121. CABARLES VS.
MACEDA hearing and without giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 303
Cabarles vs. Maceda
G.R. No. 161330. February 20, 2007.*
RENE CABARLES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure;  Motion to Reopen Case;  Requisites;  A motion to reopen a
case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was nonetheless a
recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long,
established usage, which deficiency was remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which took effect on 1 December 2000.—A motion to reopen a case to
receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was nonetheless a recognized
procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long, established usage.
This lack of a specific provision covering motions to reopen was remedied by the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. The
April 1, 2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for
reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of
conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
(3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to
prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of
_______________
*
 SECOND DIVISION.
304
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cabarles vs. Maceda
additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from
the issuance of the order.
Same;  Same; Due Process; The court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of
justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be
disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears, and the only
controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of
justice; While a judge is allowed to reopen a case before judgment is rendered, a
hearing must first be had, and where the judge does so without notice and hearing
and without giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity to manifest their
position on the matter, the same constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes
against the due process clause of the Constitution.—Generally, after the parties have
produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence
only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may allow
new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. A motion to reopen may thus
properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed
their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but
before finality of judgment and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to
reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of reopening a case was
meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice. However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to
reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing must
first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and
their position on the matter. This failure, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution which requires
notice and opportunity to be heard. The issuance of the said order, without the benefit
of a hearing, is contrary to the express language of Section 24, Rule 119.
Same;  Same; Same;  Waiver; Participation by the defense counsel in cross-
examining the witness for the prosecution and in the proceedings after the case was
reopened by the judge without prior hearing does not amount to a waiver of the
accused’s objection to the order reopening the case—to be effective, a waiver must
be certain and unequivocal.—Although the defense counsel had cross-examined
305
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 305
Cabarles vs. Maceda
Pedrosa and had participated in the proceedings after the case was reopened
by Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’s objection to
the April 1, 2003 Order. To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal.
Here, Cabarles filed the present petition seeking for a writ of certiorari against Judge
Maceda before Pedrosa was cross-examined. Also, when asked to comment on the
prosecution’s formal offer of evidence taken after the case was reopened, Cabarles
objected to its admission on the ground that the same was inadmissible having been
received by the court after Judge Maceda issued the questioned order.
Same;  Same; Same;  Witnesses; Although the matter of reopening a case for
reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion on the part of the trial
court judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done whimsically, capriciously
and/or unreasonably; The presence of prosecution witnesses in court is the
responsibility of the public prosecutor and it is incumbent upon him to take the
initiative of ensuring the attendance of his witnesses at the trial.— Although the
matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is largely a matter of
discretion on the part of the trial court judge, this judicial action must not, however, be
done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably. In this particular case, the
prosecution was given ample opportunity to present all its witnesses but it failed to do
so. The failure of the prosecution to take full advantage of the opportunities given
does not change the fact that it was accorded such opportunities. Contrary to the
justification stated in the April 1, 2003 Order, the prosecution was not deprived of its
day in court. While it may be true that due to some confusion with the trial court’s
calendar, some of the trial dates assigned to the prosecution did not push through
and some of the subpoenas issued to Pedrosa and/or Dr. Salen pertained to hearing
dates which were different from those assigned for reception of prosecution’s
evidence, still the prosecution had a total of four hearing dates when it was given the
chance to prove its case: May 23, June 20 and 27, and August 1, 2001. The presence
of prosecution witnesses in court is the responsibility of the public prosecutor and it is
incumbent upon him to take the initiative of ensuring the attendance of his witnesses
at the trial.
Same;  Same; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Nowhere is the guaranty of right to
speedy disposition of cases more significant and
306
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cabarles vs. Maceda
Page 1 of 7
 meaningful than in criminal cases where not only the fortune, but the life and
liberty of the accused as well, are at stake; The right to a speedy disposition of a
case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.—On Cabarles’s right to a speedy disposition of his case, we agree that
under the Constitution, all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases. Nowhere is this guaranty more significant and meaningful than in criminal
cases where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the accused as well, are at
stake. Although a discussion on the right to speedy disposition of the case is mooted
by our nullification of Judge Maceda’s April 1, 2003 Order as having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, we are constrained to reiterate that the concept of speedy
disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Courts;  Hierarchy of Courts; The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immemorial tradition; A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.—It is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly
improper for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the hierarchy of
courts. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with
the Court of Appeals and with the regional trial courts in proper cases within their
respective regions. However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party
seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the
court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfac-
307
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 307
Cabarles vs. Maceda
torily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial
tradition. The hierarchy of courts determines the appropriate forum for such petitions.
Thus, petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against a regional trial
court should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
the established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon this Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of its docket.
Same;  Same; The Supreme Court has full discretionary power to take
cognizance of a petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by
the nature of the issues raised.—Under the present circumstances however, we are
willing to take cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of
courts. Cabarles invokes the jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of speedy justice
since the information against him was filed way back in June 1999, and almost eight
years thereafter, no judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay in the
resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court has full
discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling
reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised. Since Section 24 is a new
provision, and considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order,
it is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this petition.
Same;  Remand of Cases;  Due Process; To order the remand of a criminal
case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to present additional evidence
would violate the constitutional right of the accused to due process, and to speedy
determination of his case.—As a final word, we find the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in the case of People v. Monje, 390 SCRA 160 (2002), instructive: A
proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court for further
proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed to
prove in the first instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous
precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to endless
litigations because whenever an accused is on the brink of acquittal after trial,
308
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cabarles vs. Maceda
and realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be allowed to
augment its evidence which should have been presented much earlier. This is a
criminal prosecution, and to order the remand of this case to the court a quo to enable
the prosecution to present additional evidence would violate the constitutional right of
the accused to due process, and to speedy determination of his case. The lamentable
failure of the prosecution to fill the vital gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the
State and the private offended party, should not be treated by this Court with
indulgence, to the extent of affording the prosecution a fresh opportunity to refurbish
its evidence.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
In an original action filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner Rene Cabarles seeks to annul the Order 1 issued by respondent Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda in Criminal Case No. 99-0878, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Rene “Nonoy” Cabarles y Adizas, for murder, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. The questioned Order dated April 1, 2003
cancelled the scheduled promulgation of judgment and reopened the case for
reception of evidence from two prosecution witnesses who were not presented during
trial.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 18, 1999, Cabarles was charged with murder under the following
information:
“The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses RENE “NONOY” CABARLES Y ADIZAS of
the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
_______________
Page 2 of 7
 1
 Rollo, pp. 14-15. absence of a subpoena issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen and notwithstanding the
309 vehement objection registered by Cabarles, Judge Maceda gave the prosecution a
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 309 last chance but warned:
Cabarles vs. Maceda “… It is however understood whether the subpoena is actually issued and served or
That on or about the 25th day of April, 1999, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and not upon the prosecution witnesses and service of such subpoena or notice will not
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without relieved (sic) the prosecution to make a
justifiable motive with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident _______________
4
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,  Id., at p. 66.
5
and stab with a deadly weapon (fan knife) one Antonio Callosa, which directly  Id., at p. 41.
6
caused his death.  Id., at p. 47.
7
CONTRARY TO LAW.”2  Supra note 5.
8
Cabarles pleaded not guilty. The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on the  Id., at p. 55.
9
following dates, to wit: pre-trial on November 22, 2000; presentation of prosecution’s  Id., at p. 72.
10
evidence on April 18, May 4, 11, 18, and 23, 2001; and presentation of defense  Id., at p. 52.
11
evidence on June 20 and 27, July 4 and 18, and August 1, 2001.3  Id., at p. 59.
12
The prosecution had subpoenas issued to its witnesses: Flocerfina Callosa, the  Supra note 10.
13
mother of the deceased; Imelda Pedrosa, the alleged eyewitness; Carlos Callosa,  Id., at p. 70.
brother of the deceased; and Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Police Senior Inspector of the 311
Southern Police District (SPD) Crime Laboratory to testify on the contents of the VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 311
death certificate of Antonio Callosa. Cabarles vs. Maceda
Through no fault of its own, the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on formal offer of evidence should the prosecution failed (sic) to present any witness in
the first four hearing dates. Instead, trial on the merits began only on May 23, 2001 the next scheduled hearing.”14
when the prosecution called Carlos Callosa to the witness stand. Since defense With no witness for the August 1, 2001 hearing, the prosecution rested its case and
counsel agreed to stipulate that Carlos would testify on matters in his May 13, formally offered its evidence.15
1999 Sinumpaang Salaysay, his testimony was dispensed with. Thereafter, Cabarles, with leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence but it was
The second prosecution witness, Police Inspector Prudencio Parejos, was denied by Judge Maceda.16 Two witnesses were called for the defense, accused
presented in court during the June 20, 2001 hearing. His testimony was likewise Cabarles and Luisito Javier, a fisherman.
dispensed with after defense counsel agreed to stipulate that Police Inspector Parejos A day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment on April 2, 2003, Judge
would testify on what was in the spot report of the stab- Maceda motu proprio issued the questioned order reopening the case. In it, he
_______________ observed that the prosecution may not have been given its day in court resulting in a
2
 Id., at p. 13. miscarriage of justice. He explained that because there was a mix-up in the dates
3
 Records, p. 37. specified in the subpoena and the hearing dates of when the case was actually heard,
310 the prosecution was unable to present its evidence on the first four of the five hearing
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED dates: April 18, May 4, 11 and 18, 2001 assigned to it. Judge Maceda found that
Cabarles vs. Maceda there was no hearing conducted on April 18, 2001. Thereafter, the subpoena issued
bing incident. In the June 20, 2001 hearing, the prosecution said it would offer its to Pedrosa required her to appear on April 11, 2001, which was not a date assigned
evidence and rest its case should the People fail to present a witness at the next for the prosecution but May 11, 2001. Also, Judge Maceda noted that another
scheduled hearing.4 subpoena was issued to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen requiring them to appear on May 11
When the case was called on June 27, 2001, the prosecution failed to present a and June 20, 2001. But, the May 11, 2001 hearing was reset to May 25, 2001
witness. Neither Pedrosa nor Dr. Salen appeared during the said hearing. Records because the judge was indisposed, and insofar as the June 20, 2001 setting was
show that four subpoenas were issued to Pedrosa informing her that she had to concerned, it was not one of the days set by the court for the prosecution. Judge
appear on November 22, 2000,5 April 116 and 18,7 May 11 and June 20,8 and August Maceda further observed that the May 18, 2001 hearing was never scheduled and
1, 2001.9 The first subpoena was personally received by her; the second subpoena by May 25, 2001 was likewise not a hearing date set by the court. According to Judge
her husband, Salvador Pedrosa; and the third and fourth subpoenas had no proofs of Maceda, since the prosecution was not able to present its evidence on the first four
service. Meanwhile, the three subpoenas issued to Dr. Salen requiring his attendance hearing dates and there was
on May 1110 and 23,11 June 20,12 and August 1, 2001,13 were all returned with the _______________
14
notation “addressee moved.” There was no evidence, however, that subpoenas were  Id., at p. 68.
15
issued to these two witnesses requiring their attendance for the June 27, 2001  Id., at p. 74.
16
hearing, which would explain why they were absent. Taking into consideration the  Id., at p. 91.

Page 3 of 7
 312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cabarles vs. Maceda
either no return on the subpoenas subsequently issued or there was no subpoena
issued at all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen, the prosecution should have been given a last
chance to present the alleged eyewitness and the doctor. His order in part read:
“… As a consequence[,] the promulgation set tomorrow, April 2, is canceled. Set the
reception of the testimony of the eye witness and the doctor on May 1, 2003 at 2:00
[p.]m. to enable the prosecution to avail [of] the last chance granted by this Court.
Issue the corresponding subpoena to Imelda Pedrosa and Dr. Romeo T. Salen
directing them to appear on the aforesaid date and time, to be served by the Branch
Sheriff who is required to make a prompt return thereof.
SO ORDERED.”17
Judge Maceda denied Cabarles’s motion for reconsideration in an Order dated April
25, 2003 and set the case for hearing on May 8, 2003 to hear the testimonies of
Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. The subpoena issued to Pedrosa for that hearing was duly
served,18 but service upon Dr. Salen failed since the doctor was no longer assigned to
the SPD Crime Laboratory. Notwithstanding the service upon Pedrosa, the
prosecution still failed to present a witness during the May 8, 2003 hearing.
Nonetheless, Judge Maceda, upon motion, again decided to extend to the
prosecution another chance, giving the People June 19 and July 3, 2003 as additional
hearing dates.19
Finally, on June 19, 2003, Pedrosa took the witness stand and completed her
direct examination. A few days thereafter, Cabarles filed the present petition
questioning Judge Maceda’s order, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Since trial in the lower court continued, on July 3, 2003, the Public
Attorney’s Office conducted its crossexamination of Pedrosa.
_______________
17
 Rollo, p. 15.
18
 Records, pp. 133-134.
19
 Id., at p. 136.
313
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 313
Cabarles vs. Maceda
On July 24, 2003, the defense counsel agreed on the facts contained in the death
certificate of the victim, so the testimony of Dr. Salen was dispensed with. Thereafter,
Judge Maceda set the date for the reception of evidence on the civil aspect of the
criminal case on August 14, 2003, when Carlos, the deceased’s brother, was recalled
to the witness stand.20
Cabarles was then given a chance to adduce further evidence on his behalf.
On August 9, 2004, Judge Maceda deferred the promulgation of judgment and
ordered the case archived pending this Court’s resolution of the case.21
In his petition, Cabarles raises as issues the following:
1. [1]WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE ISSUED THE QUESTIONED
ORDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION.
2. [2]WHETHER PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS VIOLATED.22
Did Judge Maceda act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing motu proprio the April
1, 2003 Order reopening the case, before judgment was rendered, to receive the
testimonies of two prosecution witnesses after both parties had rested their case? Did
the said order violate Cabarles’s right to due process and speedy disposition of his
case?
On the first issue, Cabarles insists that Judge Maceda gravely abused his
discretion when he ordered the reopening of the case before promulgation of
judgment although both parties had already rested their case. Cabarles argues that a
case may only be reopened after a judgment of conviction has
_______________
20
 Id., at p. 172.
21
 Id., at p. 223.
22
 Rollo, p. 85.
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cabarles vs. Maceda
been made but before its finality, as provided in Section 24,23 Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Cabarles insists that the reopening of a case under
Section 24 presupposes that judgment has already been promulgated, which is not
the case here. According to petitioner, the cases cited by the People are not at all
applicable in this case since they were tried and decided before the introduction of
Section 24 under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
For Judge Maceda, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that
Section 24 is a new provision which merely formalized the long accepted practice of
judges of reopening a case to avoid a miscarriage of justice. This being the case,
jurisprudence providing that a judge has the discretion to reopen a case even before
promulgation of judgment still holds.
After a thorough consideration of the submissions by the parties, we find that the
petition is meritorious.
A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it
was nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance
from long, established usage.24 This lack of a specific provision covering motions to
reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect
on December 1, 2000.
The April 1, 2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following
requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a
judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge
_______________
23
 SEC. 24. Reopening.—At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction,
the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the
proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated
within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.
24
 Alegre v. Reyes, No. L-56923, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 226, 231.
315
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 315
Cabarles vs. Maceda
on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is
conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the
Page 4 of 7
presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty
days from the issuance of the order.
Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the
furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling
will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. 25 A
motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had
formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, 26 and
even after promulgation but before finality of judgment 27 and the only controlling
guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. 28 This
remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.29
However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is
rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda
issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and hearing and without giving the
prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter. This
failure, to our mind, constitutes
_______________
25
 Gacayan v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483 (OCA-I.P.I. No. 98-578-RTJ),
September 17, 1999, 314 SCRA 682, 694; People v. Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No.
45037, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 38, 42.
26
 Alegre v. Reyes, supra note 24; II F. Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 551 (10th ed., 2004), citing People v. Concepcion, 84 Phil. 787, 788
(1949).
27
 REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 119, Sec. 24; II F.
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra.
28
 People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 419, 444.
29
 II F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra.
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cabarles vs. Maceda
grave abuse of discretion and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution
which requires notice and opportunity to be heard.30 The issuance of the said order,
without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the express language of Section 24,
Rule 119.
Although the defense counsel had cross-examined Pedrosa and had participated
in the proceedings after the case was reopened by Judge Maceda, the same does
not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’s objection to the April 1, 2003 Order. To be
effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal. 31 Here, Cabarles filed the
present petition seeking for a writ of certiorari against Judge Maceda before Pedrosa
was crossexamined. Also, when asked to comment on the prosecution’s formal offer
of evidence taken after the case was reopened, Cabarles objected to its admission on
the ground that the same was inadmissible having been received by the court after
Judge Maceda issued the questioned order.
On the second issue, Cabarles maintains that contrary to Judge Maceda’s
observation, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present its case as seen
by the issuance of several subpoenas to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. Cabarles argues
that he is presumed innocent until proven guilty and should not be made to wait
indefinitely for prosecution witnesses to testify. To do so would violate his
constitutional right to due process and a speedy disposition of his case. According to
Cabarles, the reopening of the case is clearly detrimental to him since it meant
another day in prison.
The OSG counters that the reopening of the case was made in accordance with
Section 24 since the prosecution is entitled to the reopening of the case to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, Cabarles’s right to a speedy trial had not
_______________
30
 See Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004, 426 SCRA 29, 40.
31
 Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998, 287 SCRA
581, 591.
317
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 317
Cabarles vs. Maceda
been violated since delays caused by the absence of a prosecution witness are
excluded when computing the time within which trial should start under Section
3,32 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
_______________
32
 SEC. 3. Exclusions.—The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence:
1. (a)Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
accused, including but not limited to the following:
1. (1)Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition
of the accused;
2. (2)Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges
against the accused;
3. (3)Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;
4. (4)Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that the delay does
not exceed thirty (30) days;
5. (5)Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change
of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
6. (6)Delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a prejudicial question;
and
7. (7)Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days,
during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under
advisement.
1. (b)Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an
essential witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent
when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due
diligence. He shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known
but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.
1. (c)Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical
inability of the accused to stand trial.
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cabarles vs. Maceda
Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is largely a
matter of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, this judicial action must not,
however, be done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably.33 In this particular
case, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present all its witnesses but it
Page 5 of 7
failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take full advantage of the
opportunities given does not change the fact that it was accorded such opportunities.
Contrary to the justification stated in the April 1, 2003 Order, the prosecution was not
deprived of its day in court. While it may be true that due to some confusion with the
trial court’s calendar, some of the trial dates assigned to the prosecution did not push
through and some of the subpoenas issued to Pedrosa and/or Dr. Salen pertained to
hearing dates which were different from those assigned for reception of prosecution’s
evidence, still the prosecution had a total of four hearing dates when it was given the
chance to prove its case: May 23, June 20 and 27, and August 1, 2001. The presence
of prosecution witnesses in court is the respon-
_______________
1. (d)If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and
thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any
period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the
time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had
there been no previous charge.
2. (e)A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a
co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to
whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for separate trial has
been granted.
3. (f)Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any
court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or
the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of its
findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice served by taking such
action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy
trial.
33
 Gacayan v. Pamintuan, supra note 25, at p. 695.
319
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 319
Cabarles vs. Maceda
sibility of the public prosecutor and it is incumbent upon him to take the initiative of
ensuring the attendance of his witnesses at the trial.34
Since Judge Maceda issued the questioned order without complying with the third
requirement of Section 24, that there be a hearing conducted before the order to
reopen is issued, then the assailed order must be annulled and set aside for having
been issued contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of discretion.35
On Cabarles’s right to a speedy disposition of his case, we agree that under the
Constitution, all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases.
Nowhere is this guaranty more significant and meaningful than in criminal cases
where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the accused as well, are at
stake.36
Although a discussion on the right to speedy disposition of the case is mooted by
our nullification of Judge Maceda’s April 1, 2003 Order as having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, we are constrained to reiterate that the concept of speedy
disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.37 The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial
_______________
34
 People v. Monje, G.R. No. 146689, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 160, 174.
35
 See Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 141, 148.
36
 Clave v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 102502 and Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 103143, June 19, 2001, p. 5 (Unsigned Resolution).
37
 Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA
478, 485.
320
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cabarles vs. Maceda
are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.38
With regard to the OSG’s allegation in its Comment and Memorandum, that
Cabarles failed to observe the rule on hierarchy of courts since the petition for
certiorari was filed directly with the Supreme Court, Cabarles insists that he is a
detention prisoner needing immediate resolution of his case. He also argues that this
case not only involves grave abuse of discretion but also a pure question of law
involving the application of Section 24, which is a new provision.39
It is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper for it
violates the established policy of strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. This
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Court of
Appeals and with the regional trial courts in proper cases within their respective
regions. However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking any
of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his
choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. The
hierarchy of courts determines the appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus,
petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against a regional trial court
should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is the
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
this Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
_______________
38
 Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116945, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA
499, 504, citing Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991, 199
SCRA 298, 307.
39
 Rollo, pp. 51-52, 100-102.
321
VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 20, 2007 321
Cabarles vs. Maceda
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of its docket.40
Under the present circumstances however, we are willing to take cognizance of
this case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Cabarles invokes the
jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of speedy justice since the information against
him was filed way back in June 1999,41 and almost eight years thereafter, no
judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay in the resolution of the instant
petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court has full discretionary power to
Page 6 of 7
take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted Notes.—Where the trial court judge was well aware of the nature of the
by the nature of the issues raised. 42 Since Section 24 is a new provision, and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that have so far been presented, and that
considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to convict, he, motu proprio,
to resolve the issues raised in this petition. _______________
43
As a final word, we find the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the case  Supra note 34, at pp. 179-180.
of People v. Monje instructive: 323
“A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court for VOL. 516, FEBRUARY 21, 2007 323
further proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed Small vs. Banares
to prove in the first instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous should have called additional witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of
precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to endless questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind with reference to particular facts
litigations because whenever an accused is on the brink of acquittal after trial, and or issues involved in the case. (Merciales vs. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA
realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be allowed to augment its 345 [2002])
evidence which should have been presented much earlier. This is a criminal A trial court is not in error if it opts to reopen the proceedings of a case, even after
prosecution, and to order the remand of this case to the court a quo to enable the both sides had rested and the case submitted for decision, by the calling of additional
prosecution to present additional evidence would violate the constitutional right of the witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judge’s mind with reference to
accused to due process, and to speedy determination of his case. The lamentable particular facts involved in the case—a judge cannot be faulted should he require a
failure of the prosecution to fill material witness to complete his testimony. (People vs. Tee, 395 SCRA 419 [2003])
_______________ ——o0o——
40
 Page-Tenorio v. Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004, 443 SCRA © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
560, 567-568.
41
 Records, p. 1; Rollo, p. 13.
42
 Ark Travel Express, Inc v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010, August 29, 2003, 410
SCRA 148, 157.
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cabarles vs. Maceda
the vital gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the State and the private offended
party, should not be treated by this Court with indulgence, to the extent of affording
the prosecution a fresh opportunity to refurbish its evidence.
In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must
be dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the
perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her family, the
protection provided by the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without
exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political persuasion—whether
privileged or less privileged—to be invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused
deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what the
prosecution has not proved.”43
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. We hold that the assailed Order
dated April 1, 2003 was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Said Order is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, any evidence received and offered in this
case as a result of the April 1, 2003 Order is hereby stricken off the record. Let the
records of this case be REMANDED immediately to the trial court concerned for its
appropriate action without further delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition granted, assailed order annulled and set aside. Records remanded to
trial court.

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