TITLE:

SPOUSES JUVY MARAÑO AND MARIA LUISA G. MARAÑO v. PRYCE GASES, INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 196592
April 06, 2015

TOPIC:

Rule 31, Consolidation or Severance

ISSUE:

Whether respondent’s complaint for cancellation of title should be dismissed because the
question of validity of the certificate of title issued in their names over the subject lot is already being
litigated in the reivindicatory action case that is pending appeal before the RTC.

HELD:

No. There are three kinds of actions to recover possession of real property, namely: (1) actions
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, also denominated as accion interdictal, which are summary in
nature and seek to recover only physical possession (possession de facto) of the property, (2) an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right to possess the property, without claim of title,
and (3) an accion reivindicatoria (or accion de reivindicacion) or a reivindicatory action, which is a
plenary action to recover not only possession of, but also ownership of the real property.

Since a reivindicatory action includes a claim of title or ownership, the court must necessarily
inquire into the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s acquisition of his or her title to the real
property sought to be recovered. The petitioners point out that the MTC in the subject reivindicatory
case already conducted a full-blown trial on the issue of validity of their claim of ownership and had, in
fact, ruled that their certificate of title is inoperative and has no binding effect. They argue that for the
RTC to conduct another full-blown trial in the cancellation of title case on the same issue would, in
effect, nullify the MTC’s decision in the reivindicatory case.

Instead of ordering the dismissal of the respondent’s complaint for cancellation of certificate of
title, the consolidation of the reivindicatory action and the cancellation of certificate of title case is the
appropriate remedy in the present situation. Consolidation is proper when two or more actions pending,
not necessarily, before the same court involve a common question of law or fact. In such cases, the
court may: order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions, order all the
actions consolidated, and make such orders concerning the proceedings therein for the purpose of
avoiding unnecessary costs and delay.

Considering that the validity of the petitioners’ certificate of title is the crucial issue in both the
reivindicatory action pending appeal before the RTC and the cancellation of certificate of title case filed
by the respondent, these two cases should be consolidated in order to avoid the possibility of rendering
conflicting decisions and for the orderly administration of justice.
TITLE:

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successor-in-interest of ASIAN BANK CORPORATION vs.
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and HON. RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA
(in their capacities as Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Second Division of SANDIGANBAYAN)
and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169677
February 18, 2013

TOPIC:

Rule 31, Consolidation or Severance

ISSUE:

Whether or not a motion for separate trial is proper.

HELD: 

No. The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:

Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may
order a separate trial of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.

The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of
claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the
exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.

Further, Corpus Juris Secundum makes clear that neither party had an absolute right to have a
separate trial of an issue; hence, the motion to that effect should be allowed only to avoid prejudice,
further convenience, promote justice, and give a fair trial to all parties.

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for
conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the
issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when
separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial
to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.

TITLE:
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the
instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO,
ET AL.
G.R. No. L-18148
February 28, 1963

TOPIC:

Rule 33, Demurrer to Evidence

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court was correct in declaring that petitioner waived her right to present
evidence?

HELD:

Yes. We cannot sustain petitioner. As the trial court observed, her move, expressed through
counsel, was merely "dilatory." But neither can we affirm the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals
directing the trial court to receive the evidence of the defense after its motion for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence was denied. It is contrary to the letter and spirit of Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules
of Court.

The implications and consequences of obtaining prior leave before the accused files a demurrer
to evidence were discussed by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules as reflected in its Minutes of
18 February 1997. Mr. Justice Jose Y. Feria, Co-Chairman of the Committee, explained - Objections were
raised against the new Rule on the ground that it was prejudicial to the accused. Hence, the present
amended provision was adopted. It is only when the accused files such a motion to dismiss without
express leave of court that he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment
on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution x x x Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Chairman of the
Committee, suggested that - x x x there may be instances where it is very plain that the evidence is
insufficient, but there are also instances where the court is in doubt x x x x it is the court that will now
determine whether a demurrer should be filed or not after getting the opinion of both sides x x x x If the
accused asks for leave of court and the court supports it, it is good; but x x x if it finds the motion
dilatory, then it denies it. But x x x there should be no waiver if the demurrer is with leave of court,
because there may be a situation where the court itself may want to dismiss the case x x x x If leave is
denied, and the accused still files the demurrer, then there is waiver (underscoring supplied).

The Committee finally approved the following propositions of the Chief Justice: (a) The court on
its initiative can dismiss the case after giving prior notice to the prosecution; (b) The accused can file a
demurrer only if he is granted prior leave of court; (c) If the motion for leave or the demurrer is denied,
the accused can present his evidence, and there is no waiver; and, (d) If the accused files a demurrer
without leave, his right to present evidence is waived.
 In fine, under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer
to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court before
filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs
without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present
evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power
to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the
proceedings.

In the case at bar, petitioner admits that in the hearing of 20 May 1994 the trial court denied her
motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In such case, the only right petitioner has under Sec. 15,
Rule 119, of the Rules of Court after having been denied leave to submit a demurrer is to adduce
evidence in her defense. However, even without express leave of the trial court, nay, after her motion
for leave was denied, petitioner insisted on filing a demurrer instead of presenting evidence in her
defense.

Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial
court. But to allow the accused to present evidence after he was denied prior leave to file demurrer is
not discretionary. Once prior leave is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to evidence or
motion to dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to present evidence. The only
recourse left for the court is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. And, unless there is grave abuse thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which
is not present in the instant case, the trial courts denial of prior leave to file demurrer to evidence or
motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. However, any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still
be elevated by the accused to the appellate court.