Group Processes & Intergroup

Relations
http://gpi.sagepub.com

Understanding the Relationship between Attribute-Based and Metaphor-Based

Dehumanization
Steve Loughnan, Nick Haslam and Yoshihisa Kashima
Group Processes Intergroup Relations 2009; 12; 747
DOI: 10.1177/1368430209347726

The online version of this article can be found at:

http://gpi.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/12/6/747

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for Group Processes & Intergroup Relations can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://gpi.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://gpi.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations http://gpi.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/12/6/747

Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009

 Group Processes &
Intergroup Relations
2009 Vol 12(6) 747–762

Understanding the Relationship

between Attribute-Based and
Metaphor-Based Dehumanization
Steve Loughnan, Nick Haslam and Yoshihisa Kashima
University of Melbourne

Previous research has adopted two distinct approaches to the study of dehumanization. One has
focused on the denial of human attributes to groups (attribute-based dehumanization) and the
other on the likening of group members to nonhumans (metaphor-based dehumanization).
The relationship between these two approaches has yet to be examined. The current studies
seek to clarify this relationship by integrating the two approaches. Using Haslam and colleagues’
(Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima & Bain, 2008) model of dehumanization, we
examined whether attribute-based dehumanization leads to metaphor-based dehumanization,
and vice versa. In Study 1 participants read about a novel group that was described either as
lacking one type of humanness or as being like a nonhuman. In Study 2 a concrete learning
task taught participants that a novel group lacked a specific type of humanness. In both studies,
participants explicitly learned to dehumanize the group and inferred the corresponding type
of attribute- or metaphor-based perception (e.g. perceived a group as animal-like after learning
that it lacked uniquely human attributes, and vice versa). Implicitly, however, participants were
able to directly learn but not robustly infer the corresponding type of dehumanization. We
suggest that the relationship between the two types of dehumanization can be understood using
cognitive models of metaphor-making.

keywords dehumanization, infrahumanization, metaphor

The study of dehumanization1 is experiencing attributes to others or on the likening of others

rapid growth within social psychology. Since
the emergence of infrahumanization theory
less than a decade ago (Leyens et al., 2001),
the field has expanded to encompass a wide
variety of phenomena in group and person per-
ception, and a rich assortment of research
methods and theoretical perspectives. At the
same time, approaches to the field have subtly
diverged. The purpose of this paper is to address
one central aspect of this divergence and attempt
to integrate it. Dehumanization research has
tended to focus either on the denial of human
to nonhumans, and the present paper aims to
bridge these attribute- and metaphor-based
approaches.
Most previous research has examined attribute-
based dehumanization. Research on infra-
humanization exemplifies this focus on denials
Author’s note
Address correspondence to Steve Loughnan,
Department of Psychology, University of
Melbourne, Parkville VIC 3010, Australia.
[email: lost@unimelb.edu.au]

Copyright © The Author(s), 2009

Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
12:6; 747–762;
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne DOI:21,10.1177/1368430209347726
Library on October 2009
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12(6)
of humanness, specifically the denial of unique-
ly human emotions to outgroup members
(Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007;
Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002). Under
this paradigm, researchers first established
which characteristics are unique to humans
(i.e. secondary emotions), and then examined
the differential attribution of these character-
istics to ingroup and outgroup. The denial of
uniquely human emotions to outgroup mem-
bers was taken to indicate that they are subtly
viewed as less human than the ingroup (Leyens,
Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Leyens
et al., 2001).
A focus on the denial of humanness-defining
attributes also characterizes the dehumanization
research of Haslam and colleagues. Haslam
(2006) proposed that humanness may be under-
stood as attributes that are unique to humans
(human uniqueness; HU) and those that are
essential to being human (human nature; HN).
In interpersonal comparisons, people tend to
deny HN to others relative to the self (Haslam &
Bain, 2007; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian,
2005), and deny both HN and HU to particular
groups in intergroup contexts (Loughnan &
Haslam, 2007; Saminaden, Loughnan, &
Haslam, in press). Similar to infrahumanization
research, studies in this tradition examine
dehumanization as the subtle denial of particular
human attributes.
A second and largely independent stream of
research has examined dehumanization as the
association of outgroup members with non-
human entities. This metaphor-based approach
has typically examined the likening of out-
groups to animals. For instance, Viki et al. (2006)
investigated the perceived likeness of ingroup
and outgroup members to animals and found a
tendency to consider outgroup members more
animal-like than ingroup members. A similar
effect was also found when comparing tradi-
tional and modern people (Saminaden et al.,
in press). Other research has established that
ethnic outgroups can be likened to apes relative
to the ingroup (Boccato, Capozza, Falvo, &
Durante, 2008; Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, &
Jackson, 2008). Metaphor-based dehumaniza-
tion research has not remained limited to the
study of animalization. Loughnan and Haslam
748
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
(2007) found that although some occupational
groups (i.e. artists) are likened to animals, others
(i.e. business people) are likened to robots.
The distinction between attribute- and metaphor-
based dehumanization captures most previous
dehumanization research, but their relationship
remains theoretically and empirically uncertain.
Infrahumanization theorists have argued that
because HU attributes define the boundary be-
tween humans and animals, their denial tacitly
animalizes outgroup members (Leyens et al.,
2007). Indeed, Leyens et al. (2007, p. 140) state
that ‘infrahumanization in a process by which
people consider their ingroup as fully human
and outgroups as less human and more animal-
like’. Similarly, Haslam claimed that ‘if people
are perceived as lacking what distinguishes
humans from animals, they should be seen im-
plicitly or explicitly as animal-like’ (Haslam,
2006, p. 258). However, the claim that the denial
of HU leads to animalization has not received
empirical scrutiny. With regards to a denial of
human nature, Haslam (2006, p. 258) claims
that ‘the shared, typical, or core properties of
humanness are also those that distinguish us
from automata’. Again however, the claim than
the denial of HN leads to mechanization has
not been investigated. Although attribute- and
metaphor-based types of dehumanization have
occasionally been examined simultaneously
(e.g. Loughnan & Haslam, 2007; Saminaden
et al., in press), whether denying human at-
tributes to a group and seeing its members as
nonhuman are causally linked has not been
examined. Thus, although there are theoretical
links between denials of HN and robot or
machine metaphors, and between denials of HU
and animal metaphors (Haslam, 2006; Leyens
et al., 2007), there is currently no evidence for
these associations. This represents an important
gap in our understanding of dehumanization.
The current research aimed to address this
gap by directly examining the relationship be-
tween attribute- and metaphor-based dehuman-
ization. It builds on recent advances in our
understanding of the formation of implicit
and explicit representations of social groups.
Social cognitive research on implicit and explicit
attitude formation has recently examined the
mechanisms through which people come to
 Loughnan et al. attribute and metaphor dehumanization
hold evaluative beliefs about others. One tech-
nique widely employed in this research has been
the ‘novel group’ paradigm, whereby partici-
pants are required to form an attitude about
a completely fictitious group (Gregg, Seibt, &
Banaji, 2006; Ranganath & Nosek, 2008; Rydell,
McConnell, & Mackie, 2008; Rydell, McConnell,
Mackie, & Strain, 2006; Rydell, McConnell,
Strain, Claypool, & Hugenberg, 2007). Under the
novel group technique, participants are typically
provided with positive or negative information
about the group before indicating their implicit
and explicit evaluations.
In the current research we adapted this
approach to the study of dehumanization. In
two studies participants were given descrip-
tions that dehumanized a novel group in either
an attribute-based (i.e. low in HU or HN) or
metaphor-based manner (i.e. being animal-
like or robot-like). We then assessed i) whether
people were able to directly learn metaphor-
and attribute-based dehumanization at both an
implicit and explicit level, and ii) whether they
were further able to infer the corresponding
type of dehumanization at both an implicit
and explicit level. If attribute- and metaphor-
based dehumanization are related in the man-
ner suggested by infrahumanization theory
(Leyens et al., 2007) and dehumanization theory
(Haslam, 2006), then learning that members of
a group lack a particular sense of humanness
(e.g. HU) should lead people to infer that they
are like a particular nonhuman (e.g. animals).
If the effect is bi-directional, then learning that
group members are like a particular nonhuman
(e.g. robots) should lead people to infer that they
lack a specific sense of humanness (e.g. HN).
This paper examines the relationship between
both types of dehumanization with regards to
the directionality of inference (attributes to
metaphors/metaphors to attributes) and level
of acquisition and inference (implicit/explicit).
Using this design we can foresee several different
patterns of results. With regard the directionality
of inference, at least three types of relationship
are possible.
One possibility is that being denied a specific
sense of humanness might lead to a group being
viewed as like a specific nonhuman. That is,
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
attributes lead to metaphors. This model tacitly
underlies much of the existing theorizing in both
the infrahumanization and dehumanization
literatures. Although these frameworks differ
in their respective types of humanness, both
argue that a particular set of human attributes
is required to be considered fully human.
Denying another group these attributes shifts
them away from the human and towards the
nonhuman. Stated otherwise, attribute-based
dehumanization leads to metaphor-based de-
humanization. Finding support for this model
would validate existing theory. Alternatively, a
metaphorical association between the outgroup
and a particular nonhuman might lead to the
inference that the group lacks a specific sense
of humanness. Put simply, metaphors lead to
attributes. In contrast to the preceding model,
the second model suggests that metaphors
cause attribute-based dehumanization.
The third model is the reciprocity model.
This model combines the two preceding models
by positing two routes to full metaphor and at-
tribute dehumanization. The outgroup can be
viewed as lacking a specific sense of humanness
which leads to the inference that they are like a
nonhuman and being likened to a specific non-
human causes people to infer that the group
lacks a specific sense of humanness. The reci-
procity model allows both previous accounts
to be accurate; attributes lead to metaphors
and metaphors lead to attributes. If this model
is correct we can provide an integrated, bi-
directional account of the relationship between
these two types of dehumanization. Under
this model neither type of dehumanization
is primary, rather both types may lead to and
be inferred from the other. This set of models
is not intended to be exhaustive. Indeed, it is
possible that the two types of dehumanization
are unrelated or that a third variable can explain
their co-occurrence. However, this set is sufficient
for an initial investigation, and seems to cover
the most plausible relationships.
These studies additionally allow us to ex-
plore whether dehumanization is learned and
inferred spontaneously (and thus appears at an
implicit level) or non-spontaneously (and thus
appears only at an explicit level). Many social
749
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12(6)
inferences and aspects of impression formation
occur spontaneously, whereas others require
deliberative processing (for a recent review see
Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). If the ac-
quisition of dehumanization occurs rapidly at
both levels it would suggest that, like attitudes
(Gregg et al., 2006; Rydell et al., 2007), people
can readily form dehumanizing impressions
of others. By contrast, if people are only able
to acquire dehumanizing representations ex-
plicitly, this would suggest that the process of
learning to dehumanize a group is cognitively
demanding. The same can be said for dehuman-
izing inferences. If they appear at both an
implicit and explicit level then we have evidence
that people can rapidly expand their sense of
dehumanization (for a related discussion on
the rapid generalization of implicit attitudes
see Ranganath & Nosek, 2008). In contrast, if
dehumanization occurs at an explicit but not
an implicit level, there is evidence that the in-
ference process is cognitively demanding. It
may be the case that learning that a group is
less than fully human is more complex than
learning that they are positive or negative, and
accordingly requires the investment of consider-
able cognitive resources. Finally, it is possible that
dehumanization occurs at an implicit but not
an explicit level. This pattern of results would
suggest that people are perhaps hesitant to
report dehumanization (even of novel groups),
despite these beliefs forming easily. In sum, this
study design allows us to distinguish multiple
different accounts of the relationship between
these two aspects of dehumanization.
Study 1
In the first study, we examined both attribute-
and metaphor-based dehumanization. At the
attribute level, we examined the denial of
HN and HU. At the metaphor level, the group
was likened to either animals or robots. We
adopted Gregg et al.’s (2006) approach for
inducing attitudes towards a novel group by
having participants read a short description
of the group. Four dehumanizing stories
were presented: two attribute-based and two
metaphor-based. Consistent with theory we
750
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
hypothesized that the denial of specific attrib-
utes would lead directly to learning attribute-
based dehumanization and indirectly to inferring
metaphor-based dehumanization. Likewise, we
predicted that the metaphorical likening of a
social group to nonhumans would lead directly
to learning metaphor-based and indirectly to
inferring attribute-based dehumanization.
These measures of direct learning acted addi-
tionally as manipulation checks to ensure that
we were able to induce different types of de-
humanization. We measured dehumanization
at both an implicit and explicit level.
Method
Participants One hundred and fourteen under-
graduates (89 female, mean age 20.56 years,
SD = 4.69) participated in partial fulfillment of
course requirements. Participants completed
four tasks: a categorization task, a scenario read-
ing task, an implicit dehumanization measure,
and an explicit dehumanization measure. All
four tasks involved participants working with two
novel groups: the Hebians and the Nopoes.
Materials A categorization task was used to
ensure participants were able to quickly and
accurately discriminate between names repre-
senting two novel groups: Hebians and Nopoes.
To ease the categorization of a name as either
Hebian or Nopoe, all Hebian names contained
the letter string ‘h-e-b’ and all Nopoe names
contained the string ‘o-p-o’ (see Gregg et al.,
2006). The categorization task involved the
presentation of single names from both groups.
Participants were required to respond to Hebian
names by striking the ‘A’ key and Nopoes
names by striking the ‘L’ key. Each response
was followed by immediate accuracy feedback,
with a 700 ms timeout.
Participants were presented with one of four
stories depicting a novel group. All stories started
with a short description of the novel group as
an ethnic group living in a fictitious nation
(Hebia or Nopoia). The two Hebian stories de-
scribed the ‘typical Hebian’ as possessing certain
attributes. The aim of these stories was for par-
ticipants to form an impression of the group as
lacking one sense of humanness. In the low-HU
 Loughnan et al. attribute and metaphor dehumanization
condition, the group was described as posses-
sing attributes low in human uniqueness.
Conversely, in the low-HN condition, the group
was described as possessing attributes low in
human nature. The humanness attributes were
drawn from previous research where they were
extensively validated and matched from fre-
quency, familiarity, and word length (Haslam &
Bain, 2007; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007;
Saminaden et al., in press). The Nopoes’ stories
presented the group as like a particular type of
nonhuman using nonhuman descriptors and
behaviors. One story animalized the Nopoes
directly by labeling them as animal-like and
indirectly by reference to their animal-like be-
haviors and appearance. The other story mech-
anized the Nopoes directly by labeling them
as robot-like and indirectly through reference
to robotic behaviors. Behaviors were used to
bolster the direct metaphor, and were selected
to reflect those highly characteristic of animals
and robots based on previous research (Haslam,
Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008) (see
Appendix for all study stimuli).
To assess implicit dehumanization partici-
pants completed a Go No-go Association Task
(Nosek & Banaji, 2001). The GNAT is an implicit
association measure which, similar to the SC-IAT
(Karpinski & Stienman, 2006), measures a single
association between two target categories. The
GNAT measures the strength of association
between two target concepts, indexed using a
d-prime (d′) statistic, and has been previously em-
ployed to examine dehumanization (Capozza,
Andrighetto, Falvo, & Trifiletti, 2006; Loughnan
& Haslam, 2007). Participants were presented
with four individually randomized blocks of
GNAT trials. These blocks tested the associations
between the novel group and both i) the two
senses of humanness and ii) the two nonhumans
(animals and robots). For the animal stimuli we
decided to focus specifically on apes. Previous
research has shown that social groups are
subtly likened to apes (Boccato et al., 2008; Goff
et al., 2008), and that this can have particularly
harmful consequences for the group (Goff
et al., 2008). Each concept was represented by
six terms. Each GNAT block contained four
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
concepts (two targets, two distractors) with each
term repeated five times, resulting in 60 targets
and 60 distractors. All terms were matched with
their paired distractor for familiarity, frequency,
and length using a lexical database (Baayens,
Piepenbrock, & van Rijn, 1995). Participants’
task was to distinguish targets (go response)
from distractors (no go response). Given the
ease of identifying Hebian or Nopoe names, a
response deadline of 600 ms was imposed.
To measure explicit attribute-based and
metaphor-based dehumanization a question-
naire was administered. The attribute-based
dehumanization questions required participants
to rate the degree to which a series of HN and
HU traits were typical of the group on a six-point
scale (1 = not at all typical, 6 = highly typical).
The 20 traits were drawn from previous re-
search (Haslam et al., 2005; Loughnan &
Haslam, 2007) and included the 12 traits used
in the GNAT task with the addition of four
HN traits (i.e. nervous, trusting, sociable, and
impatient) and four HU traits (i.e. humble,
broadminded, stingy, and shallow). For par-
ticipants in the Hebian condition this ques-
tionnaire served as an explicit measure of
direct learning. For participants in the Nopoe
condition, it assessed the inference of attribute-
based dehumanization. The metaphor-based
dehumanization task required participants to
indicate the perceived likeness of the novel
group to particular nonhumans. Participants
indicated how much the group was like animals
and robots using a six-point scale (1 = very unlike,
6 = very like). For participants in the Nopoe
condition this questionnaire was an explicit
measure of direct learning. For participants in
the Hebian condition, it assessed the inference
of metaphor-based dehumanization.
Procedure The experiment was administered
to groups of one to eight participants, who were
randomly assigned to one of the four stories.
All participants completed the categorization
task, reading task, GNAT, and questionnaire in
order. Following the completion of the ques-
tionnaire participants were thanked and fully
debriefed.
751
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12(6)
Results
The results of the name discrimination task indi-
cated that participants were able to distinguish
the Hebian and Nopoe names at high speed
with over 80% accuracy, well above chance
level responding. An analysis of discrimination
accuracy and average d′ scores in the GNAT
revealed that 14 participants performed at
or below chance and they were subsequently
excluded from further analysis. The exclusion
of participants who respond below chance is
recommended when using d′ values (Green &
Swets, 1966).
Explicit dehumanization The questionnaire
required participants to rate the group on HN
and HU trait terms. Both HN and HU terms
demonstrated good reliability (Cronbach’s
α = 0.89, 0.89). To examine the effect of story
condition on ratings of humanness, a 4 (Between:
story condition) × 2 (Within: humanness type;
HN, HU) mixed model ANOVA was conducted.
There was no significant main effect of condi-
tion, F(1, 95) = 3.33, p = 0.077, indicating no
general tendency to rate the group higher on
either sense of humanness, but a significant
interaction between humanness and condition,
F(1, 95) = 118.46, p < 0.001. As hypothesized,
participants in the low-HU condition rated the
group as possessing less HU than HN traits,
F(1, 25) = 179.28, p < 0.001, whereas participants
in the low-HN condition rated the group as
possessing less HN than HU, F(1, 24) = 122.17,
p < 0.001. This result indicates that the manipu-
lation of humanness attributes was successful at
an explicit level. Participants in the mechanized
condition—who read that Nopoes were robot-
like—viewed the group as possessing less HN
than HU, F(1, 22) = 120.13, p < 0.001, whereas
Table 1. Explicit dehumanization learning and inference
Condition HN
Low-HN 2.32a
Mechanization 2.30a
Low-HU 4.82a
Animalization 3.34a
Note: Values with different subscripts are significantly different across rows.
752
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
participants in the animalized condition viewed
the group as possessing less HU than HN,
F(1, 24) = 9.22, p = 0.006 (see Table 1). These results
indicate that learning that a group is like a spe-
cific type of nonhuman leads to the inference that
it lacks particular psychological attributes.
Explicit metaphor-based dehumanization
was measured by asking participants how much
the group was like ‘animals’ and ‘robots’. A 4
(story condition) × 2 (nonhuman; animal, robot)
mixed model ANOVA yielded the predicted
interaction between condition and nonhuman,
F(3, 95) = 54.30, p < 0.001. Consistent with ex-
pectations, participants rated the animalized
group as significantly more animal-like than
robot-like, F(1, 24) = 52.80, p < 0.001, and the
mechanized group as more robot-like than
animal-like, F(1, 23) = 15.13, p = 0.001. This
finding indicated that the stories were successful
in manipulating overt representations of the
group as like certain nonhumans. Participants
in the low-HU condition also viewed the group
as significantly more animal-like than robot-like,
F(1, 26) = 43.20, p < 0.001, and participants
in the low-HN condition viewed the group as
significantly more robot-like than animal-like,
F(1, 23) = 15.13, p = 0.001 (see Table 1). Thus
participants who learned that a group lacked
certain humanness-defining attributes inferred
that it was like particular types of nonhuman.
In sum, participants both directly learned and
inferred dehumanization at an explicit level.
Implicit dehumanization Response accur-
acies for each participant in each GNAT block
were converted into d′ values by subtracting the
standardized probability of a false alarm from
the standardized probability of a hit (Nosek &
Banaji, 2001). Higher d′ values indicate a stronger
HU Animals Automata
4.73b 2.54a 4.20c
3.94b 2.13a 5.04c
2.35b 3.66c 1.59d
2.55b 4.36c 1.60d
 Loughnan et al. attribute and metaphor dehumanization
association. The attribute-based (Hebian) and
metaphor-based (Nopoe) story conditions were
analyzed separately.
To examine the effect of attribute-based story
manipulation on implicit associations, a 2
(Between: low-HN, low-HU) × 4 (Within: HN,
HU, animal, robot) mixed model ANOVA was
conducted. The results indicated a significant
interaction between block-d′ and story type,
F(3, 46) = 5.54, p = 0.002. Age and gender had
no effects in any of the study analyses. To investi-
gate the effect of the low-HU story on implicit
associations between the groups, humanness
attributes, and types of nonhuman, two planned
comparisons were conducted. The first compared
d′ values for the HN block with the HU block,
revealing a significant difference between the
two attribute types, F(1, 26) = 6.34, p = 0.018.
Participants who read that Hebians were low
in HU associated them with HU attributes less
than with HN attributes, indicating that the story
manipulation influenced perceived attribute-
based humanness at an implicit level. The second
planned comparison contrasted the d′ values
for the Animal and Robot blocks, revealing that
participants associated the Hebians with animals
more than robots, F(1, 26) = 4.86, p = 0.037.
This result suggests that participants inferred
an implicit relationship between the group
and a particular type of nonhuman based on
the type of humanness that the group lacked
(see Table 2).
The pattern of results observed in the low-
HU condition was expected to reverse for the
low-HN condition. Indeed, participants who
read that Hebians lacked HN attributes im-
plicitly associated them with HU attributes
more than HN attributes, F(1, 24) = 7.13,
p = 0.013. In contrast, the planned comparison
Table 2. Implicit dehumanization learning and inference
Condition HN d′
a b
Low-HN 1.32
Mechanization 1.11a
Low-HU 1.69a
Animalization 1.48a
Note: Values with different subscripts are significantly different across rows.
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
revealed no significant difference between
d′ values for the Animal and Robot blocks,
F(1, 24) < 1, ns.
The two metaphor-based (Nopoes) story
conditions were examined in the same manner.
In the ‘animalized’ condition the planned
comparison indicated that participants did not
implicitly associate Nopoes with animals more
than robots, F(3, 24) = 1.09, p = 0.20, or HU
attributes less than HN attributes, F(3, 24) < 1,
ns. These fi ndings suggest that reading the
description of Nopoes as animal-like did not
lead to the formation of implicit associations
with either nonhumans or perceived humanness.
In the ‘mechanized’ condition, the planned
comparisons indicated that Nopoes were
associated more with Robots than Animals, F(3,
22) = 11.92, p = 0.002, and marginally less with
HN attributes than HU attributes, F(3, 22) = 3.78,
p = 0.065 (see Table 2).
Discussion
The findings of Study 1 are twofold. First,
they indicate that people can learn and infer
dehumanizing perceptions of groups. Second,
although direct learning occurs at an implicit
and explicit level, inference robustly occurs
only explicitly.
Participants were able to learn to explicitly
and implicitly dehumanize the novel group
in both attribute-based and metaphor-based
ways. When a novel group is dehumanized,
people learn it rapidly regardless of the type of
dehumanization. This direct learning indicates
the speed with which dehumanizing stereotypes
can develop. Further, the robustness with which
participants were able to learn both implicit
and explicit dehumanization indicates that
explicitly presented dehumanizing material
HU d′ Animals d′ Automata d′
c
1.60 2.34 2.26c
1.47b 1.99c 2.24d
1.47b 2.63c 2.37d
1.37a 1.92b 1.99b
753
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12(6)
can lead to implicit learning (for similar results
in the attitude domain see Gregg et al., 2006;
Ranganath & Nosek, 2008).
At an explicit level, this dehumanization
spreads from attributes to metaphors, and vice
versa. Importantly, the pattern of inference
is entirely consistent with the predictions of
dehumanization (Haslam, 2006) and infra-
humanization (Leyens et al., 2001) theory; the
denial of HU attributes leads to likening to
animals, and denial of HN attributes leads
to likening to robots. This study is the first to pro-
vide direct evidence for a reciprocal causal link
between attribute- and metaphor-based forms
of dehumanization. Whereas previous research
has demonstrated the co-occurrence of attribute-
based and metaphor-based dehumanization
(Loughnan & Haslam, 2007; Saminaden et al.,
in press), this study indicates that denying one
type of humanness leads people to infer the
corresponding dehumanizing metaphor.
Interestingly, this movement from one type
of dehumanization to the other was only
robust at an explicit level. At an implicit level,
although participants were generally able to
learn dehumanizing attribute- or metaphor-
based perceptions directly, they were unable to
consistently infer one type of dehumanization
from the other. People were able to infer low
HN from mechanistic dehumanization and
animalization from low HU. However, the
former result only reached marginal signifi-
cance and the latter failed to replicate in the
next study. These findings imply that people
neither spontaneously infer dehumanizing
attributes from dehumanizing metaphors, nor
spontaneously use dehumanizing metaphors
when a target group is ascribed dehumanizing
attributes. They move between attribute-based
and metaphor-based dehumanization when they
are required to do so.
Nonetheless, it is possible that this result
arose due to the type of learning paradigm em-
ployed (i.e. scenario-based learning). Dual-route
attitude models have recently dissociated a fast,
reflective, and cognitively expensive explicit
learning system and a slower, unconscious, less
cognitively demanding implicit learning sys-
tem (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2007).
754
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
The scenario-based learning paradigm may
have activated the explicit processing system,
leading to robust explicit dehumanization, while
providing only limited learning opportunities
to the implicit learning system, resulting in
weaker implicit dehumanization. Alternative
learning paradigms that have been previously
demonstrated to lead to strong implicit and
explicit representations might yield stronger
implicit results. This possibility is examined in
Study 2. In sum, Study 1 indicates that people
can learn to dehumanize at both an implicit and
explicit level. Moreover, at an explicit level, a
theoretically consistent form of dehumanization
can be inferred.
Study 2
The aim of Study 2 was to replicate the results
of Study 1 and to investigate the possibility that
an alternative learning paradigm may lead to
robust inference of implicit dehumanization.
This study focused on the learning of attribute-
based dehumanization and the subsequent
inference of metaphor-based dehumanization.
We elected to focus on this particular path of
dehumanization for several reasons. A majority
of previous dehumanization and infrahuman-
ization research has worked from an attribute-
based approach (Boccato et al., 2007; Haslam &
Bain, 2007; Haslam et al., 2005; Leyens et al.,
2001; Paladino et al., 2002). Thus, focusing on
this approach aligns this study with previous
research. Importantly, previous social cognitive
research investigating attitude acquisition has
focused on how people move from more basic
(e.g. behavioral) representations to more com-
plex (e.g. trait, evaluative) representations (e.g.
Ranganath & Nosek, 2008). Choosing to examine
the movement from more basic humanness
attributes to more abstract metaphors aligns
this study more closely with previous research.
Finally, to broaden the scope of the findings, we
examined associations with animals in general
rather than apes in particular.
One possible explanation of the lack of spon-
taneous dehumanization in Study 1 was the
choice of learning paradigm (i.e. scenario-
based). Recent implicit attitude research has
 Loughnan et al. attribute and metaphor dehumanization
employed the concrete-learning paradigm to
investigate the acquisition of both implicit
and explicit attitudes. This paradigm provides
participants with multiple single instances of be-
haviors or traits descriptive of the target group
or individual. Participants are required to guess
whether the description is accurate, forming an
impression of the target over multiple trials.
Although Gregg et al. (2006) demonstrated
that this technique generates similar results
to the scenario-based approach, Rydell et al.
(2006) have recently shown that concrete-
learning can lead to rapid implicit and explicit
attitude formation. Further, although explicit at-
titudes are sensitive to small amounts of counter-
attitudinal information, implicit attitudes
gained using this technique are highly resistant
to change (Gregg et al., 2006; Rydell et al.,
2007). Finally, in a recent study investigating
the generalization of implicit attitudes between
members of the same outgroup, Ranganath and
Nosek (2008) demonstrated that implicit at-
titudes acquired in this fashion quickly spread
amongst members of the same group. In short,
concrete-learning induces strong implicit and
explicit attitudes, and therefore may lead to
strong implicit and explicit dehumanization.
Further, this technique has been demonstrated
to induce attitude spread across groups and
therefore may also lead to inferences of other
associations.
Method
Participants Eighty-six undergraduates (54 fe-
male, 32 male) with a mean age of 19.15 years
(SD = 2.10), participated for partial fulfillment
of course requirement or $10 payment.
Materials Participants were required to com-
plete several tasks in a set order: a concrete
learning task, a name differentiation task,
a four-block GNAT, and an attribute-based
dehumanization and metaphor-based dehuman-
ization measure.
Concrete learning Participants were ran-
domly assigned to learn that a novel group,
the Luupites, lacked human nature (low-HN)
or human uniqueness (low-HU) attributes.
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
Learning trials consisted of the presentation of
a series of trait terms and behavioral descriptors.
Participants responded by guessing whether
the attribute was typical of the group. The traits
were the 20 adjectives employed in Study 1
and previous research (Loughnan & Haslam,
2007). These were supplemented by 10 brief
behavioral descriptors previously shown to
align with HN or HU (Wilson, 2008); five
indicative of HN (e.g. ‘maintaining rela-
tionships’) and five of HU (e.g. ‘reading’) (see
Appendix).
Attributes were presented individually on
a computer monitor and participants were
required to guess whether the attribute was
characteristic of the Luupites (press ‘A’) or
not (press ‘L’). Participants were informed
whether their guess was correct (e.g. ‘Correct:
Luupites are Friendly’) or incorrect (e.g. ‘Incor-
rect: Luupites are not Friendly’). For half the
participants HN terms were uncharacteristic
(low-HN), and for the remaining participants
HU terms were uncharacteristic (low-HU).
Name differentiation Participants completed
a name differentiation task identical to that
used in Study 1. This task enabled participants
to practice identifying names representing
Luupites from distractors (i.e. Niffite names)
at high speeds. As in Study 1, all Luupite names
contained the character string ‘l-u-p’ (see Gregg
et al., 2006).
The GNAT Participants completed a four-
block GNAT, pairing Luupites with HN, HU,
Animals, and Robots. Each block consisted
of 120 trials, including 60 targets comprising
three repetitions of two sets of 10 stimulus
items (see Appendix). The HN and HU items
were identical to the trait terms employed in
the concrete learning task, to which the partici-
pants had prior exposure, and did not include
the behavioral descriptors. Animal and robot
concepts were represented by exemplars of those
categories. Rather than focusing specifically on
likening to apes (Study 1), which may narrow
the scope of the findings, a more general ani-
mal category was drawn from prior research
(Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). The distractors
755
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12(6)
formed the complementary category to the
targets. For example, HN targets were coupled
with HU distractors (Nosek & Banaji, 2001).
All terms were matched with their paired dis-
tractor for familiarity, frequency, and length
using a lexical database (Baayens et al., 1995).
Trial- and block-order was randomized between
participants. All other features of the GNAT
were identical to that of the previous study.
Dehumanization questionnaire Participants
completed the metaphor-based and attribute-
based dehumanization questionnaire for the
Luupites. This questionnaire was identical to
that presented in Study 1 but was presented
electronically. The 22 questions appeared
individually in the center of the screen and par-
ticipants responded using a six-point scale
ranging from 1 (not at all typical, very unlike) to
6 (highly typical, very like).
Results
Preliminary analysis Participants in both con-
ditions completed two sets of concrete learning
trials designed to teach them that the group
lacked one set of humanness attributes. As
participants were forced to guess whether each
attribute was typical of the Luupites or not,
d′ sensitivity scores were calculated for each
participant. A hit refers to correctly attributing
a Luupite characteristic to the Luupites (e.g. a
HN trait in the low-HU condition) and a false
alarm to incorrectly attributing a non-Luupite
characteristic to the Luupites (e.g. a HU trait
in the low-HU condition). Average d′ scores
were significantly above chance in the low-HU
(M = 1.36) and low-HN (M = 1.20) conditions,
ts(85) > 18.20, ps < 0.001. Independent-
samples t-tests revealed that the differences
between low-HN and low-HU d′ scores did
not reach significance, t(85) = 1.79, p = 0.079.
Two participants consistently demonstrated d′
values more than two standard deviations below
the mean, and thus were excluded from all
further analysis. Participants also performed well
at the name dissociation task. Again, d′ scores
were calculated using the standardized number
of hits (correct identifications of the Luupite
name) and false alarms (incorrect classifications
756
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
of Niffite names as Luupite names). In both
the low-HN (M = 2.67) and low-HU conditions
(M = 2.73) participants rapidly and accurately
dissociated the names, performing well above
chance, ts(85) > 28.0, p < 0.001. Independent-
samples t-tests revealed that name learning did
not vary by condition, t(85) = 0.50, p > 0.05. In
short, participants performed with a high level
of accuracy, indicating that they successfully
learned the attribute-based dehumanization and
the capacity to identify Luupite names.
Explicit dehumanization The two sets of
humanness items demonstrated excellent
reliability despite containing both positive and
negative trait terms (Cronbach’s α = 0.96, 0.89)
and so were averaged to create HN and HU
scores for each participant. A 2 (condition;
low-HU or low-HN) × 2 (humanness type; HU
and HN) mixed model ANOVA yielded the
predicted two-way interaction between condi-
tion and humanness, F(1, 82) = 395.57, p < 0.001.
As expected, people in the low-HN condition
rated the group lower on HN terms than people
in the low-HU condition, F(1, 82) = 357.12,
p < 0.001, and people in the low-HU condition
rated the group lower on HU than those in the
low-HN condition, F(1, 82) = 197.47, p < 0.001
(see Figure 1).
To investigate whether learning attribute-
based dehumanization leads to metaphor-based
dehumanization a 2 (condition: low-HN or low-
HU) × 2 (nonhuman: animal and robot) mixed
model ANOVA was conducted. The predicted
Figure 1. Explicit ratings of novel group on
humanness attributes and likeness to nonhumans
in the low-HU (dark bars) and low-HN (light bars)
conditions, Study 2.
 Loughnan et al. attribute and metaphor dehumanization
interaction emerged with participants rating the
low-HU Luupites more animal-like than robot-
like, and the low-HN Luupites more robot-like
than animal-like, F(1, 82) = 31.59, p < 0.001
(Figure 1). Simple effects analysis indicated that
this difference was significant for both the low-
HU condition, F(1, 42) = 11.00, p = 0.002, and
the low-HN condition, F(1, 40) = 21.76, p < 0.001.
In short, participants are able to learn and infer
explicit attribute-based and metaphor-based
dehumanization. This finding is consistent with
predictions and with the findings of Study 1.
Implicit dehumanization In the analysis of the
implicit association (GNAT) data a 2 (condition:
low-HN or low-HU) × 2 (humanness: HN and
HU) mixed model ANOVA failed to yield the
predicted two-way interaction between condition
and humanness, although the effect trended in
the expected direction F(1, 81) = 2.89, p = 0.09.
Participants in the low-HU condition more
readily associated the group with HN traits than
with HU traits, whereas those in the low-HN
condition more readily associated the group with
HU than with HN traits (see Figure 2). Planned
comparisons revealed that this difference
failed to reach significance in both the low-HN
condition, F(1, 81) = 0.30, p = 0.58, and the low-
HU condition, F(1, 81) = 1.59, p = 0.21.
To investigate whether learning about the
humanness characteristics possessed by a group
might lead to the inference of implicit metaphor-
based dehumanization a second 2 (condition:
Figure 2. Implicit associations (d′) between novel
group, humanness attributes and types of nonhuman
in the low-HU (dark bars) and low-HN (light bars)
conditions, Study 2.
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
low-HN or low-HU) × 2 (nonhuman: animal
and robot) mixed model ANOVA was conducted.
This analysis did not yield the expected two-way
interaction between learning condition and
nonhuman, F(1, 81) = 2.19, p = 0.14. There was a
large main effect of nonhuman, F(1, 81) = 14.93,
p < 0.001, indicating that people were more
sensitive when responding to animals compared
to robots (Figure 2). Simple effects analysis
were conducted for each of the two conditions,
revealing that participants associated the
Luupites more with robots than animals in the
low-HN condition, F(1,39) = 13.00, p = 0.001,
with no difference in the low-HU condition,
F(1,42) = 3.11, p = 0.085. In sum, people have
difficulty learning and inferring dehumaniza-
tion implicitly.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 replicated the findings
of Study 1. Consistent with the scenario-based
learning of the previous study, concrete learning
yielded explicit dehumanization and mixed
evidence for implicit dehumanization. This study
employed a new learning paradigm previously
demonstrated to induce both implicit and ex-
plicit attitudes (Ranganath & Nosek, 2008; Rydell
et al., 2006). The technique proved effective
at teaching people that a novel group lacked
certain types of humanness. Further, participants
moved beyond the supplied attribute-based
information to perceive a group that lacked
humanness attributes to be like nonhumans,
although this inference occurred only at an ex-
plicit level. In short, concrete learning proved
an effective technique for inducing explicit
dehumanization and lead to the direct learning
of implicit dehumanization.
General discussion
This study aimed to investigate the relation-
ship between the two predominant approaches
in the study of dehumanization: attribute-
based and metaphor-based dehumanization.
We taught participants to dehumanize groups
using one type of dehumanization and examined
whether they inferred the second type. Across
two studies we robustly demonstrated that
757
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12(6)
people can learn to dehumanize explicitly and
implicitly, whereas inference is far stronger at
an explicit level than at an implicit level.
Dehumanization theory Both infrahumaniza-
tion and dehumanization theory have posited
that a denial of specific attributes leads to people
being subtly likened to various nonhuman
entities. The denial of HN is theorized to lead
to likening to robots, machines or objects
(Haslam, 2006) and the denial of HU to liken-
ing to animals (Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al.,
2001, 2007). Previous research has provided
indirect evidence for this claim, demonstrating
that groups denied HN tend to be mechanized
and those denied HU animalized (Loughnan &
Haslam, 2007). The current research provides
evidence not only that this is the case, but that
the effect is bi-directional; the denial of human-
ness attributes can be inferred from metaphor-
based dehumanization and vice versa.
This fi nding is important for at least two
reasons. First, it can help explain the regularity
with which the denial of one type of humanness
is paired with a specific nonhuman metaphor.
The co-occurrence of low-HU and animalization
has been observed in multiple studies (Loughnan
& Haslam, 2007; Saminaden et al., in press) as
has low-HN and mechanization (Loughnan &
Haslam, 2007). This co-occurrence may arise due
to the inference process demonstrated in our
studies. Second, the finding helps to explain
how people can come to hold a metaphor-based
dehumanization of groups without directly
learning those metaphors. If people already view
a group as lacking a specific type of humanness
(e.g. HU) then this research indicates they can
infer that the group resembles a specific kind
of nonhuman (e.g. animals). In sum, this re-
search provides direct evidence for a previously
untested theoretical claim.
Why do people infer at an explicit but not an
implicit level? The second key finding of this
research is that people are able to infer the the-
oretically consistent type of dehumanization
only at an explicit level. The use of different
learning paradigms and both broad and specific
conceptualizations of the nonhuman category
suggest that this effect is not simply an artifact
758
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
of a particular experimental design. Rather, it
may suggest something about the process by
which people come to acquire elaborate, multi-
level representations of others. We suggest that
this may reflect a specific instance of a more
general metaphor-making process.
Previous cognitive psychology research has dem-
onstrated two processes at work in laypeople’s
use of metaphors (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005;
Gentner & Kurtz, 2005; Gentner & Markman,
1997; Markman & Gentner, 1993). These pro-
cesses involve representing the specific attrib-
utes possessed by two entities and assessing the
degree of alignment or concordance between
them. For instance, people may think that
members of a specific group are uncouth,
stupid, and lack linguistic competence (low-HU
attribute-based dehumanization). They may
also think that this is true of animals. Through
the process of attribute alignment, the high
degree of concordance between the attributes
possessed by the group and animals leads
people to form this dehumanizing metaphor.
‘Candidate inference’ (Gentner & Markman,
1997) inverts this process to explain how people
can move from a higher-level metaphor-based
representation to infer the attributes possessed
by the entities. This process starts from the ex-
istence of a working metaphor (e.g. those people
are robots). People possess lay theories about
the psychological characteristics of robots
(Haslam et al., 2008), specifically that they are
cold, unfeeling, and inflexible. People can use
an established metaphor to infer attributes
possessed by the target (i.e. the group) from
the well-known base (i.e. the nonhuman entity).
Thus, a group likened to robots (metaphor-
based dehumanization) can be inferred to be
cold, unfeeling, and inflexible (attribute-based
dehumanization).
Employing this metaphor-making account
to explain the relationship between attribute-
based and metaphor-based dehumanization is
useful for several reasons. Cognitive psychol-
ogists have already demonstrated that the pro-
cesses of attribute alignment and candidate
inference require considerable cognitive invest-
ment (Gentner & Kurtz, 2005). Given these
constraints, this clarifies why dehumanization
might be readily learned and inferred at an
 Loughnan et al. attribute and metaphor dehumanization
explicit but not implicit level. When given the
time and resources to engage in effortful pro-
cessing, people are able to engage attribute
alignment and candidate inference processes
that lead to the elaboration of dehumanizing
representations. In contrast, when time and
cognitive resources are constrained through
the use of an implicit technique (De Houwer
& Moors, 2007), people are unable to employ
these processes and thus only direct learning
effects are found. Previous dehumanization
researchers have suggested that the movement
from subtle to blatant dehumanization might be a
motivated processes (Kofta & Miroslawska, under
review), and this research may help shed light on
the mechanism through which it is achieved.
The second benefit of adopting this model
is that it allows us to understand how people
might come to hold dehumanizing metaphors
of groups without direct exposure to those
metaphors. Although such metaphors have
historically been attached to certain groups
(Jahoda, 1999; Lott, 1999) and continue to be
employed in the discourse of extremists, main-
stream, everyday dehumanization may spring
from a different source. These groups may
be stereotyped in ways that are dehumanizing
(e.g. lacking HU), and this may lead to the in-
ference of dehumanizing metaphors (e.g. being
animals). This possibility is consistent with the
finding of Goff et al. (2008) that contempor-
ary Americans who claimed that they had not
been exposed to the African-ape metaphor
and were not aware of the history of metaphor-
based dehumanization nevertheless associated
African-Americans with apes. In short, there
may be multiple routes to the acquisition of
dehumanizing perceptions of groups.
Finally, it should be noted that these studies
have dealt with broad attribute-metaphor asso-
ciations, as proposed by infrahumanization and
dehumanization theory. It is possible that some
specific instances of dehumanization rest on
highly differentiated trait-metaphor sets. For
instance, saying that members of a group are
‘leeches’ more readily leads to the inference
that they are parasitic than that they lack linguis-
tic competence. Further, some traits may privy
dehumanizing inferences more than others.
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
Being gracious and being impersonal are both
considered low in human nature, but the latter
is arguably more likely to lead to a mechanistic
inference than the former. The capacity
for specific attributes to lead to nonhuman
metaphors has yet to be investigated. These
specifics are beyond the scope of the present
studies, but nevertheless could be accommodated
within the model above.
Conclusion
This study aimed to examine an important
but previously untested component of current
theory; that denials of specific types of human-
defining attributes lead to a likening of others
to nonhumans. Incorporating two distinct ap-
proaches to the study of dehumanization in
the literature, attribute- and metaphor-based
dehumanization, we examined people’s ability
to move between these two forms. Across two
studies our results indicate that people can learn
to dehumanize and will infer the correspond-
ing type of dehumanization in a theoretically
consistent manner. Importantly, this latter effect
was much stronger explicitly than implicitly.
We conclude that this difference between the
implicit and explicit may be understood as a
special instance of a more general metaphor
making ability.
Note
1. We use the term ‘dehumanization’ to
refer to the denial of humanness. Both
infrahumanization theory and Haslam’s
(2006) model of dehumanization fall under
this framework.
References
Baayens, R. S., Piepenbrock, R., & van Rijn, H.
(1995). The CELEX lexical database (Version 2).
Philidephia, PA.
Boccato, G., Capozza, D., Falvo, R., & Durante, F.
(2008). The missing link: Ingroup, outgroup, and
the human species. Social Cognition, 26(2), 224–234.
Boccato, G., Cortes, B., Demoulin, S., & Leyens, J.
(2007). The automaticity of infrahumanization.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(8), 987–999.
759
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12(6)
Bowdle, B., & Gentner, D. (2005). The career of
metaphor. Psychological Review, 112(1), 193–216.
Capozza, D., Andrighetto, L., Falvo, R., & Trifiletti, E.
(2006). The use of GNAT to study intergroup
dehumanisation. Testing, Psychometrics,
Methodology, in Applied Psychology, 13(2), 295–304.
De Houwer, J., & Moors, A. (2007). How to define
and examine the implicitness of implicit
measures. In B. Wittenbrink & N. Schwarz
(Eds.), Implicit measures of attitudes (pp. 179–194).
New York: Guilford Press.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. (2006).
Associative and propositional processes in
evaluation: Conceptual, empirical, and
meta-theoretical issues. Reply to Albarrasin,
Hart, and McCulloch (2006), Kruglanski and
Dechesne (2006), and Petty and Brinol (2006).
Psychological Bulletin, 132, 745–750.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. (2007).
Unraveling the processes underlying evaluation:
Attitudes from the perspective of the APE model.
Social Cognition, 25(5), 687–717.
Gentner, D., & Kurtz, K. (2005). Relations, objects,
and the composition of analogies. Cognitive
Science, 30(5), 609–642.
Gentner, D., & Markman, A. (1997). Structure
mapping in analogy making and similarity.
American Psychologist, 52(1), 45–56.
Goff, P., Eberhardt, J., Williams, M., & Jackson, M.
(2008). Not yet human: Implicit knowledge,
historical dehumanization, and contemporary
consequences. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 94(2), 292–306.
Green, D. M., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal Detection
Theory and Psychophysics. New York: Wiley.
Gregg, A., Seibt, B., & Banaji, M. (2006).
Easier done than undone: Asymmetry in the
malleability of implicit preferences. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 90(1), 1–20.
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative
review. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
10(3), 252–264.
Haslam, N., & Bain, P. (2007). Attributing greater
humanness to the self: Moderators and the
attribution of lesser humanness to others.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(1),
57–68.
Haslam, N., Bain, P., Douge, L., Lee, M., & Bastian, B.
(2005). More human than you: Attributing
humanness to self and others. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 937–950
Haslam, N., Kashima, Y., Loughnan, S., Shi, J., &
Suitner, C. (2008). Subhuman, inhuman,
and superhuman: Contrasting humans with
760
Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009
non-humans in three cultures. Social Cognition,
26(2), 248–258.
Jahoda, G. (1999). Images of Savages: Ancient roots
of modern prejudice in Western culture. London:
Routledge.
Karpinski, A., & Stienman, R. (2006). The single
category implicit association test as a measure of
implicit social cognition. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 91(1), 16–32.
Kofta, M., & Miroslawska, M. (under review).
Infrahumanization and ingroup bias in the minimal
group paradigm: How do they relate to each other?
Unpublished manuscript.
Leyens, J.-Ph., Demoulin, S., Vaes, J., Gaunt, R., &
Paladino, M.-P. (2007). Infrahumanization: The
wall of group differences. Social Issues and Policy
Review, 1(1), 139–172.
Leyens, J.-Ph., Rodríguez-Pérez, A.,
Rodríguez-Torres, R., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M.-P.,
Vaes, J., et al. (2001). Psychological essentialism
and the differential attribution of uniquely
human emotions to ingroups and outgroups.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 395–411.
Lott, T. (1999). The Invention of Race: Black culture
and the politics of representation. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Loughnan, S., & Haslam, N. (2007). Animals and
androids: Implicit associations between social
groups and nonhumans. Psychological Science,
18(2), 116–121.
Markman, A., & Gentner, D. (1993). Structural
alignment during similarity comparisons.
Cognitive Psychology, 25, 431–467.
Nosek, B., & Banaji, M. (2001). The Go/No-go
association task. Social Cognition, 19(6), 625–666.
Paladino, M.-P., Leyens, J.-Ph., Rodríguez-Torres, R.,
Rodríguez-Pérez, A., Gaunt, R., & Demoulin, S.
(2002). Differential association of uniquely and
non-uniquely human emotions with the ingroup
and the outgroup. Group Processes & Intergroup
Relations, 5(2), 105–117.
Ranganath, K., & Nosek, B. (2008). Implicit
attitude generalization occurs immediately,
explicit attitude generalization takes time.
Psychological Science, 19(3), 249–255.
Rydell, R., McConnell, A., & Mackie, D. (2008).
Consquences of discrepent explicit and implicit
attitudes: Cognitive dissonance and increased
information processing. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 44(7), 1526–1532.
Rydell, R., McConnell, A., Mackie, D., & Strain, L.
(2006). Of two minds: Forming and changing
valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit
attitudes. Psychological Science, 17(11), 954–958.
 Loughnan et al. attribute and metaphor dehumanization

Rydell, R., McConnell, A., Strain, L., Claypool, H., &
Hugenberg, K. (2007). Implicit and explicit
attitudes respond differently to increasing
amounts of counterattitudinal information.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(6),
867–878.
Saminaden, A., Loughnan, S., & Haslam, N.
(in press). Afterimages of savages: Implicit
associations between “primitives”, animals and
children. British Journal of Social Psychology.
Uleman, J., Saribay, S., & Gonzalez, C. (2008).
Spontaneous inferences, implicit impressions,
and implicit theories. Annual Review of Psychology,
59, 329–360.
Viki, T., Winchester, L., Titshall, L., Chisango, T.,
Pina, A., & Russell, R. (2006). Beyond secondary
emotions: The infrahumanisation of outgroups
using human-related and animal-related words.
Social Cognition, 24(6), 723–752.
Wilson, S. (2008). Perceptions of the humanness of
behaviours. Unpublished data, The University of
Melbourne.

Appendix
Study 1
Story Stimuli
Low-HN Low-HU Animals Robots
Gracious Warm Considered animals Considered robots
Civil Vivacious Live outside Live in cities
Refined Nervous Excellent perception Excellent precision
Intelligent Fickle Irrational Highly rational
Hard-hearted Intolerant No language Complex language
Conforming Trusting Spontaneous Rigid
Conservative Distracted Creative Inflexible
Shallow Outgoing Tough hides Methodical
Polite Curious Thick hair Strict routine
Moral Aggressive Athletic Programmed
Cold Exuberant Totemism Computer use
Organized Emotional Animalistic games Computerized games
Rude Friendly
Humble Jealous
Thorough Sociality
Broadminded Fun
Impersonal Open

Study 2
Learning Task Stimuli
Human Nature Human Uniqueness
Traits Traits
Friendly Sociable Humble Broadminded
Fun-loving Trusting Thorough Stingy
Curious Aggressive Cold Polite
Jealous Impatient Shallow Hard-hearted
Nervous Distractible Organized Conservative
Behaviors Behaviors
Maintaining relationships Writing
Having sex Reading
Verbal communication Studying
Snoozing Performing calculations
Forming groups Numerical reasoning

761

Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12(6)

GNAT Stimuli
Animals Animals
HN HU Automata (Study 1) (Study 2)
Study 1 Friendly Conservative Robot Chimp Alligator
Fun-loving Cold Software Baboon Animals
Curious Hard-hearted Android Gorilla Beast
Aggressive Thorough Cyborg Monkey Cattle
Distractible Organized Mechanism Orangutan Chimpanzee
Jealous Polite Automata Gibbon Elephant
Study 2 Sociable Humble Machine – Kangaroo
Additional Trusting Shallow Computer – Mammals
Stimuli Impatient Broadminded Synthetic – Platypus
Nervous Stingy Mechanical – Primates

Biographical notes include dehumanization, psychological

steve loughnan received his PhD from the
University of Melbourne. His research interests
include dehumanization and metaphors.
nick haslam is Professor of Psychology at the
University of Melbourne. His research interests
essentialism, and prejudice.
yoshihisa kashima is Professor of Psychology at
the University of Melbourne. He has research
interests in stereotyping, communication
processes, essentialism, cross-cultural
psychology, and connectionist modeling.

762

Downloaded from http://gpi.sagepub.com at University of Melbourne Library on October 21, 2009