CASE

RECIT READY

RULE 78 – RULE 85 AND RULE 87

In 1901, Teran was appointed administrator of the estate. In 1902, Maria Munoz was appointed guardian of minors; from this
date therefore, with respect to the interests of the minors in the estate, Maria Munoz was in charge of its administration and not
Teran. In 1906, the Court revoked the appointment of Maria Munoz as guardian because she was not a Philippine resident. The
1) Guerrero v. Teran
issue is W/N the revocation of Maria Munoz as guardian was proper. (YES) When this case was promulgated, there was no rule
yet that non-residents should not be allowed as administrators or guardians. However, the Court still held that they should
disallow appointments of non-residents as administrators or guardians because the courts will find it difficult to fulfil their duty
of protecting estates of deceased persons and wards of the estate if the administrators and guardians are not personally subject to
their jurisdiction.

This is an appeal dated Nov. 11, 1922 from an order of the CFI appointing Jose Garcia as administrator of the estate of deceased
Geronima Uy Coque.

The appellant is the surviving spouse of the deceased and maintains that the court erred in not appointing him instead. The court said
that even though there was no appeal from the order of the court below dated Sept. 30, 1922 and the question raised in this appeal is
already res judicata, they will still give another reason for the satisfaction of counsel.

2) Navas v. Garcia Generally, the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to be the administrator cannot be arbitrarily and without sufficient reason be
disregarded. However, when the person enjoying preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The
determination of a person’s suitability rests in the discretion of the court and will no be interfered with on appeal unless it was clearly
wrong.

In this case, it appeared from the record that the appellant had adverse interests in the estate of such character as to render him
unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested
in the estate. The court below stated the facts which may constitute grounds for setting aside the preferential rights and which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, must be presumed sufficient.

Monsignor Juan Bautista Gorordo died in Cebu and left a will instituting his sister Maria Jaen as universal heir to his estate. He named
Father Emiliano Mercao as executor and in the absence of the latter, Alejandro Espina. The will of Monsignor was probated without
opposition and CIF of Cebu confirmed appointment of Father Emilio Mercado as executor. The heirs opposed to the appointment of the
executor. The heirs claimed that Father Mercado was unfit and incapacitated to discharge the duties of the executor alleging (1)
notwithstanding the opposition, he contracted services of attorneys to represent him in these proceedings for the sole purpose of
repaying the obligations he owed to the attorney (2) He cannot be impartial as the executoe because the church of San Nicolas of which
3) Mercado v. Vda. De Jaen he is parish priest is one of the legatees named in the will (he would favor the interest of his parish) (3) Since the estate had no debts
and the heirs instituted in the will are all of age, there is no necessity of making the estate incur unnecessary expenses as the exector’s
fees (4) Heirs are better able to protect their interests of the estate (5) Another attorney is willing to render professional services to
the estate for free. They prayed for the suspension of said appointment. Lower court denied their motion

WON the lower court erred in overruling the opposition of the heirs of the deceased to the appointment of the executor-- No

When Monsignor chose father Mercado as executor, he must have had a good and sufficient reason, therefore his will must be respected.
 The evidence shows that when the deceased bishop made his will naming said priest in preference to anybody else, he was in the full
enjoyment of his intellectual faculties. Under the circumstances, it is not only just but also right to fully comply with his last will; and
this is precisely what the lower court did in confirming the appointment of Father Mercado as executor herein. As a matter of fact,
section 641 of Act No. 190 provides that when a will has been probed and allowed, the court is bound to issue letters testamentary
thereon to the person named as executor therein provided he accepts the trust and gives the bond as required by law, which Father
Emiliano Mercado certainly did willingly before assuming his trust. While it is true, as the appellants contend, that this provision of the
law should not be strictly interpreted because the court would be deprived of its power not to appoint, in certain cases, one who is
unworthy of the trust, notwithstanding the fact that he was named as such by the testator (sec. 653, Act No. 190); it is also true that in
order to do this, the unworthiness, incapacity, ineptitude and unfitness of such person must be manifest and real and not merely
imaginary

Carlos Palanca died leaving a will where he named Petitioner Ramon Ozaeta as executor. Upon Palanca’s death, petitioner presented a
petition for the probate of the will with a prayer that he be appointed special administrator. Some of decedent’s heirs oppose the
petition. The court appointed Phil. Trust Company as special administrator, which later presented a petition to resign as such. The
court then appointed Sebastian Palanca. However, it reconsidered its order appointing Sebastian Palanca as special administrator and
appointed BPI instead. It held that it has the discretion to choose the special administrator and is not bound to appoint the person
named in the will as executor because the order had been appealed.
4) Ozaeta v. Pecson and BPI
WON the probate court erred in appointing as special administrator a person other than the executor named in the probated will even
if its order of probate is on appeal – YES

When a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the probate court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as
executor in the will upon the latter's application, even if the order of probate is on appeal.

This is an opposition of Angelica Limcolioc against the appointment of Apolinario de Guzman as her co-administrator in the estate of
their father, Proceso. The SC ruled that the principal consideration in the appointment of the administrator of the estate is the interest
of that person in the estate. This is why preference is given to the widow of a deceased husband as the administrator. HOWEVER, THIS
PREFERENCE IS NOT ABSOLUTE if the Court finds that there is another who has more interest therein than the surviving spouse.
5) De Guzman v. Limcolioc
In this case, Apolinario as Angelica’s brother has the same or in fact, more interest than her. For more, she shall not worry because
Apolinario will only serve as her helper. The fact that Apolinario was sued by their own father while he was living for misappropriating
12k to 15k to buy a fishery, a sedan, and a duck farm is of no moment because the same case was withdrawn by their father. Lastly, the
appointment of the administrator is discretionary on the part of the Court and in the absence of grave abuse of discretion – the
appointment shall not be disturbed.

6) Gonzales v. Aguinaldo In the intestate proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis, the court a quo appointed
petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate.
Doña Ramona is survived by 4 children who are her only heirs, namely, Asterio Beatriz, Teresa, and Cecilia.
Beatriz F. Gonzales went to the US to accompany her ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment. Teresa Olbes filed a motion

to remove Beatriz as co-administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions
detrimental to the interest of the estate. Respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to Beatriz. Beatriz filed an
MR. Cecilia Gomez stated that it would be pointless to re-appoint Beatriz F. Gonzales as co- administratrix. Beatriz contends that her
removal was not shown by respondents to be anchored on any of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court.

Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, which The SC ruled in favor of Beatriz Gonzales and reappointed her as a co-administrator.
states:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept Section 6 of Rule 78 establishes the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption
resignation of executor or administrator. behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand,
Proceedings upon death, resignation or suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
removal — If an executor or administrator administer the estate correctly. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as to entitle them to protection
neglects to render his account and settle the from removal without just cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the legal and specific causes authorizing
estate according to law, or to perform an the court to remove an administrator.
order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the
absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator.
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the For mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. Conflicts of opinion and
trust, the court may remove him, or in its judgment naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the same estate.
discretion, may permit him to resign. . . .
In this case, the court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict and disharmony between the two (2) co-administratrices
were unjustly caused by petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the
management of the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her continuance as co-
administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate. Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales
as co-administratrix of the estate also on the ground that she had been absent from the country. Beatriz explained that her absence
from the country was due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband to the United States for medical treatment. However,
Beatriz had continually maintained correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of the estate during the
petitioner's absence from the country. As a matter of fact, petitioner, while in the United States, sent respondent Olbes a letter
addressed to the Land Bank of the Philippines duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes)
to receive, and collect the interests accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the payment of
accounts necessary for the operation of the administration.
The above facts, we note, show that Beatriz had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been
remiss in the fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator
of the estate.
As held in re Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence outside of the state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors'
family, is not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.
The appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for her removal was shown, the court a quo
gravely abused its discretion in removing her. Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Her
removal was therefore improper.

Carmen Johannes died intestate in Singapore. Her heirs are the following: her husband (B.E. Johannes), 2 siblings (Frederick and Ida)
living in Singapore, and 1 brother (Alfred) who lived in Manila. Her husband was named the administrator of her property in Singapore
while her brother Alfred, through his petition, was named the administrator of her property in Manila by Judge Harvey. The husband
says the appointment of an administrator in Manila is unnecessary because he was already appointed the administrator in Singapore.

WON an administrator in Manila was still necessary. - YES.

7) Johannes v. Harvey It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country
of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration.
The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country
in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the United States. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his las domicile, property to be administered
in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs. Hence, even though the
husband was declared the administrator of the Singapore property, he had no administration powers over the Manila property since
 the latter property was located in another country.
There is still another aspect to the case. This is that pursuant to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order of a Court of First
Instance appointing an administration of the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties
thereunder, within the meaning of the statute, and is appealable

Dr. Francisco Varela Calderon was a bachelor, a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and at the time he made his will was residing
temporarily in France and that at the time of his death he left no ascendants. The petitioner in this case is the administrator of the
estate of Dr. Calderon. The appellants are brothers and sisters of full blood of the deceased and have filed an opposition to the project
of partition of their deceased brother Calderon, the lower court denied their intervention. The beneficiaries of Calderon are his
illegitimate children. The CFI of Manila issued an order of partition based from the will of Calderon. The appellants who are siblings of
the testator, sought to intervene and oppose the approval of the project of partition since the beneficiaries of the will are his illegitimate
children. The appellants contend that the illegitimate children are not qualified to inherit from the deceased. However, the CFI rejected
the opposition, stating that the siblings have no right to intervene in the consideration of the project of partition as well as the
adjudication of the property of Dr. Calderon. With the opposition being denied, the appellants appealed before the Supreme Court.

8) Gutierrez de Ocampo v. Valera Calderon WoN the trial court erred in refusing the appellants to intervene - No.

The beneficiaries under the will of Francisco Varela Calderon, granting that they are illegitimate children, are not incapacitated to take
property under the will of their father. Article 763 of the Civil Code provides that a person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will
of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire.

The appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the deceased and therefore have no right to any part of the property left by the
testator, once he had disposed of the same by will. If any of them were forced heirs they would be entitled to intervene in this case and
protect their interest in so far as they may have been prejudiced by the will. It is evident therefore that they have not been injured or
prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only forced heirs whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to intervene in a case of this
character.

This case involves the two wills of Crisostomo. The Court allowed for probate the October 19 will. Her nephews and nieces filed a
petition for relief of the allowance of the said will and alleged: the lower court failed to perform its legal duty to set date for proving
the will of August 16 will and the failure to set aside a date for proving the will of August 16 with the will of October 19 was entirely
due to the lower court's fault or negligence. (Medyo magulo ung case so inayos ko nalang for recit-ready)

Issues:

W/N failure to send personal notice to legal heirs make the order void- NO. This was raised first time in the appeal. Hence, there is the
9) Trillana v. Crisostomo
legal presumption that the probate court promulgated the order in accoradnce with the Rules.

W/N the court erred in not setting a date for the hearing of the allowance of the August 16 will- NO, the court did not err. The August 16
will was expressly revoked by the October 19 will. The revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will
is disallowed. (Additional facts: According to the attorneys for the appellant, the will dated August 16 was sent together with a writing
called "Manifestation" by registered mail on October 30, 1948, from Manila to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, by Attorney Mr.
Tomas V. Barnes, and said will must have been received by the Clerk of Said Court on or after November 1, 1948, the date when the
subsequent will of October 19, was filed for probate.)

W/N the nephers and nieces are interested parties- NO. In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the
interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that he will be materially and directly
benefited or injured by the court's order, decree or judgment: and not indirect or contingent Here, the interest claimed by the
appellants is purely contingent or dependent upon several uncertain and future events to (1) The disallowance of the will of October
19, 1948 (2)The allowance of the will of August 16, 1948, and (3) invalidation of certain legacies left in said will of August 16, 1948.
Moreover, in their petition they did not even specify the degree of relationship they had with the testatrix.

Irene Santos died intestate. Her only heirs were her surviving spouse, Jose Villegas, and her two nieces, Rizalina Santos Rivera and
Adela Santos Gutierrez. Jose filed a petition for LOA and was appointed administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named as intestate
heirs, besides himself, Rizalina and Adela. During the proceeding, an unverified manifestation signed by Adela, accompanied by a
kasulatan, was presented to the Probate Court, stating that she will no longer take part in the proceedings and is transferring all her
rights, interests, and participation to Rizalina. Adela averred that such manifestation was obtained through fraud by Villegas, as she
thought she was signing for a loan, but was instead signing a Deed of Sale. An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who
alleged that Adela, although originally a party to the probate proceedings, has voluntarily and expressly desisted from being so, and
that having assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and participations in the estate, she has no longer any legal standing in the case.

10) Gutierrez v. Villegas
ISSUE: W/N Adela is still entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator in the probate proceedings. Yes.

Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of
Assignment, the record, nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court. Every act intended to put
an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. No serious argument can be offered to deny the co-heir-ship of appellee in the estate
under probate. It appearing that the transaction is in the nature of extra-judicial partition, court approval is imperative, and
the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment
and desistance.

Pio died intestate. He was survived by his wife Josefina, his siblings, and nephews and nieces. Cipriano, one of Pio's surviving brothers,
through a public instrument, renounced all his hereditary rights in favour of Josefina. Cipriano later filed a petition for intestate
proceedings, praying to be the administrator. Josefina opposed this since Cipriano was not an interested person (any more). Cipriano
countered by saying that Josefina wasn't even Pio's real wife. Another brother, Miguel, also asked to be co-petitioner of Cipriano. The
CFI held that Cipriano was no longer an interested party.

W/N Cipriano and Miguel are interested persons—NO.
11) Duran v. Duran

The brothers argue that an assignment by one heir of his share in the estate to a co-heir amounts to a partition needing approval by
the settlement court to be effective; and that the assigning heir does not lose his status as a person interested in the estate, even after
said assignment is approved by the court. But the case relied upon the brothers cannot apply to them. The assignment in the Santos
case took place when no settlement proceeding was pending. The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the
jurisdiction of a settlement court. Cipriano’s assignment is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he is left without that
“interest” in the estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.

12) De Guzman v. Angeles Respondent Elaine de Guzman (surviving spouse) filed a petition for settlement of estate of deceased Monolito de Guzman before the
 RTC Makati. She filed a motion for writ of possession on 5 vehicles registered under the name of the decedent alleging that it is conjugal
property but in the possession of petitioner Pedro de Guzman (father of deceased). She also filed a motion to appoint herself as special
administratrix and this was granted by the court. Pedro resisted when the Deputy Sheriffs tried to take the vehicles saying that they
were his personal properties. Pedro also argued that the appointment of special administratrix constitutes abuse of discretion for
having been made without giving him and other parties an opportunity to oppose appointment. The issue is whether or not probate
court may appoint special administratrix and issue writ of possession even before notice is served to all interested parties? The SC said
NO. RTC Makati acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon filing of petition for settlement of estate but not over the persons who
are interested in the settlement of estate. Rule 79, Sec. 3 provides that the court should set time for hearing and notice. Thus, where
there is no notice to persons believed to have an interest in the estate, the proceeding is considered void and should be annulled
because notice through publication is jurisdictional.

The court defined a Special Administrator: representative of the decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his
estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed.

13) Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals

Carlos Palanca was able to leave a will before he died. He named therein Ozaeta as executor of the will in case of unavailability of General Roxas. When
Palanca died, Roxas died after and Ozaeta was prompted to file a petition for the probate of Palanca’s will, with the prayer of being appointed as a special
administrator. The heirs opposed the appointment. The bank previously appointed as administrator resigned on grounds of conflict of interest.

It should be noted at the outset that Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, under the provisions of which the order appealed from was made, grants discretion
to the probate court to appoint or not to appoint a special administrator. It is silent as to the person that may be appointed as special administrator,
unlike section 6 of Rule 79, which expressly gives the order of preference of the persons that may be appointed regular administrator. The appointment
of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators. However, that while the choice of the person
lies within the court's discretion, such discretion should not be a whimsical one, but one that is reasonable and logical and in accord with fundamental
legal principles and justice. The fact that a judge is granted discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Such discretion must be based on reason and legal principle, and it must be exercised within
the limits thereof. And there is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be
taken into account in the appointment of the special administrator.
14) Roxas v. Pecson
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes.
It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of the estate.
The curtailment of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights granted by will take effect from the time of
death, the management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his
assumption of the trust can be interposed any longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue
letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his application. It is the testator that appoints his executor, as the question as to his peculiar
fitness for such a position or his want of ability to manage the estate can not be addressed to the discretion of the county judge.

In the case at bar, the will has already been admitted to probate, and respondent judge himself has expressly appointed petitioner as administrator.
The only reason or ground, therefore, for suspending his appointment, and for the appointment of a special administrator, who is not the petitioner
himself, is a very technical one. It also appears that the Philippine Trust Company, which had acted as special administrator for a period of only a few
months, has submitted a bill for P90,000. This would cut deep into the income of the estate, and if the new special administrator appointed by the
respondent judge takes office, it is not improbable that the estate may again be subjected to the same expensive cost of administration. Under these
circumstances, it would seem unreasonable to refuse to appoint the petitioner as special administrator. To do so would be delaying the fulfillment of
 the wishes of the testator and subjecting the estate to unnecessary expense.

Manuela Ruiz and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain and lived together. They had a son named Theodoro. Crlos abandoned Manuela
and lived in the Philippines with their son Teoforo in 1945. He resided at Pontevedra, Negross Occidental. Carlos lived maritally with
Rizalina Perez whom he had 2 children. Manuela then went to the Philippines in 1960 but Carlos refused to admit her to his residence.
Hence, Manuela filed a case for support and annulment of some alleged donations of the conjugal property in favor of Rizalina. The
court granted Manuela a monthly alimony of P2K, which was reduced by the CA to P1k.

Carlos then died and left a will naming Marcelo Pijuan as an executor and disinherited Manuela and their son. Pijuan then instituted a
SPECPRO of the CFI of Negros for the Probate of the will. He was appointed as the administrator afterwards. This was opposed by
Manuela, Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, an alleged illegitimate daughter. In 1962, Manuela instituted a SPECPRO wherein she alleged
in a motion that the alimony pendente lite has been suspended after the Death of Carlos. She also moved to be appointed as the
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. This was denied by the probate court.

15) Pijuan v. Vda. De Gurrea W/N Manuela should be appointed as administratrix - NO

In the language of this provision, said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains, however, in the
case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot
be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he
is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his
appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof.

It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse
refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order
appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court,and is not appealable.

The present administratrix, of Go Kiu's estate, Maxima Tan, sought to recover from Go Lee, the former administrator whom the former
succeeded P54,700.39. Lower courts awarded P42,849.08 to Tan. Hence, Lee’s appeal.

When Kiu died in China in in April 15, 1920, Lee was appointed as special administrator with three sureties on his bond amounting to
30k. On May 25, 1920, Lee’s status become that of an administrator. He was allowed to operate Kiu’s business in Cebu City and
municipality of Toledo, Cebu but was ordered to provide a written report every month. The total claims admitted against Kiu’s estate
amounted to P69,029.91. Only P16,700.39 was paid by Lee because Kiu’s businesses were not doing well (lost 19k) and the debtors of
16) Tan v. Go Chiong Lee
Kiu’s estate have not yet paid.

Issue: WON Lee is liable for the debts not paid. No.

The standard of responsibility of the administrator is best measured as in essence the responsibility of a bailee. Like any bailee, he
must pursue his discretion honestly and in good faith, or he will become personally liable, to those who are interested in the estate, for
waste, conversion, or embezzlement. But where an administrator, entrusted with the carrying on of an estate, acts in good faith and in
 accordance with the usual rules and methods obtaining in such business, he will not be held liable for losses incurred. It was not proven
that the loss of the business was due to Lee’s fault.

However, 6k was allowed to be recovered from Lee for his failure to inventory 850 sacks of corn.

Another doctrine: The general rule is that a personal representative will be protected in the payment of a claim which has been duly
allowed or ordered paid by the court, although it should not have been paid in full, unless it is made to appear that such allowance of
the claim, or order for the payment thereof, was obtained through his collusion or bad faith. Hence, Lee was not held liable for the fact
that some of the creditors were paid and some were not.

Sociedad de Lizzarraga – creditor; claimed in the estate of Caponong

Felicisima Abada – widow; administratrix
Francisco Caponong – deceased husband of Abada
Vicente Alvarez – new husband

Caponong (defendant Abada’s first husband) died in 1906 and he owed money to Sociedad de Lizzarraga Hermanos. Now widowed,
Abada was appointed as administratrix of the estate, and the commissioners were appointed to appraise the estate and to pass on the
claims against it. So plaintiff Sociedad presented their claim (P12k) which was allowed by the commissioners as seen in the
commissioners’ report dated 1909. Abada, as administratrix, leased the sugar cane hacienda (AKA “Coronacion”) to Hilario Zayco
for years until Abada got married to Vicente Alvarez. The lease of the hacienda to Zayco then got transferred to Alvarez in 1908.
7 years after the first husband’s death, Sociedad filed a suit in CFI Negros against Abada (personally and as administratrix):
in order to recover the P12k and that Abada, in her own name, had been receiving from Sociedad money and effects
(1908-1912) which was used “in the expense of cultivation and the exploitation of the Hacienda ‘Coronation’ ” and
that Abada had delivered to Sociedad the sugar produced until the last crop which she refused to deliver. Moreover,
Sociedad argued that Abada’s account showed that she still owes Sociedad an amount of P62k plus interest.
The guardian of the minor children of the deceased intervened and denied this claim; they also prayed for the dismissal of the action
because they already had an amicable settlement (Compromise Agreement), so the CFI dismissed the case. Record shows that
Sociedad filed a claim in the intestate proceedings of the deceased. Furthermore, the settlement agreed upon was that Abada and
the guardian recognized the deceased’s indebtedness to Sociedad. It was revealed that this included a security on the debt dated 1914
17) Lizzaraga Hermanos v. Abada
– Mortgage on all the property of deceased (including carabaos) and on all the property belonging exclusively to Abada. The
compromise and the mortgage were approved by the court, but the mortgage was not recorded in the registry of property up to the
time of this suit (1916).
Later on, Sociedad then filed another action to attach the properties of the estate as well as the appointment of a receiver because the
debt is still not fully paid. It cited Abada’s negligence in the conservation and care of the property which is why it wasn’t enough to pay
the debt. Thus, a receiver was appointed for the mortgaged property and Abada (plus guardian and minors) got ousted from the house
that they had been occupying on the premises.
Abada filed an answer arguing that the claim of Sociedad against the intestate proceedings had been allowed only in the sum of
P12k by the commissioners. The court sustained Abada’s claim and declared that the only sum to be paid Sociedad is P13k. The
attachment was dissolved and the receiver discharged, and was ordered to return the property to Abada.

Issue: WON Lizzarraga Hermanos has the right to assail the compromise agreement for the alleged non-payment of the debts of the
estate
The estate owed Sociedad less than P13,000 when the commissioners passed on their claim. Part of this has been paid, and there was
a balance due Sociedad of P8,555.78 at the time of the trial, plus interest. The Sociedad, after their claim had been presented and
allowed by the commissioners, made advances to the administratrix till their claim was more than P68,000. It is urged that the
major part of this debt of P68,000 is administration expenses, and as such is chargeable against the assets of the estate. No reason
is given why the expense of administration should be so great, and the evidence fails to sustain this position. By expense of
administration we understand to be the reasonable and necessary expense of caring for the property and managing it till the debts are
 paid, as provided by law, and of dividing it, if necessary, so as to partition it and deliver to the heirs.

Plaintiff Warner, Barnes filed a complaint in the CFI of Negros Occidental against the defendant Luzon Surety for the recovery of the
sum of P6,000, plus the costs and P1,500 fork attorney's fees. The basis of the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6,000 filed by
Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Arguedo Gonzaga in Special Proceeding No. 452 of the CFI of Negros
Occidental. Defendant Luzon Surety is the surety to this bond. The bond was filed on the condition that said bond would be void if [case
said “if” but I think this should be “would be void, UNLESS…] the administratrix faithfully prepares a correct inventory of all the property
of the deceased, faithfully pays all debts, legacies, and bequests, and renders a just and true account of his administrations.
Warner Barnes alleges in its complaint that Agueda violated the terms of the bond by failing to file an inventory, failing to pay the
approved claim of Warner Barnes, and failing to render a true and just account of her administration in general.
Warner Barnes then filed a motion for summary judgement. CFI approved this and ordered Luzon Surety to pay the 6,000 due to
Warner Barnes. Hence, this appeal by Luzon Surety.

Luzon Surety claims that there are genuine controversies between the parties litigant, and that, contrary to the allegations of the
complaint, the administratrix made a return to the court of the war damage payments she received; the administratrix cannot be
charged with having failed to pay plaintiff’s claim because there is no showing that she was ever authorized to pay approved claims;
the administratrix may be presumed to have rendered an accounting of her administration, likely in 1948, in accordance with section
18) Warner Barnes v. Luzon Surety
8 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
In answer, it is sufficient to state that the allegations that the administratrix failed to file an inventory, to pay the plaintiff’s
claim, and to render a true and just account of her administration, are factual and remained uncontroverted by counter-
affidavits which the appellant could have easily filed.

Luzon Surety also claims that the plaintiff should have first filed a claim against the Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda
Gonzaga, in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court providing that "Where the obligation of the decedent is joint and
several with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right
of the estate to recover contribution from the other debtor."
Apart from the fact that his defense was not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived
(section 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court), it appears that even as late as September 17, 1952, when the present complaint was filed,
(more than two years after the death of Agueda Gonzaga), there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate,
with the result that section 6 of Rule 87 loses its applicability. Moreover, it is to be noted that the appellant had also chosen to file
a third-party complaint in the present case against Romualdo Araneta, joint and several counter-guarantor of the deceased
administratrix, instead of presenting a claim against the latter’s estate.

The decedent here is Charles Rear and the administrator of his estate is J.J. Wilson. The private respondents are M.T. Rear and heirs of
decedent. Charles Rear was murdered by Moros in an isolated area in his plantation somewhere in Cotabato. This plantation consisted
of public lands. Meanwhile, an inventory and report were made by the Commissioners (report of claims) against estate. These claims
were not paid so the court ordered Wilson to sell a portion of the property in the estate. Wilson then filed his final account, which was
objected to by the heirs. Court approved the final account. Thus, this petition. Private respondents want Wilson to be held liable for his
19) Wilson v. Rear
neglect and imprudence. Allegedly, Wilson made disbursements in excess of the amount required to preserve the estate. They also
assert that loans and advances made cannot be charged against the estate since no authority therefor was granted by court.

Issue therefore is whether Wilson may be held liable for the claims against the estate. Court said he can be liable. Some portions in the
livestock sold were unaccounted for. The assessed value is around 4k, yet he accounted only for P628. Further, the amount that he
 disbursed did not match the amount he had received based on sales of the property (essentially leaving deficit as a result). If the
personal property of the estate had been promptly sold, and sold for its appraised value, all the debts of the deceased and the court
costs and expenses of administration would have been paid and would still even have a balance. Instead of doing that, the administrator
without any authority from the court, continued the operation of the plantation and the employment of Fleming as manager and a large
number of men in the plantation at the expense of estate. However, in computing for his liability, the Court became lenient considering
his circumstances that he lived 300km away from the plantation. Operating expenses of the plantation for the first 8 months and claims
of the Commissioners were deducted from his liability.

20) Luzon Surety v. Quebral

Manuel Soriano, ex-administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme was indebted to the
estate in the sum of P23,603. CFI ordered the execution of his bond after he was unable to
turn over said amount. The new administrator also had the sheriff levy on the properties of
21) Cosme de Mendoza v. Pacheco Soiano’s sureties Pacheco and Cordero to pay the remaining balance. The sureties
appealed to the SC alleging that CFI as probate courts had no authority to order execution
of the administrator’s bond in the same proceeding. SC held that such is within the probate
court’s power albeit not expressly stated by law.

Father died so his son was appointed administrator of his estate. The son filed his accounts for the years 1923-1925. Wife of the
deceased wanted the son removed as administrator for his negligence and for making it appear in his accounts illegal expenses ruinous
to the estate under administration. The son, as administrator, demanded a yearly salary of P3000. He also presented several accounts
for the years 1926-1927. The problem was that there appeared to be deficits in these accounts presented by the son.

A creditor of the dead father’s estate opposed the accounts presented by the administrator and also opposed the salary demanded by
the administrator. He also opposed the accounts since it appeared that certain alleged debts had been charged twice to the estate
without adequate vouchers to justify the charges. The creditor also took exception to the distribution of surplus of around P11,000

Judge Santamaria disapproved of the accounts presented by the administrator and asked him to present amended accounts reflecting
22) Gustilo v. Sian the correct amounts. However, another judge, Judge Salas, overturned Judge Santamaria’s order and approved the 2 accounts
presented by the administrator. The creditors did not receive due notice of Judge Salas's order to approve the 2 accounts. Now, the
creditors are opposing the order of Judge Salas approving the accounts presented by the administrator and are praying for the
administrator’s removal.

Issue: W/N Judge Salas was correct in approving the accounts presented by the administrator? NO.

The administrator did not administer his dad’s estate with due regard to the rights of the other persons in interest such as the creditors.
He should be removed as administrator. He presented accounts with obvious deficits. Furthermore, the creditors were not given the
opportunity to make an effective opposition before Judge Salas overturned Judge Santamaria’s order. In the end, proceedings should
be restored to the position before Judge Salas’ approval order except with a new administrator.

23) Degala v. Ceniza and Umipig Umpig was the appointed special administrator of the estate of Mina. This case was filed by Degala who sought relief from the failure
or refusal of the judge to remove said special administrator. He sought Umpig’s removal on the ff grounds (1) he has an adverse interest
 (2) he is a stranger to the estate (3) failed to include some properties in his inventory (4) failed to pay certain taxes (5) failed to render
an accounting. Degala invoked Section 2 of Rule 83 which provides that “if an executor neglects to render his account and settle the
estate... ... the court may remove him, or in its discretion may permit him to resign”.

WON Judge Ceniza gravely abused his discretion in not removing Umpig as the administrator

NO. The removal of an administrator lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. The sufficiency of any ground for removal
should thus be determined by said court. And in the case at bar, we cannot hold that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion,
particularly in view of the circumstance that the alleged grounds for removal are not in fact weighty. Just because Quintillan, (a former
administrator who was removed by the court on the ground of adverse interest) is Umpig’s attorney does’t mean that Umpig is
necessarily disqualified on the same ground. Any interest which Quintillian may have is exclusively personal to him.

Other grounds: Whether Umpig failed to include in his inventory some, is question of fact to be determined by the Judge after the
reception of necessary evidence.Also, it may be true that Umpig failed to pay all taxes due, but said failure may be due to lack of funds.
Regarding the alleged failure to render an accounting, it appears that he did so on January 28, 1947. Whether it was filed on time and
was complete and correct, are matters addressed to the discretion of the Judge.

Chua Tan seeks to appeal the decision of CFI Manila for dismissing their complaint and absolving Del Rosario as administratix of estate
of Chua Toco. Chua Tan is alleging that CFI erred in sustaining the Res Judicata argument of the Respondents because there was already
an existing ruling by the SC about the Intestate Proceedings of Chua Piaco.

Issue W/n Res Judicata applies in this case? YES, it applies.

Requisites of Res Judicata (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. All requisites
for Res Judicata are present in this case.

Identity of parties - Benedicta Santa Juana, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Chua Piaco, was the legal representative of said
24) Chua Tan v Del Rosario estate and its creditors and heirs. The decision in the former case is conclusive and binding upon plaintiffs in the present case. Under
the provisions of the law, the judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of the testate or intestate estate, but also of the
creditors, and heirs and legatees, inasmuch as he represents their interest in the estate of the deceased.

Identity of Subject Matter - In the former case the petition was for the rendering of an accounting of certain funds. In the present case
the petition is for the partition of those same funds and their fruits between the heirs of both deceased.

Identity of Cause of Action – Former case had refused to render an accounting of said funds. In the present case the plaintiffs include
the same allegation of trust, and the defendant makes the same denial.

Identity of Cause of Action - The relief sought by Chua Tan is different, but the question at issue is the same, namely, whether Chua
Piaco or Chua Toco was the owner of said funds.
 (case was in Spanish) Petitioner (admin of the estate of deceased Rudocindo Adapon) while oppositor is the latter’s surviving spouse
in his 2nd marriage. Petitioner filed an inventory of properties and assets and respondent asked the court to order petitioner to pay
her monthly allowance of P50, and to include properties in the inventory. Petitioner also claimed some of the properties in the list of
respondent. Respondent asked the court to relieve respondent of his duties and appoint another in the latter’s place. W/N CFI could,
25) Adapon v. Maralit
upon petition of oppositor to include certain properties in inventory prepared by administrator, determine the question of ownership
over the properties involved. Held: YES. It is not seen how probate court can determine respective merits of the conflicting claims made
by admini. And oppositor without necessary declaring the lawful ownership of the properties involved. Such declaration is necessary
and inevitable, and without it the probate court cannot properly proceed and dispose the petition submitted by oppositor.

Surviving wife and child of the deceased Samuel Allen wants to claim support from the decedent’s intestate estate. However, liabilities
of the deceased are actually greater than the value of the estate*. ISSUE: WON the widow can validly demand for support/allowance
when the liabilities of the deceased’s estate is greater than its assets? = NO.
RATIO: SC said that support cannot be granted if it is proved that there is no more property (private/conjugal) pertaining to the
26) Moore & Sons Mercantile Co. v. Wagner surviving spouse/heirs. As per Art. 1430 (NCC), support is only an advance payment on account of the respective share of each partner.
In this case, it is indisputable that the liabilities of the decedent estate exceed its assets. Plus, the widow admitted that she has not
contributed to the property of marriage. Thus, it is unlawful to grant support when there is really no property to be partitioned.

*Estate is insolvent: Liabilities - P2,457.00; Estate’s Balance - P870.97

Petitioners are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents are 4/7 children
begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural and illegitimate children of the late Pablo
Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to their father Pablo. Pablo died. Anselma and private respondents filed for a
Motion for Allowance: 1st motion prayed for a sum to be given to 4/7 children; 2nd motion: prayed that an order to include the other
3/7 children be granted directing the administrator to deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to each of the 7 children of Anselma Diaz as their
allowance from the estate of Pablo Santero. Petitioner opposed. Anselma Diaz clarified that the inclusion of the 3 other children
children who were then of age. Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already
attained majority age, 2 are gainfully employed and 1 is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
also allege that there was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school
materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school term 1982-83 because these wards have already attained majority age so that
27) Santero v. CFI of Cavite
they are no longer under guardianship. ISSUE: W/N children of the deceased who are not minors/incapacitated can be granted support
during the settlement of the estate? YES. The fact that the private respondents are age, gainfully employed or married is of no moment
and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowances under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit
allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and
his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the
inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to
the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the
"legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the
children here).

On February 8, 1935, the administatrix Estefania Fenix of the intestate of the deceased Rafael Jocson, executed in favor of appellant
28) Concepcion Jocson de Hilado v. Nava Jesus R. Nava a contract of lease period of five crop years, over certain properties of the estate, at a stipulated rental of P1,000 a year.
The contract was entered into without the intervention of the court acting in the intestate proceedings. Hillado, filed a motion in said
 proceedings, praying that the administratix be required to explain certain details in the matter of said lease; and in reply to the answer
filed by said administratrix to lease the lands compromised in the contract to the highest bidder at public auction. Jesus R. Nava, the
lessee, filed a motion asking that the order be set aside, it having been issued without jurisdiction. The motion was denied, and he
appealed. W/N the lower court has the power to annul, in the intestate proceedings, a contract of lease executed by the administratrix
without its intervention? Appellant maintains that it has no such power, and that the contract can only be annulled in a separate,
independent proceeding. The contract, being a mere act of administration, could validy be entered into by the administratrix
within her powers of administration, even without the court's previous authority. And the court had no power to annul or
invalidate the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had no jurisdiction over the person of the lessee. A separate ordinary
action is necessary to that effect.
(This is the entire case. If nakatrip si sir, just know that the 2 cases [Gamboa Case and Ferraris Case] cited by the SC was quoted in spanish.
haha)

On May 1, 1960, Nombre, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the intestate estate leased one of the properties of the estate (a
fishpond identified as Lot No. 1617 in Kabangkalan, Negros Occidental), to Pedro Escanlar.

The terms of the lease was for three (3) years, with a yearly rental of P3,000.00 to expire on May 1, 1963, the transaction having been
done, admittedly, without previous authority of approval of the Court where the proceedings was pending.

Subsequently, Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the court and Sofronio Campillanos was appointed to replace him.
The appeal on the Order of Nombre's removal is supposedly pending with the Court of Appeals. Respondent Escanlar was cited for
contempt, allegedly for his refusal to surrender the fishpond to the newly appointed administrator.|||

On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a lease contract of the same fishpond, in favor of
petitioner, Moises San Diego, Sr., for 5 years from 1961, at a yearly rental of P5,000.00. Escanlar was not notified of such motion.
Nombre, the deposed administrator, presented a written opposition to the motion of Campillanos pointing out that the fishpond had
been leased by him to Escanlar for 3 years, the period of which was going to expire on May 1, 1963.|||

29) San Diego v. Nombre Campillanos also argued that the validity of the lease contract entered into by a judicial administrator, must be recognized unless so
declared void in a separate action. The opposition notwithstanding, the Court, in effect, declared that the contract in favor of Escanlar
was null and void, for want of judicial authority and that unless he would offer the same as or better conditions than the prospective
lessee, San Diego, there was no good reason why the motion for authority to lease the property to San Diego should not be granted.|

ISSUE: WoN the contract of lease entered into by the former administrator (Nombre) was legal?

YES. While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in representative
capacity), are in some respects, identical, the provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to a judicial administrator. A
judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the
estate.
The Rules of Court provide that — "An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the real as well
as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration,
and shall administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by his will."
And the Court reiterated its ruling in previous cases that lease has been considered as an act of administration.


Antonio Tan commenced a special proceeding alleging that Carlos Villa Abrille (decedent) died intestate, and that he left real and
personal properties (among which are 19% share in the co-ownership of Juna Subdivision and cash deposits in different banks). Tan
was appointed as the Special Administrator. Tan filed an ex-parte petition for the withdrawal of certain sums (₱109,886 and ₱72,644)
from PNB. Tan was alleging that these amounts were deposited in the name of the deceased but they actually belong to, and were held
in trust for, the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The CFI granted the petition (CFI Order #1).

Afterwards, Tan together with the other co-owners of the Juna Subdivision executed a power of attorney appointing Tan as attorney-
in-fact to sell or dispose upon terms and conditions he deems wise the lots in the said subdivision. The CFI issued letters of
administration to Tan. Thereafter, Tan, as regular administrator, filed another petition alleging that the deceased was the manager of
and a co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and that he had been engaged in the business of selling the lots, and praying for the approval
by the court of the power of attorney executed by him, in behalf of the intestate estate, and appointing and authorizing himself to sell
the lots. This was granted (CFI Order #2).

Natividad Jaroda, the decedent’s daughter, moved to nullify Orders #1 and #2.

Issue: Whether CFI Orders #1 and #2 are null and void. (YES)

30) Jaroda v. Cusi Jr. As to the propriety of CFI Order #1 (allowing the special administrator to withdraw the decedent's bank deposits): Such order
was in abuse of the court’s discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. First, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a
special administrator laid down in Section 2, Rule 80, which states “take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, credits and estate
of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed…” Second, the order was issued without
notice to, and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. It would seem that such withdrawal of the deposits may be view as taking of
possession and charge of the credits of the estate, but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the special administrator of a prima facie
exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The bank deposits were in
the decedent’s name which prima facie belongs to his estate. And until the contrary is shown by proper evidence at the proper stage,
when money claims may be filed in the intestate proceedings, the special administrator is without power to make the waiver or to hand
over part of the estate, or what appears to be a prima facie part of the estate, to other persons on the ground that the estate is not the
owner thereof. Hence, CFI Order #1 is null and void. An administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any
transaction concerning trust property.

As to the propriety of CFI Order #2 (approving the power of attorney executed by Tan): The said order is, likewise, void for want of
notice and for approving an improper contract or transaction. The very rule, Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, relied on by
Tan to sustain the power of attorney for the sale of the pro-indiviso share of the estate in the subdivision requires "written notice to
the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish such
notice. Without such notice, the order of the court authorizing the sale is void.

31) Garcia v. Escudero Gregorio Verdejo died, leaving an open will where he named as heirs his three sisters (plaintiffs) and Escudero (defendant) as
one of the administrators. The intestate proceedings were commenced for the properties not disposed of by will. Plaintiffs brought
 an action against the defendant to render an account of the properties inherited by them. The trial court ordered Escudero to
deliver the properties of the deceased (such as furniture, jewelry, cattle, and coconut lands). In Escudero’s statement, he explained
that these properties have been either seized, destroyed by fire, and the cattle died due to rinderpest. The issue is W/N the
administrator should be held liable for the properties under his administration through fortuitous event. (No) The administrator
in an administration proceeding is not responsible for the loss, by a fortuitous event, of the personal properties under
administration in the absence of proof that said loss was due to his negligence. Also, the administrator is not bound to render an
account of the products of the realties seized by the Philippine revolutionary troops during the Philippine Revolution.

This is an appeal taken by Domingo Nicolas, ex-administrator of the intestate of the deceased Santiago Nicolas. Domingo was ordered
by the CFI of Tarlac to turn over the balance of P726.01 to Protasio Santos.

Domingo assigns alleged errors as committed by the court:
1. Domingo said that the lower court erred in disapproving the record on appeal and in ordering the amendment thereof by
eliminating certain pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments as these constituted the best evidence of the services rendered
by him and his lawyer.
a. What Sec 778 requires to be transmitted to this Court in case of an appeal from a decree approving or disapproving
the accounts of an administrator is a certified transcript of the appeal, order, decree, or judgment appeal from and
of the accounts embraced in the order, the inclusion of any other order, decree, or judgment from which no appeal
has been taken being unnecessary and superfluous. So, the CFI committed no error in ordering the elimination.
2. WoN the CFI erred in not submitting the appellant to an examination under oath and in not holding a hearing on his accounts?
a. The record shows that the CFI ordered the accounts in question to be called for hearing, in order that the parties
might present evidence in support of their respective claims. Therefore, Domingo was given the opportunity to
32) Nicolas v Nicolas explain his accounts and present his evidence in support thereof, and that he appeared at the hearing of said
accounts. So, now he cannot allege that he was not examined under oath and that no hearing was held on the
accounts in question.
3. Domingo alleged that there were expenses which were rejected by the CFI. These were money advances to the lawyer, partial
payment of the debt of the deceased to a creditor, partial payment to the Commissioner and expenses during the death
anniversary of the deceased.
a. These were unauthorized by the court and they have already been discussed in the Judge’s order from which no
appeal was taken.
b. As for the expenses during the death anniversary, these were not funeral expenses despite the erection of a
mausoleum which forms part of the sepulture of the deceased. So, it cannot be claimed as funeral expenses.
4. With regard to the other expenses and fees:
a. The law only authorizes the payment of P4.00 to the administrator for each day of service, not for each and every
task he might perform, even if it were to take only a few minutes to do so, as indicated by the nature of the great
majority of the task performed by him, for each and every one he seeks to collect P4.00. 18 days at P4.00 each is
reasonable.

Panis was counsel for the administration of said estate and that he, before the final settlement of accounts, presented a motion in the
probate proceedings for the allowance of attorney's fees in the sum of P15,000. The respondent judge, over the objections in writing
33) Uy Tioco v. Imperial
presented by the administrator, granted the motion and allowed the fees claimed by Panis. The administrator (petitioner) the herein
did not appeal from the order of the court, but on February 8, 1928, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of the minors
 Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons and then the only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion for reconsideration on the grounds
that he was not notified of the motion for the allowance of fees and had no knowledge thereof or of the order granting the motion until
a few days before the filing of there motion for reconsideration; that the fees allowed Panis were excessive and prejudicial to the
interest of the estate; and that considering the nature of the work performed, the services rendered with him did not warrant the
payment of the sum claimed. Attorney Felix Wijangco, on behalf of Panis, filed a motion in the probated proceedings in which be set
forth among others; that the property involved in the case is community property in which one-half belongs to the petitioner; that
consequently the minor Pedro Uy Tioco is only entitled to a one-fourth of the property pertaining to the estate, and that therefore his
appeal from the order allowing the attorney's fees can only relate to one-fourth of the amount allowed, wherefore the movent asked
that the administrator be ordered to make payments of three-fourths of the amount within five days from the presentation of the
motion. The respondent judge ordered the administrator to make payment of three-fourths of P15,000 within five days. The
administrator refused to make such payment, and on March 17th the court, after citing him to show cause, again ordered him to pay
as provided for in the order of March 6, under penalty of removal from office.

WON the attorney can hold the estate directly liable for the payment of his fees-- NO

The arguments submitted indicate a misconception of the character of the liability for the attorney's fees are claimed are supposed to
have been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not hold the
estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the
payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the
reimbursement from the estate.

Tirso DACANAY is one of Justiniano’s three acknowledged natural children. Silverio HERNANDEZ is the surviving spouse of Justiniano’s
only legitimate child, BIENVENIDA. Justiniano died testate. His natural child Tirso was named executor. The will greatly favored the
natural children at the expense of Bienvenida, the only legitimate child. The will stated that Bienvenida had been disobedient thus the
decedent felt justified in curtailing her inheritance. The will was presented for probate and was duly probated. Tirso qualified as
administrator and commissioners on claims and appraisal were appointed. Silverio Hernandez, in representation of his deceased wife
and his children, opposed the approval of the scheme on the ground that the portions of the estate assigned to the natural children
greatly exceeded the maximum shares allowed them as acknowledged natural children. The court disapproved the partition and
ordered the commissioners to make a new partition. Tirso filed before the SC a motion for the reopening of the case on the ground that
he had discovered new evidence consisting in an inventory of property alleged to have been donated to Bienvenida on the occasion of
her marriage. The Court granted the motion and ordered the case remanded to the CFI for additional proof. The CFI judge found the
inventory genuine and directed the commissioners to submit a new scheme of partition. The record was again remanded to the CFI
34) Dacanay v. Gernandez
and the commissioners submitted another scheme of partition which was opposed by Silverio. The parties, finding the plan by the
commissioners unsatisfactory, entered into stipulation. The court approved this stipulation. No regular final account was presented by
the administrator, but annual accounts for 10 years were submitted. The accounts show income as against expenses. Silverio and his
daughters opposed the approval of accounts.

WON the scheme of partition presented by administrator Tirso Dacanay should not have been approved.

Yes. The fees and deductions laid down in the accounts (deduction of value of bundles of palay allegedly stolen and spoiled,
compensation for administrator Dacanay’s services, attorney’s fees - NOTE THAT THE CASE LISTS THE SPECIFIC EXPENSES IN
SPANISH) relate to services rendered for the benefit of the administrator and for that of the other natural children of Justiniano, not
for the benefit of the estate. It is true than an administrator may employ competent counsel on questions affecting his duties and on
 which he is in reasonable doubt and that reasonable expenses may be charged against the estate subject to the approval of the court.
Such however, is not the case here. The administrator deliberately and knowingly resorted to falsified documents for the purpose of
defrauding legitimate heirs of the deceased. The claims that palay was lost and spoiled cannot be entertained. Repairs in the storehouse
were made from time to time with permission of the court. There is room for grave suspicions that the administrator converted to his
own use at least a part of the palay alleged to have been stolen or spoiled. The administrator was in a position in some respects
analogous to that of a bailee for his own sole benefit and was bound to exercise great care and attention in the conservation of the
property under administration. The administrator must then be held responsible for loss or disappearance of the palay and must be
ordered to pay the value of the same to the estate. The compensation administrator is asking for seems excessive. The prolongation of
the settlement of the estate was entirely due to the efforts of the administrator to defraud the legitimate heirs and he cannot be allowed
to profit from his own fraud. The per diem compensation of an administrator can only be allowed for necessary services.

Facts: Atty. Ephraim Serquina petitioned the probate court for the probate of the will of Carmelita Farlin (her heirs are the petitioners
in this case). Atty. Serquina petitioned in his capacity as the COUNSEL OF THE HEIRS (petitioners) and the executor under the will.
Later on, Atty. Serquina filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees worth 68,000 pesos. The heirs answered that they only agreed to pay him
7,000. A motion for execution against the heirs was later on ordered by the Court. The heirs now argue that the granting of attorney’s
fees to Atty. Serquina was in violation of Rule 86, Section 7.

Issue: WON Atty. Serquina is entitled to attorney’s fees worth 68,000 pesos? No, however on a quantum meirut basis, he is entitled to
15,000. But he has already been paid 6,000.

Held: The rule is clear that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but
35) Lacson v. Reyes
he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is in the nature of
executor's or administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's fees. Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court set aside the sum
of P65,000.00 as and for Mr. Serquina's attorney's fees, to operate as a "lien on the subject properties," the trial judge must be said to
have gravely abused its discretion.

Note that attorney’s fees in this case is to be shouldered by the CLIENT and not by the estate. Mutatis mutandis, where the administrator
is himself the counsel for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay therefor. In this case, Atty. Serquina did not do anything out of the
ordinary – he will was uncontested, he assisted the parties in transferring the properties to their names in the BIR and the Registry of
Deeds, and helped sell real property that was already subject for sale before the decedent died. Hence, 15,000 is enough as based on
quantum meirut.

Upon the death of Henry W. Elser, C. W. Rosenstock filed a petition in the CFI of Manila for the probate of Elser's will, and that he,
Rosenstock, be appointed as executor of the estate. Judge Diaz admitted the will to probate, and appointed Rosenstock as executor,
who later qualified and entered upon the discharge of his duties. At the time of his appointment, all parties agreed that the executor
should have and receive P1,000 per month for his services.
Rosenstock filed a petition to be allowed P1,000 per month as compensation as administrator of the estate. He stated that all parties
in the above-entitled case have agreed that the said sum of P1,000 per month, as compensation for the executor, is just and reasonable.
36) Rosenstock v. Elser CFI granted.
The widow of Mr. Elser led a petition asking that the order of October 3, 1923, be revoked, and that the compensation of the executor
should be based upon the provisions of section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Judge Imperial revoked the order of 1923, and fixed the compensation of the executor at P400 per month, the widow appeals.
contending that the trial court erred in failing to reduce the compensation of the executor to the statutory amount allowed under
section 680.
SC upheld the reduction of the fee from P1000 to P400.
 The present order, reducing the executor's fee to P400 per month, from which both parties have appealed, was made on June 13, 1925,
more than nineteen months after the original order was made. That is to say, that at the time the last order was made, Rosenstock had
been acting as executor of the estate for more than nineteen months, and, as such, had been administering the affairs of the estate, with
the ultimate view of winding up and closing it.
It is very apparent that whatever reasons may have existed for allowing him a compensation of P1,000 per month at the time of his
appointment have ceased to exist. During that period, all of the assets and liabilities of the estate should have been legally ascertained
and determined. In other words, the character and class of the work which now devolves upon the executor is of a very different type
and nature now than at the time of his appointment. Although by mutual consent his compensation was fixed at P1,000 per month at
the time of his appointment, that was not a valid or binding contract continuous throughout the whole administration of the
estate. It was always subject to change and the approval of the court, and to either an increase or decrease as conditions might warrant.
At all times the compensation of the executor was a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court.
The original order of October 3, 1923, and the last order of June 13, 1925, were both made in the court in which the probate proceedings
were pending, and all matters pertaining to the estate were peculiarly within the knowledge and province of that court, by which all
orders were made, and in which all accounts were filed. That is to say, from the date of the appointment of the executor until the order
of June 13, 1925, the lower court had before it all of the records, orders, and proceedings growing out of the administration of the
estate. Based upon such records, it found as a fact that under all of the existing circumstances the fee of the executor from June 1, 1925,
should be P400 per month.
In matters of this nature, the findings and conclusions of the probate court are entitled to much weight, particularly on questions of
fact.

37) Joson v. Joson

Picard was appointed as administrator of the Intestate Estate of James Burt upon filing a bond of 1k. After some time, he was dismissed
as administrator and appointed Phil Trust in his place. An inventory report was done by the latter showing only 57.75 pesos as the
only asset left in the estate of Burt. After review by the Court, it was found that there is still 7k balance so Picard was ordered to deliver
within 48 hours from receipt of a copy of the Order. Later on, he was prosecuted for estafa. The Court then ordered Luzon Surety to
show cause why the administrator's bond filed by it on behalf of Picard would not be confiscated. Luzon filed a motion to set aside said
order upon the following grounds: Firstly, that the Court cannot order the confiscation of the administrator's bond, on prejudice or
injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having been shown Secondly, that "a probate court cannot, ex proprio
motu, prosecute the probate bond." Court denied the motion as well as the MR.

WON the the surety is privy to the proceedings against the executor or administrator? YES
38) Phil. Trust Co. v. Luzon Surety
From the very nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an administrator’s bond, he (surety) is bound and concluded, in
the absence of fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though said surety was not a party to the proceedings
against the administrator, nor notified in connection therewith prior to the issuance of the court order for the confiscation of the bond.

In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 135, the sureties on the administrator’s bond were held liable thereon altho they
were not parties to the proceeding against the administrator, nor were they notified in connection therewith prior to the issuance of
the court order for the confiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of
the account of an executor or administrator, his sureties “may upon application, be admitted as a party to such accounting.” The import
of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the
executor or administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time.

39) Dela Cruz v. Camon This is involves the estate of Fallon and Murphy which owns 2/4 share pro-indiviso Hacienda Rosario in Negros Accidental. The whole
 hacienda was held in lease by Camon even before the institution of the intestate proceedings. Dela Cruz, as administrator, filed a motion
before the probate court to order Camon to pay the 2/4 share of the rentals of the hacienda for yea crop years 1948-1949. Camon
opposed and argued that the court has no jurisdiction over his person. The probate court denied the motion and ruled that the demand
for rentals cannot be made by mere motion by the administrator but by independent action. Hence, this appeal.

W/N the probate court may order the payment of rentals- No, the probate court has no power to order it. Here, the court sits as a
probate court. Said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. For these purposes,
property in the hands of the estate's administrator comes within the power of the probate court. The amount demanded is not, by any
means, liquidated. Thus, the lessee may interpose certain defenses which shall be heard in full blown trial. In this case, Camon even
argues that he will raise the defense of sale. Because of all of these, the money (rentals) allegedly due is not property in the hands of
the administrator; it is not thus within the effective control of the probate court. Neither does it come within the concept of money of
the deceased "concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away", which would confer upon the court incidental prerogative to reach out its
arms to get it back and, if necessary, to cite the possessor thereof in contempt. At best that money is debt to the estate — not against
the estate. Recovery thereof, we are persuaded to say, should be by separate suit commenced by the administrator.With reason,
because of the absence of express statutory authorization to coerce the lessee debtor into defending himself in the probate court.

Doctrine: "When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not
under the court's jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action
against the third person." For even "matters affecting property under judicial administration" may not be taken cognizance
of by the court in the course of intestate proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are prejudiced

Involved are several motions for reconsideration involving the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi filed by Juan Gomez, Jesus David, the
Raquiza children, and Antonio Quirino, which the Court resolved separately. The relevant claims in this case are for attorney’s fees [AF
for brevity] and for payment for services rendered to estate by the administrator.

Juan Gomez was claiming that AF equivalent to 12% of 1/3 of the estate should be rendered to the heirs of Don Juan [son of Don
Alfonso]. These claims may not be properly charged against the estate of Don Alfonso. It is important to note that Juan’s claims for
attorney’s fees and transportation as well as representation expenses are for services rendered to the alleged substituted heirs of Don
Juan and such services did not inure to the benefit of Don Alfonso Castellvi or his estate. The court charged with the settlement of the
estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi is bound to protect the estate from any disbursements based on claims not chargeable to the estate.

40) Quirino v. Gorospe Jesus David’s claims for AF is for services rendered for the benefit of Dona Carmen Castellvi [daughter of Don Alfonso, previous
administratix until she passed away], and not for the benefit of Don Alfonso Castellvi or his estate. Only claims which could have been
enforced against the deceased in his lifetime are allowed to be presented against his estate, with the exception of:
1. funeral expenses,
2. expenses for the last sickness and
3. administration expenses in the ordinary course thereof.
For the Court to allow in this proceeding—which is for the settlement of the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi—the enforcement of the
claim of David against Dona Carmen’s alleged share in the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi, would amount to summarily declaring Dona
Carmen an heir of Don Alfonso, without giving the other heirs or claimants to the latter’s estate an opportunity to oppose the same.
Moreover, whatever fees Dona Carmen might have earned during her lifetime as administratrix of the estate of Don Alfonso should go
to her estate. Hence, whatever claim herein intervenor has against the deceased Dona Carmen, should be presented before the court
 with jurisdiction in settling her estate.

With regard to one of the Raquiza children’s claim for payment for services rendered to the estate of Don Alfonso, the rule is that
where the monetary claim against the administrator has a relation to his acts of administration in the ordinary course thereof, such claims
can be presented for payment with the court where a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is pending, although said claims
were not incurred by the deceased during his lifetime and collectible after his death. This is so, because the administration is under the
direct supervision of the court and the administrator is subject to its authority. A monetary claim against the administrator which has
a relation to his acts of administration may be presented for payment with the court where a special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate is pending, though such claim was not incurred by the deceased in his lifetime and collectible after his death.

Salinas and Sps. Aguas filed an action to recover damages from Llemos. Llemos allegedly served the latter through registered mail a
copy of a petition for a writ of possession with notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of Samar on 23 February
1960 at 8.00 AM. Salinas and the Aguases proceeded to the court but found out that no such petition had been filed and that Llemos
maliciously failed to appear in court, so that their expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain. Llemos died before he could answer
the complaint. Thus, the complaint was amended to include Llemos' heirs. In denying the heirs' motion to dismiss, the lower court
ruled that testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated since the action was for recovery of money.

W/N the action for recovery of money survives even after the death of Llemos—YES.

The actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments
41) Aguas v. Llemos
for money; and (3) “all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied”. None of these includes that of
Salinas and the spouses; for it is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from “contract
express or implied”. On the other hand, actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions
to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is
not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished.To
maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property.

Ultimately, parties have arrived at an amicable settlement of their differences, and that they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. The
settlement has been approved and embodied in an order of the Court of First Instance. #happyending

A passenger bus owned and operated by Felicidad Balla and driven by Domingo Casin collided with a Ford Fiera owned by Mateo Lim
Relucio and driven by Ruben Lim Relucio, then further collided with another passenger bus owned by Benjamin Flores and driven by
Fabian Prades. Balla, mother of Prades, Casin, Ruben Relucio and Prades all died because of the accident. Sps. Oscar and Victora Prades
(heirs of Prades) filed for damages. The heirs of Balla moved to dismiss saying that there is no cause of action against them. Heirs of
Prades amended their complaint to include estate as defendant. The CFI denied the motion to dismiss. No intestate proceeding was
42) Melgar v. Buenviaje
filed by the heirs of Balla saying that deceased Balla left no properties. The issue is whether or not CFI has the power to entertain a suit
for damages arising from the death of a person, filed against the estate of another deceased person as represented by the heirs? The
SC said YES. Rule 87, Sec. 1 provides that actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property may be brought against
executor or administrator. However, since no estate proceeding exist by reason that the heirs of Balla had not filed any proceedings
for settlement of estate, the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased.

43.) Pajarillo v. IAC The petitioners are the widow and children of the brother of the principal private respondent. She and her brother
appear to be the only remaining issue of the mother who seems to have caused all the present confusion. The
mother was Juana Balane de Suterio, who had a brother named Felipe Balane and a sister named Perfecta
Balane de Cordero. Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate in 1945 and leaving a tract of 28hectares of
land with buildings and improvements in the Quezon Province. On May 20, 1946, perfecta’s siblings Juana
and Felipe executed a public instrument entitled “ Extra- judicial settlement of the estate of the decease
Perfecta Balane de Cordero.” In it they disposed that in according to Perfecta’s wishes and in consideration
of love and affection, the said property be donated to private respondent Salud Suterio de Matias,
Perfecta’s niece, who will assume the encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine National Bank in the
amount of P 1,000. In the same document, the done accepted the donation in a public instrument. The
instrument was never registered nor the title transferred to Salud’s name although she immediately took
possession of the land. Sometime in 1951,
Salud transferred the possession of the land to her mother Juana, who was then staying with her brother
Claudio and his family. During the period they were occupying the land, Claudio paid realty taxes thereon.
On May 25, 1956, Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio. Two years later,
Claudio had the land registered in his name. Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. On June 30,
1965, the private respondents Salud and Pedro Matias filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the
property on the ground that the deed of sale in favour of Claudio was fictitious and the registration in his
name was null and void. Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by Claudio and that the transaction
was deliberately concealed from her by her brother and the defendants.

W/N donation was valid? Yes.

There is nothing in either of the two instruments showing that "authentic notice" of the acceptance was made
by Salud to Juana and Felipe. And while the first instrument contains the statement that "the donee does hereby
accept this donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the donor," the
only signatories thereof were Felipe Balane and Juana Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the reason for the
separate instrument of acceptance signed by Salud a month later.

A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion than the annulment of the donation for being
defective in form as urged by the petitioners. This would be in keeping with the unmistakable language of the
above-quoted provision. However, we find that under the circumstances of the present case, a literal adherence
to the requirement of the law might result not in justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their
intentions. It is also a policy of the Court to avoid such an intepretation.

The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated
to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in
fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by Salud. Given
 this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the donation ineffective because there is no
notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on
mere form over substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation as
manifested in the separate instrument dated June 20,1946, and as later acknowledged by Juana.

[Copied from the first Bernardo v. CA case which I also digested. I emphasized in bold characters the doctrine relating to
the rule]
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died in 1958 and his wife died the following year.
A testate proceeding was conducted and his will was admitted to probate. After the wife died, Deogracias Bernardo, the
executor of the estate, filed a petition for Hermogena to be substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs. The
executor then filed a project of partition in the estate proceeding but this was opposed by the collateral relatives of
Hermogena Reyes claiming that ½ of the properties of Eusebio should belong solely to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses and not to Eusebio alone. The probate court rendered a decision declaring the donation void because it falls
under the prohibition in the civil code which disallows donations between spouses during marriage. In the same order,
it disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another, dividing the property mentioned in the
last will and testament of Eusebio and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation between the instituted hers of
the deceased and legal heirs of Hermogena. The CA affirmed this.

The issue in this case is w/n the probate court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claims of the heirs of Hermogena
involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio. YES.
44.) Bernardo v. CA

The court held that as a general rule, the question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate
proceedings. An exception is where one of the parties merely prays for the inclusion or inclusion from the inventory of
the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.

The matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they
belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction
of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate
of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of
course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition
of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected.
It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her
own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore,
the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the
requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by the respondents)
are all heirs claiming title under the testator.

Espiridion Guanco obtained a credit, not exceeding P175K, with interest, from PNB, pledging pledging as security 250 shares of the
capital stock of the Binalbagan Estate, Inc., and 6,196 shares of the capital stock of the Hinigaran Sugar Plantation, Inc. (Hinigaran)
45.) Guanco v. National Bank
In the following year, Hinigaran gave the bank a promissory note for P273,932.11, the original debt of Guanco being included therein
and a mortgage on real property in favor of the PNB for P350,000 as security for the note and for such future credits as might be
 granted the company. The shares given the bank as security for the transaction of January 18, 1921, were not mentioned in the
mortgage.

After Guanco’s death, the administrator filed a petition asking that the Court of First Instance issue an order requiring the president or
manager of the bank to appear in court for examination with regard to the 250 shares of the Binalbagan Estate under section 709 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Such was granted. The manager did not appear but PNB filed an answer stating that the pledge of 250
shares was still in force. Thereupon, the Court ordered delivery of such shares to the administrator.

Issue: WON the CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the bank manager to deliver the subject shares to the administrator – YES

SC held that the proceeding under sec. 709 only provides a proceeding for examining persons suspected of having concealed,
embezzled, or conveyed away property of the deceased or withholds information of documentary evidence tending to disclose rights
or claims of the deceased to such property or to disclose the possession of his last will and testament. The purpose of the proceeding
is to elicit evidence, and the section does not authorize the court to enforce delivery of possession of the things involved. To obtain
the possession, recourse must therefore generally be had to an ordinary action.

Gregorio Navarro died (no exact date when) and in 1910, Prospero Alafriz was appointed as administrator of Navarro’s estate by the
CFI Ilocos Sur. At the time of his death, Navarro left some minor children, a widow, and property (real and personal). The CFI also
appointed Navarro’s widow as the guardian of the minor children.

Alafriz alleged that Pia Mina had possession of a document for jewelry which was previously deposited as security for a loan worth
P160 by the deceased. As administrator, Alafriz filed a motion for Pia Mina to appear in court to determine if such a document was
really in her possession. Upon appearance, she presented Pawn Ticket No. 243 (this was for inventory purposes as directed by the
court to the administrator) but thereafter filed a motion so that the jewelry be excluded from the inventory. She also offered to
introduce proof that such jewelry belongs to her and her mother. This was denied, and the jewels deposited remained with the court
for inventory of the estate.

Issue: (1) WoN the administrator may bring such actions against Pia Mina as he may deem necessary and the rights of which pertain
to the intestate estate of which he is the administrator? - YES
46.) Alafriz v. Mina Section 709 of the Code (presently Rule 87, Sec. 6) expressly authorized the order of which complaint is made. If upon the hearing,
there was good reason for believing that the person cited had property in his or her possession belonging to the estate, then it was the
duty of the administrator to proceed by an ordinary action to recover possession of the same.

(2) WON the court erred in not permitting the introduction of evidence relative to the ownership of the said jewel? – NO.
Section 709 does not seem to make provision for the determination of the right of ownership of property. Said section provides that
the person suspected of having property belonging to the estate may be cited, and the court may examine such person, under oath, on
the matter of such property.
It will be observed that the section nowhere expressly gives the court the power to determine the right of property. The usual way of
determining the right of contending parties to the ownership of property is by instituting an ordinary action for that purpose.
The court believes that Sec. 709 did not provide for a trial of the right of property of a deceased person, embezzled or alienated by a
third person.
The administrator in this case placed the jewelry In his inventory but this is in no way deprives the Mina of her property therein. She
is still entitled to be heard upon the question of ownership to a proper court.
 J. H. Ankrom died on September 1922. The appellee, A. L. Baker, qualified as his administrator. A few months later, the administrator
filed his inventory of the assets pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which inventory was included a tract of land covered by
Torrens certificate of title and containing an area of more than 930 hectares. [we shall refer this as “subject land”]
The heirs of Rafael Gregoire, appellants, filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom for the sum of Php70,000 based upon a court decision
in the SC of Panama. This claim was allowed in the estate of Ankrom.
Initially, the assets appeared to be sufficient to pay all claimants, but Baker later discovered that the decedent executed a real estate
mortgage on the subject land. Two days after the execution of the REM, the decedent assigned all his interest in re: the mortgaged
property to a certain Jung for a sum of Php1 and other valuable consideration. As such, Baker presented an amended inventory omitting
the subject land. However, the Court noticed that omitting the subject property would make the estate INSOLVENT; thus, it issued an
Order reinstating the subject property to the inventory. [ORDER 1]
Then… upon motion by Baker, the Court reversed itself an omitted the subject property from the inventory. [ORDER 2]

What is the remedy of the claimants (heirs of Rafael Gregoire)?

The precise remedy open to the appellants in the predicament above described is clearly pointed pout in section 713 of our Code of
Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased
47.) Heirs of Gregoire v. Baker person made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in
the preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced such
action, commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or administrator, an action for the recovery of the same
and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such action shall not
be commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the
executor or administrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him so recovered for
the costs incurred and such other expenses as the court deems equitable.
The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to institute an
action in the name of the administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been made in fraud
of creditors.

W/N ORDER 1 which reinstated the subject property to the inventory became final already, making ORDER 2 invalid.

This contention is untenable. Orders made by a court with reference to the inclusion of items of property in the inventory or
the exclusion of items therefrom are manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional, and interlocutory nature and are
subject to modification or change at any time during the course of the administration proceedings. Such order in question not
final in the sense necessary to make it appealable. In fact we note that the appealed order was expressly made without prejudice to the
rights of the creditors to proceed in the manner indicated in the provision above quoted from the Code of Civil Procedure.

A certain Benjamin is the decedent here. He died leaving his wife and children as heirs. During his lifetime, Benjamin owned 64% of
shares of stock of corporation called Island Associates Inc. When he died, the administrator of his estate Muñoz, together with the
officers of the said company mortgaged three of the company’s parcels of land to a certain Villanueva. These lands were also sold to
48) Velasquez v. George Villanueva after the lapse of some time. Now surviving spouse Maria and children filed a complaint to annul the sale made since they
maintain that this impaired the distribution of Benjamin’s estate. Administrator however countered by saying that under Rule 87 Sec.3,
only the administrator of the estate has the capacity to file a case.

The issue thus is whether heirs of Benjamin (wife and children) can file said complaint. Court said they can. The administrator is not
the only person who can file a case. The heirs of the decedent can do this too because they became the owners of the property upon
Benjamin’s death (Art. 777). This is especially true in this case considering that the administrator was the one who caused the contested
sale. It would be far-fetched to expect the same administrator to file the action on behalf of the estate. The heirs here have an interest
in the estate; they possess the requisite personality to cause the annulment of sale.