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TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGMENT...................................................................................................................2

DECLARATION............................................................................................................................2

TABLE OF CONTENT...................................................................................................................3

INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................4

APPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION ACT.........................................................................................6

IMPORTANT DEFINITION.............................................................................................................8

CONDONATION OF DELAY........................................................................................................10

DISABILITY...............................................................................................................................13

SUITS AGAINST TRUSTEES AND CONTRACTS ENTERED OUTSIDE TERRITORIES.....................16

COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION IN TERMS OF EXCLUSION OF TIME....................18

COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION IN TERMS OF EFFECTS........................................24

COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION.............................................................................29

ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP BY POSSESSION........................................................................30

CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................32

BIBLIOGRAPHY.........................................................................................................................33

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INTRODUCTION

The word limitation itself says the meaning. The word limitation in its literal term means a
restriction or the rule or circumstances which are limited. The law of limitation has been
prescribed as the time limit which is given for different suits to the aggrieved person within
which they can approach the court for redress or justice.

The basic concept of limitation is relating to fixing or prescribing of the time period for
barring legal actions. According to Section 2 (j) of the Limitation Act, 1963, ‘period of
limitation’ means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the
Schedule, and ‘prescribed period’1 means the period of limitation computed in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.

The Law of Limitation signifies to prevent from the last date for different legal actions which
can take place against an aggrieved person and to advance the suit and seek remedy or
righteous before the court. Where a suit is initiated after the bar of limitation, it will be hit by
the law of limitation. The main and the fundamental aim of the law of limitation is to protect
the lengthy process of penalizing a person indirectly without doing any offence

In India, the Limitation Act, 1963 is the legislation that governs the period within which suits
are to be filed, with relevant provisions for delay, condonation thereof etc. The principle that
pervades statutes of limitation at common law is that ‘limitation extinguishes the remedy, but
not the right' this means that the legal right itself is not defeated, but only the right to claim it
in a court of law is extinguished.2

The Limitation Act is a Procedural Act and not a substantive piece of Law.3

An exception to this general rule is the law of prescriptive rights, whereby the right itself is
destroyed. Section 27 of the limitation Act, 1963 proclaims:“Section 27: Extinguishment of
Right to Property at the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for
instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be
extinguished.”

This provision, in Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 establishes the law of
adverse possession as it stands in India today. These two Articles both prescribe a period of
twelve years within which the right to claim a particular property is extinguished, but the two
differ in so far as the date on which such period of limitation begins to run.Article 64 deals
with cases where the dispute is over possession not necessarily based title, and in such cases
the period of limitation runs from the time when the plaintiff was dispossessed of the
property. Article 65 deals with cases where the dispute is over title as such also, and in such
cases the period of limitation runs from the time when the defendant becomes adverse to that
of plaintiff.

1
Section 2 (j), Limitation Act,1963.
2
LS Synthetics Ltd v Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd, 2004 (SCC).
3
ASK Krihnappa Chettair v SVV Somiah, AIR 1964 SC.

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AIMS AND OBJECTIVE

To study the scope of Limitation Act,1963 and its provision and Schedule.

HYPOTHESIS
The researcher hypothesis that Limitation Act bars the remedy and not the Right.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:
The researcher has opted for doctrinal method of research. This project has been done based
on thorough research work based on intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of the project.

SOURCES OF DATA
The researcher has used both primary and secondary data, primary being Acts, Statutes and
Case Laws and secondary being Books, Journals and Websites.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Though in the topic “Limitation Act ” there is a lot to research but due to certain limitations
like time limitation, source limitation and area limitation, the researcher has not been able to
deal with the topic in greater detail.

MODE OF CITATION
The researcher has followed a uniform mode of citation through the course of this project.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
 What are the provisions for easements Rights?
 What are the general principles of Limitation Act?

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APPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION ACT

The Limitation Act,1963 has 32 sections and 137 articles. Article 1 to 113 deals with suits.
114 to 117 with appeals and 118 to 137 with applications.

Limitation Act is applicable in the following situations

Suits relating to accounts, contracts, declarations, decrees & instruments, movable property,
torts, trust and trust property, immovable property. Further, it is applicable to appeal of order
of acquittal from sec. 417 of Code of Criminal Procedure, appeal of sentence of death passed
by a Court of High Court or other Court, appeal from decree or order passed by the High
Court or other code under Civil Procedure Code. The limitation act is also applicable in
Application for leave to appeal as a pauper to High Court or any other court, application to
leave to defend the issue under summary proceedings and Application of leave for review of
the judgment of the Court.

Limitation Act is not applicable in the following situations

Filing of Writ petition under Article 32 and Art 226 4, application of a final decree in a suit fro
partition, application for a revocation of probate or application under Section 151 of Civil
Procedure Code, in cases of criminal proceeding unless applicable by express provisions.

Article 133 of the Limitation Act prescribes for a period of limitation of 90 days for filing a
special leave petition to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Retrospective Operation of the Code

Limitation Code is retrospective in nature as it is a Code of Procedure.5

The act is exhaustive in nature as it govern the law of limitation in respect of all matters
specifically dealt by it, and the Indian Court are not permitted to travel beyond its provisions
to add or supplement them.6

The limitation act applies to only such applications as party is bound to make for securing the
relief he requires and does not apply when the application relates to an action which the court
ought to take its own motion whether he applies for it or not.

Public Policy behind the Law of Limitation

1. Long Dormant Claim have more cruelty than justice in them7;

2. The defendant might have lost the evidence to the disputed claim;
3. The person with good cause of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence.

4
Rajamata VR Scindia v State of UP, AIR 1986 SC 756.
5
FV Mathapati v Achappanaik Desai, AIR 1956 Bom.
6
AS Krishnappa Chettiar v Nachipappa Chettiar, AIR 1964 SC 227.
7
MP Raghavan Nair v State Insurance Officer, 1971 Ker LJ 583 (FB).

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Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to ensure
that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.8

The law of limitation bars the action and not the defence. It is, therefore, open to the
defendant in a suit filed by the plaintiff to set up a plea in defence which he may not be able
to enforce by filing suits.9

In Rajendra Singh v Santa Singh10, the court held that the object of the law of limitation was
to prevent disturbance and deprivation of rights what may have been acquired by equity and
justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own indignation,
negligence or laches. In Balakrishnan v MA Krishnamurthy11, the Act is based on the Statute,
“interest republicae ut sit finus litium.”

Limitation Act is Lex Fori

It is lex fori as remedies on contracts are to be regulated and pursued according to the law of
the place where the action is instituted and not by the law of the place of contract.

Enlargement of Time

The judge cannot on equitable grounds enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its
operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by it.12

Application of the Act over the Territory of India

In Syndcate Bank v Parbha D Naik, 13 the court held that there is only one Law of Limitatiojn
for the entire territory of India.

The act applies to Courts only

The Limitation Act applies to court only. IT applies to proceeding which can be initiated in a
court of law.14 Tribunals, Quasi Tribunals are not covered by the Act.15 Thus the proceeding
do not apply before the labour court16, arbitration court17 or Election Tribunal.18

Application to Criminal Proceedings

As a general rule, “the crime never die”. Lapse of time does not bar the crown to prosecute an
offender. The provisions of the Limitation Act does not apply to criminal proceedings ,
except when the express provisions has been made for that purpose.

8
S. Ganesharaju v Narasamma, (2013) 11 SCC 341.
9
Kishan Lal v Kashmiro, AIR 1916 PC 172.
10
AIR 1973 SC 2537.
11
(1998) 7 SCC 123.
12
Kirpa Shah Sant Singh v Sri Harikishan Das, AIR 1957 Punj 273.
13
AIR 2001 SC.
14
MP Steel Corpn v CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58.
15
Sushila Devi v Ramanandan Prasad, (1976) 1 SCC 361.
16
Nityananda v LIC, (1969) 2 SCC 199.
17
Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewage Board v Subhash Project & Marketing Ltd, (2005) 30 AIC 891.
18
KV Rao v BN Reddi, AIR 1969 SC 872.

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IMPORTANT DEFINITION

Following are the important definitions

1. Applicant19

It includes

(i) a petitioner;
(ii) any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply;
(iii) any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply other
representative;

It includes a person who prefers an original application or otherwise.

2. Application20

It includes an Petition but a suit does not include an appeal or an application. Application
ordinarily applies act of making prayer or request for something.

3. Bill of Exchange21

Bill of exchange includes a hundi and a cheque. It can also be

i. Instrument in writing;
ii. Containing an unconditional order;
iii. Signed by the maker;
iv. Directing a certain person to pay a certain sum of money;
v. Directing a certain person to pay a certain sum of money;
vi. Only to the order of a certain person to pay a certain sum of money.

4. Defendant22

It includes

(i) any person from or through whom a defendant derives his liability to be sued;
(ii) any person whose estate is represented by the defendant as executor, administrator
or other representative.

5. Easement23

Easement includes a right not arising from contract, by which one person is entitled to
remove and appropriate for his own profit any part of the soil belonging to another or
anything growing in, or attached to, or subsisting upon, the land of another.

19
Section 2 (a), Limitation Act, 1963.
20
Section 2 (b), Limitation Act, 1963.
21
Section 2 (c), Limitation Act, 1963.
22
Section 2 (e), Limitation Act, 1963.
23
Section 2 (f), Limitation Act, 1963.

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6. Good Faith24

Good faith—nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due
care and attention.

It includes

i. Honesty in belief or purpose;

ii. Faithfulness to one’s duty or obligation;
iii. Observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealings in a given trade
or business;
iv. Absence of intent to defraud or seek inconsiderable advantage.

7. Period of Limitation25

Period of limitation means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by the Schedule, and “prescribed period” means the period of limitation
computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

If a period of limitation expires on the day during the court vacation, a suit filed on the
next opening day shall be treated within time. If the day immediately preceding the last
day for filing the suit is a holiday, the same may be excluded in computing the period of
limitation.

CONDONATION OF DELAY

(Section 3 to Section 5)

24
Section 2 (h), Limitation Act, 1963.
25
Section 2 (j), Limitation Act, 1963.

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Section 3- Bar of limitation.—Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although
limitation has not been set up as a defence.

For the purposes of this Act,

(a) a suit is instituted,

(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and
(iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant
first sends in his claim to the official liquidator;

In Noharlal Verma v District Co-op Central Bank Ltd,26 the SC observed that if a suit,
appeal or application is barred by limitation, a court or an adjudicating authority has no
jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and decide it
on merits. Even in the absence of such plea by the defendant , respondent or opponent,
the court or authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that
same is barred by limitation. This general rule is stated in Section 3 (1).

Section 3 bars the legal remedy, the enforceability of the right accrued whether under a
contract or under an other situation.27 Section 3 only bars the remedy but not does not
destroy the right tow which the remedy relates.28 Section 3 requires that every suit filed
after the period of limitation shall be dismissed, and the same for application also.29

The section is mandatory in its term and as observed by the privy council in General AF
and L Insurance Corporation v Jan Mohd,30 . In Boota Mal v UOI and Rajendra Singh v
Santa Singh, where SC refused to apply an alien doctrine of lis pendens against
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The limitation has to be computed from the date when the suit is filed and not from any
other previous date. IN the case of Bhabani Sahankar Agarwal v State of West Bengal31, it
was held that the complaint sent a demand notice but was not able to know whether it was
served upon the accused or not. The postal authority initiated the date of delivery of the
demand notice. Limitation begins to run from the date of postal authority intimation.

Generally defence of limitation mist be raised in pleadings so that the other party may
also note the basis and the facts by reasons of which the suit is sought to be dismissed. In
Food Corporation of India v Babulal Agarwal 32, it was held that it observed that it is well
settled that a suit filed beyond limitation is liable to be dismissed eventhough limitation
may not be set up as defence.
26
2008, SC.
27
Soic Southern Petrochemicals Inds Corpn Ltd v M/S AK Jajee, Distributor of Seeds Fertilizers and
Agricultural Equipment, 2012 (3) Civil LJ 96 (Kant).
28
Palai Central Bank v Joseph Augusti, AIR 1966 Ker 121.
29
Rameshwar Bux v Ganga Bux, AIR 1950 All 598.
30
Privy Council, 1941.
31
AIR 2007 (DOC) 204 (Cal).
32
(2004) 2 SCC 712.

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In the case India Switch Company Private Limited v ACL (India) Inc 33, it was held by the
virtue of section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 it is obligatory for the court to non-suit any
person who sues belatedly after the expiry of the period of limitation.

Section 4- This section is limited in its applicability to the institution, preferring or making of suits, appeal
or applications where a period of limitation has been prescribed therefore. Thus, the Limitation Act
encompasses not only the suits or appeals, but the applications also.

Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed,
the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court re-opens.

A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its
normal working hours it remains closed on that day.

Principle behind Section 4 is

i. The law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform;
ii. An act of court shall not prejudice anyone.

The section 4 of the Limitation Act does not extends the period of limitation. It provides
for the contingency when the prescribed period expires on a holiday and the only
contingency contemplated is “when the court is closed”.

Section 5- The section applies only to

i. Appeals;
ii. Application other than execution application under Order XXI , CPC.

The section applies only to an application for leave to the Supreme Court.34

This section applies to criminal appeals and the criminal appellant court have the power
to excuse delay and admit a time barred appeal, if the court is satisfied that the appellant
has sufficient reason for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time.35

In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v Katiji 36, the court laid down the principles for
Section 5.

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit from an late appeal;

2. There is no resumption that delay is to be necessarily caused by mala fides of litigant;
3. Refusing to condone delay can cause a meritorious matter to be thrown out at the very
threshold and cause justice to be defeated.

33
2007 (136) CC 470.
34
Ramesh Prasad v UOI, AIR 1973 Cal 12.
35
Harihar Das v kokanath, (1970) 36 Cuttack Law Times 1263.
36
AIR 1987 SC 1353.

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Section 5 works on the presence of “sufficient causes” for the delay therefore, the party
seeking condonation of delay must show the fact there was sufficient case of delay. The
expression, “Sufficient Cause ” is to be liberally construed.37

Ignorance of law is no excuse.38

Following are some instances when the delay has been condoned;

i. Subsequent changes in law;

ii. Illness of the Party;
iii. Party being a Pardanishin Lady;
iv. Imprisonment of a Party;
v. The party belongs to a minority group who has insufficient funds;
vi. Poverty or Paupernes;
vii. Party is a government servant;
viii. The delay is caused to pendency of writ petition;
ix. The party is illiterate;

Such a delay is to be liberally construed by the court 39 so as to advance substantial

justice. 40 For the same a justice oriented approach is necessary41.

DISABILITY

Section 6 deals with Legal Disability

i. Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is,
at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he
may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has
ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column
of the Schedule;
ii. Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by
two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another
disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both
disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified;

37
G Ramagowda v Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1988 SC 897.
38
Hadi Ali v Amir Bux, 1950 RD 142.
39
Shakuntala Devi Jain v Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575.
40
Satyanarain v Santosh Kumar Yadav, AIR 2009 Jhar 149 (151).
41
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353.

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iii. Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative may institute
the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have
been allowed from the time so specified;
iv. Where the legal representative referred to in sub-section (3) is, at the date of the death of the
person whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules contained sub-sections (1)
and (2) shall apply;
v. Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to
him under this section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application
within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available to that person had
he not died.

For the purposes of this section, „minor‟ includes a child in the womb.

The combined effect of section 6 and Section 8 being that would be to enable the person,
who has been disposed of during his minority, to file a suit within 3 years of his attaining
majority or within the usual period of time ordinarily allowable to a major, whichever is
longer.

Section 65 of the Limitation Act makes it clear that the time will continue to run even
during the disability of a person. It does not give afresh starting point. Section 6 does not
prevent the running of time as against a person under disability. This section only extends
the person under disability is entitled to an extension of time till the expiry of the period
mentioned in the schedule calculated from the cessation of his disability subject to the
limitation mentioned in section 8.

The benefit of Section 6 applies to the person who is entitled to sue or apply for the
execution of decree at the commencement of the limitation. The section does not apply to
the person who cannot sue or apply for the execution of decree at the commencement of
the limitation.42

This section does not apply to cases where a person is not under any disability even
though the suit or the application is for the benefit of the person who is labouring under a
disability.43 Thus, this section is only applicable only to cases where the person who
makes the application is labouring under disability.

Onus of proof lies on the person who relies on the provision. 44 He must allege in the
plaint that his case comes within one of them and then prove the facts on the strength of
which he is entitled to rely upon those provisions. 45 IF the lunacy or the alleged disability
cannot be proved than section 6 will not be attracted.46

Section 7 deal with Disability of one of several persons

42
General fire & Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Jan Mohammad, AIR 1941 PC 6.
43
General fire & Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Jan Mohammad, AIR 1941 PC 6.
44
Gopi Nath v Satish Chandra, AIR 1964 All 53.
45
Mehar Singh v KArtar Singh, AIR 1952 Pepsu 85.
46
Devgonda Patil v Shamgonda Patil, AIR 1992 Bom 189.

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Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of
a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person,
time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any
of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others
or until the disability has ceased.

This section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability in respect of any
immovable property.

For the purposes of this section, the Manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law
shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of the other members of the
family only if he is in management of the joint family property.

Section 7 applies to cases of persons whose substantive rights is joint, and not to to
persons whose rights are several though they may join together under Order I, Rule 1 of
Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of instituting a suit.47

The principle underlying section 7 is that when one of the several persons jointly entitled
to institute a suit under disability and if there is any other member, who can give a valid
discharge without the concurrence of the person under disability, the time will begin to
run from the date when that member competent to give a discharge can institute a suit.

Under section 7, the capacity or incapacity to give discharge is intended to relate to legal
capacity or incapacity.

In order to attract the terms of section 7, it is necessarily that one of the several persons
jointly entitled to institute a suit under disability and a discharge can be given without the
concurrence of such person by the other person jointly entitled to institute the suit.

Section 8 deals with Special exceptions

Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall be deemed to
extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected
thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application.

The provisions of this section are not applicable to cases, to which a period of limitations
is prescribed by special or local law. This section refers to periods of limitations
prescribed by the Act itself and has no application to a case where the decree is barred by
other special or local law.

The combined effect of section 6, section 7 and section 8 results in

i. Where the ordinary period of limitation expires at the end of three years from the
cessation of disability. In such cases also the period of limitation cannot be
extended under section 6 or section 7 and such extension would contravene the
provision of section8. 48

47
Ponnamma v Padmanabham, AIR 1969 Ker 163.
48
Darshan Singh v Gurdev Singh, AIR 1995 SC 75.

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Thus section 8 imposes a limitation on the concession provided under section 6 or

section 7 of the act to a maximum of three years after the cessation of disability. 49
Section 8 is a proviso to section 6 or section7.

Section 9 deals with Continuous running of time.

Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an
application stops it:

Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor,
the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the
administration continues.

Thus section 8 states that once a limitation has commenced to run it would continue to
run unless it is stopped by virtue of any express any statutory provisions.

Section 9 applies to cases where the cause action persists, no cases where cause of action
is cancelled by subsequent events.50

SUITS AGAINST TRUSTEES AND CONTRACTS ENTERED

OUTSIDE TERRITORIES

Section 10 deals with suits against trustees and their representatives

Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in
whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or
assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands
such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by
any length of time.

49
Kolandavai v Chinnapan, AIR 1965 Mad 541.
50
SR Goel v Municipal Board, Kanpur, AIR 1985 SC 1036.

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For the purposes of this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or
charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose and the
manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.

The object behind the section is that the trust should not suffer from misfeasance or non-
misfeasance or non-misfeasance of a trustee. 51 Section 10 grants a total exemption in
regard to suits mentioned in the section. 52 A guardian under Guardians and Wards Act is
not covered by the section.53

The word, “trust” used in Section 10 of the Limitation Act us held to carry the same
meaning as in the Trusts Act.54

Section 11 deals with suits on contracts entered into outside the territories to which the Act extends.

(1) Suits instituted in the territories to which this Act extends on contracts entered into in the State of
Jammu and Kashmir or in a foreign country shall be subject to the rules of limitation contained in this Act.

(2) No rule of limitation in force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir or in a foreign country shall be a
defence to a suit instituted in the said territories on a contract entered into in that State on in a foreign
country unless

(a) the rule has extinguished the contract; and

(b) the parties were domiciled in that State or in the foreign country during the period prescribed by such
rule.

The principles laid down in Section 11 are based on both the English law of remedies and
the general principle of international law. The reasons for this principle are found in
Huber v Steiner55, which was cited in Ruckmaboye v Lulloobh Mottichund.56

IT is a general principle of international law that a contract regarding its form, validity,
interpretation and the rights and liabilities of parties to it, is governed by lex loci
contractus, that is the law of the place where the contract is made or the law which the
parties have agreed or intended shall govern the contract or which they may be so
presumed to have intended while all matters of procedure are governed only by lex fori or
the law of forum inn which the action is brought.57

Section 11 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to suits.

51
A. Pillai v State, AIR 1972 Ker 39.
52
Beli Ram and Brothers v Md. Afzal, AIR 1948 PC 168.
53
Mirabai v Kaushalyabai, AIR 1949 Nag 235.
54
Chidambara Vinayagar Bevasthanam c Chidambaran Chettiar, (1943) 2 MLJ 389.
55
(1835) 2 Bing NC 202.
56
(1835) 5 MIA 234.
57
Muthukanni v Andappa, AIR 1955 Mad 96.

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COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION IN TERMS OF

EXCLUSION OF TIME

(Section 12- Section 15)

Section 12 deals with Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.

(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such
period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.

(2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision
or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or
reviewed shall be excluded.

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(3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where an application
is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment
shall also be excluded.

(4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for
obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.

In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time
taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not
be excluded.

The objet and scope of section 12 are;

i. To include application for revision within its scope;

ii. To provide expressly that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment
in the case of an application for leave to appeal is excluded;
iii. Any delay in the office of the court in drawing a decree or roder before the
application for a copy shall not be excluded.

The section does not deal with the starting point of limitation for filing a suit, appeal or
application. It deals only with exclusion of certain period of limitation inter alia for
appeal. This section cannot be applied for proceedings in foreign court.

This section does not require any prayer or application on the part of the party for the
exclusion of time spent. It is the duty of the court itself to exclude such time. 58 While
excluding the time, the date of the delivery of the copy to the applicant is not material but
the date when the copy is ready.

The provision of section 12 and section 14 are applicable to arbitration proceedings.

Section 13 deals with exclusion of time in cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for.

In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or appeal in any case where an application for
leave to sue or appeal as a pauper has been made and rejected, the time during which the applicant has
been prosecuting in good faith his application for such leave shall be excluded, and the court may, on
payment of the court fees prescribed for such suit or appeal, treat the suit or appeal as having the same
force and effect as if the court fees had been paid in the first instance.

Section 13 deals with cases where leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for. The
section covers not only the rejection of an application under under Order XXXIII, Rule 5,
Code of Civil Procedure, but also the refusal to allow the application to sue as a pauper
under Order XXXIII, Rule 7, CPC. Section 13 of the Limitation Act has two parts. The
cumulative effect of the two parts which are interconnected is that the period between the
date of the application to sue or appeal and the date on which it was rejected shall be
58
Mehar Singh v Bladev Singh, AIR 1955 HP 12.

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excluded if the prosecution was in good faith and the court fee paid. No time limit is set
out in section 13 and it is a matter of discretion of the court as “may” indicates. Court can
extend the time59.

Section 14 deals with Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.

(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or
revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue
and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,
is unable to entertain it.

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or
revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted
in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to
entertain it.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission
granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the
first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.

For the purposes of this section,

(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that
proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted;

(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;

(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of
jurisdiction.

The principle behind section 14 is to protect a person against the bar of limitation of a
person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on the basis of merits, but failing to
through the court being unable to give him such trial.60

The section is applicable to cases where persons where the persons brings his suit in the
wrong court,. Further, the section is applicable to cases where he brings his suit in the
right court , but is prevented from getting a trial on the merits by a defect.61

The following conditions need to fulfilled to apply section 14-:

i. The plaintiff must be prosecuting Civil Procedure which he relies with due
diligence;
ii. The earlier and latter proceeding must be founded on the same cause of action;

59
P.Sreedevi v P. Appu, AIR 1991 Ker 76.
60
Narain Das v Banarsi Lal, AIR 1970 Pat 50.
61
SK Dutt v Purnachandra Sinha, AIR 1949 Cal 24.

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iii. The former proceeding must have been prosecuted in good faith in a court from
which a defect of jurisdiction or other cause is unable to entertain it.62

The question of bona fide intention and good faith needs to be determined by the court
before the benefit under section 14 can be conferred on a party for subsequent
proceedings.63 The burden of proof of the person claiming that due diligence was applied
in the prior proceedings lies on the person claiming the benefit.64

The section applies only where a period of limitation has been prescribed.65

Article 14 applies to suits and applications. It also applies to

i. Writ petition under Article 22666;

ii. Execution proceedings67;

However, this section is not applicable to appeals.68

The power to grant an extension of time under section 5 is discretionary, wherelse under
section 14 it is mandatory if the requisite conditions are fulfilled. 69

Section 4 of the limitation act does not extend the time prescribed, wherelse section 14 in
effect extends the period of limitation.

Exclusion of limitation of under section 13 is different from section 14 as section 14

excludes time during which another civil proceedings was prosecuted with due diligence
relating to the same matter in issue in good faith in a court which form the defect of
jurisdiction or other causes of like nature become unable to entertain it. This provision is
not applicable in cases coming under section 13 which does not involve any inability of
the court to entertain it.70

Section 15 deals with Exclusion of time in certain other cases.

(1) In computing the period of limitation of any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the
institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the
injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall
be excluded.

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been given, or for which the
previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required, in accordance with the
requirements of any law for the time being in force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the
time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded.
62
India Electric Works v James Mantesh, AIR 1971 SC 231.
63
State of West Bengal v M/s BBJ Construction Co. Ltd, AIR 2013 Cal 186.
64
Madhavrao v Ram Kishna, AIR 1958 SC 767.
65
Rahmetulla v Hariprasad, AIR 1956 Bom 650.
66
State v Satyanarayan Rice Mill, AIR 1985 Cal 391.
67
Syed Taimur v HAr Deo, AIR 1960 All 375.
68
ST Commr, UP v Parsons Tools & Plants, AIR 1975 SC 1039.
69
Bansi Dhar v Alopi Pershad, AIR 1963 Punj 55.
70
P Sreedev v P Appu, AIR 1991 Ker 76.

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In excluding the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other
authority, the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of
receipt of the order of the Government or other authority shall both be counted.

(3) In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for execution of a decree by any
receiver or interim receiver appointed in proceedings for the adjudication of a person as an insolvent or by
any liquidator or provisional liquidator appointed in proceedings for the winding up of a company, the
period beginning with the date of institution of such proceeding and ending with the expiry of three months
from the date of appointment of such receiver or liquidator, as the case may be, shall be excluded.

(4) In computing the period of limitation for a suit for possession by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a
decree, the time during which a proceeding to set aside the sale has been prosecuted shall be excluded.

(5) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the defendant has been absent
from India and from the territories outside India under the administration of the Central Government, shall
be excluded.

This section covers only suits and applications for execution of decree. AN application
for delivery or possession by the auction-purchaser under Order 21, Rule 97 of the CPC is
not an application for execution, and hence is not covered under this section.

A party seeking to take advantage of section 15 must show that he was earlier restrained
by an order from making the prayer, which he is trying to do now, he cannot move the
application of section 15.71

Where any procedure are stayed by the court or an injunction is given by the court, that
period should be excluded in computing the period of limitation. These provisions are
applicable to all proceedings under the limitation act,1963 72. While calculating the period
during which the award remained in custody is to be excluded.73

A partial stay of execution is covered under Section 15 (1) of the limitation act so as to
entitle the decree holder to claim exclusion of the period during which there was a stay.
15(1) should not be given a restricted meaning, so as to deny the benefit to the decree-
holder where there is complete or partial stay of execution which makes the decree
altogether unexecutable74.

Thus, the word “execution” under Section 15(1) should be given a broad and liberal
meaning.75 the word “execution” includes all the appropriate means by which a decree is
enforced. It includes all processes and proceedings in aid of, or supplement to, execution.

Proper interpretation of section 15 (2) of the act would mean that in the computing the
period of limitation, the period of notice, provided notice is given within the limitation
period, would be mandatorily excluded.76
71
Tribeni Prasad Dhandhania v Sita Ram Poddar, AIR 1980 Pat 135.
72
Director of Inspection, IT v Pooran Mall & Sons,, AIR 1975SC 67.
73
Raj Kumar v Tarapada, AIR 1987 SC 2195.
74
Anandilal v Ramnarain, AIR 1984 SC 1383.
75
Sreenath’s Roy, (1883) ILR 9 Cal 773.
76
Disha Construction v State of Goa, (2012) 1 SCC 690/

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Section 15(2) has no application where a notice is not a notice of suit but is only intended
as an information of the claim to the defendants.77 Similarly, the provisions of sevtion
15(2) have no application where the notice is given before the accrual of the cause of
action for the suit which to which it relates. 78

In a suit against several defendants notice is to be given to the defendants either jointly or
severally by law. If the plaintiff claims relief against all defendants jointly, the period of
notice should be excluded for the whole suit and not merely so far as the defendant to
whom the notice was given is concerned. 79

To attract section 15 (3) the suit is to be filed by the receiver or interim receiver appointed
in proceedings for adjudication of a person as an insolvent or by a liquidator appointed in
proceedings for the winding up of the company. It has no application to a suit for
recovery from company for goods delivered.80

In Section 15 (4), it is not the intention of the legislation that an application of auction-
purchaser for possession of auctioned property is to be treated as an application for
execution. An application of auction-purchaser for possession is not an application for
execution of decree. Hence, the exclusion of the period of limitation under section 15 is
not available in computing is not available for such application under Order XXI, Rule
95 of the CPC.81 The time during which a proceeding to set aside an auction-sale is
prosecuted , shall be excluded.82

Section 15(5) provides for exclusion of the period of defendants absence from India in
computing the period of limitation. The absence of the of the defendant from India does
not give rise to an “inability or disability to sue” on the part of the plaintiff.hence there is
no stopping of running of time.83

77
Union of India v Kedar Nath, AIR 1959 Pat 252.
78
State v Sube Singh, AIR 1982 Raj 115.
79
Mohammad Sharifv Nazir Ali, AIR 1930 All 742.
80
Rajan Products v Jayant Vegoiles & Chemicals Pvt Ltd, (1991) 72 Comp Cas 181 (Bom).
81
Govindrao Sopanrao Kadam v Gopinath, AIR 1994 Bom 183.
82
SV Rao v K Ramaiah, 1998 (2) Civil LJ 493 (AP).
83
Mutthia CHettiar v Shammugham, AIR 1969 SC 552.

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COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION IN TERMS OF

EFFECTS

Section 16 deals with effect of death on or before the accrual of the right to sue.—(1) Where a person who
would, if he were living, have a right to institute a suit or make an application dies before the right accrues,
or where a right to institute a suit or make an application accrues only on the death of a person, the period
of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased capable
of instituting such suit or making such application.

(2) Where a person against whom, if he were living, a right to institute a suit or make an application would
have accrued dies before the right accrues, or where a right to institute a suit or make an application
against any person accrues on the death of such person, the period of limitation shall be computed from the
time when there is a legal representative of the deceased against whom the plaintiff may institute such suit
or make such application.

(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption or to suits
for the possession of immovable property or of a hereditary office.

This section provides a purely personal exemption which cannot be claimed by an

assignee of the property. 84 This section has no application in suits for possession of
immovable property in view of sub section (3). If the cause of action accrues before the
death of the person to whose estate the right relates , this section has no application to
such a situation. In view of section 16 (3) of the Limitation Act, held that section 16 (1)
does not apply to suits for possession of immovable property85.

84
Thayammal v Rangaswami, AIR 1956 Mad 15.
85
Lakhmir Singh v Sucha Singh, 1990 (1) Civ LJ 708 (P&H).

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As a general rule, unless a statute provides otherwise, statute of limitation begins to run at
the time when complete cause or right of action accrues liable to an action. Cause of
action arises when the aggrieved person has the right to the proper court or Tribunal for
relief. The accrual of cause of action depends on two elements; Injury and Damages.
In computing the period , the day on which the cause of action arose, is excluded. Apart
from any special provision, a cause of action normally accrues when there is in existence
a person who can sue and another who can be sued, and when there are present all the
facts which are materials to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed.

Section 17 deals with effect of fraud or mistake.

(1) Where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act,

(a) the suit or application is based upon the fraud of the defendant or respondent or his agent; or

(b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of
any such person as aforesaid; or

(c) the suit or application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; or

(d) where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulently
concealed from him,

the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the
mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of a concealed document,
until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling
its production:

Provided that nothing in this section shall enable any suit to be instituted or application to be made to
recover or enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property which—

(i) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to
the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know, or have reason to believe, that any fraud had been
committed, or

(ii) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration subsequently to the transaction in
which the mistake was made, by a person who did not know, or have reason to believe, that the mistake had
been made, or

(iii) in the case of a concealed document, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who
was not a party to the concealment and, did not at the time of purchase know, or have reason to believe,
that the document had been concealed.

(2) Where a judgment-debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of a decree or order within the
period of limitation, the court may, on the application of the judgment-creditor made after the expiry of the
said period extend the period for execution of the decree or order:

Provided that such application is made within one year from the date of the discovery of the fraud or the
cessation of force, as the case may be.

Section 17 provides that where in the case of any suit or application for which the period
of limitation is prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right or title on which the suit

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or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his agent [section
17(1)(d)] or where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or
applicant has been fraudulently concealed from him [section 17 (1)(d)], the period of
limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or
the mistake which could not be discovered with reasonable diligence.

On order to claim the benefit, the party has to show that due to the fraud of the other
party, the knowledge of his right was concealed and he could not know his right. Section
17 applies only when a party is kept from the knowledge of right to do a certain thing by
the fraud of the other party but now where he is kept from exercising his right.

Section 17(1)(c) provides that in a case for suit of relief on the ground of mistake, the
period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers the mistake or could
with reasonable diligence discovered it.

Thus, Section 17 is an enabling provision which postpones the starting point of limitation
for suits and applications like an application to set aside execution sale where the
plaintiffs or the applicants right to seek relief is kept from his knowledge by means of
fraud.86

The provision can be further invoked to suits and applications for relief from the
consequences of mistake, but difference of opinion of valuers cannot furnish ground of
mistake to evoke section 17(1)(c)87. Protection has also been extended to purchaser for
valuable consideration, who was not a party to the fraud, mistake or concealment and had
no knowledge about it, in place of a person “claiming… in good faith and for a valuable
consideration.”

The knowledge of the right and title on which the suit or application is founded is
different from “sufficient cause” within the meaning of section 5, otherwise the party
failing to comply with the requirements of section 17(1)(b) would be entitled to the same
benefit sought for under section 17(1)(b) by invoking section 5 and it cannot be the
intention of the legislature to nullify the effect of section 17(1)(b) by section 5.88

Section 18 deals with the effect of acknowledgment in writing.—(1) Where, before the expiration of the
prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of
liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom
such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh
period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.

(2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time
when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral
evidence of its contents shall not be received.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—

86
In re: Marappa Goundar, AIR 1959 Mad 26.
87
Krishna Kumar v JN Bhan, AIR 1971 Cal 322.
88
S. Devi v RL PIllai, 1981 Ker LT 120.

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(a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right,
or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompanied
by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set off, or is addressed
to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right,

(b) the word “signed” means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf, and

(c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application in respect
of any property or right.

Section 18 deals with the effect of acknowledgement in writing on limitation. Under this
section, where before the expiration prescribed period for the suit or application in respect
of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability with respect to such property or
right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such right or property is
claimed, or by any person though whom he derives his right or title, a fresh period of
limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.
Such acknowledgement can be with respect to right, property or liability.

Requirement for an authority of acknowledgement-:

i. An admission of the acknowledgment;

ii. Such acknowledgement must be with respect of liability in property or right;
iii. It must be made before the expiry of period of limitation;
iv. It should be in writing and signed by the party against whom such property or
right is claimed.

Letters exchanged between parties cannot be held as acknowledgment under section 18.

Section- 19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy.—Where payment on account of a
debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to
pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be
computed from the time when the payment was made:

Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an
acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person
making the payment.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—

(a) where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce of such
land shall be deemed to be a payment;

(b) “debt” does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court.

This section extends the benefit of extension period of limitation when payment is made
by the debtor to a creditor irrespective whether the payment is made towards the interest
amount., but the only requirement is that on the date on which part payment is made, both
principal and interest should be due.

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The acknowledgement as prescribed under section 19 merely renews debt. It does not
create a new right of action and it is a mere acknowledgment of liability in respect of the
right in question and it needed to be accompanied by promise to pay either expressly or
even by implication.

Further, this section provides that payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy
shall give afresh period of limitation for suits and legacies.

This section is restricted to suits for debts and legacies. So far as debts are concerned this
section applies to all kind of debts whether secured or unsecured. However, this section
has no application in suits for redemption.

Section 20- Effect of acknowledgment or payment by another person.—(1) The expression “agent duly
authorised in this behalf” in sections 18 and 19 shall, in the case of a person under disability, include his
lawful guardian, committee or manager or an agent duly authorised by such guardian, committee or
manager to sign the acknowledgment or make the payment.

(2) Nothing in the said sections renders one of several joint contractors, partners, executors or mortgagees
chargeable by reason only of a written acknowledgment signed by, or of a payment made by, or by the
agent of, any other or others of them.

(3) For the purposes of the said sections,—

(a) an acknowledgment signed or a payment made in respect of any liability by, or by the duly authorised
agent of, any limited owner of property who is governed by Hindu law, shall be a valid acknowledgment or
payment, as the case may be, against a reversioner succeeding to such liability; and

(b) where a liability has been incurred by, or on behalf of a Hindu undivided family as such, an
acknowledgment or payment made by, or by the duly authorised agent of, the manager of the family for the
time being shall be deemed to have been made on behalf of the whole family.

This section is an explanation to section 18 and section 19. 89 This section deals with the
question as to who can keep alive a right which is not time-barred.

Section 20 (1) include;

i. Lawful guardian, committee or manager;

ii. An agent duly authorized by such guardian, committee or manager;
iii. An unqualified acknowledgment of liability by a party saves limitation and alos
give rise to a cause of action.

Section 21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant.—(1) Where after the institution of a
suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have
been instituted when he was so made a party:

Provided that where the court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due
to a mistake made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be
deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date.

89
Naziruddin Ahmad v Parmanand, AIR 1948 Oudh 193.

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(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a case where a party is added or substituted owing to
assignment or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit or where a plaintiff is made a
defendant or a defendant is made a plaintiff.

Section 21 refers to the case where the suit is bought by or against parties other than those
originally on the record, i.e. where the new plaintiff or defendant is suitable or added thus
if certain defendants are used as under a certain designation but are at a later stage stated
individually, there is no addition or substitution of new defendants; if at all it is a
correction of the misdescription, the suit would not be barred.

Section 21 contemplates substitution or addition of nee parties after institution of the suit.
It cannot be said that by merely invoking Order I, Rule 8, CPC any person can be
substituted or added as a party. In each case the court has to determine whether the
plaintiff intended to sue originally a party which was substituted or added at a later stage.

Under section 21 a suit is deemed to have instituted against the arrayed defendant from
the date if the order. Under the garb of Order I, Rule 10, no party can extend the period of
limitation.

COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION

(Section 22 to Section 24)

Section 22- Continuing breaches and torts.—In the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of
a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the
breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues.

Section 22 deals with contracts and torts in which there is a continuing breach of contract
or the violation of ten right which constitutes the tort. In such cases, a right to sue arises at
every moment of the time during which the breaches continues. The cause of action in
such cases is said to be renewed de die in diem (from day to day).

This ection applies to cases which have not been expressly provided for in the schedule to
the Act. In cases provided for in the schedule, time begins to run from the dates shown in
the schedule for the periods laid down there. The criterion of the application of this
section, both in cases of contract as well as torts, is not whether the right or its
corresponding obligation is a continuing one, but whether the wrong is continuing one.

This section applies to contracts which oblige the party to them during the continuance of
the relation covered by the contract. Section 22 lays down that in the case of continuing
tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which
the breach or the tort, as the case may be , continues.

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Section 23- Suits for compensation for acts not actionable without special damage.—In the case of a suit
for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of action unless some specific injury
actually results therefrom, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the injury results.

This section is not based in its application to suits based on torts. This section also applies
in cases of ex-contractu in proper cases. It cannot however apply to cases in which there
is a definite breach of an obligation under the contract and complete loss occurs on such
breach, without the possibility of any further injury.

This section deals with cases where the cause of action is based not upon the act done but
upon the injury resulting from it. The section lays down that in case of suit for
compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of action unless some specific
injury results therefrom, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when
the injury results. The principle of this section is where the cause of action lies not in
specific act or omission, but in the resulting damage, the period of limitation runs from
the time when the plaintiff sustained the loss.

Section 24- Computation of time mentioned in instruments.—All instruments shall for the purposes of this Act
be deemed to be made with reference to the Gregorian calendar.

ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP BY POSSESSION

Section 25. Acquisition of easements by prescription.—(1) Where the access and use of light or air to and
for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith as an easement, and as of right, without
interruption, and for twenty years, and where any way or watercourse or the use of any water or any other
easement (whether affirmative or negative) has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming
title thereto as an easement and as of right without interruption and for twenty years, the right to such
access and use of light or air, way, watercourse, use of water, or other easement shall be absolute and
indefeasible.

(2) Each of the said periods of twenty years shall be taken to be a period ending within two years next
before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates is contested.

(3) Where the property over which a right is claimed under sub-section (1) belongs to the Government that
sub-section shall be read as if for the words “twenty years” the words “thirty years” were substituted.

Explanation.—Nothing is an interruption within the meaning of this section, unless where there is an actual
discontinuance of the possession or enjoyment by reason of an obstruction by the act of some person other
than the claimant, and unless such obstruction is submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the
claimant has notice thereof and of the person making or authorising the same to be made.

Section 25 and section 26 deal with acquisition of rights under easement by prescription.
Section 27 deals with the extinguishment of right to property. It is now possible to extend
the provisions of section 25 and section 26 to those parts of India to which the Indian
Easements Act, 1882 applies. Section 25 and section 26 of the limitation act corresponds
to section 15 and section 16 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882.

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Section 15 and section 26 deals with direct acquisition of rights to easements by adverse
possessions. Section 27 deals with indirect acquisition of ownership of corporeal
property by possession.

This section is only applicable only to easementary right and to natural right. The exercise
of this section must be within two years of the suit. If not exercised within the period, the
suit would be time barred. The stature is remedial, and not prohibitory or exhaustive.

These rights are not exhaustive as such right is acquired by long enjoyment which in
certain circumstances lead to a presumption of lost grant or agreement. A person
may acquire under this section a right of easement which he did not have originally ,
but it does not prevent or exclude the acquiring the easement right in other modes.

The word “as of right” does not mean user without trespass; they simply mean enjoyment
in the assertion of the right.

The enjoyment must be open and peaceful and manifest and not clandestine, surreptious
or invisible. This section does not mean that there should be actual or physical use. It is
sufficient that the dominant owner has the amenity or advantage of using wherever he
chooses to do it.

The use of “other easement” in this section has made it clear that this section is not
exhaustive and other easements not specifically mentioned can be acquired such a right to
store manure on land belonging to another.90

Section 26- Exclusion in favour of reversioner of serivent tenement.—Where any land or water upon, over
or from, which any easement has been enjoyed or derived has been held under or by virtue of any interest
for life or in terms of years exceeding three years from the granting thereof, the time of the enjoyment of
such easement during the continuance of such interest or term shall be excluded in the computation of the
period twenty years in case the claim is, within three years next after the determination of such interest or
term resisted by the person entitled on such determination to the said land or water.

In a suit by the owner of the servient land for declaration that the defendant had not
acquired any right of easement of light and air over his land, the plaintiff contended that
the period during which his tenants and their predecessors were occupying the land
should be excluded in computing the prescribed period in such a case, it is necessary for
the plaintiff to plead and prove the lease and their term and determination within there
years of the suit.

Section 27- Extinguishment of right to property.—At the determination of the period hereby limited to any
person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.

The general rule is that the Limitation Act only bars the remedy and does not extinguish
the right. Section 27 is an expression to this general principle so far as suits fro possession
of property are concerned and lays down that after the expiry of the period thus
prescribed for instituting the suit for possession of any property the person should have
instituted such suit but failed to do so, shall cease to have any right over the property.

90
Ladha v Mahi, AIR 1947 Lah 79.

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After the expiry of its period, the law declares not simply that the remedy is barred but
that the title is extinct in favour of the possessor. This section is confined to suits for
possession only.

CONCLUSION

In India, the Limitation Act, 1963 is the legislation that governs the period within which suits
are to be filed, with relevant provisions for delay, condonation thereof etc. The principle that
pervades statutes of limitation at common law is that ‘limitation extinguishes the remedy, but
not the right' this means that the legal right itself is not defeated, but only the right to claim it
in a court of law is extinguished. An exception to this general rule is the law of prescriptive
rights, whereby the right itself is destroyed. Section 27 of the limitation Act, 1963
proclaims:“Section 27: Extinguishment of Right to Property at the determination of the
period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his
right to such property shall be extinguished.”

The Limitation Act, 1963, prescribed limitation with a view to see that a litigant does not
drag on the litigation. Section 5 gives an opportunity to a litigant to file applications beyond
the prescribed period of limitation provided; he is able to establish that he was prevented by
sufficient cause from approaching the Court within the said period. Even though explanation
for day- to-day delay is not being insisted by the Courts, the litigant has to nevertheless
furnish the satisfactory explanation for filing the application beyond the prescribed period of
limitation. This responsibility on the part of the litigant is much more in cases of abnormal
delays, for by such delays right came to be vested in his adversary and such a right cannot be
easily taken away by making unduly liberal approach by the Court.

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Limitation and compensation of Delay are two effective implementations in the quick
disposal of cases and effective litigation. The law on limitation keeps a check on pulling of
cases and prescribes time period within which the suit can be filed and the time available
within which the person can get the remedy conveniently. The law of compensation of delay
keeps a check on the pulling of cases and prescribes a time period within which the suit can
be filed and the time available within which the person can get the remedy conveniently. The
law compensation of delay keeps the principle of natural justice alive and also states the fact
that different people might have different problem as and the same sentence or a singular rule
may not apply to all of them in the same way. Thus it is essential to hear them and decide
accordingly whether they fit in the criteria of the judgment or whether they deserve a second
chance.

The hypothesis of the researcher has been proven true that the Limitation Act bars the
remedy and not the right.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Indian Limitation Act (Act no 36 of 1963);

 THE LIMITATION ACT, BB Mitra, 23rd edn, 2014, Eastern Law House;
 LAW OF LIMITATION, Dr HK Saharay, 4th edn., 2018, Premier Publishing
Company.

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