31.

CITY GOV’T OF BUTUAN VS CBS

FACTS: City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan City
to solicit its support for her decision to deny the application for mayor’s permit of
respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), and to eventually close
down CBS radio station. She justified her decision by claiming that CBS operating its
broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had violated the
City zoning ordinance. Thereupon, the Sangguniang Panlungsod adopted a Resolution to
strongly support the decision of the City Mayor.
The City licensing officer served on CBS station manager a final/last notice of
violation and demand to cease and desist illegal operation, with a warning that he would
recommend the closure of its business in case of non-compliance.
CBS and its manager, filed a complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages
against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC), with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
petitioners from closing its station, or from disturbing and preventing its business
operations. Judge Dabalos granted CBS’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus,
the petitioners commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (with
prayer for TRO or writ of preliminary injunction). The CA dismissed the petition and held that
the writ of preliminary injunction had properly issued, because the petitioners had
threatened to defeat CBS’s existing franchise to operate its radio station in Butuan City by
not issuing the permit for its broadcast business.

ISSUE: W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COURT
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
WITHOUT REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW WHETHER
SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS A CLEAR RIGHT THERETO.

HELD: A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding

prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to
refrain from a particular a
particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in
which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction
is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory
injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a
party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be
protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded
in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or
whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the
final relief sought.
An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of
action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be
protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable
as a matter of law.

32. UNION BANK VS CA

FACTS: This case stemmed from a real estate mortgage executed by spouses Leopoldo and
Jessica Dario (hereafter mortgagors) in favor of UNIONBANK. The mortgage covered a
Quezon City property with TCT in Leopoldo Dario's name and was annotated on the title. For
non-payment of the principal obligation, UNIONBANK extrajudicially foreclosed the property
mortgaged and sold the same at public auction, with itself posting the highest bid.
One week before the one-year redemption period expired, private respondents filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City against the mortgagors, UNIONBANK, the Register of
Deeds and the City Sheriff of Quezon City. the complaint was for annulment of sale and real
estate mortgage reconveyance and prayer for restraining notice of lis pendens was
annotated on the title.
RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the redemption of property
within the statutory period and its consolidation under UNIONBANK's name. Judge Lipana-
Reyes settled the motion in favor of UNIONBANK and dismissed 5 the complaint.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. In the meantime,
without notifying private respondents, UNIONBANK consolidated its title over the foreclosed
property, A new TCT in UNIONBANK's name was issued in its stead.
Private respondents’ amended complaint was admitted and set the application for
writ of preliminary injunction for hearing. After UNIONBANK's motion for reconsideration of
said Order was denied, it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the admission
of the amended complaint. The CA upheld Judge’s order admitting the amended complaint,
UNIONBANK thereafter elevated its cause to this Court.
In an Order, the RTC held the mortgagors and the City Sheriff of Quezon City in
default and sustained UNIONBANK's contention that the act sought to be enjoined had been
enforced, negating the need of hearing the application for preliminary injunction. Private
respondents filed a lengthy motion for reconsideration to this Order.
The annulment case was re-raffled, Judge Roxas, denied the motion to reconsider the
Order but suggested that private respondents amend their application from prohibitory to
mandatory injunction. As private respondents were unable to amend their application, the
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and their motion for indirect contempt, "in the
interest of free speech and tolerance". Asserting grave abuse of discretion, private
respondents brought the denial of their motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.
CA nullified the consolidation of ownership, ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel
the certificate of title in UNIONBANK's name and to reinstate TCT No. 41828 with the notice
of lis pendens annotated at the back. The CA also set aside the portion of the assailed RTC
Orders that declared private respondents' prayer for writ of preliminary injunction as moot
and academic. UNIONBANK's motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision
was likewise rejected for lack of merit on 7 April 1998.

Hence, UNIONBANK came to this Court.

ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the application for preliminary prohibitory injunction valid.

HELD: There is, moreover, nothing erroneous with the denial of private respondents'
application for preliminary prohibitory injunction. The acts complained of have already been
consummated. It is impossible to restrain the performance of consummated acts through
the issuance of prohibitory injunction. When the act sought to be prevented had long been
consummated, the remedy of injunction could no longer be entertained, 18 hearing the
application for preliminary injunction would just be an exercise in futility.

