ARTICLE IN PRESS

Energy Policy 35 (2007) 1282–1291

www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

The United States and international climate cooperation:

International ‘‘pull’’ versus domestic ‘‘push’’$
Guri Banga, Camilla Bretteville Froyna, Jon Hovia,b,, Fredric C. Menza,c,{
a
Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo, Norway
b
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1097, 0317 Oslo, Norway
c
School of Business, Clarkson University, Potsdam, NY 13699, USA
Available online 15 May 2006

Abstract

The US government is being pressured by both international and domestic influences to re-engage in international climate control.
This paper considers whether the international ‘‘pull’’ and the domestic ‘‘push’’ will be strong enough to accomplish this. First, we
discuss whether changes in the architecture of the current climate regime might induce the United States to re-engage at the international
level. We argue that the United States is unlikely to rejoin any global climate regime that is based on the Kyoto architecture, even if
Kyoto were to be ‘‘reformed’’. Second, we discuss whether domestic political developments might eventually cause the United States to
re-engage. We conclude that US re-engagement is likely to require the emergence of a new climate regime that basically extends US
regulation to other countries. However, the forging of a unified US climate policy is still in the making. Furthermore, a new regime can
gain widespread participation only if the Kyoto countries accept the idea of replacing Kyoto with some alternative architecture, which
seems unlikely in the near future.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Climate regime; Kyoto Protocol; International cooperation; The United States

1. Introduction governments have enacted numerous policy measures

Russia’s ratification in October 2004 enabled the Kyoto
Protocol to enter into force in February 2005. This has
increased public awareness of the Bush administration’s
repudiation of Kyoto in 2001 and efforts to re-engage the
United States in an international climate regime.1 The
Kyoto member-parties recognize that the effect of any
international climate treaty will be limited without
participation by the United States, which is the world’s
largest source of greenhouse gases (GHG), responsible for
25% of global emissions.
There is also growing interest within the United States to
respond to climate change. In particular, state and local
$
Seniority of authorship is shared.
Corresponding author. Department of Political Science, University of
Oslo, P.O. Box 1097, 0317 Oslo, Norway.
E-mail address: jon.hovi@stv.uio.no (J. Hovi).
{
Deceased.
1
Throughout this paper, the term ‘‘climate regime’’ refers to the Kyoto
Protocol or some alternative climate treaty.
to control GHG emissions either directly or indirectly.
For instance, in August 2005, nine northeastern states
announced a preliminary agreement to freeze power
plant emissions (including carbon dioxide) at their current
levels in 2009 and then reduce them by 10% by 2020
(New York Times, 2005b). This agreement would establish
a regional, market-driven emissions trading system among
the nine states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, and Vermont). In addition, three western states—
California, Oregon, and Washington—are exploring a
regional agreement to control GHG emissions. Many
states have recently adopted regulations such as re-
newable portfolio standards that mandate a minimum
percentage of electricity production from renewable energy
sources. And California, which is typically at the forefront
of state efforts to control pollution from mobile and
stationary sources, is considering more stringent fuel
economy standards for motor vehicles to control carbon
emissions.

0301-4215/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2006.03.015
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Bang et al. / Energy Policy 35 (2007) 1282–1291
The federal government is thus being pressured by a
combination of international and domestic influences to
control its GHG emissions. The question we explore in this
paper is whether the combination of international ‘‘pull’’
and domestic ‘‘push’’ is likely to re-engage the United
States in an international climate regime with effective
global participation. We attempt to answer this question
through an analysis in two steps.
First, we discuss whether changes in the architecture of
the current climate regime might encourage the United
States to re-engage. Three possible changes in regime
design are considered: (1) introduction of binding emis-
sions targets for developing countries, (2) replacement of
Kyoto’s absolute limits on GHG emissions with intensity-
based emissions limits, and (3) modification of the
compliance system.
Second, we discuss whether domestic political develop-
ments might eventually cause the United States to re-
engage in a global climate regime. In particular, we
consider whether factors such as changes in public opinion,
access to more advanced technology, pressure from state
and local governments, or concerns about national security
and dependence on foreign energy supplies could pre-
cipitate a change in US climate policy.
We conclude that the United States is unlikely to
rejoin any international climate regime that is based on
the Kyoto architecture, even if Kyoto were to be
‘‘reformed’’. A more realistic scenario for US re-engage-
ment is that a different international regime emerges on the
basis of developments in US climate policy. However, such
a regime could gain widespread participation only if the
Kyoto countries accept the idea of replacing Kyoto with an
alternative architecture, which seems unlikely in the near
future.
