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HIS 299 Final Paper
HIS 299 Final Paper
HIS 299 Final Paper
Anthony Peel
HIS 299: Introduction to History
December 9, 2019
1
Introduction
Harry S. Truman walked into Eleanor Roosevelt’s study on April 12th, 1945, not
knowing what to expect. Quietly Mrs. Roosevelt approached him and spoke the words, “Harry,
the President is dead.” Shocked, the Vice President finally found the words, “Is there anything I
can do for you?” “Is there anything we can do for you?” the First Lady replied, “For you are the
one in trouble now.”1 A truer phrase may have never been spoken. Harry Truman, who had been
Vice President for just 82 days, was now to be entangled in a deep spiderweb of political
problems that he did not fully understand. The second World War was beginning it’s conclusion
in Europe but still raging in the Pacific against the Japanese. Less than four months after
Roosevelt died, the United States’ new president would decide to become the first nation to
unleash a power the earth had never seen. A light as bright as the sun exploded over Hiroshima,
Japan on August 6th, 1945 when the world’s first atomic bomb was dropped. Historians have
rightfully debated the inevitability, the morality and the alternatives of the actions that were
taken by Harry Truman to end the war in the Pacific, including some suggesting that Truman’s
policies shifted from Roosevelt’s after learning of the successful atomic test at Alamogordo,
New Mexico. Were there any effects on the eventual dropping of the atomic bombs when F.D.R.
died suddenly and Harry Truman was appointed President of the United States? With an
examination into the lives, memoirs and letters of world leaders, documents signed during World
War II and secondary sources written by expert historians, I will show that, while we cannot
know for certain, President Roosevelt intended to use the atomic bombs in a similar military,
strategic, and diplomatic fashion as his successor, Harry Truman. Although the question I pose is
a hypothetical one, the evidence I have gathered is based in fact and reason. We cannot fully
1 Truman, Harry. Memoirs Volume I: Year of Decisions. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1955), 5.
2
know what F.D.R. was or was not planning but we will start by identifying and examining
President Roosevelt’s actions and knowledge in regards to the atomic bomb. Then we will
review what Truman assumed Roosevelt would do with the weapon and how his experiences
with Roosevelt and his cabinet created an inevitability around the bomb. Finally, we will identify
what changed after Truman became president, particularly in regards to the United States foreign
The debates around the use of atomic bombs have grown louder as time grants us the
wisdom of hindsight. The morality of the decision to use such a destructive force has been
questioned. Should the atomic bombs have been dropped? Is this action something that a morally
conscious nation should have the power over? In a journal article in Foreign Affairs, Barton J.
Bernstein questions the use of the bomb to kill innocent civilians concluding that the barbarity of
the war on all sides redefined the morality of every country post-World War II. Many authors
and historians have debated whether it was necessary to take such a large step to defeat the
Japanese in the Pacific. Could the United States have brought a quick end to the war without the
use of atomic bombs? Was Japan on the brink of surrender before Hiroshima was bombed? What
were the alternatives to using the atomic bomb? Wilson D. Miscamble attempts to answer these
questions and explain why Truman’s decision to go ahead with the bombing was critically
important to the future of the United States in his book “The Most Controversial Decision:
Finally, historians questioned whether or not Harry Truman decided to launch the attack
in order to use “atomic diplomacy,” which is defined as the use or threat of use to gain or achieve
diplomatic goals. Is atomic diplomacy something that should be of acceptable use? The loudest
voice in this conversation is Gar Alperovitz in his book “Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and
3
Potsdam” in 1965. Just twenty years after the end of the war, Alperovitz questions Truman’s
foreign policies and concludes that he did not intend to follow Roosevelt but instead created his
own policies revolving around the reduction of the power of the Soviet Union in post-war
Europe. My research findings are not meant to reject or modify any of the previous arguments
that have been presented by experts in the past sixty years but instead, The goal of this work is to
build upon the current understanding of how and why the atomic bombs were dropped on
eventual use of the atomic bombs, we must discern how much Roosevelt really knew about the
bomb. When reviewing personal letters from Roosevelt between 1928 and 1945, there are zero
mentions of the words ‘atomic bomb.’2 The man was not one to spill his heart out on paper but
rather kept to himself. How can we learn what the President knew if there is no record of his
thoughts? We must examine his actions. On August 2nd, 1939, the President received a letter
that would begin the American governments’ increased involvement in the research of atomic
energy. Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard alerted the President to the work of Frederic Joliot, Dr.
Enrico Fermi, and Szilard himself. They believed the work of these scientists made it possible to
“set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium by which vast amounts of power and
large quantities of new radium-like elements would be generated.”3 Einstein and Szilard were
adamant that this process could be possible sooner rather than later and the construction of
powerful bombs would assuredly follow. The letter from Einstein and Szilard led Roosevelt to
2 Roosevelt, Franklin D., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters 1928-1945. (New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1950).
3 Atomic Heritage Foundation, National Museum of Nuclear Science and History, Einstein-
Szilard Letter, 2019, https://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/einstein-szilard-letter
4
order the creation of the Advisory Committee on Uranium on October 21st, 1939, beginning the
United States government’s research into atomic energy two years before the United States
Possibly the more important question when assessing Roosevelt’s knowledge of the
bomb is less about what he knew but attempting to understand how F.D.R. intended to use the
atomic bomb. Was it meant to be a deterrent against the Germans or Japanese? Was it meant to
be used as a preemptive or first strike? The American government knew that Nazi Germany was
attempting to build a bomb with atomic power. According to Michael Dobbs in his book “Six
Months in 1945,” the Third Reich was the leading power in the race for atomic weapons: “The
Germans also controlled the rich uranium reserves that the Belgian mining concern Union
Miniere had extracted from the Congo.” Additionally, Dobbs states that the German physicist
Werner Heisenberg was “believed to be hard at work building a uranium machine, the German
term for a nuclear reactor.”4 With the knowledge that they were behind and disadvantaged in a
race for a power that would change mankind, it is reasonable to believe that Roosevelt knew
what they were attempting to create would, at the very least, need to be kept as a deterrent and
On October 9th, 1941, two months before the Japanese would bomb Pearl Harbor and
officially pull the United States into the global conflict, Vannevar Bush, the director of the
Office of Scientific Research and Development as well as secret science advisor to the President,
Roosevelt. The Maud Committee, according to David Holloway’s “Stalin and the Bomb,”
reported their belief that “it will be possible to make an effective uranium bomb which,
4 Dobbs, Michael. Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill, Truman and the Birth of the
Modern World. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2012), 241.
5
tons of T.N.T. and would also release large quantities of radioactive substances, which would
make places near to where the bomb exploded dangerous to human life for a long period.”5 The
next January, Roosevelt gave the go-ahead to Bush with a simple, handwritten note: “V. B. OK
—returned—I think you had best keep this in your own safe F.D.R."6 The awareness of the
German attempt to create a bomb, the Maud Report and the approval to proceed creates an
important point in this discussion: Roosevelt not only knew the power of the atomic bomb they
were creating but showed intent to at least match the Germans, if not outdo them.
If we move our timeline forward to 1944, another important source of information comes
into play. We can draw what may be some of Roosevelt’s intentions towards the use of an atomic
bomb from the Hyde Park Aide-Memoire. This was a top secret agreement written and initialed
by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill just one year before the
war would end. The world leaders agreed in this document that any bomb or atomic energy
power created was not to be made public knowledge, that it may be used—specifically against
the Japanese—and the United States and the British government would be in full control of these
new powers.7 This importance of the Hyde Park Aide-Memoire cannot be understated. These
men were keeping this enormous power a secret from the world, including their own
5 Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956.
(New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 79.
