PERUVIAN

Military Culture

2018

By Frank O. Mora, Brian Fonseca, & Juan Carlos Liendo

 The FIU-USSOUTHCOM Academic Partnership
Military Culture Series

Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy (FIU-JGI) and FIU’s
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center (FIU-LACC), in collaboration with the
United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), formed the FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic
Partnership. The partnership entails FIU providing research-based knowledge to further
USSOUTHCOM’s understanding of the political, strategic, and cultural dimensions that shape
military behavior in Latin America and the Caribbean. This goal is accomplished by employing a
military culture approach. This initial phase of military culture consisted of a yearlong research
program that focused on developing a standard analytical framework to identify and assess the
military culture of three countries. FIU facilitated professional presentations of two countries
(Cuba and Venezuela) and conducted field research for one country (Honduras).

The overarching purpose of the project is two-fold: to generate a rich and dynamic base of
knowledge pertaining to political, social, and strategic factors that influence military behavior; and
to contribute to USSOUTHCOM’s Socio-Cultural Analysis (SCD) Program. Utilizing the notion
of military culture, USSOUTHCOM has commissioned FIU-JGI to conduct country-studies in
order to explain how Latin American militaries will behave in the context of U.S. military
engagement.

The FIU research team defines military culture as “the internal and external factors — historical,
cultural, social, political, economic — that shape the dominant values, attitudes, and behaviors of
the military institution, that inform how the military views itself and its place and society, and that
shape how the military may interact with other institutions, entities, and governments.” FIU
identifies and expounds upon the cultural factors that inform the rationale behind the perceptions
and behavior of select militaries by analyzing historical evolution, sources of identity and pride,
and societal roles.

To meet the stated goals, FIU’s JGI and LACC hosted academic workshops in Miami and brought
subject matter experts together from throughout the U.S., Latin America and the Caribbean, to
explore and discuss militaries in Latin America and the Caribbean. When possible, FIU-JGI
researchers conduct field research in select countries to examine these factors through in-depth
interviews, focus groups, and/or surveys. At the conclusion of each workshop and research trip,
FIU publishes a findings report, which is presented at USSOUTHCOM.
 The views expressed in Peruvian Military Culture are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Government, Florida
International University, or any other affiliated institutions. This report was funded by the United
States Southern Command.

2
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................................... 4
General Characteristics ..................................................................................................................................... 4
External Influences ........................................................................................................................................... 4
A National Identity to Unify Society.................................................................................................................. 4
Sources of Pride and Identity ............................................................................................................................ 5
Military and Society .......................................................................................................................................... 5
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES .............................................................................. 6
The Incan Empire and the Spanish Conquest ................................................................................................... 6
The Royal Army of Peru .................................................................................................................................... 7
Independence and Military Caudillismo of the 19th Century........................................................................... 7
The War of the Pacific ....................................................................................................................................... 8
The Era of Military Professionalism: the French, Italian and U.S. Legacy ......................................................... 9
The Trujillo Revolution of 1932 ..................................................................................................................... 10
The Creation of the CAEM and Military Reformism ....................................................................................... 11
The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces; and the Binomial People and Armed Forces ............ 13
The War against Terrorist Organizations and Military Ostracism................................................................... 14
Military Populism in the 21st Century ............................................................................................................ 16
SOURCES OF PRIDE & IDENTITY .......................................................................................................................... 17
Inca Tupac Yupanqui (1441-1493) .................................................................................................................. 18
Miguel Grau Seminario (1834-1879) .............................................................................................................. 18
The Battle of Angamos (8 October 1879) ....................................................................................................... 19
The Battle of Arica (7 June 1880) .................................................................................................................... 19
Marshal Andrés Avelino Cáceres .................................................................................................................... 20
General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1910-1977) .................................................................................................. 21
Operation Chavin de Huantar (1997).............................................................................................................. 21
MILITARY AND SOCIETY ...................................................................................................................................... 22
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................................... 28
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................................... 30
ABOUT THE AUTHORS......................................................................................................................................... 31

3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
General Characteristics
Peruvian military culture 1 reflects the evolution of the country’s social, political, and military
history. The culture claims its heritage from the Incan Empire through the Spanish viceregal era,
struggling for independence and later attempting to recover after the catastrophic military defeat
against Chile. Throughout the twentieth century, Peru’s efforts have focused on creating a
maintaining internal sociopolitical stability, although it finds itself in a state of flux today.
 The Peruvian military traces its lineage to the Incan and Spanish imperial forces.
 The birthdate of the modern Peruvian Army is based on the Peruvian Guard Legion’s
foundation on August 18, 1821.
 The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) is viewed as a national military disaster that was caused
by a lack of national unity and internal political instability. As Chile invaded and occupied
Peru, seizing its southern territory, perception of Chile as an ever-present threat grew. During
the war, however, leaders of the Peruvian forces stood strong against insurmountable odds,
never backing down or surrendering, but instead showing heroism, sacrifice, and dedication.
The actions by these commanders are the basis of inspiration for much of contemporary
military culture.
 Peruvian military culture has historically been driven by the quest to forge a national identity
from a society long-divided along ethnic, racial, geographic, and cultural lines.
External Influences
 External influences on Peruvian military identity were strongest from 1896 to the 1970s as the
Army professionalized, the Air Force was established, and the Navy modernized.
 The professionalization of the Peruvian Army, from 1896-1940, was undertaken by a French
military mission comprised of Foreign Legionnaire officers with Algerian colonial experience,
while the Peruvian Navy claims a cultural affinity with the U.S., and the Air Force traces its
cultural heritage to Italy.
 In the mid-1960s, U.S. counterinsurgency training emphasized civic action programs to enable
socioeconomic development, heavily influenced Army culture.
 Soviet military influence peaked during the Peruvian conventional military buildup of the
1970s and ended in the 1990s.
A National Identity to Unify Society
 The dominant military cultural narrative has been the Peruvian Army’s advocacy of forging a
national identity to unify society. The result increased political-military tensions throughout
the country’s history.
 To broaden acceptance and support of a national identity across society, the Army promotes
military events and personalities from throughout Peruvian history that underscore the values
of resistance and self-sacrifice

1
This study seeks to identify the most prevailing historical and cultural considerations that run across the military
institution. However, the authors recognize that there are, at times, competing sub-cultures within and across the
branches that comprise the military institution.

4
 The country’s general political instability and paralysis from the 1930s-1950s convinced many
senior officers that the social, political, and economic reforms necessary to ensure national
security could only be attained by the armed forces. This belief culminated with the military’s
seizure of power and the installation of its Revolutionary Government of the People and Armed
Forces (GPAF) in 1968.
 The socially and politically conservative Navy eventually publicly resisted the Army-
dominated GPAF’s radical leftist social, economic, and political programs, causing internal
discord within the military.
Sources of Pride and Identity
 Viewed as exemplars of strength, will, power, and wisdom, Incan emperors, especially Inca
Pachacutec, have long been revered by the Peruvian military and society.
 During the War of the Pacific, both specific battles and commanders became steadfast symbols
of dedication, self-sacrifice, and resolve in the face of certain death and defeat.
 An unofficial part of the narrative, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, the leader of the coup that
deposed the civilian government from power in 1968 and the first president of the GPAF, is
viewed as imposing the social, economic, and political reforms to achieve national unity.
 Operation Chavin de Huantar, the 1997 rescue operation of 71 people held hostage by the
Túpac Amaru at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima, is a primary contemporary
source of pride.
Military and Society
 Peru’s chronically weak governance has influenced civil-military relations. The military saw
itself as the only national institution that has been able to maintain domestic stability during
the country’s frequent social and political upheaval.
 The Army has advocated and performed socioeconomic development throughout its history,
often blaming the political system and civilian governments for instability and socioeconomic
underdevelopment.
 The Navy has tended to be socially and politically conservative. During the fight against
terrorist organizations (Sendero Luminoso and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement-
MRTA), the military assumed political and administrative control of emergency zones, which
helped to enhance its influence and image in rural areas.
 The success of its anti-terrorist campaign boosted its image and reputation within society but
it was quickly undercut by the systemic abuses, particularly human rights violations and
corruption.
 Today, the military’s influence on society has been virtually eliminated after it was ostracized
and isolated following the end of the Fujimori presidency in 2000.
 In spite of its more recent degradation, the military remains one of the most popular institutions
in Peruvian society.

