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COLLADO V. CA (2002) are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates
Digest by: Jofil Abrenillo | 390 SCRA 343
Principles: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the state.
Facts: On 1985, Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration
court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an
approximate area of 120.0766 hectares It is situated in Barangay
San Antipolo, Rizal.
Attached to the application was the technical description of the
Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-
in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which
stated, [T]HIS SURVEY IS INSIDE IN-12 MARIQUINA
WATERSHED.
The OSG, and the Municipality of Antipolo, filed oppositions to
petitioner’s application. In due course, the land registration
court issued an order of general default against the whole
world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that:
 they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial.
 Their possession has been open, public, notorious
and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed
in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902
 they declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid
all the corresponding real estate taxes.
 According to them, there are now twenty-five co-
owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectares
each. During the hearings, petitioners submitted
evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers
of rights among them and their predecessors-in-
interest.
RTC ruled in favor to the petitioners, stated that “After appraisal
of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration
court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to
establish their registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the
court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of
petitioners”.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to
Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there had been
no clear showing that the Lot had been previously classified as
alienable and disposable making it subject to private
appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association,
Inc., an association of holders of certificates of stewardship
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR for brevity) under its Integrated Social
Forestry Program (ISF for brevity), filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-
In-Intervention. They likewise opposed the registration and
asserted that the Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that they
of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree
planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally
during the preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During
the preliminary conference, all the parties as represented by
their respective counsels agreed that the only issue for
resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the public
domain
CA declared RTC’s ruling to be null and void, under the Regalian
Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973
(Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands
of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the
private respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain
(Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public
land and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA
376).
Issue
Whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
Discussion: Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 established the
Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of
Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that the Lot is inside
the technical, literal description of the MWR.
However, the main thrust of petitioners claim over the Lot
is that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject
to private rights. They point out that EO 33 contains a saving
clause that the reservations are subject to existing private
rights, if any there be. Petitioners contend that their claim of
ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known
predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and
ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law
then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by
individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore
alienable and disposable. They conclude that private rights
were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33,
thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
UNDER THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE, ALL LANDS NOT
OTHERWISE APPEARING TO BE CLEARLY WITHIN PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP ARE PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE STATE.
The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias which laid the foundation
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that all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all
lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown.
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles
and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of
1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the Mortgage Law as
well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last
Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the
adjustment or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise
the lands would revert to the state.
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United
States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory
of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial
government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act
No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which provides that:
the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States.
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act and CA 141
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926
in 1919. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141 for brevity) amended Act
2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition
of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands.
Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act of
1903 later updated by PD 1529
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration
by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and
imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on
February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in the
Philippines under the Torrens system. The Torrens system
requires the government to issue a certificate of title stating
that the person named in the title is the owner of the property
described therein, subject to liens and encumbrances
annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title
is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel
of land are quieted upon issuance of the certificate. PD 1529,
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known as the Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11,
1978, amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian
doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as
the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain.
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, on
Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources barred the
alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural
lands, which were the only natural resources the State could
alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine
in Section 8, Article XIVon the National Economy and the
Patrimony of the Nation. The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the
Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on National
Economy and Patrimony.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation
of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public
domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed,
all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas,
oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features
which supply a human need and contribute to the health,
welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the
well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted
to park and recreational purposes.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did
petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue, private rights
over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33
segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative
FIRST. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the
burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section
48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption
that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and
that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration
in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title
may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo
real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant,
a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de
compra or title through purchase.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and
enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the
required period of possession, whether under the original
Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under
the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904,
petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by
deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for
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instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando
Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily,
petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner
and for the number of years required by law for the
confirmation of imperfect title.
SECOND, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable
land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the
Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable
and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their
application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a
watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of
petitioner’s application.
of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not change even if
we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed
the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in
1904. Petitioners case falters even more because of the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According
to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637
reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where petitioners'
Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly
populated and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners.

The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904

could no longer be counted because as a watershed
reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy,
disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141,
as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable
public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed
reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of
forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into
private ownership.

The possession of public land, however long the period may

have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.

LASTLY, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to

petitioner Edna T. Collados [as original applicant] application is
the technical description of the Lot signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the
Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated
that the Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.

The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and

insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been
officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included within a
watershed reservation duly established by Executive
Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that
the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and
convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.

It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither

petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had
been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioner’s
possession as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985
would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance

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REPUBLIC V. DELA ROSA (1988)
Digest by: Val Joseph Acevedo |
Facts: These three cases arose from the application for
registration of a parcel of land in 1965 by Jose de la Rosa on his
own behalf and on behalf of his three children. The land,
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into
9 lot. Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his
children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
1964.
The Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (Lots 1-5), Atok Big Wed
Corporation (Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9), and the
Bureau of Forestry Development (Lots 1-9) separately filed
opposition to the application.
In support of the application, Balbalia and Alberto testified that
they had acquired the land by prescription. Furthermore, they
presented their respective evidences. Balbalio presented her tax
declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to
1964, Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax
receipts from that year to 1964.
Oppositors’ Arguments
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral
claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it in 1934. Moreover, that it
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the
land in concept of owner. In support of this, Benguet presented
evidences such as its affidavits of annual assessment, geological
mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and
payment of taxes on the land.
On the other hand, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and
all of Lots of 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral
claims in 1930 and recorded in 1931, in the office of the mining
recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased in 1931 by
Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lots. The evidences that were
presented are its annual assessment work on the claims, such
as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes
thereon.
The BFD argued also that the land sought to be registered was
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by
reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
Decision of the RTC
RTC denied the application. It held that that the applicants had
failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the
land sought to be registered.
Decision of the CA
CA however reversed the decision of the RTC and recognized
the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet
and Atok respecting their mining claims.
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In other words, CA affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas
over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface
rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok went to the Supreme Court invoking
their superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own
petition for review and argues that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid
claim to the land because it is not alienable and registerable.
Issues
(1) Whether or not Benguet and Atok have superior right of
ownership over the disputed lands?
(2) Whether or not the land was transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription?
(3) Whether or not the land can be half agricultural and half
mineral?
Discussion:
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether or not Benguet and Atok have superior
right of ownership over the disputed lands?
RULING NO. 1: YES. Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to
the property in question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of
1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain
except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption.
Benguet and Atok have a vested right over the subject
property which could not be impaired
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land
and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this
did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at
that time.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and
Emma mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to
the approval of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, they
were removed from the public domain and had become private
properties of Benguet and Atok.
Effect of having a valid location of a mining claim
The location of the mining claim was perfected prior to 1935. In
the case of McDaniel v. Apacinle and Cuisia, the court ruled that
a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the
public domain. By such location and perfection, the land
located is segregated from the public domain even as against
the Government.
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only
to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to
the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right
to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and
conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of
a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public
domain and the property of the locator."
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The perfection of the mining claim converted the property
to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed
it from the public domain
By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land,
against even the government, without need of any further act
such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent
over it. As the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to
Benguet and Atok.
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether or not the land was transferred to the
private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription?
RULING NO. 2: NO. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private
property was subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even
to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription.
The land cannot be acquired through acquisitive
prescription in the case, for two reasons
However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not
available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open,
continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the
applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership.
They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and
applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. The trial judge,
who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand
and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their
credibility was not convinced.
We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it
was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient
basis.
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest
of the de la Rosas had really been in possession of the subject
property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of
the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which
it was not.
The property was mineral land, and they were claiming it
as agricultural land
They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor
were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in
the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was
aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below” but she
did not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed
to be the owner of the said land.
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ISSUE NO. 3: Whether or not the land can be half agricultural
and half mineral?
RULING NO. 3: NO.
Classification of the land must be categorical—either
completely mineral or completely agricultural
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and
that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral.
The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural.
In the case: In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so
and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the
mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations
were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease
to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because
it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who
were unlawfully occupying the surface.
Regalian Doctrine
Commonwealth Act No. 137 (Sec. 3-6) supports the application
of the Regalian doctrine. The rule simply reserves to the State
all minerals that may be found in public and even private land
devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining."
The Supreme Court corrected the reasoning of the Court of
Appeals when it supposed that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes
simultaneously.
According to the Court, the correct interpretation is that once
minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which
it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued
by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
Land is converted to mineral land and may not be used by
any private party
The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used
by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for
any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be
undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is
of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws
or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
Held: The decision of the respondent court dated April 30,
1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11,
1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.
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CARIÑO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT (1907)
Digest by: Nicole Kristine Dagohoy | 8 Phil. 150
Principle: Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of
land, being of common origin, presumptively belonged to
the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the
legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it was
necessary that the possession of the same pass from the
State.
Facts: In 1903, Mateo Cariño filed his petition in the Court of
Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to
a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares in Baguio, Benguet.
He claimed that he and his predecessors in interest had been in
possession over said parcel of land since time immemorial; that
the Igorot community where the said land was located had
always considered Mateo Cariño and his
predecessors/ancestors as the owner of said land; that said
parcel of land had been transferred to his predecessors and
unto him in accordance with the Igorot custom.
The land registration court granted his petition however, the
Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions,
alleging that the whole parcel of land is public property of the
Government and that the same was never acquired in any
manner or through any title of egresion from the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the
court of Land Registration rendered its judgment in these
terms:
Therefore, the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have
not possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said
property prior to the date on which Cariño constructed the house
now there — that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and
Cariño held possession for some years afterwards of but a part of
the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed
and the property in question is adjudged to be public land.
The case reached the Philippine Supreme Court. The latter ruled
against Mateo Cariño hence Cariño further appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not Mateo Cariño’s should be granted.
Discussion: Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of
land, being of common origin, presumptively belonged to
the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the
legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons, it
was necessary that the possession of the same pass from
the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion
of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government, nor is
there any possessory information equivalent to title by
composition or under agreement. The possessory information
filed herein is not the title to property authorized in substitution
for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894,
this being the last law or legal disposition of the former
LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES | BATCH 2018-2019 6
sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of
common lands:
1. First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is
not covered nor does it come within any one of the
three conditions required by Article 19 of the said
royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an
uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of
six years last past; or that the same has been
possessed without interruption during a period of
twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up
to the date of the information and during the three
years immediately preceding such information; or that
such land had been possessed openly without
interruption during a period of thirty or more years,
notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor
is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the
two witnesses to the possessory information for the
following reason.
2. Second, because the possessory information
authorized by said royal decree or last legal
disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for
the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right,
equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish
Government and required and necessary at all times
until the publication of said royal decree was limited
in time to one year, in accordance with article 21,
which is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be
extended, is allowed to verify the possessory
informations which are referred to in Articles 19 and
20. After the expiration of this period of the right of
the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain
gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together
with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case
may be, to the community, and the said possessors
and cultivators or their assigns would simply have
rights under universal or general title of average in the
event that the land is sold within a period of five years
immediately following the cancellation. The
possessors not included under this chapter can only
acquire by time the ownership and title to
unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with
common law."
HELD: Yes, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision held
by the Philippine Supreme Court. Mateo Cariño cannot be
deprived of his land simply because he failed to comply
with the formalities required by the Spanish law (or by a
Philippine law). Cariño’s title, which he acquired from his
ancestors predates, by more than 50 years, the establishment
of the American government in the Philippines (in fact, even
before the establishment of the Spanish government in the
Philippines).
From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been
determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might
be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared
in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we should not lose
sight of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in
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 LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES | BATCH 2018-2019 7

granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cariño

and his children have already exceeded such amount in
various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in
different cases decided by the said Court of Land
Registration, donations or gifts of land that could only have
been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with
the assistance of these new laws.

The US Supreme Court also noted that even the Solicitor

General admitted that the Igorots were hardly ruled by the
Spanish government. That being, it is unlikely that the Spanish
government would grant land titles to the Igorots even if they
will register their land under the old Spanish Law.

As what has been shown during the trial of this case, this land,
of which mention is made in said possessory information, and
upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the
petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the
possession in the judgment, is "used for pasture and sowing,"
and belongs to the class called public lands.

The US Supreme Court also ruled that to follow the stand of the
Solicitor General is to deprive the land titles of the natives (not
only Igorots but all native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands).
Under the Constitution: “no law shall be enacted in said
islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws.” The term “any
person” includes the natives (in this case, the Igorots). All lands
held under private ownership during the Spanish era shall
therefore be presumed to be such. Failure to register under
Spanish Law did not revert said lands to the public domain.

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LEE HONG KOK v. DAVID (1972)
Digest by: Lexa Athena Gador | 48 SCRA 372
Principle: The concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by
the present Constitution, states that ownership of lands is
being vested in the state as such rather than the head
thereof.
Facts: Respondent Aniano David obtained a lawful title to the
subject lot (Lot 2892 – 226 sqm, portion of Lot 2863 of Naga
Cadastre) pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. In
accordance with which, an order of award and for issuance of a
sales patent was made by the Director of Lands.
Based on the order of award of the Director of Lands, the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT
No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to
Respondent David.
Since the filing of the sales application of Respondent David
and during all the proceedings in connection with said
application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his
favor, Petitioners Hong Kok (Pedro, Simeon, Rosita, Leoncio)
did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto.
The lack of opposition or adverse claim is fatal to them because
after the registration and issuance of the certificate and
duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the
land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation
of Republic Act 496 (The Land Registration Act).
The land in question is not a private property as the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
have always sustained the public character for having been
formed by reclamation, as opposed to Petitioners’ contention
that it is accretion.
The only remedy available to the appellants is an action for
reconveyance on the ground of fraud. However, in the case, no
fraud was committed by Respondent David because everything
was done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of
the land were published, the actual sale and award to
Respondent David were not clandestine but open. The
application was also merely a renewal of his deceased wife's
application, with she occupied since 1938.
Issues
(1) Whether or not the Petitioners Hong Kok may question the
government grant to Respondent to Respondent David.
(2) Whether or not Respondent David has original acquisition of
title.
Discussion:
1. Whether the Petitioners Hong Kok may question the
government grant to Respondent to Respondent David. NO.
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring
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an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to
a void patent.
In the case: This was not done by said officers but by
Petitioners Hong Kok, who cannot claim that the patent and
title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as
owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after
claiming it as their private property. As such, they cannot
question the title legally issued. The legality of the grant is a
question between the grantee and the government.
Imperium v. Dominium; jura regalia
Imperium is the government authority possessed by the state
which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty.
Dominium is the capacity to own or acquire property. The use
of Dominium is appropriate with reference to lands held by the
state in its proprietary character. It may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution.
There was a recognition that "Spain in its earlier decrees
embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held
from the Crown.” That was a manifestation of the concept of
jura regalia, adopted by the present Constitution, ownership
being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof.
The unappropriated public lands constituting the public
domain remain to be in the government’s possession until
severed therefrom by state grant.
In the case: It was found that the disputed lot was the result of
reclamation, as such, its being correctly categorized as public
land is undeniable. The holding of Heirs of Datu Pendatun v.
Director of Lands finds application: "There being no evidence
that the property was acquired by the applicants or their
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title or by any other
means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be
held to be public domain." The well-settled rule is that "no
public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the government." It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the
state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
2. Whether or not Respondent David has original acquisition of
title. YES.
Because of their lack of opposition or adverse claim to the land
from the onset up until it comes under the operation of RA 496,
Respondent David’s title is already impressed with the quality
of indefeasibility. The decree of registration is conclusive and
final.
HELD: The Court dismissed the complaint of Petitioners Hong
Kok to have the Torrens Title of Respondent David declared null
and void.
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SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS v. COURT OF
APPEALS (1990)
Digest by: Karlena G. Luz | 181 SCRA 443
Principle: Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State
(Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution).
Facts: Sunbeam Convenience Foods Corporation (SUNBEAM)
acquired a Sales Patent given by the Director of Lands over 2
parcels of land situated in Mariveles, Bataan on 29 April 1963.
The Sales patent was registered on 3 May 1963 in the Registry
of Deeds who in turn issued an OCT. Subsequently, the OCT was
cancelled and a TCT was issued in favor of Coral Beach
Development Corporation (CORAL BEACH).
On 11 May 1976, the Solicitor General instituted before the CFI
of Bataan an action for reversion. Both SUNBEAM and CORAL
BEACH filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Republic should have (1) exhausted all the administrative
remedies first, (2) the title given to SUNBEAM and CORAL
BEACH had already become indefeasible, and (3) the action for
reversion is defective since it was instituted by the SolGen and
not the Director of Lands.
If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these
proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered
open to disposition.
Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles
do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land
is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
The director of lands does not confer
validity on title if land is forest land
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands
does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered
by the title or patent is part of the public forest.
The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the
classification of the land is by remanding the case to the lower
court for a full-dress trial on the issues involved.

CFI dismissed their complaint on 7 October 1977, adopting
mainly the theory that since the titles sought to be cancelled
emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands
Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the
disposition of the land. SolGen states that the lower court erred
in dismissing the complaint, that it isn’t under the jurisdiction
of the Director of Lands and that it should have decided based
on the merits and that the lands in question are inalienable, and
that the complaint was not defective.
We find nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of
Appeals to give due course to the petition considering that the
issue affected a matter of public concern which is the
disposition of the lands of our patrimony. No less than the
Constitution protects this policy.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

CA gave due course to the petition and set aside the Order of
Dismissal rendered by the CFI. Hence, this petition by
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.

Issues
W/N the lands which are subject of the complaint are alienable.

Discussion:
Classification of the Lands as Forest Lands
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ granting of the petition
filed by the Republic of the Philippines charging the then Court
of First Instance with grave abuse of discretion.

The filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion

by SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of cause
of action, necessarily carried with it the admission, for purposes
of the motion, of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the
complaint instituted by the Republic.

An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the

classification of the lands as forest lands. This material
allegation stated in the Republic’s complaint was never denied
specifically by SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.

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REPUBLIC VS. SAYO (1990)
Digest by: Kayla Paclibar | 191 SCRA 71
Principle: All applicants in land registration proceedings have the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be
registered belongs to the public domain. Under the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Facts: Casiano filed an original application for registration for
Lot No. 7454 of Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 with
an area of 33,950 hectares. The Director of Lands(DOL), Director
of Forestry(DOF), and Heirs of Liberato Bayaua (Heirs of Bayaua)
opposed the petition. After 20 years, a compromise agreement
was entered into by Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (Heirs of
Sandoval), Bureau of Lands, Heirs of Bayaua, and Philippine
Cacao Farm Products dividing the land according to the
following:
(1) Bureau of Lands = 4,109 hectares
(2) Bureau of Forest Development = 12, 341 hectares
(3) Heirs of Liberato Bayaua = 4,000 hectares
(4) Philippine Cacao = 8,000 hectares
(5) Heirs of Casiano Sandoval = 5,500 (1,500 to their
counsel)
They all agree to mutually waive and renounce all prior claims
to and over the Lot No. 7454.
Judge Sayo (respondent) approved the compromise agreement
and confirmed the title and ownership to the parties according
to the terms stated. The Solicitor General argues that the
decision by Judge Sayo.
Solicitor General’s Arguments
The decision of Judge Sayo should be annulled for being void
on the ground that it is a GAOD because:
(1) No evidence presented for registration of the land
(2) DOL and DOF had no legal authority to enter into a
compromise agreement
(3) The Sol Gen should have been given notice and
accorded opportunity to take part in the proceedings.
(4) There was no notice served to the Sol Gen for the
approval of the compromise.
Respondent’s (all parties to the CA) Arguments
Respondents contend that the Sol Gen’s arguments are
premised on the proposition that the Lot is a public land. It is
private in character because of the following:
(1) Possessory information title of applicants and
predecessors-in-interest
(2) Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the
DOL in cadastral proceeding
(3) Certification of National Library from 1932 that the
Estadistica de Propiedades of Isabela in 1896 and in the
Bureau of Archives the property was registered under
the Spanish system of land registration as private
property owned by Liberato Bayaua, their
predecessors-in-interest
(4) The registration under Torrens system (Act 496)
presupposes that there is already title to be confirmed
LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES | BATCH 2018-2019 10
by the court. Public Land act is not followed where the
presumption is that the land belongs to the State.
Issues
(1) Is Lot No. 7454 privately owned?
(2) Is a compromise agreement a sufficient basis to evince
ownership of property upon registration?
Discussion:
(1) Is Lot No. 7454 privately owned? NO.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Hence, applicants in land
registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming
the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain.
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired
by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any
other means for the property acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be part of the public domain. The
applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general
statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual
evidence of possession and title.
In the case: The only evidence presented was a photocopy of
a certification of the National library that the property was
registered under the Spanish system of Land Registration as
privately owned by Bayaua. However, that Spanish document
cannot be considered a title to property, it not being one
of the grants made during the Spanish Regime, and as it
follows, not constituting primary evidence of ownership.
(2) Is a compromise agreement a sufficient basis to evince
ownership of property upon registration? NO.
Following the discussion above, the registration of the land is
based solely on the compromise agreement. Such agreement
included parties who did not adduce evidence of ownership
over the land. Such decision founded on nothing but the
agreement among themselves that they had rights and
interests over the land.
Likewise, the assent from DOL and DOF to the compromise
agreement cannot defeat the absence of evidence of title by
the respondent-claimants.
Moreover, the Informacion posesoria under Spanish Mortgage
Law is a mode of acquiring title by:
(1) Inscription in the Registry of Property
(2) Actual, public, adverse, uninterrupted possession of
the land for 20 years
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 LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES | BATCH 2018-2019 11

In the case: There is no evidence as to the 2 requirements

for informacion posesoria. Thus, it cannot be evidence of
possession.

Lastly, the Sol Gen, who is the principal counsel of the

Government, should have been given notice to the execution
of the compromise agreement and the submission to Court for
approval. Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal,
acting as agent of the Sol Gen in land registration cases, are
not binding until they are actually received by the Sol Gen.

HELD: The Court declared the decision null and void and
remanded the case to the proper court for the presentment of
evidence to claims of ownership.

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SEVILLE v. NATIONAL DEV’T COMPANY (2001)
Digest by: Reginald Matt Santiago | GR 129401
Principle: Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that
piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence, occupation
thereof, however long, cannot ripen into ownership.
Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari questioning CA’s ruling.
Facts:
 By virtue of PD 625, Leyte Sab-a Basin Development
Authority, (LSBDA) was created to integrate government
and private sector efforts for a planned development
and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in Leyte.
 LSBDA was empowered to acquire real property in the
successful prosecution of its business.
 Letter of Instruction 962 authorized LSBDA to acquire
privately owned lands circumscribed in the Leyte
Industrial Development Estate by way of negotiated
sales with the landowners.
 14 June 1980, Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA a lot consisting
of 464,920 square meters in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Isabel,
Leyte covered by tax declarations under her name.
 1 June 1982, LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application with the Bureau of Lands (BOL) covering said
lot together with other lots acquired by LSBDA with
aggregate area of 4427508 sq.m.
 After due notice and investigation of the BOL,
Miscellaneous Sales Patent 9353 was issued in name of
LSBDA on the basis of which an Original Certificate was
transcribed in the Registration Book for Leyte on 12
August 1983 in the name of LSBDA.
 LSBDA assigned all of its rights over the subject
property to National Development Authority (NDC) as a
result of which a TCT was issued in 2 March 1990 by
Registry of Deeds in the name of NDC.
 This property was then leased to Philippine Associate
Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR); Philippine
Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS) and
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. (LEPANTO).
 29 November 1988 the Estate of Joaquin Ortega
represented by administrator Felipe Seville filed with the
RTC Ormoc a complaint for recovery of real property,
rentals and damages against the respondents (LSBDA,
NDC, PASAR, PHILPHOS, LEPANTO, Calixtra Yap and
Registry of Deeds of Leyte). This was later amended on
11 May 1990.
LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES | BATCH 2018-2019 12
RTC Ormoc Br. 12 Ruling
 Deed of Sale between Yap and LSBDA conveying the
subject property to LSBDA is declared null and void ab
initio.
 Intestate Estate of Joaquin Ortega is declared the owner
in fee simple of the 735,333 square meters subject of the
present action and NDC is ordered to segregate such
area from the OCT and convey the same to the Estate of
Joaquin Ortega.
 Respondents was ordered to pay accrued rentals and
interest.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing the Regalian Doctrine that lands not appearing to be
privately owned are presumed to be part of the public domain
it reversed the RTC ruling that:
1. No competent evidence proving property was private.
2. Possession then thereof, no matter how long would
not ripen into ownership, absent showing land is
alienable.
3. Property had been untitled before issuance of the
Sales Patent in favor of the LSBDA.
4. Petitioners were guilty of laches because they had
failed to apply for the judicial confirmation of their
title, if any.
5. There was no evidence of bad faith on part of LSBDA.
Issue
Whether or not the title of LSBDA over the property is valid.
Ruling: Yes, LSBDA has a valid title. The contention of Seville
that the property was theirs by acquisitive prescription, they
failed to present sufficient proof to overcome the presumption
under the Regalian Doctrine.
In addition, LSBDA has valid title because even though the land
was adjudged to be a public domain by the court, it is shown
that LSBDA followed the procedure by applying for a
Miscellaneous Sales Patent with the Bureau of Lands (after due
investigation) and acquired it in a public auction.
Validity of the LSBDA Title
SEVILLE’S ARGUMENT: Argues that the title is void having allegedly
been obtained from Calixtra Yap who had no right to it. They
maintain that they acquired title over the property by
acquisitive prescription, because they and their predecessors in
interest had been in possession of it for more than thirty years.
COURT REPLY: Thiscontention is untenable. There was no showing
that the land had been classified as alienable and disposable
before title was issued to LSBDA, hence Seville could not have
become the owners by acquisitive prescription.
Public Character of the Land
Under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of public domain belong
to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be
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clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain.
Occupation thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by
the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable.
To clarify, under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, a person in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of a
public land for more than thirty years acquires an imperfect title
that may be the subject of judicial confirmation.
 But, under Section 4 of PD 1073, Section 48 of the
Public Land Act only covers to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
Section 48 of Public Land Act:
The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall he entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this Chapter."
Section 4 of PD 1073:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act, are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945
Seville had no certificate of title over the subject property. Their
claim on acquisitive prescription was not supported by
incontrovertible proof that land has been previously classified as
alienable.
Again, tax declarations and deeds of sale are not conclusive
proofs of ownership, let alone showing that the land is
alienable. They are only indicia of claims.
LSBDA’s Title
SEVILLE’S ARGUMENT:They claims that LSBDA’s title is void for it
was derived from Calixtra Yap who was allegedly not the owner
of subject property. They allege that LSBDA having acquired the
rights of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of her imperfect title
under Section 48 of the Public Land Act.
COURT REPLY: This argument is devoid of factual or legal basis.
LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES | BATCH 2018-2019 13
They fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based not on
the conveyance made by Yap, but on the Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. 9353 issued by the director of the Bureau of Lands.
LSBDA filed an application for patent, the BOL conducted
investigation and found that the land was part of the public
domain. After compliance with the notice and publication
requirements, LSBDA acquired the property in a public
auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands.
On Estoppel
They insist that LSBDA was estopped from
SEVILLE’S ARGUMENT:
claiming that the land was public because the Deed of Sale
executed by Yap in its favor stipulated that “the seller (Yap) is
the absolute owner in fee simple of the property”
COURT REPLY: The power to classify a land as alienable belongs to
the State not to private entities, this the pronouncements of
Yap and LSBDA cannot affect the reclassification of the
property.
Moreover, the assailed misrepresentation was made by Yap as
a seller, thus the objections must be made by LSBDA not by
Seville. To clarify, Yap merely conveyed a claim not a title.
On Collateral Attack
SEVILLE’S ARGUMENT: They insist that they are not seeking the
reopening of a decree under the Torrens system for they are
only praying for segregation of 73 hectares more or less from
the OCT issued to LSBDA.
COURT REPLY: Petitioners are effectively seeking the modification
of the OCT of LSBDA which is tantamount to a collateral attack
not allowed by law (PD 1529, Section 28). A certificate of title
once registered cannot be attacked except in a direct
proceeding permitted by law. Moreover, the title became
indefeasible and incontrovertible after a lapse of one year from
the time of its registration and issuance.
On Reconveyance: Considering that the land was public before
the Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued to LSBDA, Seville had
no standing to ask for the reconveyance.
Conclusion: Absent any showing that the land has been
classified as alienable, their possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot ripen into ownership. They have not become
the owners of the disputed property.
Moreover, LSBDA’s title was derived from a Miscellaneous Sales
Patent not from Yap. Finally, petitioners cannot by a collateral
attack, challenge the certificate of title which has become
indefeasible and incontrovertible.
Decision: Petition is hereby denied; CA decision is affirmed.
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REPUBLIC V. ROD (1995)
Digest by: Jofil Abrenillo | 244 SCRA 537
Principles: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to belong to
the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public
lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the
Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Facts: On April 18, 1967, Manuel Atienza was awarded a Free
Patent over a parcel of land located in Ila, Malicboy, Pagbilao,
Quezon, with an area of 172,028 square meters. By virtue of
such award, he was issued on May 5, 1967, an Original
certificate of Title.ch Sometime in 1968, an investigation was
conducted by the Bureau of Lands in connection with alleged
land grabbing activities in Pagbilao. It appeared that some of
the free patents, including that of Atienza's, were fraudulently
acquired.
Thus, on March 19, 1970, a criminal complaint for falsification
of public documents was filed in the then Court of First Instance
of Quezon, Branch II, against Atienza and four other persons for
allegedly falsifying their applications for free patent, the survey
plans, and other documents pertinent to said applications.
In its decision, the court acquitted the accused of the crime
charged but, finding that the land covered by the application
for free patent of private respondent was within the forest zone,
declared as null and void the Original Certificate of Title issued
in Atienza's name and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon
to cancel the same.
In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in question was no
longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the
approval of his application for free patent by the Bureau of
Lands, the land "was already alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. He further alleged that through a certain
Sergio Castillo, he had been in possession of the land since the
Japanese occupation, cultivating it and introducing
improvements thereon. The DBP, after due and proper
investigation and inspection of his title, even granted him a loan
with the subject property as collateral. Finally, he stated that his
acquittal in the criminal case proved that he committed no
fraud in his application for free patent.
Meanwhile, On July 27, 1981, the lower court rendered a
decision with the categorical finding based on "solid evidence"
that "the land in question was found definitely within the forest
zone.
ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private
properties. In the absence of such classification, the land
remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition.
In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and disposing
lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands,
and ultimately, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources). Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department through the Office of
the President. Courts have no authority to do so.
Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public
agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption
of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the
private claimant who, in this case, is Atienza. The records show,
however, that he failed to present clear, positive and
absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to
support his claim.
Failed to present proof that he or his predecessor-in-
interest
Apart from his assertions before this Court, Atienza failed to
present proof that he or his predecessor-in-interest was
one of the claimants who answered the petition filed by the
then Attorney-General in the said cadastral proceedings.
The document reflecting said cadastral decision, a xerox copy,
indicated the claimants simply as "Jose Abastillas et al." In
support of that decision, Atienza presented a certification
purportedly issued by someone from the Technical Reference
Section of the Surveys Division, apparently of the Bureau of
Lands, stating that "Lot 5886 is a portion of Lot 5139 Pagbilao
Cadastre," which evidence is, however, directly controverted by
the sketch plan showing that the land in controversy is
actually outside the alienable and disposable public lands,
although part of Lot 5139.
The fact that Atienza acquired a title to the land is of no
moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of titles issued
under the Torrens system. In Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, we ruled that the indefeasibility of a certificate of title
cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of
fraud. The "fraud" contemplated by the law (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529)
is actual and extrinsic, that is, "an intentional omission of fact
required by law," which in the case at bench consisted in the
failure of Atienza to state that the land sought to be registered
still formed part of the unclassified forest lands.

Issue
WON the land in question is part of the alienable and
disposable public land. NO.

Discussion: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not

otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are
presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or
timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private

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ITURALDE V. FALCASANTOS (1999) Petitioner’s Arguments

Digest by: Lexa Athena Gador | 301 SCRA 293 Petitioner submits that when the Director of Lands allowed him
to file a public land application for said property, it was
Principles: Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are equivalent to a declaration that said land was no longer part of
public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the public domain.
the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released
Issue
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Whether the act of the Director of Lands allowing the filing of
Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and public land application for a forest land is a declaration that such
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other was no longer part of public domain. NO.
purposes, there must be a positive act from the government—a
positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land Discussion: CA correctly held that “the evidence is unrebutted
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. that the subject land is within the Forest Reserve Area and,
hence, not capable of private appropriation and occupation.
Possession of forest land, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.
Forest lands as public lands; private properties
Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public
Facts: Petitioner Ramon Ituralde acquired by purchase from the
lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under
heirs of Pedro Manaay a parcel of land at Bañas, Lantawan,
the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence
Basilan Province, with an area of 6 hectares.
of such classification, the land remains unclassified public
land until released therefrom and rendered open to
Respondent Alfredo Falcasantos applied with the Bureau of
disposition.
Lands in Isabela, Basilan province, for the award to him of the
same parcel of land under free patent. However, petitioner
Requirement to declassify forest land for other purposes
Ituralde filed a protest to such application.
Before any land may be declassified from the forest group
and converted into alienable or disposable land for
The Regional Director of Lands rendered a decision giving
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act
respondent Falcasantos a period of one hundred twenty (120)
from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
days to exercise the right to repurchase the land by reimbursing
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified
petitioner Ituralde of all expenses he incurred in the purchase
as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that
of the property in question, and held in abeyance respondent
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
Falcasantos’ application for free patent.
lands of the public domain - a positive act of the government
is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or
The Regional Director then issued an order declaring that
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
respondent Falcasantos had waived his right of repurchase, and
rejected his application for free patent for lack of interest, and
A long settled rule is: Possession of forest lands, however long,
allowed petitioner Ituralde to file a public land application for
cannot ripen into private ownership.
the subject land.

In the case: There was yet no award or grant to petitioner

The Regional Director ordered respondent Falcasantos to
Ituralde of the land in question by free patent or other ways of
vacate the land in question, but he refused. As such, petitioner
acquisition of public land. Consequently, he cannot lawfully
Ituralde filed with the RTC, a complaint for recovery of
claim to be the owner of the land in question.
ownership and possession of the subject parcel of land.
Respondent Falcasantos answered that the land occupied by
HELD: The Court affirms the decision of CA.
him belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, and that he
had introduced improvements thereon such as coconut and
other fruit trees.

RTC rendered decision declaring petitioner Ituralde the owner

and possessor of the subject parcel of land with all the
improvements existing thereon and ordering respondent
Falcasantos to vacate the land in question.

The decision was appealed to the CA, and it reversed the RTC’s
decision, and entering a new judgment dismissing petitioner’s
complaint without prejudice to any action that petitioner may
take if the subject land was declassified from forest land to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

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REPUBLIC V. CANDY MAKER (2006)
Digest by: Nicole Kristine Dagohoy | 492 SCRA 272
Principle: The statute of limitations with regard to public
agricultural lands does not operate against the State unless the
occupant proves possession and occupation of the same after a
claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.
Facts: Sometime in 1998, Candy Maker, Inc. decided to
purchase Lot No. 3138 Cad. 688 of the Cainta-Taytay Cadastre,
a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation
away from the Laguna de Bay, and bounded on the southwest
by the Manggahan Floodway, and on the southeast by a legal
easement.
On April 1, 1998, Geodetic Engineer Potenciano H. Fernandez,
prepared and signed a Subdivision Plan of the property for
Apolonio Cruz. The property was subdivided into two lots: Lot
No. 3138-A with an area of 10,971 square meters, and Lot No.
3138-B with an area of 239 square meters. The technical
description of Lot No. 3138 was also prepared by Fernandez,
and was approved by the Regional Technical Director of the
Bureau of Lands on April 14, 1998.
On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc.
The buyer declared Lot No. 3138 for taxation purposes in 1999.
On June 16, 1999, Candy Maker, Inc., as applicant, filed an
application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal, for the registration of
its alleged title over Lot No. 3138-A and Lot No. 3138-B.
Subsequently, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) of Antipolo City filed on August 18,
1999 his Report declaring that "the land falls within the
Alienable and Disposable Zone, and that the property is the
subject of CENRO Case No. 520(97) entitled Perpetua San Jose
v. Almario Cruz. On the other hand, the Land Resgistration
Authority (LRA), in its September 21, 1999 Report,
recommended the exclusion of Lot No. 3138-B on the ground
that it is a legal easement and intended for public use, hence,
inalienable and indisposable.
On September 30, 1999, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) approved Resolution No. 113, Series of 1993,
providing that untitled shoreland areas may be leased subject
to conditions enumerated therein.
On July 20, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed
its Opposition to the Amended Application in which it alleged
that the lot subject of the application for registration may not
be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the
Laguna Lake bed, a public land within its jurisdiction pursuant
to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as amended. According to the
LLDA, the projection of Lot No. 3138-A, Cad-688-D Csd-04-
018302 in its topographic map based on the Memorandum of
LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES | BATCH 2018-2019 16
Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela of the Engineering and
Construction Division of the LLDA indicated that it is "located
below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred
to datum 10.00 meters below mean lower water" and under
Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the property is a public land
which forms part of the bed of the Laguna Lake. This
Memorandum was appended to the application.
Fernando Co Siy testified that the applicant acquired Lot No.
3138 from siblings Antonio, Eladia and Felisa Cruz, who had
possessed it since 1945; that after paying the real estate taxes
due thereon, it caused the survey of the lot; that possession
thereof has been peaceful and none of the former owners
claims any right against it; neither the applicant nor its
predecessors-in-interest received information from any
government agency that the lot is a public land; the subject lot
is 3 kms. away from Laguna de Bay, above its elevation and that
of the nearby road; the property is habitable and was utilized
as a riceland at the time it was sold by the former owners; and
that he was aware that a legal easement is affecting the lot and
is willing to annotate it in the land title.
The LLDA moved for a joint ocular inspection of the parcels of
land in order to determine its exact elevation. On September
14, 2001, a Survey Team of the Engineering and Construction
Division of the LLDA, conducted an actual ground survey of the
property. The team used a total station and digital survey
instrument to measure the elevation of the ground in reference
to the elevation of the lake water. The team found that the lot
is below the prescribed elevation of 12.50 m. and thus part of
the bed of the lake; as such, it could not be titled to the
applicant. The team also reported that the property is adjacent
to the highway from the Manggahan Floodway to Angono,
Rizal. The LLDA moved that the application be withdrawn,
appending thereto a copy of the Survey Report.
MTC’s Decision: Granted the registration of the lots
On appeal to the CA, the petitioner contended that the MTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over the application for registration
since the actual copies of the Official Gazette (O.G.) where the
notice of hearing was published were not adduced in evidence;
the applicant likewise failed to establish exclusive ownership
over the subject property in the manner prescribed by law.
CA’s Decision: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the
Decision of the MTC.
On the issue of ownership over the subject lots, the CA upheld
the applicant’s claim that the parcels of land were alienable and
not part of the public domain, and that it had adduced
preponderant evidence to prove that its predecessors had been
tilling the land since 1937, during which palay and vegetables
were planted. In fact, before the lots were purchased, the
applicant verified their ownership with the assessor’s office, and
thereafter caused the property to be surveyed; after the lots
were acquired in 1999 and a survey was caused by the
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applicant, no adverse claims were filed by third persons.
Further, the CA ruled that tax declarations or tax receipts are
good indicia of possession in the concept of the owner, which
constitute at least positive and strong indication that the
taxpayer concerned has made a claim either to the title or to
the possession of the property.
Issues
1. Whether the property subject of the amended application is
alienable and disposable property of the State, and, if so,
2. Whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove its ownership over the property under
Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
Discussion:
1. Whether the property subject of the amended application is
alienable and disposable property of the State.
Petitioner asserts that the Engineer’s Survey Report and the
Laguna de Bay Shoreland Survey both show that Lot No. 3138-
A is located below the reglementary lake elevation, hence,
forms part of the Laguna Lake bed. It insists that the property
belongs to the public domain as classified under Article 502 of
the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Bernardo v.
Tiamson, petitioner avers that the subject lot is incapable of
private appropriation since it is a public land owned by the
State under the Regalian doctrine. On this premise, petitioner
avers that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and as a consequence, its decision is null and void.
Ruling: We find and so rule that the property subject of this
application was alienable and disposable public agricultural
land until July 18, 1966. However, respondent failed to prove
that it possesses registerable title over the property.
2. Whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove its ownership over the property under
Section 14 of P.D. 1529. NO.
Requisites to prove ownership:
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore,
prove the following:
(a) that the land forms part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and
(b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
Regalian Doctrine
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. The presumption is that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State. Unless public land is shown
to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES | BATCH 2018-2019 17
domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept
of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title. The statute of limitations with regard
to public agricultural lands does not operate against the
State unless the occupant proves possession and
occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State.
HELD: No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant from the government, whether express or
implied. It is indispensable that there be a showing of a title
from the State. The rationale for the period "since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945" lies in the presumption that
the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the
occupants or possessor claim an interest thereon only by virtue
of their imperfect title as continuous, open and notorious
possession.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, or
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. A
certification of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources stating that the land subject of an
application is found to be within the alienable and disposable
site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence
to show the real character of the land subject of the application.
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of
ownership to substantiate the claim over the land. Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over
his own property. A mere casual cultivation of portions of
the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis
for a claim of ownership; such possession is not exclusive
and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from
the State.
The petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted.
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MINERS v. FACTORAN (1995)
Digest by: Lexa Athena Gador | 240 SCRA 100
Principle: The adoption of the concept of jura regalia that all natural
resources are owned by the State embodied in the ’35, ’73 and ’87
Constitutions ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy of
“full control and supervision by the State” in the exploration,
development and utilization of the country’s natural resources.
Facts: The controversy started by the change introduced by
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system
of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s
natural resources. No longer is the utilization of inalienable
lands of public domain through “license, concession or lease”
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions allowed under the 1987
Constitution.
Pursuant to Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
legislative acts (EO 211 and EO 279) were issued by
President Aquino in the exercise of her legislative power. EO
211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and
approval of applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of minerals. EO 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary
to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or
production-sharing agreements for the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources, and
prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those
agreements involving technical or financial assistance by
foreign-owned corporations for largescale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals.
To implement such acts, the DENR Secretary promulgated
Administrative Order Nos. 57 (Guidelines on Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement under EO 279) and 82
(Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation), the validity
and constitutionality of which are being challenged in this
petition.
Under Art. 9 of AO 57, all existing mining leases or agreements
which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 shall be
converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1)
year from the effectivity of these guidelines, except small scale
mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and
quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or
less.
Sec. 3 of AO 82 enumerates the persons or entities required to
submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from the effectivity of
DENR Administrative Order No. 57. Failure to do so within the
prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining,
quarry and sand and gravel claims.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., mainly
contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both AOs
in excess of his rule-making power under Sec. 6 of EO 279.
Petitioner also contends that both orders violate the
LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES | BATCH 2018-2019 18
nonimpairment of contract provision under Art. III, Sec. 10 of
the 1987 Constitution. It was argued that both AOs have the
effect of repealing or abrogating existing mining laws (PD 463,
The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974) which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of EO 279.
Issues
(1) Whether or not Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are valid
and constitutional.
(2) Whether or not the AOs repealed or abrogated PD 463.
(3) Whether or not the AOs unduly preterminate existing mining
leases in general.
Discussion:
1. Whether or not Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are valid
and constitutional. Yes.
The Court reiterates the principle that the power of
administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in
the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to
carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment.
So long as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provision of the law, they are valid.
2. Whether or not the AOs repealed or abrogated PD 463. No.
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old
system of exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources through “license, concession or lease” which has been
disallowed by Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By
virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing
law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive
Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on “license, concession,
or lease” of mineral resources under PD 463, as amended, and
other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore,
ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all
other areas of administration and management of mineral,
lands, the provisions of PD 463, as amended, and other existing
mining laws, still govern.
The provisions of PD 463, as amended, on lease of mining claims
under Chapter VIII, quarry permits on privately-owned lands or
quarry license on public lands under Chapter XIII and other
related provisions on lease, license and permits are not only
inconsistent with the raison d’etre for which EO 279 was passed,
but contravene the express mandate of Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Its force and effectivity are thus foreclosed.
3. Whether or not the AOs unduly preterminate existing mining
leases in general. No.
Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution does not apply
retroactively to “license, concession or lease” granted before
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
Under EO 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that
privileges as well as the terms and conditions of all existing
mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be
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 LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES | BATCH 2018-2019 19

subject to any and all modifications or alterations which

Congress may adopt pursuant to Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of
contract clause under Art. III, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution
do not apply to the aforesaid mining leases or agreements
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
pursuant to EO 211. They can be amended, modified or altered
by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Art.
XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

EO 279 issued by President Aquino, in the exercise of her

legislative power has the force and effect of a statute or law
passed by Congress. As such, it validly modified or altered the
privileges granted, as well as the terms and conditions of
mining leases and agreements under EO 211 after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by authorizing the DENR
Secretary certain acts.

Well-settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the

reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by
the State, such as those granted pursuant to EO 211 referred to
in this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the State.

The Court ruled that obligations of contracts must yield to a

proper exercise of the police power when such power is
exercised to preserve the security of the State and the means
adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that
end and are, therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.

The economic policy on the exploration, development and

utilization of the country’s natural resources under Art. XII, Sec.
2 of the 1987 Constitution is clear. The exploration, development
and utilization of the country’s natural resources are matters vital
to the public interest and the general welfare of the people.

As such, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this

regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction
on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and
amending the mining leases or agreements granted under PD
463, as amended, pursuant to EO 211.

Nowhere in AO 57 does it authorize the automatic conversion

of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity
of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to EO 211, to production-
sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term
“production-sharing agreement” implies negotiation between
the Government and the applicants – a meeting of the minds
of parties in accordance with AO 82 procedure.

The Court ruled that the validity and constitutionality of AOs

57 and 82 must be sustained as they were reasonably directed
to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which
they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount
interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare.

HELD: The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

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