6 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of History and Heritage Resources, A Tentative Decision to
Drop the Bomb, 2019. https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1939-
1942/tentative_decision_build.htm
7 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, Aide-Memoire
Initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, 2019.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944Quebec/d299
6
governments and allies. Additionally, and possibly more importantly to our discussion, they
specifically agree that the atomic bomb may be used as a first-strike option on the Pacific Front.
In the Foreign Affairs article “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” Barton J. Bernstein
tells how a young Senator by the name of Harry Truman unknowingly led an investigation into
an expensive project undertaken by the War Department. Secretary of War Henry Stimson
described Truman as “a nuisance and pretty untrustworthy… he talks smoothly but acts
meanly.”8 Stimson was able to convince the senator not to continue with his investigation.
Truman’s memoirs state that Stimson confided in him the following, “I can’t tell you what it is,
but it is the greatest project in the history of the world,” and Truman called for the immediate
halt of investigations into the War Department. The Missouri Senator went on to describe
Stimson as “a great American patriot and statesman.”9 Harry Truman and all of Congress had
come close to tripping into one of the greatest secrets in human history, but Truman would not be
made fully aware until after he walked into Eleanor Roosevelt’s study on August 12th, 1945.
Shortly after taking his oath as President of the United States, Harry Truman’s first move
was to retain all of Roosevelt’s Cabinet. Truman stated, “It was my intention, I said, to continue
both the foreign and domestic policies of the Roosevelt administration.”10 Truman would rely on
these men for their knowledge and advice more than Roosevelt would. As previously stated,
F.D.R. was a president who would not let many of his advisors in on what his plans were.
8 Bernstein, Barton J. “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered.” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1. (1995):
139
9 Truman, Harry. Memoirs Volume I: Year of Decisions. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1955), 10-11.
10 Truman, Harry. Memoirs Volume I: Year of Decisions. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
&
Company, Inc., 1955), 9.
7
However, the situation was different for Truman. He was not in his fourth term of office, in fact
the man had only been Vice President for 82 days before being thrown into the deep end of a war
which would change the world. In that extraordinarily short time as Vice President, Roosevelt
had not given Truman one serious briefing on the Manhattan Project.11 It was necessary for
Of course, this creates the question: how was the information of the atomic research
presented to Truman? According to Wilson D. Miscamble in his book, Truman’s “advisors (and
events themselves) tended to frame the issues for him to decide and determine the timing of
them.”12 Secretary of War Henry Stimson, along with Vannevar Bush, would give Harry Truman
his first real glimpse into the new power that they had been developing. At this time, Truman
was not given specific details but he was finally made aware that the project was one of extreme
destructive power and was nearing completion. Secretary of War Henry Stimson was the most
important man in the government, according to Gar Alperovitz in his 1965 book “Atomic
Diplomacy.” Stimson had complete access and knowledge of the entire Manhattan Project as
well as a complete trust of Harry Truman. Alperovitz states, “For three quarters of an hour
Stimson discussed the atomic bomb with the President. It was assumed—not decided—that the
bomb would be used.”13 Stimson’s framing of the strategies as well as Roosevelt’s own mistakes
11 Miscamble, Wilson D. The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and
the
Defeat of Japan. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 25.
12 Miscamble, Wilson D. The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and
the
Defeat of Japan. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 28.
13 Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. (New York, N.Y.: Simon and
Schuster, Inc, 1965), 56.
8
in not informing Truman created an almost certainty to Truman that Roosevelt meant to use the
When the time approached to use the atomic bomb in 1945, Stimson suggested a
committee be created to decide the implications of using the weapon. The Interim committee was
chaired by Secretary Stimson himself and the group included Bush, other prominent politicians,
advisors and scientists connected to the developments such as Dr. Robert Oppenheimer and Dr.