2. Modifications of the Kyoto architecture
President Bush’s repudiation of Kyoto in March 2001
was based on two main objections. The first echoed the
Byrd-Hagel resolution from July 1997,2 stating that ‘‘the
Kyoto Protocol y exempts 80% of the world, including
major population centers such as China and India, from
compliance.’’3 The second objection was that the Kyoto
Protocol ‘‘would cause serious harm to the US economy’’.4
As suggested by public choice theory, a country will
participate in an international environmental agreement
like the Kyoto Protocol only when cooperation is
associated with a net gain to that country (Svendsen,
2
The resolution, which was adopted by a 95-0 vote, states that ‘‘the
United States should not be a signatory to any protocoly[which
mandates] commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for
the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol mandates new specific
commitmentsy for Developing Country Parties within the same
compliance period.’’ (US Senate, 1997).
3
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html
4
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html
1283
2003).5 This hypothesis suggests that a country will not
accept binding strictures on GHG emissions if it expects
the costs of implementing such strictures to outweigh the
benefits. The other side of the coin is that such a country
might reconsider participation if the balance of benefits
and costs is reversed.6 It is therefore reasonable to ask
whether changes in the Kyoto architecture to accommo-
date US objections might cause the United States to re-
engage internationally. We consider three such changes:
binding emissions targets for developing countries, sub-
stitution of so-called intensity targets for Kyoto’s absolute
caps, and a modification of the compliance system.
2.1. Emissions targets for developing countries
Whether developing countries should have emissions
reductions targets is an important issue for the United
States in the international climate negotiations. As the
economies of major developing countries like India and
China are growing stronger and are posing increasingly
serious competition to the US economy, binding emissions
targets for these countries would sweeten the pill of
participation for the United States.
There are two major reasons for this. First, participation
by developing countries in emissions trading would
significantly reduce projected compliance costs for the
United States because of ample opportunities to cut
emissions cheaply in those countries (Nordhaus and Boyer,
1999). Second, the United States has argued that it would
make more sense if emissions from growing developing
country economies are also regulated, since their GHG
emissions will soon surpass those of the United States and
other industrialized countries. Potentially expensive US
efforts could seem futile if emissions in other parts of the
world continue to grow. Also, introducing targets for
developing countries would contribute to an even playing
field, an issue that is becoming increasingly relevant as
economies like India and China are posing real competition
to the United States in key markets. The image of unfair
competition from low-cost countries exempted from
emissions targets is part of the US climate policy discourse,
and these concerns are unlikely to become less important in
the near future.
The question then becomes if binding targets for
developing countries are realistic in a future treaty, and
in what form. Developing countries—represented by the
Group of 77 (G77) in the Kyoto negotiations—have
consistently resisted any form of commitment to reduce
GHG emissions (Bodansky, 2001). At the first Conference
of the Parties in Berlin in 1995, the G77 achieved a major
5
At the same time, however, other factors such as rent-seeking behavior
by domestic political interests may have an important influence on policy
formation, thus the government might not maximize the total welfare of
the nation.
6
The high costs that would be imposed by Kyoto were certainly a major
reason for the United States’ withdrawal from Kyoto in 2001. For
discussion, see e.g., Grubb and Yamin (2001) and Svendsen (2003).
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
1284 G. Bang et al. / Energy Policy 35 (2007) 1282–1291
victory when they managed to negotiate agreement from
the industrialized countries on the principle that countries
should have common—but differentiated—responsibilities
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). The G77’s interpretation of ‘‘common but
differentiated responsibilities’’ is very clear: The industria-
lized countries should fulfill their emissions mitigation
commitments before members of G77 will even consider
undertaking binding commitments. This interpretation is
the foundation of G77’s approach to climate policy:
Climate change mitigation is first and foremost the
responsibility of the industrialized countries because the
problem up to now has been primarily caused by them
(Grubb et al., 1999).
Previous studies have argued that the most likely form of
commitments for developing countries in the future is a
diversified regime, where countries are assigned commit-
ments based on their degree of economic development
(Criqui et al., 2003; Höhne et al., 2004). Equity considera-
tions make it unreasonable to demand the same commit-
ment from developed and undeveloped countries (Müller,
2002). Within the framework of a regime with differen-
tiated commitments, a multi-stage approach has received
considerable attention (Berk and den Elzen, 2001; den
Elzen et al., 2003; Höhne et al., 2004). This type of regime
implies that commitments to reduce GHG emissions be
differentiated among countries based on their economic
development. For example, countries in the initial stage of
economic development might have no commitments to
limit their emissions, whereas countries in later stages of
development might be required to reduce their emissions
relative to gross domestic product (GDP) or achieve an
absolute reduction in their emissions. In a multi-stage
regime, least-developed countries might even receive
transfers of funds and technologies to assist them in the
economic development process. The intent is to ensure that
countries in comparable economic, developmental, and
environmental situations bear similar burdens under the
climate regime. Moreover, the system defines that a
country’s levels of responsibility or commitment changes
as its circumstances change (Berk and den Elzen, 2001).7
The European Union has expressed a preference for a
multi-stage approach, saying that ‘‘the ‘staged approach’ is
a promising way to provide for differentiated participation
by developing countries’’ (EC, 2005, p. 45).
