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behaviors like substance use that, while initially were
rewarding, are now causing serious health/legal/social
consequences (Hildebrandt et al. 2008).
While there is evidence linking these processes
together, this is clearly not the whole picture. Reversal
learning is only one component underlying impulsiv-
ity, which itself is only one of several factors contribut-
ing to psychiatric conditions like pathological
gambling. Future research is needed to determine not
only what other processes are involved but, more
importantly, how they affect the role played by reversal
learning.
Cross-References
▶ Neural Mechanisms of Extinction and Retrieval
▶ Neurophysiology of Motivated Learning
▶ Personality Effects on Learning
References
Cools, R., Clark, L., Owen, A. M., & Robbins, T. W. (2002). Defining
the neural mechanisms of probabilistic reversal learning using
event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging. The Jour-
nal of Neuroscience, 22, 4563–4567.
Fellows, L. K., & Farah, M. J. (2003). Ventromedial frontal cortex
mediates affective shifting in humans: Evidence from a reversal
learning paradigm. Brain, 126, 1830–1837.
Gray, J. A., & McNaughton, N. (2000). The neuropsychology of anxiety:
An enquiry into the functions of the septo-hippocampal system
(2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Gullo, M. J., & Dawe, S. (2008). Impulsivity and adolescent substance
use: Rashly dismissed as “all-bad”? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral
Reviews, 32, 1507–1518. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.06.003.
Gullo, M. J., Jackson, C. J., & Dawe, S. (2010). Impulsivity and reversal
learning in hazardous alcohol use. Personality and Individual
Differences, 48(2), 123–127. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.09.006.
Harlow, J. M. (1868). Recovery from the passage of an iron bar
through the head. Reprinted in History of Psychiatry, 4(1993),
274–281.
Hildebrandt, H., Brokate, B., Fink, F., Muller, S. V., & Eling, P. (2008).
Impaired stimulus-outcome but preserved stimulus-response
shifting in young substance-dependent individuals. Journal of
Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 30, 946–955.
doi:10.1080/13803390801894699.
Inattention
▶ Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
Incentives and Student Learning I 1511
Incentives and Student
Learning
WAYNE A. GROVE1, LESTER HADSELL2
1
Department of Economics, Le Moyne College,
Syracuse, NY, USA
2
Department of Economics, SUNY-College at
Oneonta, Oneonta, NY, USA
Synonyms
Encouragement; Inspiration; Provocation; Reason to
learn
Definition I
Generally, incentives for learning can be defined as an
inducement or supplemental reward that serves as
a motivational device for intended learning. What
kinds of incentives, especially financial, improve stu-
dent learning? This question is salient worldwide, but
particularly in the USA where, despite being the richest
of the 41 OECD countries, US students’ math, science,
and reading abilities rank them in the middle and
below that of the OECD countries (Fryer 2010, p. 3).
The American student high school graduation rate of
about 70% is low compared to OECD countries, with
students in urban areas faring much worse (Education
at a Glance 2007). Within the USA, a stark Hispanic/
black-white learning gap persists, with rates of
underperformance roughly twice as high for minorities
as for whites. Colleges, universities, and employers
report that too many high school graduates do not
possess the basic skills and knowledge necessary for
career success. All the foregoing is true despite a more
than doubling of the spending per pupil in the USA
since the 1970s.
These poor educational outcomes exist despite
their importance for students’ economic and social
success. In consequence, policymakers and researchers
have particularly focused on the role played by incen-
tives for students, families, teachers, administrators,
and for entire schools.
In this entry, we review a selection of the emerging
scholarship of educational reform initiatives regarding
incentives and learning. Most of the empirical work has
focused on primary and secondary education, although
1512 I Incentives and Student Learning
there is some recent evidence from post-secondary
schools. As economists, we take a particular interest
in the role of monetary incentives and market-based
initiatives and focus on those in this piece.
Theoretical Background
Learning and Incentives
A primary goal of elementary and secondary education
is for children to develop basic academic and social
skills and noncognitive attributes (e.g., perseverance,
dependability, and consistency) necessary for produc-
tive citizenship and entry into the work force, a training
program, or college. Despite the broader range of
desired educational outcomes, policymakers focus on
the learning of particular subject material. The lack of
learning, to simplify, may result either from students
themselves or from a problem with the complements to
students’ learning. On the first count, students may
lack motivation to learn or may highly discount the
future (so that the payoff to academic effort is
overwhelmed by the immediacy of alternative uses of
their time). Alternatively, factors beyond students’ con-
trol may be contributing: ineffective teachers and
administrators and unengaged parents and peers. The
challenge, then, is to get students to exert effort, for the
effort to yield achievement, and to aid the process with
educational and social support.
The theory of student learning entails motivation
(intrinsic and extrinsic) determining effort which
yields learning depending upon innate ability (the
ease of turning effort into learning) and support. The
latter, support, refers to the quality of teaching, the
relationship with the teacher, the classroom and school
learning environment, parental and family support,
and so on. Thus, aside from individual aptitude, learn-
ing is determined by effort which results from
motivation.
How might financial incentives help overcome the
roadblocks to learning and attainment mentioned in
the introduction? First, a variety of incentives might get
students to exert more effort. Large and growing wage
premiums for high school, college, and professional
education would seem already to provide an extrinsic
incentive to study and learn. Research shows, though,
that many children and young adults place a low value
today on long-term rewards: that is, they highly dis-
count future outcomes. So to motivate such students to
study now requires either more immediate rewards or
a better understanding of the link between studying
now and the rest of their lives. Many students who are
aware of the big financial benefits of completing college
fail to exert academic effort, perhaps because they lack
role models to envision that such opportunities are
available to them. Incentives ranging from direct pay-
ment for performance on standardized tests to pay-
ments to families based on student effort (e.g.,
attendance) have been attempted, as discussed in
more detail below.
Second, how might incentives overcome the lack of
knowledge of how to convert effort into learning,
namely, how to effectively study, complete assign-
ments, and learn material that prevents student effort
from yielding achievement? One solution may be
rewarding the inputs in the learning process rather
than the outputs. Recent programs show promise on
this front (e.g., Fryer 2010).
Finally, how might incentives alter administrators’,
teachers’, parents’, and fellow students’ behavior to
influence student achievement? Several incentive pro-
grams provide direct payments to administrators and
teachers for improved student performance or simply
putting forth greater effort (additional time with stu-
dents or obtaining additional certification). Charter
schools also fall within this realm. Some programs
provide payments to parents based on students’ atten-
dance or exam scores.
Although policymakers have focused on the poten-
tial role of external rewards and incentives, educational
psychologists (and some economists) have noted their
limitations. In an extensive review of the literature,
Deci et al. (1999) conclude that the manner in which
students respond to incentives rests on several key
factors, including the student’s own goals and level of
intrinsic motivation (which determines the value of the
task to them) and their perceived likelihood of success.
While much of the empirical work in Education
Psychology concludes that extrinsic rewards are helpful
in getting students to do unpleasant work, such
rewards have been found to be ineffective and even
harmful in certain circumstances – for example, when
they are seen as controlling or when they are used as
incentive to get students to do work they otherwise
enjoy; furthermore, subsequent interest, risk prefer-
ence, effort, and emotion can suffer if extrinsic rewards
are overemphasized. Consequently some experimental

studies (e.g., Fryer 2010) measure changes in intrinsic
motivation, using, for example, the Intrinsic Motiva-
tion Inventory, developed by Ryan (1982).
Methodology: Randomized
Evaluation
A center piece of the recent search for effective educa-
tional policy solutions has been the use of randomized
evaluation, with random assignment to treatment and
control groups. This is especially important due to
concerns of program effects given complex and multi-
ple channels of causality. Let us say you use a new
pedagogical approach in class and at the end of the
year your students’ learning is 20% higher than the
average in the three other classes of the same grade
and material. Can we attribute the increase to the
pedagogical approach? Or to you as a teacher versus
the rest? Or might an unusual mix of students in your
class account for the outcome? This selection bias
problem, ensuring that participants and nonpartici-
pants do not systematically differ, is the central diffi-
culty that randomization seeks to avoid.
Important Scientific Research and
Open Questions
Student Incentives
Recent studies by economists have examined the effec-
tiveness of a wide range of monetary incentives in
a variety of settings in several countries. Direct incen-
tives for K-12 and college students take the form of cash
payments for performance on standardized exams
(e.g., Advanced Placement exams, Regents exams in
New York State, exit exams in Israel), school atten-
dance, and college enrollment. Such incentives gener-
ally appear to have positive effects.
Reward Inputs or Outcomes?
Fryer (2010) describes a series of school-based ran-
domized trials in over 250 urban schools designed to
test the impact of financial incentives on student
achievement. His results suggest that student incentives
increase achievement (and are less costly) when the
rewards are given for inputs to the educational produc-
tion function, while incentives tied to output are not
effective. He suggests that incentives for inputs may be
more effective because students do not know how to
turn their motivation for rewards into achievement.
Incentives and Student Learning I 1513
Fryer also finds no evidence that monetary incentives
decrease intrinsic motivation.
In contrast, here are two studies with some evidence
that rewarding outcomes works. Merit scholarship for
girls in Kenya generated significant gains in academic
exam scores and yielded positive externalities
(Kremer et al. 2004). In Coshocton, Ohio, 3rd- through
6th-grade students received cash payments for the suc-
cessful completion of standardized tests (Bettinger
2010). Young children responded to the “paying to
learn” program by improving math scores but not the
test results for reading, social science, and science.
Motivation and Support
In a randomized field experiment at a large Canadian
university (Angrist et al. 2009), first-year undergradu- I
ates were assigned to one of three treatment groups:
(1) services such as peer advising and organized study
groups, (2) substantial merit scholarship for good
grades, and (3) both services and scholarships. Several
interesting results emerge. First, use of services was
much greater when combined with a financial incen-
tive. Second, none of the interventions affected males,
whereas females’ grades improved for both treatments
with scholarships. Finally, retention rates improved for
females who received both services and scholarships.
The Dallas-based Advanced Placement (AP) Incen-
tive Program involved payments both to 11th- and
12th-grade students and to their teachers for passing
AP tests. The program improved students’ long run
academic performance, namely, attending college, col-
legiate GPAs, and persistence in college beyond the
freshman year (Jackson 2010). While the program
appears to have improved the outcomes of students
who would have attended college anyway, most notably
it increased the college graduation rate of black and
Hispanic students, groups that tend to underperform
in college. Thus, this program appears to have gener-
ated lasting positive and large effects.
Outcome Rewards Work for Higher
Achieving Students
Angrist and Lavy (2009) report that cash incentives
increased the certification rates of Israeli girls (but
not of boys), apparently because the girls devoted
extra time to exam preparation. The effect on girls
was largely driven by an increase in passing rates
among those who had a relatively high chance of
1514 I Incentives and Student Learning

passing these exams to begin with, rather than for
low-achieving students.
In an example of who responds to incentives, eco-
nomics and business freshman at the University of
Amsterdam were offered either a high or a low financial
reward for passing all first-year requirements compared
to a control group with no reward (Leuven et al. 2010).
Although the passing rate and accumulated credits did
not differ between the three groups, higher compensa-
tion did elicit better outcomes for students with higher
math skills and more highly educated fathers.
● Health-focused conditions, which include
maintaining health insurance coverage for parents
and their children, as well as obtaining age-
appropriate preventive medical and dental
checkups for each family member
● Workforce-focused conditions, aimed at parents,
which include sustaining full-time work and par-
ticipation in approved education or job training
activities
The program seems to have positively affected the
last two areas above but not academic outcomes.

Family Incentives: Rewarding Student Teacher Incentives

and Family Inputs Performance-based pay for teachers attempts to influ-
Indirect incentives focus on withholding benefits for
ence student performance via teacher effort (from
families on public assistance whose children do not
attendance to additional time after school helping stu-
meet certain academic criteria (e.g., minimum atten-
dents). Both individual-based and group-based incen-
dance levels). Such “conditional cash penalties” are in
tives for teachers have been studied. For the former,
effect in such diverse areas as Mexico (PROGRESA)
teacher effort (or more precisely, student outcomes)
and Wisconsin in the USA (Learnfare).
and reward are directly linked whereas in the latter
Mexico’s antipoverty program, PROGRESA pro-
effort and reward are measured at the school level
vides monetary transfers to families contingent on
(changes in school-level student performance is met
their children’s regular attendance at school.
with school-level rewards/punishments). Individual
A randomized social experiment, PROGRESA
teacher-level incentives have been found to be more
increased schooling attainment by reducing dropout
effective than group incentives – probably due to free-
rates and facilitating grade progression, particularly
riding with the group incentives. Recent research on
during the transition from primary to secondary
teacher incentives in the USA finds that teachers some-
school (Behrman et al. 2001). Since most commonly
times react strategically by, for example, reclassifying
females tend to respond more to incentives than males,
poor-performing students or even cheating (Jacob
it is notable that the PROGRESA treatment effects for
2002; Jacob and Levitt 2003).
boys exceeded that of girls.
Figlio and Kenny (2006) find that that test scores
Dee (2009), studying Wisconsin’s “Learnfare” pro-
are higher in schools that offer individual teacher
gram, finds that well-designed financial incentives,
incentives for good performance, including a particu-
those that reward effort rather than direct perfor-
larly strong relationship for schools that may have the
mance, can be effective in improving the school persis-
least parental oversight. Since this study was not
tence of at-risk students at scale. He concludes,
a randomized evaluation, the authors cannot deter-
“Learnfare closed the enrollment gap between baseline
mine whether this relationship results from more effort
dropouts and school attendees by 41%.”
by teachers or better schools adopting teaching
In New York City beginning in 2007, a privately
incentives.
funded conditional cash transfer program offered an
A flurry of new research has occurred recently
extensive set of rewards (averaging $6,000 per family in
investigating the benefits of explicit incentives for stu-
its first 2 years) in three areas (Riccio et al. 2010):
dent learning in developing countries, for example, in
● Education-focused conditions, which include India (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2009; Duflo
meeting goals for children’s attendance in school, and Hanna 2005) and Kenya (Kremer et al. 2004). The
achievement levels on standardized tests, and other findings are generally positive: improvement in test
school progress markers, as well as parents’ engage- scores (of around 0.2 standard deviations), with spill-
ment with their children’s education over effects, and increased teacher attendance, but with

some evidence that the incentives lead to more test prep
rather than more effort.
School-Level Changes and Incentives
Market-based incentives meant to increase competi-
tion for students and associated funding have been
introduced in the USA (and elsewhere) at the
national and local levels. In the USA, the No Child
Left Behind Act, signed into law in 2001, was
a response at the national level to the poor learning
and graduation rates of America’s youth and the
debate about education policy precipitated by the
1983 publication of the federal government’s report
on the state of America’s schools, A Nation at Risk
(National Commission on Excellence in Education).
NCLB changed incentives regarding standardized
tests, creating penalizes if students do not meet stan-
dards (“minimum requirements”?) or do not show
year-to-year improvements. If all students fail to
meet, or are not making progress toward, minimum
standards, schools could be labeled “underperforming”
which allows students to transfer to other schools and
threatens reduced funding for the school and removal
of administrators. The Obama administration modi-
fied NCLB to improve state-adopted learning stan-
dards, and to focus on the worse-performing 5% of
schools (threatening to replace the principals) and
well-performing schools (allow more latitude to
innovate).
The following studies provide evidence of student
learning benefits of particular changes but no evidence
that competition between schools improved educa-
tional outcomes.
Some evidence exists that lower-performing stu-
dents score better at the expense of their higher-
performing classmates under programs like NCLB
(Neal and Schanzenbach 2007). This likely results
from the incentive structure: schools are sanctioned if
too many students are not performing up to
a minimum standard. Thus, focus – effort and
resources – is placed on improving the performance
of students near the minimum level.
At the state and local levels, voucher programs and
charter schools are increasingly being used. Several
countries, the USA included, have initiated programs
designed to inject competition into the primary and
secondary education market. Voucher programs pro-
vide public funds so that students may attend any
Incentives and Student Learning I 1515
school, although the choice is often limited to nonsec-
tarian institutions. Charter schools are privately run
(typically publicly funded) alternatives to public run
schools. The idea is that competition will spur effort
and innovation, leading to improved teaching
techniques.
Although we will not survey the voluminous liter-
ature on charter schools, we will indicate the very
significant learning gains from the Knowledge is
Power Program (KIPP) charter schools (Angrist et al.
2010). The KIPP schools embrace a No Excuses
approach of public education, have a longer school
day and year, selective hiring of teachers, strict behavior
norms, and a focus on traditional reading and math
skills. In Boston, charter school students outperform
“pilot schools,” which are a public school alternative to I
charter schools in that they have some of the indepen-
dence of charter schools but operate within the school
districts, face little risk of closure, and are covered by
many of the same collective bargaining provisions as
traditional public schools (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2009).
According to Rouse and Barrow (2009), a survey of
the empirical evidence indicates limited benefits of
voucher programs. According to the authors “The
best research to date finds relatively small achievement
gains for students offered education vouchers, most of
which are not statistically different from zero. Further,
what little evidence exists regarding the potential for
public schools to respond to increased competitive
pressure generated by vouchers suggests that one
should remain wary that large improvements would
result from a more comprehensive voucher system.”
They continue, “Many questions remain unanswered,
however, including whether vouchers have longer-run
impacts on outcomes such as graduation rates, college
enrollment, or even future wages, and whether
vouchers might nevertheless provide a cost neutral
alternative to our current system of public education
provision at the elementary and secondary school
level.” Some research does report positive outcomes,
for example, in Columbia (Angrist et al. 2006),
Charlotte, North Carolina (Hastings and Weinstein
2007), and Florida (marginally higher scores, Figlio
and Rouse 2006).
Clark (2009) finds large student achievement gains
in British schools in which the vote to opt out of local
authority and to become autonomous barely won com-
pared to schools in which it barely lost. The gains seem
1516 I Incentives and Student Learning
to result from changes in the teaching staff. This reform
effort, though, appears not to have generated spillover
effects for neighboring schools, as the school choice
advocates argue.
General Conclusion and Open
Questions
A preliminary finding (e.g., Fryer 2010) is that incen-
tives for completion of tasks on the input side (e.g.,
attendance, reading) are more effective than similar
incentives for attainment on the output side (exam
scores, grades). In addition to students and families,
does this apply to teachers and administrators?
The disparate findings indicate that the particulars
of the incentive program and the school and students
affected matter a great deal. The devil is in the details.
Programs that emphasize individual rewards are more
likely to encourage greater effort and better outcomes
than programs whose structure allows for more free-
riding (as when rewards for good performance are
shared among participants).
We also do not know enough about the likely ben-
eficiaries of incentives. Whereas NCLB targets low
performing students and appears to have some success
in doing so, most studies discussed in this chapter show
that higher achieving students are more likely to
increase performance in response to incentives to do
so. Some studies indicate that the lowest performing
students fail to increase their achievement while other
studies show the opposite. Some studies indicate
improvement for females but not males.
Most of the programs using financial incentives to
improve student outcomes are fairly new, with many
unanswered questions. Longer-run impacts are still
being measured. Thus, it is not entirely clear what the
effects are on graduation rates, college enrollment, and
attitudes toward life-long learning.
Finally, cost effectiveness has not yet been a major
point of study. Costs will surely become increasingly
important in the current and future era of fiscal
constraints.
Cross-References
▶ Autonomous Learning and Effective Engagement
▶ Engagement in Learning
▶ Student-Centered Learning
▶ Styles of Engagement in Learning
References
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(2009). Accountability and flexibility in public schools: evidence
from Boston’s charters and pilots. NBER Working Paper No.
15549, Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Angrist, J., & Lavy, V. (2009). The effects of high stakes high school
achievement awards: Evidence from a group randomized trial.
The American Economic Review, 99, 1384–1414.
Angrist, J., Bettinger, E., & Kremer, M. (2006). Long-term educational
consequences of secondary school vouchers: Evidence from
administrative records in Colombia. The American Economic
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Angrist, J., Lang, D., & Oreopoulos, P. (2009). Incentives and
services for college achievement: Evidence from a randomized
trial. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1,
136–163.
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Who benefits from KIPP? NBER Working Paper No. 15740.
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Behrman, J., Sengupta, P., Todd, P. (2001). Progressing through
PROGRESA: An impact assessment of a school subsidy experi-
ment. Penn Institute for Economic Research Working Paper 01–
033. http://pier.econ.upenn.edu/Archive/01-033.pdf. Accessed
3 June 2010.
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Incidental Learning
STEVE W. KELLY
Department of Psychology, University of Strathclyde,
Glasgow, Scotland, UK
Synonyms
Experiential learning; Informal learning; Learning
en-passant; Low involvement learning; Tacit knowing;
Unconscious learning
Definition
Incidental learning refers to any learning that is
unplanned or unintended. It develops while engaging
in a task or activity and may also arise as a by-product
of planned learning. “Incidental learning” can imply
View publication stats
Incidental Learning I 1517
that the acquisition of knowledge is unconscious in
nature, though in contrast to implicit learning, there
is no expectation that such knowledge should remain
largely inaccessible to conscious awareness. However,
note that some articles may refer to implicit learning
tasks as incidental without making the above distinc-
tion. There is also a suggestion, mainly from an educa-
tional perspective, that incidental learning involves
subsequent conscious reflection on material that was
consciously noted at time of study but not recognized
as relevant or useful.
Theoretical Background
Incidental learning features mainly in the education/
occupational literature and in the cognitive psychology
literature. In the former, incidental learning is seen as I
a subset of “informal learning” which is unstructured
and learner-led, the difference being that incidental
learning is seen as almost always occurring in every
situation. As this definition can be seen to incorporate
a vast array of circumstances and knowledge bases,
these models of incidental/informal learning cite fac-
tors such as life context of the learner, learning strate-
gies, framing problems, and the need for some internal
or external trigger to signal dissatisfaction with current
solutions (e.g., Marswick and Watkins 2001).
In cognitive psychology, the definition of incidental
learning is more likely to involve unconscious acquisi-
tion of information and the contrast between inciden-
tal and intentional learning of stimuli with a predefined
stimulus set. Early research found dissociations
between intentional and incidental learning with vari-
ables such as intra-list interference, distraction, incen-
tive, and emotion being manipulated experimentally
(e.g., Winnick and Lerner 1963). An example of
a standard paradigm would be to require learning of
geometric shapes of different colors; the shape would
be intentionally learned as this was part of the study
instructions but if color was also found to have been
correctly remembered then this was taken as evidence
for the incidental learning of color. While laboratory-
based studies were demonstrating learning effects
under incidental instructions, there was little evidence
to suggest that such learning was commonplace in
real life. Morton (1967) examined knowledge of the
correspondence between the letters and numbers on
telephone dials. Even experienced telephonists performed
poorly on recognition and recall of this material.