5
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PERUVIAN ARMED
FORCES
Peruvian military culture reflects the evolution of the country’s social, political, and military
history. The culture claims its heritage from the Incan Empire through the Spanish viceregal era,
the struggle for independence, the catastrophic military defeat against Chile, and the effort to create
and maintain internal sociopolitical stability throughout the twentieth century. Central to Peruvian
military culture has been the quest for a national identity and national socioeconomic development
to achieve its long-held vision of Peru as a regional power capable of ensuring its security and the
pursuit of its interests. While domestic political instability left the Incan Empire vulnerable to the
Spanish conquest, Chile’s invasion during the War of the Pacific, and the Marxist-Maoist inspired
insurgencies of the late 20th century, disunity has been associated with internal violence and
military defeat. The Peruvian military’s visions for national unity have clashed with the political
system’s reliance on often-divisive ethnic and elite interests in the distribution of power and
resources. Today, the military culture is in a state of flux as traditional narratives and values are
challenged by a political system enduring the upheavals of democracy.

The Incan Empire and the Spanish Conquest

The war of the Spanish Conquest of the Incan empire constitutes an important reference
point in the development of the Peruvian military institution due to its epic character and claims.
The Spanish conquest of Peru and the subsequent destruction of the Incan Empire was a total war
of ideologies and peoples. The warring factions were respected for their bravery and audacity; the
Spanish for their skillful use of technology and leadership in their conquest, and the Incans for
their bravery in battle and their unwillingness to accept defeat. Incans’ unwillingness to accept
defeat and persistent resistance for four decades underscores an important element fused into
contemporary Peruvian military culture. The concept of resistance — never surrender — has its
origins in Incan resistance to Spanish conquest. This epic conquest narrative infused Peruvian
military culture with an emotional component, expressed in its self-identification as a strong and
powerful Andean army. The idea of resistance was strong At the beginning of the 20th century,
a French military mission charged with instructing and administering the “Army of Peru” used the
Conquest’s epic narrative, centered on the image of the powerful and valiant “Incan soldier” to
establish the army’s basic values and its identity. The names of various units, the orders of cadet

6
school selectees, military operations and the iconography of numerous military garrisons and bases
refer to Incan and pre-Incan heroes and culture.

The Royal Army of Peru

The Spanish Imperial era military force provided the foundational base of the Peruvian
military institution in two transcendental aspects. The first was political; 34 of 40 Peruvian
viceroys over a period of 300 years were Spanish Imperial military officers, leading to a typical
political-military government over administration at the town, village, superintendence, and
missionary community levels, with all authorities having military rank. Second, the military was
an agent of viceregal personal power and hence a potential threat to the Spanish monarchy’s
control over the colony. The viceroyalty’s military forces were reduced in numbers and oriented
toward the security of viceregal authorities until the mid-18th century. As Spain’s control over
Peru was challenged by its European rivals, it created a popular militia-based force, expanding the
role of the military in society.

By 1776, 96,376 militiamen already existed, centered on the coastal regions, organized
along the viceroyalty’s political and administrative structures, commanded by authorities and
noblemen under the “Captain of War” command structure and categorized by profession (artisans,
merchants), ethnicity (Indigenous, Blacks, Mulattoes, Criollos, Whites), or urban and rural
jurisdictions. They also were militarily structured (grades, promotions and salaries), received
military training and were regulated and disciplined by ordinances (regulations), while officers
and militia cavalry were uniformed. By 1787, they were organized by infantry, cavalry and
dragoon units.

The viceroyalty’s political-military organization and the existence of the Royal Peruvian
Army structured along urban-rural popular militia lines, constitute the first cultural basis of Peru’s
military institution, which would project itself into the 19th century with the figure of the caudillo
and into the 20th century with the military professional.

Independence and Military Caudillismo of the 19th Century

The independence-era Army of Peru is recognized, since the formation of the Republic, as
the foundational and tutelary institution of the nation, responsible for guaranteeing its sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity. Its origins lay in the formation of the first military unit of

7
the Peruvian Army on August 18, 1821 ― weeks after the country’s declaration of independence
(July 28, 1821). On that date, the Peruvian Guard Legion (an infantry battalion, two cavalry
squadrons and a battery of artillery) was established with “the duty to sustain the independence of
Peru.” The Legion participated in a number of battles during the War for Independence until the
victory of the Battle of Ayacucho on December 9, 1824, celebrated today as the Army’s
anniversary.

The new Peruvian Army became the only institution capable of forging national unity from
the ashes of the Spanish Empire. As with all the newly independent Hispano-American republics,
Peruvian military commanders used their forces to establish political power. Peru entered an
intense period of personality-driven and regionally-based military caudillismo, which can only be
understood through its political-military nature sustained in the entrenchment of viceregal
administrative experience and republican-era chaos.

Field Marshal Ramόn Castilla is a key personality in Peruvian military culture due to his
efforts to transition the military from a caudillo-driven revolutionary-era force to one based on a
national identity. A Spanish officer who defected to the revolutionary Army, Castilla fought in
various civil and national wars after independence. Ultimately, he became president four times ―
from 1845-1863. He was a nationalist, fighting successfully alongside Chile in the 1836-1839 War
of the Confederation to dismember the short-lived Peru-Bolivian Confederation. Castilla publicly
invoked his humble origins and racial heritage as a source of legitimacy; he was of mixed white-
indigenous origin and, in his words, claimed that he represented Peru’s three worlds ― Spanish,
mestizo and indigenous. Nationally, Castilla is renowned for abolishing slavery, introducing a
constitution, and instituting universal direct suffrage. Castilla’s legacy in military culture is
controversial. Although he was a caudillo who was willing to align with Chile to pursue his
ideological views, he also was the first senior military officer to promote a racially and ethnically
united Peruvian nation based on democratic principles. His vision is reflected in the military
cultural self-perception as the builder of the modern Peruvian nation and the forger of the country’s
national identity.

The War of the Pacific

The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) is the principal historical and cultural reference point
of Peru’s military institutional culture. The war was Peru’s first ― and only ― total national war;

8
the entire population was directly or indirectly affected. Over subsequent years, the war assumed
the primary narrative of national identity in some ways with more force, impact, and transcendence
than independence itself. No fewer than 70 percent of streets, plazas, parks, political-
administrative districts and public buildings bear the names of heroes and battles of the War of the
Pacific. The phenomenon of the War of the Pacific goes beyond the signing of the Ancόn Treaty,
which ended the war on October 20, 1883. Chile continued occupying part of Peru’s southern
territory and maintained control of the provinces of Tacna and Arica until August 1929, when
through U.S. mediation, Peru lost the province and port of Arica but regained the province of
Tacna. Suspicion, resentment, and animosity toward Chile remains entrenched in Peru’s military
institution and the popular culture to this day.

Because of the valiant last stands and tactical victories by Peruvian Army and Navy forces
and their commanders in the face of inevitable defeat, the War of the Pacific played a central role
in military culture and its self-perception today. Colonel Francisco Bolognesi, the defender of
Arica, is exalted for vowing to “fight to the last cartridge” in response to a Chilean offer to accept
the surrender of the city and afterwards dying valiantly in its defense. His vow is the motto of the
Peruvian Army, displayed on its official flag. Another leader upheld as an example of resolution
and nationalism is General Andrés Cáceres, who guided the implacable resistance against Chilean
forces as both commander of conventional forces and then leader of a predominantly indigenous
peasant-based insurgency. The Peruvian Navy also exalts the exploits of Admiral Miguel Grau,
who as commander of the ironclad Huascar, singlehandedly interdicted Chilean maritime traffic
and bombarded ports, delaying the Chilean amphibious invasion of Bolivia and Peru for nearly a
year. Today, Admiral Grau is announced as “present” at the roll call of all Peruvian congressional
sessions in honor of his heroism during the war.

The Era of Military Professionalism: the French, Italian and U.S. Legacy

Between 1896 and 1940, a French military mission comprised primarily of Foreign
Legionnaire personnel from the Algerian occupation forces became the foundation of a
professional army. With the subsequent creation of the Officer Training School, the Superior War
College (High Command), and the modernization of the Armed Forces’ administration, the French
military mission helped bring an end to XIX century military caudillismo, consolidating
professional officer leadership with French expeditionary military colonial spirit in accordance

9
with the famous French military theoretical work “The Social Role of the Army.” The Ecuadorian-
Peruvian War, a territorial battle in 1941, was the culmination of the French success in
consolidating a strong and efficient professional Army as Peru quickly overwhelmed its
competitor.

French military influence was more limited in the Navy and Air Force. The U.S. military
served as the initial organizer of the Peruvian Air Force in the late 1920s. However, an Italian air
mission ultimately laid the basis of the Peruvian Air Force’s institutional culture during the 1930s,
distinguishing it from the region’s generally U.S. Air Force professional institutional origins. U.S.
military influence has been strongest within the Peruvian Navy. In 1920, the U.S. Navy was
selected to oversee the reform and restructuring of the Peruvian Navy, including its command
structure, and training and education system, establishing a relationship that has lasted nearly a
century with only a brief interruption in the 1930s.

The Trujillo Revolution of 1932

The 1930s introduced an era of political violence that affected the military culture’s
narratives on the relationship between politics and security. On July 7, 1932, radicals from the
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Spanish initials: APRA) attacked and captured the
military garrison in the city of Trujillo, inciting a socialist rebellion against the democratic
government. The apristas’ murder of imprisoned Army officers during the rebellion led to a
military operation to recapture the city. The result left approximately 4,000 apristas dead in a city
with no more than 20,000 inhabitants. The Trujillo revolt was the first of several bloody
confrontations between soldiers and aprista party militants during the first half of the 20th century.
As the APRA party gained national political legitimacy, it created rancor and mistrust between the
military and the political system itself. Even today, the APRA remains a profoundly anti-military
political party while the Army retains its anti-aprista tendency. Resisting Political Radicalism: The
Rise of the APRA

The APRA initiated the first popular political mass movement in Peruvian political history.
It was based on a radical socialist platform that brought class-based social divisions, leading to
turmoil in the military and threatening its unity during the 1930-1940s. Prior to this period, military
commanders exerted influence over the political system, but stayed away from governing until
1930. The threat of radicalism/socialism brought on a period of military governments, and for the

10
first time in its history, the military’s institutional unity was threatened with external political
intervention. The APRA’s radical socialist ideology found many sympathizers among the enlisted
and junior to mid-officer ranks. In March 1934, an Army regiment in Cajamarca rebelled as part
of another APRA anti-government revolt. An APRA inspired military coup attempt barely failed
in February 1939, and another APRA military revolt broke out in 1948 at the Callao Naval Base
but was immediately halted by the Army. The democratically elected government’s unwillingness
to eliminate the APRA’s threat to military order after the 1948 Callao revolt led the military to
support a successful right-wing coup against it.

The onset of political violence in the 1930s coincided with new military cultural
foundational narratives for a national identity. By 1933, the military was declaring itself the only
institution capable of “forging a national identity…” by promoting literacy of the indigenous
population, construction of infrastructure linking the interior with the coast, and providing the
moral example of a nationalist organization. The military’s violent experience against the socialist
radicals in the past was part of the Military’s justification to seize power in 1968, claiming an
impending radical socialist revolt. However, unlike its South American neighbors, Peruvian
military culture would incorporate socialist principles as the ideological basis for its leftist social,
political and economic policies while in power.

The Creation of the CAEM and Military Reformism

The Center for High Military Studies (CAEM) founded in 1950 by General José del
Carmen Marín, established a National Defense doctrine known as “There is no National Defense
without Development” and “There is no Development without National Defense.” The doctrine
espoused that Peru’s underdevelopment made it vulnerable to internal instability and external
intervention. CAEM’s faculty believed that since only the Army was aware of the nation’s social
and economic problems, only it could address them. The doctrine reflected the continuing
influence of French military thinking still prevalent among senior officers

Philosophically, CAEM’s leaders during the 1950s believed that any concept of national
identity necessary to achieve security could not be imposed and had to be based on legitimacy,
summarized as “ideas are presented and not imposed.” With an emphasis on convincing Peruvians
to accept CAEM-driven military ideas on their merits, many military officers concluded that the
social, political, and economic status quo was perpetuating insecurity. This military intellectualism

11
philosophy, combined with a politically reformist orientation, further led them to believe that to
ensure national survival, the status quo needed to be changed.

The reformist ideological tendencies of the Army’s senior officers was reinforced by their
counterinsurgency experience of the early 1960s. Cuban-inspired insurgencies broke out in the
Northern regions of the country. In response, the Army reoriented its institutions toward supporting
counterinsurgency operations. Most significantly, officers and commanders began receiving U.S.
counterinsurgency training. The culture’s French military colonial-era doctrinal legacy gave
commanders a sensitivity toward the importance of internal security. U.S. counterinsurgency
training at the Special Warfare Center and School at Ft. Bragg and the School of the Americas in
the Canal Zone instilled the importance of civic action programs to promote economic
development and reduce rural unrest.

By the 1960s, CAEM’s reformist doctrinal influence within the officer corps was replaced
by the Army Intelligence Service’s revolutionary ideological program. CAEM’s theories gave way
to the lessons drawn by the counterinsurgency experiences of infantry and intelligence officers.
The Army Intelligence Service’s commanders openly believed that Peru’s social, political, and
economic inequality made it vulnerable to communist insurgencies. Ingrained in the training
school’s graduates was the conclusion that ending Peru’s social injustice, exploitation, and
dependency was vital to internal security.

Peruvian military culture merged the French National Mission with U.S. Civic Action
programs to create a socio-politically driven narrative, and the Army Intelligence Service became
the most ardent advocate of this cultural narrative. The chief of Army intelligence at the time
declared that social and economic development in military zones was necessary to “win the
confidence of its people.” The Intelligence Service would be heavily involved in the Coup of 1968
and would provide much of the intellectual foundation for the military government’s policies.
CAEM had become irrelevant by the time of the coup; its faculty had come to criticize the
prevalence of social justice-driven doctrinal advocacy among senior officers. CAEM’s faculty and
syllabi had, by the time of the coup, become influenced by the Inter-American Defense College
and the Brazilian military.

12
The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces; and the Binomial People and
Armed Forces
By 1968, senior Army officers had developed a sense of urgency over the paralysis of
governance created by a financial crisis and the political system’s polarization. The pre-WWI
French military advocacy of the armed forces’ social role in unifying the nation ― and CAEM’s
doctrinal linkage of development and defense ― had instilled among senior Army officers the
belief that the governance of the nation was too important to be left to politicians. This combination
of urgency and the belief in the Army’s organizational superiority motivated its takeover of the
country after a military coup in October 1968 led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado. The twelve
year military government imposed a socioeconomic reformist program designed to establish its
popular legitimacy, ultimately transforming the political economic and social structures of the
country.

