INTRODUCTION: FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE

BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-31995; June 15, 1973

FACTS

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front
of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

It was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact
an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech
and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. 

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their
business and backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they
pushed through with the rally. 

ISSUE

Whether or not the company is guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing its employees

RULING

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight leaders for proceeding with
the demonstration and consequently being absent from work constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees.

Furthermore, the dismissal of the eight leaders of the Union is a harsh punishment for a one-day absence
from work. The appropriate penalty, if it deserves a penalty, should have been simply to charge said one-
day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight leaders is a most cruel penalty.

Wherefore, the orders of the respondent court is null and void. Directing the reinstatement of the eight
leaders with full back pay minus one day’s pay.
POLICE POWER

BUCK vs. BELL

274 US 200; May 2, 1927

FACTS

Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was committed to the State Colony. She is the daughter
of a feeble minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child.
An Act of Virginia approved March 20, 1924, recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of
society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives, under careful
safeguard. The sterilization may be effected in males by vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy,
without serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the Commonwealth is supporting in various
institutions many defective persons who if now discharged would become a menace but if incapable of
procreating might be discharged with safety and become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and to
society; and that experience has shown that heredity plays an important part in the transmission of
insanity, imbecility.

ISSUE

Whether or not Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process of the
law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

RULING

The attack is not upon the procedure but upon the substantive law. We have seen more than once that the
public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It is better for the entire world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. Three generations of imbeciles are
enough. It is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point out shortcomings of this sort. But
the answer is that law does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all
within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means
allow. Of course so far as the operations enable those who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned
to the world, and thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.
Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice Butler dissents.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE
ASSOCIATIO3N, INC
G.R. No. 135962; March 27, 2000

FACTS

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.  
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City.
Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

Respondent received from petitioner, a notice requesting to open Neptune Street to public vehicular
traffic starting January 2, 1996. 

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. 

MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government endowed
with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it
follow then that it need not for an ordinance to be enacted first. 

ISSUE

Whether or not the MMDA have the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers?

RULING

The MMDA's jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that
transcended local boundaries. Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical
assistance in the preparation of local development plans. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given
to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. The MMDA was created to put some order in the
metropolitan transportation system, but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its
good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision
without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of
the rule of law. The petition is denied.
RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-74457; March 20, 1900087

FACTS

In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no carabao and
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be subject to confiscation
and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the
carabaos.

On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He
issued a writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court sustained the
confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked
authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence, this petition for review filed by
Petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A is a valid exercise of a police power

RULING

We find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL vs. AYALA LAND INC.
G.R. No. 177056; September 18, 2009

FACTS

Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate shopping malls in various
locations in Metro Manila. They have parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles. Respondents
expend for its maintenance and administration. The parking tickets or cards issued to vehicle owners
contain the stipulation that respondents shall not be responsible for any loss or damage to the vehicles
parked.
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a
joint investigation for the following purposes: (1) legality of the prevalent practice of charging parking
fees; (2) basis and reasonableness of the parking rates; and (3) to determine the legality of the policy of
denying liability in cases of theft, robbery, or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the
parking tickets.
In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is
contrary to the National Building Code and is therefore illegal. While it is true that the Code merely
requires malls to provide parking spaces, without specifying whether it is free or not, both Committees
believe that the reasonable and logical interpretation of the Code is that the parking spaces are for free.
ISSUE

Whether or not the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a valid exercise of
police power of the State

RULING

No, it is not a valid exercise of police power. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting
respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property. It is to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property. The State is not only
requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but is also
mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive
intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a
portion of their properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just
recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.
EMINENT DOMAIN

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 14355; October 31, 1919

FACTS
The City of Manila, in exercising the power of Eminent Domain, presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance praying that certain lands, be expropriated for constructing the extension of Rizal Avenue.
Herein respondents contend that there are other parcels of land offered at a lesser cost and that the chosen
land by the City is a cemetery. Also, they will have to spend a great deal amount of money in the
relocation and rebuilding of sepulchres, tombstones and monuments of those affected by the
expropriation should they pursue to use the Chinese Cemetery. The trial judge, Hon. Del Rosario decided
that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question. The City of
Manila appealed contending that under the law, it has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire
and neither the court nor the land owners can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or
ask concerning the necessities therefore; and that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved.

ISSUE
Whether or not may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?

RULING

Under Sec. 243 of Act No. 190, courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon: 1. whether the
purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public; and 2. whether the land is public
or private. Supreme Court also averred that the exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessary in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. Therefore, if there is no greatest necessity existing for an expropriation, it should not be made
for such purposes until it is fully established that such necessity exist. In the present case, even granting
that a necessity exist for the opening of Rizal St. through the cemetery, record shows that
adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge which will answer every
purpose of the City of Manila. The cemetery, then, still being undercare and maintenance of the living
should be spared from such expropriation where there are other lands offered for expropriation at
a much lesser expense to serve the same purpose. The judgment of the lower court is
hereby affirmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET. AL
G.R. No. L-12172; August 29, 1958

FACTS

During the incumbency of Mayor Juan F. Fajardo, Ordinance 7, series of 1950 was passed prohibiting any
construction of building that will destroy the view of the Public Plaza. Four years later, Fajardo and his
son-in-law, request a permit to construct a building. The request was denied as it would destroy the view
or beauty of the public plaza. Whereupon, Fajardo and Babilonia proceeded with the construction of the
building because they needed a place of residence very badly. Fajardo and Babilonia were charged and
convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of Ordinance 7. Fajardo
and Babilonia appealed to the Court of First Instance (CDI), which affirmed the conviction. From this
decision, Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to
the Supreme Court because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

ISSUE

Whether the refusal to issue a building permit on the ground that it would destroy the view of the public
plaza is an undue deprivation of the use of the property, and thus a taking without due compensation

RULING

The refusal to issue a building permit was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would
"destroy the view of the public plaza". The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates
— to permanently deprive the latter of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds
of police power, and amounts to a taking of the property without just compensation. But while property
may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, the State may not, permanently divest owners of
the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community. Fajardo would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain
idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally
achieve that result, the municipality must give Fajardo just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET. AL
G.R. No. L-20620; August 15, 1974

FACTS

In 1947, petitioner, through AFP entered into a lease agreement over a land with Castellvi on a year-to-
year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the
permanent installations that were erected on the property. Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga to eject them from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, petitioner
instituted these expropriation proceedings. It argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the
year 1947 when they were granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor
wish to terminate the lease. Defendant, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of
property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1)
entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period,
and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, which are not present.

ISSUE

Whether or not the taking of properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the action

HELD

No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than
a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the
property under a contract of lease.
TAXATION

WENCESLAO PASCUAL vs. THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. L-10405; December 29, 1960

FACTS

Governor Pascual instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, for the construction and
improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder road as contained in the tracings attached
to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the
Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which
projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main
highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the
subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains
from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the
government.

ISSUE

Whether or not the incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of
justifying an expenditure of the government

RULING

No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but
a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine
its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which
the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and
the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.

Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be used only for
a public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate public funds is correlative with its right to tax,
and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the
collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state
funds can be made for other than a public purpose. The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring
the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the
furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally
serve the public. 
REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-19201; June 16, 1965

FACTS

Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc. donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish
priest and predecessor of herein petitioner, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality.
The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended. On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate,
Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. The respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an
assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which
petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interests of 1% monthly
from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return. Petitioner
lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner should be liable for the assessed donee's gift tax on the P10,000.00 donated for the
construction of the Victorias Parish Church.

RULING

Yes. Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries,
churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements
used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on
such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the present
case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the properties
themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties,
upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties (Phipps vs. Com. of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627).
Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not
a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the
imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt
from taxation," as employed in the Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from
all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of
petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied.