G.R. No.

L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.,

respondents. Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners. City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this
application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with
in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great
difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular
government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an
independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is — Shall
the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in
the Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove
profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of
the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in
the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city
authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to
Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers
that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had
not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly
given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the
steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary
soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of
October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and
receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the
case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from
the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out
of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this
case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less
clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a
life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in
to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently,
the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who
were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the
application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts,
which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their
liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city
of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court.
The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts
relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted
because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in
the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit
attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good
salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in
answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila
without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed
Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of
Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their
liberty, on December 2, 1918.

Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense.
On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme
Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of
the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It
has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their
own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The
fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him
when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to
the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed
between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered
certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did
not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to
fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control,
because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed
contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the
women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The
court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which
related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the
court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in
Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on
January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the
judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the
respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It
was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court
would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain
detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk
of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented
before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight
others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by
their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the
persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents,
through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their
consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they
desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn
statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all
efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city
fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose
Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and
Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that
the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated
January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas
corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were
isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to
consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence
of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law
chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what
law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons
from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and
we find —

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of
congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing
from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice
of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of
the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and
other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women
convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel
vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is
done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or
regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police
of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in
a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the
same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to
another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer
who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his
residence.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to
be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system,
liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so
elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been
said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative,
either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts
within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere
behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so
insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the
Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then
any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons
would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and
under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the
same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or
exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or
defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng.
stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum
which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law,"
said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only
supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to
observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S.
vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high
tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of
living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery
itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing
the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary
question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws
to be established in the Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the
citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money
damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never
intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in
force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and
twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find
that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and
press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this
action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be
proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in
a case which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an
application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient
answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until
the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In
the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific
objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in
parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that
the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally
suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only
extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives
and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it
impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for
the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code
of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it
the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the
court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no
application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in
court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First
Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule
of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a
hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any
judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec.
79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the
Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is
dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance
their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their
attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown
that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the
women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ
was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant
the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was
prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the
women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of
police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer
examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the
writ of habeas corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when
and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his
right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen
and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend
his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true
principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his
power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he
should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally
parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ
should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could
deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have
the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change
her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any
analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to
whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within
the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the
State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the
Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and
Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally
divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed.
Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom
concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell
was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will
hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent
passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ
on the petition which was laid before us.

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half
have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment;
after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that
"Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its
benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should
now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which
is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is
important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper
remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .

The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the
source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench
derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed
to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it
is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the
former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison
doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to
release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails
to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and
imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted
to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not
important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the
court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not
increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance
may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am aware
of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers
vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex
parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken
out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench
Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce
the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but
he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been
handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was
impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court,
through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ
commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the
Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her
being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be
obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it
could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child
before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that
might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child,
and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful
excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some
anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ
cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ.
The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not
producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B.
D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N.
S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to
the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons,
with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had
purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were
removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and
that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show
that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of
habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was
bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them,
ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the
negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that
Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run
away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of
the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also
Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the
Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not,
whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and
Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2,
1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the
city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial
governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the
telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but
who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted
effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the
day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to
show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf
the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present
writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped
affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of
which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through
ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought
back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this
number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail
until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from
sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate
with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case,
supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the
consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he
must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and
even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the
matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of
excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the
women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic
action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash
between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents
another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were
posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in
such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record
might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is
a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our
sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated
in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still
restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it,
nothing further in this connection remains to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz,
Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to
retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless
when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a
valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of
contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the
body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a
contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re
Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections,
we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has
flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law
of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating
circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a
misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would
seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city
government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike
from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this
undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record
discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered
the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the
constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the
head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate
women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress
the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas
corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require
respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach
to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some
members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since
respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged
his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view.
Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban
to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of
justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his
conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive —
such an amount is P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in
contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100).
The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al
Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against
respondents. So ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope
that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and
to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.

Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.

Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

Section 2.

G.R. No. L-2662             March 26, 1949

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, 
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel
MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major
FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.

Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.

Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for
respondents.

MORAN, C.J.:

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and
19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties
as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and
customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No.
68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission
and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.

In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.

First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of
our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a
signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international."
Hence petitioner argues — "That in view off the fact that this commission has been empanelled by
virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein
petitioner."

Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port
who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a
diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a
violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.

Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not
being a party in interest in the case.

Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation
governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the
29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our
Constitution provides in its section 3, that —

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including
the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been
guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with
the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of
Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said —

War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities
incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An
importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command
not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure
those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the
law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a
military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war.
And in the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical
state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to
the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial
of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal June, 1944.)

Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this

unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines
is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules
and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted
by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two
Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines
was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United
States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all
our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing
those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to
remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):

. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then
Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .

By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a
Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.

Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to
practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said
attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.

In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special
law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that
Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid
and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel
appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the
parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.

Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It
is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her
government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of
those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our
government but by the United State Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of
her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said
trials.

Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the
personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United
State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which
petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our
Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its
government to a military tribunal of our country.

The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the
crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner
in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.

For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda for
Violation of the laws and customs of land warfare.

Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme Court to
practice law were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of the case.

The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of
the Philippines the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional grounds. Petitioner
has also challenged the personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as prosecutors before
the commission.

The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people of the
Philippines as accusers.

We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port. It
appearing that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law
there could not be any question that said person cannot appear as prosecutors in petitioner case as
with such appearance they would be practicing law against the law.

Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question involved
in the challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is challenged on several
constitutional ground. To get a clear idea of the question raised it is necessary to read the whole
context of said order which is reproduced as follows:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68.

ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING RULES

AND REGULATION GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR CRIMINAL.

I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines do hereby establish a National War Crimes Office
charged with the responsibility of accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese accused of
war crimes committed in the Philippines and prescribe the rules and regulation such trial.

The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army of the Philippines and shall function under the direction supervision and
control of the Judge Advocate General. It shall proceed to collect from all available sources
evidence of war crimes committed in the Philippines from the commencement of hostilities by
Japan in December 1941, maintain a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial maintain
a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial of the accused.

The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section General
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall exchange with the said
Office information and evidence of war crimes.

The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war criminals:

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS

(a) General. — person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission to be

convened by or under the authority of the Philippines.

II. JURISDICTION

(a) Over Person. — Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have jurisdiction
over all persons charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the convening authority
at the time of the trial.

(b) Over Offenses. — The military commission established hereunder shall have jurisdiction
over all offenses including but not limited to the following:

(1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation
of international treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

(2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be limited to
murder ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of civilian population of
or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees or person on
the seas or elsewhere; improper treatment of hostage; plunder of public or private property
wanton destruction of cities towns or village; or devastation not justified by military necessity.

(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts committed
against civilian population before or during the war or persecution on political racial or
religion ground in executive of or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or not
in violation of the local laws.

III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS

(a) Appointment. — The members of each military commission shall be appointed by the

President of the Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may be
appointed by the convening authority. Such shall attend all session of the commission, and
in case of illness or other incapacity of any principal member, an alternate shall take the
place of that member. Any vacancy among the members or alternates, occurring after a trial
has begun, may be filled by the convening authority but the substance of all proceeding had
evidence taken in that case shall be made known to the said new member or alternate. This
facts shall be announced by the president of the commission in open court.

(b) Number of Members. — Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3)
members.

(c) Qualifications. — The convening authority shall appoint to the commission persons whom
he determines to be competent to perform the duties involved and not disqualified by
personal interest or prejudice, provided that no person shall be appointed to hear a case in
which he personally investigated or wherein his presence as a witness is required. One
specially qualified member whose ruling is final in so far as concerns the commission on an
objection to the admissibility of evidence offered during the trial.

(d) Voting. — Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the
Commission shall be by majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be by the
affirmative vote of not less than conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of
not less than two-thirds (2\3) of the member present.

(e) Presiding Member. — In the event that the convening authority does not name one of the
member as the presiding member, the senior officer among the member of the Commission
present shall preside.

IV. PROSECUTORS

(a) Appointment. — The convening authority shall designate one or more person to conduct
the prosecution before each commission.

(b) Duties. — The duties of the prosecutor are:

(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a commission.

(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission of all
cases referred for trial.

V. POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSION

(a) Conduct of the Trial. — A Commission shall:

(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the
charges, excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or
interference.

(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate punishment
therefor.

(3) Hold public session when otherwise decided by the commission.

(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be directed by
the convening authority.

(b) Rights of the Accused. — The accused shall be entitled:

(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly worded so
as to apprise the accused of each offense charged.

(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the convening
authority or counsel of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.

(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the trial in
support of his defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who personally appears
before the commission.

(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and any
documentary evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand them.

(c) Witnesses. — The Commission shall have power:

(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to administer oaths or
affirmations to witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.

(2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.

(3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers and duties
set forth in (1) and (2) above.

(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.

(d) Evidence.

(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance in
proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have
probative value in the mind of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply the rules of
evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to achieve expeditious
procedure. In particular, and without limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing general
rules, the following evidence may be admitted:

(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission to have
been signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of
any Government without proof of the signature or of the issuance of the document.

(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the
International Red Cross or a member of any medical service personnel, or by any
investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person whom commission considers as
possessing knowledge of the matters contained in the report.

(c) Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.

(d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to the
commission to contain information relating to the charge.

(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the original is not
immediately available.

(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official
government documents of any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of military
or other agencies of any of the United Nation.

(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary offer of
proof whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of such evidence.

(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor be
considered in mitigation of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of the accused's
superior, or of his Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the commission determines that justice so requires.

(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in evidence
without any showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that such confession or
statement was procured by mean which the commission believe to have been of such a
character that may have caused the accused to make a false statement the commission may
strike out or disregard any such portion thereof as was so procured.

(e) Trial Procedure. — The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially as

follows unless modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:

(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open court.

(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or "Not guilty."

(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member may at this
or any other time require the prosecutor to state what evidence he proposes to submit to the
commission and the commission thereupon may rule upon the admissibility of such
evidence.

(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or presented. At the
close of the case for the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the defense for a
finding of not guilty, consider and rule whether he evidence before the commission may
defer action on any such motion and permit or require the prosecution to reopen its case and
produce any further available evidence.
(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The presiding
member may, at this any other time require the defense to state what evidence it proposes to
submit to the commission where upon the commission may rule upon the admissibility of
such evidence.

(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented.
Thereafter, the prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the
commission may rule as being admissible.

(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission.

(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless
otherwise directed by the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment and
sentence if any. The commission may state the reason on which judgment is based.

( f ) Record of Proceedings. — Each commission shall make a separate record of its

proceeding in the trial of each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared by the
prosecutor under the direction of the commission and submitted to the defense counsel. The
commission shall be responsible for its accuracy. Such record, certified by the presiding
member of the commission or his successor, shall be delivered to the convening authority as
soon as possible after the trial.

(g) Sentence. — The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to death by

hanging or shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or such other punishment
as the commission shall determine to be proper.

(h) Approval of Sentence. — No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried into

effect until approved by the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or life
imprisonment shall be carried into execution until confirmed by the President of the
Philippines. For the purpose of his review the Chief of Staff shall create a Board of Review to
be composed of not more than three officers none of whom shall be on duty with or assigned
to the Judge Advocate General's Office. The Chief of Staff shall have authority to approve,
mitigate remit in whole or in part, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence
imposed, or (without prejudice to the accused) remand the case for rehearing before a new
military commission; but he shall not have authority to increase the severity of the sentence.
Except as herein otherwise provided the judgment and sentence of a commission shall final
and not subject to review by any other tribunal.

VI. RULE-MAKING POWER

Supplementary Rule and Forms. — Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to govern
its procedure, not inconsistent with the provision of this Order, or such rules and forms as
may be prescribed by the convening authority]or by the President of the Philippines.

VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out of the
appropriations for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office in
the accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set forth, and shall be expended in
accordance with the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General as approved by the
President. The buildings, fixtures, installations, messing, and billeting equipment and other
property herefore used by then Legal Section, Manila Branch, of the General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Power, which will be turned over by the United States
Army to the Philippines Government through the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the
Surplus Property Commission are hereby specification reserved for use off the National War
Crimes Office.

Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and forty-seven, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.

MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines
 By the President:

EMILIO ABELLO
Chief of the Executive Office

EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION

Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of
congressional enactment.

The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important question,
is whether or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative power expressly
vested in Congress by the Constitution. .

The Constitution provides:

The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)

While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative
power by agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would
dispel any doubt as to the constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised
exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President of the President of the
Philippines, to the specific provision which allow the president of the Philippines to suspend the
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place any part of the Philippines under martial law, and
to the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.

There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were believers in
the tripartite system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further elaborated by
Montequieu and accepted and practiced by modern democracies, especially the United State of
America, whose Constitution, after which ours has been patterned, has allocated the three power of
government — legislative, executive, judicial — to distinct and separate department of government.

Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government are in
the nature of grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of government may
exercise any power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue express
authority of the Constitution.

Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish
government office is essentially legislative.

The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions.
Whether such a provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers upon
military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war crimes. The power to define and
allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the
Constitution in Congress. .

It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural subject
constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme Court.

It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of the
Philippines cannot exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court,
he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commission.

It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office established
by the said Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative power as the
power to vote appropriations belongs to Congress.

Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the
Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme
Court.
Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued Executive
Order No. 68, respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted, however, to suggest
that the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under the emergency power
granted to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, and
Commonwealth Act No. 671, both of which are transcribed below:

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 600.

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING THE

PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATION TO SAFEGUARD
THE INTEGRITY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TO INSURE THE TRANQUILITY OF
ITS INHABITANTS.

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national
emergency which makes it necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with
extraordinary power in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the
tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all subversive to
the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply, and by providing means
for the speedy evacuation of the civilian population the establishment of an air protective
service and the organization of volunteer guard units, and to adopt such other measures as
he may deem necessary for the interest of the public. To carry out this policy the President is
authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force and effect off law
until the date of adjournment of the next regulation which shall have the force and effect of
law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the First Congress of the
Philippines, unless sooner amended or repealed by the Congress of Philippines. Such rules
and regulation may embrace the following objects: (1) to suppress espionage and other
subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a) when not engaged in any
lawful occupation, to engage in farming or other productive activities or (b) to perform such
services as may bee necessary in the public interest; (3) to take over farm lands in order to
prevent or shortage of crops and hunger and destitution; (4) to take over industrial
establishment in order to insure adequate production, controlling wages and profits therein;
(5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes whenever necessary to prevent the unwarranted
suspension of work in productive enterprises or in the interest of national security; (6) to
regulate the normal hours of work for wage-earning and salaried employees in industrial or
business undertakings of all kinds; (7) to insure an even distribution of labor among the
productive enterprises; (8) to commandership and other means of transportation in order to
maintain, as much as possible, adequate and continued transportation facilities; (9) to
requisition and take over any public service or enterprise for use or operation by the
Government;(10) to regulate rents and the prices of articles or commodities of prime
necessity, both imported and locally produced or manufactured; and (11) to prevent, locally
or generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding injurious speculations, and private control
affecting the supply, distribution and movement of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemical,
building, material, implements, machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and
industry, with power to requisition these commodities subject to the payment of just
compensation. (As amended by Com. Act No. 620.)

SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the President
may designate any officer, without additional compensation, or any department, bureau,
office, or instrumentality of the National Government.

SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision of this
Act or of this Act or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the President under the
authority of section one of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than ten
years or by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by both. If such violation is
committed by a firm or corporation, the manager, managing director, or person charge with
the management of the business of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally responsible
therefor.
 SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days from the
date of the opening of its next regular session whatever action has been taken by him under
the authority herein granted.

SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend such
amounts as may be necessary from the sum appropriated under section five Commonwealth
Act Numbered four hundred and ninety-eight.

SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to
be unconstitutional and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the remainder of this Act.

SEC. 7. This Act shall take upon its approval.

Approved, August 19, 1940.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR

INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULE AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.

Be it enacted the National Assembly of the Philippines;

SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of Europe and
Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.

SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the President
is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulation as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1
hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, department, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to
create new subdivision, branches, departments, offices, agency or instrumentalities of
government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and
appropriation which would lapse or otherwise became inoperative, and to modify or suspend
the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to imposed new taxes
or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the
issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expensive of the proceeds thereof; (g)
to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for
purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or
the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other power as he may deem necessary to
enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.

SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation
promulgated by him under the power herein granted.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations.
promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall
otherwise provide.

Approved December 16, 1941.

The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947.
Said Acts had elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces or, at the
latest, when the surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.

When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken direct
part in their consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said legislative body as
chairman of the Committee on Third Reading population Known as the "Little Senate." We are,
therefore in a position to state that said measures were enacted by the second national Assembly for
the purpose of facing the emergency of impending war and of the Pacific War that finally broke out
with the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. We approved said extraordinary measures, by
which under the exceptional circumstances then prevailing legislative power were delegated to the
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the following provisions of the Constitution:

In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out declared national policy. (Article VI, section
26.)

It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the
emergency created by the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provision of
the Constitution. We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question.; but if there could still
be any the same should be resolved in favor of the presumption that the National Assembly did not
intend to violate the fundamental law.

The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the surrender
of Japan can not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before the surrender of
Japan, or since the middle of 1945, the Congress started to function normally. In the hypothesis that
the contention can prevail, then, since 1945, that is, four years ago, even after the Commonwealth
was already replaced by the Republic of the Philippines with the proclamation of our Independence,
two district, separate and independence legislative organs, — Congress and the President of the
Philippines — would have been and would continue enacting laws, the former to enact laws of every
nature including those of emergency character, and the latter to enact laws, in the form of executive
orders, under the so-called emergency powers. The situation would be pregnant with dangers to
peace and order to the rights and liberties of the people and to Philippines democracy.

Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a
possibility that no one can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he long
recess of Congress (two-thirds of every year ) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of
Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.

Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamental
guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially so, because it permit
the admission of many kinds evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and
by which it is impossible to determine whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable
doubt.

The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation
governing the trial of twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in Chief of
the United State Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among other, General
Yamashita and Homma. What we said in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the decision
promulgated on December 19, 1945, in the Yamashita case, L-129, and in our concurring and
dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23, 1946 in disposing the Homma case, L-244, are
perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence in Executive Order No. 68. Said rules of
evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can expected.

For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we vote to
declare Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in
his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON:
BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor
Amado D. Aquino for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a letter of Instruction   providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is
1

assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary
and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land
Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio,
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of
Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza.   Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation
2

of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power
measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be
considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be
dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on
December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or
serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles
along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching
motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been
recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna
Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I,
Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and
highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users
or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early
warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at
least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or
disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways
or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned
herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged,
disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular
Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of
motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the
acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to
effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such
measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction.   Thereafter, on
3

November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of
Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation
Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the
registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or
make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate
such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'"   There was issued
4

accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10,
1976.   They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month
5
period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a pre-registration
requirement for motor vehicle was concerned.   Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of
6

Instruction   the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of
7

Instruction No. 229 as amended.   It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued
8

Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated
June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of
Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the
following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated
December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from whatever
source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in Section
2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is
equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this
Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the
registration certificate and official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle
concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This
Order shall take effect immediately.   It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L.
9

Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and Communications.  10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already
properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which
could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"   alleged that said Letter
11

of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power,
[sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional
and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society."   He contended that they are
12

"infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring
public;"   are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
13

manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to
buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set."   are
14

unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as
being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a
practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's."   He
15

therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular
void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C.
Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the issues
raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or
mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an answer thereto
within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved
to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise
ordered by this Court. 16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on
November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual
allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating they
lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen
Beetle Car,   they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its
17

subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by
Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative
Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due
process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are
likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal
the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in
the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer."  Unlike petitioner who contented himself with
18

a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of
constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a
valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not
susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the
portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be
the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v.
Williams,   Morfe v. Mutuc,   and Edu v. Ericta.   Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna
19 20 21
Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines
was a signatory and which was duly ratified.   Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in
22

detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of
petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot
survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As
noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former,
however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal
protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing.
The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice
Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers
of government inherent in every sovereignty"   was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v.
23

Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into
force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v.
Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-
Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit
all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly
distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in
the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice
Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice
Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may
be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with
the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a
group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."  24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would
be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that
character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest
decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law,   an enactment conceived
25

with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the
purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads * * *.   As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the
26

effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act,   with petitioner failing in his quest,
27

was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules
and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual
foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila.   The rationale was clearly set forth in an
28

excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion:
"The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact
may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute.  29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of
validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the
necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such
factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning devices 'are
not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per
cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12
of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated
by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void
on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that
not reason enough to require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-
end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise
result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?"   It is quite manifest then that the
30

issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive
Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to
conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known
penchant for exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction
was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is
not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with
1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4)
"well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory
countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a
distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who
sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or
expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty
in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.  31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of
the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended,
or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the
early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned
like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question,
procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical
ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so
long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction
and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be
oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers
of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly
concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a more subtle racket
may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that
unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an
unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the
challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional
defects alleged against it.32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack
of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say
negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished,
if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the language
of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of legislation.' As
expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it
within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As
long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them
regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are
not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is
thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that
only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the
main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to
such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left
to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence
to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly
litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained.  33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is

equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint
himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to
make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the
matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion
by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly,
the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is
"safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel
in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the
principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He
continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects
of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward
the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the
reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the
statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed."  34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which
was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * "   It cannot be disputed then that
35

this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * *
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * *
*."   The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It
36

is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept
of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even
elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical
why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate
occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern
Broadcasting Co.,   namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point
37

is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued."   "Equal protection" is not a talismanic
38

formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will
crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, concur.
G.R. No. L-7995             May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, 
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila,respondents.

Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent
Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions
of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of
fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to
protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it
regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and
national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and
tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien,
so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and
bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes
the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not
citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of
juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United
States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of
the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision
requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature
of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities;
and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance
and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3)
the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced
in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary
succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution
of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power. —

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of
due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and
resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and
fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is
the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it?
What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts?
These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the
case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible
to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not
need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and
survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where
the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field
and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So
it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they
do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and
the equal protection clause.

b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our
Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220,
226.)

c. The, equal protection clause. —

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause. —

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest?
These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is
reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification
has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must
not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of
police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of
circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law
promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public
policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of
individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of
the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or
palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not
supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved.
If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question
that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of
residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its
subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has
always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in
communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they
do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big communities and
specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions
and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents
and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety
of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail
dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and
supplies are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He
ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets
and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice
or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell,
even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer,
therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department
store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.

b. The alien retailer's trait. —

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but
gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of
population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in
the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a
slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and
insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and
forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.

c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In
big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control
over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs,
sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for some national
corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal
foods and products would easily become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is
said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is
merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an
element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually
impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The
others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our
prerogative to pass upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the
year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade,
as witness the following tables:

Assets Gross Sales

Year and No.- Per cent
Per cent
Retailers Establishment Pesos Distributio Pesos
Distribution
Nationality s n
1941
:
Filipino .. 106,671 200,323,13 55.82 174,181,92 51.74
........ 8 4
Chinese 15,356 118,348,69 32.98 148,813,23 44.21
........... 2 9
Others .. 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
..........
1947
:
Filipino .. 111,107 208,658,94 65.05 279,583,33 57.03
........ 6 3
Chinese 13,774 106,156,21 33.56 205,701,13 41.96
........... 8 4
Others .. 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
.........
1948 (Census
: )
Filipino .. 113,631 213,342,26 67.30 467,161,66 60.51
........ 4 7
Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,22 38.20
.......... 7
Others .. 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
........
1949
:
Filipino .. 113,659 213,451,60 60.89 462,532,90 53.47
........ 2 1
Chinese 16,248 125,223,33 35.72 392,414,87 45.36
.......... 6 5
Others .. 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
........
1951
:
Filipino .. 119,352 224,053,62 61.09 466,058,05 53.07
....... 0 2
Chinese 17,429 134,325,30 36.60 404,481,38 46.06
.......... 3 4
Others .. 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87
........

AVERAGE 
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Item Gross
Year and Retailer's 
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 1,633

Chinese ............................................ 7,707 9,691

..

Others .............................................. 24,415 8,281

.

1947:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 2,516

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others .............................................. 24,749 13,919

 1948: (Census)

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,111

Chinese ............................................ 7,707 24,398

.

Others .............................................. 24,916 23,686

1949:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,069

Chinese ............................................ 7,707 24,152

..

Others .............................................. 24,807 20,737

1951:

Filipino ............................................. 1,877 3,905

Chinese ............................................ 7,707 33,207

.

Others .............................................. 24,824 22,033

.

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of
Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their
assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino
retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and
sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to the
known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were
largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is
thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and
supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the
legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted.
The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control
when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of
the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II
Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That
was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting.
Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause
of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general
preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their
control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th
ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the
economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he
says:

But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence
 alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of
recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such
conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the
nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it
(the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only
against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien
interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No.
1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar
resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and
Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance and control; so our
newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We,
therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt
by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien
retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the
fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the
market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute,
that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national
economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and
consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an
article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does
not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its
introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from
their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free
enterprise correspondingly suppressed.

We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of
truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in
the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of
which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of
essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to
unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and
prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the
National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and
tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential
commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168),
authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have
secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply
and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater
or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed
by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated
import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority.
It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic
representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the
above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not
have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what
we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and
commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to
the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national
holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even
become the potential enemy of the State.

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is
not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate
desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from
the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its
existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is,
Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage
is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien
resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we
admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of
regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking
advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the
alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the
country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on
whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may
seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but
the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy
and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and
temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail
distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their
secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their
customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests,
which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the
nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade
measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the
alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no
reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.

b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are
actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals
and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer,
that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is
actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said
that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the
legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the
limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power
admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only
when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier
cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369,
which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be
voided as contrary thereto:

. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United
States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761
of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of
vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or
the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not
violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law
had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these
Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all
presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the
equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In
rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the
case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:

"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts
licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is
distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to
encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other
nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its
coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated,
in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an
American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to
the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra
distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds
upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That
would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes
than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise
of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of

hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared
his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It
may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for
the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this
judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which
prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not
to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was
based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life
as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and
was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115
(1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati
prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational
discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may
not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the
basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and
that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the
legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124
N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30
(Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring
public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying
aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that
aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty,
hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard,
card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State
Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as
barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of
the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the
convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479
(1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible
to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and
because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them,
so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the
outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices
dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources.
In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed
a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was
declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax
was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.

d. Authorities contra explained. —

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold
that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this
decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or
were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public
interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States
Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in
any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the
decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of
distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be
deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for
the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the
operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for
carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring
powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place,
was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no
reason for the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and
that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900),
a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the
discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification
was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens
do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom
they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so
far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land.
These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and
instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the
language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the
distinction between the alien and the national, thus:

. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the
intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is
likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow
countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born,
whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment
and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political
systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed
toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself.
Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be
affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for
making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it
relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .

VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated
by the highest authority in the United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .

xxx     xxx     xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared
by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction
it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not
whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .

xxx     xxx     xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not
be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:

. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
 In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first
questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient
foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive,
and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals,
comfort, and general welfare of the public.

b. Petitioner's argument considered. —

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges
long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful
and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized.
This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e.,
that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him,
by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the
citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the
Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly
abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys
a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's
economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the
facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and
manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is
clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test
of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the
means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation,
which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill,
which later was enacted into law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance
to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no
permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All
aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.

In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who
are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take
away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it
respects existing rights.

The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none

the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The
removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation
that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of
a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. —

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of
due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to
the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme
happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they
expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation
in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of
retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for
Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National
Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the
privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the
nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that
"no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility shall
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a
continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution.
Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions
of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties
towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the
complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public
interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature
was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat
that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the
Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those
already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar
recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied
to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case,
attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs
of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and
purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well
settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general
matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the
Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not
palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as
a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the
provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised
against the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of
aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of
competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that
there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of
these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is
misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail
business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to
be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:

No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the
provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not
and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which
terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term
than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term
regulation.

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page
41 of Answer.)

Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc."
sufficiently expresses the subject of an actprohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and
to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the
subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)

The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and
prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word
regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it
should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a
thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton,
162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title
need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See.
4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general
term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules
for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or
"prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have
been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid.
The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of
statutes, under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all
other provisions found in the body of the Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is
to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or
of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the
nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took
active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the
prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore,
that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be
overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the
Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a
mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p.
39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights
can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and
Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws
against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18,
1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But
the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty
is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed.
257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State
(plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the
law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry
out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of
the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may
not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been
made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been
given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our
legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority
and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the
Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature;
they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-21897            October 22, 1963

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, 
vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of
Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of
Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice
procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein1 for the implementation of said
proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales —
a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are,
likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn — filed the petition herein, averring that, in
making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which
allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 — explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and
corn "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency;" that petitioner has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary
injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency this case
and to prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said
petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining
respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive
Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered making said injunction permanent.

Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and
petitioner's pray for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties
appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the
respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said incident may require some
pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the same
was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to argue orally,
although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.

I. Sufficiency of petitioner's interest.

Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient
interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find no merit in this
pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency". Republic Act No. 3452 declares, in Section 1
thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic
foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the
Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return
for their labor and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a
rice land of substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now
seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with
public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must
necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial
assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said
funds.

II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not exhausted all
administrative remedies available to him before coming to court". We have already held, however,
that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one",3 or where the controverted act is "patently
illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,4 or where the respondent is
a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter,5 unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.7 The case at bar fails under each one of the foregoing
exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable.

III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.

Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the
proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was
authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for military stock pile purposes" in the exercise
of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1;8 that in cases of necessity, the
President "or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for the restoration of good order
and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, "the President ...
is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency without waiting for any
special authority".

Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by
petitioner herein - on which our view need not be expressed — we are unanimously of the opinion -
assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force — that the two Acts are applicable to the
proposed importation in question because the language of said laws is such as to include within the
purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines". Pursuant to Republic Act No.
2207, "it shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government agency to import
rice and corn into any point in the Philippines", although, by way of exception, it adds, that "the
President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities through any
government agency that he may designate", is the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are
present. Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration or any
government agency" from importing rice and corn.

Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting
the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to importations "made by
the Government itself", because the latter is not a "government agency". This theory is devoid of
merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as
respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of our Government, our government
agencies and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to importations by the Government as
such, becomes more apparent when we consider that:

1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the "President of the
Philippines" and, hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;

2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency
from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds "that the importation of rice
and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes", thus indicating
that only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions; and

3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five
(5) years for those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender is
a public official and/or employees", he shall be subject to the additional penalty specified therein. A
public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers or employees of
instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the former are those of the
Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government, as such. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207
are, in this respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional penalty for any
"officer or employee of the Government" who "violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any
provision" of said Act. Hence, the intent to apply the same to transactions made by the very
government is patent.

Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those prescribed in
Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic entities the
preference in the purchase of articles for the Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:

The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other

officers and employees of the municipal and provincial governments and the Government of
the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus, departments, offices,
agencies, branches, and bodies of any description, including government-owned companies,
authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or make disbursements for articles, materials,
and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public works shall give preference to
materials ... produced ... in the Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities,
subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for the
armed forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation
involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the provisions
of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security —
predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created by
the Malaysia problem" - and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would
foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor
that is vital to our ability to meet possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in
anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if
the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.

Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national security and/or national emergency
is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and
Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities as it may deem
proper and necessary to meet any contingencies". Moreover, it ordains that "the buffer stocks held
as a national reserve ... be deposited by the administration throughout the country under the proper
dispersal plans ... and may be released only upon the occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...".
(Emphasis applied.)

Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so
much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation. The
means for the attainment of those objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the
conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated in said Section 2, may be availed of, are
provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5
thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national defense may be secured
by the Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national mobilization",9 which does not exist.
Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be produced in
such manner as Congress may by other laws provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are
concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.

Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work
cited10 shows that Corwin referred to the powers of the President during "war time"11 or when he has
placed the country or a part thereof under "martial law".12 Since neither condition obtains in the case
at bar, said work merely proves that respondents' theory, if accepted, would, in effect, place the
Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the Executive to that effect. What is worse, it
would keep us perpetually under martial law.

It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of the people". Salus
populi est suprema lex, it is said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents, as
officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice shortage.
And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Army — not the civilian population.

But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that appears on
the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will
not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be rejected - we still live under a
rule of law.

And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now — as respondents explicitly admit —
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of producers
and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the people lies precisely in
the compliance with said Acts.

It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the
Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit
importation — but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be complied with.

IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma —

It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2)
contracts for the Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under
international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon the signing thereof by
representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail,
because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved —
under the American jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner
herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which
the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned contracts have already been
consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved
therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sell of the said commodity. We find no
merit in this pretense.

The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been
sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the same as
executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main
function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in
the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He
may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the
one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents
not only admit, but, also insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be
justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and
consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can
be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States.

As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law
or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in — (1) All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is
in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma
does not render this case academic, Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not
from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except under the
conditions Prescribed in said Act. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2) main
features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directly from our local
planters, growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and
leaves such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the
proposed importation — which has not been consummated as yet — is legally feasible.

Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our
Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the
sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied
with without importing the commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still be
legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.

V. The writ of preliminary injunction.

The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents
herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation. However,
the majority favors the negative view, for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and
has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting
said authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for
lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so
ordered.

Bengzon, CJ, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.
   August 15, 1961

IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar without
taking the examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

BARRERA, J.:

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting
to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino
citizen born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken
and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and
qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he
studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he
was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provision of the Treaty of
Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations.

After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the following grounds:

(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State can not be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11
thereof;

The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the validity
of their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their
professions within the territory of the Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).

from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their
professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession
in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the
privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.

(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .

The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice the
liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national
authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the
Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the latter. . . ..

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made
expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired
to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2,9, and 16
thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in
the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish
State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach
upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved
only to the Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad,
JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
Concepcion, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-45892             July 13, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-45893             July 13, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.

Severino P. Izon for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, J.:

In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de
Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National
Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of
twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the
1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The
evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to
appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law,
and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of
the information.

The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in
the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight
years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings,
and does not wish to kill or be killed.

Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of
imprisonment, with the costs.

In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced,
is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides as follows:

SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty
of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. 1ªvvphïl.nët

In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service
adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the
power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and
maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require compulsory military
service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the
life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25
Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled
by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or
political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of
being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also
said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense,
there is no right of property to an office or employment.

The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual existence of
war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies
compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to
make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent
families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying
with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these
family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs to the appellants. So
ordered.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Section 6

G.R. No. L-45459             March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, 
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks
the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues
of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of
the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the
designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:

"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue,
green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2,
6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater
part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by
the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the
instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While,
generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs.
516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to
"functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the
respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the
Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in
the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep
them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts
are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary
for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez
[1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:

No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or

indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage,
or leprosarium.

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country,
it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the
union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the estate will use the
church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of
separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted
in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in
President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of
1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the
Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this
country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the
highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to
recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations
and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into
the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When
the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in
order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony
of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence
of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions
are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art.
VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment
Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister
or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines).
Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art.
XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy
Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results.
The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious
worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:

No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND
MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY
NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF
POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature
assembled and by the authority of the same:

SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates
and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.

SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein
appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government.

SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, February 21, 1933.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and
printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes
the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question
appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated
September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent
alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted.
He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at
P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does
not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of
Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church.
Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it
appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage
of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people"
(Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the
Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as
actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription
as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is
not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received
by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the
opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental
results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately
be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295;
20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate
the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a
constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and
prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by
the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or
favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act
No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there
has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse
postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government."
Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling
the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between
the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is
yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Section 10 and 11- relate to Article XIII

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents
Williams, Fragante and Bayan

City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648;

DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS. — The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer
legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in
said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is
not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules
and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and
the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot
be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some
other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law.

2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. —

Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority
is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty
which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty
is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.

3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of
all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of
the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest
good to the greatest number."

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought
before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams,
as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works;
Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17,
1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m.
to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of
the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works
the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2,
1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing
of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the
Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and
Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the
hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a
consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick
up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of
the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is
authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and
traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better
stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude
of cases, namely: ’The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.
Co. v. Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to
give prominence to the ’necessity’ of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and
regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating
the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the
national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the
Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience
and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon
them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down
by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The
delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law
is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to
determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But
it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in
Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to
depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the
public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to
things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The
Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are
many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the
law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of
the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)

In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June
12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065,
promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation
of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise
to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of
separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the
promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.

The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference
with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the state.

Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted
by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve
congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then,
lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To
this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is
a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline,
so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so
much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in
the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of
Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police
power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the
changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public
health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46
Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the
state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The
development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with
an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for
the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many
questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved
not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

G.R. No. 113412 April 17, 1996

Spouses PONCIANO ALMEDA and EUFEMIA P. ALMEDA, petitioner, 

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:p

On various dates in 1981, the Philippine National Bank granted to herein petitioners, the spouses Ponciano L. Almeda and Eufemia P.
Almeda several loan/credit accommodations totaling P18.0 Million pesos payable in a period of six years at an interest rate of 21% per
annum. To secure the loan, the spouses Almeda executed a Real Estate Mortgage Contract covering a 3,500 square meter parcel of land,
together with the building erected thereon (the Marvin Plaza) located at Pasong Tamo, Makati, Metro Manila. A credit agreement embodying
the terms and conditions of the loan was executed between the parties. Pertinent portions of the said agreement are quoted below:

SPECIAL CONDITIONS

xxx xxx xxx

The loan shall be subject to interest at the rate of twenty one per cent (21%) per
annum, payable semi-annually in arrears, the first interest payment to become due
and payable six (6) months from date of initial release of the loan. The loan shall
likewise be subject to the appropriate service charge and a penalty charge of three
per cent (30%) per annum to be imposed on any amount remaining unpaid or not
rendered when due.

xxx xxx xxx

III. OTHER CONDITIONS

(c) Interest and Charges

(1) The Bank reserves the right to increase the interest rate within the
limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever policy it may
adopt in the future; provided, that the interest rate on this/these
accommodations shall be correspondingly decreased in the event
that the applicable maximum interest rate is reduced by law or by the
Monetary Board. In either case, the adjustment in
the interest rate agreed upon shall take effect on the effectivity date
of the increase or decrease of the maximum interest rate. 1

Between 1981 and 1984, petitioners made several partial payments on the loan totaling.
P7,735,004.66,  a substantial portion of which was applied to accrued interest.  On March 31, 1984,
2 3

respondent bank, over petitioners' protestations, raised the interest rate to 28%, allegedly pursuant
to Section III-c (1) of its credit agreement. Said interest rate thereupon increased from an initial 21%
to a high of 68% between March of 1984 to September, 1986. 4

Petitioner protested the increase in interest rates, to no avail. Before the loan was to mature in
March, 1988, the spouses filed on February 6, 1988 a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
docketed as Civil Case No. 18872. In said petition, which was raffled to Branch 134 presided by
Judge Ignacio Capulong, the spouses sought clarification as to whether or not the PNB could
unilaterally raise interest rates on the loan, pursuant to the credit agreement's escalation clause, and
in relation to Central Bank Circular No. 905. As a preliminary measure, the lower court, on March 3,
1988, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Philippine National Bank from enforcing an
interest rate above the 21% stipulated in the credit agreement. By this time the spouses were
already in default of their loan obligations.

Invoking the Law on Mandatory Foreclosure (Act 3135, as amended and P.D. 385), the PNB
countered by ordering the extrajudicial foreclosure of petitioner's mortgaged properties and
scheduled an auction sale for March 14, 1989. Upon motion by petitioners, however, the lower court,
on April 5, 1989, granted a supplemental writ of preliminary injunction, staying the public auction of
the mortgaged property.

On January 15, 1990, upon the posting of a counterbond by the PNB, the trial court dissolved the
supplemental writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
interim, respondent bank once more set a new date for the foreclosure sale of Marvin Plaza which
was March 12, 1990. Prior to the scheduled date, however, petitioners tendered to respondent bank
the amount of P40,142,518.00, consisting of the principal (P18,000,000.00) and accrued interest
calculated at the originally stipulated rate of 21%. The PNB refused to accept the payment. 5

As a result of PNB's refusal of the tender of payment, petitioners, on March 8, 1990, formally
consigned the amount of P40,142,518.00 with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 90-663.
They prayed therein for a writ of preliminary injunction with a temporary restraining order. The case
was raffled to Branch 147, presided by Judge Teofilo Guadiz. On March 15, 1990, respondent bank
sought the dismissal of the case.

On March 30, 1990 Judge Guadiz in Civil Case No. 90-663 issued an order granting the writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the foreclosure sale of "Marvin Plaza" scheduled on March 12, 1990.
On April 17, 1990 respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order.

On August 16, 1991, Civil Case No. 90-663 we transferred to Branch 66 presided by Judge Eriberto
Rosario who issued an order consolidating said case with Civil Case 18871 presided by Judge
Ignacio Capulong.

For Judge Ignacio's refusal to lift the writ of preliminary injunction issued March 30, 1990,
respondent bank filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with respondent Court of
Appeals, assailing the following orders of the Regional Trial Court:

1. Order dated March 30, 1990 of Judge Guadiz granting the writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the foreclosure sale of Mavin Plaza set on March 12, 1990;

2. Order of Judge Ignacio Capulong dated January 10, 1992 denying respondent
bank's motion to lift the writ of injunction issued by Judge Guadiz as well as its
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-663;

3. Order of Judge Capulong dated July 3, 1992 denying respondent bank's

subsequent motion to lift the writ of preliminary injunction; and

4. Order of Judge Capulong dated October 20, 1992 denying respondent bank's
motion for reconsideration.

On August 27, 1993, respondent court rendered its decision setting aside the assailed orders and
upholding respondent bank's right to foreclose the mortgaged property pursuant to Act 3135, as
amended and P.D. 385. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, dated September 15, 1993 and October 28, 1993, respectively, were denied by
respondent court in its resolution dated January 10, 1994.

Hence the instant petition.

