Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Learning How To Learn A Critique
Learning How To Learn A Critique
Christopher Winch
christopher.winch@kcl.ac.uk
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain Annual Conference 2008
Keynote Lecture
ABSTRACT
The claim that to ‘learn how to learn’ is the central ability required for young
people to be effective ‘lifelong learners’ is examined for various plausible
interpretations. It is vacuous if taken to mean that we need to acquire a capacity
to learn, since we necessarily have this if we are to learn anything. The claim
that it is a specific ability is then looked at. Once again, if we acquire an ability
to learn we do not need the ability to learn how to learn. After noting the
implausibility of any such general ability, the paper goes on to examine the
claim that certain specific but transferable abilities might satisfy the description
‘to learn how to learn’. Various candidates are considered: forming and testing
hypotheses and abduction are two promising ones, but each has decisive
objections to it. Numeracy and Literacy are thought to be more promising but
achievements at the national level leave a lot to be desired, despite the clear
advantages for learning of being able to read, write and count. If we needed to
learn how to learn before we learned how to read, write and count, it is unlikely
that we would get anywhere. Finally, dispositions and character rather than
cognitive attributes are considered and, drawing on the work of Dearden and
others, it is suggested that the development of these aretetic and personal
qualities rather than cognitive ones may be most decisive for developing
independent learning in a range of subject matters.
1
So much is written about ‘learnacy’ or ‘learning how to learn’ (lh2l for short) and so little argued
about what it actually consists in (if indeed the term lh2l does refer to anything distinct), that it is
appropriate to examine the claim that one of the central aims of education should be the
development of the ability to learn how to learn. The claim is essentially this; that if one learns
how to learn then one can be an independent learner who can not only learn well at school but
throughout life. Not surprisingly, lh2l is thought by some to be the central curricular aim of formal
education. But do we really understand what is being claimed about this putative ability?
The Claim that we are ‘born to learn’ and the confusion in this claim between capacities and
abilities.
It is sometimes claimed that we are born with an innate drive to learn (Rousseau 1762; Chomsky
1988). The implication is that if we can harness that drive then we will become successful learners
for life. But the claim itself is exceedingly vague. Is it a conative claim, does it mean that we have
an impulse to learn? If so, then this might not be sufficient for learning, for wanting something is
not the same as knowing how to get it. Is it a cognitive claim, does it mean that we have an ability
to learn? If so, then this also might not be sufficient for learning, for knowing how to do something
is not the same as wanting to do it. In developmental theory, from Rousseau to Chomsky, the
impulse is a biologicallybased mixture of the conative and the cognitive, so educational progress
should be guaranteed through our biological development if it takes place in appropriate
conditions. In what immediately follows I will be discussing the cognitive rather than the conative
claim.
We are not born with a generalised ability to learn, since it is far from clear what this would amoun
to (see below). We could, however, be possessed of a capacity to learn, meaning an ability to
acquire an ability (a distinction made in Kenny 1968, for example). Having a capacity to learn
would be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for having such an ability, which would,
presumably, be acquired rather than innate. Indeed, it is difficult to see how we could have an
ability to learn if we did not already have a capacity to learn. But if we had such a capacity, why
would we also need an ability to learn? Although the capacity to learn would be innate, the ability
would be acquired. However, why should we need an ability to do x if we already had a capacity to
do x? If a human baby has an innate capacity to learn to speak, then surely it does not need an
acquired ability to do so in addition?
2
If we are born with an capacity to learn, then we do not need to learn how to learn.
These reflections should serve only to heighten our puzzlement about the claim that we should be
encouraged to learn how to learn. The problem is that if we do indeed have a cognitive and a
conative capacity to learn generally, then that should be sufficient for learning to take place given
the right environmental conditions? If I can and want to learn, then I should learn in the right
conditions. But then either a general capacity or a general ability to learn how to learn is
apparently quite superfluous, since if I can learn, then a fortiori I must be able to learn how to
learn. But if I can learn, why should I need to learn how to learn? On the other hand, if I don’t have
a capacity to learn, then a fortiori I will never acquire an ability to learn how to learn and all
efforts in that direction will be in vain. It looks as if it is difficult to attach a clear sense to the
claim that it is a key aim of education to enable children to learn how to learn, so why has the
claim become so influential?
The distinction between a capacity and an ability also makes it clear that the claim that the ability
to learn how to learn is incoherent because it leads to a vicious regress, is a false one. The claim is
this. If I can learn how to learn then I must be able to learn. So in order to learn how to learn I
need to be able to learn how to learn how to learn. I can learn how to learn how to learn. But if I
am able to learn how to learn how to learn then I need to be able to learn. But then I will need to
learn how to learn how to learn how to learn. An infinite regress of abilities threatens, which
makes the lh2l claim incoherent. But the objection proves far too much, for the argument works on
the simple case of learning as well. Thus, if I can learn, then I must be able to learn how to learn.
But then I must be able to learn how to learn how to learn etc. and we are back to the same
problem. The capacity/ability distinction stops this regress in its tracks. If I can learn, then I must
have a capacity to learn. But I do not need a capacity to learn how to learn, since the capacity to
learn is innate and encompasses the capacity to learn how to learn. But although the distinction
rescues learning as a capacity, it cannot do anything for learning how to learn as an ability, since if
I do have a capacity for learning, I won’t need an ability to learn, let alone an ability to learn how
to learn.
If learning how to learn is a capacity, then it is of no use unless it can lead to an ability of that
kind.
3
In order to understand this, we need to look more closely at our capacity to learn. Possession of a
capacity to learn is, tautologically, the necessary condition of learning. However, it is far from
being sufficient. The capacity to learn in a human being must be a general one, a capacity to learn
all the kinds of things that a human can learn. But in order to operate, that capacity must be
accompanied by a will to learn and the right conditions for learning, such as exposure to spoken
language in the case of learning to speak, or of firm surfaces for learning to walk. In addition, there
is very often a sensitive period in which the capacity operates in certain areas, for example, one
cannot readily learn to speak after a certain age (Lieberman, 1990). For learning to speak one’s
mother tongue, a capacity to learn, together with the right environmental conditions ought to be
sufficient to acquire that ability. But the capacity for learning languages will not enable one to go
on learning other languages in the same way, later learning of different languages will be slower
and more difficult. Thus the capacity to learn may manifest itself in different ways (see also Adey
and Shayer 1994).
Given these considerations, can it make any sense to speak of an ability to learn as opposed to a
capacity to do so? It seems that it can. A may be better able than B to learn carpentry for example.
In this sense, A and B both know how to learn carpentry and the ability is properly described as a
skill or as knowhow, to distinguish it from capacities like breathing which cannot be so described
(cf. Snowdon 2003). 1 Both have the capacity to learn carpentry, but A also has knowledge and
technique that enable her to learn it more effectively than B. Thus A may have a good
understanding of the property of wood, of the powers and functions of woodworking tools, a firm
but subtle grip, good handeye coordination and an ability to visualise, all of which B possesses to
a lesser or nonexistent degree. Thus A has specific abilities which enable her to learn how to do
carpentry. The capacity to learn must, in many cases, it seems, in order to be effective, be
supplemented by specific abilities to do certain things.
Does this help the claim that there is an ability to learn how to learn which educators should strive
to develop? Here we encounter a further problem, for abilities are specific, we cannot just be able,
we must be able at something or other. And even if we claim that there are abilities of a general
nature, then we must be able to give an account of the range of those abilities. But the lh2l claim
seems to be that such an ability is a general one, to be applied across the full range of subject
matter. Can that make sense?
4
Let us review the situation so far: for the claim that we need an ability to learn how to learn to be
plausible, the following must be true.
1. We have a capacity to learn. If we did not we could not learn anything.
2. We do not therefore have a distinct capacity to learn how to learn, since this would
be superfluous, being part of our capacity to learn.
3. We need to acquire the ability to learn how to learn, since the capacity to learn is a
necessary, but not sufficient condition for acquiring the ability to learn how to learn.
But 3. is puzzling. It is simply not clear why, given that the capacity to learn is a necessary
condition for learning (and, a fortiori, for learning how to learn), that the ability to learn how to
learn should constitute a prima facie sufficient condition for learning. One obvious riposte would
be that one needs, in addition to the capacity to learn, certain highly specific abilities that are
necessary to acquire further knowledge or abilities. Whether these highly specific abilities are
themselves singly, or in conjunction with other abilities, sufficient to acquire a range of further
abilities, will require further conceptual and empirical investigation. What is clear as a matter of
logical grammar is that the verb ‘is able to’ and its cognates ‘knows how to’, ‘can’ etc. are
transitive, that is, they take an object phrase which signifies an ability, skill or disposition. This
does not mean, of course, that such abilities, skills and dispositions do not have a range of
situations in which they can obtain, which might be narrow or broad, but it does mean that they do
need to be completed with an object specification.
One reply could be that one could complete ‘A is able to…’ with ‘learn’, (referring to an ability) to
yield ‘A is able to learn’ which would specify the outcome of ‘A has learned how to learn’.
Reflection shows that this will not do. The problem is that the verb ‘learn’ is, in this respect,
similar to ‘is able to’. Whether as an indicative as in ‘A is learning…’ or coupled with a modal
auxiliary as in ‘A can learn….’ the verb is also transitive. In order to understand a sentence
containing the verb in whatever form, we need it to be completed with an object phrase that sets
out the range of abilities, skills, theories or propositions that A is learning or is capable of learning.
This object phrase may signify a more or less broad range of such things, but it must be present.
However, the following is not remotely plausible in characterising an ability:
‘For any activity, ability, skill, theory, proposition that a human being could reasonably be
expected to acquire, A is able to learn that activity, ability, skill, theory or proposition.’ 2
5
Why is this so? Because the range of such things is so diverse that we would not know how to
identify such an ability. Consider:
i. A can control his breathing
ii. A can ride a bike
iii. A can repair an electrical circuit
iv. A can throw a pot
v. A can read
vi. A knows the main sequence of events in the First World War
vii. A knows whether it is time to go home
viii. A knows the theoretical basis of quantum mechanics
and one can see that it would be very hard to specify such an ability. i seems to require specific
muscular and neural capacity, ii coordination and balance, iii both theoretical and specific
knowledge and manual ability, iv requires practical knowledge of the properties of clay, an
aesthetic sense and manual ability, v requires coordination of knowledge of properties of spoken
and written language, vi of a series of interconnected propositions and how they relate to each
other, vii could be ability to read a clock or a sense of what it is appropriate to do, viii requires
knowledge of a physical theory expressed in mathematical language.
To talk of an underlying ability, as opposed to a capacity, to acquire all these accomplishments
seems absurd. Even the characterisation of the diversity in this brief list underestimates the
complexity of what we are talking about. For example, i – iv seem to involve, in some way, bodily
strength. Yet, as Ryle (1974) pointed out, physical strength is not one, but many (albeit
overlapping) things: the punching power of a boxer, the stamina of a runner, the pull and grip of an
archer, the musculature of a jumper, that of a weightlifter and so on. These abilities are so diverse
that to talk of an ability to acquire them requires it to be a unique ability, since all the others have a
range which can be specified with reasonable accuracy. It seems, therefore, that we have not yet
succeeded in attaching a clear sense to the verb ‘to learn how to learn’. Let us now look at the most
plausible candidates.
2. Forming and testing hypotheses.
6
One very popular candidate for such a general ability is that of the ability to form and test
hypotheses. It is an idea that we find, for example, in the work of Dewey and in a range of neo
Cartesian thought about learning. The efficiency of learning, and, in particular of learning our
mother tongue, is attributed to our abilities to match the sounds we hear to hypothesised
grammatical structures and meanings and to test them against subsequent input, thus building up
an accurate theoretical picture of the structure and meaning of our native language (cf. Chomsky
1988, Fodor 1978). Now there are reasons for doubting that we learn language by forming and
testing hypotheses, for reasons connected with Wittgenstein’s private language argument, but let
us concede the point to Chomsky and Fodor for a moment.
Their claim is that the ability to form and test hypotheses is innate, part of our neurological wiring
and operates automatically. In other words, it is, as we saw, a capacity rather than an ability. In
fact, it is a way of characterising what our capacity to learn the range of things that a human being
is capable of learning. If this characterisation of the capacity to learn is correct, then it should be
superfluous to claim, in addition, that we need to have an acquired ability to form and test
hypotheses, for such a capacity would preclude the need for an ability to learn how to learn.
But of course, humans do acquire abilities to form and test hypotheses. There are two points to be
made about these abilities. First of all, it is a moot point whether the method of forming and testing
hypotheses is the only or even the most efficient way to learn something in particular areas of
activity. Fodor’s (1978) claim that it is difficult to see what other ways there are of learning is
simply false. One can learn through being drilled, trained, instructed, by memorising, by practice,
through indoctrination, through intuition and so on. There are also good reasons to think that the
hypotheticodeductive approach may not be the best way of characterising our inferential and
explanatory (and hence some of our learning) abilities (Lipton 2004). Humans learn many different
things and do so in many different ways; this is part of what Wittgenstein called our ‘natural
history’ and it cannot be reduced to hypothesis formation and testing without some pretty
convincing evidence and argumentation, which has not, so far, been forthcoming.
Second, it is far more plausible to suggest that the hypotheticodeductive method is more
appropriate in some areas than others. The nature and extent of its use in science is, for example, a
matter of longstanding and continually lively debate (Kuhn 1962, Lakatos 1970, NewtonSmith,
1990, Okasha, 2002, Lipton op.cit., Popper, 1936). But, where it is used, it is an ability grounded
7
in detailed subject knowledge and rigorous techniques, which only an expert in a specific area can
use to acquire significant new knowledge. Even where the hypotheticodeductive method is
appropriate, it presupposes training in technique and instruction in theory and specific facts. Even
if the learning capacity were best characterised as hypotheticodeductive, it would constitute a
necessary condition of learning hypotheticodeductively rather than a sufficient one, since
otherwise babies might carry out work in quantum mechanics through the exercise of that capacity.
For these reasons, although a hypotheticodeductive capacity is a plausible candidate for a general
power of the mind, it is not going to work as characterisation of a general ability of the mind
underlying learning how to learn.
Powers of the mind: why the mind is neither modular nor connectionist.
One of the continuing themes of the debate about general powers of the mind is the attraction of
the computer model as a way of understanding such powers. In one way, this is not difficult to
understand, since computers are structured in such a way as to permit identification of distinct
functions. These functions are integral to the machine and constitute its basic ‘architecture’.
Connectionist models, on the other hand, dispense with architecture and allow connections to build
up with the impact of experience. But connectionism is unlikely to yield an overall strategic
direction for learning since, as in empiricist epistemology, the connections are experience
dependent and thus, to a certain extent, ad hoc.
But if an innatist computerbased model of the acquisition and integration of knowledge is more
suitable to the project of identifying a generalised learning ability than a connectionist model, it
brings significant problems of its own. Not the least of these is the fact that, if the learning capacity
is innate, it cannot play the role of an acquired ability of learning how to learn. On the other hand,
if it is an acquired ability, then we are owed a story concerning why we need this, since, according
to the conventional computer architecture story, we already have a hypotheticodeductive module
embodying the capacity, innately. But there is a further problem with the modular thesis. It claims
that the human mind is organised into discrete functional parts which each carry out an element of
mental activity autonomously. There is thus a language module, a visual one, a hypothetico
deductive one, a mathematical one, and so on. Fodor (2001) has argued, however, that the
modularity thesis has enormous problems in making sense of the global or abductive nature of
human cognition, the fact that all relevant faculties are brought to bear in decision making, for
example, not just particular modules. One particular problem may apparently be suitable for
8
solution by a particular module. But a decision needs to be made concerning which module should
solve the problem. But there is no general rule concerning what this should be because decision
making is contextdependent. Circumstances, rather than general principles, determine how one
goes about making decisions or, in our case, how one goes about learning or indeed, making
decisions whether one should learn in particular circumstances (Fodor 2001 , Ch.3). Fodor also
argues that connectionist models are no better, since the relevance of any piece of information to a
network is determined by the relationship of junctions (nodes) on the network. But since these are
invariant once established, since they are neurological junctions which, by their nature are
permanent, the relevance of a piece of information within the network to other nodes in the
network will also be invariant. But a key point about abductive processes is that they make
considerations of relevance context dependent. Whether or not the state of my bank balance is
relevant to my decision making will depend on what kind of decision I am making and particular
circumstances relevant to the decision. Connectionism, since it requires that the relevance of
information is invariant, is unable to account for this (Fodor 2001, pp.5051). All of this is
particularly relevant to the learning how to learn thesis, since if it is to be a practical ability,
learning how to learn will involve decisionmaking about the relevance of certain information to
the learner’s projects, circumstances and background. It appears, then, that learning how to learn is
difficult to explain both in terms of modularity and connectionist theses.
Abduction and Integration.
Human beings have the ability to bring to bear on a decision or judgment those considerations that
are relevant, or at least enough considerations that are relevant to the making of that decision or
judgment. What these considerations are will depend on the issue being faced. Clearly we must
have an innate capacity to do this. However, our ability to do so is not available at birth. There is
plenty of evidence that it grows gradually over a long period (Wood 1990). It is a sign of
intellectual maturity that one can judge in this way. So it looks at last if we have an acquired
ability with the requisite generality to serve as the candidate general mental power which we need
in order to account for learning how to learn.
Unfortunately, however, this is a false promise. The abductive faculty, although acquired and of
general application, is a mark of mature human rationality as such, it is not an optional desirable
feature. Those who cannot bring together relevant considerations in their judgments are not able to
make rational judgments, since that is part of what we mean by rational judgment. The making of
9
rational judgments does not require the acquisition of an ability to learn how to learn, but an ability
to bring to bear relevant considerations on judgment making. This means learning to make a very
wide range of contextual judgements, using existing knowledge and experience of different kinds
of circumstances. This involves a great deal of learning, but not learning how to learn as an ability.
The integrative ability is acquired, often painfully and over a long period, but is a property of every
rational human being, not just of those who are good at learning. If it could be identified with the
ability to learn how to learn, then we would not need to advocate it, since everyone who is rational
would have it.
We have now looked at two candidate general powers of the mind which could be what learning
how to learn is: the hypotheticodeductive faculty and the integrative one. The hypothetico
deductive faculty will not do, either because it is innate or, if it is not, it is context and knowledge
– dependent. The integrative faculty will not either, since although it is acquired, it is a general
property of all rational humans and not a desirable option such as learning how to learn is said to
be. We have run out of options for general powers of the mind which could serve as learning how
to learn. It is now time to look elsewhere.
Generality and Transfer
If lh2l is not a general power of the mind, could it be something else? The other kind of candidate
would be a skill or skills that were relatively specific in kind, but which were transferable; that is,
they could be learned in one context and then used in others. A skill is a kind of ability which has a
more or less specifiable range, but which can also possibly be employed in a variety of situations.
A skill is, more precisely, a form of knowing how to which is usually itself learned. To make the
point clearer with an example, digesting is a capacity that I have, but it is not a skill since I can
either digest normally or abnormally, but I cannot digest well or badly in the way that I can, for
example, ride a bike correctly or incorrectly and, if correctly, well or badly (Snowdon 2003). Skills
are attributes that I have to learn before I can be said to have acquired them and, as with knowing
how to generally, they are normative, that is, they must be done correctly if someone can be truly
said to possess them.
So we require abilities that have to be learned but which can be put to work in a variety of contexts
in order to assist further learning. Are there such abilities? It seems that there are and the two of
most interest in our enquiry are called literacy and numeracy. One might add, of course, that of
10
equal importance are the skills of speaking and listening. But these are abilities, of broad range and
applicable in a wide variety of situations which most of us acquire independently of formal
education. There are some aspects of these abilities that need to be learned through the right kind
of experience or even through some formal learning, but on the whole, they are not, outside deficit
models such as that of Bernstein, considered to be the proper province of education, or at least if
speaking is, listening, which would be the medium of learning, is generally not.
Literacy
Reading is an ability which has a number of different dimensions, the most simple of which many
children never acquire. Approximately 20% of 11 year olds fail to reach Level 4 in the English
National Curriculum, which requires that they should “show understanding of significant ideas,
themes, events and characters, beginning to use inference and deduction. They should refer to the
text when explaining their views. They locate and use ideas and information”. 3 As can be seen by
an inspection of the different dimensions of reading, described below, these are criteria for fairly
basic functional literacy, not for the sophisticated use of text as a learning tool. We may safely
assume that anyone who fails to reach level 4 in reading will not be able to make use of it in
significantly furthering their education without help in achieving higher levels of reading ability.
The first of these dimensions of reading is literal comprehension, which allows the reader to
understand the primary meanings (as opposed to secondary or metaphorical meanings) of
sentences in the text. But the ability to reorganise material, to understand at a suprasentential
level, for example, the structure of an argument or arguments within a more extended section of
text, is vitally important for the proper use of nonnarrative prose. It is also the case that even
simple narrative, because it uses suprasentential forms of textual organisation, requires
acquaintance with such structures before narratives can be understood.
The ability to understand textual organisation is also vital for the ability to locate information
through the use of suprasentential structural features of text in order to eliminate the literal
reading of material superfluous to the reader’s immediate purpose. Beard (2000) has enumerated
these different techniques which depend on the use of largescale structural features of texts, such
as contents, indexes, abstracts, headings and subheadings, to the use of skimming (rapid,
superficial reading of text to obtain the general drift of a passage), scanning (looking for words or
phrases related to one’s purpose) and search reading (looking for particular words or phrases).
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These are all skills that only become apparent at level 5 of the National Curriculum. In addition,
there are metastructural aspects of text that need to be understood. These include: inference
beyond the literal (for example, the detection of enthymematic arguments and the use of
implicature), evaluation (for example, the appraisal of a text as fit for stated or implicit purpose)
and appreciation (for example, the appraisal of a text according to aesthetic criteria). These last
would include, not just the appreciation of a poem or novel as something to be enjoyed, but, more
generally, the use of style and other effects in a pleasing way. None of these skills are accessible
below level 5 and some of them, such as appreciation, only fully at level 8.
Not only is there evidence that the more basic aspects of reading fail to be achieved by many
young people , but there is also evidence that suprasentential and metastructural comprehension
is weak. For example, level 5 in English requires that pupils:
“show understanding of a range of texts, selecting essential points and using
inference and deduction where appropriate. In their responses, they identify
key features, themes and characters and select sentences, phrases and relevant
information to support their views. They retrieve and collate information from
a range of sources.” 4
The achievement figures for these abilities for 2005 are as follows: 68% overall (75% girls, 61%
boys). 5 These are levels of achievement that an able 11 year old should be able to reach and are
figures for the achievement of 14 year olds.
At least since the HMI report on primary education published in 1978, it has been a persistent
complaint that these ‘higher reading skills’ are poorly taught and inadequately learned. It may be
doubted whether a significant number of postgraduate students ever fully attain some of these
skills. Personal experience of postgraduate teaching at M and D level at a variety of institutions
suggests this to be the case, together with the fact that study skills texts are used in ESRC training
programmes, not to mention the popularity of study skill material at undergraduate level. These
problems, remarkable in a country that prides itself on having aspirations to take part in the
‘knowledge economy’ are odd, and attest to a deepseated failure to successfully teach, not only
basic literacy, but also those literary abilities that allow for the understanding of suprasentential
and metastructural features of text in a range of nonnarrative, nonfictional genres and which
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involve, in particular, the identification and evaluation of structures of argumentation in the most
general sense of transitions from premise to conclusion (pc structures in Levi’s (2000) terms).
Such failures are quite fundamental whatever position one takes on the question of whether
‘thinking skills’ are context or context independent, since it is a presupposition of either position
that one has the ability to identify and evaluate a pc structure (Toulmin 1957, Fisher 2001).
It might be argued that these higher order reading skills are, in fact, a form of thinking skill and so
misnamed as reading skills. The PISA study of 2003 appears to take the view that reasoning skills
are at the heart of problem solving ability and that such abilities can be crossdisciplinary (p.6).
We can assume, then, that the generic ability to solve problems and to reason are, in fact dealt with
under the misleading heading of reading ability at level 5 and above. This, however, is a serious
misunderstanding of what is involved in solving the problems in PISA type tests. Noone would
seriously expect a pupil to be competent to solve the ‘reallife’ problems set up in the tests, such as
prescribing drugs, simply because they would have neither the detailed knowledge of pharmacy,
biochemistry or general practice, nor the professional experience to do anything of the sort. These
problems are not generic but, in this example, specific medical problems. One can only simulate
the solution of such problems through these tests. They are essentially tests of comprehension,
using specially prepared texts as a basis, of extracting and organising relevant information from
text or tables ands reorganising it into a form prescribed by the test. They also involve the
organisation of the material so that correct inferences are drawn from the information given. They
are the kind of ability that an advanced reader should display, they are not an ability to solve
complex reallife professional problems and it is highly misleading to suggest that they are
anything of the sort.
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this problem by providing all necessary information within a text prepared in such a way as to
render unnecessary the search for enthymeme and implicature. But this is not at all how real life
problem solving works, depending as it does on background knowledge, situational awareness,
contextual inference and personal contact. 6 What is less in dispute however, is that such higher
level literacy skills may well, in the hands of skilful teachers, be applied to text in particular
subjects as a very useful foundation on which to build subjectspecific analytical skills. We can
conclude, then, that the ability to read (and associated auxiliary writing abilities relating to the
reorganisation of text) is a form of know how, is an identifiable type of skill and is, although not
without further teaching, transferable to cognate activity within a range of disciplines. In this sense
the ability to read, broadly conceived, is a specific transferable skill or form of know how and a
plausible candidate for one of the attributes to be acquired if one is to learn how to learn.
Furthermore, there is good evidence that it is a form of know how lacking in the vast majority of
the population. Here then, is ample grist for the mill of learning how to learn and a considerable
pedagogic challenge.
It should be noted that literacy, as a transferable ability that assists learning, would need to be
acquired prior to learning how to learn as a general ability. If one had to learn how to learn before
one could learn to read and write, then it is not clear how one would become literate. On the other
hand, if learning how to learn requires literacy, it is not at all clear what this hypothesised general
ability would add to an extremely useful transferable ability of wide application.
Numeracy
Similar considerations and arguments apply to the range of skills that go under the ‘numeracy’
heading. In fact, in many respects they are closely related to the higher level reading skills
discussed in the previous section. There is little doubt that ability to handle numerical operations,
geometrical, algebraic and statistical techniques can, in principle, be applied across a range of
subject matters. There is also compelling evidence of the limited range of such abilities within the
school population and beyond. Recent government statistics on the achievement of Level 6 in Key
Stage 3 assessment of Mathematics, which is below the basic level of simple algebraic
competence, is 52% for all pupils at age 14 (53% teacher assessment, 51% test assessment) (DfES
2005).
14
The analogy with literacy goes further however. First, there is good reason to think that although,
in principle, mathematical abilities are transferable from one context to another, the mere evidence
of possession of such abilities in one context is by no means sufficient for their successful use in
other contexts. This applies both to the transfer of relatively decontextualised mathematical
abilities to practical contexts such as commerce or engineering (Hoyles, Noss, & Pozzi, 1999), or
the transfer of such abilities from practical to abstract contexts and vice versa (Nunes,
Schliemann, & Carraher, 1993; Lave 1988).
Second, there is the issue of the representation of mathematical structures. This can be done in
various ways which involve: lateral and columnar organisation of numeric and algebraic structures,
geometric proof in formal deductive mode, tabular and graphic representation of information in
numeric form and mathematical display and argumentation within nonmathematical texts (for
example in situating mathematical problems in practical contexts). Post hoc at least, mathematical
structures are, in many cases, of pc form, that is, they represent more or less formal, ordered
transitions from premise to conclusion. There are a number of characteristic forms employed in
mathematics: arithmetical, geometrical and algebraic deduction, which belong to the larger family
of deductive inference, since they are all truthpreserving forms of argumentation, although the
principles involved in each differ somewhat (eg specific axioms in geometry, specific rules of
inference in arithmetic), mathematical induction ( a form of deductive reasoning used in higher
order reasoning in mathematics and formal logic), and various forms of inductive argument
employed in statistical reasoning. Like the case of reading and writing however, the practical
knowledge involved, although necessarily learned in certain contexts is, in principle, applicable
across a range of contexts, even if applicability is often difficult in practice. Finally, as in the case
of literacy, there is good evidence that such knowhow is a] poorly distributed amongst the
population (DfES 2003, Cockcroft 1982) and b] where it does exist, the evidence of ability to
transfer is also limited (Hoyles et al op.cit.; Boaler 2002 who draws attention to the differences
between school and operational conditions as being significant).
We thus have two very plausible examples of specific transferable skills, whose applicability, at
least in theory, to a very wide range of subject matter is enormous and for which there is ample
evidence that they have not been acquired even at a basic level by vast numbers of the population
and, where they have, have not always been acquired to the degree of depth and confidence that
makes them transferable. Here, then, is ample evidence both for the need for learning how to learn
15
and for its lack. This constitutes a major educational challenge which, in the UK at least, has yet to
be met.
Character, Disposition and Virtue
However, we also know that learning is not always easy. Often it requires patience, persistence,
diligence, attention to detail, the ability not to be too discouraged by initial failure and so on. These
attributes are given various names: they are Nietzsche’s petty virtues, they are sometimes called
selfregarding, as opposed to otherregarding virtues and Kerschensteiner (1964) called them the
‘bourgeois’ as opposed to the ‘civic’ virtues (see also Gramsci, 1975). Despite these somewhat
disparaging references, however, they are of enormous importance for our enquiry. Learning is
difficult and is often literally a characterforming experience (see Polya 1954 for the case of
mathematics). Educators often have to strike a delicate balance between engendering confidence
and encouraging students to overcome the inevitable difficulties that come in the path of learning.
Too few difficulties encountered and the student becomes overconfident and never acquires the
16
bourgeois virtues needed for difficult learning; too many and the bourgeois virtues never get
developed and confidence is undermined. This is why it is important to identify and to successfully
teach those abilities whose transfer value is high.
One of the key attributes associated with successful learning is that of independence (sometimes
referred to as ‘autonomy’). Independence is partly attitudinal and is connected with self
confidence. It is thus related to the virtues; however, it presupposes certain skills which allow tasks
to be performed without supervision, these include the ability to plan, regulate and assess one’s
own activity and to work collaboratively with others. Black et al (2006) draw attention to a number
of projects that suggest that qualities of independence are important in making learning more
effective. As they point out (p.3), Robert Dearden had already, in 1976, drawn attention to the
importance, not of a unitary secondorder ability that could be characterised as ‘learning to learn’
but to the possibility of clusters of skills, attitudes and dispositions that, taken together, might
perceptibly improve the ability of individuals to learn in a variety of contexts, which he preferred
to characterise as ‘learning how to learn’.
There is a case for maintaining that the virtues are themselves transferable. This claim needs to be
made carefully as there are different aspects of important and complex virtues such as courage and
justice that make them difficult to describe as unitary. However, it is a general characteristic of the
virtues that they can be practised in a variety of contexts. Indeed, if the claim that they can only be
fully acquired if they are prefiguratively exercised in a large variety of different situations is
correct, then we would expect this to be the case almost as a quasitautology. This conceptual point
has enormous relevance for curriculum design and pedagogy since it suggests that one will not
become patient, selfdisciplined etc. if one is not given a chance to fully practice these virtues. It
suggests, in the first instance, that particular attention be paid to those transferable abilities whose
early mastery is likely to breed success in a variety of areas and the confidence to work
independently. In the second instance, it suggests that a broadly based curriculum that gives
students the opportunity to achieve in diverse kinds of activity which involve music, sport or
physical activity, technical skill and so on, is likely to assist in the development of such virtues. It
does not require, of course, that they become experts in these areas, but that they learn enough to
have achieved enough to have gained some appreciation of what excellence would look like and to
have acquired the confidence to go towards a significant degree of mastery should they so wish.
Confining them to subjects that are particularly suited to certain ‘learning styles’ is not likely to
allow them to do this.
17
If the argument is correct, the aretetic aspects of lh2l will not be adequately addressed by a
narrowly constrained literacy and numeracy curriculum which does not focus on the application,
and hence the transferability of such skills, although attention to these areas is of enormous
importance. This is one of the central challenges for curriculum design and is nothing new. As
Alexander (1984) pointed out, it is the axis around which competing conceptions of the primary
curriculum have long revolved.
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NOTES
1
Somewhat confusingly, the literature on knowing how often calls these innate capacities
‘abilities’ in contrast to examples of knowing how. I shall use the term ‘capacity’ for these
innate phenomena.
2
One may be able to do something (eg digest) without knowing how to do so, and in this
sense, one could be able to learn, rather than know how to. Note also though that one may
learn to know how to control some aspects of such a capacity, eg. to hold one’s breath.
3
http://www.nc.uk.net/webdav/servlet/XRM?Page/@id=6001&Session/@id=D_yis3e4CTrLs7ag596PwI&P
OS[@stateId_eq_main]/@id=6048&POS[@stateId_eq_at]/@id=6048)
4
QCA 2006
5
www.dfes.gov.uk/rsfgateway/DB/SFR (2006)
6
There is an associated problem of thinking that a fallacious kind of reasoning in one area is
always such in another. An example can be found in Halpern (1998, p.457), when she claims
that the notion of ‘sunk costs’ in economics and accountancy has application across a range of
contexts, and that sunk costs arguments can be identified in other areas. It is doubtful, for
example, that someone who wants to marry his girlfriend because they have spent many years
together is using a sunk cost argument. More likely he is inferring future happiness from past
and wishes to take steps to secure it more firmly.
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