Impact Assessment Modeling and Control o PDF

G.
Vijayaraghavan, Impact assessment, modeling, and control of dust explosions in chemical process
industries, M. Tech Thesis, Coimbatore Institute of Technology, 2004
Chapter 1
Introduction
When the subject of accidents in chemical process industries is discussed in India,

the focus is mainly on toxic releases such as the one that occurred in Bhopal in
1984 or on vessel bursts and accompanying fires such as the ones occurred as
the HPCL refinery in Vishakapatnam on 1996. The terms VCE (Vapour Cloud
Explosion), BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion), pool fire, flash
fire, fireball are heard most of the time there is a seminar on process industry
accidents. In comparison, the phenomena of dust explosion is much less
discussed or cognized. This is highly worrisome because some of the most
damaging accidents in chemical and agro processing industries have been caused
not by flammable liquids or gases but ‘dusts’. As many as 36 people died at
Westwego, Louisiana, in 1977, in a grain dust explosion. Property worth over $32
million (Rs 160 crores). As detailed in Chapter 3, heavy causalities and property
damage has occurred in dust explosions throughout the world was destroyed.
More than 70 % of powders processed in industry being combustible, a vast
1
G. Vijayaraghavan, Impact assessment, modeling, and control of dust explosions in chemical process
majority of industrial plants that have powder-processing equipment are

susceptible to dust explosions.
In India, information pertaining dust explosions is almost non- existant solely
because in most accidents that occur in India, the broad term ‘Explosion’ is used
and recorded which the type of explosion goes unreported. Also, in public
perception, explosions are what occur in pressurized vessels containing gases
liquids, or by the operation of explosives. Dust is seldom perceived as a cause for
explosions, till so far explosions that match or exceed the ferocity of well-known
industrial disasters like the one that occurred in Felix borough (Khan & Abbasi 1a).
This situation is quite different from the one existing in developed countries where
dust explosions are recognized as very major industrial hazards and meticulous
attention is paid towards their prevention/control.
The present work
In this thesis, which is one the first studies in India on the phenomena of dust
explosions, we present an extensive treatment of,
a. Past accident analysis

b. Mechanism
c. Modeling
d. Forecasting
e. Mitigation of dust explosions.
The ongoing development of a software package is also described is based on the

lead-up studies detailed in this thesis and would be the first-ever computer-
automated tool developed in India on dust explosions.
2
Chapter 2
Accidents in chemical process

industries – an overview
The increasing diversity of products manufactured by chemical process industries

has made it more and more common for these industries to use reactors, conduits
and storage vessels in which hazardous substances are handled at elevated
temperatures and/or pressures. Accidents in such units caused either by material
failure (such as crack in the storage vessels), operational mistakes (such as raising
the pressures temperature/flow-rate beyond critical limits), or external perturbation
(such as damage caused by a projectile) can have serious often catastrophic -
consequences. The most gruesome example of such an accident is the Bhopal
Gas Tragedy of 1984 which killed or maimed over 20,000 persons but there have
3
been numerous other accidents (Flixborough-1974, Basel-1986, Antwerp-1987,

Pasadena-1989, Panipat-1993, Mumbai-1995, and Vishakhapatnam-1997) in
which the death toll would have been as high as in Bhopal if the areas where the
accidents took place were not less densely populated (Less, 1996; Marshall,
1987).
Along with the rapid growth of industrialisation and population the risk posed
by probable accidents also continues to rise. This is particularly so in the third
world where population densities are very high and industrial areas which are
surrounded by dense clusters of neighbourhoods. Further it is common to find
‘industrial areas' or ‘industrial complexes' where groups of industries are situated
in close proximity to one another. The growth in the number of such industrial
areas and in the number of industries contained in each of the areas gives rise to
increasing probabilities of ‘chain of accidents' or cascading/domino effects wherein
an accident in one industry may cause another accident in a neighbouring industry
which in turn may trigger another accident and so on. Some of the past experience
like Mexico-1984, Antwerp-1987, Pasadena-1989 and recently Vishakhapatnam-
1997 are examples of such disasters (Hindu, 1997). In order to prevent -or at least
reduce the frequency of occurrence of such accidents major efforts are needed
towards raising the level safety, hazard management and emergency
preparedness. This realisation and the increased public awareness towards this
issue, has prompted techniques development of new process to carry out risk
assessment and safety evaluation of chemical process industries, singly or in
combinations (as they exist in chemical complexes).
The resulting science of risk assessment, which has emerged in recent years
with ever - increasing importance being attached to it, deals with the following key
aspects of accidents in chemical process industries
a) Development of techniques and tools to forecast accidents.
b) Development of techniques and tools to analyse consequences of likely

accidents. Such consequence analysis fulfils two objectives:-
4
 it helps in sitting of industries and management of sites so as to

minimise the damage if accident does occur;
 it provides feedback for other exercises in accident forecasting and

disaster management;
c) Development of managerial strategies for ‘emergency preparedness’ and

‘damage minimisation'.
2.1 Types of accidents in process industries
The types of accidents that occur in a process industry can be broadly classified
into three categories:
I. Fire.
II. Explosion.
III. Toxic release.

Quite often, though not always, explosion accompanies fire and vice versa. A
toxic release can be in the form of a gas as happened in Seveso (Italy) and Bhopal
(India) or a liquid. The impact of gaseous release in highly dramatic but not often
very persistant. On the other hand a liquid release, which seeps into soil can persist
for decades or more. At times, as happened in Seveso and parts of Bhopal, if the
gaseous release is very intense, it can toxify soil, plants, and water it touches.
Within the broad categories there are accident types, which differ from each other
in their mechanisms and natures of impact.
Table 1 presents a list of accidents that have occurred around the world. The table
illustrates the myriad ways in which accidents occur, the variety of substances that
are involved, and the damage they cause
2.1.1 FIRE
Fire or combustion, is a chemical reaction in which substance combines with
oxygen and heat is released. Usually fire occurs when a source of heat comes in
to contact with a combustible material. If a combustible liquid or solid is heated it
5
evolves vapor, and if the concentration of vapor is high enough it forms a

flammable mixture with the oxygen of the air. If this flammable mixture is then
heated further to its ignition point, combustion starts. Similarly, a combustible gas
or vapor mixture burns if it is heated to sufficiently high temperature (Lees, 1996).
Thus there are three conditions essential for a fire: (1) fuel, (2) oxygen (3) heat.
These three conditions are often represented as the fire triangle. If one of the
conditions is missing, fire does not occur and if one of them is removed, fire is
extinguished.
Normally the heat required is initially supplied by an external source and then
provided by the combustion process itself. The amount of heat needed to cause
ignition depends on the form of the substance. A gas or vapor may be ignited by
a spark or small flame, while a solid may require a more intense heat source.
The three conditions of the fire triangle indicate how fires may be fought. The
first method is to cut off the fuel. This is particularly relevant for fires caused leak
on process plant. The second method is to remove heat. This is usually done by
putting water on the fire. The third method is to stop the supply of oxygen. This
may be affected in various ways including the use of foam or inert gas.
Fire is sustained only if there is a net release of heat. The heat comes from the
combustion of fuel. If this fuel is liquid or solid, it must first be vaporized. With liquid
or solids fire usually involves a process of positive feedback. The heat evolved by
the fire cause the vaporization of an increasing amount of fuel and the fire spreads.
Accidental fires are of the following types:

There are several classifications of fires. In the UK, the BS classification is given
in BS EN2: 1992 this classification is:
Class A Fire involving solid materials, usually of an organic nature, in which
combustion takes place with the formation of glowing embers.
Class B Fires involving liquids or liquefiable solids.
Class C Fires involving gases.
Class D Fires involving metals.
6
Fires also classified by size. The classification recommended by the central Fire
Brigades Advisory council and given in the Manual of Firemanship by the home
office is:
Major fire 20 jets
Large fire 8-19 jets
Medium fire 3-7 jets
Small fire 1-2 jets, or 3 hose reels
Minor fire 1-2 hose reels, or hand extinguishers.
Classification of fires:
With regard to fires in the process industries specially, fires may be classified
broadly into the following categories:
(1) Vapor cloud fires-
(a) Fires with no explosion,
(b) Fires resulting from explosion,
(c) Fires resulting in explosion;
(2) Fireballs;
(3) Jet flames
(4) Liquid fires
(a) Pool fires
(b) Running liquid fires;
(5) Solid fires
(a) Fires of solid materials,
(b) Dust fires;

(6) Warehouse fires
(7) Fires associated with oxygen.
Many major fires are vapor cloud fires. It is convenient to term the three categories
of vapor cloud fire, or flash fire, as
Type1 fires with no explosion
Type 2 fires resulting from explosion
7
Type3 fires resulting in explosion
2.1.2 EXPLOSION
An explosion is a sudden and violent release of energy. The violence of the
explosion depends on the rate at which energy is released. The energy stored in
a car tyre, for example, is capable of causing an explosive burst, but it can be
dissipated by gradual release.
There are several kinds of energy, which may be released in an explosion.
Three basic types are (1) physical energy (2) chemical energy (3) nuclear energy.
Physical energy may take such forms as pressure energy in gases, strain
energy in metals or electrical energy. Examples of the violent release of physical
energy are the explosion of a vessel due to high gas pressure and the sudden
rupture of a vessel due to brittle fracture. Another important physical form is
thermal energy. This is generally important in creating the conditions for an
explosion rather than as a source of energy for the explosion itself. In particular,
superheat in a liquid under pressure causes flashing off of the liquid if it is let down
to atmospheric pressure.
Chemical energy derives from a chemical reaction. Examples of the violent
release of chemical energy are explosion of vessel due to combustion of
flammable gas, and explosion of reactor caused by decomposition of reaction
products in runway chemical reaction.
Chemical explosives are either (1) uniform explosions or (2) propagating
explosions. An explosion in vessel tends to be a uniform explosion, while an
explosion in a vessel long pipe gives a propagating explosion (Lees, 1996).
Explosions in the process industries include the following types:
1. Physical explosions
a) Mechanical failure of pressure system (within design envelope)
b) Overpressure of pressure system
c) Under pressure of pressure system
d) Over temperature of pressure system
e) Under temperature of pressure system
8
2. Condensed phase explosions.
a) High explosive
b) Ammonium nitrate
c) Organic peroxides
d) Sodium chlorate
3. Vapour cloud explosions
4. BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions).

5. Confined explosions with reaction
a) Explosion involving vapour combustion.
b) Reactor explosions.
c) Other explosions involving liquid phase reactions.
6. Vapour escapes into; & explosions in buildings.
7. Dust explosions.
Table 2 Explosion Vs fires some data on 83 large loss fires/ explosions over a 5
years period during 1969
Proportionality %
Explosion inside equipment because air got in 11
Explosion inside equipment because of runaway 23
reactions or explosive decomposition
Explosion outside equipment but inside building 24
Explosions in the open 3
Vessel bursting (due to corrosion, overheating or 7
overpressure)
Fires 32
Total 100
2.1.3 Toxic Release
9
The third of the major hazards, after explosion and fire, is a release of a toxic
chemical. The hazard presented by a toxic substance depends on the conditions
of the exposure and on the chemical itself. It ranges from a sudden brief exposure
at high concentration to prolonged exposure at low concentrations over a working
lifetime.
Both these situations present serious hazards. Avery large release of a toxic
chemical such a chlorine under the most unfavorable conditions is usually
regarded as having a disaster potential greater than that of fire or explosion.
However, a large toxic release is a much less frequent occurrence than a large
fire or explosion.
With toxic materials, the sudden release of very large quantities could
conceivably cause even larger numbers of casualties than a flammable escape. In
theory such a release could, in certain weather conditions, produce lethal
concentrations in places 20 miles from the point of release but the actual number
of casualties (if any) would depend on the population density in the path of the
cloud and the effectiveness of the emergency arrangements, which might include
evacuation.
Exposure to some chemical results in temporary or permanent damage to
organs of the body, i.e. poisoning. There is wide variety of types of damage caused
by toxic substances. The effects of exposure to toxic chemicals may be acute or
chronic. Acute effects result from a single exposure to high concentration of the
chemical; chronic effects result from exposure to low concentrations, perhaps over
large part of working lifetime. With the latter type of exposure the effects may be
latent and may show themselves only after many years. It is also possible for the
effects of a single exposure to a high concentration to be latent.
A toxic chemical may induce a graded or a quantum response. A graded
response refers to the symptoms shown by an individual, which become
progressively more severe as the dose in increased. Exposure to carbon
monoxide, for example, results in a set of symptoms of increasing severity. A
quantum response, on the other hand, refers to the effect of a toxic chemical on a
population, in which some individual suffer the defined injury and others do not. A
10
person either has or dose not have mesothelioma from crocidolite (blue) asbestos.
On this case it is the proportion of cases in the population of causes in the
population, which rises with an increasing dose level.
The effects of acute exposure to toxic chemicals include:
(1) Irritation
a. Respiratory
b. Skin
c. Eyes
(2) Narcosis
(3) Asphyxiation
a. Simple
b. Chemical
(4) Systematic damage.
Inhalation of some substances (e.g. chlorine) causes respiratory inhalation. This
irritation can serve as a warning. These are some chemicals, however, which
reach a toxic level before they cause appreciable irritation and thus give no
warning.
Some substances (e.g. hydrocarbon vapors) have narcotic effects so that the
person’s responses are affected and he may become exposed to an accident. With
certain chemicals (toluene diisocyanate) the effect is that the persons become
euphoric and oblivious of danger so that he is liable to perform hazardous acts.
Gases, which act as simple asphyxiants (e.g. nitrogen and helium) merely
displace oxygen in the atmosphere so that the concentration falls below that
needed to maintain consciousness. But there are also chemical asphyxiants (e.g.
carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide), which have specific blocking action and
prevent a sufficient supply of oxygen from reaching the tissues.
The effects of chronic exposure to toxic chemicals tend to be induction of injury
or disease. One of the most important of these diseases is cancer. Some chemical
induce cancer. In addition to these carcinogens there also mutagens, which induce
gene changes, and teratogens, which induce birth defects.
11
Some chemicals are much more liable than others to accumulate in the body over
the long term. Such bioaccumulative chemicals are particularly harmful.
Different toxic chemicals affect different sites in the body. The effect of such
chemicals depends on the target organ.
It will be apparent, therefore, that it is difficult to express the toxicity of different
chemicals in terms of a common equivalent. Use is sometimes made of the term
chlorine equivalent.
Toxicity depends on the number of factors and no simple hard and fast rules can
be laid down. The mode of action depends not only on the nature of the chemical
but upon the dose received and the time scale of exposure. Strictly speaking the
term chlorine equivalent can be given relevance only in connection with slow,
corrosive irritant chemicals having similar solubility in inhalation. Chemicals such
as Sulphur dioxide, ammonia, acrolein and nitrogen dioxide are all irritant yet have
such different sites of action and variable effects as to make even an approximate
calculation of a chlorine equivalent difficult. The problem becomes even more
difficult when one considers the potential toxicity of chemicals such as carbon
monoxide, which are not predominantly irritant. Mechanisms of toxicity are almost
as varied as the classes of chemical, which could be released.
The aspects of the problem considered here are the general effects of toxic
substances, the limit values set for these, the effects of particular toxic chemicals
and the assessment and control of the hazard of toxic release (Lees, 1996).
12
Chapter 3
Dust Explosion – a Past Accident Analysis
3.1 Illustrative case histories of a few major dust explosions