Nonetheless, the political feasibility of such a regime is
questionable. First, we have already mentioned that the
United States has serious concerns about maintaining its
global competitiveness, and countries like China, India,
and Mexico are perceived to pose an economic threat
because of their relatively low production costs. It is not
7
Though the discussion is usually framed in terms of different absolute
emissions limits for different countries (as is done under Kyoto), targets
for countries could also be specified in terms of different (allowable)
emissions intensities. The distinction between intensity-based emissions
limits and absolute emissions limits is discussed below.
clear that these concerns can be met in a mutually
satisfactory manner by a multi-stage approach, because
different countries would face different levels of commit-
ment. If the market conditions cannot be evened out in a
new multi-staged regime, it is unlikely that the United
States would be re-engaged simply by the adoption of such
an approach.
Furthermore, the United States seems willing to pursue
climate and energy agreements outside the auspices of the
United Nations that might weaken developing countries’
willingness to participate in future regimes led by the UN.
For example, in 2005, the United States engaged in a
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate with the
biggest coal producers in the world, among them India and
China, to exchange knowledge on cleaner coal technology.
In addition, the United States has established bilateral
science agreements with India, China, and other significant
developing countries to facilitate technology transfer.
These arrangements have a potential of serving as
substitutes for UN-led global climate policies, thus under-
mining the prospects for a future global climate regime.
Second, it is by no means certain that G77 will accept the
kind of differentiation of commitment types among its
member countries that a multi-staged regime demands.
Given the success the group has had by posing a united
front against demands from Annex 1 countries8 in the
UNFCCC to accept emissions reductions targets, it is hard
to imagine that G77 could be convinced to move away
from this negotiation strategy.
In conclusion, binding targets for developing countries
will most likely continue to be an important factor for the
United States in international climate talks. However, it is
far from clear that such targets—in a multi-staged
approach or in the mildest form (intensity targets)—will
be neither acceptable to developing countries nor sufficient
to spur US re-engagement.
2.2. Replacing absolute emissions limits with intensity-based
emissions limits
Kyoto sets limits on countries’ emissions in terms of an
absolute ceiling to be achieved as of a given date, with
different targets for different countries. An alternative to
Kyoto’s absolute emissions limits is the use of emissions-
intensity targets. Like absolute caps or ceilings on
emissions, intensity-based emissions limits can be either
mandatory or voluntary (although they are mandatory in
most environmental regulations). Either can also be fixed
or allowed to vary over a certain time period.
Intensity-based emissions targets link actual emissions to
some output measure. Specifically, emissions intensity (EI)
is the quantity of emissions (E) per unit of output (Y).
Thus, in any given time period, EIt ¼ Et/Yt. In the context
of controlling GHG emissions, emissions intensity is
8
Countries in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol have accepted absolute
emissions limitations targets.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Bang et al. / Energy Policy 35 (2007) 1282–1291
typically defined as the quantity of GHG emissions per unit
of total output (GDP). With a given emissions-intensity
target, the total amount of GHG emissions will vary with
changes in GDP, and the specific target that is chosen will
determine the amount of abatement required and the costs
of meeting the intensity target. Over time, emissions
growth could be slowed, stopped, or reversed depending
on whether growth in GDP falls below, equals, or is greater
than emissions intensity. Therefore, uncertainty about
growth in future GDP translates into uncertainty about
the future quantity of emissions.9
An intensity-based target lowers the risk of high
abatement costs, but increases the risk of climate change
by leaving aggregate emissions uncertain. Thus, intensity
targets multiply uncertainties about the benefits of climate
change abatement activity, possibly making investments in
GHG abatement less attractive (Dudek and Golub, 2003).
In contrast, with absolute emissions limits, uncertainty
about future GDP translates into uncertainty about the
level of future abatement costs to meet the target emissions
cap.10 If GDP growth is greater than expected, the ceiling
on emissions will require more abatement and higher costs
than an intensity target; if GDP growth is lower than
expected, the converse will be true (Ellerman and Wing,
2003).
Intensity-based emissions targets have been widely used
in several different forms to regulate source emissions.
Emissions-intensity targets can regulate emissions either
indirectly by mandating the use of certain pollution control
technologies or directly by limiting the rate of emissions
relative to some measure of output. Examples of manda-
tory intensity-based limits in US environmental regulations
include limitations imposed by states on air pollution
emissions from sources in order to comply with the US
Clean Air Act; requirements that new sources employ the
best available air pollution control technology; and
mandatory emissions standards for new mobile sources.
An example of a voluntary emissions intensity target is
President Bush’s goal of reducing the GHG intensity of the
US economy by roughly 18% from 2002 to 2012.
An emissions-intensity target could be equivalent to an
absolute cap on emissions by ex-post adjustments that
compensate for fluctuations in economic activity, particu-
larly if an emissions permit program were used to achieve
the target. If expectations of future GDP are met, then an
intensity target will achieve the same result as an absolute
cap; if GDP turns out to be higher than anticipated, more
abatement will be required and permits can be issued; if
GDP is lower than anticipated, less abatement is required
and permits can be retired.11
9
For a discussion of intensity targets and uncertainty, see Dudek and
Golub (2003) and Jotzo and Pezzey (2005).
10
If GDP and GHG emissions are positively correlated, increases in
GDP will require emissions cutbacks—and higher abatement costs—to
stay within the cap.
11
Emissions could also be regulated through the use of other policy
instruments, including emissions taxes. The literature (e.g., Baumol and
1285
The Bush administration’s climate policy—announced in
February 2002—has the goal of reducing GHG emissions
intensity by approximately 18% over the 2002–2012 time
period. This voluntary policy was met with considerable
scepticism by the environmental community in the United
States and in many other nations. It is interesting that a
similar goal for the decade of the 1990s would have been
met by the United States, presumably triggered by
technological change, fuel switching, and other market
forces. The main point of the criticism was that the ‘‘new’’
target announced by President Bush essentially represented
business as usual (Menz, 2002). Despite this criticism, there
is growing interest in intensity targets as opposed to an
absolute cap for controlling GHG emissions (e.g., Kolstad,
2005; Pizer, 2005).
There are at least three possible reasons why the United
States might view a switch from absolute to intensity-based
targets in a post-Kyoto agreement positively. First, the
Bush administration has already formulated a GHG-
intensity target for the US economy. Hence, depending
on the exact design of the treaty, an international regime
based on intensity targets could extend US climate policy
to other countries. Second, intensity targets could ease the
economic burden as compared with Kyoto’s absolute caps.
Finally, an international regime based on intensity targets
would—at the very least—make participation by develop-
ing countries more likely. Should major developing
countries such as China and India eventually agree to
binding intensity targets, this would go a long way toward
meeting the requirements of the Byrd-Hagel resolution of
1997.
2.3. Changes in the compliance system
A third possible reform of the climate regime is to
change the compliance system. The Kyoto–Marrakesh
compliance system is innovative in that it provides a
Compliance Committee with an Enforcement Branch
empowered to impose punitive ‘‘consequences’’ on a
country that is found to be in non-compliance with its
commitments. In particular, a country that fails to comply
with its assigned emissions target must make up for the
deficit plus an additional 30% in the next commitment
period. In addition, eligibility for selling emissions credits
will be suspended. If this system works as intended, it can
potentially make non-compliance very costly for a country.
Moreover, the more demanding a country’s assigned
amount, the less likely it is that it will actually reach its
target, other things being equal, making the penalty
effectively more stringent for countries with larger abate-
ment requirements.
(footnote continued)
Oates, 1988; Bohm and Russell, 1985) shows that taxes and auctioned
tradable emissions permits are equivalent under certainty. However, if
emissions permits are grandfathered, income is transferred to the holders
of the permits from the government, making grandfathered emissions
permits preferable to emissions taxes for most permit holders.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
1286 G. Bang et al. / Energy Policy 35 (2007) 1282–1291
Because the United States’ abatement requirements
under Kyoto were relatively demanding (a 7% reduction
in GHG emissions from their 1990 level), it might be
tempting to infer that a tough compliance system would be
viewed as unattractive by Washington. However, when the
United States ratifies an international treaty, it becomes
part of US legislation, meaning that it can be enforced
domestically. Thus, had the United States ratified Kyoto,
then anyone would—at least in principle—have been able
to take the US administration to court if it did not comply
with their Kyoto obligations.
It follows that the design of the compliance system
would have had little or no impact on US compliance and
it should come as no big surprise that during the
negotiations on the compliance system, the US delegation
took it more or less for granted that the United States
would always comply fully with its emissions target
(Werksman, 2005). In the eyes of the United States, the
compliance system was largely a tool to ensure compliance
by other countries. This explains why the United States
favored a tough compliance system despite the fact that it
would likely face significant implementation costs. Indeed,
the compliance system provided by the Marrakesh Accords
was to a large extent of American design.