This appeal by certiorari from the respondent court's decision dated August 27, 1993 raises two
principal issues namely: 1) Whether or not respondent bank was authorized to raise its interest rates
from 21% to as high as 68% under the credit agreement; and 2) Whether or not respondent bank is
granted the authority to foreclose the Marvin Plaza under the mandatory foreclosure provisions of
P.D. 385.
In its comment dated April 19, 1994, respondent bank vigorously denied that the increases in the
interest rates were illegal, unilateral, excessive and arbitrary, it argues that the escalated rates of
interest it imposed was based on the agreement of the parties. Respondent bank further contends
that it had a right to foreclose the mortgaged property pursuant to P.D. 385, after petitioners were
unable to pay their loan obligations to the bank based on the increased rates upon maturity in 1984.

The instant petition is impressed with merit.

The binding effect of any agreement between parties to a contract is premised on two settled
principles: (1) that any obligation arising from contract has the force of law between the parties; and
(2) that there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality.  Any contract
6

which appears to be heavily weighed in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to an

unconscionable result is void. Any stipulation regarding the validity or compliance of the contract
which is left solely to the will of one of the parties, is likewise, invalid.

It is plainly obvious, therefore, from the undisputed facts of the case that respondent bank
unilaterally altered the terms of its contract with petitioners by increasing the interest rates on the
loan without the prior assent of the latter. In fact, the manner of agreement is itself explicitly
stipulated by the Civil Code when it provides, in Article 1956 that "No interest shall be due unless it
has been expressly stipulated in writing." What has been "stipulated in writing" from a perusal of
interest rate provision of the credit agreement signed between the parties is that petitioners were
bound merely to pay 21% interest, subject to a possible escalation or de-escalation, when 1) the
circumstances warrant such escalation or de-escalation; 2) within the limits allowed by law; and 3)
upon agreement.

Indeed, the interest rate which appears to have been agreed upon by the parties to the contract in
this case was the 21% rate stipulated in the interest provision. Any doubt about this is in fact readily
resolved by a careful reading of the credit agreement because the same plainly uses the phrase
"interest rate agreed upon," in reference to the original 21% interest rate. The interest provision
states:

(c) interest and Charges

(1) The Bank reserves the right to increase the interest rate within the limits allowed
by law at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future; provided,
that the interest rate on this/these accommodations shall be correspondingly
decreased in the event that the applicable maximum interest rate is reduced by law
or by the Monetary Board. In either case, the adjustment in the interest rate agreed
upon shall take effect on the effectivity date of the increase or decrease of the
maximum interest rate.

In Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,   this Court disauthorized respondent bank from
7

unilaterally raising the interest rate in the borrower's loan from 18% to 32%, 41% and 48% partly
because the aforestated increases violated the principle of mutuality of contracts expressed in Article
1308 of the Civil Code. The Court held:

CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982 (Exh. 11) removed the Usury
Law ceiling on interest rates —

. . . increases in interest rates are not subject to any ceiling

prescribed by the Usury Law.

but it did not authorize the PNB, or any bank for that matter, to unilaterally and
successively increase the agreed interest rates from 18% to 48% within a span of
four (4) months, in violation of P.D. 116 which limits such changes to once every
twelve months.

Besides violating P.D. 116, the unilateral action of the PNB in increasing the interest
rate on the private respondent's loan, violated the mutuality of contracts ordained in
Article 1308 of the Civil Code:

Art. 308. The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance
cannot be left to the will of one of them.
 In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law between the
parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential
equality. A contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent
exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties, is void (Garcia
vs. Rita Legarda, Inc., 21 SCRA 555). Hence, even assuming that the P1.8 million
loan agreement between the PNB and the private respondent gave the PNB a
license (although in fact there was none) to increase the interest rate at will during
the term of the loan, that license would have been null and void for being violative of
the principle of mutuality essential in contracts. It would have invested the loan
agreement with the character of a contract of adhesion, where the parties do not
bargain on equal footing, the weaker party's (the debtor) participation being reduced
to the alternative "to take it or lease it" (Qua vs. Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., 95
Phil. 85). Such a contract is a veritable trap for the weaker party whom the courts of
justice must protect against abuse and imposition.

PNB's successive increases of the interest rate on the private respondent's loan,
over the latter's protest, were arbitrary as they violated an express provision of the
Credit Agreement (Exh. 1) Section 9.01 that its terms "may be amended only by an
instrument in writing signed by the party to be bound as burdened by such
amendment." The increases imposed by PNB also contravene Art. 1956 of the Civil
Code which provides that "no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly
stipulated in writing."

The debtor herein never agreed in writing to pay the interest increases fixed by the
PNB beyond 24%per annum, hence, he is not bound to pay a higher rate than that.

That an increase in the interest rate from 18% to 48% within a period of four (4)
months is excessive, as found by the Court of Appeals, is indisputable.

Clearly, the galloping increases in interest rate imposed by respondent bank on petitioners' loan,
over the latter's vehement protests, were arbitrary.

Moreover, respondent bank's reliance on C.B. Circular No. 905, Series of 1982 did not authorize the
bank, or any lending institution for that matter, to progressively increase interest rates on borrowings
to an extent which would have made it virtually impossible for debtors to comply with their own
obligations. True, escalation clauses in credit agreements are perfectly valid and do not contravene
public policy. Such clauses, however, (as are stipulations in other contracts) are nonetheless still
subject to laws and provisions governing agreements between parties, which agreements — while
they may be the law between the contracting parties — implicitly incorporate provisions of existing
law. Consequently, while the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates was lifted by C.B. Circular 905,
nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting respondent bank carte
blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave its borrowers or lead to
a hemorrhaging of their assets. Borrowing represents a transfusion of capital from lending
institutions to industries and businesses in order to stimulate growth. This would not, obviously, be
the effect of PNB's unilateral and lopsided policy regarding the interest rates of petitioners'
borrowings in the instant case.

Apart from violating the principle of mutuality of contracts, there is authority for disallowing the
interest rates imposed by respondent bank, for the credit agreement specifically requires that the
increase be "within the limits allowed by law". In the case of PNB v. Court of Appeals, cited above,
this Court clearly emphasized that C.B. Circular No. 905 could not be properly invoked to justify the
escalation clauses of such contracts, not being a grant of specific authority.

Furthermore, the escalation clause of the credit agreement requires that the same be made "within
the limits allowed by law," obviously referring specifically to legislative enactments not administrative
circulars. Note that the phrase "limits imposed by law," refers only to the escalation clause. However,
the same agreement allows reduction on the basis of law or the Monetary Board. Had the parties
intended the word "law" to refer to both legislative enactments and administrative circulars and
issuances, the agreement would not have gone as far as making a distinction between "law or the
Monetary Board Circulars" in referring to mutually agreed upon reductions in interest rates. This
distinction was the subject of the Court's disquisition in the case of Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank v. Navarro  where the Court held that:
8
What should be resolved is whether BANCO FILIPINO can increase the interest rate
on the LOAN from 12% to 17% per annum under the Escalation Clause. It is our
considered opinion that it may not.

The Escalation Clause reads as follows:

I/We hereby authorize Banco Filipino to correspondingly increase.

the interest rate stipulated in this contract without advance notice to me/us in the
event.

a law

increasing

the lawful rates of interest that may be charged

on this particular

kind of loan. (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the stipulation between the parties that the interest rate may be
increased "in the event a law should be enacted increasing the lawful rate of interest
that may be charged on this particular kind of loan." The Escalation Clause was
dependent on an increase of rate made by "law" alone.

CIRCULAR No. 494, although it has the effect of law, is not a law. "Although a
circular duly issued is not strictly a statute or a law, it has, however, the force and
effect of law." (Emphasis supplied). "An administrative regulation adopted pursuant
to law has the force and effect of law." "That administrative rules and regulations
have the force of law can no longer be questioned."

The distinction between a law and an administrative regulation is recognized in the

Monetary Board guidelines quoted in the latter to the BORROWER of Ms. Paderes of
September 24, 1976 (supra). According to the guidelines, for a loan's interest to be
subject to the increases provided in CIRCULAR No. 494, there must be an
Escalation Clause allowing the increase "in the event that any law or Central Bank
regulation is promulgated increasing the maximum rate for loans." The guidelines
thus presuppose that a Central Bank regulation is not within the term "any law."

The distinction is again recognized by P.D. No. 1684, promulgated on March 17,
1980, adding section 7-a to the Usury Law, providing that parties to an agreement
pertaining to a loan could stipulate that the rate of interest agreed upon may be
increased in the event that the applicable maximum rate of interest is increased "by
law or by the Monetary Board." To quote:

Sec. 7-a. Parties to an agreement pertaining to a loan or forbearance

of money, goods or credits may stipulate that the rate of interest
agreed upon may be increased in the event that the applicable
maximum rate of interest

is increased by law or by the Monetary Board:

Provided, That such stipulation shall be valid only if there is also a

stipulation in the agreement that the rate of interest agreed upon shall
be reduced in the event that the applicable maximum rate of interest
is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board;

Provided, further, That the adjustment in the rate of interest agreed

upon shall take effect on or after the effectivity of the increase or
decrease in the maximum rate of interest.' (Paragraphing and
emphasis supplied).
 It is now clear that from March 17, 1980, escalation clauses to be valid should
specifically provide: (1) that there can be an increase in interest if increased by law or
by the Monetary Board; and (2) in order for such stipulation to be valid, it must
include a provision for reduction of the stipulated interest "in the event that the
applicable maximum rate of interest is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board."

Petitioners never agreed in writing to pay the increased interest rates demanded by respondent bank
in contravention to the tenor of their credit agreement. That an increase in interest rates from 18% to
as much as 68% is excessive and unconscionable is indisputable. Between 1981 and 1984,
petitioners had paid an amount equivalent to virtually half of the entire principal
(P7,735,004.66) which was applied to interest alone. By the time the spouses tendered the amount
of P40,142,518.00 in settlement of their obligations; respondent bank was demanding
P58,377,487.00 over and above those amounts already previously paid by the spouses.

Escalation clauses are not basically wrong or legally objectionable so long as they are not solely
potestative but based on reasonable and valid grounds.  Here, as clearly demonstrated above, not
9

only the increases of the interest rates on the basis of the escalation clause patently unreasonable
and unconscionable, but also there are no valid and reasonable standards upon which the increases
are anchored.

We go now to respondent bank's claim that the principal issue in the case at bench involves its right
to foreclose petitioners' properties under P.D. 385. We find respondent's pretense untenable.

Presidential Decree No. 385 was issued principally to guarantee that government financial
institutions would not be denied substantial cash inflows necessary to finance the government's
development projects all over the country by large borrowers who resort to litigation to prevent or
delay the government's collection of their debts or loans.   In facilitating collection of debts through
10

its automatic foreclosure provisions, the government is however, not exempted from observing basic
principles of law, and ordinary fairness and decency under the due process clause of the
Constitution. 
11

In the first place, because of the dispute regarding the interest rate increases, an issue which was
never settled on merit in the courts below, the exact amount of petitioner's obligations could not be
determined. Thus, the foreclosure provisions of P.D. 385 could be validly invoked by respondent
only after settlement of the question involving the interest rate on the loan, and only after the
spouses refused to meet their obligations following such determination. In Filipinas Marble
Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,   involving P.D. 385's provisions on mandatory
12

foreclosure, we held that:

We cannot, at this point, conclude that respondent DBP together with the Bancom
people actually misappropriated and misspent the $5 million loan in whole or in part
although the trial court found that there is "persuasive" evidence that such acts were
committed by the respondent. This matter should rightfully be litigated below in the
main action. Pending the outcome of such litigation, P.D. 385 cannot automatically
be applied for if it is really proven that respondent DBP is responsible for the
misappropriation of the loan, even if only in part, then the foreclosure of the
petitioner's properties under the provisions of P.D. 385 to satisfy the whole amount of
the loan would be a gross mistake. It would unduly prejudice the petitioner, its
employees and their families.

Only after trial on the merits of the main case can the true amount of the loan which
was applied wisely or not, for the benefit of the petitioner be determined.
Consequently, the extent of the loan where there was no failure of consideration and
which may be properly satisfied by foreclosure proceedings under P.D. 385 will have
to await the presentation of evidence in a trial on the merits.

In Republic Planters Bank v. Court of Appeals   the Court reiterating the dictum in Filipinas Marble
13

Corporation, held:

The enforcement of P.D. 385 will sweep under the rug' this iceberg of a scandal in
the sugar industry during the Marcos Martial Law years. This we can not allow to
happen. For the benefit of future generations, all the dirty linen in the
PHILSUCUCOM/NASUTRA/RPB closets have to be exposed in public so that the
same may NEVER be repeated.
 It is of paramount national interest, that we allow the trial court to proceed with
dispatch to allow the parties below to present their evidence.

Furthermore, petitioners made a valid consignation of what they, in good faith and in compliance
with the letter of the Credit Agreement, honestly believed to be the real amount of their remaining
obligations with the respondent bank. The latter could not therefore claim that there was no honest-
to-goodness attempt on the part of the spouse to settle their obligations. Respondent's rush to
inequitably invoke the foreclosure provisions of P.D. 385 through its legal machinations in the courts
below, in spite of the unsettled differences in interpretation of the credit agreement was obviously
made in bad faith, to gain the upper hand over petitioners.

In the face of the unequivocal interest rate provisions in the credit agreement and in the law requiring
the parties to agree to changes in the interest rate in writing, we hold that the unilateral and
progressive increases imposed by respondent PNB were null and void. Their effect was to increase
the total obligation on an eighteen million peso loan to an amount way over three times that which
was originally granted to the borrowers. That these increases, occasioned by crafty manipulations in
the interest rates is unconscionable and neutralizes the salutary policies of extending loans to spur
business cannot be disputed.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 27,
1993, as well as the resolution dated February 10, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Makati for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Padilla and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980

ESTRELLA B. ONDOY, petitioner, 
vs.
VIRGILIO IGNACIO, Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL FISHING
ENTERPRISES and/or THE SECRETARY OF LABOR and/or THE COMPENSATION APPEALS
AND REVIEW STAFF, Department of Labor, respondents.

Fernardo R. Moreno for petitioner.

Feliciano Tumale for private respondents.

E. V. Espanol for public respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J.: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of the claim for compensation filed by petitioner,
the mother of one Jose Ondoy, who was drowned while in the employ of private respondent, Virgilio
Ignacio. Whatever be the cause for the failure to do so, it is admitted that there was no
controversion. Such omission, fatal in character, was sought to be minimized by the filing of a motion
to dismissed based on the alleged absence of an employment relationship. What cannot be ignored,
however, is that subsequently, in the hearing of such claim private respondent submitted affidavits
executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that the deceased a fisherman, was in
that ship, undeniably a member of the working force, but after being invited by friends to a drinking
spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. The referee summarily ignored the affidavit of
the chief-mate of respondent employer to the effect "that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose
Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual performance of his work with said fishing enterprises, he
was drowned and died on October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in line of Duty."   The hearing
1

officer or referee dismissed the claim for lack of merit.   A motion for reconsideration was duly filed,
2

but in an order dated August 29, 1977, the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister Blas F. Ople,
denied such motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.   Hence this petition for review.
3

1. In La Mallorca v. Workmen's Compensation Commission,   this Court explicitly held that the failure
4

to controvert "is fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. So we have held in a host of
decisions in compliance with the clear and express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Any Assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility.   The opinion noted thirty decisions starting
5

from Bachrach Motor Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission   to Northwest Orient Airlines,

6

Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission.   Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v. Workmen's
7

Compensation Commission,   such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It was further noted that nine more
8

decisions had been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission   to Abong v. Workmen's Compensation Commission.   By the time respondent
9 10

secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration, a host of decisions that speaks to the
same effect had been promulgated.   It clearly, appears, therefore, that the failure of the referee to
11

grant the award ought to have been remedied and the motion for reconsideration granted.

2. The deceased in this case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes Shipping Corporation
v. Otadoy,  there was not even any direct testimony that the deceased was drowned while in the
12

performance of his duty. All that could be alleged was that he "was lost at sea while in the employ of
petitioner.   Nonetheless, the award for compensation was sustained. Likewise, the ruling in Caltex
13

(Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva   was cited with approval. Thus: "The fact that the employee was found
14
missing while on board the petitioner's vessel MV 'Caltex Mindanao' became known to the captain of
the vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November 1956 when the petitioner transmitted
to the respondent Compensation WCC For in No. 3 stating that the employee was 'Lost at sea and
presumed dead as of October 10, 1956,' and that it was controverting the respondent's claim.   In 15

the present case, there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. That was not controverted.
Under the circumstances, the failure to grant the claim finds no justification in law.

3. It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased
was drowned while "in the actual performance of his work" with the shipping enterprise of private
respondent. Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of
compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of
employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim.
Time and time again this Court has stressed such statutory provision. It suffices to mention cases
decided from January to April of this year.   An appraisal of the counter-affidavits submitted by two
16

employees of private respondent and thereafter beholden to him to the effect that the deceased left
the vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the standard required to negate the force of the
presumption of compensability.

4. Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim warranted because of the
doctrine that the findings of facts of an administrative agency must be accorded due weight and
consideration. An excerpt from the recent case of Uy v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission   finds pertinence: "The claim merits scant consideration for this Court is authorized to
17

inquire into the facts when the conclusions are not supported by substantial or credible evidence.  18

5. This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the interpretation
uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. So it has been
since the first leading case of Francisco v. Conching   decided a year after the 1935 Constitution
19

took effect. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission   is 20

not amiss: "There is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent] and other
employers to be reminded of the high estate accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the
constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor.   Further: "No other judicial attitude
21

may be expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative determination which antedated the
constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and protection to labor. It is easily understandable
why the judiciary frowns on resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in
frustrating such a national policy.   Lastly, to quote from the opinion therein rendered: "To be more
22

specific, the principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic view is
that expressed in Agustin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer, usually
poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has
reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but
protection.' 
23

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and petitioner Estrelita B. Ondoy is awarded the
sum of, P6,000.00 as compensation for the death of her son, Jose Ondoy; P300.00 for burial
expenses; and P600.00 as attorney's fees. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
private respondent Virgilio Ignacio.

Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur. 1äwphï1.ñët

Barredo, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-47088 July 10, 1981

CONSOLACION DUQUE SALONGA, assisted by her husband WENCESLAO

SALONGA, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
JULITA B. FARRALES, and THE SHERIFF OF OLONGAPO CITY, defendants-appellees.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals   from the decision of the Court of
1

First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third Judicial District, Branch III, Olongapo City, in
Civil Case No. 1144-0, entitled "Consolacion Duque Salonga, assisted by her husband, Wenceslao
Salonga, Plaintiff, versus Julita B. Farrales, and The Sheriff of Olongapo City, Defendants," the
dispositive part of which reads:

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff's

complaint, as well as defendants' counterclaim.

Costs against plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.  2

The records disclose that on January 2, 1973; the appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga assisted
by her husband, filed a complaint against Julita B. Farrales and the Sheriff of Olongapo City with the
Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third Judicial District, Branch III, Olongapo
City, seeking the following relief:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff most respectfully prays for the following relief:

a) Ordering defendant Julita Farrales to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land containing
an area of 156 Square Meters, more or less, where the house of strong materials of
plaintiff exists.

b) Ordering the defendants not to disturb nor interfere in the peaceful possession or

occupation of the land by plaintiff, until a final decision is rendered in this case.

c) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay costs; and

d) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law, justice and equity.

Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, December 28, 1972.  3

that on January 9, 1973, plaintiff-appellant, Salonga filed an urgent petition for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction which was duly amended on January 16, 1973,   with the following prayer:
4

WHEREFORE, plaintiff assisted by counsel most respectfully prays the Hon. Court
the following relief:
 a) That a restraining order be issued pending resolution of the instant petition for
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining defendants, particularly the
Sheriff of Olongapo City to restrain from enforcing the Writ of Execution issued in
connection with the judgment rendered in Civil Case 650 for ejectment in the City
Court of Olongapo City;

b) That after due hearing of the present amended petition, a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction conditioned upon a reasonable bond be issued enjoining the defendants,
particularly, the Sheriff of Olongapo City, to restrain from enforcing the Writ of
Execution issued in connection with the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 650 for
ejectment in the City Court of Olongapo City, in order to maintain the status of the
parties; in order to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury to plaintiff; and in order
that whatever judgment may be rendered in this case, may not become moot,
academic, illusory and ineffectual, and

c) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law, justice and equity;

that on January 22, 1973, the court a quo issued an order temporarily restraining the carrying out of
the writ of execution issued pursuant to the judgment rendered by the City Court of Olongapo City in
Civil Case No. 650, a suit for ejectment filed by defendant-appellee Farrales against five defendants,
among whom the herein appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga;   that on January 23, 1973,
5

defendant-appellee Farrales filed a motion to deny the motion for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction for being vague and her answer with counterclaim to the complaint;   that an opposition to
6

the amended petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was also filed by the
defendant-appellee Farrales on January 25, 1973;   that in an order dated January 20, 1973, the
7

court a quo denied the petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and lifted the restraining
order issued on January 22, 1973;   that plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration of the order
8

denying the motion for issuance of a preliminary injunction on January 5, 1973;   which was also
9

denied by the court a quo on February 21, 1973;   that after the trial on the merits of Civil Case No.
10

1144-0, the trial court rendered the judgment under review, dismissing plaintiff's complaint;   that on 11

August 13, 1973, the plaintiff, Consolacion Duque Salonga, appealed from the said decision to the
Court of Appeals;   that on February 25, 1974, the plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga,
12

filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in aid of
appeal;   that in a resolution dated March 6, 1974, the Court of Appeals denied the said motion on
13

the ground that "the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for being intended to restrain the
enforcement of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 650 for Ejectment, which is not involved
in this appeal, and there being no justification for the issuance of the writ ... "   that on January 13,
14

1975, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the appeal has become moot and academic because "the house of the plaintiffs-appellants,
subject matter of this appeal was demolished on October 21, 1974, Annex "A", Sheriff's return and
the land where this house was built was delivered to her and she is now the one in
possession ... ;   that the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to comment on the said motion to dismiss
15

when required by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated January 16, 1975,   the Court of 16

Appeals resolved to submit the motion for decision in a resolution dated April 17, 1975;   and that, 17

likewise, the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to show cause why the case should not be submitted
for decision without the benefit of appellant's reply brief when required to do so in a Court of Appeals
resolution dated May 14, 1975,   the Court of Appeals resolved on July 8, 1975 to submit the case
18

for decision without the benefit of appellants' reply brief. 19

In a resolution promulgated on September 15, 1977 the Court of Appeals certified the case to the
Supreme Court because the issue raised in the appeal is purely legal.  20

The plaintiffs-appellants assign the following errors:

I — THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS'

COMPLAINT AND IN DENYING SAID APPELLANTS' RELIEF TO PURCHASE
FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLEE JULITA FARRALES THE PIECE OF LAND IN
QUESTION.

II — THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING TO THE SUIT

AT BAR, SECTION 6, UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION,
WHICH CONTROLS, DELIMITS AND REGULATES PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
PRIVATE GAINS.  21
The main legal question involved in this appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred in dismissing
the complaint for specific performance or the ground that there exists no legally enforceable
compromise agreement upon which the defendant-appellee Farrales can be compelled to sell the
piece of land in question to plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga.

The facts, as found by the trial court, are:

At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts -

(1) THAT the personal circumstances of the parties as alleged in the complaint are
admitted:

(2) THAT defendant Farrales is the titled owner of a parcel of residential land situated
in Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, Identity of which is not disputed, formerly acquired by her
from one Leoncio Dytuco who, in turn, acquired the same from the Corpuz Family of
which only 361 square meters, more or less, not actually belong to said defendant
after portions thereof had been sold to Marciala Zarsadias, Catalino Pascual and
Rosanna Quiocson*; (*Per Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit B, the vendee is actually
Dionisio Quiocson);

3) THAT even prior to the acquisition by defendant Farrales (if the land aforesaid,
plaintiff was already in possession as lessee of some 156 square meters thereof, on
which she had erected a house, paying rentals thereon first to the original owners
and later to defendant Farrales.

(4) THAT, sometime prior to November, 1968, defendant Farrales filed an ejectment
case for non-payment of rentals against plaintiff and her husband-jointly with other
lessees of other portions of the land, to wit, Jorge Carvajal, Catalino Pascua,
Marciala Zarsadias, and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina Quiocson - Civil Case No.
650 of the Olongapo City Court, Branch 1, in which, on November 20, 1968, and
reiterated on February 4, 1970, a decision was rendered in favor of defendant
Farrales and ordering the therein defendants, including plaintiff herein and her
husband, to vacate the portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in arrears,
attorney's fees and costs;

(5) THAT the decision aforesaid was elevated on appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Civil Case No. 581-0 thereof, and, in a
Decision dated November 11, 1971 of Branch III thereof, the same was affirmed with
modification only as to the amount of rentals arrears to be paid;

(6) THAT the affirmatory decision of the Court of First Instance aforesaid is now final
and executory the records of the case had been remanded to the Court for
execution, and the corresponding writ of execution had been issued partially
satisfied, as far as plaintiff herein is concerned, by the payment of all rentals in
arrears although the removal of said plaintiff's house from the land still remains to be
carried out by defendant Sheriff: and

(7) THAT, even before the rendition of the affirmatory decision of the Court of First
Instance, by common consent amongst themselves defendant sold to Catalino
Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina Quiocson the
areas respectly occupied by them; while, with respect to Jorge Carvajal, in a suit
thereafter filed between him and defendant Farrales, a compromise. agreement was
entered into whereunder said defendant undertook to pay for Carvajal's house on her
land, so that the decision aforesaid is now being executed, as far as ejectment is
concerned, only against plaintiff herein. (Pre-Trial Order, May 17, 1973, pp. 2-5)  22

The lower court explained its conclusion thus:

... From the very allegations of the complaint, it is clearly admitted -

5. That plaintiff herein, in view of the sale to three tenants defendants of the portions
of land occupied by each of said three tenant-defendants, by defendant Julita B.
Farrales, also offered to purchase from said defendant the area of One Hundred
 Fifty-Six (156) Square Meters, more or less, where plaintiff's house of strong
materials exists, but, defendant Julita B. Farrales, despite the fact that said plaintiff's
order to purchase was just, fair and reasonable persistently refused such offer, and
instead insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment case, before the
City Court of Olongapo City, thru the herein defendant Sheriff of Olongapo City, with
the sole and only purpose of causing damage and prejudice to the plaintiff
(Complaint, p. 3 emphasis supplied).

Being a judicial admission, the foregoing binds plaintiff who cannot subsequently
take a position contradictory thereto or inconsistent therewith (Section 2, Rule 129,
Rules of Court; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248 Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil.,
227). Hence, if plaintiff's offer to purchase was, as aforesaid persistently refused by
defendant, it is obvious that no meeting of the and, took place and, accordingly, no
contract, either to sell or of sale, was ever perfected between them. This is only
firmed up even more by plaintiff's admission on the witness stand that no agreement
respecting the purchase and sale of the disputed land was finalized because, while
defendant Farrales purportedly wanted payment in cash, plaintiff did not have any
money for that purpose and neither were negotiations ever had respecting any
possible arrangement for payment in installments. On all fours to the case at bar,
therefore, is Velasco et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. L-31018, June 29,
1973, which was a case for specific performance to compel the therein respondent
Magdalena Estate, Inc. to sell a parcel of land to petitioner per an alleged contract of
sale in which the Supreme Court ruled:

It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that the

petitioners themselves admit that they and the respondent still had to
meet and agree on how and when the down payment and the
installment payments were to be paid. Such being the situation, it
cannot, therefore be said that a definite and firm sales agreement
between the parties had been perfected over the lot in question.
Indeed this Court has already ruled before that a definite agreement
on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential
element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of
sale.

Since contracts are enforceable only from the moment of perfection (Articles 1315
and 1475, Civil Code of the Philippines; Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Co. vs.
Central Bank, G.R. No. L-21881, March 1, 1968; Atkins, Kroll and Co., Inc. vs. B.
Cua Hian Teck G.R. No. L-9817, January 31, 1958), and there is here no perfected
contract at all, it goes without saying that plaintiff has absolutely nothing to enforce
against defendant Farrales, and the fact that defendant Farrales previously sold
portions of the land to other lessees similarly situated as plaintiff herein, does not
change the situation because, as to said other lessees, a perfected contract existed -
which is not the case with plaintiff. 
23

The trial court found as a fact that no compromise agreement to sell the land in question was ever
perfected between the defendant-appellee as vendor and the plaintiffs-appellants as vendees.  24

It is elementary that consent is an essential element for the existence of a contract, and where it is
wanting, the contract is non-existent. The essence of consent is the conformity of the parties on the
terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. The contract to sell is a
bilateral contract. Where there is merely an offer by one party, without the acceptance of the other,
there is no consent. 25

It appears in this case that the offeree, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales not only did not
accept, but rejected the offer of plaintiffs-appellants, spouses Salonga to buy the land in question.
There being no consent there is. therefore, no contract to sell to speak of.

Likewise, it must be borne in mind that the alleged compromise agreement to sell the land in
question is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds,   and thus, renders all the more ineffective
26

the action for specific performance in the court a quo.

Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the plaintiffs-appellants, as lessees, are neither
builders in good faith nor in bad faith. Their rights are governed not by Article 448 but by Art. 1678 of
the New Civil Code.   As lessees, they may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to
27

reimburse them, but the lessee does not have the right to buy the land.  28

Anent the appellants' claim that since the appellee sold to the three (3) other defendants in the
ejectment suit the three (3) portions of the land in question occupied by them, it follows that "she
must also sell that portion of the land where appellants' residential house was found to appellants" is
unmeritorious. The trial court correctly ruled that the fact that defendant-appellee sold portions of the
land to the other lessees similarly situated as plaintiffs-appellants Salonga does not change the
situation because as to said other lessees, a perfected contract of sale existed which, as previously
shown was not the case with the plaintiff. 29

As to the contention that Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at bar, it
must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property
owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice
consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to
another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on
obligations and contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the Court to grant.

There is no showing that the trial court committed any reversible error.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Sections 12- relate to Article XI & Sec. 13- relate to XI Sec. 19

Meyer

v.

Nebraska

U.S.Jun 4, 1923

262 U.S. 390 (1923)

262 U.S. 39043 S. Ct. 625

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the District Court for Hamilton County, Nebraska,
under an information which charged that on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion Parochial
School, he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond
Parpart, a child of ten years, who had not attained and successfully passed the eighth grade.
The information is based upon "An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the State
of Nebraska," approved April 9, 1919, which follows [Laws 1919, c. 249.]:

"Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational,

parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any language other than the
English language.

"Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages only after a
pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate
of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which the child resides.

"Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars
($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be confined in the county jail for any
period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.

"Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its passage and
approval."

The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment of conviction. 107 Neb. 657. It declared
the offense charged and established was "the direct and intentional teaching of the German
language as a distinct subject to a child who had not passed the eighth grade," in the parochial
school maintained by Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, a collection of Biblical stories
being used therefor. And it held that the statute forbidding this did not conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment, but was a valid exercise of the police power. The following excerpts
from the opinion sufficiently indicate the reasons advanced to support the conclusion.

"The salutary purpose of the statute is clear. The legislature had seen the baneful effects of
permitting foreigners, who had taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their
children in the language of their native land. The result of that condition was found to be
inimical to our own safety. To allow the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be
taught from early childhood the language of the country of their parents was to rear them with
that language as their mother tongue. It was to educate them so that they must always think in
that language, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and sentiments
foreign to the best interests of this country. The statute, therefore, was intended not only to
require that the education of all children be conducted in the English language, but that, until
they had grown into that language and until it had become a part of them, they should not in
the schools be taught any other language. The obvious purpose of this statute was that the
English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state.
The enactment of such a statute comes reasonably within the police power of the state. Pohl v.
State, 132 N.E. (Ohio) 20; State v. Bartels, 181 N.W. (Ia.) 508.

"It is suggested that the law is an unwarranted restriction, in that it applies to all citizens of the
state and arbitrarily interferes with the rights of citizens who are not of foreign ancestry, and
prevents them, without reason, from having their children taught foreign languages in school.
That argument is not well taken, for it assumes that every citizen finds himself restrained by the
statute. The hours which a child is able to devote to study in the confinement of school are
limited. It must have ample time for exercise or play. Its daily capacity for learning is
comparatively small. A selection of subjects for its education, therefore, from among the many
that might be taught, is obviously necessary. The legislature no doubt had in mind the practical
operation of the law. The law affects few citizens, except those of foreign lineage. Other
citizens, in their selection of studies, except perhaps in rare instances, have never deemed it of
importance to teach their children foreign languages before such children have reached the
eighth grade. In the legislative mind, the salutary effect of the statute no doubt outweighed the
restriction upon the citizens generally, which, it appears, was a restriction of no real
consequence."

The problem for our determination is whether the statute as construed and applied
unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth
Amendment. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."

While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the
term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746; Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578; Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78; Chicago, Burlington Quincy R.R.
Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590;
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312; Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474. The
established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect. Determination by the
legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is
subject to supervision by the courts. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137.

The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters
of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 declares,
"Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Corresponding to
the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to
their station in life; and nearly all the States, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by
compulsory laws.

Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified
persons who devote themselves thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and
honorable, essential, indeed, to the public welfare. Mere knowledge of the German language
cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as
helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation.
His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we
think, are within the liberty of the Amendment.

The challenged statute forbids the teaching in school of any subject except in English; also the
teaching of any other language until the pupil has attained and successfully passed the eighth
grade, which is not usually accomplished before the age of twelve. The Supreme Court of the
State has held that "the so-called ancient or dead languages" are not "within the spirit or the
purpose of the act." Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 187 N.W. 927.
Latin, Greek, Hebrew are not proscribed; but German, French, Spanish, Italian and every other
alien speech are within the ban. Evidently the legislature has attempted materially to interfere
with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own.

It is said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by inhibiting training
and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English
and acquire American ideals; and "that the English language should be and become the mother
tongue of all children reared in this State." It is also affirmed that the foreign born population is
very large, that certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move
in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are thereby hindered from becoming citizens of
the most useful type and the public safety is imperiled.

That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights
which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak
other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly
advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced
by methods which conflict with the Constitution — a desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means.

For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which should provide: "That
the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no
parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent. . . . The proper officers will take the
offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain
nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when
they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they
should be." In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled
the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to
official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great
genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly different
from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature
could impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to both letter
and spirit of the Constitution.

The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals prepared
readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate
experiences during the late war and aversion toward every characteristic of truculent
adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the means adopted, we think,
exceed the limitations upon the power of the State and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in
error. The interference is plain enough and no adequate reason therefor in time of peace and
domestic tranquility has been shown.

The power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable
regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is
not questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the State's power to prescribe a curriculum for
institutions which it supports. Those matters are not within the present controversy. Our
concern is with the prohibition approved by the Supreme Court. Adams v. Tanner, supra, p.
594, pointed out that mere abuse incident to an occupation ordinarily useful is not enough to
justify its abolition, although regulation may be entirely proper. No emergency has arisen which
renders knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to
justify its inhibition with the consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed. We are
constrained to conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation
to any end within the competency of the State.

As the statute undertakes to interfere only with teaching which involves a modern language,
leaving complete freedom as to other matters, there seems no adequate foundation for the
suggestion that the purpose was to protect the child's health by limiting his mental activities. It
is well known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at an
early age, and experience shows that this is not injurious to the health, morals or
understanding of the ordinary child.

The judgment of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

[See the separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, concurred in by MR. JUSTICE
SUTHERLAND, in the next case, at p. 412, infra.]
 U.S. Supreme Court

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

Nos. 583, 584

Argued March 16, 17, 1925

Decided June 1, 1925

268 U.S. 510

Syllabus

1. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments of this Union rest excludes
any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. P. 268 U. S. 535.

2. The Oregon Compulsory Education Act (Oreg. Ls., § 5259) which, with certain exemptions,
requires every parent, guardian or other person having control of a child between the ages of
eight and sixteen years to send him to the public school in the district where he resides, for the
period during which the school is held for the current year, is an unreasonable interference with
the liberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of the children, and in that
respect violates the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 268 U. S. 534.

3. In a proper sense, it is true that corporations cannot claim for themselves the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and, in general, no person in any business has such
an interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power by the
State upon the ground that he will be deprived of patronage;

4. But where corporations owning and conducting schools are threatened with destruction of
their business and property through the improper and unconstitutional compulsion exercised by
this statute upon parents and guardians, their interest is direct and immediate, and entitles
them to protection by injunction. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33. P. 268 U. S. 535.

5. The Act, being intended to have general application, cannot be construed in its application to
such corporations as an exercise of power to amend their charters. Berea College v. Kentucky,
211 U. S. 45. P. 268 U. S. 535.

6. Where the injury threatened by an unconstitutional statute is present and real before the
statute is to be effective, and will

Page 268 U. S. 511

become irreparable if relief be postponed to that time, a suit to restrain future enforcement of
the statute is not premature. P. 268 U. S. 536.
296 Fed. 928, affirmed.

APPEALS from decrees of the District Court granting preliminary injunctions restraining the
Governor, and other officials, of the State of Oregon from threatening or attempting to enforce
an amendment to the school law -- an initiative measure adopted by the people November 7,
1922, to become effective in 1926 -- requiring parents and others having control of young
children to send them to the primary schools of the State. The plaintiffs were two Oregon
corporations owning and conducting schools.

Page 268 U. S. 529

G.R. No. 88582             March 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old who
had been allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal
canal.

Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an information which
reads:

That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd
design and with intent to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario
Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into the vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which
caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)

When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the
merits.

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses, namely: (1)
Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr.
Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado
Salonga, (10) Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14)
Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo
Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino
Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.

On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the testimonies of (1)
Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr.
Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.

The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
are summarized in its decision, as follows:

The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich
Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his
hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children
were chosen from among a bunch of street children. Once inside the hotel room accused
told them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take a bath and when
he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot
was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting dressed up young
boys, and put them on top of the table. Other things which were taken out and placed on top
of a table were three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One
of these objects the accused played with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of
which is grayish blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was inserted inside
the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be anti-nasal
inhalers against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there as a
tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and
so did the accused. He then started masturbating the young boy and also guided the boy's
hand for him to be masturbated, so that they masturbated each other, while they were both
naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the
bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join him in bed. The
accused then placed himself between the two (2) children and accused started fingering
Rosario.

At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention. He
looked, and he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was
trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not
anymore bother to look because he was sleepy and fell asleep.

The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an "American, paid
Ramirez alias"Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the
American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American inserted
something in her vagina. But they could not do anything anymore, because the American
had already left, and neither did they report the matter to the police. Sometime the following
day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already removed from her
body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that
same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan
asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another
occasion wherein Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain
and when he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks. Thereafter,
he did not see Rosario anymore because he already went home to his aunt's house who
resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed his studies in the primary grades.

On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot
21, near the gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy
Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she
was unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her
condition and brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious
condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was the one who gave the
personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw,
Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was
already in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the
name of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony
of the Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that it was
Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives more
credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as against Gaspar Alcantara who became a
defense witness, for the reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed
that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had already known Rosario Baluyot for more than one
(1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to the house of his twin brother, Melchor
Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the name of "Nora"
who was then in the custody of his brother. His brother Melchor was also living with their
mother, brother and sister-in-law and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per
Gaspar's testimony even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's house when she
visits Nora. So the Court can safely assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he had
regularly seen Rosario at his brother's house, he must have already did come to know the
name of Rosario Baluyot including her age. In his testimony in Court he stated that he even
asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks money which can safely be concluded that he knows
her very well. It is against normal behavior especially to a Filipino who have a characteristic
of curiosity not to have found out the real name of the girl he claims to know only as
"Tomboy".

While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital, nobody was
attending to her since she is a street child, having stowed away from the custody of her
grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations, in
the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in
the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who was all alone with no relatives attending to
her and after finding out that she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After a short
interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only because she clamped up about her
residence and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the medicine she
needed during her confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able
to get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her
for the first time. For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because
their program assisted only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.

Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel movement
and vomiting, which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as
symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on
May 17, 1987, after she was examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that
there was a foreign object lodged in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged
with blood and foul smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the doctors who attended
to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by
means of a forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said object was deeply
embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged,
tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent
when she was scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an
operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the
hospital director was not obtained. The surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete
himself. He testified that Rosario had to be operated even in that condition in order to save
her life. Her condition was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the
anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at about 7:00
p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He
found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so with the peritonieum, and
the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney
appeared to have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were
traced to have been caused through infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in
the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object which was already agreed upon by both
parties that it is a portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while
under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to
the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the
authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete
considered the operation successful and the patient was alive when he left her under Dr.
Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he
left. The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her
death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20, 1987.

Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was
indicated therein that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to
septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario
Baluyot.

The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent small jar
and labelled "Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign object, and it
was given to her under proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who
helped financially Rosario's case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis.
Palencia was in custody of the said object until Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the
object.

After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask
him in locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs.
Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in
state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the
burial expenses for Rosario.

Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita
and asked her if she was interested in filing a case against the person who caused the death
of her granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City)
Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his
messenger came to her house and told her that the accused was willing to settle the case,
but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she
knows that the accused is liable to pay damages anyway. After that, she received a letter
from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who
wanted to have the case settled once and for all giving the reason that she can no longer
bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew obliged
and told her that she will be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the
records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant
barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law
office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter
left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are willing to settle for
P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she received the money with the
understanding that there was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a
statement, and she was asked to change the age of her granddaughter Rosario. With the
document prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went to the Fiscal's office to have it
subscribed, and was subscribed before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00
was not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo City and he could
no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even
apologized to her.

As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A", was directed by
Col. Daos, Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department to make a follow up of
the case of Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign
object inside Rosario's vagina was said to be an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base
also conducted its investigation headed by criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga.
Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a street
child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street children and from some of them
they learned that Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an American at the MGM
Hotel when the foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they
asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot
sometime before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought them to the said hotel.
Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his
statement. Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of
the description supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing was photocopied and copies
thereof were distributed to the local police and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval
Base. Some American servicemen who had resemblance to the composite drawing were
photographed and these were shown to Jessie Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside
from the physical description by Ramirez about the appearance of the suspect, he also
described him as having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.

After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila, and
thinking that the so-called American may be European or Australian national, the team
composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres
Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They
first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter checked in a hotel. That was on
September 23, 1987. On the first night, they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-
sexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result was negative. Then on September 25, at
about 11:00 p.m., while they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar
Street, a male caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the
two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr. Salonga that
this foreigner had a similarity with the American suspect, so the two minors were instructed
to follow the foreigner and to strike a conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie
Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner was the one who brought him and Rosario
Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had no beard
while the one previously described by Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that
maybe he have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a bar, and after several
minutes he came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up, as a signal to
confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him to the Manila
Western Police District. It could be mentioned at this stage that in this operation they were
accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western Police District. The foreigner was hand
cuffed and was told that he was a suspect for Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they first
went to the pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which
contained his personal belongings, and from there they brought him to the Western Police
Department. At the said police headquarters, they were allowed a permissive search by the
 foreigner of his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3
inhalers, money in the form of dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and
about P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that the suspect's
name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of Hitter,
Salonga and his team already left the headquarters and went to their hotel, because at this
time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with fear after he identified the accused.