In military culture, the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (1968-1980) is

considered to be the historical peak of the armed forces’ organizational administrative and
technological capability. This era is also perceived as the most extensive in terms of the military’s
influence over society, strategic integration of defense, and national development. This military
cultural interpretation is largely an Army narrative because the coup and the military government
were primarily Army-dominated. The Army’s popular social composition, its presence within
society combined with their indoctrination through military education drove its commanders’
ideological programs. The Navy’s officer corps had a different philosophy that was generally
conservative in political orientation and disapproving of the military government’s expropriations
of industry and press.

The military officers that seized power claimed to do so in the name of a revolution for the
“emancipation of the fatherland.” While the commanders could agree on opposing the civilian
political system, there was no consensus on the ideological direction of the new military
government. The seizure of power exposed three ideological factions inherent within the military
culture: conservatives, state modernizers, and progressives. The conservatives sought to avoid any
military social reform role, and the state modernizers argued for a military-led national
socioeconomic reform, claiming that eliminating social injustice contributed to national security.
The progressives, which dominated from 1968 to 1975, pursued radical social justice through
economic nationalization, agrarian reform, and populist governance.

13
 The 1968 military takeover of the state was largely the result of an existential institutional
crisis. Internally, the institution’s interests evolved from focusing on a rematch against Chile to
involvement in national politics, and rejection of political interference in the armed forces as it
advocated the unification of state and society to achieve national development. By the 1960s the
military had struggled to establish an identity relevant to the interests of the political system and
the nation as a whole. However, the military’s professionalism had led to resentments against the
political system. Politicians were perceived as self-interested, cynical, and unwilling to act for the
common national good. The expanding influence and appeal of Marxism-Leninism increased the
sense of alarm in the military. Officers came to believe that the political class’ petty differences
were making the country vulnerable to radical socialist destabilization.

The Navy’s ideological hostility to the Army’s radical economic redistribution program
and populist governance increased after 1968. By 1975, the Navy had ended its support for the
Army government and had moved into open political opposition. The Navy’s institutional
defection from the military government reflected the internal discord taking place within the
military as a whole. The economic downturn created by the global economic shock as a result of
the 1973 oil crisis, reduced the government’s ability to support its social and economic policies,
leading to outbreaks of large-scale popular protests. The economic crisis also exposed the
conservative-radical schisms within the Army. The conservative Army officer faction led by
General Francisco Morales Bermúdez overthrew General Juan Velasco Alvarado out of concern
that the economic and financial crisis threatened the country’s stability. Bermúdez abandoned most
of Velasco’s social policies, imposed market-oriented economic reforms, and began to return
political power to civilians.

The War against Terrorist Organizations and Military Ostracism

The Peruvian state militarily defeated the terrorist organizations of Sendero Luminoso
(Spanish acronym OT-SL), and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Spanish acronym
MRTA) by the early 1990s. Victory was by no means guaranteed, as by 1990 Peru was in a
condition of a “Failed State” due to the divisions within the national political class. The latitude
and administrative control afforded to the Military enabled Peru to defeat the terrorist
organizations. The military’s application of a strategic political-military war was the result of its
political support for Alberto Fujimori’s government (1990-2000).

14
 The military reached both the summit of popular prestige and the lowest depths of
unpopularity while Fujimori was president. During the Fujimori-era, senior military officials
divided the military’s fortunes according to his terms of office. His first term (1990-1995) is
perceived as one in which he enabled the military’s capacity to fight and defeat terrorist
organizations on the battlefield. Fujimori, who relied on the military as a central pillar of his
government due to his outsider status, then shut down congress, purged the judiciary, and
suspended the constitution in response to legislative-presidential deadlock. Fujimori rid the
military’s senior commands of opponents, replacing them with loyalists permitted to engage in
illegal activity. Army commands replaced civilian administration in large sections of the country
affected by terrorist operations. The Army’s battlefield experiences against the terrorist groups
led to the height of the military’s popular prestige. One of the country’s most prominent modern-
era source of cultural pride occurred under Fujimori’s leadership. In April 1997, Operation Chavin
de Huantar saw the successful rescue of 71 hostages held captive for 126 days in the Japanese
Ambassador’s residence in Lima.

Fujimori’s fall ended the military’s influence in domestic political discourse it had enjoyed
since 1968. The revelations of military crimes during his presidency contributed to Fujimori’s
resignation. Reports of military human rights violations committed during counter-terrorist
operations and Fujimori’s blanket immunity for the military personnel involved in such crimes
turned public support against the armed forces. The military’s association with Fujimori’s crimes
and high-level corruption led to public demands for political intervention to hold personnel
accountable and ensure that similar crimes and abuses would not occur in the future. An additional
consequence of the association meant a loss of military institutional autonomy and subordination
to the civilian political and judicial authority.

With the terrorist organizations’ defeat and the political fall of President Fujimori, the
Peruvian military institution was subject to a drastic process of reforms. The most critical changes
dealt with budget reductions and criminal trials (for the supposed human rights violations and acts
of corruption).These circumstances significantly impacted the military’s institutional culture in
terms of the sociopolitical isolation from the state and society, and the military’s strong rejection
of the political class and external intervention. Simultaneously, the military’s isolation has led to
a resurgence of latent fundamentalist ideologies within the military’s culture into the officers’
discourse over the relationship between the military and society.

15
Military Populism in the 21st Century

Following the fall of President Fujimori, a period of political and judicial persecution
followed under the “democratic control of the armed forces” program that continues to date. This
has led to reduced salaries, the loss of military equipment, annulment of the military code of
justice, and the disruption of the military organizational hierarchy. In turn, this has brought about
a deterioration in discipline, increased corruption, and an erosion of command authority. Today,
the military cultural view linking security with domestic development has little relevance in
popular or political discourse. In addition, the tradition of military influence in in domestic political
affairs and the forging of a national identity has no significant national appeal in society today.
The institutional establishment of democratic principles since the Fujimori era has created a
political culture of ensuring military separation from domestic affairs. The armed forces’ have
responded to this unprecedented ostracization from society and politics by reaffirming that its
cultural ideas are just as relevant as ever.

The military's current political and popular marginalization has generated resentment
within it against foreign and multinational organizations. The military also remains entrenched in
its traditional national conventional defense focus rather than assimilating the state's growing
international security interests. These circumstances have led to a culture of mistrust and rejection
of international initiatives and agreements (principally within the Army) and the rise of
fundamentalist nationalist groups among discharged personnel and Army veterans that espouse
indigenous and anti-globalization narratives under the Ethnocacerist Movement.

Despite the damage to the military’s reputation in the aftermath of the Fujimori era, senior
military officers have successfully transitioned into politics and the Peruvian electoral process
itself. In 2011, retired Lieutenant Colonel Ollanta Humala was elected president of Peru. In the
2016 elections, military officers were elected to the Congress of the Republic. Today, the presence
of military officers in political campaigns has become symbolic the identification with nationalist
and anti-systemic ideas.

16
SOURCES OF PRIDE & IDENTITY
Like many South American countries with a rich and diverse history, Peru’s sources of pride and
identity are as vast as its landscape that ranges from coastal lands to the peaks of the Andes
Mountains and the plateaus of the Amazon region. A country with a large indigenous population,
Peru grew from the Incan Empire and was heavily influenced by its Spanish colonization, and,
later by a migrant population, largely European, but also as wide-ranging as Chinese and Japanese.
As one would expect, however, due to the entwinement of its military and politics ― and a long
narrative disputes and battles over territories and power, many sources of pride and identity come
straight from key figures in the military and in government.

