession of land which can be brought within
ten (10) years after the cause of such action accrues.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in its ruling.

Ruling: The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is
to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and the prayer for relief. Here, the complaint clearly and
expressly alleges the supposed fraud and deceit in procuring the execution of the deed of sale of the
land in question in favor of the defendants, and the discovery of the said fraud on a day years after the
date of the supposed fraud. The action was for the annulment of contract or deed on the ground of
fraud, which action should be filed within four years after the discovery of the fraud.

Therefore, the trial court was correct in applying Section 44, paragraph 3 of Act 190 and in ruling that
the action had prescribed, since more than four years had elapsed since the discovery of the fraud.

Fortune Motors, Inc. v. CA, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company

Facts: Private respondent extended various loans to petitioner for a total sum of P32,500,000.00. Due to
financial difficulties, and economic recession, the petitioner was not able to pay the loan which became
due. The respondent bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the mortgaged property was
sold at public auction where respondent was the highest bidder. 3 days before the expiration of the
redemption period, petitioner filed a complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at
the RTC of Manila, alleging that:
(a)the foreclosure was premature because its obligation to the Bank was not yet due,
(b)the publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there was no public auction,
(c)the price for which was “shockingly low”;
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the venue of the action was
improperly laid in Manila for the realty covered by the real estate mortgages is situated in Makati,
therefore the action to annul the foreclosure sale should be filed in the RTC of Makati;
Petitioner argued that its action is a personal action and that the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings so that it may have a new one year period to redeem the same.
RTC: reserved the resolution of the Bank’s motion to dismiss until after the trial on the merits
CA: on petition for certiorari and prohibition, granted the petitions and dismissed the case without
prejudice to the filing of the case before the proper courts
Reconsideration was denied, hence the petition before the SC

Issue: WON petitioner’s action for annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale
of Fortune Building is personal action or a real action for venue purposes

Ruling: Yes, the action is a real action which should have been filed before the RTC of Makati. The
decision of CA is affirmed.

Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, must be instituted in the CFI of the
province where the property or any part thereof lies. Personal actions upon the other hand, may be
instituted in the CFI where the defendant resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

An action for the annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and
nature of action which is to recover real property. An action for annulment or rescission of sale of real
property is a real action; its prime objective is to recover said real property. An action to annul a real
estate mortgage foreclosure is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property.

G.R. No. L-13280 February 25, 1960

LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and ALEJANDRO T. LIM, respondents.

Facts: Alejandro Lim is a leasee of two parcels of riceland However it was later sold to the defendant.
Respondent herein claiming ownership over the planted rice filed a complaint with injunction against
the petitioners before the Court of First Instance of Manila. prayed that the defendant Land Tenure
Administration (petitioner herein) be restrained from preventing the plaintiff's entry in the land for the
purpose of gathering the standing crops therein and to enjoin the other defendants, officials of the Land
Tenure Administration, from taking and appropriating the same for the benefit of the Administration.
The defendants made a special appearance before the court seeking the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground improper venue. The respondent Judge denied the motion, and in the same order of denial,
issued the writ preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiff.
In a resolution of this Court, dated the 27th of December 27, 1957, the Clerk of Court was authorized to
issue, without bond, a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the lower court's
order of December 20, 1957 until further notice from this Supreme Court
Hence, Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondent Hon.
Higinio B. Macadaeg, in his capacity as judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, from enforcing
his order of December 20, 1957 in Civil Case No. 34453
Issue: Whether the venue is proper

Ruling: No. It is apparent that the plaintiff is primarily interested in establishing his right to recover
possession of the land for the purpose of enabling him to gather his share of the crops. Hence, his
action is real and must be brought in the locality where the land is situated provided by Section 3, Rule
5. Hence, petitioners correctly contend that Lim's action must be brought in the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, the province where the land lies, and not in the courts of the City of Manila.
Wherefore, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The order of December 20, 1957, appealed
from, is set aside and the action instituted by Alejandro T. Lim in the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Civil Case No. 34453) is ordered dismissed, but without prejudice to its renewal in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent.
Costs against respondent Lim. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-14434 April 28, 1960

EUSEBIO ESPINELI and ANASTACIA MOJICA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AMADO S. SANTIAGO, and MAGDALENA VDA. DE RAMIREZ, respondents.

Facts: It appears that on February 6, 1958, Magdalena Vda. de Ramirez, the main respondent herein,
instituted said civil case against the Magdalena Estate, Inc. hereafter referred to as the corporation for
the purpose of requiring the same to deliver and surrender transfer certificate of title and to recover
damages and attorney's fees. However, corporation filed an answer alleging that its refusal to deliver
the certificate of title to Mrs. Ramirez was due to the adverse claim thereto of petitioners herein, the
spouses Eusebio Espineli and Anastacia Mojica, who had similarly demanded deliver of said certificate
of title, upon the ground that, by virtue of a deed of absolute sale, executed, on December 23, l946, by
Rosita Ramirez and Julio Ramirez.
The Espinelis filed motion, in said Civil Case No. U-152, praying that they be allowed to intervene
therein as party defendants, for the reason that on August 2, 1951, the corporation had, for assignment
in their favor of the rights of Mr. Ramirez to the lot in question
This motion having been granted, the Espinelis filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, upon the
ground "that venue is improperly laid," the property in dispute being located in Quezon City.The court
denied the motion and required the Espinelis to file their answer, upon the theory that said Case No. U-
152 involved a personal action, not a real action, the main relief therein sought being the delivery of the
certificate of title to Lot No. 34. Hence,the present special civil action for a writ of prohibition against
the aforementioned respondent Judge and Mrs. Ramirez.

Issue: Whether or not the Judge can decide over the matter.
Under the facts set forth in the complaint and in the motion to intervene filed in said Civil Case No. U-
152, the issue therein is, who, as between Mrs. Ramirez, on the one hand, and the Espinelis on the
other, has a better right to the aforementioned Lot No. 34, which is situated in Quezon City. The main
relief Sought therein by Mrs. Ramirez the delivery of the certificate of title covering said Lot is
entirely dependent upon the aforesaid issue. Thus, it is not possible for the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan to decide the case, without passing upon the claim of the parties with respect to the title and
possession of said Lot No. 34, which claim shall be determined pursuant to the above-quoted provision
"in the province where" said "property or any part thereof lies."
Wherefore, respondent Judge can not entertain the aforementioned case No. U-I52 over the objection of
petitioners herein, as interventors therein, and, accordingly, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby
granted, with costs against respondent, Magdalena F, Vda. de Ramirez.