Enrico Fermi. Holloway makes an important point that “the deliberations of the Interim
Committee provides crucial evidence on the thinking behind American policy. By asking how,
not whether, the atomic bomb should be used against Japan, the committee proceeded on the
assumption that the bomb would be used against Japan when it was ready.”14 The inevitability of
the bomb being used is highlighted again when Michael Dobbs quotes military aide George
Elsey: “there was no decision to be made about the bomb. Truman could no more have stopped it
than he could have stopped a train moving down the tracks.”15 On June 1st, this committee
recommended to the President that the bomb be used against the enemy as soon as possible
without warning. According to Truman, the committee recommended that it should not and
cannot be used as a technical demonstration but must be a “direct military use” in order to end
“The final decision,” Truman stated emphatically, “of where and when to use the atomic
bomb was up to me.” It is important to note that the President believed that the bomb was a
“military weapon” and did not doubt whether or not it should be used. Winston Churchill told
Truman that he was unopposed to using the atomic bomb without hesitation, according to
14 Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 120.
15 Dobbs, Michael. Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill, Truman and the Birth of the
Modern World. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2012), 327.
9
Truman, “if it might aid to end the war.”16 These are important points when considering the
current day debates that rage about the morality of the issue. Bernstein contends that the world
redefined what morality meant with the multitude of “savagery” that occurred including but not
limited to Germany’s murder of Jews, Japan’s rape of Nanking, and the United States’ use of
The Soviet Union was not excluded from these horrendous events as Joseph Stalin’s
policies “over the previous fifteen years had killed millions of people and inflicted enormous
suffering upon the Soviet Union.”18 The U.S.S.R. was to be a major factor in the Allies’ victory
and a superpower in their own right in the post-war world. President Roosevelt knew this and
according to Dobbs, his relationship with Stalin was based on a “harsh political calculation: to
defeat one dictator, F.D.R. had to ally himself with another.”19 In order to defeat the Axis
powers, he needed Stalin to continue to hold the western front to defeat Hitler and then engage
the Japanese in the Pacific. At the Yalta Conference meeting of the “Big Three,” Holloway
points out that Roosevelt was willing to concede multiple points to Stalin including “preservation
of the status quo of Outer Mongolia... restoration of rights lost by Russia in the Russo-Japanese
war of 1904–5… and annexation of the Kurile islands.” The author notes that the western
16 Truman, Harry. Memoirs Volume I: Year of Decisions. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
&
Company, Inc., 1955), 419.
17 Bernstein, Barton J. “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered.” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1.
(1995): 151.
18 Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 73.
19 Dobbs, Michael. Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill, Truman and the Birth of the
Modern World. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2012), 18.
10
leaders’ “willingness” to work with Stalin on these demands marks just how “anxious they were
Despite this seemingly open relationship, the West was not so willing to include the
Soviet Union in their atomic plans. Some advisors and scientists, including physicist Niels Bohr,
did suggest to Roosevelt and Churchill to include Stalin in the atomic bomb development. Bohr,
a physicist who had escaped Denmark as the Nazis gained control in September of 1943, wanted
Stalin to be convinced of the need for “international control of atomic energy.”21 Bohr, and
eventually the Interim committee, argued that they were worried about the usage of atomic
energy in the post-war world. Against this advice, Roosevelt and Churchill signed the Hyde Park
Aide-Memoire and decided to keep Stalin and the Soviet Union in the dark. The Aide-Memoire
rewarded Bohr with an investigation into his activities to “ensure that he is responsible for no
leakage of information, particularly to the Russians.”22 According to Holloway, Joseph Stalin did
not realize the importance of the atomic bomb until after the United States’ first successful test
on July 16, 1945—the day before the Potsdam conference in which Truman, Stalin and Churchill
were to meet.23
With the end in sight for the European Axis powers in the summer of 1945, the Big
Three, now including Harry Truman, met for the final time at the Potsdam Conference to
20 Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 123.
21 Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 118.
22 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, Aide-Memoire
Initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, 2019.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944Quebec/d299
23 Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 116
11
determine what the world, in particular Europe, would look like after the last of the Nazis had
been defeated. Historians, such as Alperovitz, agree that this is one clear spot in which Truman
deviates from Roosevelt’s approach.24 Learning of his country’s first successful atomic test had
clear effects on Truman. Having a tested and confirmed atomic weapon gave the President the
confidence to approach the Soviet Union with less caution, resulting in the Potsdam Conference
being a “tense and irritable session” according to Dobbs. Truman approached Stalin without a
translator and, quoting Dobbs, told the leader that the Americans had “a weapon of unusual
destructive force,” to which Stalin replied, “Glad to hear it. I hope you will make good use of it
against the Japanese.”25 Joseph Stalin was aware of the Americans’ attempt to build the bomb
before the showdown with Truman but after hearing of the first successful test “launched a crash
program to build a Soviet bomb” in the next five weeks.26 Truman had broken away from
Roosevelt’s secretive policy to keep the U.S.S.R. behind in the race for atomic energy but it’s
difficult to say that Roosevelt would not have taken a similar route. To Roosevelt, the idea of the
Conclusion
history. We cannot know what President Franklin D. Roosevelt would have done if he had a
confirmed atomic weapon in his arsenal at the end of the war. We can only compare Truman’s
actions with those of F.D.R. and all of Roosevelt’s actions appeared to point in the direction of
using the atomic bomb. Beginning with the Einstein-Szilard letter and the Maud Report,
24 Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. (New York, N.Y.: Simon and
Schuster, Inc, 1965), 13.
25 Dobbs, Michael. Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill, Truman and the Birth of the
Modern World. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2012), 329.
26 Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 116.
12
Roosevelt knew the powerful possibilities that the bomb possessed when he approved the
research to match the Third Reich. In the Hyde Park Aide-Memoire, Churchill and Roosevelt
secretly agreed that they would be the ones to control the atomic power of the future and that it
may possibly be used on the Pacific front against the Japanese. All of these actions undoubtedly
signal that Roosevelt was at least aware that he may need to use an atomic weapon.
The bomb became an inevitable force when Truman assumed the duties of President of
the United States. The Roosevelt cabinet and advisors were retained and relied upon heavily.
These advisors always used the language of inevitability—“when” instead of “if” the bomb
should be used, an important distinction when wondering if Roosevelt had also framed his
language as such. This point we cannot know, as the previous President left no documents
detailing his thoughts on the possibility of using the weapons. Where we are sure Truman leaves
Roosevelt’s path is in regards to foreign relations, distinctly with the Soviet Union. The
administration knew victory was within its grasp and began thinking of how the world would be
shaped when the dust had settled. Whereas Roosevelt had been nothing but accommodating
towards Stalin, Truman attempted to scare the leader with his atomic power. It is crucial to note
that Roosevelt had attempted to keep the atomic research a secret from the Soviets, so would he
have eventually used the same atomic diplomacy approach that the Truman administration did?
It is possible. Unfortunately, we will never know whether Roosevelt could have or would have
stopped the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but when they were launched
and the dust settled we, as Dr. Robert Oppenheimer stated, had “become death. The shatterer of
worlds.”
13
Bibliography
Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. New York, N.Y.: Simon and
Atomic Heritage Foundation, National Museum of Nuclear Science and History, Einstein-
Szilard
Bernstein, Barton J. “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered.” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1. (1995):
135-52. doi:10.2307/20047025.
Dobbs, Michael. Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill, Truman and the Birth of the
Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956. New
Miscamble, Wilson D. The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the
Roosevelt, Franklin D., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters 1928-1945. New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1950.
Truman, Harry. Memoirs Volume I: Year of Decisions. Garden City, New York: Doubleday &
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of History and Heritage Resources, A Tentative Decision to
history/Events/1939-1942/tentative_decision_build.htm
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, Aide-Memoire
14
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944Quebec/d299