The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo
City Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him at the City Fiscal of
Olongapo. At the preliminary investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel. The
private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla because it was she who had custody of Rosario
Baluyot after her mother Anita Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio
Baluyot had left them under her custody. When this case was filed, the father's whereabouts
was unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this case before the Court was already
in progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about the
death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was already
gone.

The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime of Rape with
Homicide because the suspect was described as an American while Ritter is an Austrian.
Also advanced by the defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot
was at the time of the commission of the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having
been born on December 26, 1973 as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that
Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on December 26, 1973
as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish Church who issued the Baptismal
Certificate, having custody and possession of the book of baptism for the year 1975, but
admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered therein.
Likewise, the defense's stand is that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a
vibrator is not a weapon of death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual pleasure,
and that the death of Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the
surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo,
pp. 109-116)

On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the prosecution
has established the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape
with Homicide as defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00)
Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's fees to
the private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)

The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly committed by the
court:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING
THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT
IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING
THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE
ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE
WITH HOMICIDE.

III
 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO AND NOT REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT
UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.

Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of
the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most
painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy
judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v. Villapaña,
161 SCRA 73 [1988]).

The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a young girl who
died after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside her
vagina.

As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—whether or not
Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged incident happened on
October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there was statutory rape,
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a
woman under 12 years of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or
unconscious state do not have to be present.

The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually abused by the
accused and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.

In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's grandmother
and father who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975. These oral declarations were
admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a
birth certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable
fact in the life of a member of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which
permits the admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as proof of
birth (Decision, p. 54).

The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth date because
her brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the only one who
failed to attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8,
Jan. 13, 1988).

The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on December 22,
1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1) year old
when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).

The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record and the death
certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City General
Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the
hospital's clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario
Baluyot also testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court
accepted this as adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in
this case declared that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario
Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been less than 12 yeas
old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)

The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father supported by other
independent evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate and the testimonies of Fe Israel
and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the defense without any
probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)

The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the application of
evidentiary rules.

The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised
Rules of Court).

For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
 (1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;

(2) That pedigree is in issue;

(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or
marriage;

(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante litem motam;
and

(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must as a general rule be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the declarations
fall within the purview of the rule.

The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age were admitted by
the trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify in court.
Their declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the controversy arose. The
other witnesses who testified on Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The
testimonies of Rosario's relatives must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of
what happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family history.

At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.

The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to the ruling laid
down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of the
mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the
age because the child was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not
hearsay, but came from one who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.

It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness.
(People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])

With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral was never
established, which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be remembered. The father's
declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had
direct knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than one (1) year
old at the time she was baptized.

The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was there any basis
shown to establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical records were based on Gaspar
Alcantara's incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara
came to know her only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the
circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely
based on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.

All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years
old at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of birth, much less
offset a documentary record showing a different date.

The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as being
hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses establishing
Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of
belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).

By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St.
James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and
stated that he is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled
"Liber Baptisnorum", a latin term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said
Registry Book, there appears the name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25,
1974, and born on December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents
of Subic, Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.

In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:

x x x           x x x          x x x

In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of
baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations
made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31,
1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court
held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in
conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it
does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate
that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in
order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by
law. (At pp. 84-85)

In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the
course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The
baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical
duties and recorded in a book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28
Phil. 105 [1914] Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot
was baptized on December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio
Baluyot, the victim's father testified that he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different
from the one presented in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a
date different from that brought by the official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that
Rosario was baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that Rosario could
have been born on December 22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before she was born.
Exhibit "22" may be proof only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in
1975. With the father's assertion that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was
baptized, we are then more inclined to agree that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the
Baptismal Registry.

In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:

x x x           x x x          x x x

. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly not been
registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, was sufficient to
establish that Mary Rose was below twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos.
(At. p. 426)

Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document
as to Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she was born on December 26, 1973.
Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.

Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies on
the prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident in
a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.

Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged
sexual violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that
there was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in
accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence
shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to
have consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie
Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances
coupled with the testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that
Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life
may have forced her to submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come under
the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.

In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was committed. But was
Ritter guilty of homicide?

The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a consequence of the
insertion of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the appellant.

We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which
led to her death?

The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the
circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.

Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario's vagina.
Neither could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object which the
appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.

In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he answered that:

x x x           x x x          x x x

T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng
kano sa kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?

S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at napansin ko na may
inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang
nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.

T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng Amerikano?

S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang dalawang pulgada.
Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang
hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.

T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin
mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman
sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag?

S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad noong takip ng
bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay asul
gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)

Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not
deny having possessed at that time. He was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January
6, 1988)

Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with color blue
(Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency
of the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements made especially when he
answered on additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was
the same object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the
prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the
sexual vibrator because he did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.

What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the foreigner
inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted such statement as part of the res
gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the trial court focused the
test of admissibility on the lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the average 13
years old, the insertion of a mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a young
girl is undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence to show
that the statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the
event was so startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)

Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's vagina, the
evidence is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.

Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her vagina. We
quote:

Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even categorically
admitted to you that she was already able to remove the object allegedly inserted inside her
vagina, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x

ATTY. CARAAN:

Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by Rosario Baluyot later
on when you met her when you asked her and when she told you that she was already able
to remove that object from her vagina?

A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already removed?" And
she answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the same night, she again complained of pain of
her stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was
uttering defamatory words against me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp.
72-73)

This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children were invited by
the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so
we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by
the appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and
discomfort until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People
vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).

At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for
the defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate of the State
University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of
the Institute of Criminology University. He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in
1963, and also a graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of
Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation in 1940 until 1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the
Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at
the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical
Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with the
NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less than 13 conferences abroad. He is the author of the
textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and
medical background, his testimony is too authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of
his testimony:

Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2" which object was
described as a part of a sexual vibrator battery operated. Now, given this kind of object,
would you kindly tell us what would be the probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is
inserted into her vagina?

A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human being and as
such be considered a foreign object. As a foreign object, the tendency of the body may be:
No. 1—expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The tendency of the body is to react to that foreign
body. One of the reactions that maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body
 is concerned is to cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further
injury to the body.

Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest symptoms and
changes in the area where the foreign body is located.

In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but may be felt all
over the body, we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering the fact that this foreign body as
shown to me is already not complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for the body
to react. If there is mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort
of power from within and that power must be a dry cell battery. [The] composition of the
battery are, manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and any substance that will cause
current flow. All of these substances are irritants including areas of the container and as
such, the primary reaction of the body is to cause irritation on the tissues, thereby
inflammatory changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes
would be a supervening infection in a way that the whole generative organ of the woman will
suffer from diseased process causing her the systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the
area, and other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19,1988)

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction such as an
infection would set in, how many days after the insertion of this object in the vagina of a 12
year old girl?

A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in a way that
vaginal secretion has more chance to get in, well, liberation of this irritant chemicals would
be enhanced and therefore in a shorter period of time, there being this vaginal reaction.

Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the insertion?

A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in the vaginal canal
usually developed within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator was inserted in
her vagina on October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on May 19, 1987 the following
year, so it took more than 7 months before this was extracted, would you say that it will take
that long before any adverse infection could set in inside the vagina?

A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p.
18)The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame
wherein infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis,
the time frame is not more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame."

A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is
facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be based on probabilities
which are less likely than those probabilities which favor him.

It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged inside the
body. An examination of the object gave the following results:

(1) Color: Blue

Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.

(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per certification
dated 01 June 1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical Systems
Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic (see attached certification).
 (3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator depicted in the
catalog because no actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical characteristics were
shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")

The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the open end
portion which revealed the following:

Result of Examination

Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows the

following inscription:

MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")

From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis'
testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in much earlier. Considering also that the object
was inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ which is
lined with a very thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more
susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)

The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case. We see no
reason why his opinions qualified by training and experience should not be controlling and binding
upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166
SCRA 469 [1988]).

Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot on May
17, 1986 as a referral patient from the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to the
patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)

The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled
that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal conversation with the doctors and would
be sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario
Baluyot to the hospital, she was unconscious and writhing in pain.

It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that time because
there were several instances testified to by different witnesses that she was still able to talk prior to
her operation:

(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic
Renewal Movement testified that as a member of this group she visits indigent children in the
hospital every Saturday and after office hours on working days.

On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to Rosario
Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N.,
pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)

(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who worked at Pope
John 23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she
encountered Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who happened to
be Rosario Baluyot seated on the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there, she
was told that it was too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively.
(T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7, 1988)

(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified that she was
conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he brought
her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)

From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still answer
questions asked of her although she was complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical
attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was
too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis,
which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual
vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian
tubes and into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.

The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC

He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:

The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the
prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no
defense at all. The defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of
the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the
bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the
positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the accused
until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(At. p. 592)

The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of witnesses and
preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and convincing proof
that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused her
death seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were mere
circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though, that the
following requisites should concur:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)

For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In
this case the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the
liability of the appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)

We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death
exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most street children encounter as they sell their bodies in
order to survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in their lives, they
experience life in its most heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle
disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults should
never be made to carry.

It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of Government to
dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street
children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer
could be brought to justice so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the
formulation and implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal
justice system are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for
normal, decent, and law-abiding people.

The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that
the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.

By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:

1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt about her being
less than 12 years old when the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for the
prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet born on the date she was baptized.

2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory, the
prosecution has to prove force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to convict for
rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the evidence shows a willingness to submit to the
sexual act for monetary considerations.

3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was
Jessie Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning after the
insertion, he was only told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who
informed him that she was able to remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the
night of that second encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach.
She was even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only hearsay, it is also
contradictory.

4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active
properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only after seven months inside a
young girl's vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled
that the incident happened in December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The
evidence, however shows that the appellant was not here in the Philippines that December.
As per the Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived
in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October 12, 1986. He never returned until
September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident could have happened only in
October, but then it would have been highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay inside
the vagina for seven (7) months with the kind of serious complications it creates.

5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement testified that
she told him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.

Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the hotel incident.
Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months
prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility
that she could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a
vibrator or vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.

Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime
renders the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection with
the requisite moral certainty. (SeePeople v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).

The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a
foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the
appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction
upon mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be
taken against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)

Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken
into account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates
the mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason.
The strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
 . . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt
in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof
"to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes
every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the
proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be
true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral
certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those
who are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S.
v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .

In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt
of the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.

This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie
Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are
convinced that he comes to this country not to look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge
in legitimate pleasures but in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.

With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant who picked
him and Rosario from among the children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the hotel he was
shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each other, such actuations clearly
show that the appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young
children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:

Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive desire to
have sexual intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various ages participate in
sexual activities, like fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual
intercourse. Usually committed by a homosexual between a man and a boy the latter being a
passive partner.

Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself.
Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth. (Article
II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]).
Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our country.

In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not
only to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The state
has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. (Art. XV, Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused
Filipino children, enticing them with money. The appellant should be expelled from the country.

Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a
person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated
in Urbano v. IAC, supra.

. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for
damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of
the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal
of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has
given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was
 due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for the reparation of damages suffered by
the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that
article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper
that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt?
Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice—a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable
persons injured or wronged.

Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house.  Circumstances
1âwphi1

forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs
who have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous
death as reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of
rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only
the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight
case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier
stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's
vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on
probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.

The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public
policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children,
enticing them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults
in the Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed
by the appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the
case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.

And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children
from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from
the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never
intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among
the forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college
dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the
appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue
to advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We
have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however,
express the Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against
them. Something must be done about it.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH
STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay
the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot.
The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation
proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry
into the country.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ, concur.

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER

FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners, 
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, respondents.

Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three
(3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time.

The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

But first the facts.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of
Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many
times.  When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the
1

aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his
admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom
and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the
NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition.   In an amended petition
2

filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series
of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged
order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had
been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police
power. 3

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,   this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended
4

to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence
and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous
Court:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized
to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in
the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation
of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the
student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the
process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission
to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development,
are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests
in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or
inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold
that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation
and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those
who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her
reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-
called "three-flunk rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue
raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least
initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter
cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is
validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary
to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.5

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated
by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link,
the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human
resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the
individual a sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants
to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he
may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By
the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to
take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution
also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. 6

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared.
Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded
medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found
wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law
does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other
students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession
directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require
more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable
profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not
be similarly treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and
others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection
requires is equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of
the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The
private respondent has failed the NMAT five times.   While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the
7

least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who
does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The
only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling
that has not excited his interest.

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed
and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education
for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even
be a brilliant future.

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the
farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as
merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by
directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not
because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13,
1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-47841 March 21, 1978

FRANCISCO VIRTOUSO, JR., petitioner, 

vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, and CHIEF OF POLICE OF MARIVELES,
BATAAN, respondents.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus on February
23, 1978, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the pre examination which led to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal
Judge of Mariveles, Bataan,   failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to
1

ascertain whether there was a probable cause.   He likewise alleged that aside from the
2

constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail
imposed was clearly excessive.   It was in the amount of Pl6,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set
3

being imputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it
on Wednesday, March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified
the issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no impropriety in the way the
preliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, he asserted that
while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of
Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P 8,000.00.

Petitioner's counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally argued the matter on March 15, 1978. In
the course of intensive questioning by the members of this Court, especially Justices Barredo,
Aquino and Santos, it was ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year old minor entitled to the
protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code.   a youthful offender being defined
4

therein as "one who is over nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense."   As such, he could be provisionally released on recognizance in the
5

discretion of a court.   According accordingly, after the hearing, the Court issued the following
6

resolution: "Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court
Resolved pursuant to section 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old
minor, to [order] the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso,
Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to
act in such capacity, without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner
being taken in accordance with law."   This Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and
7

force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional
mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their
physical, intellectual, and social well-being." 
8

Thus was the petition resolved, without the need of passing upon the issue of whether or not the
procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause was constitutionally
deficient. Nonetheless, it must ever be kept in mind by occupants of the bench that they should
always be on the alert lest by sloth or indifference or due to the economic or social standing of the
alleged offended party, as was intimated in this petition, the rights of an accused, instead of being
honored, are disregarded. There is much more importance attached to the immunities of an
individual during a period of martial law, which in itself is a creature of the Constitution as a mode of
coping with grave emergency situations. It is equally pertinent to state that there should be fealty to
the constitutional ban against excessive bail being required. There is relevance to this excerpt
from De la Camara v. Enage:  9

Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is
understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes
meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee
were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that that United States
Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the
latest American decision, 'the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the
accused's presence at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under the Eighth
Amendment.  10

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of this Court of
March 15, 1978 as set forth above.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

Oposa V. Factoran 224 SCRA 792

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the
new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.  The complaint  was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit  and alleges that the plaintiffs
1 2 3

"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same
was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."  Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
4

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands
has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the
habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest
cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;
the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water
table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of
the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which
may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and
the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and
varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine
resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i)
the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide
gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares
of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago
and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached
as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25

hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if
not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and
to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit
from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural

resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office.
On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all
logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a
country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna
and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to

the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent
part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of

dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's

is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section
14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural
law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
 22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.  6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's
abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.  In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause
7

of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf
of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating
the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy),
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard
the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They
likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They
see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right"
which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a
political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but
to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done
by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of
time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take
issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that
the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers 
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.  Such rhythm
9

and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.  Needless to say, every generation
10

has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits
of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the
petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help
but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the
noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a
specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action
in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of
by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers"
of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law.  11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section
of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment

necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance.  12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development
and utilization of the country's natural resources,   then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated
13

on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192,   Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
14

Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation
and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3
thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure
the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
 country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true
value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,  specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
15

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other
hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the
fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall
be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a)
to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being."   As its goal, it speaks of
16

the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations."   The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
17

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

 . . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.  18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action,   the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency
19

of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the
truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,
may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint?   In Militante
20

vs. Edrosolano,   this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
21

circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF
ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the
basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely
put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,   Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
22

distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice
to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and
the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning
of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson,   Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
23

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
 The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law.  24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted
with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other
form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not
a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry,   this Court held:
25

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and

is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:  26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the
latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.  27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very
nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler 
Corp.   this Court stated:
28

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be

absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation
aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words,
the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York,   quoted in Philippine American
29

Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,  to wit:

30

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.  31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as
of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it
as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders
or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ.,
concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and
course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing
and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal
interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness
of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the 
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and
the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure
to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is
no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest,
with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive
violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular
claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil,
chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil
rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open
land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide
range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and
sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear
to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in
the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section
16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present
form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are
too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right
— a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be
a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will
those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence
of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public
respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and
course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing
and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal
interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness
of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the 
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and
the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure
to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is
no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest,
with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive
violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular
claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil,
chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil
rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open
land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide
range of topics:
 (a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and
sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear
to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in
the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section
16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present
form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are
too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right
— a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be
a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
 whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will
those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence
of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public
respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127,
Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.

Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City
Government of Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:

The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons
of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of
the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are
dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R. 
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10,
1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.
Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP 
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision  promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the
1

LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of
garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint  with the Laguna Lake Development Authority
2

seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of
pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling
of the leachate that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao
3

River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No.
1586,  and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850,  as amended by
4 5

Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6

After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams
could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of
bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or
handling.  On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order  ordering the City
7 8

Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to
completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at
the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However,
sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992
among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and
LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to
settle the problem.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA
issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist
Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the
Camarin area.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its
Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala
Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the
LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ
of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of
Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety
and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction.9

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.
Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at
the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127,
the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.

The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others,
that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as
the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not
by the Regional Trial Court. 10

On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-
15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the
trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated separately.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order  denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ
11

of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf,
from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan
from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further
orders of the court.

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer
for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the
aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan
City denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution  on November 10, 1992 referring the case to
12

the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the
petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of
Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1)
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to
cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and
desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at
the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12,
1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an
urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would
arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite
(i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow
the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution  directing the Court of Appeals to
13

immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary
restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if
it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted into a
preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the
Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals.  After the oral argument, a conference
14

was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the
General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the
Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to appear.

It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and
review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a
rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10
days from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall
be deemed submitted for resolution. Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the
15

dispute.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease
and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake
Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its
enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order 
No. 927, series of 1983.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in
the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the
temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage in
said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the proposal
attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby
adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining
and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal
proceedings.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now
docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of
Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper
interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order  enjoining the City Mayor of
16

Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at
the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until
otherwise ordered by the Court.

It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the
environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open
dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains
highly open to question.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit,
pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code,   to determine the effects
17

of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is
maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and
desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City
Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not
incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of 
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any
person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of
Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and
adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential
Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and
authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of
Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following
powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this
Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice
and hearing.

(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying
the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.

(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be
reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of
sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and
industrial disposal system or parts thereof.

(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify
any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or
abate pollution.

(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or

instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above
provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial
functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the
corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order
which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold
question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws,
have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in
Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering
the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in
the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if
not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive
Order No. 192, series of 1987,  has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National
18

Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the
powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of
pollution cases. 19

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be
recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the
declared national policy  of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the
20

Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan  with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
21

management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant
and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to
protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the
aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within
the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs
and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.  22

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's
jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the
open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken
without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850,
as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the
said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was
recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as
intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of 
re-opening the open dumpsite.

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue:
Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act
No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the
dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop
dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in
violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws,  cannot be
23

stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution."  (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever
24

order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and
desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the
express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984
which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it
would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the
order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority
need not necessarily be express.  While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
25

only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express
powers.  In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and
26

quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to
a "toothless" paper agency.

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,  the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-
27

parte cease and desist order when there isprima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the
allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take
several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as
the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is
a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives
vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or
the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-
impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote
the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."  It is to be borne in
28

mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma
Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.  29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under
its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been
complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal
steps would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the
means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute
"necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue
implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous
clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the
private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal
with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of
such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet
such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the
LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its
surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related
issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special
knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from
dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Section 19

G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner, 

vs.
THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, LUZON
PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL CORPORATION, respondents.

Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Luzon Petrochemical Corporation.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant
from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha
and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

This petition is a sequel to the petition in G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v.
the Board of Investments", September 7, 1989, where this Court issued a decision, ordering the BOI
as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Board of Investments is

ordered: (1) to publish the amended application for registration of the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its records on
the original and amended applications for registration, as a petrochemical
manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding,
however, privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other business and
financial information, and (3) to set for hearing the petitioner's opposition to the
amended application in order that he may present at such hearing all the evidence in
his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC
petrochemical plant to Batangas province. The hearing shall not exceed a period of
ten (10) days from the date fixed by the BOI, notice of which should be served by
personal service to the petitioner through counsel, at least three (3) days in advance.
The hearings may be held from day to day for a period of ten (10) days without
 postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibition or preliminary injunction is
denied. No costs. (Rollo, pages 450-451)

However, acting on the petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration asking that we rule on the
import of P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 and on the foreign investor's claim of right of final choice of plant
site, in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, this
Court on October 24, 1989, made the observation that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not provide that
the Limay site should be the only petrochemical zone in the country, nor prohibit the establishment
of a petrochemical plant elsewhere in the country, that the establishment of a petrochemical plant in
Batangas does not violate P.D. No. 949 and P.D. No. 1803.