In addition, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, movant must show that there exists a right
to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore,
there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage. 19 The
injunctive remedy prevents a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the
parties before their claim can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated; it is
resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which
cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. 20

In the case at bar, the consolidation of ownership over the mortgaged property in favor of
UNIONBANK and the issuance of a new title in its name during the pendency of an action for
annulment and reconveyance will not cause irreparable injury to private respondents who
are plaintiffs in the said preliminary injunction. This is because .as purchaser at a public
auction, UNIONBANK is only substituted to and acquires the right, title, interest and claim of
the judgment debtors or mortgagors to the property at the time of levy. 21 Perforce, the
judgment in the main action for reconveyance will not be rendered ineffectual by the
consolidation of ownership and the issuance of title in the name of UNIONBANK.

33. SPS ESTARES VS CA

FACTS: petitioner filed a complaint for "Damages and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction"
against private respondent Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) alleging that
they obtained a loan from PLCC secured by a real estate mortgage of a parcel of land with
improvements covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99261; the promissory note
and the real estate mortgage were falsified because they affixed their signatures on two
blank documents; the monthly interest of 3.5% and 3% penalty on each delayed monthly
interest are different from the 18% interest per annum to which they agreed to; for failure to
pay their obligation despite repeated demands, PLCC filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna; and on June 8, 1999, the
Sheriff sent a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the Estares spouses.

Accordingly, the Estares spouses sought to declare as null and void the promissory note and
the real estate mortgage for not reflecting their true agreement. In the interim, they prayed
for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin PLCC
from taking possession of the mortgaged property and proceeding with the extrajudicial sale
scheduled on July 13, 1999 at 10:00 a.m.

ISSUE: W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION TO PREVENT RESPONDENTS PLCC AND PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LAGUNA/
SHERIFF ARNEL MAGAT FROM FORECLOSING THE MORTGAGE AND CONDUCTING THE
AUCTION SALE OF PETITIONERS’ PROPERTY AND/OR IN UPHOLDING THE ORDER DATED
AUGUST 18, 1999 OF JUDGE DAMASO A. HERRERA, RTC-BRANCH 24, LAGUNA.

HELD: Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights
or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct
to a main suit. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ
is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly
adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The
application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special
reason for such an order before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential
conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts
which appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the
entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the
injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the
litigation.32

The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the following requirements
for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a) the existence of their right to be protected;
and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of such
right.33] To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the
existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. 34 Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied
under any standard compensation.35

In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief.
They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC but only question the amount thereof.
Their property is by their own choice encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the
nonpayment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is
properly subject to a foreclosure sale.

Rosenda’s testimony sealed the fate of the necessity of the writ of preliminary injunction.
She admitted that: they did not question PLCC in writing why they only received
₱637,000.00; they did not question the figures appearing in the Statement of Account when
they received it; and, when they received PLCC’s demand letter, they went to the former’s
office not to question the loan’s terms and conditions but merely to request for extension of
three months to pay their obligation. 36 She acknowledged that they only raised the alleged
discrepancy of the amount loaned and the amount received, as well as the blank documents
which they allegedly signed, after PLCC initiated the foreclosure proceedings. 37

It must be stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its
conclusive determination.38 As such, a trial court’s decision to grant or to deny injunctive
relief will not be set aside on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. In granting or
denying injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to
consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination, relies on clearly
erroneous factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives too
much weight to one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its
factual or legal conclusions.39

In the present case, the Estares spouses clearly failed to prove that they have a right
protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari.

34. OCAMPO V SISON VDA DE FERNANDEZ

FACTS: Central to the Petition at bar is a piece of property, consisting of a residential lot and
improvement previously registered under the name of Iluminada, married to Ramon Piano.
According to petitioner Felix, the spouses Piano tookcustody of George, Jr. as soon as the
latter was born in 1947. Although there is no allegation or evidence presented that they
complied with the legal adoption process, the spouses Piano, during their lifetime,
maintained custody of and raised George, Jr. as their own son.

Apparently, Ramon passed away before his wife. Iluminada, already a widow, executed a
document supposedly bequeathing to George, Jr. The ownership and administration of all
her properties, including the subject property, which served as her residence, and other
properties which she leased out.

George, Jr. and Emy met and developed an intimate relationship and, shortly after, Emy
came to live with Iluminada and George, Jr. on the subject property. Even though Iluminada
did not trust Emy at the beginning, the latter was able to deceive and win the old lady’s
confidence subsequently. It would then seem that Emy was later entrusted with the
administration of Iluminada properties. In 1992, when Iluminada fell extremely ill and
suffered mental lapses, Emy entirely took over the old woman’s affairs, running the latter’s
household, as well as her businesses.
Iluminada died sometime in 1997. It appears that by said time, George, Jr. and Emy had
already parted ways. George, Jr. continued to live on the subject property with his family
until their possession was disturbed by herein respondent Leticia S. Fernandez (Leticia), who
instituted with the MeTC a suit for unlawful detainer against George, Jr.

It was only then that George, Jr. found out that the subject property was supposedly
transferred by Iluminada to herein respondent Alicia Sison vda. de Fernandez (Alicia) by
virtue of a Deed of Sale, who then conveyed the subject property via a Deed of Absolute
Sale8 to her daughter and co-respondent Leticia. Shortly thereafter, the subject property was
registered in respondent Leticia’s name under a new TCT.

Respondent Leticia prevailed in MeTC and since George, Jr. did not interpose any appeal
within the reglementary period, the judgment therein became final and executory, and a
writ of execution was issued to enforce the same. 11 George, Jr. was thus served by the
Sheriff of Quezon City with a Notice to Vacate the subject property.

This prompted George, Jr. to file with the RTC, against respondents Alicia and Leticia, as well
as Emy,12 the MeTC, and the Office of the Sheriff and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
for Recovery of Ownership/Reconveyance, Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction and Damages. The original Complaint 13 filed with the RTC was in the name of
George, Jr. as "the administrator, acknowledged son and for or in behalf of the other heirs"
of Iluminada.

George, Jr. sought to recover the subject property since respondents Alicia and Leticia
acquired the same by fraud, deceit, and manipulation, in conspiracy with Emy,
their kababayan from Pangasinan.

In his complaint, George, Jr. further prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the Sheriff of Quezon City, so as to
enjoin the latter from implementing the writ of execution issued by the MeTC in Civil Case
No. 22375. The complaint contended that unless the execution of the judgment of the MeTC
in Civil Case No. 22375 is enjoined, the rights of George, Jr. and those he represents, shall
definitely suffer irreparable injury and prejudice, especially since the subject property serves
as George, Jr.’s family abode.

ISSUE: W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE ORDER OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE INJUNCTION DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO APPEAR IN THE HEARING OF ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION DESPITE NOTICE THEREBY WAIVING THEIR RIGHTS TO QUESTION THE ORDER
GRANTING THE INJUNCTION.

HELD: Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court, enumerated the grounds for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit·SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of
preliminary injunction.·A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established: (a)
That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b)
That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a party, court,
agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
There are generally two kinds of preliminary injunction: (1) a prohibitory injunction which
commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act; and (2) a mandatory injunction
which commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.
It is a well-settled rule that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy
between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the
controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a right
to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore,
there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The applicantÊs right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of a clear legal
right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Where the applicantÊs
right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.
A clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown.
Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will
not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act
which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must
be a patent showing by the applicant that there exists a right to be protected and that the
acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.

35. GO VS VILLANUEVA

FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from the execution of the Decision of RTC,
Bacolod City, Branch 45 in a complaint for collection of a sum of money. The court rendered
a Decision ordering Looyuko/NAMI to pay Multi-Luck the value of the three (3) UCPB checks.
Looyuko/NAMI did not file an appeal. Hence, the Decision became final and executory.
Upon Multi-LuckÊs motion, the Bacolod RTC issued a writ of execution5 over a house
and lot covered by TCT No. T-126519 registered in the name of Looyuko and one share in
the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. in the name of NAMI. The auction sales
were scheduled.
Petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against respondents before the RTC, Pasig City,
Branch 266 which issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining public respondent sheriffs
Caponpon, Jr. and Villanueva, Jr. from holding the public auction and denying all the
respondent’s motions.
Multi-Luck elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of restraining order and/or injunction. the CA granted Multi-LuckÊs
petition and reversed the ruling of the Pasig RTC. Hence, this present petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N the principle on non-intervention of co-equal courts’ does not apply where, as
here, a third party claimant is involved.

HELD: We have time and again reiterated the doctrine that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction. This doctrine of non-
interference is premised on the principle that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. As correctly
ratiocinated by the CA, cases wherein an execution order has been issued, are still pending,
so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. Since the
Bacolod RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over the collection suit (Civil Case No. 98-
10404) and rendered judgment in relation thereto, it retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other coordinate courts over its judgment, including all incidents relative to the control
and conduct of its ministerial officers, namely public respondent sheriffs. Thus, the issuance
by the Pasig RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 68125 was a clear act
of interference with the judgment of Bacolod RTC in Civil Case No. 98-10404.
Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights;
it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act
which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must
be a patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the
acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right. The purpose of a
preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Thus, to be
entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the following
requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a
violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.

36. CITY GOV’T OF BUTUAN VS CBS

FACTS: City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan City
to solicit its support for her decision to deny the application for mayor’s permit of
respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), and to eventually close
down CBS radio station. She justified her decision by claiming that CBS operating its
broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had violated the
City zoning ordinance. Thereupon, the Sangguniang Panlungsod adopted a Resolution to
strongly support the decision of the City Mayor.
The City licensing officer served on CBS station manager a final/last notice of
violation and demand to cease and desist illegal operation, with a warning that he would
recommend the closure of its business in case of non-compliance.
CBS and its manager, filed a complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages
against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC), with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
petitioners from closing its station, or from disturbing and preventing its business
operations. Judge Dabalos granted CBS’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus,
the petitioners commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (with
prayer for TRO or writ of preliminary injunction). The CA dismissed the petition and held that
the writ of preliminary injunction had properly issued, because the petitioners had
threatened to defeat CBS’s existing franchise to operate its radio station in Butuan City by
not issuing the permit for its broadcast business.

ISSUE: W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COURT
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
WITHOUT REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW WHETHER
SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS A CLEAR RIGHT THERETO.

HELD: A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding

prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to
refrain from a particular a
particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in
which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction
is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory
injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a
party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be
protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded
in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or
whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the
final relief sought.
An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of
action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be
protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable
as a matter of law.

37. CORTEZ- ESTRADA VS HEIRS OF DOMINGA SAMUT ET AL

FACTS: Petitioner’s father Emiliano Cortez filed a Free Patent Application with the Bureau of
Lands (Bureau) covering two parcels of land situated at Libertad, Echague, Isabela. The
application was approved and he was issued Free Patent. An OCT was subsequently issued
in his name. After the demise of Cortez, the OCT cancelled and TCT was issued in the name
of his widow, Antonia. Antonia subsequently died intestate and is survived by her children
including herein petitioner.

On November 6, 1956, Domingo Samut (Samut), represented by Antonia Samut, filed before
the Bureau a Protest5 alleging that he has since the Second World War been in possession of
the properties which he converted into a flourishing rice, tobacco and corn field and
introduced other improvements thereon such as a residential house, a well and rice paddies.

Acting on Samut’s claim the Legal Division of the Bureau directed the District Land Officer of
Ilagan, Isabela to conduct an investigation on the grant of Cortez’s patent and title which
resulted to an order declaring claimants-protestants as the actual occupants over the land in
dispute. No appeal from the order was filed.

The State, represented by the Director of Lands, later filed a complaint dated January 3,
2000,9 for Reversion of Land to Public Domain. The complaint alleged that Cortez
deliberately made fraudulent representations in his free patent application, hence, the
patent and title granted to him should ipso facto be cancelled pursuant to Section 91 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.

In her Answer with Third Party Complaint, 12 petitioner averred that herein respondent Samut
cannot legally acquire the properties by possessory rights despite the alleged period of
occupation, for Cortez and Joaquin Samut (Joaquin), son of Domingo Samut, executed a
Contract of Lease under which Joaquin, as lessee, agreed to plant agricultural crops on the
properties and deliver to Cortez, as lessor, twenty (20%) percent of the crops harvested
every year. Petitioner likewise averred that upon investigation, she discovered that a portion
of the property was sold by the heirs of Samut to herein respondent Chito Singson who
subsequently introduced improvements thereon, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Cortez. Additionally, petitioner claimed that the investigation conducted by the Bureau is
illegal and without legal force and effect as the same was conducted 18 years after the
issuance of OCT No. P-9148 and that the right of reversion had already prescribed, the case
for the purpose having been filed by the State more than 40 years after the grant of patent
to Cortez.

Petitioner then prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent respondents Samut and Singson from selling or cultivating
the properties or introducing any improvements thereon.

RTC to which the case was raffled denied petitioner’s plea for injunctive relief. Petitioner’s
MR was likewise denied.She then subsequently filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
which found petitioner’s petition dismissible for procedural infirmity. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, she filed the present petition.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in denying her plea for injunctive relief.

HELD: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole
objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heardfully. Status
quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual
controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial
court must not make use of its injunctive power to alter such status.
To entitle a petitioner to the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction, he must
establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is
material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. When
the complainantÊs right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right
and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not improper and constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.
Sine dubio the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case
rests in the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment
and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court
for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in
injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
A prayer for injunctive relief should not be granted for the purpose of taking the
property, the legal title to which is in dispute, out of the possession of one person and
putting it into the hands of another before the right of ownership is determined. The reason
for this doctrine is that before the issue of ownership is determined in light of the evidence
presented, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in their status quo so
that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other.

38. LBP VS HEIRS OF LISTANA

FACTS: Severino Listana (Listana) owned a parcel of land in Sorsogon. Listana voluntarily
sold the property to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform, under
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657(CARL).The DARAB of Sorsogon commenced summary
administrative proceedings to determine the amount of just compensation for the property.
In its Decision, the DARAB set the amount at P10,956,963.25 and ordered petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Listana the same.

PARAD issued a writ of execution ordering Land Bank Manager and Agrarian Operations
Center Head Alex A. Lorayes (Lorayes) to pay the set amount. Lorayes refused. Thus, Listana
filed with the PARAD a motion for contempt against Lorayes.

LBP filed with the Regional Trial Court, acting as special agrarian court (SAC), a petition for
judicial determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP challenged
the amount set by the DARAB and prayed that the amount be fixed at ₱5,871,689.03.
The PARAD granted Listana’s motion for contempt. SAC dismissed LBP’s petition for judicial
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP appealed. PARAD
ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution, ordering LBP to pay Listana
₱10,956,963.25. On 3 January 2001, the PARAD issued a warrant of arrest against Lorayes.

LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest against
Lorayes. In its 29 January 2001 Order, the RTC enjoined the PARAD from implementing the
warrant of arrest pending final determination of the amount of just compensation for the
property. LBP posted a ₱5,644,773.02 cash bond.

Listana filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Listana filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and the
orders of RTC were set aside.

Clearly, the court a quo soundly exercised its discretion in refusing to release the injunction
bond posted by Land Bank.13

LBP filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 May 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:W/N the court a quo is correct in refusing to release the injunction bond posted by
Land Bank

HELD: An applicant for preliminary injunction is required to file a bond executed to the party
or person enjoined, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction. Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. — A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:

xxxx

(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if
the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of
the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.

As correctly ruled by the lower courts, the ₱5,644,773.02 bond shall answer for the damages
Listana may sustain if the courts finally uphold the ₱10,956,963.25 just compensation set by
the DARAB. In Republic v. Caguioa,16 the Court held that, "The purpose of the injunction
bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case
the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is usually
conditioned accordingly."17

39. BPI VS CA

FACTS: Petitioner, formerly FEBTC, granted a total of eight (8) loans to Noah’s Arc
Merchandising. The said loans were evidenced by identical Promissory Notes all signed by
Albert T. Looyuko, private respondent Jimmy T. Go and one Wilson Go. Likewise, all loans
were secured by real estate mortgage constituted over a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title [No.] 160277 registered in the names of Mr. Looyuko and herein private
respondent. Petitioner, claiming that Noah’s Ark defaulted in its obligations, extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. The auction sale was set on 14 April 1998 but on 8 April 1998
private respondent filed a complaint for damages with prayer [for] issuance of TRO and/or
writ of preliminary injunction seeking [to] enjoin the auction sale. [I]n the Order dated 14
April 1998 a temporary restraining order was issued and in the same order the application
for Preliminary Injunction was set for hearing [i]n the afternoon of the same day.

In an order3 dated April 15, 1998, Judge Victorio extended the TRO for another 15 days, for a
total of 20 days. The Court of Appeals decision continues thus:

After hearing, the 7 May 1998 Order granted the application for preliminary injunction which
shall take effect upon posting of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00). 

Private-respondent then filed a bond as required by the order. After petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision which partially denied the petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction

HELD: this Court finds that private respondent was not entitled to the TRO and the writ of
preliminary injunction. Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction, to wit:

A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending
to render the judgment ineffectual.

private respondent is not entitled to the relief of injunction against the extrajudicial
foreclosure and auction sale. Neither are the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale
violative of private respondent’s rights.

Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. –  No preliminary injunction

shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that
great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on
notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from notice
to the party or person sought to be enjoined. Within the said twenty-day period, the court
must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.

