Bixler v. Scientology: CSI Demurrer-Riales (FAC)

Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 04/07/2020 02:46 PM Sherri R.
Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Hung,Deputy Clerk
1 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

WILLIAM H. FORMAN (State Bar No. 150477)
2 wforman@scheperkim.com
DAVID C. SCHEPER (State Bar No. 120174)
3 dscheper@scheperkim.com
MARGARET E. DAYTON (State Bar No. 274353)
4 pdayton@scheperkim.com
JEFFREY L. STEINFELD (State Bar No. 294848)
5 jsteinfeld@scheperkim.com
800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor
6 Los Angeles, California 90017-2701
Telephone: (213) 613-4655
7 Facsimile: (213) 613-4656
8 Attorneys for Defendants Church of Scientology

International and Church of Scientology Celebrity
9 Centre International
10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
12 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458

BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE Assigned to Hon. Steven J. Kleifield,
13 BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2, Dept. 57
14 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS CHURCH OF

SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL AND
15 v. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
CELEBRITY CENTRE
16 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL’S NOTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO
17 TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF PLAINTIFF RIALES’ CLAIMS IN
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED
18 INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE; COMPLAINT
DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1-25,
19 [Filed Concurrently with Declaration of
Defendants. William H. Forman and [Proposed] Order]
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Date: June 15, 2020
21 Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: 57
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RESERVATION ID: 079084081086
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Complaint Filed: August 22, 2019
24 Trial Date: None Set
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DEFENDANTS CSI AND CC’S DEMURRER TO RIALES’ CLAIMS IN FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 15, 2020, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as this
3 matter may be heard, in Department 57 of the above-entitled Court, located at 111 N. Hill Street,
4 Los Angeles, California 90012, Defendants Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) and
5 Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre International (“CC”) will, and hereby do, demur to
6 Plaintiff Marie Bobette Riales’ claims in the First Amended Complaint in their entirety, including
7 Causes of Action One through Four.
8 As set forth in the concurrently-filed Declaration of William H. Forman, counsel for CSI
9 and CC attempted to meet and confer as required by Code of Civil Procedure Section
10 430.41(a)(1)-(3) regarding the demurrer, on March 31, 2020, a date and time that was set by
11 Plaintiffs’ counsel. Counsel for Plaintiffs hung-up during the meet-and-confer call before counsel
12 for CSI and CC could address the objections and arguments raised in the demurrer. (Declaration
13 of William H. Forman ¶¶ 2-7.)
14 The demurrer is based on this Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer, the attached
15 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the concurrently-filed Declaration of William H. Forman,
16 all pleadings and papers on file in this action, and any further evidence or argument that may be
17 presented at the hearing.
18
19 DATED: April 6, 2020 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

WILLIAM H. FORMAN
20 DAVID C. SCHEPER
21 MARGARET E. DAYTON
JEFFREY L. STEINFELD
22
23
By: /s/ William H. Forman
24
William H. Forman
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1 DEMURRER
2 Defendants Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) and Church of Scientology
3 Celebrity Centre International (“CC”) demur generally to Plaintiff Marie Bobette Riales’ Claims
4 in the First Amended Complaint in their entirety, including Causes of Action One through Four,
5 on the following grounds:
6 Demurrer to First Cause of Action
7 1. The First Cause of Action for Stalking In Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7
8 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section
9 430.10(d).
10 2. The First Cause of Action for Stalking In Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7 fails
11 to state a cause of action and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
12 Section 430.10(e).
13 Demurrer to Second Cause of Action
14 3. The Second Cause of Action for Physical Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Cal.
15 Civ. Code § 1708.8 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil
16 Procedure Section 430.10(d).
17 4. The Second Cause of Action for Physical Invasion of Privacy in Violation of Cal.
18 Civ. Code § 1708.8 fails to state a cause of action and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to
19 Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e).
20 Demurrer to Third Cause of Action
21 5. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of
22 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of
23 Civil Procedure Section 430.10(d).
24 6. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of
25 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 fails to state a cause of action and is therefore subject to demurrer
26 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e).
27 Demurrer to Fourth Cause of Action
28 7. The Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
3
1 misjoins parties and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section
2 430.10(d).
3 8. The Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fails to
4 state a cause of action and is therefore subject to demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
5 Section 430.10(e).

WILLIAM H. FORMAN
8 DAVID C. SCHEPER
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William H. Forman
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................8
4
II. ARGUMENT .........................................................................................................................9
5
A. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer With Prejudice Because Plaintiff’s
6 Claims Are Misjoined With the Claims of the Four Other Plaintiffs.........................9
7 B. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer Because Plaintiff Riales Fails to
Allege Facts Sufficient to State Any Claim Against CSI and CC ...........................11
8
1. All of Plaintiff Riales’ Claims Fail Because She Does Not Allege
9 Facts Demonstrating CSI or CC Engaged In Any Conduct At All ..............11
10 2. Plaintiff Riales’ First Claim Fails Because She Fails to Allege Facts
Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a Claim for Stalking ..................13
11
3. Plaintiff Riales’ Second and Third Claims Fail Because She
12 Premises Them On Conduct That Allegedly Occurred Outside of
California ......................................................................................................15
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4. In the Alternative, Plaintiff Riales’ Second Claim Fails Because She
14 Does Not Allege Facts Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a
Claim for Physical Invasion of Privacy........................................................15
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5. In the Alternative, Plaintiff Riales’ Third Claim Fails Because She
16 Does Not Allege Facts Demonstrating The Essential Elements of A
Claim for Constructive Invasion of Privacy .................................................17
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6. Plaintiff Riales’ Fourth Claim Fails Because She Does Not Allege
18 the Nature and Extent of the Emotional Distress She Allegedly
Suffered ........................................................................................................18
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III. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................18
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3
Federal Cases
4
Connor v. Franke,
5 No. 16-cv-3542, 2017 WL 1908154 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) ................................................... 14
6 State Cases
7
Aghaji v. Bank of Amer.,
8 247 Cal. App. 4th 1110 (2016) ...................................................................................................... 9
9 Angie M. v. Superior Court,

37 Cal. App. 4th 1217 (1995) ...................................................................................................... 18
10
Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co.,
11 164 Cal. App. 3d 602 (1985) ....................................................................................................... 18
12 Coleman v. Twin Coast Newspapers, Inc.,
13 175 Cal. App. 2d 650 (1959) ................................................................................................... 9, 11
14 Doe v. City of Los Angeles,

42 Cal. 4th 531 (2007)........................................................................................................... 12, 13
15
Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
16 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 (2011) .................................................................................................... 12
17 Moe v. Anderson,
18 207 Cal. App. 4th 826 (2012) .............................................................................................. 8, 9, 11
19 Pan Pac. Prop., Inc. v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz,

81 Cal. App. 3d 244 (1978) ......................................................................................................... 14
20
Pitman v. City of Oakland,
21 197 Cal. App. 3d 1037 (1988) ..................................................................................................... 18
22 Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians’ Srvc.,
81 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2000) ........................................................................................ 11, 14, 16, 17
23
24 State Statutes
25 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7 ............................................................................................................ 13, 14
26 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7(a)(3)(A) ................................................................................................... 14
27 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 ................................................................................................................. 15
28 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a) ............................................................................................................. 16
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1 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) ............................................................................................................. 17
2 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(f)(5) ......................................................................................................... 15
3 Cal. Civ. Proc. § 378(a)(1) .......................................................................................................... 9, 11
4 Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(d) ......................................................................................... 9, 11
5
Other Authorities
6
Rutter Practice Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def., B. Elements of Claim,
7 Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def. Ch. 2(IX)-B .................................................. 17
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1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2 I. INTRODUCTION
3 Rather than oppose Defendants’ demurrer to the original complaint, Plaintiff Marie
4 Bobette Riales filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on the deadline for filing an opposition.
5 Yet, the FAC does not cure a single defect identified by CSI and CC’s original demurrer and
6 therefore, this demurrer to the FAC should be sustained with prejudice.
7 Specifically, the FAC alleges that certain events have happened in Plaintiff Riales’ life:
8 trash stolen, persons loitering in front of her house, computer difficulties, a shattered window.
9 Most people understand these annoyances to be the price of modern, urban life. Plaintiff, on the
10 other hand, charges that these commonplace events are part of a vast campaign against her by
11 prominent religious organizations and the ecclesiastical leader of a religion. That argument is
12 false and malicious. Other than Plaintiff’s allegations that these events happened to her, she
13 alleges no facts that Defendants are the ones responsible. Indeed, the FAC contains no allegation
14 on personal knowledge (as distinguished from allegations on “information and belief”) that any
15 defendant committed any act that forms the basis of a claim. Instead, Plaintiff alleges “upon
16 information and belief” that all material acts identified in the FAC were performed at the direction
17 of Defendants, without alleging a single fact supporting this “belief.” Such unsupported
18 allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action. Furthermore, even taking on faith Plaintiff’s
19 unsupported argument that unidentified agents of Defendants engaged in the conduct described,
20 her claims still fail as a matter of law, as Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting the essential
21 elements of each of her asserted claims.
22 But the FAC’s lack of supporting facts and law is not even its biggest defect. The FAC
23 improperly joins Plaintiff Riales’ claims with those of four other plaintiffs. Yet, the claims are
24 premised on entirely distinct and separate acts—allegedly occurring at different times and in
25 different locations. Because the claims do not arise from the same transaction or series of
26 transactions, they cannot be pleaded jointly. Moe v. Anderson, 207 Cal. App. 4th 826, 833 (2012).
27 Thus the FAC in its current form cannot be cured by amendment and must be dismissed.
28
8
1 II. ARGUMENT
2 A. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer With Prejudice Because Plaintiff’s
3 Claims Are Misjoined With the Claims of the Four Other Plaintiffs
4 A demurrer must be sustained where “[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties.” Cal.
5 Civ. Proc. § 430.10(d). Plaintiffs may be properly joined in one action if their claims “aris[e] out
6 of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
7 law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.” Cal. Civ. Proc. § 378(a)(1)
8 (emphasis added). Separate and distinct acts occurring at separate and distinct times do not “arise
9 out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions,” and therefore joinder is not
10 proper. Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 826 (citing Coleman v. Twin Coast Newspapers, Inc., 175 Cal.
11 App. 2d 650, 653 (1959)); Aghaji v. Bank of Amer., 247 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1120-21 (2016)
12 (finding misjoinder of plaintiffs where each plaintiff’s claims arose from “unique transactions or
13 experiences”). An allegation that defendants “conspired” to commit acts against the plaintiffs is
14 insufficient to demonstrate joinder is proper where the allegations consist of separate acts
15 committed against different plaintiffs at different times and locations. Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d
16 at 654. In Coleman, the court explained that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate “a right to relief
17 arising out the same transaction or series of transactions” where “[t]hree separate and distinct
18 plaintiffs are suing to recover damages for alleged trespasses on separate and distinct premises and
19 for alleged conversions of separate and distinct property.” Id. Similarly, allegations that a
20 defendant has a “pattern and practice” of violating the law and the plaintiffs have suffered because
21 of that pattern and practice does not give rise to joinder. See, e.g., Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 834
22 (affirming sustaining of demurrer without leave to amend where plaintiffs’ claims against the
23 same defendant were based on two separate and distinct alleged sexual assaults because the
24 alleged assaults were not the same transaction or occurrence).
25 The FAC amounts to a recitation of discrete events that each Plaintiff experienced
26 separately at different times and at different places. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 95, 108, 123 (alleging
27 individuals loitered and/or surveilled outside Plaintiff Bixler’s home), ¶ 98 (alleging Plaintiff
28 Bixler was filmed on a public street), ¶ 101 (alleging Plaintiff Bixler was “harassed and
9
1 photographed” at a nail salon), ¶ 119 (alleging Plaintiff Bixler was “run off the road by a vehicle
2 that was following her”), ¶ 175 (alleging Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was followed in a Best Buy store),
3 ¶¶ 178, 189 (alleging individuals loitered and/or surveilled outside Plaintiff Jane Doe #1’s home),
4 ¶ 189 (alleging Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was watched at a hair salon), ¶ 191 (alleging Plaintiff Jane
5 Doe #1 was “accosted” at an accountant’s parking lot), ¶ 192 (alleging Plaintiff Jane Doe #1 was
6 “followed into a grocery store”), ¶¶ 221, 223, 228 (alleging individuals loitered and photographed
7 outside Plaintiff Riales’ home), ¶ 224 (alleging Plaintiff Riales was harassed in a restaurant), ¶ 226
8 (alleging Plaintiff Riales was photographed on vacation in Delaware), ¶ 255 (alleging Plaintiff
9 Jane Doe #2 was harassed at a grocery store).)
10 The FAC also alleges the occurrence of numerous bizarre and distinct events—car doors
11 discovered open, theft of trash, theft of items, poisoning of trees, trimming of trees, and
12 malfunction of electronic devices and security systems—which occurred at different locations and
13 different times. Principally, each Plaintiff claims that these events occurred at their separate
14 homes. (See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 94-97, 103, 112, 121-122, 124 (allegations regarding events occurring at
15 Plaintiff Bixler’s home); id., ¶¶ 181, 185-187, 193-195 (allegations regarding events occurring at
16 Plaintiff Jane Doe #1’s home); id., ¶¶ 222, 225 (allegations regarding events occurring at Plaintiff
17 Riales’ home).)
18 Each Plaintiff thus pleads separate and particular acts of harassment were directed to each
19 individually, and each bears the burden of proving that these acts happened: Plaintiff Bixler
20 showing that she was “harassed” at a hair salon does not absolve Plaintiff Riales of her burden to
21 show she was taunted at a restaurant. Yet these distinct and separate acts form the basis of
22 Plaintiffs’ jointly-pleaded claims. (See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 263-264, 266 (all Plaintiffs alleging that all
23 Defendants followed and threatened Plaintiffs), ¶ 276 (same, with respect to trespass allegations),
24 ¶¶ 282-283 (same, with respect to improper use of recording devices), ¶ 288 (same, with respect to
25 allegations of harassment and stalking).) Through this inappropriate joining of claims, Plaintiffs
26 have in effect cheated the Court out of filing fees for multiple actions, while still asking the Court
27 to do the work of adjudicating distinct, individual actions. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to
28 improperly join claims so as to pocket filing fees rightfully owed to this Court.
10
1 Because Plaintiff Riales’ claims are premised on different acts that occurred at different
2 times and in different locations from the other Plaintiffs’ claims, they do not arise from the same
3 transaction or series of transactions. See Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 834; Coleman, 175 Cal. App.
4 2d at 654. Therefore, joinder of Plaintiff Riales’ claims with those of the other Plaintiffs is not
5 appropriate, and the demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend. See Cal. Civ. Proc. §§
6 378(a)(1), 430.10(d); Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 834; Coleman, 175 Cal. App. 2d at 654. While
7 this is a defect with the claims of all Plaintiffs, CSI and CC have moved to compel arbitration as
8 to the remaining Plaintiffs, and CSI and CC demur only to Plaintiff Riales’ claims at this time.
9 B. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer Because Plaintiff Riales Fails to
10 Allege Facts Sufficient to State Any Claim Against CSI and CC
11 A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of factual allegations in a complaint. Rakestraw v.
12 Cal. Physicians’ Srvc., 81 Cal. App. 4th 39, 42-43 (2000). “Because a demurrer tests the legal
13 sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show the complaint alleges facts sufficient to
14 establish every element of each cause of action.” Id. at 43.
15 1. All of Plaintiff Riales’ Claims Fail Because She Does Not Allege Facts
16 Demonstrating CSI or CC Engaged In Any Conduct At All
17 The gravamen of each of Plaintiff Riales’ claims is the alleged acts of harassment and
18 surveillance perpetrated against her individually, specifically:
19  Plaintiff Riales’ First Cause of Action for stalking is based on “Defendants”

20 allegedly following Plaintiffs “online” and in person “thus placing Plaintiffs under
21 surveillance with the intent to alarm, threaten, and harass Plaintiffs.” (FAC, ¶ 264.)
22  Plaintiff Riales’ Second Cause of Action for physical invasion of privacy is based
23 on “Defendants” allegedly “trespass[ing] on [Plaintiffs’] property to take photos, look[ing]
24 in Plaintiffs’ windows, and electronically compromis[ing] their security systems, and/or
25 phones, and/or computers, and/or other digital devices.” (Id., ¶ 276.)
26  Plaintiff Riales’ Third Cause of Action for constructive invasion of privacy is based
27 on “Defendants” allegedly “us[ing] devices to capture image and sound recordings or other
28 physical impressions which, because of such device’s use, allowed Defendants to avoid
11
1 trespassing on Plaintiffs’ land while still being able to capture such recordings and
2 impressions.” (Id., ¶ 282.)
3  Plaintiff Riales’ Fourth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional

4 distress is based on “Defendants trespass[ing] on Plaintiffs’ personal property, look[ing] in
5 windows, follow[ing] and stalk[ing], hack[ing] personal online accounts and emails,
6 engag[ing] in surveillance of and interference with Plaintiffs’ daily lives, and/or call[ing],
7 and/or text[ing], and/or otherwise attempt[ing] to communicate repeatedly.” (Id., ¶ 288.)
8 Yet, Plaintiff Riales fails to allege any facts supporting the allegation that CSI, CC—or any
9 of the Defendants—committed these acts. Indeed, the FAC contains no allegation that any
10 Defendant committed any act in furtherance of a claim. Instead, the FAC alleges as to all material
11 acts identified in the FAC “[u]pon information and belief, all the following-described acts of
12 harassment, surveillance, and/or stalking were carried out by or at the direction of Defendants’
13 employees, agents, and/or representatives.” (FAC, ¶ 217.) This bare allegation is insufficient.
14 “A plaintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within [her]
15 personal knowledge, if [s]he has information leading [her] to believe that the allegations are
16 true.” Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 1158 (2011) (quoting
17 Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550 (2007)) (emphasis added, internal quotation
18 marks omitted). A pleading made on information and belief is not sufficient if it “merely assert[s]
19 the facts so alleged without alleging such information that ‘leads the plaintiff to believe that the
20 allegations are true.’” Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 4th at 551, n.5.
21 The FAC alleges that the acts in question were committed by numerous individuals, most
22 of whom are unnamed and completely unidentified. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶¶ 220-226, 228-232.) As to
23 the alleged acts of unnamed and unidentified individuals, there are no facts alleged that support the
24 belief that they were acting at the “direction of Defendants’ employees, agents, and/or
25 representatives.” These are no more than accusations of culpability without a shred of supporting
26 information.
27 Plaintiff Riales identifies only one person by name who supposedly “publicly threaten[ed]
28 Plaintiffs and their families,” Kathy Gold. (Id., ¶ 227.) Yet, the FAC never specifically alleges
12
1 Ms. Gold threatened Plaintiff Riales and fails to allege sufficient information that “leads the
2 plaintiff[s] to believe” Ms. Gold was acting at the “direction of Defendants’ employees, agents,
3 and/or representatives.” Instead, the FAC merely states (falsely) that Ms. Gold is a Scientologist.
4 (Id.) Plainly, that a person is an alleged member of a religion does not establish that all actions
5 performed by that person were “at the direction” of the religious institution. For instance, if a
6 Catholic is the party at fault in an automobile crash, the injured party cannot allege a claim against
7 the Catholic Church by stating that the culpable driver is a Catholic.
8 Plaintiff Riales does not allege facts that support her “belief” that the individuals were
9 acting at the direction of CSI, CC—or any other Defendant—when they allegedly performed the
10 acts attributed to them in the FAC. Because the FAC merely asserts allegations “on information
11 and belief” without alleging the information that leads the plaintiffs to believe that the allegations
12 are true, it is insufficient. Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 4th at 551, n.5. The Demurrer
13 should be sustained as to all of Plaintiff Riales’ causes of action.1
14 2. Plaintiff Riales’ First Claim Fails Because She Fails to Allege Facts
15 Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a Claim for Stalking
16 To allege a cause of action for stalking under California Civil Code Section 1708.7, a
17 plaintiff must allege facts supporting the following elements:
18 (1) The defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct the intent of which was to follow, alarm,
place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff . . .
19
(2) As a result of that pattern of conduct, either of the following occurred:
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(A) The plaintiff reasonably feared for his or her safety . . .
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(B) The plaintiff suffered substantial emotional distress, and the pattern of conduct
22 would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress;
23 (3) One of the following:
24 (A) The defendant, as part of the pattern of conduct specified in paragraph (1),
made a credible threat with either (i) the intent to place the plaintiff in reasonable
25 fear for his or her safety, or the safety of an immediate family member, or (ii)
reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff or that of an immediate family
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27 1
Again, this defect exists as to all claims by all Plaintiffs because they make an identical and
28 insufficient allegation “on information and belief,” (FAC, ¶¶ 93, 172, 249), but CSI and CC demur
only to Plaintiff Riales because they have moved to compel arbitration against the other Plaintiffs.
13
1 member. In addition the plaintiff must have, on at least one occasion, clearly and
definitively demanded that the defendant cease and abate his or her pattern of
2 conduct and the defendant persisted in his or her pattern of conduct unless exigent
circumstances make the plaintiff’s communication of the demand impracticable or
3 unsafe.
4 (B) The defendant violated a restraining order.
5 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7. Here, Plaintiff Riales fails to allege facts supporting the elements of her
6 claim for stalking.
7 First, as set forth above, Plaintiff Riales does not allege facts showing that Defendants
8 engaged in any conduct, much less conduct with the intent “to follow, alarm, place under
9 surveillance, or harass the plaintiff” or that Defendants made a “credible threat” to her. Because
10 Plaintiff fails to make these “most basic” allegations, her first cause of action fails. Connor v.
11 Franke, No. 16-cv-3542, 2017 WL 1908154, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) (granting motion to
12 dismiss stalking claim because “Plaintiff does not even allege that Defendant is the person who
13 broke into her home or followed her”).
14 Furthermore, Plaintiff Riales does not allege that any threat was made to her by anyone.
15 (Compare FAC, ¶ 227 (alleging that “Plaintiffs” but not “Plaintiff Riales” was threatened) with id.
16 ¶ 111 (alleging that “Plaintiff Bixler” was threatened), ¶ 191 (alleging that “Plaintiff Jane Doe #1”
17 was threatened).) For this additional reason, Plaintiff Riales’ first claim for stalking fails.
18 Second, Plaintiff Riales fails to sufficiently allege that “on at least one occasion, [she]
19 clearly and definitively demanded that the defendant cease and abate his or her pattern of conduct
20 and the defendant persisted in his or her pattern of conduct . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7(a)(3)(A).
21 At paragraph 227, the FAC alleges “Plaintiffs demanded the Defendants cease their behavior. The
22 Defendants persisted in their pattern of conduct and warned Plaintiffs that further public
23 complaints about them would only increase the severity of their fair gaming campaign.” (FAC, ¶
24 267.) This conclusory allegation, jointly-pleaded, does not state when such demand was made, in
25 what form, and to whom. Plaintiff Riales must plead these facts to state a claim. See Pan Pac.
26 Prop., Inc. v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. App. 3d 244, 251 (1978) (allegation that appellants
27 “exhausted their administrative remedies” is a “conclusionary statement” that is not admitted on
28 demurrer); see also Rakestraw, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 43 (the complaint must allege facts supporting
14
1 each element of a cause of action). Nor is this conclusory allegation plausible: Plaintiff Riales
2 does not allege a single communication or interaction with CSI or CC during which such a
3 demand could have been made. (See generally FAC.)
4 3. Plaintiff Riales’ Second and Third Claims Fail Because She Premises
5 Them On Conduct That Allegedly Occurred Outside of California
6 Plaintiff Riales’ Second and Third Causes of Action are based on Civil Code Section
7 1708.8. Civil Code Section 1708.8 explicitly states that it “applies only to a visual image, sound
8 recording, or other physical impression that is captured or taken in California in violation of
9 subdivision (a), (b), or (c) after January 1, 2010, and shall not apply to any visual image, sound
10 recording, or other physical impression taken or captured outside of California.” Cal. Civ. Code
11 § 1708.8(f)(5) (emphasis added).
12 Plaintiff Riales alleges no events that occurred in California. Plaintiff Riales “lives and
13 works in the State of Indiana.” (FAC, ¶ 5.) She alleges photography and surveillance by
14 individuals “outside her home,” “near her property,” and “throughout her town,” (id., ¶¶ 228, 232),
15 and while on vacation in Delaware, (id., ¶ 226). She also alleges other events occurring on her
16 property. (Id., ¶ 218 (alleging trash was stolen without alleging location of the trash), ¶ 192
17 (alleging a window to her home was shattered), ¶¶ 221, 223 (alleging individuals standing on her
18 property taking photographs of her home and vehicles).)2 Because all of these events allegedly
19 occurred in Indiana or Delaware, they cannot form the basis of a claim under Section 1708.8, and
20 her Second and Third Claims fail. Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(f)(5).
21 4. In the Alternative, Plaintiff Riales’ Second Claim Fails Because She
22 Does Not Allege Facts Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a
23 Claim for Physical Invasion of Privacy
24 Even if Plaintiff Riales could assert a claim under Section 1708.8(a) for conduct occurring
25
26
2
Plaintiff Riales alleges other incidents – such as persons standing outside of her home, a
27 supposed dog poisoning, and a supposed attempted arson (FAC, ¶¶ 229-231) – but such alleged
28 conduct neither falls within the definitions of Civil Code Section 1708.8 or is alleged to have
occurred in California.
15
1 in Indiana and Delaware, her allegations are insufficient to do so. Under Civil Code Section
2 1708.8(a) “[a] person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the person knowingly enters
3 onto the land or into the airspace above the land of another person without permission or
4 otherwise commits a trespass in order to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or
5 other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity and
6 the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.” Cal. Civ. Code §
7 1708.8(a). Accordingly, to allege physical invasion of privacy under Civil Code Section
8 1708.8(a), Plaintiff Riales had to allege facts showing (among other things): (1) CSI and CC
9 physically trespassed and (2) with the intent to record or photograph her engaging in private,
10 personal, or familial activity. Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a). Plaintiff Riales has not alleged facts
11 demonstrating these elements.
12 Plaintiff Riales alleges being photographed or surveilled by individuals not on her
13 property. (FAC, ¶¶ 226, 232.) She also alleges instances that may constitute trespass, but without
14 any alleged recording activity. (Id., ¶ 218 (alleging trash was stolen without alleging location of
15 the trash), ¶ 222 (alleging a window to her home was shattered), ¶ 229 (arson), ¶ 231 (dog
16 poisoning).) Plaintiff Riales also alleges two instances of individuals standing on her property and
17 taking photographs; however, in neither instance does she allege they were taking or attempting to
18 take photographs of “plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity.” Cal. Civ. Code
19 § 1708.8(a). Instead, she alleges these individuals took pictures “of her home” and of her “food
20 truck, car, license plates, and home,” and not of any activity or any person in or around her home.
21 (FAC, ¶¶ 221, 223.)
22 Because Plaintiff Riales has not alleged an instance of trespass on her property with the
23 intent to photograph or record the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity, she
24 fails to state a claim for physical invasion of privacy in violation of Civil Code Section 1708.8(a).
25 See Rakestraw, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 43 (plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish every
26 element of each cause of action).
27 ///
28 ///
16
1 5. In the Alternative, Plaintiff Riales’ Third Claim Fails Because She Does
2 Not Allege Facts Demonstrating The Essential Elements of A Claim for
3 Constructive Invasion of Privacy
4 Even if Plaintiff Riales could assert a claim under Section 1708.8(b) for conduct occurring
5 in Indiana and Delaware, her allegations are insufficient to do so. Under Civil Code Section
6 1708.8(b) “[a] person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the person attempts to
7 capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound
8 recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, familial
9 activity, through the use of any device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this
10 image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been achieved without a
11 trespass unless the device was used.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b). This statute is sometimes
12 referred to as “technological trespass” and applies when technology “enabled [a] defendant to
13 secure an image or recording that—but for the device—could not have been achieved without a
14 trespass.” Rutter Practice Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def., B. Elements of Claim, Cal. Prac.
15 Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def. Ch. 2(IX)-B (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b)). A treatise
16 further explains that this provision “might apply, for example, if a defendant used a powerful
17 telephoto lens to capture an image from the public street, because otherwise it would be
18 impossible to capture the image without physically trespassing onto plaintiff’s property.” Id.
19 Plaintiff Riales fails to allege facts showing any instance of technological trespass by CSI, CC—or
20 any Defendant.
21 Plaintiff Riales alleges being photographed from a “nearby balcony” while on vacation in
22 Rehoboth Beach, Delaware in July 2018. (FAC, ¶ 226.) Yet, Plaintiff Riales does not allege the
23 device used or that “image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been
24 achieved without a trespass unless the device was used,” as required by Civil Code Section
25 1708.8(b). Because Plaintiff Riales fails to allege facts supporting the elements of a claim for
26 constructive invasion of privacy under Civil Code Section 1708.8(b), the demurrer to her Third
27 Claim should be sustained. See Rakestraw, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 43.
28 ///
17
1 6. Plaintiff Riales’ Fourth Claim Fails Because She Does Not Allege the
2 Nature and Extent of the Emotional Distress She Allegedly Suffered
3 “Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires (1) ‘outrageous’ conduct by the
4 defendant, (2) that the defendant intended to cause (or recklessly disregarded the probability of
5 causing) emotional distress, (3) severe emotional distress, and (4) causation.” Angie M. v.
6 Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1225-26 (1995). “[T]he mere allegation that the plaintiffs
7 suffered severe emotional distress, without facts indicating the nature or extent of any mental
8 suffering incurred as a result of defendant’s alleged outrageous conduct, fail[s] to state a cause of
9 action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Pitman v. City of Oakland, 197 Cal. App.
10 3d 1037, 1047 (1988) (citing Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 602, 617 (1985)).
11 Here, the FAC alleges only “[t]he aforesaid outrageous conduct caused Plaintiffs severe
12 emotional distress, suffering, anguish, anxiety, humiliation, and shame.” (FAC, ¶ 291.) Plaintiff
13 Riales provides no facts “indicating the nature or extent of any mental suffering,” and therefore,
14 she has failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
15 demurrer to Plaintiff Riales’ Fourth Claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be
16 sustained. Pitman, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1047 (affirming sustaining demurrer to intentional
17 infliction of emotional distress claim because bare allegation that plaintiff “suffered shame,
18 humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of his employment” was insufficient to allege severe
19 emotional distress); Angie M., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1227 (affirming sustaining of demurrer to
20 intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where plaintiff failed to allege “specific facts
21 sufficient to show the severity of [plaintiff’s] alleged emotional distress”); Bogard, 164 Cal. App.
22 3d at 617-18 (affirming sustaining of demurrer to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
23 where plaintiffs “failed to set forth any facts which indicate the nature or extent of any mental
24 suffering incurred as a result of [defendant’s] alleged outrageous conduct”).
25 III. CONCLUSION
26 For the foregoing reasons, CSI and CC respectfully request the Court sustain the demurrer
27 without leave to amend.
28
18
WILLIAM H. FORMAN
2 DAVID C. SCHEPER
4
5
6
William H. Forman
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
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19
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 Chrissie Carnell Bixler v. Church of Scientology International, et al.

LASC Case No. 19STCV29458
3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 800 West
Sixth Street, 18th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017-2701.
6
On April 7, 2020, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as
7 DEFENDANTS CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL AND CHURCH OF
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE INTERNATIONAL’S NOTICE OF
8 DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF RIALES’ CLAIMS IN PLAINTIFFS’
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on the interested parties in this action as follows:
9
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
10
BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the
11 document(s) to be sent from e-mail address ptanigawa@scheperkim.com to the persons at the e-
mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the
12 transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
13 BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: I served the document(s) on the person(s) listed in the

Service List by submitting an electronic version of the document(s) to ASAP Legal Solutions for
14 e-service.
15 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
16
Executed on April 7, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.
17
18
19 Pamela Tanigawa
20
21
22
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24
25
26
27
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20
1 SERVICE LIST
Chrissie Carnell Bixler v. Church of Scientology International, et al.
2 LASC Case No. 19STCV29458
3
SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND E-MAIL Attorneys for Plaintiffs CHRISSIE CARNELL
4 BIXLER; CEDRIC BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE
Robert W. Thompson DOE #1; MARIE BOBETTE RIALES and
5 Kristen A. Vierhaus JANE DOE #2
THOMPSON LAW OFFICES
6 700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
Burlingame, CA 94010
7 Telephone: 650-513-6111
Facsimile: 650-513-6071
8 Emails: bobby@tlopc.com
kris@tlopc.com
9
Graham E. Berry
10 Law Office of Graham E. Berry
3384 McLaughlin Ave.
11 Los Angeles, CA 90066-2005
Telephone: 310-745-3771
12 Facsimile: 310-745-3771
Email: grahamberryesq@gmail.com
13
ATTORNEYS NOT ADMITTED TO THE
14 CALIFORNIA BAR – SERVED VIA E-MAIL
ONLY AS A COURTESY
15
Brian D. Kent
16 Gaetano D’Andrea
M. Stewart Ryan
17 LAFFEY BUCCI & KENT LLP
1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
18 Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: 215-399-9255
19 Facsimile: 215-241-8700
Emails: bkent@lbk-law.com
20 GDandrea@laffeybuccikent.com
sryan@laffeybuccikent.com
21
Jeffrey P. Fritz
22 SOLOFF & ZERVANOS P C
1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
Telephone: 215-732-2260
24 Facsimile: 215-732-2289
Email: jfritz@lawsz.com
25
26
27
28
21
1 Marci Hamilton
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
2 Fox-Fels Building
3814 Walnut Street
Telephone: 215-353-8984
4 Facsimile: 215-493-1094
Email: hamilton.marci@gmail.com
5
SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND E-MAIL Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS
6 Robert E. Mangels TECHNOLOGY CENTER
Matthew D. Hinks
7 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER
& MITCHELL LLP
8 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067-4308
9 Telephone: 310-203-8080
Facsimile: 310-203-0567
10 Emails: rmangels@jmbm.com
mhinks@jmbm.com
11
SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND E-MAIL Attorneys for Specially-Appearing Defendant
12 Jeffrey K. Riffer DAVID MISCAVIGE
ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN
13 GARTSIDE LLP
10345 West Olympic Boulevard
14 Los Angeles, CA 90064
Telephone: 310-746-4400
15 Facsimile: 310-746-4499
Email: jriffer@elkinskalt.com
16
SERVED VIA E-SERVICE AND E-MAIL Attorneys for Defendant
17 Andrew B. Brettler DANIEL MASTERSON
LAVELY & SINGER PROFESSIONAL
18 CORPORATION
2049 Century Park E 2400
19 Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: 310-556-3501
20 Facsimile: 310-556-3615
Email: abrettler@lavelysinger.com
21
22
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22
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Bixler v. Scientology: CSI Demurrer-Riales (FAC)

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Bixler v. Scientology: CSI Demurrer-Riales (FAC)

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Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 04/07/2020 02:46 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by K. Hung,Deputy Clerk

1 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

8 Attorneys for Defendants Church of Scientology

10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

11 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

12 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458

14 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS CHURCH OF

7 Causes of Action One through Four.

13 of William H. Forman ¶¶ 2-7.)

15 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the concurrently-filed Declaration of William H. Forman,

17 presented at the hearing.

19 DATED: April 6, 2020 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

2 Defendants Church of Scientology International (“CSI”) and Church of Scientology

5 on the following grounds:

6 Demurrer to First Cause of Action

13 Demurrer to Second Cause of Action

16 Procedure Section 430.10(d).

19 Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e).

20 Demurrer to Third Cause of Action

21 5. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of

23 Civil Procedure Section 430.10(d).

24 6. The Third Cause of Action for Constructive Invasion of Privacy in Violation of

26 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e).

27 Demurrer to Fourth Cause of Action

28 7. The Fourth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

7 DATED: April 7, 2020 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

9 Angie M. v. Superior Court,

13 175 Cal. App. 2d 650 (1959) ................................................................................................... 9, 11

14 Doe v. City of Los Angeles,

18 207 Cal. App. 4th 826 (2012) .............................................................................................. 8, 9, 11

19 Pan Pac. Prop., Inc. v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz,

25 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7 ............................................................................................................ 13, 14

26 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7(a)(3)(A) ................................................................................................... 14

27 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 ................................................................................................................. 15

28 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a) ............................................................................................................. 16

2 Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(f)(5) ......................................................................................................... 15

3 Cal. Civ. Proc. § 378(a)(1) .......................................................................................................... 9, 11

4 Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(d) ......................................................................................... 9, 11

6 therefore, this demurrer to the FAC should be sustained with prejudice.

21 elements of each of her asserted claims.

4 A demurrer must be sustained where “[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties.” Cal.

24 alleged assaults were not the same transaction or occurrence).

9 Jane Doe #2 was harassed at a grocery store).)

10 Allege Facts Sufficient to State Any Claim Against CSI and CC

11 A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of factual allegations in a complaint. Rakestraw v.

14 establish every element of each cause of action.” Id. at 43.

16 Demonstrating CSI or CC Engaged In Any Conduct At All

18 surveillance perpetrated against her individually, specifically:

19  Plaintiff Riales’ First Cause of Action for stalking is based on “Defendants”

24 in Plaintiffs’ windows, and electronically compromis[ing] their security systems, and/or

25 phones, and/or computers, and/or other digital devices.” (Id., ¶ 276.)

2 impressions.” (Id., ¶ 282.)

3  Plaintiff Riales’ Fourth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional

7 and/or text[ing], and/or otherwise attempt[ing] to communicate repeatedly.” (Id., ¶ 288.)

7 the Catholic Church by stating that the culpable driver is a Catholic.

13 should be sustained as to all of Plaintiff Riales’ causes of action.1

15 Demonstrating The Essential Elements of a Claim for Stalking

17 plaintiff must allege facts supporting the following elements:

23 (3) One of the following:

4 (B) The defendant violated a restraining order.

6 claim for stalking.

13 broke into her home or followed her”).