However, as pointed out by Barrett (2002, 2003), the
current compliance system suffers from a number of
weaknesses. First, it relies heavily on cooperation by the
non-compliant Party, in that the Marrakesh Accords
include no enforcement provisions addressing failure by a
non-compliant country to accept the punishment. Second,
there is nothing that prevents a country from postponing
implementation of the punishment for one or several
periods (or even indefinitely). Third, the compliance system
is not legally binding and can be made so only through an
amendment which would require a three-fourths majority
vote by the Meeting of the Parties. Fourth, the anticipation
of being punished might induce some countries to hold out
for a generous allowance in the upcoming negotiations for
second period emissions targets. Fifth, a non-compliant
country can evade punishment by pulling out of the climate
regime. Finally, use of punitive consequences will produce
negative welfare effects for compliant countries as well, by
causing the price of fossil fuels to go down and the price of
emission permits to go up (Hagem and Westskog, 2005).
For countries that are both exporters of fossil fuels and
buyers of permits (such as Norway), it might actually be
worse that another country (such as Canada, Japan, or
Russia) is punished than to be punished itself (Kallbekken
and Hovi, 2006), thus making the threat of punishment
from these countries less credible.
In light of all these weaknesses, it is far from clear that
Kyoto’s compliance system will ensure compliance by all
(or even most) Annex I parties. If the United States were to
rejoin the climate regime, it might be in its best interest to
have the compliance system further strengthened, given the
emphasis it places on ensuring compliance by other
countries. Conversely, it might be worth asking if
strengthening the compliance system could make a
Kyoto-like accord (at least somewhat) more attractive to
the United States.
By itself, a stronger compliance system should provide
additional assurance to the United States that at least some
other Annex I countries are going to live up to their
commitments. However, it might have some adverse effects
as well. For example, Russia and Japan had serious doubts
about a tough compliance system during the Kyoto
process, and insisted on postponing the issue of whether
to make the compliance system legally binding.12 A further
strengthening of the compliance system might reduce these
countries’ willingness to commit to significant reductions of
emissions in the second commitment period. The same
might be true for a number of other Annex I countries that
are currently seeing significant discrepancies between their
Kyoto targets and actual emissions levels. Thus, while a
strengthening of the compliance system would likely
improve legal compliance, the net effect on overall climate
performance is more uncertain.
Perhaps more important for the United States, a
strengthening of the compliance system might further
discourage developing countries from accepting binding
caps or intensity targets for future commitment periods.
Developing countries were initially highly sceptical to
enforcement based on punitive consequences (Werksman,
1998), and they did not change their position until it
became clear that the enforcement system would apply
only to Annex I countries (Werksman, 2005). However,
should developing countries at some future stage accept
binding emission targets, there will be mounting pressure to
make the compliance system applicable to developing
countries as well. Indeed, it is difficult to see how targets
could be made binding without being subject to enforce-
ment via the compliance system.
In short, while strengthening the compliance system
would likely improve compliance, it might also limit
participation and result in less demanding targets for
participating countries than otherwise. Although the
United States is likely to view improved compliance
positively, these other effects will almost certainly pull in
the opposite direction. Thus, it is far from clear that a
strengthening of the compliance system would have much
bearing on Washington’s lack of motivation to rejoin the
climate regime. In any case, it is extremely unlikely that a
modification of the compliance system alone could be a
decisive factor. At best, it might add marginally to other
sources of motivation.
3. Domestic politics
If the analysis in Section 2 is correct, the prospects are
rather dim for re-engaging the United States through
reform of the current climate regime. We now ask whether
changes in domestic politics might be more important than
12
This issue will be decided at MoP 3 in 2008 at the earliest.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Bang et al. / Energy Policy 35 (2007) 1282–1291
international factors. We consider two potential avenues
for change. The first is that developments on the domestic
political scene lead to greater support for US re-engage-
ment. The second is that initiatives taken by state and local
governments develop into a unified US climate policy. As
we shall see, a unified US climate policy is likely to be a
prerequisite for extension to a global climate regime.
3.1. Potential triggers for change in US climate policy
Several factors might provide a domestic push for
mandatory US climate policies. One factor could be that
public demand for climate policies will increase as a result
of perceived increases in the damages from climate change,
possibly linked to occurrences such as extreme weather
events.13 There is a tendency when extreme weather events
occur, like the heat-wave in 1988, the recent and increas-
ingly serious forest fires in the Southwest resulting from
several consecutive years of draught, or the high frequency
of hurricanes in the Mexican Gulf in 2004 and 2005, that
parts of the news media link this to global warming, and
hence periodically put the issue on the public agenda
(Moser and Dilling, 2004).14 However, this has also often
not been the case in US news coverage of such events
(Ungar, 1999), and a recent survey found that so far, a
majority of Americans do not link the latest hurricanes to
climate change (ABC News/Washington Post, 2005).
Nevertheless, should a link between extreme weather
events and global warming be scientifically documented
and communicated effectively to the public, public opinion
might change, thus triggering a change in climate policy.15
Technological breakthroughs might also have an impact
on public opinion. The federal government has consistently
supported programs to promote research and development
in energy technology. For example, the Bush Administra-
tion has supported development of fuel cell technology,
geological storage of CO2, and new ‘‘emissions-free’’
technologies such as gasified burning of coal in pilot power
plants (The White House, 2002). If there were break-
throughs in clean coal technology or carbon sequestration,
influential coal interests would be less opposed to domestic
climate policy measures.16
A third factor that potentially could increase domestic
demand for GHG control policies is increased costs of
dependence on foreign energy supplies. The security risk
associated with dependency on oil imports from the Middle
13
Interview by Bang with Senator Joseph Lieberman’s staff, Washing-
ton, DC, March 2003.
14
For recent examples of media focus on the link between hurricanes
and global warming, see e.g., New York Times (2005c, d).
15
Interview by Bang with Senator Joseph Lieberman’s staff, Washing-
ton, DC, March 2003.
16
Opportunities to capture streams of CO2 are also promising, chiefly
through processes of converting the fossil fuels to liquid fuels. The most
promising storage concept is geological storage in which the CO2 is placed
in deep sedimentary formations, but due to limited experience with carbon
storage, little is known about the long-term fate of the CO2 (Socolow
et al., 2004).
1287
East is high, particularly in light of the volatile political
situation in key oil-exporting countries (Salameh, 2003).
The economic risks associated with being dependent on
petroleum imports also increase as the oil price rises,
whether due to supply disruptions or increasing demand
from developing countries such as China and India
(Cleveland and Kaufman, 2003). Greater dependency on
petroleum imports could become enough of a burden to
trigger increased demand for national policies to reduce the
use of fossil fuels.
Finally, there is demand for federal action on climate
change from US companies that have been disadvantaged
by the absence of a clear-cut national policy for controlling
GHG emissions.17 Firms can be disadvantaged for several
reasons. First, capital investments have long time horizons,
so current investment decisions may have to be changed at
considerable cost if a mandatory climate policy is
eventually adopted by the federal government. Second,
companies with global operations in countries that have
ratified Kyoto will be required to meet Kyoto-mandated
emissions reductions, but cutbacks made in the United
States will not count because the United States did not
ratify Kyoto. The loss of flexibility in making mandated
GHG emissions cutbacks could be costly. Third, compa-
nies with operations in multiple states within the United
States are currently subject to different regulations
pertaining to GHG emissions, again increasing the cost
of conducting business. It can be expected that as climate
change policies are implemented in other political jurisdic-
tions (whether US states or other countries), companies
with global operations or operations scattered throughout
the United States are likely to intensify pressure on the
national government for a well-defined national climate
policy.
3.2. State and local government initiatives
While only the federal government can negotiate and
ratify international treaties, individual states have been
implementing policies to control GHG emissions (Pew
Center, 2005; Rabe, 2002).18 An example is the preliminary
agreement announced in August 2005 by nine northeastern
states to develop a regional emissions trading program that
would freeze power plant emissions (including sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and carbon dioxide) at their
current levels in 2009 and then reduce them by 10% by
17
For a presentation of corporate climate initiatives, see Pew Center
(2004). For further discussion of how firms are disadvantaged by lack of a
clear and comprehensive national climate policy, see Fri (2005).
18
An interesting question is what motivates sub-federal action on a
global public good like climate change. Like nations, individual states may
act strategically by adopting less stringent GHG abatement measures than
other states, thus inducing a ‘‘race to the bottom’’ (e.g., Barrett, 1994;
Levinson, 1997). However, empirical evidence to support this hypothesis
for US states is inconclusive (see e.g., Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002; List
and Gerking, 2000).
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
1288 G. Bang et al. / Energy Policy 35 (2007) 1282–1291
2020 (New York Times, 2005b). This regional cap-and-
trade program was initiated by the governors from New
York, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, and New Jersey.
California has a variety of existing policies and programs
addressing climate change.19 The state has established
targets for GHG emissions of 11% below current levels
over the next 5 years, 25% by 2020, and 80% by 2050.20
California is also in the process of drafting regulations to
reduce automobile GHG emissions by 30% from 2009 to
2015.21 New York and other eastern states have routinely
adopted previous California rules regulating motor vehicle
emissions and have pledged to also follow California’s lead
on GHG regulation.
In addition, a large number of states have adopted
regulations (including financial incentives and mandatory
rules and regulations) to promote the use of renewable
energy (Menz, 2005). Perhaps the most important require-
ment is the renewable portfolio standard (RPS), which
requires a gradually increasing percentage of an electricity
provider’s overall generating capacity or electricity sales to
come from qualifying renewable energy sources by a
certain date.22 Twenty states had adopted an RPS as of
September 2005, although they differ markedly in percen-
tage requirements, timetables, and what type of renewable
energy sources and technologies are included in the RPS.23
At the local level, 212 mayors from 38 states representing
a total population of 43 million citizens have joined a
bipartisan coalition to curb GHG emissions, an implicit
rejection of the Bush administration’s position on climate
change.24 Their goal is to meet what would have been the
US requirement under the Kyoto Protocol—GHG emis-
sions 7% below 1990 levels by 2012—through actions
including changes in land-use policies, increased use of
renewable energy, public information campaigns, and
efforts to change state and national policies.25 The
coalition is unusual in its open embrace of an international
19
See http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/policies/index.html for an over-
view.
20
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed an executive
order specifying these targets on June 1, 2005.
21
This has been challenged legally by the automobile industry, which
has argued that the proposed regulation is really a change in fuel economy
standards rather than a pollution control regulation because the only
effective way to curtail motor vehicle GHG emissions is to improve fuel
economy. While the US Clean Air Act authorizes California to set its own
motor vehicle emissions standards, it does not have the authority to
regulate fuel economy.
22
In two states (Illinois and Minnesota), the RPS is non-binding.
23
A federal RPS has also been discussed and included in several recent
energy bills under consideration by Congress, but has not yet received
Congressional approval.
24
This is the number of participants as of March 9, 2006. For an
updated list of participants, see http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/mayor/cli-
mate/default.htm#who.
25
The project begun by Seattle mayor Greg Nickels is called the US
Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement. For details, see http://www.
ci.seattle.wa.us/mayor/climate/default.htm. For a discussion, see Betsill
and Bulkeley (2004).
agreement spurned by the federal government and sig-
nificant because the cities are large contributors to the
country’s GHG emissions (New York Times, 2005a).
It is possible that initiatives at the state and local level
confronting the issue of climate change could provide an
avenue for a revised international climate regime for the
United States. A regime that extends action that has
already been undertaken at the state level may achieve
more support at the federal level than newly proposed
federal initiatives. For example, a national RPS has been
included in recent federal energy legislation and may have
received serious consideration because 20 states have
already enacted RPS rules. In addition, the array of
different state and local regulations that are being
developed to cut GHG emissions may encourage develop-
ment of a comprehensive national climate policy and
constitute a ‘‘bottom up’’ development path for federal
climate policies (Rabe, 2002).
4. Assessment and conclusion
The analysis in previous sections suggests that the
United States is unlikely to join any international climate
regime that is based on the Kyoto architecture. This is true
even if this architecture undergoes institutional reform,
such as introducing binding emissions targets for develop-
ing countries, substituting intensity targets for absolute
caps on emissions, or making changes in the enforcement
system. Moreover, this conclusion is likely to remain valid
even if the Democrats should win the 2008 elections. While
many Democrats might like to see a unilaterally deter-
mined emissions target for the United States, few now
favor ratification of Kyoto. A major reason for this is that
the first commitment period is approaching quickly.
Complying with the relatively demanding Kyoto target
would therefore almost certainly require the United States
to buy large amounts of emission permits, which would
entail a sharp increase in the permit price. Hence, rejoining
Kyoto at this late stage would be very costly and would
almost certainly face fierce resistance from US energy
interests (Busby and Ochs, 2004, p. 51).26
A more likely scenario for US re-engagement is that a
different international regime emerges on the basis of
developments within the United States. US practice when it
comes to environmental treaties is generally ‘‘to act first
at home, and then to build on that approach at the
26
It has also been claimed (e.g., Fisher, 2006) that the US repudiation of
the Kyoto Protocol is the product of geographically diffuse and labor-
intensive natural resource interests that have had great success in affecting
political outcomes. According to Fisher (2006), there is a robust
relationship between fossil fuel dependence and opposition to climate
change regulation, and it is the resource dependence of the nation-state
and not partisan politics that mainly determines domestic decision-making
with regards to global warming in the United States. Thus, even if the
presidency or the Congress majority were to shift parties, this alone will
not shift the American position on climate change cooperation. Also, see
Leggett (1999) and Lutzenhiser (2001).
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Bang et al. / Energy Policy 35 (2007) 1282–1291
international level’’ (Purvis, 2004, p. 175). Obviously, an
international regime along these lines would carry the
trademark of American leadership. This is likely to give
the regime a symbolic value which should strengthen the
chances for ratification by the United States and by some
other countries.
Perhaps more important, a regime that extends US
climate policy to other countries would essentially ensure
that foreign competitors face the same regulations as US
companies, thereby contributing to a more level playing
field for US firms. As explained by Putnam (1988; see also
Evans et al., 1993), the set of international treaties that are
acceptable to a particular country depends on the
distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions
among domestic constituents. If domestic constituents
would be better off without regulations of an international
treaty, they will seek to prevent the federal government
from accepting the treaty. Pivotal constituents have a
strong voice in the domestic political process and thus in
determining whether a treaty obtains a sufficient majority
in the ratification process (Putnam, 1988).
This means that the choice of treaty design will have
important consequences for how acceptable a particular
treaty is for domestic constituencies and hence for policy
makers. A treaty that basically extends US policy to other
countries is likely to receive congressional support simply
because it improves the competitive edge of US companies
by imposing more stringent regulations on foreign compa-
nies while largely prolonging existing regulations at home.
Yet, it is difficult to envision that such developments will
materialize in the near future. There are at least three
reasons for this. First, before entering into international
negotiations, the preferences of a country’s constituencies,
including both government and non-government entities,
must be consolidated into a reasonably unified negotiating
position. At the federal level in the United States, this often
requires resolution of conflicting positions taken by
different executive branch departments through inter-
agency bargaining. For wide-ranging issues like climate
change, a dozen or more government agencies, each
representing different interests, may be involved. Each
agency’s priorities will be influenced by special interests
such as trade associations, unions, environmental groups,
and other non-governmental organizations. The internal
tug-of-war among agencies on a significant issue like Kyoto
is very intense. The official delegation can begin negotia-
tions with delegations from other countries only after final
agreement has been reached among these parties on the
national stance (Barrett, 2003; Froyn, 2006). The process
of forging these concerns into a unified US climate policy is
still in the making. As we have seen, there are a number of
initiatives at the state and local levels. However, resistance
towards a mandatory national climate policy is still
substantial, and these initiatives have yet to develop into
a unified policy at the national level. Agreement on a
comprehensive federal climate policy would seem to be a
prerequisite for international extension.
1289
Second, while a treaty that basically extends US policy to
other countries is likely to receive congressional support, it
might not be acceptable to other countries. Such a treaty
will be beneficial for US constituents but not necessarily for
other countries, thereby making the prospects for ratifica-
tion elsewhere dim. Moreover, other countries are still
committed to the Kyoto process. Indeed, some observers
believe that the Kyoto process is irreversible, and that re-
engagement of the United States ‘‘will be achieved not
through tinkering with international architecture but
through the gathering of domestic political forces in the
United States, aided by progress elsewhere towards
implementation’’ (Grubb, 2004, p. 36). So long as such
beliefs remain strong in the Kyoto countries, it is unlikely
that they will view alternative international architectures
positively. If the analysis in this paper is correct, then an
open mind in the Kyoto countries about alternative
international architectures would seem to be a prerequisite
for a global treaty with US participation.
Finally, from the point of view of the United States,
another drawback of the current regime is that it takes
place within a United Nations framework. The US
Congress has a history of being sceptical to the United
Nations in general and to UN environmental action in
particular (Purvis, 2004, p. 175). It was an exception when
the United States was one of the first to sign the
Framework Convention, and it is not difficult to find
examples of environmental treaties (in addition to Kyoto)
that are accepted internationally, but that do not have the
United States as a Party (e.g., the 1992 Convention of
Biological Diversity).
US scepticism towards the United Nations has increased
rather than diminished during George W. Bush’s pre-
sidency. It was perhaps characteristic that the US-initiated
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate was launched outside the United Nations.27 The
Partnership includes the world’s four biggest coal produ-
cers—the United States, China, India, and Australia—in
addition to Japan and South Korea. It aims to keep fossil
fuel power sources, but wants to make them cleaner and
greener. In particular, the Partnership intends to spur
knowledge exchange on technologies that can burn coal
more cleanly using the latest technology to spark economic
growth and cut emissions of greenhouse gases at the same
time. Although the six members of the Partnership account
for more than 40% of global emissions of greenhouse gases
and nearly 50% of the world’s population, it is unlikely
that the Partnership will replace Kyoto as the dominant
international climate regime. According to Robert Zoel-
lick, US deputy secretary of state, the Partnership is
intended as ‘‘a complement, not an alternative, to the UN
27
For details, see Richard Black, ‘‘New climate plan ‘to rival Kyoto’ ’’
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4721449.stm, Richard Black,
‘‘Climate pact: For good or bad?’’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/
nature/4725681.stm, and Stefan Nicola, ‘‘German officials unhappy
with climate pact’’, http://news.monstersandcritics.com/europe/article_
1037716.php.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
1290 G. Bang et al. / Energy Policy 35 (2007) 1282–1291
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto
Treaty’’.28 Similarly, even though some environmentalists
believe that the Partnership might undermine Kyoto, few
see it as a likely replacement.
In conclusion, until more experience has been gathered, a
domestic US policy preference has crystallized, and the
Kyoto process has been abandoned, a global climate
regime with US participation is not likely to emerge. Thus,
re-engagement of the Unites States is unlikely to take place
for a number of years.
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