Judge Victorio, in an order dated April 14, 1998, issued a TRO for five days, then, in an order
dated April 15, 1998, extended it for fifteen more days, totaling twenty days. However, in
the first order, Judge Victorio excluded Saturdays and Sundays; and in the latter order he
added legal holidays to the exclusions. As quoted above, a TRO is effective only for a period
of twenty days from notice to the party sought to be enjoined. The rule does not specify that
the counting of the twenty-day period is only limited to working days or that Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays are excluded from the twenty-day period. The law simply states
twenty days from notice. Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court is pertinent, to wit:

How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from
which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of
performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the
next working day.

It is clear from the last sentence of this section that non-working days (Saturdays, Sundays
and legal holidays) are excluded from the counting of the period only when the last day of
the period falls on such days. The Rule does not provide for any other circumstance in which
non-working days would affect the counting of a prescribed period. Hence, Judge Victorio
exceeded the authority granted to lower courts, in Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
when he excluded non-working days from the counting of the twenty-day period.

In sum, private respondent was not entitled to the TRO nor to the preliminary injunction, and
the period granted in the TRO issued by Judge Victorio exceeded that prescribed in the Rules
of Court.

40. ERMITA VS ALDECOA- DELORINA

FACTS: Then Executive Secretary petitioner Eduardo Ermita assailed via certiorari the writ of
preliminary injunction granted by public respondent Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa Delorino,
then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 137, by Omnibus
Order1 dated February 6, 2007 in favor of private respondent Association of Petrochemical
Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP or private respondent) denying petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss and enjoining the government from implementing Executive Order No. 486.

The issuance in effect reduces protective tariff rates from 10% to 5% on the entry of
inexpensive products, particularly plastic food packaging, from ASEAN Free Trade (AFTA)
member countries into the Philippines.

APMP, an organization composed of manufacturers of petrochemical and resin products,

opposed the implementation of E.O. 486. Contending that the E.O. would affect local
manufacturers, it filed a petition before the RTC of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 06-
2004, seeking the declaration of its unconstitutionality for being violative of Sec. 4 of
Republic Act No. 6647 which prohibits the President from increasing or reducing taxes while
Congress is in session2 and Sec. 402(e)3 of the Tariff and Customs Code. It thereupon prayed
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin its implementation.
ISSUE: Whether public respondent erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition and not granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition

HELD: To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed

to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits,
or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of
hardships tips decidedly in its favor. The higher standard reflects judicial deference toward
"legislation or regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic
processes." Moreover, an injunction will alter, rather than maintain, the status quo, or will
provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be undone
even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.

Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and authority, in assessing

whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all the equities
of the situation, including the public interest. In litigations between governmental and
private parties, courts go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of
public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.
Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future enforcement, he is burdened
to show some substantial hardship. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued precisely to prevent threatened or

continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied or adjudicated – to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard
fully. Still, even if it is a temporary and ancillary remedy, its issuance should not be trifled
with, and an applicant must convincingly show its entitlement to the relief. St. James College
of Paranaque v. Equitable PCI Bank,11 explains:

Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction may be granted if the following grounds are established, thus: virtual law library

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to

do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of
the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

And following jurisprudence, these requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary
injunction, be it mandatory or prohibitory, will issue:

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a
right in esse;

(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;

 (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant;
and

(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury. (emphasis supplied)a1a

It is thus ineluctable that for it to be entitled to the writ, the APMP must show that it has
a clear and unmistakable right that is violated and that there is an urgent
necessity for its issuance. 12 That APMP had cause of action and the standing to
interpose the action for prohibition did not ipso facto call for the grant of
injunctive relief in its favor without it proving its entitlement thereto.

Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, 13 illuminates on the right of a party to
injunctive relief:

Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the
complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is
to be directed are violative of the said right. It must be shown that the invasion of the right
sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and
unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. Moreover, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any
standard compensation. (emphasis supplied)

Contrary to public respondent’s ruling, APMP failed to adduce any evidence to prove

that it had a clear and unmistakable right which was or would be violated by the
enforcement of E.O. 486. The filing of the petition at the court a quo was anchored on APMP
and its members’ fear of loss or reduction of their income once E.O. 486 is implemented and
imported plastic and similar products flood the domestic market due to reduced tariff rates.
As correctly posited by petitioner, APMP was seeking protection over "future economic
benefits" which, at best, it had an inchoate right to.