SERANA v.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 162059; January 22, 2008

Facts:

 Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of
a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year.
 Petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. Petitioner, with
her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student
Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
 One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave
P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.
 The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare
Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of
student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
 The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother.
 Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. The Information
reads:
o That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-
ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City,
while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and
fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada…xxx
 Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction
over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent and that RA No. 3019,
enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the
crime of estafa. She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even
assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the
government. Likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent,
she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held
their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addressed that she was a simple student and did not receive any
salary as a student regent. Further, she contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information
that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with
her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 Ombudsman: opposed the motion. It disputed petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner was a public officer.
As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and exercises the corporate powers of
UP. Also, compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been
interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated
 Sandiganbayan: denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.
Issues:

1. Whether the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by RA 3019 (NO)

2. Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over estafa (YES)
3. Whether petitioner is a public officer (YES)
4. Whether the offense charged was committed in relation to public office (YES)
5. Whether the source of funds is a defense (NO)

Held:

1.

 It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D.
No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further
modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may
lead thereto. Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be
filed with the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals.
 In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.

2.

 The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid
an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et
absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in
order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained
from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. In other words, petitioner’s
interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the
principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
statutum.
 Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
o B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
 Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB)
of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
3.

 This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v.
Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer. The 1987
Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in
different statutes and jurisprudence.
 Aparri v. Court of Appeals: A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public
Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem
Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have
any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
 Laurel v. Desierto, the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office: "A public office is the right,
authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer."
 Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP
student regent. Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular
tuition fee-paying student. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,
We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second
part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but
who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.
 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors
or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of
law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. Moreover, it is well established that
compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
 Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a
public officer.
 The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a
legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and
arts, and giving professional and technical training. Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it
declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.

4.

 Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.
 In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent
of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and
 taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x."

5.

 It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada’s private funds and not from the
government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
 We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then
occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the
amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the
latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused
Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
 Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of
defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.