As briefly mentioned in chapter 1, some of the most damaging of most industrial
accidents have involved dust explosions. A few case histories, briefly recapitulated
below, indicate the widespread occurrence and the damage potential of dust
explosions.
Even though mention of dust explosions is available since 1785 (Morozzo 1785
cited in Lees 1996), greater details are available only since the 20th century.
One of the earliest and most serious accidents was the grain dust explosion of the
Peavey terminal elevator at Duluth, Minn., in1916. After the explosion, the cribbed
grain bins caught fire, completely destroying the elevator. This was one of the
worst roaring infernos in dust explosions (O.F.THEIMER 1973).
13
.An explosion in a starch / corn plant at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in 1919 killed 43
people and one at a similar plant in Peking, Illinois, in 1924 resulted in 42 deaths
(Lees 1996).
In the Port Colbourne elevator in Ontario, Canada, explosion occurred in steel bins,
the roof being blown off entirely. The ensuing fire also damaged the head house
seriously. A grain dust explosion also seriously damaged the grain elevator No. 4A
of the Saskatchewan grain pools, Sept. 24, 1952, where six men were killed and
14 injured. The primary explosion in a shipping bin was followed by a secondary
explosion involving large quantities of dust, which had been allowed to accumulate
in the building. The roof gallery above the bins was also destroyed.
Dust explosions frequently sweep feed mills. A corn dust explosion occurred in
the feed mill Wayne Feeds at Waynesboro, U.S.A., May 25, 1955. Three men were
killed, 13 were injured, and the violent explosion caused extensive property
damage.
A grain dust explosion occurred in the workhouse of the South Chicago elevator in
1956. Because of the light steel frame construction of the roof gallery on top of
bins, the explosion pressure was relieved so that the concrete bins below were not
seriously damaged.
Another severe explosion occurred in Kansas City, Mo., in 1958, when the Murray
elevator was badly damaged. The head house of steel construction was
completely shattered and its installations destroyed by fire.
A dust explosion, which was caused by welding of a spout, excessively worn by

the flow of grain, occurred in the Kampffmeyer grain silo at Albern near Vienna,
July 4, 1960. The welding was performed in the elevator pit, when a spark ignited
the dust in the running bucket elevator. The pressure wave of the explosion went
14
up through the elevator shaft, ripping the casing of the elevator leg, Fig. 8, and
continuing up to the roof, causing severe damage to the building and machinery.
A flour dust explosion caused serious damage to the Sun flourmills in London on
Aug. 7, 1965, four men died and 37 were injured when a giant blast shattered and
set ablaze the mill building and a wheat storage silo of cribbed construction. The
explosion is believed to have been initiated by welding a bin containing flour.
In Germany, a most violent dust explosion on Dec. 14, 1970, seriously damaged
the grain silos at Kiel-Nordhafen on the Kaiser Wilhelm shipping canal, connecting
the North and Baltic seas. It was the worst accident of this kind in Germany. Six
men died and 17 were injured. The damage to plant, building and machinery is
estimated at 10 million dollars. And finally the latest important dust explosion
occurred again in the United States at Destrahan near New Orleans, where a
Bunge Corp. terminal elevator with an 8,000,000- bushel capacity was badly
damaged. The roof gallery above the storage tanks was entirely blown off. A
checked belt conveyor reportedly caused it. The heat from the explosion and the
resultant fire badly damaged the concrete storage bins and the adjacent
workhouse (O.F.THEIMER 1973).
Dry BPO (Brnzoylperoxide) exploded at a BPO manufacturing plant. Dai-ichi Kasei

Kogyo Co., Ltd .g in Aug 1990 some workers were killed, & 7 were injured in this
accident. The storage of an illegal quantity of dry BPO resulted in significantly more
damage (Choi 2003).
An explosion occurred at the Daido Kako Enka Firework manufacturing factory,

Moriya, Ibaraki, in June 1992 resulting in the death of 3 persons & injury of 58,
including passes- by. The presumed cause of this accident was the ignition of
powdery mixture of potassium chlorate & aluminium by fraction during the friction
during the mixing.
15
A fire broke out a textile mill, shinko seishoku Co., and ltd., Okaharu, Kumamoto
in DEC 1994. The fire caused by the ignition of dusty cotton waste as a result of
electricity leak. The factory was destroyed.
A large dust explosion occurred at the Kanaya Shoe making factory in Taito, Tokyo
in Dec 1994 killing 5 workers & injuring 22 persons, including passers- by. The
cause of the explosion was static electricity in fine rubber waste dust.
A tantalum dust deflagration occurred in a bag filter dust collecting devices in April
1997, which resulted in a fatal accident .One worker, was killed, & another was
seriously wounded.
A Mg – Al alloy exploded in a bag filter dust-collecting device at a manufacturing

plant of electronic devices in Oct 2000. One worker was killed & one was injured
in this accident (Choi 2003).
3.2 Frequency of Dust Explosions
Dust explosions are a major hazard in many industrial processes. In operations

such as crushing and grinding, conveying, classifying and storage, an explosion
may occur in the presence of combustible dusts or powders. A lot of accidental
dust explosions take place in industrial plants that have powder-processing
equipment. This is because more than 70% of powders processed in industry are
combustible. It is essential, therefore, to accumulate much knowledge as possible
on the explosion hazards of combustible powders (Dobashi et.al 1985). According
to present statistics from Germany nearly every day one dust explosion occurs
within this country. The same statistics claim that 9% of all 381 accidents analysed
were caused by static electricity if all different kinds of products are taken into
accounts whereas this percentage increases to 34% if only polymeric powders (47
explosions) are included. The HSE booklet lists a wide range of industries and
operations in which serious dust fires/explosions have occurred. Beach gives a
16
detailed analysis of dust explosions, excluding those in coalmines, in the period

1900 – 59. He lists 1110 explosions and 648 fatalities. Some statistical details on
dust explosions are given by Lunn (1992). In the UK in the period 1958- 67, there
were 247 reported explosions with 9 fatalities and 324 non-fatal injuries, and in the
period 1962 – 79 there were 474 explosions reported with 25 fatalities and 633
non fatal injuries; 10 of the 25 fatalities in this latter period occurred in two
incidents.
Lunn also quote two other surveys. One is by the HSE covering the periods 1979
– 84 and 1985 – 88, and gives breakdowns by type of event, dust involved,
equipment involved and ignition source. In the total period 1979 – 88 there were
36 dust fires with injury, 123 explosions with no injury. Principal items of equipment
involved were mills, grinders, filters, driers, silos/hoppers and ducts with 51(17%),
47 (16%), 43(14%), 19(6%), and 15(5%) events, respectively; 95(31%) events
were classified in the category ‘other’. The second survey is by the
Berufsgenossenschaftliches Institut fur Arbeitssicherheit (BIA) and gives
breakdowns by plant group, equipment involved and ignition sources (Theimer
1973 ). In the report 1120 explosions are mentioned in the United States during
the period from 1900 to 1956, of which 536 (48% of the total number explosions)
have occurred in industries handling grain, feed and flour. In these 536 explosions,
392 persons were killed, 1015 were injured and the material losses amounted
$75,888,500. This indicates that dust from grain products is most dangerous
because it ignites and propagates flames easily, the source of heat required being
small. Included this category are flour, dust from wheat and other grains and
seeds, which are the materials of flour milling and ingredients of the food
industries.
Some detailed studies were conducted in developed countries .A report of dust

explosions in U.S.A. from 1900 – 1956 consists of information details for 75 most
serious explosions out of 1125 recorded (Eckhoff R.K.). This covered a wide range
of dusts wood, food and feeds, metals, plastics, coal, paper and chemicals.
17
A report on statistics for Federal Republic Germany for dust explosion during the
period 1965-1980 gives a brief description of specific type of plant, specific plant
item, dust type likely ignition source, number of fatalities injuries and material
losses (Beck.H and Jaske. A). The total number of explosions recorded was 426
for 1965- 1985 .It was estimated that the recorded explosions represent only 15
per cent of the total dust explosions of Federal Republic Germany from 1965 -1985
was therefore about 2840. i.e. 142 per year
The data from Federal Republic Germany presented in fig 1 can be compared
directly with the data from U.S.A. There are differences in the distribution of the
number of explosion accidents on various dust categories ( Manju mittal et. al
1999) .For example. Food and feed represents 25 percent of all explosions in
Federal Republic Germany, whereas in U.S.A this percent was greater than 50.
On the other hand, the percent of explosions involving metal dusts was about twice
as high in Federal Republic Germany than in U.S.A. This probably reflects the
extra violence and radiation of flames of metals like Mg, Al, and Si. These
differences in explosions from both the countries reflect both a change with time,
from first to second part of the century and differences between the structure of
the industry in U.S.A and in Germany.
Fig 1 . Frequencies of dust exploson for various group of dust in U.S.A and F. R.
Germany.
60
FREQUENCIES OF DUST EXPLOSIONS ( % )
50
USA
F R GERMANY
40
30
20
10
0
Wood and Barks Food and Feed Metals Plastics Coal(Not Mines) Paper Others
TYPES OF DUST
18
Table 3 Illustrative examples of dust explosions (1911 - 2004) Dust Explosion

Incidents
Date Location Material Plant / building Death/injuries

1911 Glascow, UK * * 5d/8i
1911 Liverpool.UK * * 37d/100i
1911 Manchester, UK * * 3d/5i
1913 Manchester, UK * * 3d/5i
1916 Duluth, Minn Grain Steel Bin *
1919 Cedar Rapids IA Corn Starch Starch plant 43d
1924 Peking, IL Corn starch Starch plant 42d
1924 U.S.A Sulphide dust * 1d/6i
1930 Liverpool, UK * * 11d /32i
1944 Kansas city, KS Grain dust * *
1949 Port Colbourne. Grain Steel bin *
CA
1952 Bound Brook, Phenolic Resin Hammer mill 5d/21i
New Jersey dust
1952 Saskat chewan Grain dust Shipping bin 6d/14i
1955 Waynesboro, GA Grain dust Feed plant 4d/20i
1956 South Chicago Grain dust Elevator *
1958 Kansas city Grain dust Elevator *
1960 Canada Sulphide dust * 2d/-
1960 Albern near Vienna Grain dust * *
1962 St.Louis, MO Grain dust Feed plant 3d/13i
1964 Paisley, UK * * 2d/34i
1965 Bow, London, UK Flour Flour mill 4d/37i
1969 Sweden Sulphide dust * 2d/1i
1970 Kiel, FRG Grain dust Grain silo 6d/18i
1970 Germany Grain dust Silos on 6d/17i
shipping canal Loss$10million
1974 Canada Sulphide dust Fox Mines *
1974 Preska. South Sulphide dust Mines *
Africa
1977 Galvesto, TX Grain dust Grain silo 15d
1977 Westwego, Grain dust Grain silo 36d/10i
Louisiana
1979 Lerida, Spain Grain dust Grain silo 7d
1979 Canada Sulphide dust Ruttan Mines *
1980 Naples, Italy Grain dust Grain silo 8i
1980 St. Joseph, MO, Grain dust Shipping bin 1d/4i Loss
USA $4,400,000
19
1980 Ohama, NE, USA Grain dust Head house Loss

$3,300,000
1981 Canada Sulphide dust Mattabi mines *
1981 Corpus Christi, TX, Grain dust Bucket Loss
USA Elevator $59,300,000
1981 Bellwood, NE, USA Grain dust Bucket Loss
elevator $6,400,000
1985 Australia Sulphide dust Elura mines *
1985 Canada Sulphide dust Lynn lake *
1986 Canada Sulphide dust Brunswick *
mines
1986 Sweden Sulphide dust Langsele *
mines
1986 Canada Sulphide dust Dumugami *
mines
1986 Australia Sulphide dust Woodlawn *
1987 Canada Sulphide dust GECO mines *
1990 Japan Benzoylperoxide D.K.Kogyo * /7i
Co.Ltd.g
1992 Ibaraki, Japan Kci &Al Fire works 3d/58i
1994 Okaharu, Japan Cotton waste Textile mill *
1994 Tokyo, Japan Rubber waste Shoe factory 5d/22i
1997 Japan Tantalum dust * 1d/1i
2000 Japan Mg – Al alloy 1d/1i
2000 Modesto California Aluminum dust * *
2002 Wisconsin Wood dust * 2I
2004 Avon-Ohio Lacquer dust * *
* details not available
Considering some statistics of dust explosion, among a total of 248 cases

reported in Japan between 1952 and 1990, there were 44 cases of agricultural
products (food and feed), 13 of coal, 29 of inorganic materials, 60 of metals and
alloys, 32 of chemical synthetic materials, 46 of intermediate and additives, 23 of
cellulose materials and one miscellaneous (Matsuda, 1993). As the probable
ignition source, static electricity is listed (25.7%)as the cause of the dust explosion
cases between 1981 and 1990 (Matsuda, 1993).
Table 4 Dust Explosions in Japan (Nifuku 2000)

Year Explosions Death Injuries
1952 6 7 26
20
1953 9 1 16
1954 9 1 19
1955 4 0 0
1956 7 7 14
1957 4 2 6
1958 8 4 18
1959 7 3 9
1960 6 0 1
1961 3 0 6
1962 8 3 23
1963 11 2 30
1964 7 2 9
1965 12 1 41
1966 6 3 20
1967 8 9 39
1968 12 4 17
1969 8 6 11
1970 6 7 5
1971 7 2 12
1972 7 6 22
1973 12 2 53
1974 7 3 10
1975 9 3 14
1976 4 0 3
1977 6 2 2
1978 8 3 9
1979 9 2 26
1980 3 0 8
1981 2 0 7
1982 3 3 2
1983 3 0 6
1984 3 0 0
1985 5 3 6
1986 8 3 12
1987 1 0 0
1988 3 0 9
1989 1 0 0
1990 6 0 11
1991 4 1 7
1992 4 3 3
1993 1 1 1
1994 6 7 26
1995 6 0 8
Totals 269 106 567
21
Proust (1996) has summarized some of the statistics as under:

 In Germany, it is estimated that the number of dust explosions in industry
might be the order of 160 per year (period 1965-1985)
 In the USA. From 1900 to 1956, more than 1000 dust explosion accidents
in the industry were reported and among them 50% occurred in the food
and feed industry; for the period 1958-1978. Only 250 dust explosions which
occurred in the feed industry were reported
 In Japan, from 1969 to 1973, a figure of 187 dust explosions in the grain
storage facilities is given
 In U.K., more than 400 dust explosions during the period 1969-1976 were
reported
 In France, statistics do not seem to be available but it might be estimated
that the order of magnitude of the frequency of dust explosions in the
industry might be one accident per working day
3.3 Causes of dust explosion
Surveys of industrial dust explosions incidents show that, in a substantial
percentage, friction and mechanical failure and flames and flaming material are
known ignition sources. Surveys for the UK (Abbott, 1985; Porter.1989) covering
1979 – 1988, and reviewing 303 events, showed friction and mechanical failure to
be the reason for ignition in 18 % of these incidents, and flames and flaming
material to be responsible in another 15 %. Overheating and spontaneous heating
featured in a further 17 %. Similarly, a survey by the Berufsgenossen-schaftliches
Institut fur Arbeitssecherheit (BIA) (Jeske and Beck, 1989) showed mechanical
causes to be the most frequent sources if ignition, with smouldering nests the
second most frequent (Lunn 2003). The relevant percentages from BIA survey
were 26% for mechanical sparks 11% for smouldering nests and 9% for
mechanical heating.
Fig 2. correlate frequencies of dust explosions with the probable ignition
sources. Mechanical sparks are frequent ignition sources in dust collectors, mills
and grinding plants. Electrostatic discharges were the dominating ignition sources
in mixing plants but electrostatic discharge ignition occurred almost solely with
22
plastic dusts ( Manju mittal et. al 1999).Presumably, mixers are quite frequent in
plant producing and handling plastic dust and the combination of mixture and
plastic dusts is favorable for generating electrostatic discharge .
Fig 2. Frequencies of dust explosions caused by
various group of ignition sources in F.R.Germany
50
FREQUENCIES OF DUST EXPLOSIONS(%)
40
Wood dust/Wood products
Total
30 Coal dust
20
10
0
Mechanical spark self heating Electrical equipment Hot surfaces
GROUP OF IGNITION SOURCES
Fig 3 shows the involvement of various categories of plant items in

explosions in general and that for two dusts – wood / wood products and coal in
particular. This reflects differences between typical processes for producing,
storing and handling the various categories of powders and dusts.
23
Fig 3. Frequencies of dust explosions caused by various group of

industrial installations in F.R.Germany.
FREQUENCY OF DUST EXPLOSIONS
40
35 Wood/Wood products
Total
30
Coal dust
25
20
15
10
5
0
Storage units(silos Pulverizing units Dryers Mixing plants
and hoppers)
GROUP OF INSTALLATIONS
Table 3 Proportions of ignition sources in several explosions.

Number of % Ignited by %Unknown % Ignited by Period
explosions friction sparks friction sparks
+ unknown
535 20 46 66 1860-1973
128 17 27 44 1949-1973
91 54 18 72 1941 -1945
137 9 62 71 1958 -1975
83 28 5 30-35 1965 –1980
3.4 Units and material involved in dust explosion

According to an analysis by Matsuda (1993) of dust explosions, among a total of
248 cases reported between 1952 and 1990, there were 44 cases of agricultural
24
products (food and feed), 13 of coal, 29 of inorganic materials, 60 of metals and

alloys, 32 of chemical synthetic materials, 46 of intermediate and additives, 23 of
cellulosic materials and one miscellaneous.
Table 4. Dust explosion of various materials (Nifuku 2000)
Dust Type Explosions Death Injuries
Coal 13 7 41
Inorganic 31 9 28
Metals 64 41 153
Food and Feed 46 17 109
Chemical synthetic 36 12 79
materials
Intermediate additives 50 13 69
Cellulosic materials 28 7 84
Miscellaneous 1 0 4
Table 5. Principle items of equipment involved in dust explosions

Silos, bunkers 20. 0 %
Dedusting units, separators 17. 2 %
Grinding and crushing systems 13. 2 %
Conveying systems 10. 1 %
Dryer 8. 0 %
Firing plant 5. 4 %
Blender 4. 7 %
Grinding and polishing machines 4. 5 %
Scales 0. 5 %
Others 16.4%
25
Chapter 4
Dust explosion
4.1 DUST EXPLOSION: DEFINITION

A dust explosion is the rapid combustion of a dust cloud. In a confined or nearly
confined space, the explosion is characterized by relatively rapid development of
pressure with flame propagation and the evolution of large quantities of heat and
reaction products. The required oxygen for this combustion is mostly supplied by
the combustion air. The condition necessary for a dust explosion is a simultaneous
presence of dust cloud of proper concentration in air that will support combustion
and a suitable ignition source. The term dust is used if the maximum particle size
of the solid mixture is below 500 µm.
According to Palmer (1972) many combustible dusts if dispersed as a cloud in
air and ignited will allow a flame to propagate through the cloud. Such dusts include
common foodstuffs like sugar flour, cocoa, synthetic materials such as plastics,
chemicals and pharmaceuticals metals such as Al& Mg; and traditional fuels such
26
as coal wood. The propagation of the flame through the cloud is termed a dust
explosion.
An explosion hazard exists when dusts are produced, stored or processed in a
plant and these materials are present as a mixture in air (Jaeger 2001). An
explosible mixture is present, when combustible dusts are present in such
quantities in air that an explosion occurs after an ignition.
The industries where the hazard of combustible and explosive dust can be
commonly found are:
 Wood processing and storage
 Grain elevators, bins and silos
 Flour and feed mills
 Manufacture and storage of metals such as Al and Mg
 Chemical production
 Plastic production
 Starch or Candy producers
 Spice sugar and cocoa production and storage
 Coal handling or processing area
 Pharmaceutical plants
 Dust collection bins or bags
 Shelves, nooks, crannies, inside of equipment and above false ceilings in
all facilities.
4.1.1 Operations involving dusts:
Operation in which dusts are generated or handled comprise of the

following:
1. Size reduction
2. Conveying.
a) Manual
b) Mechanical
c) Pneumatic
3. Separation
27
a) Settling chambers
b) Cyclones
c) Filters
d) Scrubbers
e) Electrostatic precipitator
4. Driers
a) Tray driers
b) Rotary driers
c) Fluidized bed driers
d) Pneumatic driers
e) Spray driers
5. Screening and Classifying
6. Mixing and Blending
7. Storage
8. Packing
9. Fired heaters
4.2 CLASSIFICATION OF DUSTS
A wide range of industrial dusts is known to be explosible. But there are some
exceptions. All explosible dust may be combustible. i.e. will burn in air, but not all
combustible dusts are explosible (Palmer et.al 1972) . For example, anthracite and
graphite are not explosible, although they have high heats of combustion. Present
knowledge does not permit the explosibility of combustible dusts to be predicted
and reference must be made to tests. If the composition of the dust is known, the
first steps is to consult the list of dusts, published by HM Factory Inspectorate of
the Department of Employment which have already been tested for explosibility.
The dusts are classified into two groups as follows:
Group (a): Dusts, which ignited and propagated flame in the test apparatus
28
Group (b): Dusts, which did not, propagated flame in the test apparatus.
4.2.1 Classification based on ignitability
A measure of the ignitability of a dust layer and intensity of burning of a dust layer
is the Combustion Class (CC) (ISSA, 1998). (Lunn et.al 2003) This classification
is based on the behaviour of a defined heap when subjected to a gas flame or hot
platinum wire:
1. CC1: No ignition; no self – sustained combustion

2. CC2: Short ignition and quick extinguishing; local combustion of short duration
3. CC3: Local burning or glowing without spreading; local sustained combustion
but no propagation
4. CC4: Spreading of a glowing fire; propagation smouldering combustion
5. CC5: Spreading of an open fire; propagating open flame
6. CC6: Explosible burning; explosive combustion.
4.2.2 Classification based on Kst value
The highest value of the maximum rate of pressure rise is used to calculate the Kst
value of the dust:
Kst = (dp/dt) max V 1/3
The Kst value is essentially defined as the maximum rate of pressure rise
measured under standard conditions in a 1-m3 vessel, and is used to characterize
the explosibility of the dust by reference to four groups (Lunn 1988):
Kst = Group St0: Non-explosible
0 < Kst < 200 = Group St1 Increasing
200<Kst< 300 = Group St2 Explosibility
300 < Kst = Group St3
29
4.3 Safety codes
A number of safety codes now address the dust/ vapour explosion potential
depending on the type of industry or operations (Dahn et.al 2000). Codes of a
general nature are listed as follows:
 NFPA Codes:
Combustible Metals and Metal Dusts
i.e.NFPA65, 480,481
Explosion Protection systems
i.e.NFPA 68,69
Handling and Conveying of Dusts, Vapour, and Gases,
i.e.NFPA 91,650,654,655
 BOCA (Uniform Building Codes):
Requirements for Group H
Occupancy, Section 307.1
 VDI (Pressure release of explosions)
Verein Deutscher Ignenieure.
4.4 Dust Explosion Pentagon
The dust explosion pentagon has put forth five major parameters, which comprises
the dust explosion pentagon (Amyotte 1996);
 Presence of combustible dust in a finely divided form
 Availability of oxidant
 Presence of an ignition source
 Some degree of confinement
30
 State of mixed reactants
A dust explosion is a complex phenomenon involving simultaneous momentum,

energy and mass transport in a reactive multi-phase system. Particles, when in
dust, powder or flake forms from operations such as grinding, finishing and
processing may be suspended as a dust cloud in air and consequently may ignite
and cause serious damage. If the dust cloud is unconfined the effect is simply one
of flash fire. If however, the ignited dust cloud is at least partially confined the heat
of combustion may result in rapidly increasing pressure and produce explosion
effects such as rupturing of the confining structure (Sheridan 1996).
Dust Explosion Pentagon
Mixing Confinement
Oxidant
Fuel
Ignition source
4.5 TRIGGERS OF DUST EXPLOSION

The principle ignition sources for dusts include,
 Flames and direct heat
 Hot work
 Incandescent material
31
 Hot surfaces
 Electrostatic sparks
 Electrical sparks
 Friction sparks
 Impact sparks
 Self heating
 Static electricity
 Lightning
A brief description of each is presented below:

4.5.1 Flames and Direct heat
Incident statistics show that a large proportion of dust ignition caused by flames. A
flame is a very effective source of ignition for dust suspensions. One source of
flames is direct-fired equipment. This source may be eliminated by the use of
indirect heating using hot water or steam.
4.5.2 Hot work
Another principal ignition source for dusts is hot work such as welding and cutting.
Again a welding flame is a very effective source of ignition. In this case it is
frequently a dust layer may have an ignition temperature in the range 100-200 oC
and is readily ignited by hot work. Incidents occur because this hazard is not
appreciated and the dust is not cleaned out of the equipment before work is started.
4.5.3 Incandescent material
Burning dust, or other incandescent material, is another important ignition source.

Considerable efforts are made to prevent ignition by burning dust. Burning dust is
an ignition source, which can occur inside dust handling equipment. One
consequence of this is that it may travel through the plant. Another is that it may
32
remain undetected. A direct firing system is one potential source of incandescent

particles. In direct-fired driers the air inlet is protected by a fine screen to prevent
ingress of such incandescent material.
4.5.4 Hot surfaces
Hot surfaces are another important ignition source. One type of hot surface is
equipment with a hot surface such as steam pipe or electric lamp. Another is
overheated moving equipment such as distressed bearing. Ignition due to a hot
surface is particularly like to occur with dust layers. As already mentioned the
surface temperature can cause ignition of a dust layer is frequently no more than
100-200 o C. The ignition temperature of a dust layer decrease as the thickness of
the layer increases. It is frequently found in investigations of ignition that a dust
layer has ignited at an unexpectedly low temperature. The dust itself may
contribute to its own ignition. Dust is a poor conductor of heat and a layer of dust
on equipment mat reduce heat loss to atmosphere and thus cause the surface to
be hotter than it would be otherwise. Or again dust may enter a bearing and cause
it to run hot. Electric lamps give hot surfaces, which may ignite dust suspensions.
There are available lamps with special protection for use in dusty atmospheres.
Alternatively, areas, which may contain dust suspensions, may be illuminated by
lamps, which are separated on the other side of an armoured glass panel. Hot
surfaces may also occur as a result of distress in machinery such as pumps and
motors. It may be necessary in some cases to monitor features such as bearing
temperatures.
4.5.5 Electrostatic sparks
An electrostatic spark may occur due to a discharge from electrical equipment.

Protection against such discharges is based on hazardous area classification and
33
the associated safeguarding of electrical equipment is designed so that incendive

capacitive or inductive discharges cannot occur.
4.5.6 Electrical sparks
Electrical sparks occur in the normal operation of certain equipment such as

switches and relays and may occur in electrical equipment generally as a result of
malfunction.
4.5.7 Friction sparks
Another important contributor to incidents is frictional sparks associated with

rubbing or grinding. These can occur in plant handling dust in several ways. The
dust itself may block the equipment and cause overloading, leading to spark
generation. Preventive measures include control of dust flow and machine
overload trips. Foreign materials such as tramp iron can cause sparks. Removal
of such objects can be effected by magnetic or pneumatic separation, and is
especially desirable if the material is to pass through a mill. Failure of equipment
can also give rise to sparks.
4.5.8 Impact sparks
Much concern has centered around the potential of hand tools to create an
incendive impact spark, although there is little evidence from incidents of single
impact ignition.
4.5.9 Self- heating
Self-heating or spontaneous combustion is another significant ignition source.

There are wide varieties of reactions, which can give rise to self-heating. They
include not only oxidation reactions but reactions with water or wood. For many
34
reactions the reaction rate accelerates with temperature, according to the

Arrhenius equation. But there also auto catalytic reactions, which may accelerate
due to production of a catalyst or removal of an inhibitor.
4.5.10 Static electricity
In general terms, the static charge on dust is a function of the work done on them.
Hence the charge tends to be a stronger function of the process than of the
material. For sieving and pouring the charges are low, but for size reduction they
are much higher. It is not easy to screen for situations where static electricity might
present a hazard in dust handling. Laboratory tests for this are not well developed.
There are certain types of dust handling plant in which static electricity is readily
generated. These include mills, conveyor belts and pneumatic conveying systems.
The hazard in such equipment should therefore be carefully considered. As with
liquids, static charge can accumulate at the center of a large storage hopper. It
may then be discharged by an earthed probe. But there is also a hazard unique to
dusts that of sliding of highly charged material towards an earthed container wall
(Lees 1996).
4.6 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS
4.6.1 Primary explosions

The concentrations needed for a dust explosion are rarely seen outside of process
vessels, hence most severe dust explosions start within a piece of equipment
(such as mills, mixers, screens, dryers, cyclones, hoppers, filters, bucket elevators,
silos, aspiration ducts, and pneumatic transit systems.). These are known as
primary explosions. It is important to note that one of the main differences between
the dust explosion and flammable gas hazard is that gas/vapour explosions rarely
happen inside vessels due to a lack of air to support explosions. However with dust
it is generally suspended in air in process equipment (unless the vessel are
operated in pure nitrogen atmospheres, which can still pose a problem with metal
35
powders), which can allow dust explosion conditions to occur. This can then cause
the vessel to rupture if it has insufficient
Pressure release devices/venting or if its design pressure is too low.
An important aspect of dust explosion avoidance is the limiting of the
possibility of primary explosions, however more important is to reduce the
possibility of a secondary explosion occurring.
4.6.2 Secondary explosions

These are caused when lying dust is disturbed by the primary explosion and forms
a second dust cloud, which then is ignited by the heat released from the primary
explosion. The problem is that small amounts of lying dust occupy very little space,
but once disturbed can easily form dangerous clouds. A 1mm layer of dust of 500
kg/m3 can give rise to a 5m deep cloud of 100g/m3 dust.
36
4.7 FEQUENTLY USED TERMS
A glossary of terms frequently used in the treatment of dust explosions is

presented below:
Activation overpressure: Pa, pressure threshold, above the pressure at ignition of

the reactants, at which a firing signal s applied to the suppressor (S).
Blast wave: A shock wave in open air generally followed by strong wind, the
combined shock & wind is called blast wave.
Cubic law: The correlation of the vessel volume with the maximum rate of pressure
rise
Kmax = (dp/dt) max V 1/3
Deflagrations: An explosion in which the reaction front (energy front) moves at a

speed less than the speed of the sound in the medium.
Detonation: An explosion in which the reaction front (energy front) moves at a

speed greater than the speed of the sound in the medium.
Dust: Solid mixture with maximum particle size of 500micro meter.
Dust explosion class St: Dusts are classified in accordance with the Kmax values.
Explosion: Propagation of aflame in premixture of combustible gases, suspended

duct(s), combustible vapours, mists or mixtures thereof in a gases oxidant such as
air in a closed or substantially closed vessel
37
Explosion Pentagon: The three elements present in the fire triangle plus two
additional elements necessary for two additional elements necessary for
explosions – suspension of fuel within the flammable limits and confinement.
Explosion Severity Test:

 Per ASTM E 1226-94 using a 20-L spherical chamber.
 Will determine the dust deflagration index, Kst the maximum pressure output
and maximum pressure rise rate of the material.
Fire Triangle: The three elements necessary for a fire, fuel, heat, (ignition
sources), and oxygen.
Limiting (Minimum) O2 Concentration:

 Per ASTM proposed standard.
 Will determine how much inert gas is needed to prevent explosion in case
dust concentration is in the explosive range.
Limiting oxygen concentration (LOC): Maximum oxygen concentration in a mixture

of a combustible and air and inert gas, in which an explosion will not occur.
Maximum explosion Overpressure, Pmax: The maximum pressure reached during

an explosion in a closed vessel through systematically changing the concentration
of dust-air mixture
Maximum Reduced explosion Overpressure: Pred, max: The maximum pressure

generated by an explosion of dust air mixture in a vented or suppressed vessel
under systematically varied dust concentrations.
38
Maximum Explosion Constant, Kmax: Dust and Test specific characteristic

calculated from cubic root law. It is equivalent to the maximum rate of pressure
rise in a 1-m3 vessel.
Minimum Ignition Temperature: The lowest temperature of a hot surface on which

the most ignitable mixture of the dust with air is ignited under specified test
conditions.
Maximum Rate of Pressure Rise (dp/dt) max: The maximum rate of pressure rise
obtained in a closed vessel through systematically changing the concentrations of
a dust-air mixture.
Minimum Explosive Concentration:

 Per ASTM E 1515-96 using a 20 L Spherical chamber.
 Will determine the Minimum Concentration of dust – air mixture needed for
an explosion.
Minimum ignition energy:

 Per ASTM proposed standard using a 1.2 L cylindrical Hartmann Chamber.
 Will determine the Minimum (electrostatic spark) energy required to ignite
the material in a dust cloud form & measuring energy in the spark gap.
Minimum Auto Ignition Temperature:(dust cloud form):

 Per ASTM E 1491-97 standard.
 Will determine the Minimum Auto Ignition Temperature needed to ignite the
material in a dust cloud form and measuring energy in the spark gap.
Minimum Auto Ignition temperature (dust layer form)
39
 Per Bureau of Mines Procedure.

 Will determine the minimum auto ignition temperature needed to ignite the
material in the dust layer form.
Overpressure: The pressure on an object as a result of an impacting shock wave.
Shock waves: An abrupt pressure wave generated due to sudden release of

energy, which move in the medium.
Vent area, Av: area of an opening for explosion venting
40
Chapter 5
The dust explosion mechanism
In the proceeding chapters some glimpse were provided on the types of dusts,
which can explode, the factors, which trigger dust explosions, and how the trigger
leads to an explosion. In this chapter a rigorous treatment of the mechanism
involved in the dust explosion process is presented. The mechanism is the
foundation on which the phenomenon is modeled for the eventual exercise of
explosion prevention and control.
A dust explosion is very similar to a gas or vapour cloud explosion, i.e. when a
volume of a flammable mixture is ignited, resulting in a rapid pressure increase
and fire moving through the cloud. A dust explosion occurs when a combustible
material is dispersed in the air forming a flammable cloud and a flame propagates
through it. This of course also depends on the supply of oxygen to the fire, and the
concentration of the fuel, if, either of these are in too high or low then the explosion
will not occur.
41
Any solid material that can burn in air will do so at a rate that increases with
increased surface area (Lees 1996). If the area available for combustion is high
enough, then a flame can propagate through the combustible mixture at high
spreads. If the amount of heat released is sufficient to cause further combustion,
then the reaction will continue. If the heat release produces more combustion than
it look to generate then the fire will not just continue it will causes the fire to grow
very rapidly, if this is rapid enough then the fire will become an explosion. The
maximum pressure in a dust explosion is typically around 5-12 bar.
5.1 Dust explosion requirements

The three requirements for combustion are a fuel, an oxidizer (usually air), and an
adequate heat or ignition source. This is often called the “fire triangle”. The fuel
can be any material capable of reacting rapidly and exothermically with an
oxidizing medium. In this case, the fuel is a combustible dust. For a dust explosion,
the dust must be dispersed in the air at the same time that the ignition source is
present. The resulting rapid oxidation of the fuel dust leads to a rapid increase in
temperature and therefore pressure. This explosion may be a deflagration or a
detonation, depending on the rate of reaction and resulting burning velocity. The
discussion in this paper is mainly confined to deflagrations. The destructive
pressure forces of an explosion can destroy structures and endanger personnel.
The violence of an explosion is dependent on the rate of energy release due to
chemical reactions relative to the degree of confinement
and heat losses. The requirements for a dust explosion are often called (Stephan,
1990) the “explosion pentagon”—consisting of fuel, dispersion/suspension,
oxidizer, heat/ignition source, and confinement (Cashdollar 2000). The
confinement is usually the walls of the equipment or building in which the dust is
dispersed, but it could also come from self-confinement if the reaction is fast
enough. It is possible to have a destructive explosion even in open air if the
reaction is so fast that pressure builds up in the dust cloud faster than it can be
released at the edge of the cloud. Whether the reacting material is a gas or a dust,
42
the combustion products are usually gases so that the explosion process in a
closed system is most simply understood in terms of the ideal gas law:
----------- (5.1)
where the absolute pressure, P, times the system volume, is proportional to the
temperature, T. The proportionality constants are the number of moles, n, and the
universal gas constant, R. The number of moles is equal to the mass of gas, m,
divided by the average molecular weight, M. For a typical accidental explosion, air
is usually the oxidant and the fuel may be a dust, gas, or hybrid mixture. Because
air consists mainly of nitrogen, there is usually little change in the number of moles
of gas during combustion. Therefore, to a first approximation, a rapid combustion
reaction in a closed system results in:
----------------- (5.2)
where Pmax is the maximum absolute explosion pressure,P0 is the initial absolute
pressure, Tb is the absolute temperature of the burned gas and T0 is the initial
absolute temperature. The faster the combustion reaction is, the
more adiabatic the system will be, and the more nearly will the explosion pressure
approximate the ideal relation in Eq. (5.2). If the number of moles of gas changes
significantly during combustion or if the explosion vents from the container volume,
the maximum explosion pressure will be significantly changed. In this paper, the
terms “flammability” and “explosibility” are used interchangeably to refer to the
ability of an airborne dust cloud and/or gas mixture to propagate a deflagration
after it has been initiated by a sufficiently strong ignition source. Historically, the
term “flammability” has been used more often for gases, and “explosibility” more
often for dusts.
The mechanism of flame propagation for many dusts is combustion of flammable
gases emitted by particles heated to the point of vaporization or pyrolysis
(Hertzberg, Zlochower & Cashdollar, 1988b; Cashdollar, Hertzberg & Zlochower,
43
1989). Some other dusts can propagate a flame through direct oxidation at the
particle surface (Hertzberg, Zlochower & Cashdollar, 1992). For either mechanism,
a finer size of dust is likely to react faster than a larger size of dust of the same
material. Particle shape and porosity can also greatly affect the particle surface
area and the reaction rates. Therefore, the dust particle size and shape are of
primary importance in regard to dust explosibility characteristics. Dusts are often
defined as material that is minus 20 mesh (<850 m) (Stephan, 1990; Nagy, 1981)
or minus 40 mesh (<420 m) (NFPA, 1998). However, the larger dust particles
participate inefficiently in the flame propagation process. It is the finer fraction of
the dust particles that contributes the most to the hazard because the finer particles
have a greater surface area per mass and therefore react faster. The finer dust
particles are also more easily dispersed in air and remain airborne longer. An
example of a dust particle size distribution is shown in Fig. 6. The cumulative
distribution is shown in Fig. 6A and the differential distribution in Fig. 6B as semi-
logarithmic plots. The two types of size distributions are shown both as surface
area weighted and as mass or volume weighted curves. The surface median
diameter (23 m) and the mass median diameter (42 m) can be determined from
the 50% points on the cumulative curves in Fig. 6A. The cumulative curve also
shows that the dust has 82% by mass minus 200 mesh (, 75 m). The differential
curves in Fig. 6B are often more useful in visualizing the size distribution. Other
ways of identifying a representative particle size for the dust in Fig. 6 are the
surface mean diameter (Ds< 30 m) and the mass mean diameter (D W < 50 m),
calculated from the data in Fig. 6B. Because the combustion of the dust cloud is
greatly dependent on the surface area of the dust, a mean particle diameter based
on surface area is perhaps more appropriate than one based on mass. Various
books on particle size analysis (e.g. Allen, 1975; Irani & Callis, 1963) may be useful
in better understanding this aspect of dusts. It should be noted that different
particle size analysis instrumentation might give somewhat different results for the
same dust because of the different particle sizing methods used. The combustion
properties of a dust depend on its chemical and physical characteristics, especially
its particle size distribution. Published dust explosibility data can give an indication
44
of the hazards associated with particular type of dust. However, it is preferable to

determine the explosibility characteristics of an industrial dust by test, because
published data are for a particular size distribution that may be different from the
dust in question. Particle shape and porosity are also important considerations in
the explosibility of a dust. In general, shapes with greater surface area will
propagate flame more readily and therefore be more hazardous. It should be noted
that there is no US standardized test for whether or not a dust is explosible. There
are tests to determine whether a dust can be ignited by an electric spark (Dorsett,
Jacobson, Nagy & Williams, 1960) or what the maximum explosion pressures
(ASTM, 1999a) or minimum explosible concentrations (ASTM, 1999b) are using
stronger chemical ignitors. One reason for this lack of an explosibility test is that
the question of whether or not a dust can be ignited and propagates a flame
depends greatly on the ignition source. However, different industries have different
views about what would be an appropriate or likely ignition source. For some
industries, it could be an electrostatic spark; for others, it could be a flame; and for
the mining industry, it could a very large flame from blown-out explosives.
Therefore, each industry has to decide what are the likely or possible ignition
sources and which dusts they could ignite.
Fig 6. Dust particle size

distribution by surface area
and mass (A) cumulative
distributions; (B) differential
distributions
45
5.2 Chemistry of dust explosion

Generally dust explosion arise from the simple chemistry of combustion:
Fuel + Oxygen Oxides + Heat
Sometimes metal dusts can also react exothermally with N2 or CO2 but this is only
in very special cases. This means that only materials that are not stable oxides
can be involved in dust explosions. Therefore the following chemical compound
types are unable to produce dust explosions.
 Silicates
 Sulphates
 Nitrates
 Carbonates
 Phosphates
Therefore there is no risk of dust explosions in industries such as cement
manufacture, sand quarrying, limestone excavation etc.
Materials that can cause dust explosions are:
o Natural organic materials (grain, linen, sugar, etc.)
o Synthetic organic materials (plastics, organic pigments, pesticides, etc)
o Coal and peat.
o Metals (aluminium, zinc, iron etc.)
The four conditions necessary for an explosion were met during this unscheduled
maintenance procedure (Senecal 1991)
1. Fuel. An ample supply of easily ignitable manganese dust existed throughout

the process volume, and in particular, at the ball mill location where finer-than-
usual dust had been created.
46
2. Oxidant. Oxygen concentrations were rising in the whole process volume due
to disabling of the nitrogen purge system and the circulation of air into the system
the actions of the crew.
3. Ignition energy. Several possibilities exist which have been rated as follows:
a) Self-heating (70%). Adsorption of now-available oxygen by the very finely

ground powder at the ball mill location would result in surface oxidation with
a consequent release of heat. The thermo chemistry of manganese
oxidation is as follows:
Mn + l/2O, = MnO + 385 kJ
MnO + l/2 O * = MnO, + 136 kJ
Thus, given the large heats of reaction involved, only a modest degree of oxygen
adsorption within a layer of fine dust, which is a very thermal conductor, is
required to raise the material temperature to the point of smouldering or flaming
b) Electrostatic discharge (25%): Powder, charged transit down the rubber-lined

duct, discharging ground point. Frictional heating (3%). The rubbing of manganese
dust between shovel and fixed surfaces may initiate localized smouldering of
particles, which were subsequently dumped down the Linatex duct.
c) Mechanical sparks (2%). Sparks due to contact shovel and fixed surfaces
producing hot sparks. Mechanism (a) seems to be the most likely cause ignition in
this instance as the requirements for heating were well established. The conditions
necessary develop significant electrostatic charging (b) present. However,
relatively high ignition energies required to ignite dusts, even metal dusts, as below
indicate. However, given the high proportion of dust smaller than 44 pm ignition
energy data obtained on ‘similar’ material fully reflect the sensitivity of this dust to
electro ignition. Frictional (c) and mechanical (d) spark-seem to be less likely
47
ignition mechanisms due use of non-sparking tools and the experience of in

handling powdered manganese.
4. Confinement. Conditions 1, 2 and 3 above are sufficient to begin combustion.

It is the relative enclosure of the combustion process which gives rise development
of excessive pressure. The manganese comminuting system was, by its very
design, a nearly system. The only access to the bucket elevator volume was
through the ball mill itself and discharge rotary valve at the top of the tower which
time of the incident was clogged with powder.
Due to the complex interaction between the chemical and transport phenomena
involved, the course of an explosion of a dust cloud depends on several factors.
(Continillo et. al 1991) Some of them, such as dust agglomeration, the actual dust
concentration, turbulence, and nature, location and strength of the ignition source,
are difficult to control even in a laboratory facility. The study of ignition and flame
propagation is thus difficult, since the process depends on the method used to
generate and ignite the cloud. In view of this, it is impossible to characterize the
explosibility of a dust in a way, which is independent of the circumstances under
which the explosion is produced. This situation is reflected in the high degree of
uncertainty in the assessment of dust explosion hazard for a given substance, as
pointed out by Hertzberg’. However, it is desirable that those factors that cannot
be quantified
5.3 Factors influencing Dust explosibility

 Particle size
 Dust concentration
 Oxygen concentration
 Ignition Temperature
 Rate of pressure rise
 Turbulence
 Admixed inert dust concentration.
48
5.3.1 Particle Size and Specific Surface area
You can see that the above diagram shows the same cube, but divided up
differently. In picture (a) it has half the surface area of (b) which in turn has half the
surface area of (c). We can see that the degree of subdivision of a solid dictates
the likelihood of an explosion. A useful measurement is the specific surface area,
which allows us to see exactly how much surface area there is per unit mass. For
example a cube of edge x, will have a specific surface area S that is equal to:
S = 6 x2 / x3 = 6 / x ------------------- (5.3)
This also holds true for spherical particles (where x is the diameter):
S= x2 / ( x3 / 6) = 6 / x -------------------- (5.4)
For flake shaped particles the specific surface area is:
S=2/x -------------------- (5.5)
For fibers where the length is much greater than the diameter:
S=4/x -------------------- (5.6)
Therefore we have a convenient way of estimating the specific surface area quickly
from the diameter and basic particle characteristics.
Essentially the higher the specific surface area the more danger there is of dust
being involved in a dust cloud explosion, although it is possible for very small
49
particles to agglomerate into lumps, thus reducing the likelihood of a dust

explosion.
At the larger sizes, above 100 µm, the MEC values increase with particle size until
a size is reached that cannot be ignited. The pressures decline slowly and the
pressure rise rates decrease faster with increasing particle size. No matter how
combustible the powder, if it's in big lumps it isn't going to cause a dust explosion.
Although there is a clear dependence on size and surface area of dust particles, it
does not vary linearly with the explosibility of the powders. Often the dust (i.e. coal
dust) will become more and more explosive down to a certain size limit at which it
will plateau. The reason that surface area affects the violence of explosion is that
particle size/surface area influences the speed at which volatiles are extracted
from the particle (or how fast the particle vaporises) before they burn. As long as
this is the limiting factor in the combustion, reducing the particle size will increase
the severity of explosions. As soon as the speed of gas phase mixing or actual
combustion of volatiles is the limiting factor particle size becomes irrelevant
(although usually this is at sizes much less than 50 m). This limit can also be
different for high dust concentrations where the explosions are more violent.
5.3.2 Dust concentration effects

A standard method for measuring the MEC of a dust cloud is ASTM E1515 (ASTM,
1999b). The solid phase fuel must first devolatilize before it can mix with the air
(Hertzberg et al., 1988b). As soon as sufficient volatiles are generated to form a
stoichiometric concentration of volatiles in air, the flame front propagates rapidly
through the mixture before excess fuel volatiles can be generated. Dusts explode
even at concentrations beyond 4000 g/m3. Mintz (1993) observed some upper
limits under conditions of reduced oxygen and at large coal particle sizes. In
principle, there are rich limits for dusts. Eventually, the large mass of excess fuel
will become too much of a heat sink and the flame temperature will be reduced
below its limit value. However, for most practical purposes, dusts can be
considered to have no rich limit of explosibility. This observation has also been
made by Wolanski (1992). Dust cloud explosions can only occur if the dust
50
concentration is within certain limits. This is analogous with the concept of upper
and lower flammable limits of mixtures of gas (or vapours) and air. In general the
lowest concentration of dust that can give a dust explosion is around 50-100g/m3
and the maximum is 2-3kg/m3. These limits are dependent on the particular
chemical in question and on the particle size distribution. The worst cases are
usually when the dust concentration is slightly above the stoichiometric
concentration. Upper concentration limits are dictated by the minimum amount of
oxygen needed for explosion, lower limits by the minimum quantity of particles
needed to sustain combustion.
5.3.3 Effects of oxygen concentration

One of the ways to prevent a dust explosion is to inert the atmosphere so that there
is insufficient oxygen for a flame to propagate. This removes one side of the fire
triangle or explosion pentagon, thereby preventing combustion. One of the most
common inerting gases is nitrogen, which is the main constituent of air.
In air, the dust ignites and burns at all coal concentrations above the MEC of ~80
g/m3. As a safe margin, NFPA 69 (NFPA, 1997) recommends keeping the system
oxygen concentration at least lower than the measured LOC. Gases other than
nitrogen can also be used to reduce the oxygen concentration. Carbon dioxide is
usually more efficient than nitrogen for inerting carbonaceous dusts, but it is often
less effective than nitrogen in inerting metal dusts (Nagy, Dorsett & Jacobson,
1964). The oxidant for a dust explosion is usually the oxygen in air, although other
gases can also be oxidizers. Oxygen concentrations greater than 21% tend to
increase the burning velocity, and concentrations less than 21% reduce the
burning velocity. If the dust concentration was varied at each oxygen
concentration to obtain the highest Pmax value, the explosion pressure would be
expected to increase linearly with oxygen concentration, based on the ideal gas
law.
------------------- (5.7)
51
However, this linear relationship would change as the LOC is approached. Near
the LOC, the pressure would decrease very rapidly with decreasing oxygen
concentration, until the mixture would no longer be explosible. Because of the large
effect of varying oxygen concentration on the explosion characteristics of dusts, it
is important to test the dust at the appropriate O2 concentration. When determining
the explosion characteristics for a dust in air, it is important to measure the O 2
content of the “air” cylinders used for the tests. Gas cylinders that are filled with air
that has been compressed and dried have the normal 20.95% O2. However, many
“air” cylinders are filled with synthetic or reconstituted “air” that has been mixed
from liquefied oxygen and nitrogen. The O2 content of these cylinders has been
observed to vary considerably—from 19% to 26% O2. Less oxygen in the air
causes the explosion to be much less severe as it limits the rate of combustion of
the dust, thus limiting the oxygen in process vessels can minimize the possibility
of a dust explosion (fire can only be sustained if oxygen concentration is greater
than 10% in air).
5.3.4 Effect of temperature

ASTM standard test E1491 for the measurement of the MAIT’s of dusts (ASTM,
1999c).
-------------------- (5.8)
where CT is the limit in terms of mass concentration at temperature T, CT0

is the limit at T0, and the temperatures are in 0C. The dust concentrations to the
right of the solid curve are flammable (explosible) and the region to the left of the
curve is nonflammable. For comparison, the measured lean flammable limit data
for methane gas as a function of temperature (dashed curve, from Coward &
Jones, 1952, p. 43) are also shown. The decrease in the LFL or MEC with increase
in temperature is similar in form for the dust and gas.
At higher dust concentrations, the maximum explosion pressure for the
bituminous coal was also measured at elevated temperature in the 20-L chamber
(Cash dollar, 1996). At near ambient temperature, Pmax for the dust was 6.6 bar, a.
52
At an elevated temperature of ~180 0C, Pmax was 4.8 bar, a. This observation of
lower explosion pressures at elevated temperature was also reported previously
by Wiemann (1987). The inverse relationship of explosion pressure with initial
temperature is expected from the ideal gas law, because there are fewer oxygen
molecules at elevated temperature to react with the coal. The ratio of measured
maximum explosion pressure (absolute) at elevated temperature to that at ambient
temperature is approximately the same as the ratio of ambient to elevated
temperature in degrees Kelvin. The limiting oxygen concentration for coal dust also
measured at elevated temperature in the 20-L chamber. The measured LOC value
(Cashdollar, 1996) for the dust decreased from ~11% at ambient temperature to
~10% at ~1800C. This effect of lower LOCvalues at elevated temperature was also
observed previously by Wiemann (1987).
5.3.5 Role of Turbulence
A more turbulent cloud will result in a more severe explosion as, due to the more
homogenous concentrations and lower degree of dispersion, the flame front will
move more quickly through the dust cloud. However a less turbulent cloud is more
easily ignited, as heat dissipation is at a lower rate so the initial heat release is
more locally concentrated, leading to a higher probability of ignition from an input
of energy. Dispersion and degree of agglomeration affect the combustion as they
change the effective local dust concentrations and the effective particle size
respectively. A more evenly dispersed dust will burn more easily. The degree of
dispersion is usually dependant upon the way method of dust dispersion and the
turbulence in the system.In practical terms, turbulence may in the present context
be described as a state of rapid, more or less random, movement of small elements
of the dust cloud relative to each other in three dimensions. If the cloud is burning,
turbulence will give rise to mixing of the hot burnt/burning parts of the cloud with
the cold unburnt parts, and the cloud will become a three- dimensional laminate of
alternating hot burnt/burning and cold unburnt zones. Therefore a turbulent cloud
will burn much faster than a quiescent cloud through which a smooth,
comparatively thin flame sheet is propagating. In relation to dust explosions in
53
industry two kinds of turbulence, differing by their origin, have to be considered.

The first is turbulence generated by the industrial process in which the dust cloud
is formed, whether an air jet mill, a mixer, a cyclone, a bag filter, a pneumatic
transport pipe, or a bucket elevator. This kind of turbulence is often called initial
turbulence. The second kind is generated by the explosion itself by expansion-
induced flow of unburnt dust cloud ahead of the propagating flame. The level of
turbulence generated in this way depends on the speed of the flow and the
geometry of the system. Vent openings and obstacles, like the buckets in a bucket
elevator leg; enhance the turbulence generation under such conditions. In long
ducts or galleries a positive feedback loop can be established by which the flame
can accelerate to very high speeds and even transit to a detonation.
5.3.6 Combustible Gas Mixed with Dust Cloud
Addition of a fuel gas (or vapour) can lower the ignition energy for a pure dust cloud
massively, and raise the maximum explosion pressure.Another important factor in
the explosibility hazard a dust is the possible co-presence of a flammable gas.
Hybrid mixtures of a combustible dust (coal) and a flammable gas (CH4) were also
studied in the 20-L chamber using 2500-J ignitors (Cashdollar, 1996). For most
practical situations for mixtures hydrocarbon dusts and gases, the linear mixing
law Le Chatelier would be sufficient. This approximately linear relationship for the
lean limits of coal dust and CH4 gas mixtures was also observed by Amyotte and
colleagues (Amyotte, Mintz, Pegg, Sun & Wilkie, 1991; Amyotte, Mintz, Pegg &
Sun, 1993) using 5000-J ignitors in a 26-L chamber. This linear mixing relationship
also applicable to mixtures of two carbonaceous dusts Hertzberg & Cashdollar,
1987). However, it is not applicable to mixtures where the two components have
greatly different limit flame temperatures, such as a carbonaceous dust and
hydrogen gas (Hertzberg & Cashdollar, 1987).
5.3.7 Effect of pressure and rates of pressure rise
54
Bartknecht (1989) and Wiemann (1987) report data the effect of initial pressure on
the Pmaxand KSt values. Both show that Pmax increases linearly with increase in
initial pressure, over the range of 1–4 bar. They also show that KSt increases with
initial pressure. Increasing the pressure in a dust cloud makes the explosion more
violent, because essentially all of the combustibles are closer together. It also
lowers the required ignition energy.
The pressure evolution of an explosion in a constant volume system is predicted

by classical combustion theory (Lewis & von Elbe, 1961, pp. 367–381). For the
ideal case, the absolute pressure as a function of time, P (t), in a constant volume,
spherical explosion is related to the fractional volume, V (t), occupied by the fireball
during the time of propagation, t, as follows (Hertzberg & Cashdollar, 1987):
-------------- (5.9)
where P0 is the initial absolute pressure, V0 is the chamber volume, and k is a

correction factor related to the difference in compressibility between burned and
unburned gases. For spherical propagation from a point source,
------------ (5.10)
where r(t) is the fireball radius, r0 is the chamber radius, and Sb is the flame speed
given by:
------------------ (5.11)
where ρu/ρb is the density ratio of unburned to burned gases (at constant pressure).
The burning velocity, Su, is the rate of flame propagation relative to the unburned
gas ahead of it. The flame speed, Sb, is relative to a fixed reference point. Note
that both Sb and Su are for turbulent not laminar conditions for dust explosions. For
55
spherical propagation in a spherical chamber, the maximum pressure is reached

just as the flame contacts the wall. At that instant, k=1. Differentiating Eq. (5.9) with
respect to time and substituting Eqs. (5.10) and (5.11) into the results gives:
------------------ (5.12)
Eq. (5.12) shows that the maximum rate of pressure rise should also occur at the
instant the flame front contacts the wall. Setting and letting
-------------- (5.13)
Eq. (5) is the “cubic law”, and KSt is the size normalized maximum rate of pressure
rise. The subscript “St” refers to Staub, the German word for dust. Because it is
size normalized, the KSt value is used in the practical design of venting systems
(NFPA, 1998). This derivation of the “cubic law” is based on the idealized condition
where the vessel size is large compared with either the dust flame thickness or the
ignitor flame.
56
DUST EXPLOSION:
Start
Inputs Database
Is Dust No
Explosive and in
explosive limits
Yes No Dust
Explosion
No
Is Dust
Pentagon
closed? Yes
Vent Dust
Area Design
Design
Vented UnVented
Explosion Explosion AVC, LS
No Over
Decision for
Damage to No
Pressu
enclosure
re in
the
Yes
enclos
External ure
Stop
Over
over
Pressu
pressure
Fire from Vent re
generated
57
Conseque
Repor
nce t
Chapter 6
Prevention / Control of dust explosions
6.1 The strategies for preventing dust explosions belong to four broad
categories:
1. Process modification to reduce or eliminate & handling of hazardous dust.

2. Preventing flammable dust suspensions.
3. Elimination of sources of ignition.
4. Inerting.
6.1.1Process modification
These strategies may be used in combination to reduce the risk as far as possible.
A fundamental solution to the dust explosion problem is to use a dust free process.
In particular, it may be possible to process the materials wet rather than dry, so
that suspensions do not occur at all. This approach is in effect an application of the
principle of inherently safer design. Where it is applicable, it is one of the most
58
satisfactory methods. But, sadly, it also happens to be an option confirming to the

axiom ‘easier said than done’ because considerations of process economics, not
to speak of viability, may drastically reduce the options available to existing
industries.
Amyotte et. al (2003) have identified the following four elements associated with
inherently safe design which may reduce the risk:
1. Minimize (intensification): use smaller quantities of hazardous materials
when the use of such materials cannot be avoided.
2. Substitute (substitution): replace a hazardous substance with one that is
less hazardous or a hazardous process route with one that does not involve
hazardous material.
3. Moderate (attenuation/limitation of effects): use hazardous material in their
least hazardous forms or identify options that involve less severe operating
conditions.
4. Simply (simplifications/error tolerance): design processes and equipment to
eliminate opportunities for errors by identifying ways to eliminate excessive
use of add on safety features and protective devices.
Amyotte et. al (2003) present the following recommendations:
 Use nitrogen as a conveying gas instead of air
 Use nitrogen sealing in silos
 Fill silos using a cyclone to reduce dust cloud dispersion.
 Carefully control particle in size
 Reduce electrostatic problems with silos and bag filters by checking
the relative potential of metal construction parts.
 Control moisture in pipes and silos
 Use lower mass flow rates
 Use online monitoring of the electric field of compacted powders in
silos
 Use conduction of the electric, if required.
 Design silos and explosion isolation valves between silos for
explosion venting, so that sequential dust explosions will be avoided.
59
6.1.2 Preventing flammable dust suspensions

If flammable dust has to be handled dry, it is generally not possible to prevent that
occurrence of dust concentrations above the lower explosive concentration in
some parts of the plant. The problem is particularly acute when fine powders are
involved. Nevertheless, much can be done to minimize the volume of any dust
clouds formed and to reduce the probability of formation. Where dust suspensions
occur, large volumes should be avoided as far as practicable. Often it may be
appropriate to have several smaller volumes rather than one large one. Over
design of a unit, such as a hopper, should be avoided so that it does not operate
empty all the time. Situations should be avoided which encourage dust cloud
formation such as the free fall of dust from a height into a hopper. Dust should be
removed from suspension at as early a stage as process considerations permit.
Thus, if dust has to be removed from a gas stream, it is better to do this as soon
as practicable as the gas leaves the plant rather than to transfer it down long ducts
to a central cleaning point.
Buildings, which contain plant handling flammable dusts, should be designed to

minimize the accumulation of dust deposits and to facilitate cleaning.
Avoidance of dust suspensions depends as much on operation as on design.
Dusts should not to be allowed to accumulate at the gas cleaning plant, but should
be removed regularly min accordance with the design. Buildings, which have plant-
handling dust, should be cleaned to prevent accumulation of dust deposits. It must
be emphasized that even if a dust suspension within the explosive range is not
present in normal operation, it may be so during start up, shutdown or fault
conditions. Also the measures stated above would only help in avoiding primary
explosions; secondary explosions could still be caused if the lying dust is
sufficiently agitated leading to entrainment.
6.1.3 Preventing Ignition Sources
60
For most processes where the minimum electrical spark ignition energy of the
working dust is considerably greater than 10mJ, elimination of ignition sources is
a satisfactory protection against dust explosions.
Ignition sources belong to two main categories. The first consists of those, which
are caused by general work in the plant:
 Smoking
 Open flames
 Open light (bulbs)
 Welding
 Cutting
 Grinding
These sources can be eliminated by sufficient staff training and enforcing adequate
working routines. The second category of ignition sources originate in the process
itself:
 Open flames
 Hot surfaces
 Self-heating, Smouldering Nests and Exothermic decomposition
 Heat from mechanical impacts
 Exothermic decomposition of dust via mechanical impacts
 Electric sparks and electrostatic discharges
These ignition conditions are presented in the actual process and hence need to
be solved in a multitude of ways.
Open Flames
Open flames are most easily avoided by rigorously enforcing a no smoking policy
within the process area. Hot work must not be carried out in an area unless it, and
any area that could be directly or indirectly affected, is entirely free from dust. Gas
61
cutting torches that use excess oxygen should be avoided as they can cause
ignition to be easier than it would be in air.
Hot surfaces
Hot surfaces occur on items of process equipment that use heat, such as heaters,
dryers, steam pipes, electrical equipment, etc. They also occur in less obvious
process equipment too, such as engines, blowers, mechanical conveyors, mills,
mixers, bearings and unprotected light bulbs. Further hot surfaces can be created
during hot work, which can provide enough heat for ignition.
Dust lying on hot surfaces can be ignited, as can dust clouds, thus leading to dust
explosions. Lying dust on hot surfaces also acts as a layer of insulation, which can
cause equipment failure.
The following measures can help minimize the chance of ignition from hot
surfaces:
 Removal of all dust before performing hot work

 Prevent/Remove dust on hot surfaces
 Shield or isolate hot surfaces
 Only use electrical equipment approved for use in the presence of
combustible dust
 Use equipment with low chance of overheating
 Regular and thorough inspection and maintenance procedures.
Self heating and smouldering of dusts
Preponderance to self-heating is usually determined by the chemical

characteristics of the dust, but there are several ways to minimize the chance of it
occurring:
 Control dust temperature, moisture content etc. before putting into storage
62
 Make sure no heated bodies are in contact with the stored dust
 Monitor temperature of stored dust carefully
 Monitor dust storage for combustion gases
 Inerting of bulk material with a suitable inert gas (e.g. nitrogen)
Addition of water is not recommended as this can cause mechanical problems with
dust transport (it sticks together). Nitrogen inerting is the best way to avoid
smouldering fires, but does add the hazard of making the atmosphere
unbreathable. If a smouldering mass does occur the first thing to do is to stop any
exothermic reactions, then reduce the temperature of the rest of the dust, it should
also be checked for any toxic combustion products. Process equipment must be
checked thoroughly if a smouldering fire is generated as this can weaken vessels
significantly.
Mechanical impacts
Mechanical impacts can produce either glowing sparks or hot spots where the
impact occurs. Usually these sparks are not sufficiently energetic to provide
ignition, but in the case of repeated impact or when exotic metals are used there
is a risk of igniting a dust cloud. To best avoid these sparks occurring it is
recommended that you:
 Remove foreign objects from process streams as soon a possible

 Avoid any construction materials that could give incendiary sparks or
thermite flashes
 Inspect odd noises to see if they are caused by impacts, and if so remedy
the situation in a safe manner
Electrical/electrostatic sparks
Electrical sparks are best minimized by observing the regulations for electrical
equipment in dusty areas and ensuring that any installed electrical items comply.
63
Making sure that workers are aware of the electrical items and how to use them
safely is also wise.
Electrostatic sparks are less well understood and there are many ways to try to
minimize their formation. It has been recommended that:
 Use conducting materials for plant items to avoid charge buildup

 Earth any equipment that may become charged
 Earth workers is the dust is easily ignitable
 Earth coarse non-conducting powders via an earth rod through their storage
vessel
The golden rule is; if in doubt, earth it.
6.1.3 Inerting
Adding inert gas
Lowering the oxygen content in a process area/vessel can minimize the chance of
a dust explosion, the easiest way to achieve this is to add an inert gas to the
system. Possible choices include:
 Nitrogen
 Carbon Dioxide
 Flue Gases
 Water Vapour
 Rare Gases
Guidance on inerting of dust handling plant is given in the NFPA 69 and the IchemE
Guide. The main gases used for inerting of dust handling plant are nitrogen,
carbon dioxide, flue gas and inert gas from a generator. The IchemE Guide gives
guidance on the factors governing selection of a suitable gas. One factor is any
hazards associated with the use of the gas. One such hazard is reaction with the
dust; carbon dioxide can react violently with aluminium dust, and nitrogen can react
64
at high temperature with magnesium dust. Other relevant factors are the
availability and cost of supply. In using inerting, complete replacement of oxygen
by inert gas may be uneconomic. An alternative approach in such cases is to keep
the oxygen content well below the maximum permissible oxygen concentration to
prevent ignition. This concentration is obtained using the test referred to earlier.
When nitrogen or carbon dioxide is incompatible with some powders it is advisable

to use more expensive, rare gases. To actually introduce a new atmosphere to a
process it is recommended that the system be slightly evacuated and then flushed
with the inert gas until the pressure returns to atmospheric. This should be
repeated until the desired atmosphere is generated. If a high-pressure system is
being used the inert gas can be simply pumped into the process vessels until the
desired pressure is reached. Once the atmosphere is generated it is important to
ensure that no air leaks into the process and that if gas is introduced with powdered
feeds it is inerted too. Often partial inerting is used where total inerting would be
too costly; this does not entirely remove the chance of explosion, but limits it
massively.
The IchemE Guide also cites certain rules of thumb relating the maximum
permissible oxygen concentration for carbon dioxide Co and that for nitrogen No
No = Co – 2
= 1.3Co – 6.3
These rules are attributed to Germany and NFPA 69: 1978, respectively. The
maximum permissible oxygen concentrations to prevent ignition, which are
reported in the literature, are normally measured at ambient temperature. If it is
proposed to use inerting for dust at high temperatures (say > 100oC), the maximum
permissible oxygen concentration to prevent ignition should be determined by
tests. Likewise tests are called for if there is a hybrid vapour – dust mixture. With
regard to the safety margin to be employed, the IChemE Guide suggests a
minimum margin of 2%. Thus if the maximum permissible oxygen concentration to
prevent ignition is 11 %, the oxygen concentration should be kept below 9%. It also
recommends larger plant volumes, extended hot surfaces or high explosibility
65
dusts (St 3). There should be continuous monitoring of the oxygen content of the
gas in the plant and a trip system to shut the plant down if the concentration rises
towards a hazardous level. Since the gas contains dust, there may be problems in
the measurement of the oxygen level. The inerting solution is particularly (Kst > 600
bar/s). Inerting is not necessary effective in eliminating dust fires.
Adding inert dust
This method of avoiding forming explosive dust clouds is used successfully in

coalmines. A layer of limes stone in the working area is entrained by the blast wave
and, as it forms an incombustible atmosphere, it extinguishes the flame. This
means of inertion is not usually available due to the contamination of product that
it causes. The use of inert diluent dusts is discussed in IChemE Guide. The
proportions of inert dust quoted as necessary to provide effective inerting are high,
generally more than 60 %.
6.2 Preventive steps for specific dusts/ operations

6.2.1 Explosion protection when handling metal dusts (Going 2002)
 Grinding is one process responsible for generating enough metal dust
capable of being suspended in the air. The use of wet grinding, or the
collection of the grinding dust by a wet medium, can mitigate the hazard.
In the manufacturing of powders, such as aluminium or Mg, inerting is
an effective practice to reduce the O2 concentration.
 Nitrogen can be used for aluminium, although helium or argon is
required for magnesium. Other prevention practices, such as house
keeping. Grounding/bonding, hot work permits etc. should be routinely
practiced. Protection techniques are applied in addition to preventive
measures.
6.2.2 Explosion protection when handling combustible dusts (Jaeger 1999)
66
When combustible dusts are handled, avoiding an explosive atmosphere by

keeping the range is very rarely possible, due to sedimentation or whirling up of
the material. Thus a matter of principle, an explosive atmosphere can only be
avoided with certainty by reducing the oxygen concentration, e.g. Inerting. In
practice however inerting often cannot be used. For such situations, the only
measures become either avoiding effective ignition sources or using explosion
proof equipment.
6.2.3 Precautions during filling and emptying operations:

In these operations, ignition hazards are of prime importance owing to electrostatic
charging. The hazards comprise possible change accumulation not only on
equipment, as well as on drum & containers, but also for bulk material that one is
insulating
When adding bulk material into a previously loaded flammable solvent at a

temperature less than 5 0C below flash point, the following precautions are must:
 Operator must be grounded
 All acids to introduction such as funnels, conducting materials and be

grounded during transfer
 Containers for solvent and powders must be of conductive materials and be

grounded during transfer containers for solvent and powders must be of
conductive material and grounded during the charging process.
 Conductive vessels for solvents and bulk materials may be used with an
insulating internal coating up to 2μm maximum, if they are grounded during
filling and emptying
 Normal loose plastic sacks or plastic liners should not be used.
67
6.2.4 Precautions during mixing operations

 During filling and emptying of the mixer, mixing element must be at a
standstill or run at a relative speed (of) that does not exceed 1m/s
 In closed condition and with a fill level of 70% or more, the circumferential
speed of the mixing elements is no longer restricted.
 Circumferential speeds up to 10 m/s can be tolerated during filling and

emptying with a mixer not filled to 70% provided that the MIT of the
processed product lies above the limit values.
6.2.5 Precautions during dust separation:
Electrostatic charging must be inhibited by the following measures:
 Grounding of all conductive apparatus parts.
 With a MIE < 3mJ or in the presence of flammable gases or vapours in the
air being cleaned, electrically conducting filter materials must be used,
except when inerting is employed.
 All inner walls on which dust can impact at high speed must not have any
insulating inner coatings with a high electrical break down strength.
6.3 Dust explosion protection:

Methods of protection against dust explosions include
1. Explosion containment
2. Explosion isolation
3. Explosion suppression
4. Explosion venting
6.3.1 Explosion containment:
68
The first option for dealing with a dust explosion is total containment. In some ways
containment is an attractive option, since it is an essentially passive method and
avoids the problem of relief disposal. It is not usually practicable, however, to
design the whole of a dust handling plant so that it can withstand the pressures
generated by dust explosions. This is particularly the case with large plants.
Normally it is preferable to use some other method of protection. Containment may
be practicable, however, on small-scale units and on particular equipments. Thus
a grinding mill, for example may be made strong enough to withstand a dust
explosion. The maximum explosion pressure for most flammable gases and dusts
is given by Bartknecht (1981 a) as about 7-bar g. The IchemE Guide quotes for
dusts the range 7 – 10 bar g. The static pressure is not, however, the sole
criterion. The rate of pressure rise in a dust explosion is high, and the vessel must
be able to withstand this dynamic loading. There are a number of engineering
issues involved in the use of pressure vessels for containment of dust explosions.
They include pressure piling and modes of failure, including brittle fracture. Such
design is therefore a specialist matter. One basic principle is to use rotational
symmetry and to avoid large flat surfaces and angular parts. In designing to contain
a dust explosion, particular attention should be paid to the points at which dust is
fed or withdrawn from the plant and to connections between units. An alternative
to full containment is partial containment. This involves the use of a stronger vessel
combined with explosion relief.
6.3.2 Explosion isolation:
Another option for dealing with a dust explosion is isolation. The three basic
methods of isolation are;
1. Automatic isolation.
2. Automatic explosion suppression
3. Material chokes.
Taking these in turn, automatic isolation is applied to a pipe and involves the use
of a quick acting shut – off valve. Detection of the explosion is by means of
69
pressure and/or optical sensors may not detect a weak pressure wave. A common
threshold pressure setting is 0.1 bar. The second type of isolation is automatic
explosion suppression applied to a pipe. Again the general arrangement is similar
to that used for flammable gases. The explosion is detected by instrumentation
similar to that just described for automatic isolation. The suppressant barrier is
located some 5 –10 m from the detectors.
Quick acting valves operate most effectively on pipes up to about 0.5 m in
diameter. Suppressant barriers have been found effective in pipes up to 2.5 m in
diameter.With both techniques the pipe should be designed to withstand the local
pressure, given in the guide as up to 10 barg. The third type of isolation is the use
of a material choke. This is applicable where it is necessary to have a flow of dust
between units.
A rotary valve, which is installed vertically and is driven by a motor, is generally

designed to act as a dust explosion choke even in the absence of a head of dust
above it.
There have not been many tests of the effectiveness of rotary valves as dust
explosions chokes. It has been found, however, in one test, with an explosion
above the valve, that the valve transmitted the explosion unless arrangements
were made to trip the motor within 0.5 s of the detection of the explosion. If a rotary
valve is installed on the inlet of a hopper, there should be arrangements to prevent
it from continuing to turn if the hopper becomes overfilled, since this could cause
ignition by overheating the dust or overloading the motor. A worm conveyor, which
may be installed horizontally, vertically or inclined and is driven by a motor, is an
alternative type of dust explosion choke. One turn of the helix is removed to prevent
the choke emptying if the feed is interrupted. If the conveyor is mounted
horizontally, a baffle plate is also necessary. The choke should prevent the
passage of the dust explosion and of any burning material. There should be
arrangements to trip the motor. Depending on the application it may be appropriate
to provide inerting or suppression.
70
6.3.3 Explosion suppression

The mechanism of suppression of the dust explosion is
1. Quenching
2. Free radical scavenging
3. Wetting
4. Inerting
Of these the principal mechanism is quenching or abstraction of heat. The principal

suppressants used are halons, dry powders, and waters. The halons are used
principally Halon 1011 (chloroboromethane), which is effective but toxic, and the
less toxic halons 1211 and 1301. The dry powder most widely used is ammonium
phosphate based.
Explosion suppression requires the use of a control system, which has several
functions. Theses are
1. to detect the explosion and inject suppressant
2. to shut down the plant
3. to prevent restart of the plant unless it is safe to do so.
Detection of the explosion usually by means of the sensor. Detectors are available
which are robust to most materials, to condensation and corrosion, and to shock.
In some cases use is made of two detectors oriented in different planes. Activation
occurs when the pressure reaches its threshold value, typically of the order of 0.05
bar. In some systems use is also made of the rate of pressure rise.
The effectiveness of suppression depends in large measure on the injection

system. The requirement on that it is capable of injecting a large quantity of
suppressant in a very short time and with adequate reach to all parts of the space
protected. An injection system should be capable of a high mass discharge rate, a
high discharge velocity and hence good throw and good angular coverage.
An effective suppression system requires rapid detection, rapid injection and
adequate quantity of suppressants (Lees 1996).
71
Isolating an explosion can restrict the amount of damage caused in several ways.
Primarily it stops the explosion from reaching other areas of the plant through the
process ducts or pipes, but also it stops the possibility of flame jets that can occur
at the end of long pipes and stops the pressure from the primary explosion making
secondary explosions in further vessels even more violent.
Isolation can be achieved in two different ways, either passive (activated by the
explosion itself) or active (requiring tripping by a sensor for activation). Passive
systems are favoured as they are simpler and more reliable, as long as they
function as intended. Usually these systems will, upon triggering, spray the dust
ahead of the flame front with extinguishing agent stopping further propagation,
alternatively they may simply close a valve ahead of the flame front (although this
can cause pressure problems).
There are a number of plant items that will avoid the propagation of flame
throughout the system. These include choked screw conveyers, rotary airlocks,
and special bursting disk systems that involve flow reversal.
Fig 8 A screw conveyor with choke can stop the flame front passing
72
Fig 9A rotating airlock will stop the flame front passing
Fig 10 A Bursting disk installed on a pipeline to stop flame propagation by

reversing flow direction
6.3.4 Pressure Resistant Equipment
The best way to contain the primary dust explosion is to have process equipment
that is strong enough to withstand the explosion. Dust explosion pressures are
usually within the range of 5-12bar(g).
Resistance to pressure-shock are different to normal operation pressures, a

pressure-shock will be short lasted as opposed to high operating pressures which
may need to be upheld for months at a time. Designing the plant item as though it
were a pressure vessel will cause it to be very expensive and beyond what will
probably be called for. Most vessels at risk of dust explosion are designed so that
73
under the maximum pressure in an explosion they will distort, but not rupture.
Occasionally if the risk of a dust explosion is very high, the vessel may be built to
withstand the pressure of the entire explosion as though it were continuous.
6.3.5 Explosion Venting
Venting is the one of the cheapest, most effective ways to relieve pressure in an
explosion situation; however it is difficult to size the vent correctly to allow sufficient
pressure relief, as it must allow sufficient outflow of burnt dust and air out to relieve
the pressure being generated by the heat of the explosion. Usually venting will be
designed such that the pressure can be kept below some upper value (that is lower
than the strength of the vessel or building). If the powder in the process is toxic
venting to atmosphere is not possible, however venting to a sealed area may be
possible. Many different designs of venting are available for all kinds of processes,
including hinged doors that can withstand many explosions, simple panels that are
ejected, vent covers are usually attached to the process vessel with clips or rubber
seals which are known to fail under the load of the explosion. These aspects are
dealt in detail later in this chapter.
Fig 11 A vented dust explosion, Pred is the vessel strength
6.3.5.1 Vent area sizing: a primer
74
Vent size is dependant on:
 Enclosure Volume
 Enclosure Strength
 Strength of Vent Cover
 Burning Rate of Dust Cloud
Fig 12 The pressures in unvented, insufficiently vented, and correctly vented

vessels.
There are some rules of thumb for sizing vents; one can use a vent ratio from this
table:
Table 6 Values of vent ratio
Max Rate of Pressure Rise (bar/s) Vent Ratio (m-1)
< 345 1 / 6.1
345 - 690 1 / 4.6
> 690 1 / 3.1
75
The vent ratio is the ratio of vent area to vessel volume. One can also use the
graph below to get an approximate size for the vents:
Fig 13 Vessel volume vs. vessel area
For large vessels, greater than 30m3, the ratio for vent sizing can be reduced, the
reason being that it is unlikely that a vessel that large would be full of an explosive
mixture; hence the pressure will not rise linearly with volume.
6.3.5.2 Hazards Caused by Venting
76
Venting minimizes the probability of large and destructive explosions, but isn’t
entirely free from risk. A ‘vented explosion’ would cause:
 ejection of flames from vent opening

 emission of blast waves from the vent opening
 reaction forces on the equipment, induced by the venting process
 emission of solid objects (parts of the vessel, vent covers, etc)
 indoor venting can lead to secondary explosions
 ejection of fireballs
The larger the vent and the lower the force required breaching it, the more
hazardous it is, as this increase the chance of unburnt dust being ejected, which
could then burn in the plant area as a fireball. Using vent ducts (ducts of the same
area as the vent) can minimize some of these problems by allowing the explosion
to take place in a sealed area, but take up a great deal of space and still require
the pressure to be relieved somewhere else (at the end of the duct).
6.3.6 Automatic dust explosion suppression
Fast fire suppression systems can be used to stop dust explosion, they work with
three major considerations in mind:
 Extinguishing agent is permanently pressurized

 Large diameter discharge orifice
 High-speed valve opening (usually via a detonated charge)
These considerations are used and a system is made that obeys these rules and
can be triggered by a pressure (with a high set point to avoid accidental
triggering) or flame sensor (often both are used to stop false alarms).
6. 3.7 Good Housekeeping
Good housekeeping in this context refers to the removal of dust accumulations

within the plant. Careful removal of lying dust can eliminate the possibility of
77
secondary dust explosions occurring, and also help to prevent some ignition
sources.
This should be done by installing good dust extraction systems wherever there is
a particularly dusty area of the plant. Spilt dust should be removed immediately
using either a high power explosion proof vacuum cleaner or an internal vacuuming
system, which removes dust and sends it to a central filtration system. Minor but
steady leaks must be looked out for, as these can cause large amounts of dust to
accumulate over a period of time, this is more likely to be a problem if the process
runs at a slightly elevated pressure. The best way to avoid dust accumulation is to
be constantly aware of the surroundings and ever vigilant as even seemingly small
amounts if dust can rise to make large clouds. Compressed air blowers should not
be used for the removal of dust as all they do is relocate the dust.
78
Fig 14 Explosion
suppression system
You can see how the explosion suppression system works. The agent used for
suppression is typically a powder based one such as NH4H2PO4, although for
some powders superheated steam is quite good too.
6. 3.8 Dust Control by Addition of Liquid
Addition of liquid to a dust can reduce the risk of dust explosions in several ways;
it increases the likelihood of agglomerate production and can also lessen the
amount of fine dust created in particle collisions. Oil is often added to grain to help
to minimize the amount of fine dust. There are less applications of this in the
chemical industry as most materials need to be uncontaminated so the addition of
79
water or oil to a product would be counterproductive (usually if water or oil addition

is not a problem it is better to work with pastes than dusts at all).
6.3.9 Plant layout
Buildings used in dust processing plants that could be in danger of dust explosions
must be designed along the same lines as any plant which has the danger of
explosion. Generally they should be away from other buildings, and the actual
parts of the plant should be as far apart from each other as is possible on the site
(without creating transport problems). Buildings should be as low as possible,
preferably of one storey, or if this is not possible, the most explosion prone part of
the process should be as high as possible (preferably on the roof) to minimize the
chance of building collapse in an explosion. If the hazardous part of the plant is
located indoors then the area must be reinforced and there must be protection for
the rest of the areas of the plant (a blast wall is needed) and sufficient venting to
avoid structural damage from overpressure. Other features that must be included
are safe escape routes in case of an explosion and fire, fire resistant materials of
construction, fire-resistant doors and high quality electrical insulation.
6.3.10 Human Factors
There will be many different people working in any plant, ranging from engineers
and technicians to management and sales, above all it is important that
communication between everyone in the plant is meaningful and conveys
information properly. Workers must have knowledge, motivation and the
confidence to make decisions when needed. There must be training and instruction
for all workers that enables them to develop and be able to deal with the actuality
of a dust explosion.
6.3.11 Choice of a safety solution
80
Having seen in the previous section the many ways of avoiding and minimising the
dust explosion hazard, engineers need to identify what is needed for their plant.
There are several ways of doing this which usually come down to a cost versus
safety analysis, to see whether a solution is practicable.
It has been suggested that the problem should be broken down into fundamental
parts thus:
 The effectiveness of the protection system

 The technical feasibility
 The environmental acceptability
 The financial acceptability
The effectiveness of a system will always basically come down to how well the
system is understood and how well the safety systems have been designed, and
should allow them to be technically feasible. Environmental considerations must
also be at the forefront of the designers mind as it's not worth risking an
environmental disaster for the saving of a few thousand pounds. Really the design
and choice of system is dependant on what has been specified as the most
important condition of the plant design, this should always be the effectiveness of
the system but is too often the financial acceptability.
Hazard analysis always takes a large part in the choosing of the correct safety
system for a plant:
Hazard surveys
These should be run to see how much dangerous material is on site before
startup and to see what inventories of them will be used in the process
HAZOP
A HAZOP analysis should be performed to identify any areas where dangerous
situations can occur long before the plant is even built.
81
The diagram below shows a way of working from the process dust to consider all
the possibilities.
Fault tree analysis

This will allow designers to consider what combinations of conditions could lead
to an explosion or other hazardous situations.
Safety audits
Safety audits should be run to help keep abreast of any problems and identify
anywhere where complacency is occurring. These help maintain a high standard
of safety within the process.
There have been other suggested ways of systematically approaching the

selection of safety equipment for processes that are at risk of dust explosions, but
these are mostly used like the HAZOP analysis, as a starting point for structured
and deep thought about the process.
82
Fig 15 From Dust Explosions in the Process Industries - R. K. Eckoff.
83

Impact Assessment Modeling and Control o PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Impact Assessment Modeling and Control o PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.

When the subject of accidents in chemical process industries is discussed in India,

majority of industrial plants that have powder-processing equipment are

The present work

a. Past accident analysis

The ongoing development of a software package is also described is based on the

Accidents in chemical process

The increasing diversity of products manufactured by chemical process industries

been numerous other accidents (Flixborough-1974, Basel-1986, Antwerp-1987,

a) Development of techniques and tools to forecast accidents.

b) Development of techniques and tools to analyse consequences of likely

 it helps in sitting of industries and management of sites so as to

 it provides feedback for other exercises in accident forecasting and

c) Development of managerial strategies for ‘emergency preparedness’ and

III. Toxic release.

evolves vapor, and if the concentration of vapor is high enough it forms a

Accidental fires are of the following types:

(a) Fires of solid materials,

(b) Dust fires;

Type3 fires resulting in explosion

2. Condensed phase explosions.

4. BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions).

2.1.3 Toxic Release

Dust Explosion – a Past Accident Analysis

3.1 Illustrative case histories of a few major dust explosions

A dust explosion, which was caused by welding of a spout, excessively worn by

Dry BPO (Brnzoylperoxide) exploded at a BPO manufacturing plant. Dai-ichi Kasei

An explosion occurred at the Daido Kako Enka Firework manufacturing factory,

A Mg – Al alloy exploded in a bag filter dust-collecting device at a manufacturing

3.2 Frequency of Dust Explosions

Dust explosions are a major hazard in many industrial processes. In operations

detailed analysis of dust explosions, excluding those in coalmines, in the period

Some detailed studies were conducted in developed countries .A report of dust

Table 3 Illustrative examples of dust explosions (1911 - 2004) Dust Explosion

Date Location Material Plant / building Death/injuries

1980 Ohama, NE, USA Grain dust Head house Loss

Considering some statistics of dust explosion, among a total of 248 cases

Table 4 Dust Explosions in Japan (Nifuku 2000)

Proust (1996) has summarized some of the statistics as under:

GROUP OF IGNITION SOURCES

Fig 3 shows the involvement of various categories of plant items in

Fig 3. Frequencies of dust explosions caused by various group of

Table 3 Proportions of ignition sources in several explosions.

137 9 62 71 1958 -1975

83 28 5 30-35 1965 –1980

3.4 Units and material involved in dust explosion

products (food and feed), 13 of coal, 29 of inorganic materials, 60 of metals and

Table 5. Principle items of equipment involved in dust explosions

4.1 DUST EXPLOSION: DEFINITION

Operation in which dusts are generated or handled comprise of the

4.2 CLASSIFICATION OF DUSTS

4.2.1 Classification based on ignitability

1. CC1: No ignition; no self – sustained combustion

4.2.2 Classification based on Kst value

4.3 Safety codes

4.4 Dust Explosion Pentagon

 State of mixed reactants

A dust explosion is a complex phenomenon involving simultaneous momentum,

Dust Explosion Pentagon

4.5 TRIGGERS OF DUST EXPLOSION

A brief description of each is presented below:

4.5.2 Hot work