Admired to this day by the Peruvian Military is Inca Pachacutec (ca.1400-1471), the Inca
of the Kingdom of Cuzco, who was credited with expanding and transforming the then Incan, or
Tawantinsuyo, Empire. The chronicles of the Spanish conquest refer to Cusi Yupanqui (son of the
Inca Huiracocha) as defending the city of Cuzco against the attacking neighboring kingdom of the
Chancas. The chronicles describe Cusi Yupanqui’s defeat of a 40,000-strong Chanca warrior
attack as nothing short of miraculous; he ordered the surrounding rocks to transform into soldiers.

Cusi Yupanqui succeeded his father, Huiracocha, as Inca after the battle of Cuzco, and
proclaimed himself Pachacutec Inca Yupanqui (the Inca that changes the course of the land).
Pachacutec defeated the Chancas using a combination of diplomacy and military force.
Recognized as an “exceptional leader” due to his experiences as a soldier, conqueror and Emperor,
the imaginary Andean was called the “son of the sun,” and is considered the “first historic Inca”
of Tawantinsuyo.

The Peruvian Army adopted Pachacutec as a symbol of strength, power and resistance. His
Andean origin instilled a powerful sense of identification among active duty and retired personnel,
and his ability to overcome adversity (demonstrated by his transformation of rocks into soldiers),
in addition to his great administration and governance, was admired and respected. Pachacutec
became the patron figure of the Commando School and the Army’s Special Forces, whose
members are also known as “Pachacutec Commandos” and whose motto is, “To be and not to
seem.”

17
 The greatest source of pride in Peruvian military culture is to be a “Pachacutec commando.”
With the participation of the Special Forces in the war against terrorism (1982-2000), the conflict
with Ecuador (1995-1998), and Operation Chavin de Huantar (1997), which saw the successful
rescue of hostages held at the Japanese ambassador’s residence in Lima, its prestige ― and that of
Pachacutec ― was cemented in history.

Pachacutec is so revered that the term “Pachacutec Commando,” has transcended its strict
reference to a member of the Special Forces to become a synonym for a strong-willed, self-
sacrificing and efficient individual. In fact, the phrase, “You look like a commando,” has become
commonplace, and numerous veterans’ organizations use the names Pachacutec or Pachacutec
Command to identify themselves.

Inca Tupac Yupanqui (1441-1493)

The reverence for Incan leadership has continued. In 2016, the BAP Uníon, a Navy training
and ambassador vessel, was commissioned into service. At its bow is the figurehead of
Pachacutec’s son and successor, tenth Inca-Tawantinsuyo, Túpac Yupanqui. Remarkable for his
continued expansion and consolidation of the Incan Empire, most notably through the exploration
of new territory, conquest, and government administration, Túpac Yupanqui organized a maritime
expedition that reached the Polynesian islands, according to the Chronicles of the Conquest.

Recent students of this expedition advocated the installation of the figurehead on the BAP
Uníon, representing the values of exploration and diplomacy. In addition, the effort by the Navy
to incorporate Túpac Yupanqui’s image emphasizes the importance of the Andean identity, which
is increasingly relevant in Peruvian society as a whole and demonstrates his impact on Peruvian
military culture.

Miguel Grau Seminario (1834-1879)

There’s no shortage of heroes in Peruvian history. Among them is a Navy Admiral who is
upheld by the people as an outstanding military leader. Miguel Grau Seminario, who joined the
Peruvian Navy at the age of nineteen, became the captain of the monitor “Huascar” during the War
of the Pacific. As commander of the ship, Grau played a key role in opening the port of Iquique,
which had been blockaded by Chilean ships. In battles, although he was usually outnumbered by
aggressors, his determination often resulted in the sinking of enemy ships. A unique characteristic

18
of Grau was his compassion for the survivors of the very ships he attacked; he became known for
rescuing the crews. Eventually, he died at his post as captain of the Huascar. To Peru’s citizens
and military, his life trajectory represents the values of integrity, service, detachment and heroism.
He is also upheld as an example of a father figure, citizen and politician.

He is considered the patron saint of the Peruvian Navy due to his heroic self-sacrifice in
battle, as well as his personal virtues. As a Naval officer, he exemplified intelligence, audacity,
leadership, and extreme chivalry in the face of a defeated enemy. Grau’s image is widely known
across the ethnic European sectors of the country and has been incorporated in liberal political
circles. Streets in many Peruvian towns bear his name, and his boyhood home was restored and
turned into a museum by the Naval Ministry. With mass media popularization, Grau became an
ideal example to emulate in the military’s culture.

The Battle of Angamos (8 October 1879)

The pride Peruvians feel for Admiral Captain Miguel Grau Seminario, also explains their
admiration of The Battle of Angamos on October 8, 1879. Considered one of the most critical and
heroic episodes of the War of the Pacific, it was preceded by a seven-month Naval campaign that
inflicted severe damage against the Chilean war effort. During the Battle of Angamos, the Peruvian
monitor “Huascar,” commanded by Grau, fought six Chilean Navy warships. Surrounded, and with
defeat imminent, Grau continued his push, never backing down. The battle summarizes and
projects the values of skill, naval cunning, leadership, and chivalry in the face of the enemy.
Ultimately, Grau was killed in the fight and the Peruvian Navy was defeated. Yet because it was a
fierce clash against all odds, and an example of the utmost sacrifice for honor and country, October
8 is observed as a national holiday, commemorating Grau and others killed in battle, and
celebrating the Peruvian Navy’s anniversary.

The Battle of Arica (7 June 1880)

In an additional nod to valiant and heroic efforts in spite of defeat, another battle of the
War of the Pacific, The Battle of Arica, is championed by the Peruvian military culture. On June
7, 1880, after a brief siege, Chilean Army troops defeated the Peruvian garrison and conquered the
port of Arica. During the conflict, the Chilean forces were aware of the numerical inferiority and
perilous conditions of the Peruvian forces and offered to negotiate the surrender of the garrison.

19
The Peruvian garrison commander, Colonel Francisco Bolognesi responded by declaring, “We are
obligated to our sacred duty and we will comply until the last cartridge is fired,” a phrase that has
become a principal source of pride and identity in Peruvian military culture.

The historical narrative has instilled this battle with an epic dimension supported by the
numerous tales of heroism and sacrifice that led to the death of 70 percent of the defenders. The
battle is also portrayed as the principal event of a war that lasted four years. Although Chile agreed
to return Arica at the end of the war, it maintained control of the city against its peace treaty
commitment until 1929, when it legally was awarded to Chile.

The Battle of Arica, and the fight-to-the-death mentality of a Peruvian military facing
extreme adversity, not only reflected dedication to duty, but the willingness to sacrifice lives in
defense of military and country honor. June 7 has been institutionalized nationally as Flag Day
and the date when troops declare their oath of loyalty to the country and the flag. General Francisco
Bolognesi is the patron saint of the Army for his virtues of patriotism, commitment to duty and the
spirit of self-sacrifice, and his quote, “Until the last cartridge is fired,” became the Peruvian Army’s
motto and is featured on its institutional flag. In addition to representing a source of pride from the
military, the Battle of Arica and Bolgnesi hold significance across all sectors of society.

Marshal Andrés Avelino Cáceres

While the War of the Pacific occurred largely at sea, especially in its beginning stages,
eventually Chilean forces headed inland. In the desert, the Battle of Tarapacá, in November 1879,
became an important victory for Peru, particularly after losses at sea. During the fight, Peruvian
troops, despite being worn down and in retreat across the desert, were able to push back Chilean
forces. Each time the Chilean Army retreated, it would regroup with the hope that it could defeat
the exhausted and lessening numbers of Peru’s military. Yet, under the leadership of General
Andrés Avelina Cáceres, Peru defeated the Chilean Army. The victory was credited to the strategy,
courage, and audacity of Cáceres. The Battle of Tarapacá is celebrated as the Day of the Peruvian
Infantry and Marshal Cáceres is its patron saint.

The Chileans continued their land campaign following their loss of the Battle of Tarapacá,
and between 1881 and 1883, Cáceres led the Andean resistance against the Chilean occupation
force. Cáceres reunited the dispersed national Army, and, along with an Andean peasant Army,

20
used a guerrilla warfare strategy that significantly wore down the Chilean troops. He became
symbolic for his leadership, iron will in defense of the nation, initiative, and resourcefulness in
prioritizing scarce resources for his troops, and was largely responsible for the fortitude of the
Andean soldier as the heir of the Incas and their perseverance and tenacity in the face of adversity.
Following the war, Cáceres was elected president of Peru twice and was later proclaimed Marshal
of the Nation.

Among the Andean population, particularly in the zones that saw the heaviest fighting,
Cáceres has enormous relevance and is remembered as “The Taita Cáceres” (The Father Cáceres).
Over the last few years, this source of identity has been incorporated within an ethno-nationalist
ideological movement (the Ethnocacerist Movement) that proposes the political restoration of the
spirit of the Tawantinsuyo Empire.

General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1910-1977)

Juan Velasco Alvarado was the Peruvian President of the Revolutionary Government of
the Armed Forces, which took over power in 1968. While Velasco is not part of the official
narrative as a source of military cultural pride and identity, it is necessary to recognize that his
legacy and the challenges established during his government remain in the social and internal
discourses across all levels of the military stratum. His rule was the most politically, economically,
and socially transformative since Peru’s independence under the “Binomial People and the Armed
Forces” program. While creating a strong sense of popular sentiment that has been projected onto
the military’s culture, Velasco was highly controversial due to his rejection of the traditional
political class.

Nationalist military veteran groups advocating a politically activist role for the armed
forces utilize General Velasco’s image, largely because he and his government represented the
values of “National Dignity and Identity,” validated the “Social Role of the Army,” and promoted
the military-civic union known as the “People and the Armed Forces.”

Operation Chavin de Huantar (1997)

Among the most recent sources of military cultural pride and identity is the military rescue
operation of hostages that were held by members of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(Spanish acronym MRTA). The event began on December 17, 1996, in the Japanese Ambassador’s

21
residence in Lima. After 126 days of captivity, on April 22, 1997, the Army Special Forces
successfully rescued 71 of 72 hostages in what was called Operation Chavin de Huantar. Live
television coverage created an immensely favorable impact on public opinion.

After the event, however, the commanders of the Special Forces that participated in the
operation have been tried for human rights violations while other members continue being
investigated and charged with similar crimes to date. In spite of the charges, Operation Chavin de
Huantar represents courage, dedication, sacrifice, and commitment to duty. In addition, the success
of the operation came as the military became more experienced in dealing with terrorists. There’s
no doubt that properly equipping, training, preparing and rehearsing the rescue highlighted the
value and expertise of the Special Force. During Peru’s celebration of independence and its
honoring of armed forces, national holidays on July 28 and 29, Special Forces units annually
initiate the military parade to expressions of popular support and recognition.

MILITARY AND SOCIETY

The military’s relationship with society and government is best explained by a profound systemic
crisis in governance caused by Peru’s deeply fragmented society. The problem has led to the
military playing a historically important role, particularly since 1930. This political and social
instability that has plagued Peru since the founding of the Republic, is so significant that the
military felt compelled to assume a political leadership role as the only institution capable of
maintaining social peace in the face of intense political infighting and social upheaval.

During the period termed by Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre as the first militarism (1821-
1883), caudillos governed the country with little to no support from society. The military had yet
to be professionalized into a national institution. Nonetheless, the caudillo-led militaries did
engage society by way of development projects in some of the more remote areas of the country.
The Army established a presence in highlands as well as in the Amazonian region, where some
units provided primary education, for example. Prior to the War of the Pacific, the Army also
assisted in building some of the first railroads in the country. Meanwhile, the Navy contributed to
an incipient industrial sector involving a steel and copper foundry to meet demands from the state
and civilian industries. This early exposure to society via national development projects, along

22
with the periodic regional rebellions in which segments of the population became a vital part of
caudillo armies, directly involved the early armed forces in the challenges facing Peruvian society.

Military-society relations intensified during and after the War of the Pacific as society
became an integral component of the whole of nation struggle against Chile. It is important to
note, however, that all of these early examples of military-society interaction were very top down.
The men in uniform did not seek much input nor was there any effort made to reach a consensus
with society on key political and economic issues. As with all social relations in Peru, paternalism
(and some detachment) reigned.

Until 1930, the start of the Basadre’s third militarist period (1930-1980), the armed forces
continued to deepen their role in national development projects, exposing them to more of the
poverty and exclusion facing the most isolated communities of Peru. The arrival of the French
military mission in 1896 marked the start of the Peruvian Army’s professionalization that included
the assimilation of a doctrine – “Social Role of the Army” – that underscored the inseparable
relationship between internal security and national development. Over time, through active
partnership, the military assumed a planning role in the state and in the control and mobilization
of civil society. Despite the Army’s socially-oriented doctrine, the armed forces, particularly the
Navy, supported the local aristocracy and oligarchic political order against the emerging spread of
socialist political ideas and movements, such as the APRA.

During the third militarist period, the armed forces conception of its role in society and
ideological orientation evolved. Once CAEM was established in 1950 and introduced the
foundational doctrine that “there is no national defense without development, and there is no
development without national defense,” a deepening of the French vision of the social role of the
Army, the Peruvian Army ideological orientation and relationship with society began to change
significantly. The Army realized that it faced the challenge of not being able to generate the
national will because a population that had nothing to fight for or no stake in the battle due to their
dispossessed condition, would not be anxious to defend the country. Their exposure to remote
areas of the Andes and strong reformist training received at CAEM, led young officers to conclude
that as long as peasant groups in the Andes and Amazonia continued to live in medieval conditions
that included illiteracy, no identity documents, and no access to private property, Peru would not
only be susceptible to radicalized guerrillas (which began to surface in the early 1960s) and social

23
turmoil, but, in the face of inter-state war, the country might not be able to count on conscripts and
a system of national mobilization to defend Peru. As a result, by the 1960s the Army had shifted
its support from traditional, aristocratic political leadership toward building stronger ties with
society, particularly with the most marginalized sectors of Peru. It is important to note that during
this period, and well into the military dictatorship, the Navy maintained its ties to Peru’s traditional
political class, at times pushing back against the Army’s growing anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchy
ideology and policy orientation.

As a projection of the social role of the military institution in accordance with the French
school and the doctrinal principles espoused by CAEM, there arose a potent generation of
intellectual military professionals with a strong reformist vocation. Ultimately, it took control of
the country after the October 1968 coup.. The “Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces”
completely separated the aristocracy and traditional political parties from any influence and
applied a reformist program that sought the transformation of the country’s political and social
structures (e.g. comprehensive agrarian reform) that established a military-civic union known as
the “Binomial People and Armed Forces” program. The objective was to “re-associate the already
organized and to organize the marginalized” via a revolution from above for the purpose of
mobilizing, empowering, and tying popular sectors to the government and nation (Mason).
Through the National System for Social Mobilization (SINAMOS), the military government
sought to “channel and shape participation of the urban working class, peasants and slum dwellers”
(Kruijt and Tello). In the end, this effort at nation-building and social transformation fell short of
expectations, in large part because like all military operations it was directed from above through
a hierarchical structure that did not truly seek or incorporate popular participation. Nonetheless,
the impact of this period and its doctrinal legacy remained among active and serving nationalist
military groups that have continued to advocate a more activist role for the armed forces as critical
to confronting the need for security, defense, and national development.

In the two post-military democratic governments of Fernando Belaunde (1980-1985) and

Alan Garcia (1985-1990), the military’s role in society and government was greatly reduced by
focusing their activities on strictly professional matters. Given the divisive experience of being in
power for twelve years, many in the military were reluctant to be involved in politics. Still,
President Belaunde, having been ousted by a military coup in the 1960s, sought to ingratiate
himself with the military by allowing an increase in weapons expenditures. President Garcia (the

24
first candidate from the anti-military APRA party to become president), on the other hand, was
even more distrustful than his predecessor and made a concerted effort to further weaken the
institution and its ties to society by intervening in the military’s internal organization and limiting
its role to specific military missions.

During the transition to democracy, two terrorist organizations, Sendero Luminoso

(Maoist-inspired) and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Cuba-inspired), emerged with
the objective of destroying the state and installing a revolutionary socialist republic. The political
leadership assigned the military institution explicit responsibility of defeating the insurgency.
Under emergency decree, President Belaunde designated Comandos Politicos-Militares that were
invested with absolute political and military authority (constitutional guarantees were suspended)
in these emergency zones. The military took full control of the government counter-insurgency
efforts but did not receive the resources, political support, or guidance required to effectively
combat the insurgency. Only 20 percent of the military was deployed to counter terrorist groups
in the emergency zones in the Andes with military chiefs in each region “acting on their own in
the absence of a coherent strategic concept” (Kruijt and Tello, 44).

The Army’s request for funding to support social programs in the emergency zones went
unheeded in Lima, in large part because of the deep financial and economic crisis facing the Garcia
administration. The failure of the counter-insurgency strategy resulted almost immediately in a
dramatic increase in human rights violations and the expansion of violent insurgent activities
throughout the country. By the end of the decade, the armed forces had become demoralized and
ostracized by a cross-section of society that viewed the institution as incompetent and abusive.
The 1980s was not a good decade for the military nor for its relations with the political class and
society. Counter-insurgency operations in the interior of the country, however, ratified the view,
particularly among junior officers, that the nation’s security was threatened by a persistent lack of
development and national integration.

The independent candidacy of Alberto Fujimori won the 1990 election but came to office
without much of a political infrastructure to support his government and policies. President
Fujimori quickly sought the support of the armed forces and the intelligence services. He coopted
the military by broadly expanding its power and influence, particularly in the counter-insurgency
effort. The military developed a coherent strategy that focused on “obtaining sympathy and

25
confidence of the population; provided local social development programs; provided local
protection; and re-established law and order locally” (Kruijt and Tello, 47). The strategy was fully
supported by the Fujimori administration and the parliament that also approved a series of anti-
subversive measures to give the military more authority in the emergency zones and activate
popular militias or rondas campesinas under the command of the military.

The armed forces succeeded in nearly decimating the terrorist organizations. Operation
Chavin de Huantar – the April 1997 rescue operation of hostages held by members of the MRTA
in the residence of the Japanese ambassador – became not only a source of pride for the institution
but it enhanced its reputation among the population. This helped restore some of the confidence
lost by the failure of the 1995 frontier incident with Ecuador. By the end of the decade, however,
these strategic-operational successes had come at a great cost to the armed forces. Fujimori and
his chief politico-military aide, Vladimiro Montesinos, utilized mechanisms of control that purged,
politicized, and corrupted the highest echelons of the armed forces. The promotion process was
fully politicized. For example, General Nicolás Hermoza Ríos was made commander of the Army
in 1991 and stayed until nearly the end of the Fujimori’s government; the lack of rotation among
senior officers impacted morale and raised the perception among the public that the military had
become an extension of a government accused of high levels of corruption and human rights abuses
(the most serious accusation involved the abduction and murder of students at a public university).
The military’s counter-insurgency powers were indeed expanded considerably but the quid pro
quo was that it be politically subordinated to presidential patronage and political interference.

By the time President Fujimori submitted his resignation in November 2000, much of
society viewed the armed forces, particularly the Army, as an accomplice of a corrupt government.
In the end, “the subtle promotion of corruption-prone, back-bone lacking officers to the
commanding ranks and the rough removal of institutionalists members of the officer corps,
deprived the armed forces of its social conscience and its standing in society” (Kruijt and Tello,
57). Despite the success of its counter-insurgency efforts, the armed forces’ reputation was
tarnished by its association with the Fujimori government, which led subsequent governments and
a diverse sector of civil society to discredit and weaken the military, accusing it of drug trafficking,
systematic violations of human rights, and other crimes.

26
 For more than a decade after the Fujimori government, a period of political and judicial
persecution ensued under the policy of a “democratic control of the armed forces.” The reassertion
of government control, particularly during the Paniagua, Toledo, and Garcia (second)
administrations, resulted in severe cuts in salary and military equipment, incessant reopening of
trials against military officials for acts of corruption and human rights violations, annulment of the
military code of justice, and the weakening of the military organizational hierarchy. Moreover,
the armed forces resented their absence from any discussion or role of geopolitical security
dynamics, as it was increasingly relegated to domestic “police actions” against criminal
organizations. Taken together, this precipitated a loss of discipline, increased corruption, and the
erosion of command authority. As a result of the degradation of military professionalism and loss
of discipline coupled with strong anti-militarist sentiment among some groups in society, many
active and retired officers have turned against the country’s institutionalized politics by supporting
fundamentalist nationalist groups that promote ideologies that espouse indigenous-populist and
anti-globalization narratives and policies often referred to as Ethnocacerist. In the 2016 elections,
important retired representatives of the military institution were elected to the legislature, the
largest number of any elections. Today, the presence of military officers in political campaigns
continues to increase with the support of broad sectors of society that identify with nationalist,
anti-system ideas.

The armed forces, particularly the Army, are still widely regarded as one of the principal
means of social mobility in a society that continues to suffer from fragmentation, social exclusion,
and a rigid hierarchy. A review of the demographic makeup of the Army’s academy reveals the
large number of cadets of Indian origin. The majority of senior Army officers (2006 and beyond)
are preponderantly from families originating from the interior of the country or migrants to the
capital, including conscripts that were commissioned into the officer corps. Therefore, the Army
is more deeply identified with popular organizations and social groups in the interior of the
country, making them more attuned and sympathetic to the plight of the most marginalized. The
Navy, on the other hand, is less diverse as its demographic composition is more representative of
the upper class who have extensive relations with commercial enterprises and the more powerful
traditional political politicians. One interesting development in the last decade or so is that the sons
of Army officers are entering the Naval academy, while the sons of the Army enlisted are
populating the ranks of junior officers. The class and racial disparities between the services has

27
become quite pronounced, contributing to intensifying the long-standing social, cultural, and
political tensions between the services.

Today, despite the concerted effort on the part of Peruvian governments of the last three
decades to weaken and politicize the institution, the armed forces are viewed relatively well by the
general public. According to a January 2017 poll by El Comercio, the armed forces come in third
place as the institution most favorably viewed by the public. Much of this has to do with the
effectiveness of response to natural disasters, which more than 90% of the public believe is an
important role for the military. In addition to the Army’s consternation, 75% of the public,
according to a July 2015 Datum International/Peru 21 poll, are in favor of having the military in
the streets combatting citizen insecurity. The military remains concerned that these domestic
police and other support activities degrade its professionalism and its capacity to train and prepare
for what it describes as “geopolitical challenges.”

CONCLUSION
The texture of Peruvian military culture is rich with histories of great loss, profound heroism and
persistent resistance to external and internal threats. The origins of Peru’s military culture differs
from other Latin American militaries in its deep connection with pre-Columbian societies and the
impact of the Spanish conquest on the military’s origins—evident today in the military’s dominant
sources of pride and identity. Throughout Peru’s history, the military institution has been at the
forefront of every national effort involving the survival of the nation-state. Whether the tragic war
against Chile in the 19th Century or the brutal counter-insurgency campaign to defeat Sendero
Luminoso and Tupac Amaru in the 20th Century, the armed forces, particularly the Army, feel
greatly aggrieved and underappreciated for all the victories and sacrifices made to ensure that a
deeply fragmented society susceptible to turmoil and violence remain united. Since 2000, many
officers feel frustrated as post-Fujimori democratic governments have sought to weaken and
ostracize the Peruvian armed forces through budget cuts, judicial prosecutions, and a reorientation
of their roles and missions focused on “police actions” and disaster response. The politicization
of the armed forces, for example as in the selection of senior officers, has deepened demoralization
and discontent within the force, resulting in a kind of messianic nationalist backlash increasingly
manifested among retired officers now seeking elected office.
28
 The United States military should take into account these attitudes of anxiety, grievance
and a yearning for respect and a return to professionalism and opportunities for training when
engaging the institution at multiple levels. The differences among different services (or as they are
known in Peru—institutos) is quite pronounced as the Army’s ideological orientation and
demographic make-up is more nationalist and socio-economically diverse, while the Navy remains
more outward-oriented and less diverse in terms of race and class. The U.S. should focus on
deepening ties with the Army and providing greater opportunities to enhance professionalism and
military capabilities to mitigate growing anti-Western sentiment within the ranks. Deepening
engagement and partnership with the Peruvian armed forces that includes an appreciation of the
military’s complex and critical historical role and its current frustration and malaise will help
expand and institutionalize bilateral defense ties and deepen overall U.S.-Peruvian relations.

29
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 Booth, David and Bernardo Sorj (1983), eds. Military Reformism and Social Classes: The
Peruvian Experience, 1968-1980 (New York: St. Martin’s Press).
 Camara de Deputados del Peru; En Camara de Diputados, Habra Permanentemente Una
Curul Con El Nombre del Diputado Miguel Grau Seminario: Resolucion Legislativa No.
23680; October 14 1983; https://docs.peru.justia.com/federales/resoluciones-
legislativas/23680-oct-14-1983.pdf
 Cobas, M Efrain (2003). Las Fuerzas Armadas Peruanas en el Siglo XXI (Lima: Centro de
Estudios Sociologicos Latinoamericanos).
 Fonseca, Brian and Eduardo Gamara (2017), eds. Culture and National Security in the
Americas (Lexington Press).
 Hunter, Wendy (1997), “Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile
and Peru,” Political Science Quarterly vol. 112, no. 3 (Autumn), 453-475.
 Jaskoski, Maiah (2013), Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes (The Johns Hopkins
University Press).
 Kruijt, Dirk and Marial del Pilar Tello (2002), “From Military Reformists to Civilian
Dictatorship: Peruvian Military Politics from the 1960s to the Present,” in Political Armies:
The Military and Nation-Building in the Age of Democracy, eds Kees Koonings and Dirk
Kruijt (London: Zed Books), 35-62.
 Lowenthal, Abraham and Cynthia McClintock (1983), eds. The Peruvian Experiment
Reconsidered (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
 Masterson, Daniel; Militarism and Politics in South America: Peru from Sanchez Cero to
Sendero Luminoso; Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT., 1991.
 Mauceri, Philip (1991), “Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru,” Journal of Inter-
American Studies and World Affairs, vol 33, no. 4 (Winter), 83-110.
 Mauceri, Philip (1997), “Return of the Caudillo: Autocratic Democracy in Peru,” Third
World Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 5 (Winter), 899-911.
 Monaghan, Jay, Chile, Peru, and the California Gold Rush of 1849, University of California
Press, Berkely, CA, 1973. Pp. 95
 Nunn, Frederick (1975), “Effects of European Military Training in Latin America: The
Origins and Nature of Professional Militarism in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru,” Military
Affairs, vol. 39, no. 1 (February), 1-21.
 Obando, Enrique (1996), “Fujimori and the Military: A Marriage of Convenience,” NACLA
Report on the Americas, vol. 30, no 1 (July-August), 31-37.
 Rodriguez Beruff, Jorge (1983). Los Militares y el Poder: Un Ensayo sobre la Doctrina
Militar en el Peru, 1948-1968 (Lima: Mosca Azul Editoriales).
 Willis, Maria Emma, Peru’s Failed Search for Political Stability (1968-2000); pp. 29,
Instituto de Estudios Politicos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI), Universidad Nacional
de Colombia; June 2003. http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-
development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-one/wp39-perus-failed-
search-for-political-stability.pdf

30
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Juan Carlos Liendo, Professor, Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola (USIL)
Juan Carlos Liendo is a professor of International Relations at Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola in Lima,
Peru and serves as a Security Risk Manager Consultant at ATHOQ S.A.C—a Peruvian company that
provides Political and Security Risk analysis to public and private sectors. Liendo is a retired Peruvian
Army Colonel, spending most of his career as an Intelligence Officer. While in the Peruvian Army, Liendo
served as a Professor at the Peruvian Army’s Command and General Staff College. His courses centered
on military intelligence, history, and strategy. He received three academic medals from the Peruvian Army
for high academic performance. From 2007-09, he served as the Officer in Charge of the Peruvian Army’s
Military Intelligence Service and from 2010—2011, he worked in Directorate of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
at U.S. Southern Command of the United States (U.S. Southern Command) as the Liaison Officer
representing the Peruvian Ministry of Defense. Liendo is a graduate of the Peruvian Army’s Command and
General Staff College and the Peruvian Military’s Joint Staff College. He is also a graduate of the Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) Command and General Staff College located
at Fort Benning, Georgia. Liendo holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of
San Martin De Porres (USMP)’s Institute for Government.

Frank O. Mora, Ph.D., Director, Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center
Frank O. Mora is Director of the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) and
Professor of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University (FIU), Miami, FL. Prior
to arriving at FIU, Dr. Mora served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere
from 2009-2013. He has held several teaching positions, including Professor of National Security Strategy
and Latin American Studies at the National War College, National Defense University (2004-2009) and
Associate Professor, and Chair in the Department of International Studies, Rhodes College (2000-2004).
Dr. Mora is the author or editor of four books and numerous publications. Dr. Mora graduated with a B.A.
in International Affairs from The George Washington University in 1986. He received his M.A. in Inter-
American Studies and a Ph.D. in International Affairs from the University of Miami. He also completed
studies at universities in Peru and Costa Rica. He is a recipient of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Medal for Exceptional Public Service, Department of Defense (2012).

Brian Fonseca, Director, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy

Brian Fonseca is Director of the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International
University’s (FIU) Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs and an Adjunct Professor in
the Department of Politics and International Relations. Brian’s technical expertise is in U.S. national
security and foreign policy. He also serves as a Cybersecurity Policy Fellow at the D.C.-based think tank
New America. Brian joined FIU after serving as the Senior Research Manager for Socio-Cultural Analysis
at United States Southern Command’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center South (JIOC-S). His recent
publications include an edited volume with Eduardo A. Gamarra titled Culture and National Security in the
Americas (Lexington Books, 2017) and is co-author of The New US Security Agenda: Trends and
Emerging Threats (Palgrave, 2017). He has authored/co-authored various publications, including book
chapters and essays that cover Peruvian and Haitian strategic cultures and Argentine, Cuban and
Venezuelan military cultures. His 2018 publications focus on Russian engagement in Latin America—
including information operations, diaspora diplomacy and Russian-Venezuelan relations. Brian holds
degrees in International Business and International Relations from Florida International University in
Miami, Florida, and he has attended Sichuan University in Chengdu, China and National Defense
University in Washington D.C. From 1997 to 2004, he served in the United States Marine Corps and
facilitated the training of foreign military forces in both hostile theaters and during peacetime operations.

31
Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy | Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center