Our resolution skirted the issue of whether the investor given the initial inducements and other
circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site may change it simply because it has the final
choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the
case by his failure to appear at the hearing that was set by the BOI after receipt of the decision, so
he may be deemed to have waived the fruit of the judgment. On this ground, the motion for partial
reconsideration was denied.

A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed by the petitioner asking that we resolve the
basic issue of whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site; that the
non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final and
executory; and that the petitioner had not therefor waived the right to a hearing before the BOI.

In the Court's resolution dated January 17, 1990, we stated:

Does the investor have a "right of final choice" of plant site? Neither under the 1987
Constitution nor in the Omnibus Investments Code is there such a 'right
of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's choice is subject to processing and
approval or disapproval by the BOI (Art. 7, Chapter II, Omnibus Investments Code).
By submitting its application and amended application to the BOI for approval, the
investor recognizes the sovereign prerogative of our Government, through the BOI,
to approve or disapprove the same after determining whether its proposed project
will be feasible, desirable and beneficial to our country. By asking that his opposition
to the LPC's amended application be heard by the BOI, the petitioner likewise
acknowledges that the BOI, not the investor, has the last word or the "final choice" on
the matter.

Secondly, as this case has shown, even a choice that had been approved by the BOI
may not be 'final', for supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a
place may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that the
project will not fail. After all, our country will benefit only when a project succeeds, not
when it fails. (Rollo, pp. 538-539)

Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied.

A minority composed of Justices Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento and this ponente voted to

grant the motion for reconsideration stating that the hearing set by the BOI was premature as the
decision of the Court was not yet final and executory; that as contended by the petitioner the Court
must first rule on whether or not the investor has the right of final choice of plant site for if the ruling
is in the affirmative, the hearing would be a useless exercise; that in the October 19, 1989 resolution,
the Court while upholding validity of the transfer of the plant site did not rule on the issue of who has
the final choice; that they agree with the observation of the majority that "the investor has no final
choice either under the 1987 Constitution or in the Omnibus Investments Code and that it is the BOI
who decides for the government" and that the plea of the petitioner should be granted to give him the
chance to show the justness of his claim and to enable the BOI to give a second hard look at the
matter.

Thus, the herein petition which relies on the ruling of the Court in the resolution of January 17, 1990
in G.R. No. 88637 that the investor has no right of final choice under the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Investments Code.
Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public domain located in Lamao,
Limay, Bataan were reserved for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration,
management, and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).

The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned corporation, located at
Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of naphtha.

Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC)
and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application
specified Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was
the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The
petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of
registration on February 24, 1988 by BOI.

BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like: (1) exemption
from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation investments in
currency originally made and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3)
remittance of earnings on investments. As additional incentive, the House of Representatives
approved a bill introduced by the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad valoremtax on naphtha if and
when it is used as raw materials in the petrochemical plant. (G.R. No. 88637, September 7, 1989,
pp. 2-3. Rollo, pp. 441-442)

However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor
in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989
advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing
the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was the
insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation.

The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President Aquino expressed her
preference that the plant be established in Bataan in a conference with the Taiwanese investors, the
Secretary of National Defense and The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the Transfer of the project to Batangas, BPC
filed on April 11, 1989 its request for approval of the amendments. Its application is as follows: "(l)
increasing the investment amount from US $220 million to US $320 million; (2) increasing the
production capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing
the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the
job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. (Annex B to Petition; Rollo, p. 25)

Notwithstanding opposition from any quarters and the request of the petitioner addressed to
Secretary Concepcion to be furnished a copy of the proposed amendment with its attachments
which was denied by the BOI on May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision of the registration of
BPC's petrochemical project. (Petition, Annex F; Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to 6, Decision in G.R. No.
88637; supra.)

BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifying before the Committee on Ways and Means of the
Senate asserted that:

The BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of
the petrochemical complex, as this would provide a better distribution of industries
around the Metro Manila area. ... In advocating the choice of Bataan as the project
site for the petrochemical complex, the BOI, however, made it clear, and I would like
to repeat this that the BOI made it clear in its view that the BOI or the government for
that matter could only recomend as to where the project should be located. The BOI
recognizes and respect the principle that the final chouce is still with the proponent
who would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the
project. (Petition, P. 13; Annex D to the petition)

This position has not been denied by BOI in its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in the present
petition.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

 SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

There is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or
should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be
changed to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the
BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical
admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on
the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the
wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.

We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into this controversy and determine the
paramount issue. We grant the petition.

First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed. That is
why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan. There is available 576 hectares
of public land precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803.
There is no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed transfer to
Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long before any covetous interests intruded into the
choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly constricted and allows for expansion. The respondents have
not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable labor
situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas. Certainly, these were taken into account
when the firm named itself Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. Moreover, the evidence proves the
contrary.

Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces 60% of the
national output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can provide the
feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country is short of LPG and there is need
to import the same for use of the plant in Batangas. The local production thereof by Shell can hardly
supply the needs of the consumers for cooking purposes. Scarce dollars will be diverted,
unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to feed the furnaces of the transferred
petrochemical plant.

Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the approval of
Republic Act No. 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption from ad valorem tax.
The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical industry. The policy determination by both
Congress and the President is clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or
contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG.

Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to "regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with
its national goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of the Constitution.

In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development of the national
economy in consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism" is the set goal
of government.

Fifth, with the admitted fact that the investor is raising the greater portion of the capital for the project
from local sources by way of loan which led to the so-called "petroscam scandal", the capital
requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the project and its
feedstock shall be limited to naphtha which is certainly more economical, more readily available than
LPG, and does not have to be imported.

Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the
great benefit and advantage of the government which shall have a participation in the management
of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing
is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to
investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons
which remain murky to say the least.

And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.

Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:

x x x           x x x          x x x

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

xxx xxx xxx

Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit
of national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full control over the
development and utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign
investments in accordance with national goals and priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and
understood.

A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like a
garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an assembler of cars or manufacturer
of computer chips, where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The
petrochemical industry is essential to the national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia
and Malaysia, the government superintends the industry by controlling the upstream or cracker
facility.

In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given unprecedented favors, among
them:

(1) For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave an
eligible relending credit or relending facility worth US $50 million and a debt to swap
arrangement for US $30 million or a total accommodation of US $80 million which at
current exchange rates is around P2080 million.

(2) A major part of the company's capitalization shall not come from foreign sources
but from loans, initially a Pl Billion syndicated loan, to be given by both government
banks and a consortium of Philippine private banks or in common parlance, a case of
'guiniguisa sa sariling manteca.'

(3) Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer status.'

(4) Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the Asian
Development Bank portfolio because of the petrochemical firm's massive loan
request. (Taken from the proceedings before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee).

but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make a company abide
by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a choice
which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people.

The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the
change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say
is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the
government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the
government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems
best for the national interest.
One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part said he would not mind
having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case,
it is not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we
shall do with our heritage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent Board of Investments
approving the amendment of the certificate of registration of the Luzon Petrochemical Corporation
on May 23, 1989 under its Resolution No. 193, Series of 1989, (Annex F to the Petition) is SET
ASIDE as NULL and VOID. The original certificate of registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24,
1988 with Bataan as the plant site and naphtha as the feedstock is, therefore, ordered maintained.

SO ORDERED.

Section 21

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ,

GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR
B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G.
ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J.
PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES,
BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,

HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC.,
Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners, 
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON.
JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and
Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO
TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, 

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:

In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life
on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules
flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their
struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they
continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die
as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held
Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.

Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the
powerful Antaeus weakened and died.

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental
forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the
precious earth to stay alive.

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this
precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it
has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us
for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people,"   especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new
1

Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits."   Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and
2

implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the
soil." 
3

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted
one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but
undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the
following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.

Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already
been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated
principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was
promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition
of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners.

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for
agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This
was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over
legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public
hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited
debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as
they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4

The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions,
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They
will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of each case
will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder.

G.R. No. 79777

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and
R.A. No. 6657.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No.
228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228.
The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure
to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI,
Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may
be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the
recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay   andManotok v. National Food Authority.   Moreover, the just
5 6

compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form
of bonds or other things of value.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also
violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners
of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due
process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers
are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the
earlier cases ofChavez v. Zobel,   Gonzales v. Estrella,   and Association of Rice and Corn
7 8

Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council.   The determination of just
9

compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention
whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no
valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the
maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.

Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for
retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf
of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just
compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by
the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while
what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.

In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228
and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless,
this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the
same infirmities as the earlier measures.

A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a
1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the
payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the
basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A.
No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400
planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as
decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the
President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to
enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim
legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still
have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process,
and equal protection.

They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:

Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform
Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the
receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten
wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources
as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall
be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount
appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated
expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.

Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it
is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the
Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government,
which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4
hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that
may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in
cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be
prescribed or approved by the PARC.

The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a
careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that
can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been
lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems
exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.

A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the
country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel
Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the
Court.

NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that,
in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section
2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty
billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is
not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National
Treasurer as actually available.

Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the
violation of the fundamental right to own property.

The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of
the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax
purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to
immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.

In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality
in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as
explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's
contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's
opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.

On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that
they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the
possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of
private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of
public money without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in
existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as
Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum
appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later
when necessary.

On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing
the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends
that the measure is unconstitutional because:

(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;

(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;

(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and

(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not
originate from the House of Representatives.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due
process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private
respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.

On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding
under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land
Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition
was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had
not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion
moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the
1987 Constitution.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress
convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The
legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency
measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.

The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law
and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of
the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land, the
provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:

Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972
shall be considered as advance payment for the land.

is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of
even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven
hectares or more is undemocratic.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for
reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the
issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article
XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is
convened.

On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on
October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was
tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization
payments.

In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved
on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the
promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public
respondent's acts.

G.R. No. 78742

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and
corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the
same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are
actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be

ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of
the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance
with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules
required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes
from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do
not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit,
the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with
an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978,
(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December
29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners),
and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to
Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention
under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.

The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the
issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of
discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this
function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them
because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in
force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court
in Tanada v. Tuvera.  As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere
10

letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments
of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the
legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the
reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not
lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts
a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments,
in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed,
is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done
or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure
that the Constitution would not be breached.

In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme
Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc.  And
11

as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are
first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised
by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of
the case itself. 
12

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold
that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or
is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained
of.   And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
13

discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases,   ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
14

constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking
only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the
objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this exception in many other cases.  15

The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.

In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid
when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the
Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its
purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its
decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.

For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make
the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these
departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.

It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —

... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution.  16

The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically
resolve. And so we shall.

II

We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions.

The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law
has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on
that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and
229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
quoted above.

The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of
the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not
"midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on
July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on
July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her
legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by
subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative
simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President
Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by
her when and as long as she possessed it.

Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially
affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A.
No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.   Indeed, some portions of the said
17

measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and
21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law.  18

That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the
requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No.
131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is
not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.   The creation of the fund is only incidental to
19

the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section
25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could
not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now
has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the
proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the
Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the
Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the
law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:

Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or
retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which
shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as
commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be
awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1)
that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of
this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.

The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one
subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill
does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.  20

The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever
name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such
are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI
474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The
important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.

But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with
the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera.   Hence, unless published in
21

the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and
effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was
published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)

Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus
cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of
the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification.
Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the
discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus
can issue to require action only but not specific action.

Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and

unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed
by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to
compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If
the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For
example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable
length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great detriment of all parties
concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law
clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision,
and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause.  22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be
permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23

III

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case
of City of Baguio v. NAWASA,  for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal
24

waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held
that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome
and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for
a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,   Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police
25

power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went
"too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human
habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier
granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee
assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained
without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there
was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:

Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police
power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an
abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But
restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of
a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The
state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the
owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further
changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will have to be removed and
the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.

Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the
power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of
taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been
accepted.   As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois
26

College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which
sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks:

Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent
domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent
domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that
would be available for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the
other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a
point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to
bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately authored harm
bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure
need have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of
government's involvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has
contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain
interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend
expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,
which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the
police power's standard of "public purpose."  27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the
District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the
attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:

If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should
be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
in the way.

Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the
exercise of eminent domain is clear.

For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.  28

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,   decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S
29

Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of
the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the
Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to
be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the Terminal
would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area
could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court
nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it
said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he
called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:

In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized
to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the
Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-
story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on
neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its
losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence
more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there
is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several
measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.

The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are
prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many
bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally
agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not
discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection
with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of
expropriation.

The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the
absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that
they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the
sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their
own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars.   To be valid, it must conform to
31

the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all the members of the class.   The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by
32

the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both
as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.   The petitioners have not shown that they
33

belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing
land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners
that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter.
In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion
is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if
there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the
public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State
and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.   As the subject and
34

purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first
requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed
to achieve the constitutional goal.

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is
also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere
expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest
moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will
excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a
right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of
the nation who would deny him that right.

That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which
reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.

This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.

IV

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell
under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale
may be agreed upon by the parties.   It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or
35

cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of
eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State
over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the
case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed
no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that
has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise
of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should
first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately
disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not
correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution
calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private
agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive
departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the
absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.

A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they
decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case
of Tañada v. Cuenco:  36

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.

It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of
judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."   Even so, this should not be construed as a license
37

for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours.

The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the
redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first
provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The
Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe that the
political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.

In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,  it was held:

38

Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St.
Mary's river between the American bank and the international line, as well as all of
the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was
"necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected
therewith," that determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted
by the United States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial review of the
judgment of Congress ... .

As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the
Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why
private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum
retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an
elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are
landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the
fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.

The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more
thoughtful examination.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator.   It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's
39

gain but the owner's loss.   The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
40

"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 
41

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere
regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of
private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all
its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the
Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi,   there is compensable taking when the following
42

conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more
than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the
property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the
measures before us.

Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking
possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of
the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising
the amount."   Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
43

Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection
or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance
with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request
the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is
entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is
made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the
offer of the government to buy his land-

... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested
parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15)
days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the
matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty
(30) days after it is submitted for decision.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice
and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay   resolved44

a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just
compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by
the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring
these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees

constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have
the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of
the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary
consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule
67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the
taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of
the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or
charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that
of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair.
Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination
of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

xxx

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of
whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just
 compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to
determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this
effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

This time, we answer in the affirmative.

xxx

It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or
clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro
and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a
fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the
proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless
allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly,
the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive
upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:

Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in
the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily
resolved.

This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR
and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and
other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the
just compensation for the land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:

(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:

(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the

excess hectarage is concerned — Twenty-five
percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any
time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up

to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent (30%) cash, the
balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below —

Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid
in government financial instruments negotiable at any
time.
 (2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred
shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines
set by the PARC;

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury

bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the
bonds shall mature every year from the date of
issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That
should the landowner choose to forego the cash
portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid
correspondingly in LBP bonds;

(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds

may be used by the landowner, his successors-in-
interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face
value, for any of the following:

(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the

government, including assets under the Asset
Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by
government financial institutions in the same province
or region where the lands for which the bonds were
paid are situated;

(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-

owned or controlled corporations or shares of stock
owned by the government in private corporations;

(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the

provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial

institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be
invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a
small and medium- scale industry, in the same
province or region as the land for which the bonds are
paid;

(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to

government: Provided, That the use of these bonds
for these purposes will be limited to a certain
percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial
instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall
determine the percentages mentioned above;

(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of

the original bondholder in government universities,
colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;

(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the

original bondholder in government hospitals; and

(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to

time allow.

The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional
insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor
in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they
cite jurisprudence holding that:

The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor
less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of
said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and
complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to
suffer by reason of the expropriation .   (Emphasis supplied.)
45

In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration,   this Court held:

46

It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the
property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of
that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to
the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation
to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value being that
sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner,
willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight
of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in
money and not otherwise. Thus —

The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor

cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel
or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the
property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and
the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a
standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that
standard as money in cash.   (Emphasis supplied.)
47

Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be
regarded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation.  48

"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in

money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is
not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future
obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage.  (Emphasis supplied.)
49

It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the
past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power
of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of
expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of
the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished
farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country
but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision
and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in
this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling
life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms,
calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of
their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering
the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds
of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially
appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact
not even fully available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when
they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more
practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the
government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the
lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their
intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly
the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire
amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that what they
had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law
in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in
principle.

The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement
among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied
to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to
"fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they
should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and
reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive
compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no
special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission.  50

On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we
are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of
the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the
limitations of the expropriator.

With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the
Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our
decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities
and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely
anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are
aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing
the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and
dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is
not what we shall decree today.

Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully
in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting
the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in
money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who
can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government
financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other
modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and
other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not
a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly
hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their
forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of
the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the
Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem
to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section
14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure
but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the
valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the
contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the
factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of
eminent domain.

The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle
is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:

Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor
until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates
back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report
under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.  51

... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry,
title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made.   (Emphasis
52

supplied.)

In Kennedy v. Indianapolis,   the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property
53

does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the
decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure,   it was
54

held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the
investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use."
In Rexford v. Knight,   the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes
55

was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the
authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further
said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property
is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public
use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has
been made to him."

Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,   that: 56

If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are
attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in
this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can
be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ...
. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972
and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized
farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until
he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood,
however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the
constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972
of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis
supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-
fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it
was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to
the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after
full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with
the landowner.   No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
57

Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title
before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as
recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should
counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands
have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs
who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by
the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to
judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level,
especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other
agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.

Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have
not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are
entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole
more liberal than those granted by the decree.

The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of
bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be
scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be
continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better
protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform,
we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties.
This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice
Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture
forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should
strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron
shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the
day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and
from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At
last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give
him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep
despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he
banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music
and the dream."

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full
payment of compensation to their respective owners.
 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No.
27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions
therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Section 22

G.R. No. 195905, July 04, 2018

THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO REPRESENTED BY MAURICIO G. DOMOGAN, CITY

MAYOR, CITY BUILDINGS AND ARCHITECTURE OFFICE REPRESENTED BY OSCAR FLORES,
AND PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY DIVISION REPRESENTED BY FERNANDO MOYAEN AND CITY
DEMOLITION TEAM REPRESENTED BY NAZITA BAÑEZ, Petitioners, v. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG,
REGIONAL HEARING OFFICER-NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES-
CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, MAGDALENA GUMANGAN, MARION T. POOL,
LOURDES C. HERMOGENO, JOSEPH LEGASPI, JOSEPH BASATAN, MARCELINO BASATAN,
JOSEPHINE LEGASPI, LANSIGAN BAWAS, ALEXANDER AMPAGUEY, JULIO DALUYEN, SR.,
CONCEPCION PADANG AND CARMEN PANAYO, Respondents.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 5 August 2010 Decision1
and 31 January 2011 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110598.

The present controversy stemmed from the various orders issued by the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples-Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR) in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-
09 and 31-CAR-09.

THE FACTS

The Petitions

Private respondents Magdalena Gumangan, Marion T. Pool, Lourdes C. Hermogeno; Bernardo

Simon, Joseph Legaspi, Joseph Basatan, Marcelino Basatan, Josephine Legaspi, and Lansigan
Bawas (Gumangan petition) are the petitioners in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09. In their petition,3
filed on 23 July 2009, they prayed that their ancestral lands in the Busol Forest Reserve be
identified, delineated, and recognized and that the corresponding Certificate of Ancestral Land
Title (CALT) be issued. In addition, the Gumangan petition sought to restrain the City
Government of Baguio, et al., (petitioners) from enforcing demolition orders and to prevent the
destruction of their residential houses at the Busol Forest Reserve pending their application for
identification of their ancestral lands before the NCIP Ancestral Domains Office.

On the other hand, private respondents Alexander Ampaguey, Sr., Julio Daluyen, Sr.,
Concepcion Padang, and Carmen Panayo (Ampaguey petition) are the petitioners in NCIP Case
No. 31-CAR-09. In their petition,4 filed on 23 July 2009, they prayed that the petitioners be
enjoined from enforcing the demolition orders affecting their properties inside the Busol Forest
Reserve. The Ampaguey Petition claimed that they have pending applications for their ancestral
land claims before the NCIP.

Both the Gumangan and Ampaguey petitions assail that petitioners have no right to enforce the
demolition orders and to evict them from their properties. They aver that their claims over their
ancestral lands are protected and recognized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).

Proceedings before the NCIP-CAR

In his 27 July 2009 Order,5 public respondent Atty. Brain Masweng (Atty. Masweng), NCIP-CAR
Hearing Officer, issued a 72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the Gumangan
petition. On the same date, he issued another order6 for a 72-Hour TRO on the Ampaguey
petition. On 14 August 2009, Atty. Masweng issued a writ of preliminary injunction in NCIP Case
Nos. 29-CAR-097 and 31-CAR-09.8
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari9 before the CA assailing the TRO and
preliminary injunction issued by Atty. Masweng in the above NCIP case.

The CA Ruling

In its 5 August 2010 decision, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari for being
procedurally flawed because they did not file a motion for reconsideration before the NCIP. The
appellate court elucidated that the present petition constituted forum shopping because
petitioners had a pending motion to dismiss before the NCIP. Further, the CA ruled that the
NCIP had the power to issue the injunctive relief noting that the NCIP did not act with grave
abuse of discretion because the issuances were in accordance with law. It ruled:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSSED. The assailed issuances STAND. Costs against
Petitioners.10

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its assailed 31
January 2011 resolution.

Hence, this present petition raising the following:

ISSUES

I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FOR BEING PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE; AND

II.

WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is meritorious.

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, a resolution of certain procedural matters is in
order.

Case mooted due to supervening events

At the onset, the present case has been rendered moot and academic. A moot and academic
case is one that ceases to present a justifiable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that declaration thereon would be of no practical value.11 In City Government of Baguio v. Atty.
Masweng (contempt case),12 the Court set aside the provisional remedies Atty. Masweng
issued in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09 after he was found guilty of indirect
contempt, to wit:

In this case, respondent was charged with indirect contempt for issuing the subject orders
enjoining the implementation of demolition orders against illegal structures constructed on a
portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City.

xxxx

The said orders clearly contravene our ruling in G.R. No. 180206 that those owners of houses
and structures covered by the demolition orders issued by petitioner are not entitled to the
injunctive relief previously granted by respondent.

xxxx

As mentioned earlier, the Court while recognizing that the NCIP is empowered to issue
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction, nevertheless ruled that
petitioners in the injunction case seeking to restrain the implementation of the subject
demolition order are not entitled to such relief. Petitioner City Government of Baguio in issuing
the demolition advices are simply enforcing the previous demolition orders against the same
occupants or claimants or their agents and successors-in-interest, only to be thwarted anew by
the injunctive orders and, writs issued by respondent. Despite the Court's pronouncements in
G.R. No. 180206 that no such clear legal right exists in favor of those occupants or claimants to
restrain the enforcement of the demolition orders issued by petitioner, and hence there remains
no legal impediment to bar their implementation, respondent still issued the temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. x x x

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the petition for contempt is GRANTED. The assailed Temporary Restraining Order
dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case
No. 31-CAR-09, and Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31,
2009 and Writ of Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09 are hereby all LIFTED and
SET ASIDE.13

As a general rule, the Court no longer entertains petitions which have been rendered moot.
After all, the decision would have no practical value. Nevertheless, there are exceptions where
the Court resolves moot and academic cases, viz: (a) there was a grave violation of the
Constitution; (b) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount
public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide
the Bench, the Bar, and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading
review.14

In the case at bar, there are exceptions warranting an affirmative action from the Court. The
case definitely involves paramount public interest as it pertains to the Busol Water Reserve, a
source of basic necessity of the people of Baguio and other neighboring communities. In
addition, the present issues are likely to be repeated especially considering the other cases
involving land claimants over the Busol Water Reserve.
Exceptions to the requirement of a motion for reconsideration in petitions for certiorari

A petition for certiorari is resorted to whenever a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.15 It is an extraordinary remedy available
only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.16 In other words, certiorari is a solution of last resort availed of after all possible legal
processes have been exhausted.

Thus, it is axiomatic that a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition for certiorari.17 This is so considering that the said motion is an existing remedy under
the rules for a party to assail a decision or ruling adverse to it. Nonetheless, the rule requiring a
motion for reconsideration to be filed before a petition for certiorari is available admits of
exception. In Republic of the Philippines v. Pantranco North Express, Inc.,18 the Court
recognized the following exceptions:

Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the
petition is perishable;

Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

Where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

Where, in a criminal case, a relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;

Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and

Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.19

The Court finds that exceptions exist to warrant petitioners' direct resort to a petition for
certiorari before the CA notwithstanding its lack of a motion for reconsideration filed before the
NCIP. First, the issues had been duly raised before the NCIP especially considering that
petitioner had presented similar arguments or opposition from the TRO initially issued by the
NCIP until the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction. Second, there is urgency in the
petition because petitioners seek to implement its demolition orders with the goal of preserving
the Busol Forest Reserve, Baguio's primary forest and watershed. It cannot be gainsaid that any
delay may greatly prejudice the government as the Busol Forest Reserve may be further
compromised. Third, the preservation of the Busol Forest Reserve involves public interest as it
would have a significant impact on the water supply for the City of Baguio.

No forum shopping if different reliefs are prayed for

The CA also found petitioners' petition for certiorari dismissible for violating the rule on forum
shopping. It opined that a ruling on the said petition for certiorari would amount to res judicata
in view of the petitioners' motion to dismiss filed before the NCIP.

Forum shopping exists when a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, seeks a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari it is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.20 The following are the elements of forum shopping: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.21

The petition for certiorari filed before the CA did not amount to forum shopping despite the
existence of the motion to dismiss before the NCIP. The two actions involved different reliefs
based on different facts. In their petition, petitioners questioned the issuance of provisional
remedies by the NCIP and prayed that these be dismissed for lack of a clear legal right to be
protected. On the other hand, the motion to dismiss filed before the NCIP sought the dismissal
of the main complaint of private respondents for the issuance of a permanent injunction to
enjoin the demolition orders and/or to recognize their purported native title over the land
involved.

In addition, judgment rendered in the petition would not amount to res judicata with respect to
the motion to dismiss, and vice versa. To invoke res judicata, the following elements must
concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (b) the decision must
have been rendered by a. court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c)
the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, as
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.22
As stated, the petition for certiorari assailed the propriety of the issuance of provisional
remedies while the motion to dismiss attacked the principal action of private respondents.
Evidently, the petition for certiorari and the motion to dismiss had different causes of action
especially since the grant or denial of the provisional remedies does not necessarily mean that
the main action would have the same conclusion.

Having settled the procedural matters, we now address the merits of the case.

Clear legal right and irreparable injury

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts.23 It is an equitable and extraordinary peremptory remedy to be exercised
with caution as it affects the parties' respective rights.24

Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction may be granted when it
is established that: (a) the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) a party, court, agency or a
person is doing, threatening or attempting to do; or is procuring or suffering to be done, some
act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

In other words, the following requisites must concur before a preliminary injunction is issued:
(1) the invasion of a right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (2) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.25

Before the preventive writ may be issued, first and foremost there must be a clear showing by
the complainant that there is an existing right to be protected, a clear and unmistakable right at
that.26 Thus, it is incumbent upon private respondents to establish that their rights over the
land in the Busol Forest Reserve are unequivocal and indisputable. They, however, admit that
their claims for recognition are still pending before the NCIP; they are but mere expectations-
short of the required present and unmistakable right for the grant of the issuance of the
provisional remedy of injunction.27

Private respondents also bewail that it would be more prudent that the injunctive writs be
issued to prevent the baseless or unnecessary demolition of their house should their land claims
be ultimately recognized. While the Court understands their predicament, there is still no basis
for the issuance of the injunctive writs because it can be compensable through the award of
damages. A clear and unmistakable right is not enough to justify the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction as there must be a showing that the applicant would suffer irreparable
injury. Thus, the Court in Power Sites and Signs, Inc. v. United Neon28 ruled:

It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and
irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable. Here, there is no
irreparable injury as understood in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely,
immense loss in profit and possible damage claims from clients and the cost of the billboard
which is a considerable amount of money is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within
the concept of irreparable damage or injury as described in Social Security Commission v.
Bayona:

Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction
where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a
repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be
estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement. An
irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to,
the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and
enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will
not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof.29 (emphasis omitted)

More importantly, their continued occupation absent any clear legal right cannot be
countenanced because of the threat it poses to the Busol Water Reserve. In Province of Rizal v.
Executive Secretary,30 the Court emphasized the importance of preserving watersheds, to wit:

This brings us to the second self-evident point. Water is life, and must be saved at all costs. In
Collado v. Court of Appeals, we had occasion to reaffirm our previous discussion in Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, on the primordial importance of
watershed areas, thus: The most important product of a watershed is water, which is one of
the most important human necessities. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of flash floods that not only damage
property but also cause[s] loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational
responsibility that needs to be answered now.31 (emphasis and underlining supplied)

While the Court does not discount the possible loss private respondents may suffer should their
land claims be recognized with finality, still it bears re.iterating that they failed to show that
they are entitled to an injunctive relief. In summary, private respondents do not have a clear
and unmistakable legal right because their land claims are still pending recognition and any loss
or injury they may suffer can be compensable by damages. To add, their occupation of the
Busol Water Reserve poses a continuing threat of damaging the preservation or viability of the
watershed. Any danger to the sustainability of the Busol Water Reserve affects not only
individuals or families inside the watershed but also the entire community relying on it as a
source of a basic human necessity-water. Furthermore, unlike the injury private respondents
may suffer, any damage to the Busol Water Reserve is irreversible and may not only affect the
present generation but also those to come.

Stare decisis vis-a-vis res judicata

In its assailed decision, the CA ruled that the NCIP did not act with grave abuse of discretion
because its actions were in accordance with law as it complied with the IPRA and its
implementing rules and regulations. Still, it must be remembered that judicial decisions form
part of the law of the land.32

In The City Government of Baguio v. Atty. Masweng (City Government of Baguio),33 the Court
explained that Proclamation No. 15 is not a definitive recognition of land claims over portions of
the Busol Forest Reserve, to wit:

The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its
exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes
the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity.
The IPRA demands that the city's charter respect the validity of these recognize-land rights and
titles.

The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents' ancestral land claim was
indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be protected
by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners
must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is
directed are violative of said right.
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and
Gumangan families, the predecessor-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a
portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same.

xxxx

The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as
inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals. The declaration of the Busol Forest
Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not
endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.34

In City Government of Baguio, it was recognized that the NCIP is empowered to issue TROs and
writs of injunction. Nevertheless, the said case ruled that therein respondents were not entitled
to an injunctive relief because they failed to prove their definite right over the properties they
claimed. The circumstances in City Government of Baguio and the present case are similar. In
both cases, the claimants principally rely on Proclamation No. 15 as basis for their ancestral
land claims in the Busol Forest Reserve. Unfortunately, it was ruled that the said proclamation is
not a definitive recognition of their ancestral land claims as it only identifies their predecessors-
in-interest as claimants.

Thus, it is quite unfortunate that the CA found that the actions of the NCIP were in accordance
with law. A cursory reading of the decision indicates that it merely relied on the applicable
statute without regard to the doctrines and principles settled by the Court. The
pronouncements in City Government of Baguio should have put the appellate court on notice
that the actions of the NCIP were baseless because it settled that claimants of lands in the
Busol Water Reserve cannot rely on anticipatory claims for the issuance of the preventive writ.
It befuddles the Court why the CA did not bother to address the said ruling in its discussions
and perfunctorily relied on the statute alone.

On the other hand, respondents argue that petitioners erred in relying on City Government of
Baguio in that res judicata did not arise considering that they were not parties to the said case
and that only parties may be bound by the decision.

Nevertheless, while res judicata may be inapplicable, the ruling in City Government of Baguio
still finds relevance under stare decisis. The said doctrine states that when the Court has once
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same, regardless
whether the parties and property are the same.35Stare decisis differs from res judicata in that
the former is based upon the legal principle or rule involved while the latter is based upon the
judgment itself.36

Thus, the Court in The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng (Baguio Regreening)37
held:

Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not convinced that private respondents were
entitled to the relief granted by the Commission. Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a
definitive recognition of private respondents' ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the
Molintas and Gumangan families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but
does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. Since it is required before the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction that claimants show the existence of a right to be protected, this
Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately granted the petition of the City Government of Baguio and
set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein.

In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and
counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction, against fencing of the Busol
Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and
in the case at bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. In both cases,
petitioners claim (1) that Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders
and writs of preliminary injunction against government infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio
City is beyond the ambit of the IPRA; and (3) that private respondents have not shown a clear
right to be protected. Private respondents, on the other hand, presented the same allegations
in their Petition for Injunction, particularly the alleged recognition made under Proclamation No.
15 in favor of their ancestors. While res judicata does not apply on account of the different
subject matters of the case at bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction,
albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to
grant the instant petition.38

Like the private respondents in City Government of Baguio and in Baguio Regreening, herein
claimants principally rely on Proclamation No. 15 as basis for their ancestral land claims in the
Busol Forest Reserve. Thus, the Court is constrained to similarly rule that the injunctive relief
issued in the present case are without basis because the applicants failed to establish a clear
and legal right. After all, it has been settled that Proclamation No. 15 is not a definite
recognition or their ancestral land claims.

It is noteworthy that in the contempt case, Atty. Masweng was cited for indirect contempt for
issuing TROs and preliminary injunctions in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09. He was
found in indirect contempt because the Court had already ruled that the occupants in the Busol
Water Reserve had no clear legal right warranting the issuance of preventive remedies. In the
present case, the preventive writs issued in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09
themselves are being questioned. Thus, the Court had, on more than one occasion, found
occupants of the Busol Watershed Reservation not entitled to the preventive writ for lack of a
clear legal right, considering that their recognition claims were still pending before the NCIP.

Taking into account all the cases involving land claims over the Busol Water Reserve, it is
settled that Proclamation No. 15 and the IPRA, notwithstanding, provisional remedies such as
TROs and writs of preliminary injunction should not ipso facto be issued to individuals who have
ancestral claims over Busol. It is imperative that there is a showing of a clear and unmistakable
legal right for their issuance because a pending or contingent right is insufficient. Nevertheless,
the grant or denial of these provisional remedies should not affect their ancestral land claim as
the applicants are not barred from proving their rights in an appropriate proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 5 August 2010 Decision and 31 January 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110598 are REVERSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples-Cordillera Administrative Region in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-
09 are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Section 25

G.R. No. 91649             May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND

LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners, 
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.

H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.

Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.

PARAS, J.:

A TV ad proudly announces:

"The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."

But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because —

A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law;
 B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded
into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;

C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR —
conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;

D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony
economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)

In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared
national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987
Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections
11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present
Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).

The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco
being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and
seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D.
1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January
1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating
casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential
source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed
on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.

Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government
to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law,
under the following declared policy —

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to

centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises
or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:

(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of
chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the
Government.

(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including
sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement
and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to
fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification,
sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs,
Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and
integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions;
and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are
normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without
direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)

To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its
Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent
therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.

It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and
directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax,
government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition,
PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with
various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years
of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2
Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos
nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494)
families.

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null
and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends
toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well
as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human
Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and
Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate
consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the
highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government."
(State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).

As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of
the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our
jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of
its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it
is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority
under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must,
on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar
underscored the —

. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of
constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in
favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it
will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be
adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660,
663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v.
Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA
220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory
Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)

Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality
of petitioners to file the instant petition.

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and
has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas
Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us,
We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them
has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition,
it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino
although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the
public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that
"the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
 promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have
since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.

Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of
gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood
and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most
vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it
succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is
most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.
660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National,
40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of
change.

What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?

P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an
appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st
whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling
operations in one corporate entity — the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to
society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped
Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny,
regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the
creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and
corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies
at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.

Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose
taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local
autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as
the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."

(2) Income and other taxes. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or
otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local,
shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form
or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax
of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its
operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National
Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind,
nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national
government authority (Section 13 [2]).

Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes
(Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality
of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that
power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to
tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by
the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine
Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).

(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that
"municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January
18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general
legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541).
Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No.
9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it
can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early
as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses
or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government,
thus:

Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities
and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate,
maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is
hereby revoked.

Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog
race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government
upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .

Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the
operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a
consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.

(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR
is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares
of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II,
PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:

Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated
entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the
Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the
preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning
the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government.
Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local
taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.

The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any
manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into
execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat
316, 4 L Ed. 579)

This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.

Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of
power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities
of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or
 political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from
consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the
accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis
supplied)

Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local
authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool
for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).

The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v.
Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which
has the inherent power to wield it.

(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D.
1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:

Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue
and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied)

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which
Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed
or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to
the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be
violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in
Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does
not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."

Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments
can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be
an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of
decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)

As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government
units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens
Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).

What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State
concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local
governments.

As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter
power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . .
In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject
which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733
Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC
974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis
supplied)

Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).

We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the
well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not
have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection
is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting
(P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA
1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited,
does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because
there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA
827)

The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations
called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to
prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few
concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were
made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).

Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away
from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state
that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the
government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal
or amendment.

The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and
not what the law should be.  Under our system of government, policy issues are within the
1âwphi1

domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the
repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).

On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:

Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National
Economy and Patrimony)

It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the
Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be
regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.

On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and
13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational
Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely
statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law
should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles
ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the
executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives
of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express
their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of
the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387;
Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA
287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition
this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such
a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to
challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome
the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869
remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise,
privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values"
being raised, is up for Congress to determine.

As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162
SCRA 521 —

Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in
its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the
KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the
Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is
not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend
some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners
have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of
the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may
not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political
departments of government: the President and the Congress.

Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when
the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the
financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook
on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental
control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly
attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the
cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink,
exercise, work, and even sex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, 

vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS,
GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL
DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.

Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent
facts are as follows:

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a

member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region
XII, representing Lanao del Sur.

2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).

3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members,

respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the
Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11,
1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew
from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members
of the Assembly.

4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the

Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier
Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:

The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and

dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations
and traditional leaders on the recent and present political
developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.

The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would

hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as
envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the
Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.

You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook

Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987,
with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence,
unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary
Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no
session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress
take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ."

6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary

Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram:

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE
CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST
SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED
AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL
ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN
NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM
FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.

7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's

advice, with the following assemblymen present:

1. Sali, Salic

2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

3. Dagalangit, Rakil

4. Dela Fuente, Antonio

5. Mangelen, Conte

6. Ortiz, Jesus

7. Palomares, Diego
 8. Sinsuat, Bimbo

9. Tomawis, Acmad

10. Tomawis, Jerry

After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized
to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said
seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly
resumed with the following Assemblymen present:

1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer

2. Ali Salic

3. Ali Salindatu

4. Aratuc, Malik

5. Cajelo, Rene

6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

7. Dagalangit, Rakil

8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

9. Ortiz, Jesus

10 Palomares, Diego

11. Quijano, Jesus

12. Sinsuat, Bimbo

13. Tomawis, Acmad

14. Tomawis, Jerry

An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:

HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the
presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to
call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the
previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I
move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer
and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2,
1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.

HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.

PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented?

Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ...

Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker
vacant; one abstained and none voted against.  1

Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-

 (a) This Petition be given due course;

(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued

enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5,
1987, and on any day thereafter;

(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by

respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;

(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or

Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and

(e) Making the injunction permanent.

Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable.  2

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the
Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,"   on the grounds, among other things,
3

that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and
emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy
for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in
the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . .
."   and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without
4

authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly,"   that the
5

petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting
to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic],"   and that he had "filed
6

a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should
have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly,"   for which the respondents now submit
7

that the petition had become "moot and academic".  8

The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has
made the case moot and academic.

We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the
expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this
petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.

On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in
question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,
assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other
hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that
"since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang
Pampook."   "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory
9

gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City,"   but that was "so that their differences could be
10

threshed out and settled."  Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no
11

matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by
law.

While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely
require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard,   it does not appear
12

herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of
graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any
opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere
accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.

In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other
Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the
part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner]
before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of
the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity
and character as representative of the people"   an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access
13
to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution,   and, unless the recourse amounts to
14

malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed
warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper
proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is
within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts
are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is
exercised with grave abuse.

It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the
courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come,
therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are
now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent
of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential
Decree No. 1618   promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established
15

"internal autonomy"   in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and
16

territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,"   with legislative and
17

executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities  specified therein.

18

It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for
the respective regions,"   except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence
19

of the National Government,"   "which include, but are not limited to, the following:
20

(1) National defense and security;

(2) Foreign relations;

(3) Foreign trade;

(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and
external borrowing,

(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural

resources;

(6) Air and sea transport

(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;

(8) Customs and quarantine;

(9) Immigration and deportation;

(10) Citizenship and naturalization;

(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and

(12) General auditing.  21

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..."  22

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable,"   "and ensure their fullest development as
23

self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress."   At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
24

burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision"   over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
25

according to law."   He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
26

judgments with his own.  27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is
free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency. 28

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a
question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted
prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy
now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the
proper case.

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.  29

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.  30

xxx xxx xxx

See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.  31

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X,
sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class
is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and
the Department of Local Government).   If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
32

autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps
the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our
jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments
of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision
and control over Autonomous Regions."  In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their
33

legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:

SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall

exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national
development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:

(1) Organization of regional administrative system;

(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;

(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;

(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;

(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;

 (6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;

(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the

Autonomous Region;

(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social
services, programs and facilities;

(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture

indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and

(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of

such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people in the Autonomous Region.

The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that
enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and
programs.

The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa.  34

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the
Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of
the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the
Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective
nevertheless for lack of quorum.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true
that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or
adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook,"  but it provides likewise that "the
35

Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals."   Of course, there is
36

disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner
effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner
says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment
and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so
that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and
disunity.   The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of
37

"short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called
a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the
same Rules.   Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session.
38

But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in
question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or
not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs
of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly,
assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his
attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind
his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this
reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order
to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings
before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it.

In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent,
since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened.
In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the
future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to
its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner
should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies
to thwart them. 39

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook,

Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook,
Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Section 28

G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, 
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

CORTES, J.:

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this
special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.

This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to
information. The same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al., (G.R.
No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136 SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973
Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in order to compel the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and other presidential issuances. Prior
to the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory right to information provided for in the
Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a newspaper editor in
another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access to the records of the Register of Deeds
for the purpose of gathering data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80
Phil. 383 [1948]).

The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the Bill
of Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:

Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec.
7 of the 1987 Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development." The new provision reads:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
stations as may be provided by law.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right
to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it
cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right
and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption
of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such
as this one.

The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition. He
challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any
clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees
concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in
securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of
the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved
by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said
party from the enjoyment of a legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil.
1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that
he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be
performed.

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this
suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in
the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague
reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on
the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).

But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a
public right. It has been held that:

* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
 show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show
that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws * * * (Tanada
et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36).

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is
a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, supra, when it held that
even those who have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the
"public" to whom "(a)ll records relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall
be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as amended). In the words of the Court:

* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces

every person. To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a
pecuniary character in the particular information sought are given the right of
inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction. *** (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p.
387).

The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the
alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing
to bring the present suit.

2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the
part of those who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of
Rights in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating under fundamental rules defining the
limits of their power so as to shield individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim
to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5). Without a government's acceptance of the limitations
imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of
Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.

In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter
expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in
the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this time "subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28 thereof, to wit:

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art.
11, Sec. 28).

In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared

as an imperative duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative acts
and resolutions of a public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general
applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and in the process, We found occasion to
expound briefly on the nature of said duty:

* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be

informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law
itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be in
included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at 39).
(Emphasis supplied).

The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing the examination of
public records, specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized
in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:

Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or
sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration
officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person
 seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information
which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not
made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature
and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a
remedy. *** (Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at 388). (Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without
discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose
sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public
records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In
the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in
which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to registered lands.
However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:

* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or
loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented, that
the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured * * * (Subido vs.
Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to

regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs.
Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed
against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket
records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the
complainant to open and view the subject records, We absolved the respondent. In effect, We have
also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the manner of examining the public
records were reasonable.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to
regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A
distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a
particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded.
The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the
Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government
agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised
solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with
the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetal supra).

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a
writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be
enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The
decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether
the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.

3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a

recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v.
Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free
discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of general interest aids the people in
democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving them a better
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does
not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records,
papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second
sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91,
September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every case, the
availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not
being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is,
therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern.

a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion
to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of
showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the
same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to
dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position
to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To
safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is
subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both
terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether
the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for adequate
notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens.
In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the
knowledge of those real estate transactions which some believed to have been registered in
violation of the Constitution.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government
employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The
Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:

Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to
be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination.
(Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).

Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to
ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for
their respective positions.

b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a
given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of
the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know
who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of
those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations
for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil
service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from
the Civil Service Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the
duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person
occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S

RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners, 
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional
and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.

Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association
whose members are all members of the IBP.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the
purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing
an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region.  As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
1

parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the
benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint
along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner
Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was
stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to
make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution;   and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
2

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has
been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military
indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other
rights.

In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's
Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police,   it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege
3

that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been infringed,   or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
4

reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.  5

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without
a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure,
is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right
against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.  6

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds,   or simply looks into a vehicle,   or flashes a light therein,   these do not
7 8 9

constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings
in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions —
which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and
a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the
checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan
Police Director. 
10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it
would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that
individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights
was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be
reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The
improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped
and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility
or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to
death, if he resists.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a
routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are
systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining
and searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can sustain such a measure.
And we are not even under martial law.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and
the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed
of liberty.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed
that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence,
repugnant to the Constitution.

The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST.,
art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime
of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional
inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I submit —
to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.

Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the
light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY
TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT
DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by
General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO.
66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-
4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures, the same measures
against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA
and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right
personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had
been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the
reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore,
have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and
gruesomeness.

In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches
unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints",
have become "search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at that.

That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case." (Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case
reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No search warrant has been
issued by a judge.

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What
we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.

As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to
involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a
policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death
over the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot
you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.

Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be
anymore correct here.

"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a
warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail.
(Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious
mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are
unreasonable: There was no warrant.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the
"showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court
anyway bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it
would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that
individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights
was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be
reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The
improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped
and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility
or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to
death, if he resists.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a
routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are
systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining
and searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can sustain such a measure.
And we are not even under martial law.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and
the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed
of liberty.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed
that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence,
repugnant to the Constitution.

The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST.,
art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime
of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional
inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I submit —
to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.

Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the
light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY
TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT
DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by
General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO.
66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-
4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures, the same measures
against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA
and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right
personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had
been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the
reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore,
have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and
gruesomeness.

In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches
unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints",
have become "search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at that.

That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case." (Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case
reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No search warrant has been
issued by a judge.

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What
we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.

As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to
involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a
policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death
over the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot
you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.

Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be
anymore correct here.

"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a
warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail.
(Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious
mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are
unreasonable: There was no warrant.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the
"showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court
anyway bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991

MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner, 

vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE &
TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondents.

Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for petitioner.

Francisco Ma. Chanco for respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the
constitution.

In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine
the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members
after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are
either banned, cut or classified accordingly.

Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior
clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records
sought to be examined.

Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the
members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting
slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and
personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive property
of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the
member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.

Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character
and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination,
respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking
examination of the board's records.

On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss,
among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board
voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same
inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato
denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July
27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private
and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary, which in turn, referred the
same to respondent Morato for appropriate comment.

Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a board meeting held on June 22, 1989.
In that meeting, respondent Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on the movie
"Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier approved for
screening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained that his power to
unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB
Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade
a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial."

Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato possesses no authority to
unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board).

After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the latter
opined that PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally reverse the
decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the constitutionality of Res. No. 10-89
on the ground that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative (Rollo, pp. 38-42).

The Justice Secretary's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, respondent Morato opted to ignore
it.

Hence, this petition anchored on the following:

A. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY APPROVING AND ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO. 10-89
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
BECAUSE THE SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE III SECTION 7 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

B. MTRCB RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND CONSTITUTES AN

UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS.

C. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY OPINION NO. 1 SERIES OF 1990
OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND BY INSISTING ON THE VALIDITY OF RESOLUTION
NO. 88-1-25 ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY, IN BAD FAITH, IN EXCESS OF THEIR
JURISDICTION, AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows the
Chairman of the Board to unilaterally downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which
are controversial and 2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989) declaring as strictly
confidential, private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee which previously
reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the committee that
reviewed the film.
Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition should be dismissed outright for having
failed to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

We disagree. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a
party litigant is allowed resort to the courts, he is required to comply with all administrative remedies
available under the law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 [1988]). The rationale behind
this salutory principle is that for reasons of practical considerations, comity and convenience, the
courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available administrative remedies provided by law
have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given ample opportunity to act and
to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. If the error is rectified, judicial intervention
would then be unnecessary.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. The applicability
of the principle admits of certain exceptions, such as: 1) when no administrative review is provided
by law; 2) when the only question involved is one of law (Valmonte v. Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256
[1989], citing Aguilar v. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359
[1984]; Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306; Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 51
SCRA 340 [1973]; Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 [1959]; 3) where the party invoking the
doctrine is guilty of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v. Veterans' Backpay Commission [1969]; 4) where the
challenged administrative action is patently illegal, arbitrary and oppressive (Azur v. Provincial
Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]; National Development Co. v. Collector of Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA
429 [1963]; 5) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the
complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 [1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293 [1960]; 6)
where to exhaust administrative review is impractical and unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43
SCRA 291); and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies (Demaisip v. Court of
Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]).

The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the doctrine of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedy relied upon by respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect. At
any rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered to the
administrative processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior to
filing the instant petition by, among others, writing the Executive Secretary and bringing the matter to
the attention of the Office of the President (Rollo, pp. 145-147). Respondents' claim that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies must therefore fail.

Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by respondents, We now proceed to resolve the
issues raised by petitioner. In this regard, We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine
the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as
the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to
public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. (emphasis supplied)

As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional
provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may be
enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for
any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id. at 165). What may be provided for by the Legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be
consistent with the declared State Policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)." (See also Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte
v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 [1989]).

Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing
films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion
picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and
personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned.
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or
interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or
community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent Board
and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private?
Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification
board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve
public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.)
There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a
product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise
would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public
scrutiny for their official acts.

Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor
private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is
guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the
exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency
charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition
of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the
members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory. As stated
by this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383 [1948]):

Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examinations is unlawful, or sheer,
idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern
themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the
records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not
flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the
contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which
is called upon to devise a remedy. (emphasis supplied)

It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, supra, upheld the
right to information based on the statutory right then provided in Sec. 56 of the Land Registration Act
(Act 496, as amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason why said right, now
constitutionalized, should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundament law
mandates.

The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of
official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions and
deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find
no application in the case at bar. Petitioner request is not concerned with the deliberations of
respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or order has been
rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to
national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official records (See Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, supra).

We are likewise not impressed with the proposition advanced by respondents that respondent
Morato is empowered by PD 1986 to unilaterally downgrade or upgrade a film reviewed especially
those which are controversial. The pertinent provisions of said decree provides:

Sec 4. Decision. — The decision of the BOARD either approving or disapproving for
exhibition in the Philippines a motion picture, television program, still and other pictorial
advertisement submitted to it for examination and preview must be rendered within a period
of ten (10) days which shall be counted from the date of receipt by the BOARD of an
application for the purpose . . .

For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee
composed of at least three BOARD members to undertake the work of review. Any
disapproval or deletion must be approved by a majority of the sub-committee members so
designated. After receipt of the written decision of the sub-committee, a motion for
reconsideration in writing may be made, upon which the Chairman of the Board shall
designate a sub-committee of five BOARD members to undertake a second review session,
 whose decision on behalf of the Board shall be rendered through a majority of the sub-
committee members so designated and present at the second review session. This second
review session shall be presided over by the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman. The decision
of the BOARD in the second review session shall be rendered within five (5) days from the
date of receipt of the motion for reconsideration.

Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion picture, television program or publicity
material for exhibition in the Philippines must be in writing, and shall state the reasons or
grounds for such disapproval. No film or motion picture intended for exhibition at the
moviehouses or theaters or on television shall be disapproved by reason of its topic, theme
or subject matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program considered in its entirety.

The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the exception of a decision
disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture or television program in its entirety which shall
be appealable to the President of the Philippines, who may himself decide the appeal, or be
assisted either by an ad hoe committee he may create or by the Appeals Committee herein
created.

An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of the Philippines is hereby created
composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be appointed by the President of the
Philippines, which shall submit its recommendation to the President. The Office of the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs shall serve as the Secretariat of the Appeals
Committee.

The decision of the President of the Philippines on any appealed matter shall be final.

Implementing Rules and Regulations

Sec 11. Review by Sub-Committee of Three. — a) A proper application having been filed,
the Chairman of the Board shall, as the exigencies of the service may permit, designate a
Sub-Committee of at least three Board Members who shall meet, with notice to the applicant,
within ten days from receipt of the completed application. The Sub-Committee shall then
preview the motion picture subject of the application.

b) Immediately after the preview, the applicant or his representative shall withdraw to await
the results of the deliberation of the Sub-Committee. After reaching a decision, the Sub-
Committee shall summon the applicant or his representative and inform him of its decision
giving him an opportunity either to request reconsideration or to offer certain cuts or
deletions in exchange for a better classification. The decision shall be in writing, stating, in
case of disapproval of the film or denial of the classification rating desired or both, the reason
or reasons for such disapproval or denial and the classification considered by the Sub-
Committee member dissenting from the majority opinion may express his dissent in writing.

c) The decision including the dissenting opinion, if any, shall immediately be submitted to the
Chairman of the Board for transmission to the applicant.

Sec 12. Review by Sub-Committee of Five. — Within five days from receipt of a copy of the
decision of the Sub-Committee referred to in the preceding section, the applicant may file a
motion for reconsideration in writing of that decision. On receipt of the motion, the Chairman
of the Board shall designate a Sub-Committee of Five Board Members which shall consider
the motion and, within five days of receipt of such motion, conduct a second preview of the
film. The review shall, to the extent applicable, follow the same procedure provided in the
preceding section.

Sec 13. Reclassification. — An applicant desiring a change in the classification rating given
his film by either the Sub-Committee of Three? or Committee of Five mentioned in the
immediately preceeding two sections may re-edit such film and apply anew with the Board
for its review and reclassification.

Sec 14. Appeal. — The decision of the Committee of Five Board Members in the second
review shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion
picture in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines who may
 himself decide the appeal or refer it to the Appeals Committee in the Office of the President
for adjudication.

On the other hand, the powers and functions of the MTRCB Chairman are found in Section 5 of the
same decree as follows:

Sec. 5. Executive Officer. — The Chairman of the BOARD shall be the Chief Executive
Officer of the BOARD. He shall exercise the following functions, powers and duties:

(a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and regulations
issued by the BOARD;

(b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD;

(c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the BOARD, and
recommend to the BOARD the appointment of the necessary administrative and subordinate
personnel; and

(d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not specifically
lodged in the BOARD.

It is at once apparent from a reading of the above provisions of PD 1986 that respondent Morato, as
Chairman of the MTRCB, is not vested with any authority to reverse or overrule by himself alone a
decision rendered by a committee which conducted a review of motion pictures or television
programs.

The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General Patronage" or "For Adults
Only" is vested with the respondent Board itself and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD
1986). As Chief Executive Officer, respondent Morato's function as Chairman of the Board calls for
the implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions or orders of the
latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having been reposed by law exclusively with the
respondent Board, it has no choice but to exercise the same as mandated by law, i.e., as a collegial
body, and not transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the intervening mind of
another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari — a delegated power cannot be delegated. And
since the act of classification involves an exercise of the Board's discretionary power with more
reason the Board cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate said power for it is an
established rule in administrative law that discretionary authority cannot be a subject of delegation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by the
respondent Board are hereby declared null and void.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183591 - THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET
AL.

G.R. No. 183752 - CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET
AL.

G.R. No. 183893 - THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAURENCE LLUCH
CRUZ v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET AL.

G.R. No. 183951 - THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as

represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET AL.

x----------------------------------x

FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention.

x----------------------------------x

MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N.

DEANO, petitioner-in-intervention.

x----------------------------------x
THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P.
SANTOS-AKBAR,petitioner-in-intervention.

x----------------------------------x

THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, represented by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDDATU,

in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan
Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention.

x----------------------------------x

RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, petitioner-in-intervention.

x----------------------------------x

CARLO B. GOMEZ, ET AL., petitioner-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------------x

SEPARATE OPINION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The piece of writing being assailed in these consolidated Petitions is a peace negotiation document,
namely the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA). The Solicitor General explained that this document,
prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace
Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of
consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a
Bangsamoro homeland.1 Subsequently, the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the
consolidated cases at bar based on changed circumstances as well as developments which have
rendered them moot, particularly the Executive Department's statement that it would no longer sign
the questioned peace negotiation document.2Nonetheless, several parties to the case, as well as
other sectors, continue to push for what they call a "complete determination" of the constitutional
issues raised in the present Petitions.

I believe that in light of the pronouncement of the Executive Department to already abandon the
MOA, the issue of its constitutionality has obviously become moot.

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an
actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and,
that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself. But the most important are the first two requisites.3

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale.4 An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the
issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. Simply stated, there is nothing for the court to
resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.5

Such is the case here.

The MOA has not even been signed, and will never be. Its provisions will not at all come into effect.
The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a
piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of
violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no
more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for
resolution by this Court.

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of
opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A
justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that
the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is
conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.6

For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of the MOA will merely be an
academic exercise. It would, in effect, only be delivering an opinion or advice on what are now
hypothetical or abstract violations of constitutional rights.

In Abbas v. Commission on Elections,7 the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and Republic Act No. 6734 (the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) were challenged for purported
violations of the provisions of the Constitution on freedom of religion. The Court held therein that it
should not inquire into the constitutionality of a peace agreement which was already consummated
(the 1976 Tripoli Agreement) and an Organic Act which was already passed into law (R.A. No. 6734)
just because of potential conflicts with the Constitution. Then, with more reason should this Court
desist from ruling on the constitutionality of the MOA which is unsigned, and now entirely
abandoned, and as such, cannot even have any potential conflict with the Constitution.

The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public
interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The
power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears
or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the
Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of
constitutional law.

The Executive Department has already manifested to this Court, through the Solicitor General, that it
will not sign the MOA in its present form or in any other form. It has declared the same intent to
the public. For this Court to insist that the issues raised in the instant Petitions cannot be moot for
they are still capable of repetition is to totally ignore the assurance given by the Executive
Department that it will not enter into any other form of the MOA in the future. The Court cannot doubt
the sincerity of the Executive Department on this matter. The Court must accord a co-equal branch
of the government nothing less than trust and the presumption of good faith.

Moreover, I deem it beyond the power of this Court to enjoin the Executive Department from entering
into agreements similar to the MOA in the future, as what petitioners and other opponents of the
MOA pray for. Such prayer once again requires this Court to make a definitive ruling on what are
mere hypothetical facts. A decree granting the same, without the Court having seen or considered
the actual agreement and its terms, would not only be premature, but also too general to make at
this point. It will perilously tie the hands of the Executive Department and limit its options in
negotiating peace for Mindanao.

Upon the Executive Department falls the indisputably difficult responsibility of diffusing the highly
volatile situation in Mindanao resulting from the continued clashes between the Philippine military
and Muslim rebel groups. In negotiating for peace, the Executive Department should be given
enough leeway and should not be prevented from offering solutions which may be beyond what the
present Constitution allows, as long as such solutions are agreed upon subject to the amendment of
the Constitution by completely legal means.

Peace negotiations are never simple. If neither party in such negotiations thinks outside the box, all
they would arrive at is a constant impasse. Thus, a counsel for one of the intervenors who assert the
unconstitutionality of the MOA8 had no choice but to agree as follows:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Well, we realize the constitutional constraints of

sovereignty, integrity and the like, but isn't there a time that surely will come and the life of
our people when they have to transcend even these limitations?

DEAN AGABIN: Yes, we have seen it happen in several instances, Your Honor.
 xxx

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And in pursuit of that purpose, the Supreme Court
cannot look beyond the horizon and look for more satisfying result?

DEAN AGABIN: Well, if you mean by looking beyond the horizon, it would mean a violation
of the provisions of the Constitution, then it should not be, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: In some part, we have gone to Malaysia. We have

gone to the OIC, and we have even gone to Libya.

DEAN AGABIN: Yes, Your Honor. But in all these, we have always insisted on preserving
the territorial integrity of the country.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And this dicta or [dogma] is unassailable forever.

There cannot be an exception.

DEAN AGABIN: It is unassailable under the present Constitution, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: But, at least, you can also agree that the Constitution
ought to be changed in order for a country to fulfill its internal obligation as a matter of
necessity.

DEAN AGABIN: Yes, if the people so will it, your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: You remember how the emperor of Japan lost his
divinity? They just changed their Constitution, isn't it?

DEAN AGABIN: Yes, it was enforced upon him by Mr. McArthur, and they have no choice.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Isn't that a very good example of thinking outside the
box? That one day even those who are underground may have to think. But frankly now
Dean, before I end, may I ask, is it possible to meld or modify our Constitutional Order in
order to have some room for the newly developing international notions on Associative
Governance Regulation Movement and Human Rights?

DEAN AGABIN: Yes. It is possible, Your Honor, with the consent of the people.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And, therefore, we vote it to a referendum or any

consultation beforehand?

DEAN AGABIN: If there is such a proposal for or amendment or revision of the Constitution,
yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: So, either initiative or CHA-CHA or CON-AS?

DEAN AGABIN: Yes, Your Honor.9

It must be noted that the Constitution has been in force for three decades now, yet, peace in
Mindanao still remained to be elusive under its present terms. There is the possibility that the
solution to the peace problem in the Southern Philippines lies beyond the present Constitution.
Exploring this possibility and considering the necessary amendment of the Constitution are not per
se unconstitutional. The Constitution itself implicitly allows for its own amendment by describing,
under Article XVII, the means and requirements therefor. In Tan v. Macapagal,10 where petitioners
claim that the Constitutional Convention was without power to consider, discuss, or adopt proposals
which seek to revise the Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the
form outlined in the then governing Constitution, the Court ruled that:

[A]s long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by [the Convention], there is no
room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends
to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the Courts are
devoid of jurisdiction. x x x.
At this point, there is far from a concrete proposed amendment to the Constitution which the Court
can take cognizance of, much less render a pronouncement upon.

At most, the Court can only exhort the Executive Department to keep in mind that it must negotiate
and secure peace in Mindanao under terms which are most beneficial for the country as a whole,
and not just one group of Muslim insurgents. Transparency and consultation with all major players,
which necessarily include affected local government units and their constituents, are essential to
arrive at a more viable and acceptable peace plan. The nature and extent of any future written
agreements should be clearly established from the very beginning, and the terms thereof carefully
drafted and clearly worded, to avoid misunderstandings or misconstructions by the parties and the
public. If a document is meant to be a list of consensus points still subject to further negotiations,
then it should just simply state so.

As a final note, I find it necessary to stress that the Court must not allow itself to be mired in
controversies affecting each step of the peace process in Mindanao. It is not within the province or
even the competence of the Judiciary to tell the Executive Department exactly what and what not,
how and how not, to negotiate for peace with insurgents. Given this kind of situation where war and
peace hang in the balance, where people's lives are at stake, and the Executive Department, under
its residual powers, is tasked to make political decisions in order to find solutions to the insurgency
problem, the Court should respect the political nature of the issues at bar and exercise judicial
restraint until an actual controversy is brought before it.

In view of the foregoing, I vote for the GRANT of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Solicitor General
and, accordingly, for the DISMISSAL of the Petitions at bar for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice