• Chavez (Sol Gen) v.

Sandiganbayan and Enrile

o Facts:
• Republic through the PCGG with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez
filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint against Cojuangco and Enrile for
reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages
• Respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with
damages
• Enrile requested from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG
officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him,
which was later granted by the Sandiganbayan
• According to the Senate President Salonga not one of the documents left by then
President Marcos including the 2,300-page evidence turned over to the PCGG by the
US State Department implicates Enrile and that Chavez allowed or tolerated the filing
of the utterly baseless complaint against Defendant Enrile
• On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against
him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the
Republic, that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under the
law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases, he cannot be
sued in a counterclaim in the same case

o Issue and Ruling:

• WON impleading the petitioner Chavez as additional party defendant in the
counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile is proper (NO)
▪ The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for
acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where
they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith and a mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being
automatically dropped
▪ However, under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed
by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from
the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not
constitute a compulsory counterclaim
▪ To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil
action for damages against the Solicitor General
▪ we ruled that damages claimed to have been suffered as a consequence of an
action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action as a
compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by the
private respondent against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the
present case, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the
party plaintiff itself
▪ To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients,
who is merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in
the case would lead to mischievous consequences
▪ We do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits.
However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on a
counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a
party. Any claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should be filed in
an entirely separate and distinct civil action
• Bulacan v. Torcino
o Facts:
• A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction
was filed with the MTC against Torcino
• The complaint was signed by Nunes a friend counsel of plaintiff Bulacan but verified
by Bulacan himself
• When Torcino filed their answer they did not complain that it was Nunes who signed
the complaint
• The court rendered a decision ordering Torcino to demolish and remove the portion
of their house which was illegally constructed on the land of the plaintiff
• Torcino appealed to the CA, they sought to dismiss the original complaint on the
ground that the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted attorney,
and therefore must be considered as sham and false; and that the fact that the
complaint is verified, does not in itself cure the defect obtaining in the complaint
• Bulacan opposed the motion and alleged that the motion to dismiss was not filed on
time and the defenses therein were not pleaded in the answer in the municipal court
and therefore, are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal
in the Court of First Instance. The opposition also stated that the complaint
substantially conforms to the Rule
•
o Issue and Ruling:
• WON a complaint for forcible entry and detainer should be dismissed by a municipal
court on the ground that the plaintiff knowingly asked a non-member of the bar to
sign and file it for him (NO)
▪ The Torcinos allege that the complaint is irregular as it was signed not by the
plaintiff but by one who was not a member of the bar and who designated
himself merely as "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff." The appellants argue that
the municipal court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. They invoke
Section 5, Rule 7 which says that a party that is not represented by an atty must
sign his pleading
▪ Under the facts of this case, however, the applicable provision is Section 34,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states that in the Court of a municipality a
party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney
▪ The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend,
agent, or an attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the
litigant must be aided by a duly authorized member of the bar. The rule invoked
by the Torcinos applies only to cases filed with the regional trial court and not to
cases before a municipal court.

• Estoesta v. CA and Judge Gonzales

o Facts:
• Petitioner Estoesta was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries committed
against Corpuz in an information filed with the MeTC, by the same token, on a
 countercharge of petitioner, Perla Y. Corpuz was charged in an information for the
same offense before the same court
• Cases were consolidated and after a joint trial on the merits where both parties were
duly represented by counsel, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the
petitioner Estoesta of the crime charged and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of
11-20 days but acquitting Corpuz
• Estoesta appealed to the RTC but was instead given a straight sentence of 11 days
• Petitioner Estoesta who initially filed for extension to write a petition for review filed a
motion to withdraw the petition to review in her own behalf for the purpose of
applying for probation in the court of origin, "she being a first offender and possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for under the said
probation law; The motion was granted by the CA
• Estoesta a few month later filed for the reinstatement of petition for review and
petition on the ground that the motion to withdraw the petition for review was filed
without the advice of her lawyer and under the honest impression that her application
for probation pending with the lower court will be granted but the CA denied it hence
this petition of review on certiorari
o Issue and Ruling:
• WON there was GAD when the CA denied the motion to reinstate review (NO)
▪ SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar
▪ From the foregoing provision of the rule, it is clear that a party in a case may
conduct a litigation either personally or by an attorney in the courts. He may
also be assisted by an agent or friend for the purpose in the inferior courts. And
even if a party may have chosen to appear through counsel, he may at any time
dispense with the services of his/her lawyer and prosecute or defend his/her
case personally
▪ In this case the Court notes that before the lower courts, the petitioner was duly
represented by counsel. However, when she decided to elevate her case to the
Court of Appeals she chose to handle her case personally, first, by asking for an
extension of time within which to file a petition for review and second, by filing
thereafter a petition to withdraw the petition for review to enable her to apply
for probation
▪ Unfortunately no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
when the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction
▪ The Court emphasizes the fact that it is always better for a party to be
represented by counsel in a litigation. Nevertheless, it is the right of such party
to appear in his or her own behalf to prosecute or defend a cause in court. If in
the process petitioner suffered reverses, she has only herself to blame. She is
bound by the consequences of her own voluntary act

• Cortez v. CA and Judge Domingo

o Facts:
 • Judge Soriano of CFI Manila rendered a decision ordering defendants Kuy Guam Kay
and Supan to pay damages to the plaintiffs, the heirs of Severino Cortez. The court
found that, due to the driver’s negligence, a truck owned by Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and
driven by Supan hit and killed Severino Cortez
• Meanwhile the criminal case acquitted Supan from homicide through reckless
imprudence
• Supan filed petition in the CA so that the judgment of acquittal could be presented in
evidence, but it was denied
• 3 years later the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which increased the amount of
damages to 12K instead
• A copy of that decision was served on Atty.Yuseco, the defendants-appellants’ counsel
of record. However, Atty. Yuseco returned that copy and informed the Court by letter
that he had ceased to be the lawyer for Supan and Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd
• The CA noted Yuseco’s letter and made the observation that Yuseco had "not filed any
formal motion for the withdrawal of his appearance" in that case. The Court Appeals
then sent copies of the decision to the defendants appellants themselves by
registered mail but the copies were not delivered because they were unclaimed
• Thereafter, there was an entry of judgment indicating that the decision of the Court of
Appeals became final and executory
• Defendant firm, through a new lawyer, filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration and suspension of execution. It alleged that there was no valid service
of the decision upon it
• In 1970, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its 1969 decision and
dismissing the complaint on the basis that the acquittal of the accused of the crime of
homicide through reckless imprudence is a bar to the civil liability (Corpu v. Paje)
• Plaintiff Cortez now files the instant petition against CA and Guam Kay, which was an
appeal of the 1970 decision

o Issue and Ruling:

• WON the CA erred in reversing the already executory 1969 decision in their 1970
decision (YES)
▪ We hold that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to set aside on 1970 its
decision of 1969 which had become final and was in the process of being
executed
▪ The 1969 decision became final and executory as to defendant-appellant Kuy
Guam Kay, Ltd. because its lawyer of record, Atty. Yuseco, was duly served with
a copy of that decision. It is true that Atty. Yuseco returned that copy to the
Court with the note that he was no longer appellants’ counsel but that return
did not nullify the effectiveness of the service upon him since he did not retire
from the case with his client’s consent or with the Court’s authorization
▪ Unless the procedure prescribed in section 26 of Rule 138 is complied with the
attorney of record is regarded as the counsel who should be served with copies
of the judgments, orders and pleadings and who should be held responsible for
the conduct of the case
▪ In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a given case, there must
be
• (1) written application for substitution;
• (2) a written consent of the client, and
 • (3) a written consent of the attorney to be substituted.
• And in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be
obtained, there must at least be proof that notice of the motion for
substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by our
rules
▪ He was responsible for the conduct of the case since he had not been properly
relieved as counsel of record of the appellants

• Jesus Jureidini v. CA and Nazario Clarence Jureidini

o Facts:
• Respondent Jesus Jureidini, thru his counsel, Atty. Villanueva, filed before this Court
an appearance and amicable compromise agreement where Jesus would pay 100K to
Nazario Clarence in exchange for whatever claims the latter had in the estate of by
deceased Nazario (only) Jureidini
• Acting on the aforequoted compromise agreement the Atty. Arroyo et al. (previous
counsel for jesus), filed with this Court a manifestation and motion stating, among
other things:
▪ (a) that the appearance of Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva as counsel for respondent
Nazario Clarence Jureidini is without their knowledge and consent; and
▪ (b) that they have no knowledge intervention or inkling of the amicable
settlement executed by and between the petitioner and aforesaid respondent
• Atty. Arroyo et al. filed a motion to hold in abeyance approval of the compromise
agreement, stating among other things that the compromise, agreement "is not only
immoral and entered (into) in bad faith by petitioner and private respondent but also
patently unconscionable, inequitous and an unjust action to the prejudice of all the
lawyers who had rendered legal services
▪ Note: opposition was held in contempt for failing to file a rejoinder in the issue

o Issue and Ruling:

• WON the rights of lawyers to the fees due them for vices rendered their client be
invoked as a ground for in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement
entered into by the client and his adversary (NO)
▪ The matter of attorney's fees, if any, due from private respondent Nazario
Clarence Jureidini cannot have a standing higher than the rights of the clients or
the parties themselves.
▪ Hence, lawyers' rights to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the
lawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving or otherwise
▪ Holding in abeyance the approval of the compromise agreement, which is
otherwise not contrary to law, morals-, public order or public policy. The
lawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the proper court in an appropriate
proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court, but said rights may not be
used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement

• Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla

o Facts:
• Baby Surla, while confined at the said hospital for having been born prematurely, had
accidentally fallen from his incubator possibly causing serious harm on the child
 • Respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Santo Tomas
University Hospital in RTC Quezon
• Petitioner hospital filed its Answer with "Compulsory Counterclaim" asserting that
respondents still owed to it the amount of P82,632.10 representing hospital bills for
Emmanuel's confinement at the hospital and making a claim for moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney's fees, by reason of the supposed unfounded and malicious
suit filed against it
• Respondent spouses sought the dismissal of petitioner's counterclaim for its non-
compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a
complaint and other initiatory pleadings, such as a counterclaim, cross-claim, third
(fourth, etc.) party complaint, be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum
shopping
• Santo Tomas contended that the subject circular should be held to refer only to a
permissive counterclaim, an initiatory pleading not arising out of, nor necessarily
connected with, the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim but not to a compulsory
counterclaim spawned by the filing of a complaint and so intertwined therewith and
logically related thereto that it verily could not stand for independent adjudication.
Petitioner concluded that, since its counterclaim was compulsory in nature, the
subject circular did not perforce apply to it
• Trial court still dismissed on the ground that the admin circular did not distinguish, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision and dimissed the certiorari

o Issue and Ruling:

• WON Santo Tomas improperly filed a certiorari when an appeal was available (NO it is
proper)
▪ As a rule, errors of judgment, as well as of procedure, neither relating to the
jurisdiction of the court nor involving grave abuse of discretion, are not
reviewable by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. As long as a court acts
within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise
thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing more than
an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a
special civil action of certiorari
▪ This rule, however, is not a rigid and inflexible technicality. This Court has not
too infrequently given due course to a petition for certiorari, even when the
proper remedy would have been an appeal, where valid and compelling
considerations could warrant such a recourse
▪ In the case at bar, an appeal from the dismissal of the counterclaim, although
not totally unavailable, could have well been ineffective, if not futile, as far as
petitioner is concerned since no single piece of evidence has yet been presented
by it, that opportunity having been foreclosed by the trial court, on the
dismissed counterclaim which could form part of the records to be reviewed by
the appellate court. The object of procedural law is not to cause an undue
protraction of the litigation, but to facilitate the adjudication of conflicting
claims and to serve, rather than to defeat, the ends of justice
• WON a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer should be dismissed on the
ground of a failure to accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping (NO)
▪ It bears stressing, once again, that the real office of Administrative Circular No.
04-94, is to curb the malpractice commonly referred to also as forum-shopping.
 It is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in
one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum
▪ The language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to
cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a
claim for relief, obviously does not include a claim which cannot be
independently set up
▪ The foregoing rationale of the circular aptly taken, to sustain the view that the
circular in question has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of
claim which, by its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit
and as deriving its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be
appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for
independent resolution except by the court where the main case pends
▪ However only the damages and NOT the hospitable bills are safe from the rule

• Kavinta v. Judge Castillo

o Facts:
• Franco was a respondent in a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Issuance of
Writ of Demolition which was presided over by judge Castillo
• Petitioner Kavinta moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that "it does not
comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Supreme Court
• Judge Castillo issued an order denying the motion to dismiss in view of the submission
of the aforesaid certification, and directing the defendants to file their answer or
responsive pleading "within the remaining reglementary period

o Issue and Ruling:

• WON public respondent Judge Castillo has committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the certification of
non-forum shopping required under Administrative Circular No. 04-941 was,
nevertheless, subsequently submitted after the filing of the motion to dismiss (NO
GAD)
▪ The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its
requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances
▪ in his motion to dismiss the instant petition, private respondent Franco pointed
out that the filing of the required certification was done with dispatch by his
counsel upon "realization of the existence of said circular." He thereby admits
his unawareness or ignorance of the Circular at the time he filed his complaint.
We are not unmindful of the fact that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 took
effect only on April 1, 1994 while the case was filed in May 11, 1994
▪ The proximity then of the filing of the complaint to the date of the effectivity of
the Circular may be pleaded as a justifiable circumstance, and the belated filing
of the certification required thereunder may be deemed a substantial
compliance therewith. We thus rule pro hac vice, but not without a whit of
reluctance, that this special circumstance in this case could sustain the action of
the respondent Judge
• International Container Terminal Services v. CA and Manila Pilots Association Et Al.
o Facts:
• Philippine Ports Authority issued Administrative Order No. 02-88 (A.O. No. 02-88)
entitled "Implementing Guidelines on Open Pilotage Service, it opened pilotage
services in the Philippines to all licensed and accredited harbor pilots regardless of
their non-membership in existing harbor pilots association
• United Harbor and Manila Pilots Association claimed that the AO violated their
exclusive right to provide pilotage services in the Philippines thus they sought to
invalidate it with a prohibition
• RTC granted holding that the PPA acted without jurisdiction, went to the CA via
certiorari but dismissed because it was a purely legal question thus it went to the SC
also via certiorari
• Petitioner "International Container" took over the pilotage services at the Manila
International Port area by virtue of a contract it entered into with the Philippine Ports
Authority
• Contempt proceedings took place for not heeding the final judgment (1st case)
• Similarly, aggrieved by the unjust actuations of petitioner "International Container",
and its continuing refusal to relinquish pilotage services in the Manila International
Port area, private respondent "Manila Pilots" instituted a petition for mandamus,
prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against petitioner
"International Container (Case on prohibition 2nd case)
• the Regional Trial Court issued the writ prayed for, thereby "restoring and reinstating
private respondent "Manila Pilots" to the exclusive exercise of harbor pilotage in the
Manila International Port (MIP) area and commanding petitioner "International
Container" to cease and desist from usurping or exercising the right to compulsory
pilotage in the said Manila International Port (66143 decided on)
• Hence the appeal to the SC by the International Container Terminal Services

o Issue and Ruling:

• WON there was forum shopping (NO)
▪ ICTS contends that private respondent "Manila Pilots" is guilty of forum
shopping because at the time the contempt petitions were pending . . . and
while these petitions were being challenged 66143, another case . . . was
pending before RTC Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 66024 damages
▪ For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions,
same essential facts and circumstances. Furthermore, the actions must also
raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. We find no such
similarity in the actions involved, these two cases do not have the same facts
nor do they raise identical causes of action
• The facts which gave rise to the contempt petition is directed against
what was perceived to be violative of the permanent injunction issued to
implement the open pilotage policy
• Upon the other hand the complaint in Civil Case No. 93-68143 (sic) is
anchored on the alleged usurpation of the right of respondents on (sic)
the sole and exclusive exercise of Harbor Pilotage only in the MIP area
▪ A party to a case resorts to forum shopping because "[b]y filing another petition
involving the same essential facts and circumstances, . . ., respondents
approached two different fora in order to increase their chances of obtaining a
 favorable decision or action". 18 It cannot be said that private respondent
"Manila Pilots" sought to increase its chances of obtaining a favorable decision
or action as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, inasmuch as no
unfavorable decision had ever been rendered against private respondent
"Manila Pilots" in any of the cases brought before the courts below

• Ortiz v. CA and Rodriguez

o Facts:
• Spouses Rodriguez filed an action for ejectment in the MeTC, against the Ortizes, who
are lessees of Barramedas, on the ground that they are the real owners of the house
and lot or the subject property not Barramedas
• MeTC awarded the property in favor of spouses Rodriguez, thus the Ortizes appealed
to the RTC who later affirmed the MeTC decision and issued a writ of execution
• Ortizes appealed to the Court of Appeals but the petition was dismissed on the
following grounds:
▪ (1) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by the counsel and not
by the petitioners themselves, and
▪ (2) the copy of the RTC decision is not duly certified as a true copy as required
by Sec. 3 (b), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the CA
• Hence the petition before the SC

o Issue and Ruling:

• WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review for failure to comply with the
procedural requirements set forth in the SC circulars (NO the CA did not err)
▪ It should be recalled that Revised Circular No. 28-915 provides that the party
must certify under oath that he has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, and that
to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency.
▪ Petitioners Ortiz admit that their lawyer, Atty. Ma. Filomena Singh-Paulite,
signed the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping. Allegedly, Atty. Paulite has
personal knowledge that the Ortizes had not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same parties and causes of action. Petitioners now
assert that their lawyer's signature must be accepted as substantial compliance
with the requirements of the Circular
▪ We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance as provided for in Circular No. 28-91. The attestation contained in
the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the
party who executed the same
▪ To merit the Court' s consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must
convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of justice. However, the petitioners did not give any explanation
to warrant their exemption from the strict application of the rule. Utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction
 ▪ petitioners failed to fully satisfy the CA or this Court that
• (1) the non-compliance with the requirements was not in any way
attributable to them;
• (2) they exerted due diligence; and
• (3) there are highly justifiable and compelling reasons for the court to
make a disposition in the interest of justice
▪ The Petition for Review filed by the Ortizes' with the CA was an appeal from the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the Ortizes should
bear in mind that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.10 The party who
seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules.
Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost

RULE 8: Manner of making Allegations in a pleading

• Toribio v. Judge Bidin and Ramos

o Facts:
• Francisco and Esteban were the registered owners of the parcel of land, at the death
of said spouses, they were survived by their ten (10) children who inherited their state
in equal pro indiviso shares
• The children were all surnamed Toribio, lot 1943 was given to Justa one of the
children, who later died and was survived by 8 of her own who sold 4 of the 8 shares
of lot 1943 to Ramos while another heirs sold one share to be later received by
Camacho
• 3 heirs filed a case for recovery of hereditary rights against Ramos saying that they did
not transfer their shares to Ramos and that Ramos acquired more than he should
have
• Ramos said he got the excess from Camacho who said he got it from the heirs
• While testifying during the trial, Eusebia Toribio was asked whether she executed any
sale of her share in the parcel of land in litigation. The counsel for private respondents
objected, raising the proper mode of contesting the genuineness of an actionable
document pursuant to Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8

SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. — Whenever an action or

defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such
instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a
copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be
deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set
forth in the pleading.

SEC. 8. How to contest genuineness of such documents. — When an action or

defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness
and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the
adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts; but this provision does not apply when the adverse party
 does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an
order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

• Toribio stated that the documents submitted by the respondent Ramos was merely
evidentiary in nature, not a cause of action or defense, the due execution and
genuineness of which they had to prove. They alleged that the subject of litigation was
the hereditary shares of plaintiffs-petitioners, not any document. They stated that the
defense consisting mainly of transfer certificates of titles in the respondents' names
originating from the sale from petitioners to Dionisio and from the latter to the
respondents were merely evidentiary in nature (meaning they still have to prove its
genuiness)
• The court denied their MR and held that the documents attached to the respondents'
answer and made an integral part thereof were declared to be the very foundation or
basis of the respondents' defense and not merely evidentiary in nature. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari
o Issue and Ruling:
• WON the deeds of sale allegedly executed by the petitioners in favor of their brother
Dionisio Toribio and appended to the respondents' answer are merely evidentiary in
nature or the very foundation of their defense which must be denied under oath by
the petitioner (YES it applies to plaintiffs also, but failure to deny is not fatal)
▪ The Rule, however, covers both an action or a defense based on documents
▪ The situation obtaining in the case at bar is not a common one. The usual case is
between plaintiff and defendant where, the latter, as his defense, would
present a document to which both parties are parties and which states that the
former relinquishes his rights to the defendant. In the case at bar, we have a
situation where the defendant presented a document in his defense, a
document to which the plaintiff is a party but to which defendant is not. Thus,
the question arises as to whether or not the document is included as a
necessary part of the defense so as to make it actionable
▪ From the foregoing, it is clear that the respondents anchor their defense on the
deeds of sale by virtue of which the hereditary rights of all the petitioners over
Lot 1943-B were sold, transferred, and conveyed in favor of their brother,
Dionisio Toribio, who in turn sold the same to herein respondents. The deed of
sale executed by the petitioners in favor of their brother Dionisio is an essential
and indispensable part of their defense to the allegation that the petitioners
had never disposed of their property
▪ Apart from alleging that the documents in this case are merely evidentiary, the
petitioners also point out that the deeds of sale purportedly executed by them
were in favor of their brother, Dionisio, who in turn executed deeds of sale in
favor of the respondents. Under this circumstance, does the genuineness and
due execution of the deeds evidencing the two transactions have to be denied
under oath?
▪ The petitioners are themselves parties to the deeds of sale which are sought to
be enforced against them. The complaint was filed by the petitioners. They filed
suit to recover their hereditary properties. The new owners introduced deeds of
sale as their main defense. In other words, the petitioners brought the issue
upon themselves. They should meet it properly according to the Rules of Court
 ▪ Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 8, therefore, apply. The proper procedure was for the
petitioners to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution
of the questioned deeds of sale and to set forth what they claim to be the facts.
However, the oversight or negligence of petitioners' counsel in not properly
drafting a reply to the answer and an answer to the counter claim is not
necessarily fatal to their cause
▪ The reason for the rule is to enable the adverse party to know beforehand
whether he will have to meet the issue of genuineness or due execution of the
document during trial. (In re Dick's Estate, 235 N.W. 401). While mandatory, the
rule is a discovery procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its
purpose, and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The
interpretation should be one which assist the parties in obtaining a speedy,
inexpensive, and most important, a just determination of the disputed issues
▪ Petitioners' counsel was obviously lulled into complacency by two factors. First,
the plaintiffs, now petitioners, had already stated under oath that they never
sold, transferred, or disposed of their shares in the inheritance to others.
Second, the usual procedure is for a defendant to specifically deny under oath
the genuineness and due execution of documents set forth in and annexed to
the complaint. Somehow, it skipped counsel's attention that the rule refers to
either an action or a defense based upon a written instrument or document. It
applies to both plaintiffs and defendants
▪ Respondent court is ordered to receive the petitioners' evidence regarding the
genuineness and due execution of the disputed deeds of sale

• Bough and Bough v. Cantiveros

o Facts:
• Cantiveros is reputed to be the richest resident of the municipality of Leyte. She was
the owner of various parcels of realty of the value of thirty thousand pesos or more.
Cantiveros and her husband Vasquez, signed a marital contract of separation. At this
time there lived with Cantiveros, Hanopol, a cousin and protege since childhood, who
was married to Gustavus Bough.
• For this reason, Bough was regarded by Cantiveros with great confidence, even as her
child. Through the influence of Bough, who brought a story to Cantiveros that her
husband Vasquez was in town and might contest the contract for the separation of
the conjugal property, Cantiveros was induced to sign a fictitious contract of sale of all
her property to Basilia Bough.
• In order to reassure Cantiveros that they would not take advantage of the fictitious
sale, Gustavus Bough and Basilia Bough prepared and signed another document,
which is a donation by them to Cantiveros of all the property mentioned, to be
effective in case of the death of themselves and their children before the death of
Cantiveros. The defendant, Cantiveros, has remained in possession of the property
• Plaintiffs and appellants assign six errors of the trial court in so far as the facts are
concerned

o Issue and Ruling:

• WON The lower Court erred in permitting the defendants to present evidence, over the
objections of the plaintiff, tending to impugn the genuineness and due execution of
 the document, and in admitting them to show the circumstances under which it was
executed (NO)
▪ It is undeniable that this was an action brought upon a written instrument, and
that the complaint contained a copy of the instrument, but that its genuineness
and due execution were not specifically denied under oath in the answer. Is this
fatal to the defense
▪ Section 103 of the CC, When an action is brought upon a written instrument and
the complaint contains or has annexed a copy of such instrument, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted,
unless specifically denied under oath in the answer; and when the defense to an
action, or a counterclaim stated in an answer, is founded upon a written
instrument and the copy thereof is contained in or annexed to the answer, the
genuineness and due execution of such instrument shall be deemed admitted,
unless specifically denied under oath by the plaintiff in his pleadings
▪ the failure of the party to file an affidavit denying the genuineness and due
execution of the document does not estop him from controverting it by
evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations,
estoppel, and want of consideration. As section 285 of our Code of Civil
Procedure permits a writing to be impeached because of its illegality or fraud,
such a defense would not be barred by the provisions of section 103
▪ We hold that although the defendants did not deny the genuineness and due
execution of the contract of sale under oath, yet the defendants could properly
set up the defenses of fraud and want of consideration

• Hibberd v. Rohde
o Facts:
• In a suit on a promissory note against the makers. Only one of them, the defendant
Rohde, appeared and answered. He not having entered a verified specific denial of the
genuineness and due execution of the note, the plaintiff claims that his special
defense of illegality of consideration is cut off by section 103 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which reads as follows: "Actions and defenses based upon written
instruments. — When an action is brought upon a written instrument and the
complaint contains or has annexed a copy of such instrument, the genuineness and
due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless specifically denied
under oath in the answer
• Rhode was in the retail liquor business and secured a stock of merchandise Hibberd
and sold it. Alleging that they delivered the merchandise to him on deposit only,
Hibberd filed a complaint of Estafa against McMillian.
• McMillian was arrested and released on bond pending the preliminary hearing before
the justice of the peace. The defendant Rohde was a practicing attorney and
undertook McMillian’s defense in the Estafa case. Rohde testified that he was well
acquainted with the nature of the transaction between the firm of Brand & Hibberd
and McMillian; that the merchandise was sold outright to McMillian
• Rhode agreed to sign a promissory note in exchange for Hibberd withdrawing the
Estafa case
• Any agreement which has for its purpose the concealment of a public offense, the
suppression of evidence thereof, or the stifling of a criminal prosecution already
commenced is contra bonos mores and against public policy. Every successful attempt
 to shield persons guilty of such offenses adds impetus to crime by encouraging the
culprits and all others of criminal tendencies who may learn of such perversions of
justice, to commit further offenses
• By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an instrument, as provided
in this section, is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed
it and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment,
or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him; hence, such defenses as that the
signature is a forgery or unauthorized are cut off by the admission of its genuineness
and due execution

o Issue and Ruling:

• WON Rohde can use illegality of consideration in the promissory note can be used as a
defense even though the note was presented and its genuiness not denied by Rohde
then while under oath (YES)
▪ It has been held that the admission of the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument does not bar the defense of want of consideration
▪ The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie,
not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any
defense on the merits which does not contradict the execution of the
instrument introduced in evidence
▪ To so interpret section 103 as to prohibit such a defense as illegality of
consideration, which is clearly a defense of new matter, would pro tanto repeal
the second paragraph of section 94, which permits a defendant to answer by "A
statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim."
▪ Likewise, section 285 provides that the terms of a writing may be impeached by
reason of its illegality or fraud. We do not understand that such defenses are
barred by the provisions of section 103
▪ We accordingly hold that the special defense interposed by the defendant of
illegality of consideration is not barred by his failure to enter a verified denial of
the genuineness and due execution of the note set out in the complaint. Hence,
the evidence in support of that plea was competent
• Note
▪ We do not think that the evidence justifies this conclusion, that the note was a
compromise for a public offense. There is no charge that Brand & Hibberd filed
the criminal complaint with a view of extorting a settlement of their claim
against McMillian
▪ There can be no doubt that the agreement which resulted in the execution of
the note was entered into by Brand & Hibberd with an eye to the satisfaction of
their pecuniary claim against McMillian
▪ We are constrained to hold that no part of the consideration of the note
declared upon is illegal or against public policy. The plaintiff is therefore entitled
to judgment. The judgment appealed from is reversed and judgment is decreed
against the defendant Rohde for the sum of one thousand pesos, the amount
remaining unpaid on the note, together with legal interest from the date of the
institution of this action

• Jabalde v. PNB
o Facts:
 o Issue and Ruling:
• Central Surety v. CN Hodges
o Facts:
o Issue and Ruling:
• Capitol Motors v. Yabut
o Facts:
o Issue and Ruling: