REPUBLIC ACT 9262 also known as THE ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND

THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004

Digested by: Charish Tumaliuan Danao – Talamayan
 
1.   Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts:              

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of
her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth
by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.
The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment
on why the TPO should not be modified.  After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure
to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said
law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

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WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect
the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erred in declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision:        

1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle
the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the
Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions
only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.

4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it
ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.  The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. 

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The same holds true with the issuance of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

2.   G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.]

RALPH P. TUA, vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA,
PERALTA, J p:
Facts:
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City. They have three
children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27,
2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. Respondent claimed, among others, that:
there was a time when petitioner went to her room and cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of
his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she
filed; she hid her fears although she was scared; there was also an instance when petitioner fed
her children with the fried chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order
to stop his child from crying, petitioner would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner
that she felt unsafe and insecure with the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the
house as often as he wanted or she would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious and
threatened her of withholding his financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her
to lie flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with companions
went to her new home and forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her.
Respondent thus filed a Petition for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act
(RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her
husband, petitioner. The Petition was for herself and in behalf of her minor children.
The RTC issued ex parte a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of RA 9262 and sought to lift the TPO. Without awaiting
the resolution of the RTC on the foregoing, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
Issue:
1.Is Section 15 of RA 9262, allowing ex parte application of a TPO, constitutional?
2. Is there an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to
issue protection orders?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex
parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the

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respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it
is within the court's discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to
determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have
been committed.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court
is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb
or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order.
The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition
within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied
by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. . . . . The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.

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Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to
barangay officials to issue protection orders.
2. No. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have
the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof." Hence,
the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law
is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of
protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights.
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14.Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. — Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong
Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on
the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon
by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad
shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to
effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such
function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty
under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public
order in the barangay."
Doctrine laid out by the Supreme Court.
           Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in  pursuance of the Court’s authority to
settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable
before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.  The provision
in R.A. 9262 allowing the issuance of protection orders is not an invalid delegation of legislative
power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the
function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection
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orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs
for violations of such rights. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge,
Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
3. AAA, Petitioner, vs. BBB, Respondent
     G.R. No. 212448 - January 11, 2018
     Tijam, J.:
Facts:
           Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. They had two
children, CCC who was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD who was born on October 1, 2009.
           BBB started working in Singapore as a chef on May 2007 and acquired a permanent
resident status on September 2008.
           Respondent sent little to nothing which compelled the petitioner to fly extra hours and
take additional jobs to augment to her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of
virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence.
To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman
who he has been living with in Singapore.
           On April 19, 2011, AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room during her
visit with their kids.
           The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA
mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity. AAA was able to secure a
Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest.
Consequently, BBB filed a Motion to Quash. The trial court granted the motion to quash
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissed the case.
           AAA, aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of the case, sought direct recourse to the Supreme Court via the instant petition on a
pure question of law.
Issue:
           Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over complaint for psychological abuse
under Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004 when committed through marital infidelity outside the country.
 
Ruling:
            “Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse,
particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common.” Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9262 encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that may be
committed against women and their children.

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           What R.A. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological
violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence
inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw.
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. It provides that
the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. While the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is
certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental
or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant.
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that
acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing
crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Thus, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed.
In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are
residents of Pasig City since March 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise
jurisdiction over the case.
We say that even if the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife mental and
emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No.
9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
 
 
4. RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, Vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
IRSH SAGUD, Respondents, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010
Facts:
Rustan Ang and Irish Sagud were on-and- off sweethearts, when the latter learned afterwards
that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he gotten pregnant, Irish broke up
with him.
Prior to the marriage of Rustan, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with
him. Irish rejected the proposal and changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow
managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages, using the following numbers: 0920-
4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her
alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message (MMS) a
picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure. The
sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers
Rustan used. Rustan boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures
and threatened to spread the picture through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish
was: “Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter.”
Irish sought the help of Vice Mayor Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under the
police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone number he used in sending the
picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan if he could meet her at Lorentess Resort.

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Rustan came with a motorcycle and was arrested by the police upon walking towards Irish. The
police searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
 
Irish filed a case in violation of Sec 5 (h) of Republic Act 9262. The RTC found Irish’s
testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. Thus the RTC found
Rustan guilty of the said crime. Rustan appealed but denied, then raised the case to the higher
court.
 
Issues:
 
Whether or not the accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture pasted with her
face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and
humiliation on her in violation of Sec 5 (h) of RA 9262.
 
The subordinate issues are:
1)  Whether or not a “dating relationship” existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is
defined in RA 9262
2)  Whether or not a single act of harassment, like sending the nude picture in this case,
constitutes a violation of Sec 5 (h) of RA 9262
3)  Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of
his constitutional rights; and
4)  Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in
the case.
 
Held:
1)  Yes. Dating relationship as defined in Section 3 “refers to a situation wherein the parties
live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual
acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social
context is not a dating relationship.
 
2)  Yes. Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitutes
violence against women.This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into
violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children.
Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
 
3)  No. Prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the
police officers seized from him at the time of the arrest. The prosecution did not need
such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting
the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted
owning during pre-trial conference. Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious
text message to Irish.
 
4)  The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on
such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already

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 waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present
criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi
judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
 The court AFFIRMED the decision of RTC.
 
5. Go-Tan vs. Sps. Tan
Topic: VI Local Government Units
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Date: September 30, 2008
 
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of conspiracy under the RPC is applicable to RA 9262. Therefore,
offenders under such law are not limited to those related to the victim only by marriage, a former
marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; but also include those acting in conspiracy with
them.
QUICK FACTS: Wife prays for the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order against her
husband and parents-in-law. Respondents herein are only the parents-in-law as they are
contending that they cannot be instituted as respondents in this case as they are not covered by
RA 9262.  
FACTS:
Contested Law: RA 9262
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan were married. Out of
this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12,
2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a Petition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses
Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in
conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her
in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner Go-Tan contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in
the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the
suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on
"conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that
Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home;
and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
Respondent’s Contention:  Spouses Tan’s were contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No.
9262. They submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly
provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or
a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual
determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review.

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TC      -          Granted respondent spouses Motion To Dismiss and issued a resolution
dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-
known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,
PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".
HELD: YES.

RATIO: The ratio of the SC is anchored on the 4 points below:

(1) Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as

"any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application
of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the
RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. 

(2) Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and
their children may be committed by an offender through another.

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,

that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her
child;

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 (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her
child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals
or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x

(3) In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts
of violence against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending
husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this
Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing,

personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this
Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,

contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
xxx

(4) Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection
and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. 

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius"
finds no application here.

 
ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT OF 2003
REPUBLIC ACT 9208
 
Digested by:
Isaiah Ceasar Bie
 
 
 
People vs. Casio
G.R. No. 211465, December 3, 2014
 
FACTS

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International Justice Mission (IJM) coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons
engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. A team of police operatives were designated as
decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. The team went to
Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms were adjacent to each other. Room
24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team. The
team proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district.
Shirley Casio noticed them and called their attention by saying “Chicks mo dong?” (Do you like
girls, guys?). The police operatives told Casio that they have a guests waiting in the hotel. After a
few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB The team convinced Casio to come with
them to Queensland Motel and was soon arrested by police operatives. The trial court found
Casio guilty of violating R.A. 9208, otherwise known as the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003.” Casio argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated into
committing the crime. The police did not conduct prior surveillance and did not even know who
their subject was. She denied being a pimp and asserted that she was a laundrywoman. In
addition, AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her decision to display
herself to solicit customers.
 
ISSUES:
 
Whether or not the entrapment of Casio is valid.
 
Whether or not Casio is liable under R.A. 9208.
 
RULING:
 
There is a valid entrapment
 
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension
of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the
accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin
of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The
idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law officer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and
carries it into execution. As testified by the police operatives, Casio called out their attention by
saying “Chicks mo dong?” If accused had no predisposition to commit the offense, then she most
likely would not have asked the police operatives if they wanted girls.
 
Casio is liable under R.A. No. 9208
 
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.
Trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent. Under Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 wherein it is stated that trafficking in persons refers to the
recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim's consent or knowledge.
 

12 | P a g e
 
Young v. People
G.R. No. 213910, February 3, 2016
 
FACTS
 
On separate dates, members of the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force
(RAHTTF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted surveillance operations at Jaguar
KTV Bar (Jaguar) in Cebu City, and observed that its customers paid P6,000.00 in exchange for
sexual intercourse with guest relations officers (GROs), or P10,000.00 as “bar fine” if they were
taken out of the establishment. In the course of their surveillance, they learned that: (a)
petitioners were the owners of Jaguar; (b) a certain “Tico” acted as overall manager; and (c) a
certain “Ann” welcomed customers and offered them GROs.
 
On April 9, 2011, RAHTTF members raided Jaguar resulting to multiple arrests, seizure of
sexual paraphernalia, recovery of the marked money from one Jocelyn Balili (Balili), and the
rescue of 146 women and minor children. Later, six (6) of these women - who all worked at
Jaguar as GROs, namely, AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, EEE, and FFF (AAA Group) - executed
affidavits identifying petitioners, Tico, and Ann as Jaguar's owners. Accordingly, a criminal
complaint for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208
was filed against them, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City (OCP).
 
In defense, Vinson denied ownership of Jaguar and asserted that he had sold his rights and
interests therein to one Charles Theodore Rivera pursuant to a Deed of Assignment. Not being
the manager nor owner of Jaguar, therefore, he had no control and supervision over the AAA
Group, with whom he denied acquaintance. Similarly, Benny claimed that he was neither the
owner nor manager of Jaguar and was not even present during the raid. He raised “mistake in
identity” as defense, stressing that he was not the same person identified by the AAA Group in
their respective affidavits.
 
In an Order dated July 24, 2012, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. It
ruled that the affidavits of the RAHTTF members and the AAA Group failed to show that
petitioners had knowledge or participated in the recruitment of the 146 women and minors who
were rescued at Jaguar as sex workers. It also found that the recantations of the AAA Group
were fatal to the prosecution’s case, since it effectively cleared petitioners of any knowledge in
Jaguar’s operations. It further reasoned that the December 14, 2009 Deed of Assignment showed
that Vinson had already ceded his rights and interests in Jaguar.
 
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, respondent People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
dismissing the case for lack of probable cause.
 
In a Decision dated September 10, 2013, the CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. Consequently, it ordered the
reinstatement of the information and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

13 | P a g e
 
Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a
Resolution dated July 31, 2014; hence, the instant petition.
 
ISSUE
 
Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
dismissing the criminal case against petitioners for lack of probable cause.
 
Whether or not a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to filing a certiorari petition.
 
HELD
 
The CA did not err
 
A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the
evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records readily
show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged.
 
In this case, the evidence on record does not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence
of probable cause against petitioners. Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that the
prosecution was able to establish a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Sections 4
(a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208. As it appears from the records,
petitioners recruited and hired the AAA Group and, consequently, maintained them under their
employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. In view of this, probable cause
exists to issue warrants for their arrest.
 
Moreover, the Court notes that the defenses raised by petitioners, particularly their
disclaimer that they are no longer the owners of the establishment where the sex workers were
rescued, are evidentiary in nature - matters which are best threshed out in a full-blown trial.
Thus, the proper course of action on the part of the RTC was not to dismiss the case but to
proceed to trial.
 
Unfortunately, and as the CA aptly observed, the RTC arrogated upon itself the task of
dwelling on factual and evidentiary matters upon which it eventually anchored the dismissal of
the case. Consequently, grave abuse of discretion was correctly imputed by the CA against the
RTC for its action.
 
The MR may be dispensed with in this case
 
Anent the question of whether a motion for reconsideration - is a prerequisite to the filing of
a certiorari petition, the Court finds the OSG’s argument well-taken. In this regard, jurisprudence
has carved out specific exceptions allowing direct resort to a certiorari petition, such as x x x
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. Significantly, the
present case involves public interest as it imputes violations of RA 9208, or the “Anti-

14 | P a g e
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003,” a crime so abhorrent and reprehensible that is characterized
by sexual violence and slavery. Accordingly, direct resort to a certiorari petition sans a motion
for reconsideration is clearly sanctioned in this case.
People vs. Manalili
G. R. No. 210798, September 14, 2016
 
FACTS
 
On April 25, 2007, AAA ran away from home after finding out that she was adopted and
after being scolded by her mother, who became the private complainant in this case. The friends
of AAA informed private complainant that AAA was staying at the On Tap Videoke Bar,
working as a Guest Relations Officer. Private complainant sought assistance from the Channel 2
TV program XXX to regain custody over AAA. Private complainant, accompanied by the TV
crew, lodged a preliminary complaint with the Southern Police District Headquarters of Taguig
City against On Tap Videoke Bar and a task force was created for the rescue of AAA. After the
operation, the Office of the City Prosecutor charged accused-appellant with human trafficking
under R.A. 9208 for the reason that accused-appellant “recruited and exploited AAA, a 13-year
old minor, to work as a GRO in her bar by taking advantage of her vulnerability as a child.”
Meanwhile, on May 31, 2007, an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by private complainant.
The Affidavit of Desistance was executed after the private complainant had the opportunity to
talk to AAA after the rescue operation and after AAA revealed that she was merely allowed to
stay at the videoke bar after she ran away from home.
 
ISSUE
 
Whether or not the circumstantial pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
inexorably lead to the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Trafficking.
 
HELD
 
The elements of trafficking in persons, derived from the expanded definition found in
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 as amended by R.A. No. 10364, are as follows:
 
1.   The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders;”
2.   The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another person;” and
3.   The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal
or sale of organs.”
 

15 | P a g e
 The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall still be considered “trafficking in persons” even if it does not involve any of
the means set forth in the first paragraph of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208. Given that the person
allegedly trafficked in the case at bar is a child, we may do away with discussions on whether or
not the second element was actually proven.
 
In an attempt to prove the first element, the prosecution stresses the fact that accused-
appellant is the registered owner of the On Tap Videoke Bar. The prosecution insists that by
merely being the registered owner, accused-appellant necessarily committed the act of recruiting,
maintaining or harboring AAA. Such contention is misplaced. Recruiting, harboring, or
maintaining a person for the purpose of exploitation are acts performed by persons who may or
may not be registered owners of establishments. Thus, being the registered owner per se does not
make one criminally liable for the acts of trafficking committed in the establishment. What the
prosecution should have done was to prove the act of trafficking by other means, and not by
mere showing that accused-appellant was the registered owner.
 
The prosecution likewise failed to prove the third element—that the recruiting, maintaining
or harboring of persons is for the purpose of exploitation. Curiously, AAA was seen by the
prosecution witnesses at the videoke bar only on the day the rescue operation was conducted.
That AAA was exploited could not be proven by her mere presence at the videoke bar during the
rescue operation.
 
Nowhere in the text of R.A. No. 9208 can it be inferred that a presumption arises by the
mere fact of presence of a child in a videoke bar or similar establishment. Our survey of
jurisprudence likewise does not reveal such established presumption. More to the point, the
constitutive crime of trafficking through harboring or receipt of a person must be specifically for
purposes of exploitation. In other words, establishing mere presence without establishing the
purpose therefor cannot be considered as an element of trafficking. In this case, the private
complainant's affidavit of desistance categorically explained the child’s presence in the videoke
bar—for humanitarian reasons of providing shelter to a runaway minor.
 
People v. Hirang
G.R. No. 223528, January 11, 2017
 
FACTS
 
On June 27, 2007, Hirang sold BBB, along with AAA, CCC and DDD, to his Korean
customers for sexual activities. Hirang told his victims that they would receive ₱5,000.00 after a
“gimik” with them. At around 10:00 p.m., their group proceeded to meet with the Koreans at
Chowking restaurant, C-5 in Taguig City. Hirang instructed the girls to tell the Koreans that they
were 16 years of age, as this was their customers’ preference. When their group arrived at
Chowking, Hirang talked to a Korean and then introduced the girls to him. The Korean handed
money to Hirang and as the latter was counting it, NBI agents arrived at the scene and announced
a raid. NBI agents arrested Hirang, while a social worker approached the girls and brought them
to the NBI for their statements.
 

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ISSUE
 
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Hirang for
the crime charged.
 
Whether Hirang should be acquitted in view of the failure of the arresting officers to observe
R.A. No. 7438.
 
HELD
 
The information filed against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation
of the minor victims for sexual activities and exploitation, with the offender taking advantage of
the vulnerability of the young girls through the guarantee of a good time and financial gain.
Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified
trafficking, as it was committed in a large scale and his four victims were under 18 years of age.
 
The presence of the crime’s elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who
testified during the trial. The young victims themselves testified on their respective ages, and
how they were lured by Hirang to participate in the latter’s illicit sex trade. Hirang recruited the
girls to become victims of sexual abuse and exploitation. Mainly upon a promise of financial
benefit, the girls agreed and, thus, joined him on June 27, 2007 in meeting with the Korean
customers in search for prostitutes. Police authorities personally, witnessed Hirang’s unlawful
activity, as they conducted the entrapment operations and arrested him after Hirang transacted
with the supposed customers and received payment therefor.
 
Hirang still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies were
conflicting and improbable. Such alleged inconsistencies pertained to the supposed participation
of Ka Lolet in the recruitment of the victims, how the IJM agents came to personally know of
Hirang, and other incidents that involved prior surveillance and the entrapment operation itself.
It is evident, however, that the supposed inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies pertained
to minor details that, in any case, could not negate Hirang’s unlawful activity and violation of
R.A. No. 9208. Moreover, the Court has ruled time and again that factual findings of the trial
court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies
and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule,
the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by
the CA. 
 
Hirang argued that he was merely instigated to commit the offense, but even such defense
deserves scant consideration. It has been established by the prosecution that Hirang has been
engaged in the illegal activities leading young women to prostitution, and the police officers
merely employed means for his capture. Trafficking of women was his habitual trade; he was
merely entrapped by authorities. Entrapment is an acceptable means to capture a wrongdoer.
 
In this case, it was established during trial that Hirang had been recruiting and deploying
young girls for customers in the sex trade. The IJM personnel approached him for girls precisely
because of his illicit activities. Also, Hirang was not first approached for prostitutes by police or

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government authorities, but by investigators of IJM, which is a non-profit and non-governmental
organization. IJM only sought coordination with the police officers after Hirang, Sarmiento and
Villagracia had determined to meet on June 27, 2007 for the transaction with the purported
Korean customers. Clearly, there could be no instigation by officers, as barred by law, to speak
of.
 
Even as the Court considers the alleged failure of the apprehending police officers to inform
Hirang of the Miranda rights upon his arrest, there is no sufficient ground for the Court to acquit
him. The CA correctly explained that any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured by his
voluntary act of entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the issue.
 
 
People vs. Hermosa
G.R. No. 211721, September 20, 2017
 
FACTS
 
The evidence for the prosecution is anchored solely on the testimony of Police Officer I
Raymond Escober (PO1 Escober), on the joint sworn affidavit of the arresting officers.
According to his testimony, on August 8, 2006, PO1 Escober was at the police station preparing
for the police operation called Oplan Bugaw for the purpose of eliminating prostitution on
Quezon Avenue in Quezon City. PO1 Escober, designated to pose as customer, was
accompanied by P02 Reynaldo Bereber (P02 Bereber) as his backup, and Police Inspector Pruli
James D. Lopez (P/lnsp. Lopez). While parking their vehicles at the target area, PO1 Escober
was flagged down by Rodriguez who allegedly offered the sexual services of three (3) pickup
girls. PO1 Escober readily gave Rodriguez the pre-marked ₱500.00 bill as payment. This
signaled his backup to enter the scene and aid in the arrest. PO1 Escober then retrieved the pre-
marked bill. Thereafter, the officers brought Rodriguez and the three (3) pickup girls to the
police station. Rodriguez was charged and convicted for qualified trafficking in persons under
Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(c), of R.A. No. 9208. In his defense, Rodriguez denied that
he had offered a girl for sexual purposes to PO1 Escober. He said that he was only selling
cigarettes on Quezon Avenue when he was arrested by the police officers. He only found out that
he was being accused of human trafficking after he was brought to the City Hall.
 
ISSUE
 
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the crime charged.

HELD
 
Section 3(a)29 provides the elements of trafficking in persons: (1) the ruj of recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipts of persons with or without the victim’s consent
or knowledge, within or across national borders; (2) the means used which include “threat or use
of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another; and (3) the purpose of

18 | P a g e
trafficking is exploitation which includes “exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.”
 
A careful review of the records shows that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of
these elements beyond reasonable doubt, nor did we find the second and third elements proven
by the prosecution.
 
A review of emerging jurisprudence on human trafficking readily shows that a successful
prosecution, to a certain extent, relies greatly on entrapment operations. Thus, just like in any
operation that involves capturing the perpetrator in flagrante delicto, the testimonies of the
apprehending officers on what transpired are crucial for a conviction. In People v. Casio, having
similar factual circumstances with the case at hand, the Court upheld the conviction of the
accused for qualified human trafficking. In that case, the accused came up to the police officers
and asked if they were interested in young girls. After receiving a positive response, the accused
picked up two (2) minor girls and presented them to the police officers. Thereafter, they all
proceeded to the motel room where the accused was arrested.
 
The case before us differs from the Casio case where more than one (1) credible witness, the
minor victims, were presented in court by the prosecution, and allowed to testify on the
circumstances on how they were recruited by the accused and later offered for sex in exchange
for money. Significantly, the testimony of PO1 Escober in the case before us lacks the material
details to convince us that Rodriguez had committed human trafficking.
 
 
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7877 AN ACT DECLARING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
UNLAWFUL IN THE EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION OR TRAINING
ENVIRONMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
 
Digested by:
 
Meryljan Angangan
 
 
G.R. NO. 177580,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. VICTORIO MEDRANO
OCTOBER 17, 2008
 
FACTS:

             Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher filed before the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman a
sworn letter-complaint against her superior herein-respondent Victorio N. Medrano for violation
of Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) (criminal case),
and grave misconduct (administrative case). While the administrative case was pending
investigation, Dumalaog filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension, and was

19 | P a g e
granted by the Ombudsman ordering the preventive suspension of Medrano for six months
without pay. Medrano moved for lifting the suspension but was denied. When Medrano filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Ombudsman lifted the preventive suspension order.

The Ombudsman rendered its decision with the administrative case and found Medrano
guilty of grave misconduct. Medrano moved for reconsideration of the decision and assailed not
only the factual findings and conclusions of the Ombudsman, but for the first time, challenged its
jurisdiction over the case. With regard to the criminal case, Ombudsman found probable cause to
indict Medrano and a criminal case was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Biñan, Laguna against him. By joint order, the Ombudsman affirmed its Resolution in
the criminal case but modified its decision in the administrative case.

Medrano filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing

Ombudsman‘s jurisdiction over the administrative case. The CA annulled Ombudsman‘s
decision in the administrative case and dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over it. The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration of
the CA‘s decision but was denied.

ISSUE:
              Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative
complaint against Medrano even if an affidavit of desistance has already been filed by Dumalaog
 
HELD:

The flaw in Medrano‘s argument that the execution of Dumalaog‘s Affidavit of Desistance and
the dismissal of the criminal case must result in the dismissal of the administrative case is that it
ignores the whale of a difference between those two remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and
Rodel A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Ombudsman), the Court stressed the distinct and independent character of the
remedies available to an offended party against any impropriety or wrongdoing committed by a
public officer. It provides the three remedies available: 1.) civil, 2.) criminal, and 3.)
administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or
successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.

At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a rule, viewed with suspicion
and reservation because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually
through intimidation or for monetary consideration. And there is always the probability that it
would later be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable. Hence, such
desistance, by itself, is not usually a ground for the dismissal of an action once it has been
instituted in court.

With regard to whether Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint,
Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution “created the independent Office of the Ombudsman.”
Hailed as the “protectors of the people,” the Ombudsman and his Deputies are bestowed with
overreaching authority, powers, functions, and duties to act on complaints against public officials
and employees, as provided in Sections 12 and 13.

20 | P a g e
 When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher, however,
Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the same
shall be heard initially by an investigating committee composed of the school superintendent of
the division, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial
or national teachers‘organization, and a supervisor of the division. Thus, Section 23 of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner “may refer certain complaints to the proper
disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring
public officers or employees.”

In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the
proper committee of the DepEd.

While Ombudsman should have desisted from hearing the administrative complaint
against Medrano and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already
concluded the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon, Medrano is now barred from
assailing Ombudsman‘s acts under the principle of estoppel. He had actively participated in the
administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked
Ombudsman for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint
allegedly for being baseless. Verily, Medrano cannot be permitted to challenge Ombudsman‘s
acts belatedly.

 
 
 
G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008
DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, respondent.
 
FACTS: Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School. Respondent
Eduardo O. Wahiman is the father of AAA, an elementary school student of the petitioner.
AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an errand.
Once inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and
place it on his table. He then asked her to come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then
touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he fondled her breast five times, and that she felt
afraid. A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have witnessed the incident,
testified that the fondling incident did happen just as AAA related it.

In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just as he was
handing AAA a lesson book.6 He further stated that the incident happened in about two or three
seconds, and that the girl left his office without any complaint.

21 | P a g e
CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), and dismissed
him from the service. Specifically, the CSC found the petitioner to have committed an act
constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7877, the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.

CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioner’s right to due process, and based on its
finding that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there was no violation of that
right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with “disgraceful and immoral
conduct and misconduct,” the CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved
petitioner’s guilt of grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.

Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense, such as “Grave
Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment),” different from that specified in the formal charge
which was “Misconduct.” He further argues that the offense of “Misconduct” does not include
the graver offense of “Grave Misconduct.”

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of Sexual Harassment

 
HELD: The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law.
 
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit or
stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, “It is true that this provision calls for a ‘demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor.’ But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be
discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.”

The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of
mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under
Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is
committed “(w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.” AAA even testified that she felt fear at the
time petitioner touched her.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule must be manifest.14 The act of petitioner of fondling one of his
students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner
cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple misconduct.

He is dismissed from service

Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling

22 | P a g e
complained of. It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge
against him, which was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he
defended himself from such charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with
precision is of no moment in this administrative case.

CASE: Domingo v. Rayala

G.R. No. 155831
February 18, 2008
FACTS:
             Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of
DOLE. The complaint contains the following allegations :
 
Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her
ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses
with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual lover tones
all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
 
             Upon receipt of the Complaint, DOLE Secretary referred it to the OP, Rayala being a
presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered
Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for
such purpose.
             On December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Admin. Order. No. 280, Series of
1998, constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance with
Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. The Committee heard the
parties and received their respective evidence.
             On March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary
Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the
minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6)
months (the correct penalty is 6months and 1 day). Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119,
which dismissed Rayala from service effective upon receipt of the Order. Rayala filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution. Under Rule 65, Filed a Petition for
Certiorari and   Prohibition   with   Prayer   for   Temporary   Restraining   Order.   However,   it
was   dismissed for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. Motion for reconsideration was filed
and the case was referred to CA for appropriate action.
CA: Sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he
was charged with. Dismissed for disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Rayala timely filed
a Motion for Reconsideration. CA modified its ruling in a special division of 5, the penalty of
dismissal is DELETED and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the maximum
period of one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the challenged
decision stands. Domingo filed a Petition for Review, but was  denied for having a defective
verification. MR granted,  petition reinstated. Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review arguing
that he is not guilty of any act of sexual harassment. Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA, but was denied.
 

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ISSUES: Whether or Not  Rayala commits sexual harassment?
 
 
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
             Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favour, demand
or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion.
According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was
merely Domingo’s perception of malice and a product of her own imagination.
RULING:
             YES. Factual findings are conclusive on the SC. And quite significantly, Rayala himself
admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to him.It is noteworthy that the five CA
Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous in upholding the findings of the Committee
and the OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee and the OP to be a meticulous
and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the respondent
(Rayala), and their respective witnesses.  They differed only on the appropriate imposable
penalty.That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment is,
therefore, the common factual finding of not just one,  but three independent bodies: the
Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial
evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great
respect and even finality by the courts. The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings
should bind us.
 
             Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or
requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher
position. It is enough that the respondent’s act result in creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment for the employee.
 
 
CASE:Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation vs. NLRC and Cortez
G.R. No. 124617
April 28, 2000
 
FACTS:Rosalinda Cortez was the company nurse at Philippine Aeolus. As early as her first year
of employment, her Plant Manager, William Chua, already manifested a special liking for her,
that she was receiving special treatment from him who would oftentimes invite her “for a date,”
which she would as often refuse. On many occasions, he would make sexual advances –
touching her hands, putting his arms around her shoulders, running his fingers on her arms and
telling her she looked beautiful. The special treatment and sexual advances continued during her
employment for four (4) years but she never reciprocated his flirtations, until finally, she noticed
that his attitude towards her changed. He made her understand that if she would not give in to his
sexual advances he would cause her termination from the service; and he made good his threat
when he started harassing her. She just found out one day that her table which was equipped with
telephone and intercom units and containing her personal belongings was transferred without her
knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for which reason, an argument ensued
when she confronted Chua resulting in her being charged with gross disrespect. The company
then dismissed her for throwing a stapler and throwing invectives, among others, at her Plant

24 | P a g e
Manager, Chua. Rosalinda, thereafter, filed an illegal dismissal case and explained that the
incident arose when she had been trying to refuse the sexual advances of Chua. The Labor
Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in her favor, holding that the
dismissal was illegal and ordering the company to pay her moral damages. The corporation
elevated the case on certiorari to the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
W/N  NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding as illegal the dismissal of private
respondent (Cortez) and W/N she is entitled to damages in the event that the illegality of her
dismissal is sustained
RULING:
             The Supreme Court declared Rosalinda’s dismissal illegal and affirmed the award of
moral damages. It did not give merit to the company’s argument that it is unbelievable that it
took her four (4) years before she reacted violently in defense of her womanhood. The court
recognized Mr. Chuas acts as sexual harassment and explained that there is no time period for
reporting such crime saying:
             Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled why it took private respondent
more than four (4) years to expose William Chua’s alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that
it would have been more prepared to support her position if her act of throwing the stapler and
uttering invectives on William Chua were her immediate reaction to his amorous overtures. In
that case, according to public respondent, she would have been justified for such outburst
because she would have been merely protecting her womanhood, her person and her rights.
             We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the
violation of the employee’s sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee,
male or female, may rightfully cry “foul” provided the claim is well substantiated. Strictly
speaking, there is no time period within which he or she is expected to complain through the
proper channels. The time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more
importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee.
             Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out
with her employer’s sexual impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made
of the stuff that can endure the agony and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If
petitioner corporation had not issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of
private respondent, we could only speculate how much longer she would keep her silence.
Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed to transfer from one employer to another. The
dearth of quality employment has become a daily “monster” roaming the streets that one may not
be expected to give up one’s employment easily but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all tolerable
means. Perhaps, to private respondent’s mind, for as long as she could outwit her employer’s
ploys she would continue on her job and consider them as mere occupational hazards. This
uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one
could only imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all that
time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had no place in private respondent’s
heart, so must she have no place in his office. So, he provoked her, harassed her, and finally
dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up anger for years, he “found” the perfect reason
to terminate her.
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced “superiority” which is enough to
dampen an employee’s spirit in her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment. It
changes her life, if for this alone private respondent should be adequately compensated.

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ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. MAILA CLEMEN F.
SERRANO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175433, March 11, 2015
 
Facts: Respondent alleged that on November 23, 2000, petitioner invited her, along with her
officemates, Administrative Officer V Eva Bataller, Atty. III Eugene Juanson, and Stenographer
II Roman Vidal, to eat lunch at Buddy’s Restaurant, at J.P. Rizal St., Makati City. While seated
at the table waiting for their food to be served, petitioner suddenly took hold of respondent’s
face and forcefully kissed her lips in the presence of Eva, Eugene, Roman and other customers.
Respondent tried to ward off petitioner by pulling her head away from him, but he persisted on
kissing her against her will. She was so shocked, terrified, and humiliated that she could hardly
talk and move. She wanted to cry, but held her tears for fear of further embarrassment.

Respondent also alleged that prior to that “kissing” incident, petitioner had already degraded her
person on four (4) separate occasions, namely: (1) on the very first day she met him in the office,
he offered to purchase her a cell phone so that he can text her, which offer she straightforwardly
refused; (2) on that same day, he wanted her to join him in his car in going home, which she
likewise refused; (3) a week later, he asked her to eat out for lunch; again, she refused; and (4)
on August 23, 2000, after her sick leave from office, petitioner called her in his office and
scolded her.

Issue: whether or not ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES committed sexual harassment and

acts of lasciviousness.

Held: In this case, the Court finds the element of corruption present. As correctly pointed out by
the CA, petitioner used his position and authority as Head of the Legal Division of
PHILRACOM, as well as his moral ascendancy, to elicit sexual favors and to indulge in sexually
malicious acts from his respondent, his female subordinate. 29 As to petitioner’s sole defense that
he merely gave respondent an innocent birthday greeting kiss, the Court is unconvinced in view
of the Joint Affidavit of their officemates attesting that he forcibly kissed her on the lips.

The act of grabbing and attempting to kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable
manifestation of his intention to violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the
work environment. Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate RA 7877, his
attempt to kiss petitioner was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time
immemorial – that intimate physical contact between individuals must be consensual.

 
R.A. NO. 3019 OR THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPTION PRACTICES ACT
 
Digested by:
Maria Teresa Garcia

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OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. SHERIFF JOSE M. RAMANO. A.M.
No.P-90-488; January 25, 2011

FACTS: Complainant Jose dela Riva filed an information against Deputy Sheriff Ramano for
violation of Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act for
alleged extortion, deliberate delay in serving court processes and refusal to levy with regard to
Civil Case 35349. Thereafter, Court Administrator Meynardo Tiro filed the instant
administrative case against Ramano.
 
Ramano denied the charges against him and said that the alleged delay of the issuance of the
Writ of Execution was due to complainant Dela Riva's refusal to consult with his lawyer as well
as his inability to locate and point out properties to be levied upon. He also denied that he
demanded 35% of all the recoveries on the levies. The Sandiganbayan decided to convict
Ramano for violation of RA 3019. The entry of judgment was issued thereafter. Due to Ramano's
failure to appear during the promulgation of judgment the court ordered his arrest but he remains
at-large.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramano is guilty of gross misconduct.
 
HELD: The Court referred the instant administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report
and recommendation. The OCA found that Ramano's refusal to implement the Writ of Execution
to compel complainant to give him 35% of the proceeds of the levies was a deliberate refusal to
perform his duty and a means to obtain some consideration. Thus, considering that in
administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, the OCA found Ramano guilty
of serious misconduct and recommended his dismissal from service with forfeiture of all
benefits, except accrued leave credits.
 
Sheriffs ought to know that they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution with
utmost dispatch. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with
reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. Unless
restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly
delayed. Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily as
possible.

In the instant case, it was established that Ramano had been negligent in implementing the
subject writ due to complainant Dela Rivas refusal to give in to respondent's demand that he be
given 35% share of whatever may be collected from the implementation of the writ. Apparently,
complainant Dela Riva even provided substantial leads to assist Ramano in pursuing the
implementation of the writ, but the latter stubbornly refused to facilitate it. While pointing the
blame to complainant Dela Riva's alleged continued and unexplained refusal to consult with his
counsel, as well as failure to locate the properties to be levied upon, Ramano himself failed to
even make inquiries and verification with the pertinent government offices, such as the Office of
Philippine Coast Guard, Land Transportation Office, or the Register of Deeds, which could have
been helpful in locating the properties subject to execution. The Court also found no other reason

27 | P a g e
why complainant Dela Riva would institute a criminal action against the accused if he was
innocent of the charges. GRANTED.
 
HENRY EDQUIBAN BARRERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
438 SCRA 221 (2004)
 
FACTS: Henry Barrera, the Mayor of the Municipality of Candelaria, Zambales was indicted
before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. An administrative case was
also filed against Barrera before the Office of the Ombudsman which recommended that he be
faulted for abuse of authority and be penalized with suspension from office without pay for six
(6) months. Barrera filed a motion but it was denied. He thus filed a petition for review of the
Ombudsman decision before Court of Appeals which denied the same. The Sandiganbayan
ordered Barrerra‘s preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days.
 
ISSUE : Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in
placing Henry Equiban Barrera under preventive suspension for a period not exceeding
ninety (90) days.
 
HELD: Henry Barrera admits in his memorandum filed before the Supreme Court that upon his
receipt of the resolution directing his preventive suspension, he started serving the same. The
issue has thus been rendered moot and academic. Besides, the Sandiganbayan, by
Decision dismissed Criminal Cases on the ground that the elements of the offense under Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
At this juncture then, a determination of whether the preventive suspension under Section 13 of
Rule 3019 is mandatory and automatic would not have any practical effect on the existing
controversy. En passant, if the administrative case filed against Barrera has been terminated also
in his favor, he may invoke Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.
 
It is Barrera‘s contention that Section 13, R.A. 3019 should not be taken in isolation but should
be viewed in light of the rationale behind the suspension, the purpose being to prevent the officer
or employee from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence
potential witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him. And, so Barrera maintains, since the prosecution failed to prove, if not substantially
allege that he is abusing the prerogatives of the office, intimidating possible witnesses and/or
tampering with documentary evidence during the pendency of the cases against him, the
suspension order should not have been issued.
 
It has been long settled, however, and it bears reiteration that Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public official “shall be suspended from
office” while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. The rule on the matter is specific and
categorical, leaving no room for interpretation. There are no ifs and buts about it. The court has
neither the discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent
the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue
committing malfeasance in office. Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan so teaches.
 
 

28 | P a g e
HENRY T. GO vs. THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 172602   April 13, 2007
 
FACTS: Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Henry Go, Chairman and
President of PIATCO, were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, also known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Go, in relation to the voided 1997 Concession
Agreement and the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) entered into by the
government with Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO).
 
Petitioner Go contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given that he was not a
public officer, a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g) of RA 3019. He further assert
that conspiracy by a private party with a public officer is chargeable only with the offense under
Sec3(e).
 
 
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with violation of
Sec 3(g) of RA 3019.
 
HELD: The application of the anti-graft law extends to both public officers and private
persons. Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if
found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
 
Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable to Go’s case. In the former, Dans, the public officer
and with whom Marcos had allegedly conspired with in committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019,
had already been acquitted. Marcos could then not be convicted, on her own as a private person,
of the said offense.
 
The finding of probable cause against petitioner by the Office of the Ombudsman is a function
duly belonging to the latter. The exercise of such function cannot be meddled with by the courts
by virtue of the doctrine of non-interference except for compelling reasons.
 
JOSE R. CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175991; August 31, 2011
 
 
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Catacutan was held guilty before the Sandiganbayan for the violation
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for his refusal to implement
the promotion and appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as
Vocational Supervisors III despite the directive of CHED and the Civil Service commission.
Catacutan questioned the judgment, contending that he was denied due process when he was not
allowed to present the CA judgment, dismissing the adminstrative case against him.
 

29 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment, finding petitioner guilty of violating RA 3019, was well
founded despite the refusal of the trial court to admit the dismissal of the administrative case as
evidence.
 
HELD: The stubborn defiance by petitioner in carrying out the memorandum issued by CHED
was attended by ill motive and bad faith. Such factual finding by the Trial courts, which was
affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, was based on the evidence presented before it. The non-
admittance of the dismissal of the administrative case did not violate petitioner’s right to due
process where such dismissal was not relevant to the adjudication of the criminal case. After all,
administrative proceedings require a different quantum of proof compared to criminal
proceedings, the judgment in one is not dependent on the other.
 
Present in the case were the elements to find the petitioner guilty of violating Sec3(e) of RA
3019, to wit: 1.that the accused was a public officer performing an official function; 2) that he
acted in bad faith; and 3) that injury was caused to another party because of such act.
 
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011
 
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175482
 
FACTS: Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado
were found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring
with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco
Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s residence.
 
ISSUES:
1.)  Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2
accused has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.
 
2.)  Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was
a violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same
act.
 
HELD: The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a
position with a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused
occupies a position with a salary grade “27” or higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the
lower courts. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial governor and so as with
Apelado for being a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade
of 22.
 
The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code
and Administrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly

30 | P a g e
vested before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident
bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at hand even if the act was not one relative
to the “granting of licenses and concessions”. The provision was meant to include officers with
such duty to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity.
Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the recipient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not
preclude application. The act employs the phrase “private party”, which is more comprehensive
in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect
his personal interest.
 
Thus, the verdict by the Sandiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was
proper.
 
 
 
 
RA 9160 entitled AN ACT DEFINING THE CRIME OF MONEY LAUNDERING,
PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES or the ANTI
MONEY LAUNDERING ACT of 2001
 
Digested by:
Wally Caculitan Aranas
 
 
 
1.   SUBIDO, PAGENTE, CERTEZA, MENDOZA, AND BINAY LAW OFFICES VS
COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 216914 (2016)
 
2.   RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, ERLINDA Y. LIGOT, PAULO Y. LIGOT,
RIZA Y. LIGOT, and MIGUEL Y. LIGOT vs. REPUBLIC, represented by the
AMLC GR No. 176944 (March 6, 2013)
 
3.   REPUBLIC, represented by AMLC vs. HON. EUGENIO, JR., PANTALEON
ALVAREZ, and LILIA CHENG. GR No. 174629 (February 14, 2008)
 
4.   REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC vs. GLASGOW CREDIT AND
COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R.
No. 170281 (January 18, 2008)
 
5.   REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC vs. CABRINI GREEN & ROSS, INC.,
MICHAEL J. FINDLAY and JANE GELBERG G.R. No. 154522 (May 5, 2006)
 
REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC vs. R.A.B. REALTY, INC.,
MULTINATIONAL TELECOM INVESTORS CORPORATION, ROSARIO A.
BALADJAY and SATURNINO M. BALADJAY G.R. No. 154694 (May 5, 2006)
 

31 | P a g e
 REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC vs. MISA, LAFUENTE, SILVERIO,
NICHOLAS and JAO
G.R. No. 155554 (May 5, 2006)
 
REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC vs. DE LOS REYES, CASTRO, DE VERA,
LAZO and LIWAG G.R. No. 155711 (May 5, 2006)
 
SUBIDO, PAGENTE, CERTEZA, MENDOZA, AND BINAY LAW OFFICES VS COURT
OF APPEALS
GR No. 216914 (2016)
 
FACTS: SPCMB files for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on the Constitutionality of
Section 11 of RA 9160 (AMLA).
 
One year before the 2016 elections, reports surfaced of alleged ill-gotten wealth by VP Binay
and family. Investigations by Ombudsman were conducted.
 
News reports from various new sources, including The Manila Times, announce of possible
inquiry over the accounts of Binay.
 
SPCMB tries to confirm this with the CA. The CA refused to comment, alleging the
confidentiality of the case.
 
Eventually, The Manila Times report the CA’s issuance of the order allowing inquiry.
 
Q1: SPCMB authorized an associate to inquire on the veracity of a report that the AMLC asked
the CA to allow it to peep into the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law
office where a family member was once a partner. He authorized to secure copies of relevant
document like the petition and order issued if any. The newspaper later in reported that the CA
issued a resolution granting ex-parte the application of the AMLC to examine the bank accounts
of SPCMB. Petitioner then filed directly with the SC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
contending that AMLA is unconstitutional as it allows examination of a bank account without
any notice to the offended party; Hence, it violates the right to due process and the right to
privacy. Rule on the contentions and explain.
 
A1: No, we do not subscribe to SPCMB’s position. Succinctly, Sec. 11 of AMLA providing for
ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does
not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that
stage. It is the preliminary and actual seizure of the bank deposits or investments in question
which brings these within the reach of judicial process.
 
In fact, the Eugenio case delineates a bank inquiry order under Sec. 11 from a freeze order under
Sec. 10 on both remedies’ effect on the direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits and investments:
 
“A bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitates any form of physical seizure of
property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the

32 | P a g e
particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The
monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not
seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder’s
details record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the
records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the
account holder. Said records are in possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at
the instance of the account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and
devotion of the bank.”
 
 
Q2: SPCMB also contends that the inquiry intrudes into the privacy of the owner of the account.
Rule on the contention and explain.
 
A2: The contention was not correct. While an ex-parte proceeding authorizing the government to
inspect certain bank accounts or investments without notice to the depositor would have
significant implications on the right to privacy still does not preclude such inquiry order to be
allowed by specific legislation as an exception to the general rule of absolute confidentiality of
bank deposits.
 
1.   The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application
for bank inquiry order;
2.   The CA, independent of the AMLC’s demonstration of probable cause, itself makes
a finding of probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful
activity under Sec. 3(i) or a money laundering offense under Sec. 4 of the AMLA;
3.   A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank
inquiry court order ex-parte for the principal account which court order ex-parte for
related accounts is separately based on probable cause that such related account is
materially linked to the principal account inquired into; and
4.   Authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related
accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution. The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank
account are not undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion
of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC, and
determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental
action. We will revert to these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the
CA’s denial of SPCMB’s letter request for information concerning the purported issuance
of a bank inquiry order involving its accounts.
 
In sum, the SC affirms the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte
application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits and
investments.
 
RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, ERLINDA Y. LIGOT, PAULO Y. LIGOT, RIZA
Y. LIGOT, and MIGUEL Y. LIGOT vs. REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC
GR No. 176944 (March 6, 2013)

33 | P a g e
FACTS: Republic filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the issuance of a freeze order with
the CA against certain monetary instruments and properties of Ligot, et al. The application was
based on a letter from the Office of the Ombudsman recommending that the latter conduct an
investigation on Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family for possible violation of RA No. 9160.  The
Ombudsman attached the Complaint it filed against the Ligots for perjury under Article 183 of
the RPC, and for violations of Section 8 of RA 6713 and RA 3019.

The Ombudsman’s complaint alleges that Ligot served in the AFP for 33 years and 2 months as a
cadet until his retirement. He and his wife have four children.

Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) that as of 31
December 2003, he had assets in the total amount of P3.848M. In contrast, his declared assets in
his 1982 SALN amounted to only P105K. 

Aside from these declared assets, the Ombudsman’s investigation revealed that Ligot and his
family had other properties and bank accounts, not declared in his SALN, amounting to at least
P54M.

Given that Ligot’s main source of income was his salary as an officer of the AFP and his wife
and children’s lack of any other substantial sources of income, the Ombudsman declared the
assets registered in Ligot’s name, as well as those in his wife’s and children’s names, to be
illegally obtained and unexplained wealth, pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 1379 (An Act
Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor).

The investigation also looked into Mrs. Ligot’s younger brother, Edgardo Tecson Yambao, and it
was found that Yambao acted as a dummy of the Ligot spouses, and all the properties registered
in Yambao’s name actually belong to the Ligot family.

Compliance and Investigation staff (CIS) of the AMLC conducted a financial investigation,
which revealed the existence of the Ligots’ various bank accounts with several financial
institutions. The Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers issued a
resolution holding that probable cause exists that Lt. Gen. Ligot violated Section 8, in relation to
Section 11, of RA No. 6713, as well as Article 183 of the RPC.

On 25 May 2005, AMLC issued Resolution No. 52, directing the Executive Director of the
AMLC Secretariat to file an application for a freeze order against the properties of Lt.
Gen. Ligot and the members of his family with the CA. Subsequently, on 27 June 2005,
Republic filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application with the appellate court for the issuance of a
Freeze Order against the properties of the Ligots and Yambao.

The appellate court granted the application, ruling that probable cause existed that an unlawful
activity and/or money laundering offense had been committed by Ligot and his family, including
Yambao, and that the properties sought to be frozen are related to the unlawful activity or money
laundering offense. CA issued a freeze order against the Ligots’ and Yambao’s various bank
accounts, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from the date of issuance.

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On 26 July 2005, Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of Freeze
Order, arguing that if the bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles were not continuously
frozen, they could be placed beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities and the
government’s efforts to recover the proceeds of the Ligots’ unlawful activities would be
frustrated. In support of its motion, it informed the CA that the Ombudsman was presently
investigating cases involving the Ligots.

Finding merit in the Republic’s arguments, CA granted the motion extending the freeze order
until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations have been terminated.

The Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order and further argued that the extension
not only deprived them of their property without due process; it also punished them before their
guilt could be proven. The motion was denied.

Meanwhile on 15 November 2005, the "Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset
Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing,
Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under Republic
Act No. 9160, as Amended" (Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) took effect. Under this rule, a
freeze order could be extended for a maximum period of six months.

The Ligots filed a motion for reconsideration, insisting that the freeze order should be lifted
considering: (a) no predicate crime has been proven to support the freeze order’s issuance; (b)
the freeze order expired six months after it was issued on July 5, 2005; and (c) the freeze order is
provisional in character and not intended to supplant a case for money laundering. This motion
was also denied.

Ligot filed for certiorari arguing that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it extended the freeze order issued against him
and his family even though no predicate crime had been duly proven or established to support the
allegation of money laundering. He also maintains that the freeze order issued against them
ceased to be effective in view of the 6-month extension limit of freeze orders provided under the
Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases. The CA, in extending the freeze order, not only unduly deprived
him and his family of their property, in violation of due process, but also penalized them before
they had been convicted of the crimes they stand accused of.

HELD: Court finds merit in the petition.

Probable cause exists to support the issuance of a freeze order

The Ligots’ argument is founded on a flawed understanding of probable cause in the context of a
civil forfeiture proceeding or freeze order application.

Based on Section 10 of RA 9160, amended by RA 9194, there are only two requisites for the
issuance of a freeze order: (1) the application ex parte by the AMLC and (2) the
determination of probable cause by the CA. The probable cause required for the issuance of a

35 | P a g e
freeze order differs from the probable cause required for the institution of a criminal action, and
the latter was not an issue before the CA nor is it an issue before us in this case.

The CA’s statutorily-guided determination’s focus is not on the probable commission of an

unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the Office of the Ombudsman has already
determined to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other monetary instruments
sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities enumerated under RA
No. 9160, as amended. Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the
relation between an unlawful activity and the property or monetary instrument which is
the focal point of Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended.

A freeze order can be issued upon the AMLC’s ex parte application further emphasizes the law’s
consideration of how critical time is in these proceedings. As we previously noted in Republic v.
Eugenio, Jr., "to make such freeze order anteceded by a judicial proceeding with notice to the
account holder would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the order
could be issued."

It should be noted that the existence of an unlawful activity that would justify the issuance and
the extension of the freeze order has likewise been established in this case.

From the ex parte application and the Ombudsman’s complaint, we glean that Lt. Gen. Ligot
himself admitted that his income came from his salary as an officer of the AFP. Yet, the
Ombudsman’s investigation revealed that the bank accounts, investments and properties in the
name of Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family amount to more than Fifty-Four Million Pesos
(₱54,000,000.00). Since these assets are grossly disproportionate to Lt. Gen. Ligot’s income, as
well as the lack of any evidence that the Ligots have other sources of income, the CA properly
found that probable cause exists that these funds have been illegally acquired. On the other hand,
the AMLC’s verified allegations in its ex parte application, based on the complaint filed by the
Ombudsman against Ligot and his family for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, clearly sustain the CA’s finding that probable cause exists that the monetary instruments
subject of the freeze order are related to, or are the product of, an unlawful activity.

A freeze order, however, cannot be issued for an indefinite period

A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief issued by the CA to prevent the dissipation,
removal, or disposal of properties that are suspected to be the proceeds of, or related to, unlawful
activities as defined in Section 3(i) of RA No. 9160, as amended. The primary objective of a
freeze order is to temporarily preserve monetary instruments or property that are in any
way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by preventing the owner from
utilizing them during the duration of the freeze order. The relief is pre-emptive in character,
meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property and thwarting the State’s effort in
building its case and eventually filing civil forfeiture proceedings and/or prosecuting the owner.

… to otherwise leave the grant of the extension to the sole discretion of the CA, which may
extend a freeze order indefinitely or to an unreasonable amount of time – carries serious
implications on an individual’s substantive right to due process. This right demands that no

36 | P a g e
person be denied his right to property or be subjected to any governmental action that amounts to
a denial. The right to due process, under these terms, requires a limitation or at least an inquiry
on whether sufficient justification for the governmental action.

… as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a period not
exceeding six months. Before or upon the lapse of this period, ideally, the Republic should have
already filed a case for civil forfeiture against the property owner with the proper courts and
accordingly secure an asset preservation order or it should have filed the necessary information.
Otherwise, the property owner should already be able to fully enjoy his property without any
legal process affecting it. However, should it become completely necessary for the Republic
to further extend the duration of the freeze order, it should file the necessary motion before
the expiration of the six-month period and explain the reason or reasons for its failure to
file an appropriate case and justify the period of extension sought. The freeze order should
remain effective prior to the resolution by the CA, which is hereby directed to resolve this kind
of motion for extension with reasonable dispatch.

REPUBLIC, represented by AMLC vs. HON. EUGENIO, JR., PANTALEON ALVAREZ,

and LILIA CHENG.
GR No. 174629 (February 14, 2008)
 
FACTS: A series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO
were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of
petitioner Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC). The CIS conducted an intelligence
database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals involved in the award,
including respondent Pantaleon Alvarez (Alvarez) who had been the Chairman of the PBAC
Technical Committee, NAIA-IPT3 Project; Wilfredo Trinidad; Alfredo Liongson; and Cheng
Yong. The AMLC issued Resolution No. 75, Series of 2005, whereby the Council resolved to
authorize the Executive Director of the AMLC "to sign and verify an application to inquire into
and/or examine the [deposits] or investments of the mentioned individuals, and their related web
of accounts.
 
Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire into or
examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the
RTC of Makati, Branch 138. The Court issued an order granting inquiry, and the CIS proceeded
to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and related web accounts of the four.
 
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote
a letter, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other
entities involved in the nullified contract. Attaching a memorandum "on why the investigation of
the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan."
 
The letter adverted to probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the
commission of unlawful activities that were committed in relation to the criminal cases then
pending before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the
investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal cases before

37 | P a g e
the Sandiganbayan. The AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of
2005 which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the
accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other
accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. Cheng Yong refused to have the account
examined on ground of the Bank Secrecy Act.
 
HELD: Because of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic
state policy in the Philippines. Subsequent laws, including the AMLA, may have added
exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act, yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule.
It falls within the zones of privacy recognized by our laws. The framers of the 1987 Constitution
likewise recognized that bank accounts are not covered by either the right to information under
Section 7, Article III or under the requirement of full public disclosure under Section 28, Article
II. Unless the Bank Secrecy Act is repealed or amended, the legal order is obliged to conserve
the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank deposits.
 
Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated. Section 2 of
the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by any person, government official, bureau or official; namely when: (1) upon written
permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts
is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;
and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of RA
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting
an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar
recognitions as well.
 
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC
may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the
AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments
are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering
offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the
deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom, certain violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, hijacking and other violations under RA 6235,
destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before
it could inquire into such accounts.
 
Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act
it does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the
older law that "[a]ll deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature." Indeed, by force
of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the
legislated exceptions referred to above. There is disfavor towards construing these exceptions in
such a manner that would authorize unlimited discretion on the part of the government or of any
party seeking to enforce those exceptions and inquire into bank deposits. If there are doubts in
upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits against affirming the authority to
inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. Such a

38 | P a g e
stance would persist unless Congress passes a law reversing the general state policy of
preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts.
REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC vs. GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION
SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 170281 (January 18, 2008)
 
FACTS: Republic filed a complaint in the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent
plea for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction) against the bank deposits
maintained by Glasgow in Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. The case was filed pursuant to RA 9160,
as amended.
 
RTC Manila issued a 72-hour TRO. The case was thereafter raffled to Branch 47 and the hearing
on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was set on August 4, 2003.
 
After hearing, the trial court issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The injunctive writ was issued on August 8, 2003.
 
Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned "unserved" as it could no longer be found at its
last known address.
 
On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of Glasgow’s "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of
Special Appearance)", alleging that the complaint was premature and stated no cause of action as
there was still no conviction for estafa or other criminal violations implicating Glasgow among
other grounds.
 
The Republic opposed Glasgow’s motion to dismiss. It contended that its suit was an action
quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court. It asserted that prior conviction for unlawful activity was not a
precondition to the filing of a civil forfeiture case and that its complaint alleged ultimate facts
sufficient to establish a cause of action. It denied that it failed to prosecute the case.
 
Trial court issued an order dismissing the case and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and
directed CSBI to release to Glasgow or its authorized representative the funds in the account.
 
Republic filed a petition for review of the order issued by the Trial Court.
 
HELD: Court agrees with the Republic.
 
RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations lay down two conditions when
applying for civil forfeiture:
 
(1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or a covered transaction report deemed
suspicious after investigation by the AMLC; and
(2) the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary
instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report.
 

39 | P a g e
It is the preliminary seizure of the property in question which brings it within the reach of the
judicial process. It is actually within the court’s possession when it is submitted to the process of
the court. The injunctive writ issued on August 8, 2003 removed account no. CA-005-10-
000121-5 from the effective control of either Glasgow or CSBI or their representatives or agents
and subjected it to the process of the court.
 
Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in CSBI was (1) covered by several
suspicious transaction reports and (2) placed under the control of the trial court upon the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction, the conditions provided in Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as
amended, were satisfied. Hence, the Republic, represented by the AMLC, properly instituted the
complaint for civil forfeiture.
 
Whether or not there is truth in the allegation that account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 contains the
proceeds of unlawful activities is an evidentiary matter that may be proven during trial. The
complaint, however, did not even have to show or allege that Glasgow had been implicated in a
conviction for, or the commission of, the unlawful activities of estafa and violation of the
Securities Regulation Code.
 
A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the institution of a
civil forfeiture proceeding. Stated otherwise, a finding of guilt for an unlawful activity is
not an essential element of civil forfeiture.
REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC vs. CABRINI GREEN & ROSS, INC., MICHAEL
J. FINDLAY and JANE GELBERG
G.R. No. 154522 (May 5, 2006)
 
REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC vs. R.A.B. REALTY, INC., MULTINATIONAL
TELECOM INVESTORS CORPORATION, ROSARIO A. BALADJAY and
SATURNINO M. BALADJAY
G.R. No. 154694 (May 5, 2006)
 
REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC vs. MISA, LAFUENTE, SILVERIO, NICHOLAS
and JAO
G.R. No. 155554 (May 5, 2006)
 
REPUBLIC, represented by the AMLC vs. DE LOS REYES, CASTRO, DE VERA, LAZO
and LIWAG
G.R. No. 155711 (May 5, 2006)

FACTS: AMLC issued freeze orders against various bank accounts of respondents. The frozen
bank accounts were previously found prima facie to be related to the unlawful activities of
respondents.

AMLC invoked the jurisdiction of the CA in the belief that the power given to the CA to issue a
TRO or writ of injunction against any freeze order issued by the AMLC carried with it the power
to extend the effectivity of a freeze order. In other words, the AMLC interpreted the phrase
"upon order of the court" to refer to the CA.

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However, the CA disagreed with the AMLC and dismissed the petitions. It uniformly ruled that
it was not vested by RA 9160 with the power to extend a freeze order issued by the AMLC.

ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to extend the effectivity of a freeze order?

HELD: The cases were remanded to CA, pursuant to RA 9194, amending RA 9160.

During the pendency of these petitions, Congress enacted RA 9194 (An Act Amending Republic
Act No. 9160, Otherwise Known as the "Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001").It amended
Section 10 of RA 9160 as follows:

SEC. 7. Section 10 of [RA 9160] is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. – The Court of Appeals, upon

application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that
any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined
in Sec. 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze
order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court. (emphasis
supplied)

Section 12 of RA 9194 further provides:

SEC 12. Transitory Provision. – Existing freeze orders issued by the AMLC shall remain in
force for a period of thirty (30) days after the effectivity of this Act, unless extended by
the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)

The amendment by RA 9194 of RA 9160 erased any doubt on the jurisdiction of the CA over the
extension of freeze orders. As the law now stands, it is solely the CA which has the authority to
issue a freeze order as well as to extend its effectivity. It also has the exclusive jurisdiction to
extend existing freeze orders previously issued by the AMLC vis-à-vis accounts and deposits
related to money-laundering activities.

 
 
 RA 80 49 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-HAZING LAW OF 1995
Digested : by Jeff Edilee L. Corpuz
 
Dandy L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines
761 SCRA 375
July 1, 2015
FACTS:

41 | P a g e
 
Marlon Villanueva was a neophyte of the Alpha Phi Omega fraternity.
On January 14, 2006 at Villa Novaliches, Calamba City, Laguna, Dandy Dungo and Gregorio
Sibal Jr. together
with other Alpha Phi Omega fraternity members and officers held an initiation rite.
During said rite, Villanueva was subjected to physical harm leading to his death. Dungo and
Sibal were charged
with violation of RA 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995. The RTC found Dungo and Sibal
guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The RTC explained that despite the fact that there was no evidence that Dungo
and Sibal
participated in inflicting physical harm to Villanueva, their aid in inducing Villanueva to attend
the initiation
rite and bringing him to the location was indispensable. Dungo and Sibal appealed but the CA
upheld the ruling
of the RTC.
Hence, they appealed to the Supreme Court.
Dungo and Sibal argued that the information charged them as “they did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and
feloniously assault and use personal violence upon [Villanueva].” Yet, both the RTC and CA
found them guilty
of violating RA 8049 because “they induced the victim to be present during the initiation rites.”
Since
inducement is not included in the crime of hazing by actual participation, they cannot be
convicted of a crime
noit stated or necessarily included in the information. They contend that this is a violation of
their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them.
ISSUE: W/N Dungo and Sibal can be convicted of the crime of hazing under RA 8049.
HELD: YES
The SC ruled that Dungo and Sibal can be convicted of violation of RA 8049 despite the lack of
evidence in
their direct participation. The crime of hazing RA 8049 is a mala prohibita. The act of hazing
itself is not

42 | P a g e
inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be
prohibited.
Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the
defense of good
faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.
The argument of Dungo and Sibal that they were not properly informed of the accusation against
them was also
not accepted by the court. According to the Rules of Court 1 , the information need not use the
exact language
of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test
is whether it
enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to
render judgment
properly.
Sec. 9, Rule 110: Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances
and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The court said that the act of inducing the victim to attend the initiation rite is necessarily part of
a “planned
initiation rite.” Not only did they induce the victim, they also brought him to the location. They
fulfilled their
role in the planned hazing rite which led to the death of the victim.
 
Furthermore, RA8049 provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is a prima facie
evidence of
participation as principal unless he prevented the commission of the punishable act.
 
Villareal vs People (Lenny Villa Case)

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Facts:
February 1991- 7 freshmen law students of ADMU signified their intention to join the Aquila
Legis fraternity.
They were met by members of AL at the lobby of Ateneo Law. They were informed that there
will be physical
beatings and that they can quit anytime. The rites were scheduled to last 3 days. They were
subjected to
traditional Aquilan initiation rites such as the “Indian Run”, “Bicol Express”, “Rounds”, “Auxies
Privilege
Round”, rough basketball, comic plays, and other forms of paddling. Lenny received several
blows, one of
which was so strong that it sent him sprawling to the ground. When they were already sleeping,
the neophytes
were roused by Lenny’s shivering and mumblings. He was brought to the hospital but was
pronounced dead on
arrival.
Held:
No crime without a law punishing it
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of
mala in
seadhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment
thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma
faced by Congress
is further proof of how the nature of hazing — unique as against typical crimes — cast a cloud of
doubt on
whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in seat the time.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness,
which made the
resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to
their initiates a
duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With the foregoing facts, we rule that the
accused are guilty
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the
victim’s death

44 | P a g e
was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those
who directly
participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall
cover only
accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect
then, these five
accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by
reclusion
perpetua(life imprisonment). Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny
died, we are
constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death.
 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, et al.
G.R. Nos. 171222 & 174786, 18 February 2015, FIRST DIVISION, (Sereno, C.J.)
The failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law
exposes them
to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers
cannot stand idly by
in the face of patently criminal acts committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear
the
commensurate duty to ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not
committed.
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant
Marine
Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully
complete the
mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001.
Balidoy died on
3 May 2001. PMMA were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to
hazing under the
Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information
against them on the
basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include
in the

45 | P a g e
Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. Consequently, this petition
was filed
before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.
ISSUE:
May the dismissal of the criminal case of the principal accused be invoked as a ground to dismiss
the criminal
case of the accomplices, some school authorities herein?
RULING:
No. That the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence
of trial of the
purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal,
especially when
the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the
act, they may
nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above
elements,
occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or
failed to take
preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
First, the Court rejects the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization.
Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is not limited to
– groups,
teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs,
societies, cooperatives,
companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the Department of
Transportation and
Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned educational institution established for the
primary
purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included
in the term
organization within the meaning of the law.
Nevertheless, the Court finds – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be
granted, as the
46 | P a g e
Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to
hazing. Failure to
aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal
responsibility of the
accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing.
 
ARVIN R. BALAG v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 234608, 3 July 2018, EN BANC (Gesmundo, J.)
FACTS

This is a case of petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer of an issuance of a
temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin implementation
of the Senate
P.S. Resolution No. 504 and October 18, 2017 Order of Complaint by the Senate Committee on
Public Order
and Dangerous Drugs filed by Arvin R. Balag (petitioner) against the Senate of the Philippines,
et. al.
(respondent). On September 17, 2017, a first-year law student from the University of Santo
Tomas named
Horacio Castillo III, allegedly died due to hazing-related activities conducted by the Aegis Juris
Fraternity. On
September 20, 2017, the senate released Senate Resolution No. 504 entitled “a Resolution
Directing the
Appropriate Senate Committees to Conduct an Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent
Death of Horacio
Castillo III Allegedly due to Hazing-Related Activities” filed by Sen. Paolo Benigno Aquino IV.
When the petitioner attended the hearing dated on October 18, 2017, Sen. Grace Poe asked the
petitioner if he
was the president of Aegis Juris Fraternity however, the petitioner refused to answer and invoked
his right to
self-incrimination. Sen. Panfilo Lacson reminded that it was just a “simple question” to invoke
self-
incrimination and warned the petitioner that he may be cited in contempt, but the petitioner still
refused to
47 | P a g e
answer. According to Sen. Grace Poe, the petitioner’s signature appeared on the document for
the application of
the Aegis Juris Fraternity in the organizational sheet submitted in the school administration and it
was indicated
therein that the petitioner was the President, yet he still refuses to answer the simple question
asked. The
petitioner was then cited in contempt and was ordered to place in detention under the Senate
Sergeant at Arms’
supervision after the senate hearing. Sen. Panfilo Lacson gave the petitioner a chance to purge
out of contempt,
however, the petitioner still refused to answer and invoked his right to self-incrimination. When
the petitioner
was asked of the question of whose decision it was to bring the victim to the hospital, the
petitioner submitted a
plea to lift his contempt and stated that he was a member of the Aegis Juris Fraternity, however,
he does not
know who the president was because he was enrolled at another university at the time of the
incident. The
question asked before his plea was again repeated and the petitioner invoked again his right to
self-
incrimination. The d
ISSUE:
Did the Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion in conducting the legislative
inquiry and citing
petitioner in contempt?
RULING:
YES. However, the court denied the petition for being moot and academic. In the present case,
the Court finds
that there is no more justiciable controversy to be decided up since in its resolution dated
December 12, 2017,
the Court ordered in the interim the immediate release of petitioner pending resolution of the
instant petition.
Thus, petitioner was no longer detained under the Senate's authority.
However, the court still resolved the case despite being moot and academic. The court ruled that
the period of

48 | P a g e
imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of
legislation should
only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry. The court stated that the interests of the
Senate and the
witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry should be balanced. The Senate can continuously
and effectively
exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even
during recess.
 
Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a
contemptuous act, subject
to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness. However, during recess, the
Senate will be
prevented from effectively conducting legislative hearings. But the Senate may still exercise its
power of
contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment
shall only last
until the termination of the legislative inquiry upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee
Report. Thus,
the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and compelling even during its
recess. At the same time,
the rights of the persons appearing are respected because their detention shall not be indefinite.
[ A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4141-RTJ), January 24, 2017 ]
JUDGE MARTONINO R. MARCOS (RETIRED), COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. PERLA V.
CABRERA-
FALLER, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 90, DASMARIÑAS
CITY,
CAVITE , RESPONDENT.
Facts. Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] against Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller
(Judge Cabrera-
Faller) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas City, Cavite (RTC), filed by
Martonino R. Marcos,
a retired judge (complainant), for ignorance of the law, misconduct, violation of the anti-graft
and corrupt
practices act, and for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order.

49 | P a g e
The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant's grandson, Marc Andrei Marcos
(Marc Andrei),
during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum Fraternitas (Lex Leonum) held on July 29, 2012 at the
Veluz Farm,
Dasmariñas City, Cavite.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) issued its
Resolution,[2] dated May 8, 2013, recommending the prosecution of several members of Lex
Leonum for
Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049, otherwise known as The Anti Hazing Law. In the
same resolution,
the OCP also recommended that Cornelio Marcelo (Marcelo), the person assigned to be the
buddy or "angel" of
Marc Andrei during the initiation rites, be discharged as a state witness pursuant to the
provisions of Section 12
of R.A. No. 6981.[3]
Thereafter, the Information[4] for Violation of R.A. No. 8049 was filed against Jenno Antonio
Villanueva
(Villanueva), Emmanuel Jefferson Santiago, Richard Rosales (Rosales), Mohamad Fyzee Alim
(Alim), Chino
Daniel Amante (Amante), Julius Arsenio Alcancia, Edrich Gomez, Dexter Circa, Gian Angelo
Veluz, Glenn
Meduen, alias Tonton, alias Fidel, alias E.R., and alias Paulo, before the RTC. The case was
docketed as
Criminal Case No. 11862-13.
Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the
Order,[5]
dated June 3, 2013, directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and, at the same time, the
archiving of the entire
record of the case until the arrest of the accused.
On June 13, 2013, acting on the Omnibus Motion filed by Rosales, Alim and Amante, Judge
Cabrera-Faller
issued another Order[6] directing the recall of the warrants of arrest of the three accused which
she claimed
were issued inadvertently.

50 | P a g e
On August 15, 2013, acting on the separate motions for the determination of probable cause and
to withhold
issuance of warrants of arrest[7] and extremely urgent motion to quash warrant of arrest[8] filed
by the accused,
Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the Omnibus Order,[9] quashing, lifting and setting aside the
warrants for their
arrest and ultimately dismissing the case against all of them for lack of probable cause.
Ruling. XXX…Indeed, in her Omnibus Order dismissing the case, her reasoning that there was
no probable
cause was strained and taxed one's credulity. As earlier stated, Judge Cabrera-Faller wrote
that the statement of
Marcelo simply depicted the stages of initiation rites and failed to show that the accused
conspired to inflict
fatal injuries on Marc Andrei. Despite the admission on the part of the accused that initiation
rites were indeed
 
conducted on July 29, 2012 and that they were present in the different stages of the initiation
rites, she brushed
aside these admissions and the narrations of the prosecution witnesses and simply opted to
believe the claim of
the accused that it was Marcelo, and Marcelo alone, who inflicted the fatal blow on his recruit.
Judge Cabrera-Faller should know that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. A
hearing is
absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution's
evidence is strong or
weak. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, if the person subjected to hazing or other forms of
initiation rites
suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity,
sorority or
organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as
principals, and the
officers and members present during the hazing are prima facie presumed to have actually
participated, unless it

51 | P a g e
can be shown that he or she prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This disputable
presumption
arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing.
Judge Cabrera-Faller must be reminded that a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged for it would be unfair to require the
prosecution to
present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon the filing of the
information against
the latter.
A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the
evidence on record
plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records readily show uncontroverted,
and thus,
established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.
Hazing is commonly characterized by secrecy and silence and to require the prosecution to
indicate every step
of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case would be a
strenuous task.
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be
borne in mind
that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. It must be stressed that a careful and deliberate
consideration for
the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial.
Although judges are generally not accountable for erroneous judgments rendered in good faith,
such defense in
situations of infallible discretion adheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and
does not apply
where the basic issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be
beyond
permissible margins of error.
Time and again, the Court has earnestly reminded judges to be extra prudent and circumspect in
the

52 | P a g e
performance of their duties. This exalted position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of
which is
proficiency in the law. They are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and
procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith. When the law is sufficiently basic,
a judge owes it
to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance
of the law.
Moreover, judges are duty bound to render just, correct and impartial decisions at all times in a
manner free of
any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality or integrity.The records must be free from the
slightest suspicion
that the trial court seized upon an opportunity to either free itself from the usual burdens of
presiding over a
full-blown court battle or worse, to give undue advantage or favors to one of the litigants. Public
confidence in
the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. The appearance of bias or
prejudice can
be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.
 

JURISPRUDENCE RELATING TO REPUBLIC ACT No. 10591

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND

AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Digested by: CHESTER ALLAN D. PREJIDO

 
 
1.   PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LUISITO GABORNE G.R NO. 210710
 
Facts:
 

53 | P a g e
Rey Perfecto De Luna (De Luna) and Sixto Elizan (Elizan) entered a videoke bar at Barangay
Mugdo, Hinabangan, Samar. Noli Abayan (Abayan), appellant and Joselito Bardelas (Bardelas)
followed five minutes thereafter. While Elizan and De Luna were drinking, singing and merely
having fun, four successive gunshots were fired through the window. Elizan and De Luna were
hit from behind. De Luna and Marialinisa Pasana (Pasana) saw appellant, who was then wearing
a black t-shirt and a black cap, holding a gun aimed at their location. Pasana also saw accused-
appellant and Bardelas escape after the incident. Elizan and De Luna were brought to St. Paul's
Hospital at Tacloban City. Unfortunately, Elizan was pronounced dead upon arrival while De
Luna survived.
 
Appellant’s alibi: According to him, he and his companions ordered for bottles of beer.
However, when they tried to order for more bottles, the waitress refused to give them their order
unless they pay for their previous orders first. While Abayan was explaining to the father of the
owner of the videoke bar, appellant and Bardelas went out to urinate, however, the waitress
locked the front door. While standing outside, he heard the waitress utter the words, "If you will
not pay, I [will] have you killed, all of you, right this moment. He also consistently contend that
it was a man wearing black shirt and camouflage pants who fired shots to the videoke bar, not
him.
 
The following day, appellant and Bardelas were arrested and underwent paraffin test.
 
RTC found him guilty of the two 2 charges of Murder with the use of Unlicensed Firearm and
Frustrated Murder. Abayan and Bardelas were acquitted. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
 
Issue:
 
Whether or not the degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met in the case at bar.
 
Held:
Yes.
 
The elements of murder are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248
of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
 
ARTICLE 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment
or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with
the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

54 | P a g e
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
 
The requisites of treachery are: (1) The employment of means method, or manner of execution
which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the
victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution. In this case,
the hapless victims were merely drinking and singing in-front of the videoke machine when shot
by the appellant. The firing was so sudden and swift that they had no opportunity to defend
themselves or to retaliate. Furthermore, appellant's acts of using a gun and even going out of the
videoke bar evidently show that he consciously adopted means to ensure the execution of the
crime.
 
In addition, the lower courts appropriately found appellant liable for the crime of Frustrated
Murder.
 
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
 
Intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive alone is not a proof and is hardly ever an essential
element of a crime. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged
does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of
accused for the crime charged such as murder.
 
Evidently, accused-appellant's intent to kill was established beyond reasonable doubt. This can
be seen from his act of shooting Elizan and De Luna from behind with a firearm while they were
innocently singing and drinking.
 
In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No. 10591, to Presidential
Decree No. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in
order. Instead, illegal possession of firearm is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance
in the crime of murder. It is clear from the foregoing that where murder results from the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the crime is not qualified illegal possession but, murder. In such a case, the
use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a
mere aggravating circumstance. Thus, where murder was committed, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating
circumstance. The intent of Congress is to treat the offense of illegal possession of firearm and
the commission of homicide or murder with the use of unlicensed firearm as a single offense.
 
In the case at hand, since it was proven that accused-appellant was not a licensed firearm holder,
and that he was positively identified by the witnesses as the one who fired shots against the

55 | P a g e
victims, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of Murder and
Frustrated Murder should be considered as an aggravating circumstance thereof.
 
  
2.   PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSELITO PERALTA G.R NO. 221991
 
FACTS:
 
The instant case arose from an Information dated November 20, 2008 charging Peralta of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition, defined and penalized under PD 1866, as amended, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
 
That on or about the 18th day of November, 2008, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSELITO PERALTA y
Zareno, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession, custody,
and control one (1) cal. 45 with Serial No. 4517488 with magazine with five (5) live
ammunitions, without authority to possess the same.

Contrary to PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294.

The prosecution alleged that at around 11 o'clock in the evening of November 18, 2008, a team
consisting of Police Officer 3 Christian A. Carvajal (PO3 Carvajal), one Police Officer Lavarias,
Police Officer 2 Bernard Arzadon (PO2 Arzadon), and Police Officer 3 Lucas Salonga (PO3
Salonga) responded to a telephone call received by their desk officer-on-duty that there was a
man firing a gun at the back of the PLDT Building in Pantal District, Dagupan City. Upon arrival
thereat, the police officers saw two (2) men walking, later identified as Peralta and his
companion, Larry Calimlim (Calimlim), holding a gun and a knife respectively. Upon seeing the
police officers, the men became uneasy, which prompted the police officers to swoop in. Upon
apprehension, they recovered a caliber .45 pistol with Serial Number 4517488 containing a
magazine with five (5) live ammunitions from Peralta and a knife from Calimlim. The men were
then brought to the Region I Medical Center in Dagupan City, and later, to the community
precinct for paraffin and gun powder residue test. Meanwhile, the pistol and the magazine with
live ammunitions were endorsed to the duty investigator.

In his defense, Peralta denied the accusation against him and presented a different narration of
facts. According to him, he was riding a motorcycle with Calimlim when they were flagged
down by the police officers. While admitting that the latter recovered a knife from Calimlim,
Peralta vigorously denied having a firearm with him, much less illegally discharging the
same. He pointed out that it was impossible for him to carry a gun at the time and place of arrest
since they were near the barangay hall and the respective residences of Police Officer Salonga
and mediaman Orly Navarro. Further, Peralta averred that upon arrival at the police station, he
was forced to admit possession of the gun allegedly recovered from him, and that they were
subjected to a paraffin test but were not furnished with copies of the results thereof.  Finally,
Peralta claimed that he and Calimlim were merely framed up, after his brother who operated a
"hataw" machine went bankrupt and stopped giving "payola" to the police officials.

56 | P a g e
 
The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated July 31, 2012, the RTC found Peralta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

The RTC found that the prosecution had established the existence of the elements of the crime
charged, considering that PO3 Carvajal positively identified him walking at the Pantal District,
Dagupan City carrying a firearm and that he had no license to carry the same, as per the
Certification issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office in Camp Crame, Quezon City.

Aggrieved, Peralta appealed to the CA.

 
The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated May 29, 2015, the CA affirmed Peralta's conviction in toto. It concurred with
the RTC's finding that the prosecution had established all the elements of the crime charged,
namely, the existence of firearm and ammunitions, and the lack of the corresponding license/s by
the person possessing or owning the same. In this relation, the CA held that the police officers
conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Peralta under the plain view doctrine, considering that the
latter was walking at the Pantal District carrying a firearm in full view of the arresting
policemen, who arrived at the scene in response to a call they received at the police station.

Further, for lack of substantiation, it did not lend any credence to Peralta's claim that he was only
set up by the police officers as revenge for his brother's failure to give "payola" to the police
officials in connection with his operation of the "hataw" machine. Finally, the CA ruled that the
results of the paraffin test were immaterial to Peralta's conviction of the crime charged since
what is being punished by the law is the possession of a firearm and ammunitions without any
license or permit to carry the same.

Undaunted, Peralta moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated

December 8, 2015; hence, this petition.
 
ISSUE:
 
The sole issue for the Court's Resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Peralta's
conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
 
RULING:

57 | P a g e
 
The petition is without merit.

At the outset, the Court reiterates that Peralta was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for carrying a .45 caliber pistol with a magazine containing five (5) live
ammunitions, a crime defined and penalized under Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA
8294, pertinent portions of which read:
 
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. - The penalty of xxx shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any xxx firearm, xxx part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition xxx.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44,
.45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .
22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of
two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

xxxx
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or
permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish
the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b)
the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess or carry the same.

In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid
elements, considering that: (a) the police officers positively identified Peralta as the one holding
a .45 caliber pistol with Serial Number 4517488 with magazine and live ammunitions, which
was seized from him and later on, marked, identified, offered, and properly admitted as evidence
at the trial; and (b) the Certification dated August 10, 2011 issued by the Firearms and
Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police which declared that Peralta "is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, specifically Caliber .45 Pistol, make
(unknown) with Serial Number 4517488 per verification from the records of this office as of this
date."

That the prosecution failed to present the results of the paraffin test made on Peralta is
inconsequential since it is not indicative of his guilt or innocence of the crime charged. In People
v. Gaborne, the Court discussed the probative value of paraffin tests, to wit:
 
Paraffin tests, in general, have been rendered inconclusive by this Court. Scientific experts
concur in the view that the paraffin test was extremely unreliable for use. It can only establish the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; however, the test alone cannot determine

58 | P a g e
whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The presence of
nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of
infallibility that a person has fired a gun, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances
other than gunpowder.[33]
Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed
by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to
assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties, and hence, due
deference should be accorded to the same.

In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Peralta questioned the legality of the
warrantless arrest and subsequent search made on him. According to him, there was no reason
for the police officers to arrest him without a warrant and consequently, conduct a search
incidental thereto. As such, the firearm and ammunitions purportedly recovered from him are
rendered inadmissible in evidence against him.

Such contention is untenable.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section
3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In
other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches
and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be effected is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the
parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a
general rule - be complied with:
 
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or

59 | P a g e
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be
lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that
said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during
the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b),
Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused
had committed it.

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer
himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime
has just been committed.

In this case, records show that upon the police officers' arrival at Pantal District, Dagupan City,
they saw Peralta carrying a pistol, in plain view of everyone. This prompted the police officers to
confront Peralta regarding the pistol, and when the latter was unable to produce a license for
such pistol and/or a permit to carry the same, the former proceeded to arrest him and seize the
pistol from him. Clearly, the police officer conducted a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest on Peralta, thus, making the consequent search incidental thereto valid as well. At this
point, it is well to emphasize that the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
prohibitum punished by special law and, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of
the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and
that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without
criminal intent. In People v. PO2 Abriol,the court ruled that the carrying of firearms and
ammunition without the requisite authorization - a clear violation of PD 1866, as amended - is
enough basis for the conduct of a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest. Given these,
Peralta can no longer question the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the items seized
from him on account of the search incidental to such arrest.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Peralta, the courts a quo en-ed in sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. As may be gleaned from Section

60 | P a g e
1 of PD 1866, as amended, the prescribed penalties for the crime Peralta committed is "prision
mayor in its minimum period," or imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) day up
to eight (8) years, and a fine of P30,000.00. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special
penal law, the penalty provided therein is taken from the technical nomenclature in the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v. People, the Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of
prescribed penalties found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, viz.:
 
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),
provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and
maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the special law
prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling of People v.
Simon that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the
penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance,
the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily apply to
the special law.
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the
RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those
crimes punishable under the RPC.

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the Court deems it proper to adjust the indeterminate
period of imprisonment imposed on Peralta to four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum. Finally, the imposition of fine in the amount of P30,000.00
stands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution
dated December 8, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35193, which upheld the
Decision dated July 31, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 in Crim.
Case No. 2008-0659-D finding petitioner Joselito Peralta y Zareno (petitioner) GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, defined and penalized
under Section 1, paragraph 2 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P30,000.00.
 
3.    PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALANGA,
& SERVILLANO NACIONAL G.R NO. 218466.
 
The Facts

The instant cases stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC, charging accused-

61 | P a g e
appellants of the aforementioned crime, the accusatory portion of which states:
 
That on or about January 20, 2002, in the evening, at Brgy. Cabanaetan, Municipality of Mabini,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength and
at night time, armed with an unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot ROLANDO NECESITO y FABRIGAS which caused his untimely death, to
the damage and prejudice of his heirs.[5]
The prosecution alleged that between 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of January 20, 2002,
eyewitness Reynaldo Necesito (Reynaldo) was walking towards the store of Leonida Fabrigas
when he chanced upon accused-appellants having an altercation with the victim, Rolando
Necesito (Rolando). From his vantage point, Reynaldo heard Ramos yell, "Okinam patayan ka!"
(Son of a bitch! I will kill you!) and saw accused-appellants chase and eventually surround
Rolando at an area around seven (7) meters away from where Reynaldo was hiding. Reynaldo
then heard four (4) successive gunshots, making him hide under the trunk of the duhat tree for
fear of being hit. It was on the sound of the fourth shot when Reynaldo witnessed Rolando fall
face down on the ground. To ensure Rolando's demise, Ramos approached Rolando and shot him
again. Thereafter, accused-appellants fled the scene. [6]

The next day, Rolando's body was found near the duhat tree, prompting police officers to
conduct an investigation from which were gathered the following evidence and information: (a)
a piece of bamboo was recovered three (3) meters away from Rolando's corpse; (b) Rolando
purportedly had a previous misunderstanding with Ramos sometime in 1997, yet the same was
settled before the barangay; and (c) Rolando allegedly had a drinking spree with his friends at the
time of the incident. An autopsy was likewise conducted on Rolando's body, revealing that there
were four (4) incised wounds on his left hand, a stab wound on his left chest, and five (5)
gunshot wounds on his body; that based on the nature and sizes of his wounds, it was possible
that the firearm used was of the same caliber; and that his injuries could not have been inflicted
by a single person.[7]

For their respective parts, accused-appellants similarly invoked the defenses of denial and alibi.
Essentially, they insisted that they were somewhere else when the incident occurred. In addition,
Ramos maintained that the declarations of Reynaldo against him were motivated by a personal
grudge, while Nacional claimed that the corpus delicti was not proven with exact certainty since
the cadaver that was exhumed and examined was already in an advanced stage of decomposition,
having been interred for more than a month. [8]

 
 
The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[9] dated December 8, 2010, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole, and ordered to pay jointly and severally
Rolando's heirs the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as death indemnity,

62 | P a g e
and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.[10]

In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to the direct, straightforward, and categorical eyewitness
testimony of Reynaldo positively identifying each of the accused-appellants as co-perpetrators of
the crime, further noting that Reynaldo had no ill-motive to falsely testify against them. On the
other hand, it found the defense testimonies to be untenable, as they were riddled with various
inconsistencies and contradictions. Further, the RTC found the presence of the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength which qualified the killing to Murder, considering that the accused-
appellants took advantage of their combined strength and their several weapons to overcome
their unarmed victim and assure the success of their felonious design. In view of the foregoing,
the RTC concluded that accused-appellants "are equally guilty of the crime of Murder
aggravated with the use of unlincensed firearm, there having been proven the existence of
implied conspiracy between them."[11]

Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA.[12]

 
The CA Ruling

In a Decision[13] dated April 28, 2015, the CA affirmed accused appellants' conviction for the
crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm with modification, increasing the awards
of civil indemnity and moral damages to P75,000.00 each and imposing legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from finality of the judgment until fully paid.
[14]
 It held that Reynaldo was able to positively identify accused-appellants as Rolando's killers,
given that he was only seven (7) meters away from the situs criminis. The CA likewise held that
the accused-appellants took advantage of their combined superior strength as they even used
several weapons to render the unarmed victim completely defenseless.[15]

Hence, the instant consolidated cases.

Dissatisfied, Nacional filed a Notice of Appeal, [16] (G.R. No. 221425) while Ramos and Salonga
filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466).

 
The Issues Before the Court

The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-
appellants' conviction for the crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.

 
The Court's Ruling

Preliminarily, the Court notes that Nacional elevated the matter before the Court thru a Notice of
Appeal[17] (G.R. No. 221425) filed before the CA; on the other hand, Ramos and Salonga filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466).[18] As a general rule,
appeals of criminal cases shall be brought to the Court by filing a petition for review

63 | P a g e
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;[19] except when the CA imposed the penalty of
"reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty," in which case, the appeal shall be
made by a mere notice of appeal filed before the CA. [20] In this case, Ramos and Salonga clearly
availed of a wrong mode of appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari before the Court,
despite having been sentenced by the CA of reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, in the interest of
substantial justice, the Court will treat their petition as an ordinary appeal in order to resolve the
substantive issue at hand with finality.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase
the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.[21]

As will be explained hereunder, the accused-appellants should only be held liable for simple
Murder, and not Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.

To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (a)
that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (d) the
killing is not parricide or infanticide. [22]

In the instant case, the prosecution, through the testimony of eyewitness Reynaldo, had
established beyond reasonable doubt that: the accused-appellants chased, ganged up, and
eventually, killed Rolando, and likewise, it was shown that they deliberately used weapons (i.e.,
gun and bamboo stick), which rendered Rolando defenseless from their fatal attacks. Thus, such
killing was attended with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, [23] which
perforce warrants accused-appellants' conviction for Murder.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the courts a quo erred in convicting accused-appellants of

Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.

Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance." There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the
gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus
probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.[24]

In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds which led to
his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to
recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was
recovered, whether or not such firearm was licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions of the
courts a quo were silent regarding this matter. As the Information alleged that accused-appellants
used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this

64 | P a g e
allegation.[25] Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use of an
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby modifies accused-appellants conviction to simple
Murder.

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659, [26] Murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present (except for
abuse of superior strength which was used to qualify the killing to Murder), accused-appellants
must be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, to conform with existing
jurisprudence, accused-appellants must be ordered to jointly and severally pay Rolando's heirs
the amounts of P50,000.00 as temperate damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with six percent (6%) legal interest per
annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. [27]

WHEREFORE, the consolidated appeals are DENIED. The Decision dated April 28, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05095 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows: accused-appellants Manny Ramos,
Roberto Salonga, and Servillano Nacional are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to
jointly and severally pay Rolando Necesito's heirs the amounts of P50,000.00 as temperate
damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on all the monetary awards
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
 
4.   PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JONATHAN MENDOZA
FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision [2] dated June 21, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 38156 and its Resolution[3] dated August 24, 2017, denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision affirmed albeit with modification as to penalty the
Decision[4] dated August 26, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan, Batangas,
Branch 6, finding Jonathan Mendoza y Esguerra (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions as defined and penalized by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294.
An Information was filed before the RTC of Tanauan City, Batangas, Branch 6, charging the
petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, to wit:

That on or about the 31st day of August 2006, at about 11:45 o'clock in the evening at Barangay
5, Poblacion, City of Tanauan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously has in his possession, custody and control one (1) Ranger caliber 45 pistol (Imperial
Defense Service) with Serial No. C02009, two (2) magazines with nine (9) pieces of live

65 | P a g e
ammunitions and three (3) pieces of empty shells of the same caliber without having secured the
necessary license and/or permit from the proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
On December 13, 2006, assisted by the counsel, the petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged.[6] Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The evidence for the prosecution tend to establish that on August 31, 2006, at about 11:45 p.m.,
during a checkpoint, Police Officer 1 Ryan Pagcaliwagan (PO1 Pagcaliwagan), PO1 Celso
Torres, and PO1 Fheljun Calalo flagged down a motorcycle as it had no license plate and its
three occupants were not wearing a helmet. The occupants were later identified as Julius Opeña
(Opeña), the owner of the motorcycle, Jeffrey Coral (Coral), and herein petitioner who was then
driving the motorcycle.[7]
As they were approaching the motorcycle, PO1 Pagcaliwagan saw the petitioner take a firearm
and cover it with a bag. The former then alerted his co-police officers, took the firearm and
arrested the petitioner who denied ownership of the gun, but at the same time claimed the same
was licensed.[8]
Confiscated from the petitioner were one (1) gray Ranger caliber .45 pistol with Serial No.
CO2009, one (1) stainless magazine with four (4) pieces of live ammunition, one (1) black
magazine, five (5) live ammunition, and three (3) pieces of empty shells for caliber .45. The
items were brought to the police station and turned over to PO1 Charlie Bermejo and marked by
PO1 Pagcaliwagan.[9]
For their part, the defense presented as witnesses the petitioner, Opena, and Anthony Carpio
(Carpio).[10]
The petitioner denied any criminal liability and by way of defense claimed that the firearm,
magazines, and live ammunition were the product of an illegal search and thus were illegally
obtained in his possession.[11]
The petitioner testified that on the alleged date of the incident, he went to a drinking spree with
his friends at Barangay Santol. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted that he went to buy more beer
with his friends Opeña and Coral. While on their way and as they were passing Bank of the
Philippine Islands, they were stopped by police officers. As ordered, they stopped and alighted
from the motorcycle. They were frisked and the motorcycle was searched. As a result of which,
the firearm, magazines, and ammunitions were recovered under the seat of the motorcycle.[12]
Opeña and Carpio corroborated the petitioner's testimony. Carpio, in his testimony, likewise
admitted that the firearm and ammunition are registered under his name, and that he placed the
same under the seat of the motorcycle without the knowledge of the petitioner. Carpio submitted
that he brought the said firearm as he intends to sell the same to a friend but later forgot to
retrieve the same from the motorcycle. Carpio averred that the day after, after having learned of
the petitioner's arrest, he immediately went to the police station and presented his license to the
chief of police his license to possess the said firearm.[13]
On August 26, 2015, the lower court rendered its Decision, [14] the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding [petitioner] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, the court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from
six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (Php 30,000.00).
Without pronouncement as to costs.

66 | P a g e
SO ORDERED.[15]
In so ruling, the RTC held that the prosecution established the elements of the crime charged. In
so doing, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of PO1 Pagcaliwagan that the subject firearms
and ammunitions were retrieved from the petitioner. Further, and similarly relying on the
testimony of PO1 Pagcaliwagan, the RTC found untenable the petitioner's defense of illegal
search and seizure as well as lack of knowledge as to his possession of the seized items,
concluding the search was incidental to a lawful arrest. The RTC held that PO1 Pagcaliwagan
was correct in flagging down, arresting, searching, and seizing the subject items from the
petitioner after seeing the latter withdrew a gun and hid it under his bag.

Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the CA. On June 21, 2017, the CA rendered its
Decision[16] affirming the lower court's decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we AFFIRMED with Modification the Decision of the
[RTC] dated August 26, 2015 in Criminal Case No. 06-09-3144. As modified, [the petitioner] is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS,
EIGHT MONTHS and ONE DAY of prision mayor minimum in its medium period, as
maximum and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was a valid search and seizure of the subject
item, which is done pursuant to a lawful arrest. Contrary however to the RTC's determination,
the CA held that it was the initial violation for the absence of license plate and helmet that
justified the search and seizure in this case. Anent the penalty, the CA modified the imposition
by the RTC which it found to be contrary to the indeterminate sentence law.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in its Resolution [18] dated
August 24, 2017.
 
ISSUE:
 
1.) Whether or not police officers have the legal authority to search the body of the driver and/or
his motorcycle because he violated traffic rules and regulations?

2.) Whether or not the police officers in this case had validly conducted a search incident to a
lawful arrest as governed by Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

RULING:
 
The Court rules in the negative.
The issue of credibility is a factual issue that is generally beyond the province of a petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with the principle that the Court is not a trier of facts. Thus,
as a rule, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally left to be determined by the
trial court which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility
through their demeanor on the stand. Likewise, the factual findings by the trial court when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect by the Court and not disturbed on appeal. However,
jurisprudence provided exceptions to the said rule. Thus, the Court may pass upon questions of

67 | P a g e
fact: where there is an "ostensible incongruence" in the findings of the said courts, [20] or in
criminal cases where the testimony upon which the conviction is based is "riddled with patent
inconsistencies and improbabilities on material points."[21] The Court, in Medina v. Mayor
Asistio, Jr.,[22] summarized the recognized exceptions to the rule, thus under the following
instances, the Court, acting on a petition for review for certiorari may rule upon factual
questions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
[23]
 (Citations omitted)
In this controversy, a review of the records reveals that there are improbabilities in the testimony
of PO1 Pagcaliwagan, upon which the conviction is based, thus warranting that the Court re-
examine the relevant facts and circumstances. Primarily, while the same relies heavily on the
credibility of the testimony of PO1 Pagcaliwagan, a matter that is generally left for the trial court
to determine, finding that the appreciation of the same is erroneous, the Court decides to make its
own evaluation of the evidence on record. In this light, the Court concludes that the warrantless
arrest of the petitioner is invalid, which thus renders the search conducted thereafter illegal.

The prosecution and the defense vary as to their narration of what happened on the day the
alleged crime was committed.

Based on the testimony of PO1 Pagcaliwagan, they flagged down the motorcycle ridden by the
petitioner, and the latter's two (2) male companions after noticing that the vehicle bore no license
plate and its occupants were not wearing a helmet. Thereafter, PO1 Pagcaliwagan allegedly saw
the petitioner took out a gun and hid it under his bag. This is what prompted the officers to arrest
the petitioner and conduct a search as an incident thereto.

The theory of the prosecution, which was found credible by both the RTC and the CA, was that
the warrantless arrest and search was justified under Section 5(a) and (b), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it.

68 | P a g e
In order for an arrest to be justified under paragraph (a), the following elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, in order for paragraph (b)
to operate, at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.[24]
Even siding with the version offered by the prosecution, the Court sees no such overt act, much
more, an offense that was committed that would justify the arrest of the petitioner without
warrant.

The petitioner and his companions were flagged down during a checkpoint after the police
officers noticed that the motorcycle which they were riding bore no license plate and the riders
are not wearing any helmet. The commission of a traffic violation does not justify the arrest of
the petitioner. Under Section 29[25] of R.A. No. 4136 or The Land Transportation Code, such
violation merely warrant the confiscation of the offender's driver's license.[26]
Furthermore, the conflicting accounts of how the firearm was retrieved, lend support that the
arrest and eventual search and seizure are invalid.

In this case, while PO1 Pagcaliwagan claims that the firearm was within his plain sight just as
the petitioner attempted to conceal the same while 2 to 3 meters away from the checkpoint, the
petitioner claims that the motorcycle's compartment was opened and from there PO1
Pagcaliwagan saw and recovered the firearm and ammunitions.

The Court finds the story offered by PO1 Pagcaliwagan as to how the firearm was retrieved, hard
to believe. When confronted by police officers, the ordinary reaction of a person who knows that
he has in his possession a gun for which he has no license is to prevent the same from being
discovered. It is inconceivable why the petitioner would go the lengths of going down the
motorcycle, opening the compartment from under the seat and remove the well-concealed
firearm, only to again cover the same with his bag in front.

The theory is not only contrary to human experience and reaction but as well faced with
suspicion in view of the fact that the placement of the gun when it was taken was outside the
view of other police officers in the checkpoint. Simply, it is only PO1 Pagcaliwagan who
affirmed that the firearm was in plain sight.[27]
Also the charge must fail as the prosecution failed to establish the essential elements of, and the
facts constitutive of the offense charged.[28]
The petitioner was indicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms, as defined and
penalized by P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. The elements for the prosecution of
which crime are: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who
possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. Verily, ownership is
not an essential element of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. What is merely required is
either actual or constructive possession coupled with animus possidendi or intent to possess.[29]
In this controversy, while the existence of the firearm and the absence by the petitioner of the
license to own the same may be conceded, the absence on the part of the petitioner of animus
possidendi is sufficient to cause his acquittal.

69 | P a g e
In the case of People v. De Gracia,[30] the Court held that while mere possession, without
criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be
shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.
Otherwise stated, to be convicted of illegal possession of firearms it is sufficient that the accused
had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if
such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent. Thus, the Court continued:
[A] temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be
considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as
long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.[31]
Animus possidendi is a concept that eludes specific standards to indicate its existence. Being a
state of mind, animus possidendi is determined on a case to case basis, taking into consideration
the prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. [32] "What
exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in a range of action."[33]
The petitioner claims that he was not aware that the subject firearm and ammunitions were inside
the motorcycle's compartment. This was corroborated by Carpio, the firearm's owner. Carpio's
testimony was succinctly summarized by the CA, viz.:
Anthony admitted and corroborated the testimony of accused-appellant, among others, that the
firearm and ammunition were owned and licensed in his name, that he placed the bag containing
the said firearm and ammunition in the compartment of the motorcycle without the knowledge of
accused-appellant. He further testified that he happened to bring the firearm as he intended to sell
it to his co-worker who failed to arrive that day in Brgy. Santol. However, he forgot about the
firearm in the motorcycle when he left the accused-appellant at the drinking session. It was only
the following day that he learned of the arrest of the accused-appellant for possessing the
firearm. Immediately, he proceeded to the police station. He saw the accused-appellant in jail
and presented to the chief of police his license to possess said firearm.[34] (Citations omitted.)
The consistency of the story and the manner in which Carpio acted coupled with the fact that the
petitioner was merely charged to be the driver on the night of the incident bolsters the conclusion
that the petitioner was indeed not aware of the presence of the firearm and ammunitions inside
the motorcycle compartment. Not being the owner of the motorcycle, the petitioner cannot even
be remotely charged with or presumed to have knowledge of the subject firearm.

Knowledge is an essential component of intent. Without awareness or knowledge of the

existence of the subject firearm and ammunitions, it cannot be said that the petitioner has the
intent to possess.

While absence of knowledge on the part of the petitioner cannot be established with absolute
certainty in this case, possibilities abound that constrain the Court to acquit the accused. It is both
well settled and elementary principle in criminal law that when the facts and evidence are
susceptible to two or more interpretations, one of which consistent with the innocence of the
accused, and the other with his guilt, acquittal must ensue. [35] As in that case, the prosecution is
regarded to not have hurdled the test of moral certainty required for conviction.[36]
The overriding consideration in criminal prosecutions is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, in which case the
Court is "under a long standing injunction" to resolve the doubt in favor of the petitioner.
[37]
 Where there is reasonable doubt, presumption of innocence must be favored and the accused

70 | P a g e
must be exonerated as a matter of right, even though his innocence may not have been
established.[38] This is a guarantee that no less that the Constitution enshrines.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated June 21, 2017 and Resolution dated August 24, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 38156 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jonathan
Mendoza y Esguerra is ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions on the ground of reasonable doubt.
 
 
5.   PP VS. ALEXIS DINDO SAN JOSE G.R NO. 179148
 
FACTS:
 
The accused hereby urges the thorough review and reversal of the decision promulgated on April
27, 2007,[1] and asserts that the Court of Appeals (CA) erroneously affirmed his convictions for
violations of Section 15 and Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), and for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition as defined and punished under
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, through the judgment rendered on April 13, 2005 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 156, in Pasig City. [2]

 
Antecedents

The CA summarized the factual and procedural antecedents in its assailed decision, as follows:
 
Accused-appellant Alexis Dindo San Jose was charged with three criminal acts under the
following informations:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8633-D

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Alexis Dindo y (sic) San
Josey Suico a.k.a. 'Dodong Diamong' (sic) with the crime of Violation of Sec. 15 Art. III of RA
6425, as amended (The Dangerous Drugs Act), committed as follows:
On or about January 26, 2000, in San Juan, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to sell, dispense, transport or
distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver and give away to SPO1 Edwin Anaviso, a police poseur-buyer, two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing 196.5 grams and 57.25 grams, respectively, of white
crystalline substance, having a total weight of 253.75 grams, which was found positive to the test
for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, in violation of the said law.

Contrary to law.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8634-D

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Alexis Dindo y (sic) San
Josey Suico a.k.a. 'Dodong Diamond' with the crime of Violation of Sec. 16 Art. III of RA 6425,
as amended (The Dangerous Drugs Act), committed as follows:
71 | P a g e
On or about January 26, 2000, in San Juan, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to use or possess any regulated
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under
his custody and control one self-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 372.3 grams of white
crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), a regulated drug, in violation of the said law,

Contrary to law.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 11700

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Alexis Dindo San Josey
Suico a.k.a. 'Dodong Diamond' with the crime of violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A.
8294 (Illegal Possession of Firearms), committed as follows:
On or about January 26, 2000, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, being than a private person, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1)
caliber .45 pistol marked COLT with serial no. 1811711 and one (1) super .38 caliber pistol
marked 'Springfield Armory' with serial no. UJ1152 with magazine land nine (9) pieces of live
ammunitions, without first securing the necessary license or permit from the proper authorities.

Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on 12 April 2002, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. After
the pre-trial on 16 May 2000, the case was set for hearing. The prosecution presented three (3)
witnesses in the persons of SPO4 Wilfredo Yee (SPO4 Yee), SPO1 Edwin Anaviso (SPO1
Anaviso) and Forensic Chemist Mayra M. Madria. The defense, on the other hand, presented
accused-appellant himself to testify in his behalf.

According to the prosecution, a confidential informant known as "Bong" reported to the

Regional Mobile Group, National Capital Regional Command at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig,
Metro Manila, that an illicit drug trade was being conducted by two (2) drug pushers known as
"Dodong Diamond" (herein accused-appellant), and Evita Ebora, whose trust and confident (sic)
had been gained by said confidential informant. A surveillance team was then formed which
conducted surveillance on 21 January 2000 and 22 January 2000.

On 24 January 2000, SPO1 Anaviso accompanied by Bong went inside the condominium unit
known as Cluster 3-4 D to purchase shabu from accused-appellant. Then on 26 January 2000, a
buy-bust operation was conducted with SPO1 Anaviso as poseur buyer. Two (2) small plastic
bags, suspected to contain shabu, were sold by accused-appellant to SPO1 Anaviso, immediately
after which accused-appellant was arrested.

A forensic examination of the substance seized was conducted by Mayra M. Madria who found
that the specimen submitted all contained shabu. The Initial Laboratory Report and Physical
Science Report were submitted in evidence. The testimonies of SPO1 Anaviso, SPO4 Yee were
summed up by the trial court, thus:
On 21 January 2000, a male confidential informant (a.k.a. 'Bong') reported to the Regional
Mobile Group (RMG), National Capital Regional Command stationed at Camp Bagong Diwa,

72 | P a g e
Taguig, Metro Manila, an illicit drug trade of two notorious drug pushers identified as alias
'Dodong Diamond' (accused herein) and Evita Ebora whose trust and confidence had been gained
by the informant. Acting upon the information received, P/Supt. Jaime Calungsud, Jr. instructed
SPO1 Edwin Anaviso (Anaviso, for brevity) and company to develop the said information. The
latter, together with Bong, conducted a two-day surveillance and monitoring activity at Little
Baguio Gardens Condominium located in RJ Fernandez St., Kabayanan, San Juan, Metro
Manila, from 6:00 p.m. of 22 January 2000 to 9:00 a.m. of the following day. The result of the
surveillance confirmed Bong's information that people came in and out with different vehicles at
wee hours of the night, heading towards Cluster 3-4 D of the said condominium.

On 24 January 2000, Bong accompanied Anaviso to Cluster 3-4 D and was introduced to
'Dodong Diamond' inside the condominium unit. Accused acceded to their offer to buy two
hundred and fifty grams. (250g) of shabu at Php150,000.00, but accused asked them to come
back on the 26th of January at 11:00 p.m. for the actual exchange.

At around 6:00 p.m. of 26 January 2000, the buy-bust operation against the accused was hatched
at the RMG, NCR, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig by the Intelligence Operatives which included
SPO1 Anaviso as team leader, SPO4 Wilfredo Yee, SPO1 Samoy, SPO2 Ricardo Concepcion
and their superior officer. Two (2) bundles of buy-bust marked money were prepared and given
to Anaviso who was designated as poseur buyer. A Nextel cellphone was likewise provided (to)
him for a pre-arranged signal (press of a button) to his team once a sale is consummated. SPO4
Wilfredo Yee together with SPO4 Baby Marcelo and SPO1 Samoy were instructed to give
assistance (back up) to Anaviso during the buy-bust operation. The briefing lasted up to 9:00
p.m. of said date.

Two private vehicles composed of the two groups proceeded to RJ Fernandez St., Kabayanan,
San Juan, Metro Manila. Once in the area, the RMG operatives conducted a final briefing.
Anaviso then went alone to Cluster 3-4 D where he was allowed entry by the accused. Anaviso
asked for the shabu from the accused and the latter took from the drawer of his table two (2)
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance. He weighed them one by one and
said "hayan, parehas yan." Anaviso suddenly noticed two (2) guns placed on top of the table and
another plastic bag containing shabu inside the drawer. Accused handed the two aforesaid plastic
bags to Anaviso. After inspecting the items, Anaviso pulled out of (sic) his bag and handed to the
accused the buy-bust money. Simultaneously, he pressed the button of his Nextel cellphone. He
immediately introduced himself as a police officer, drew his 9 mm Baretta gun and pointed the
same to the accused, informing him of his arrest and his rights under the law. Accused stood up,
surprised. The back up team then arrived.

A super .38 caliber with scope, with serial number SNUJ 2252, one (1) magazine with nine (9)
live bullets, and a .45 caliber pistol with serial number 1811711 were seized in addition to
another plastic sachet of shabu found inside accused (sic) drawer. Accused could not produce
pertinent documents as to the lawful possession of the firearms. In the course of the
investigation, it was found out that accused['s] real name was Alexis Dindo San Josey Suico.
The defense, on the other hand, claimed that he was framed up. He claimed that he was in the
business of buying and selling used cars and was at Little Baguio only because he was selling a

73 | P a g e
car to one Mr. Ong. He stated that he was arrested with Mr. Ong, who was the original suspect
but was later released. His testimony were (sic) summed up by the trial court as follows:
Sometime in January 2000, accused was engaged in the business of buying and selling second
hand cars under the business name Elorde San Jose Trading, registered in the name of his wife,
Ma. Lorita Elorde. He had been engaged in that business for the past ten years. At the time of the
incident, he had six cars displayed at his residence (compound) in Elorde's Complex, Sucat,
Parañaque. He advertised his business at the back of each car, indicating thereon his telephone
number.

On 26 January 2000, at about 10:00 a.m., accused was at the guardhouse of Little Baguio
Condominium in San Juan, Metro Manila, waiting for a certain Mr. Ben Ong (Mr. Ong for
brevity), a prospective buyer of accused['s] Nissan Patrol Car Model '92. Three to four days
before said date, Mr. Ong, who was a resident of Little Baguio Condominium, called up the
accused upon seeing that the latter's car was for sale. He invited the accused to go to Little
Baguio Condominium. Mr. Ong also asked the accused to bring the car to the condominium for a
test drive. The first time that accused went to said condominium, he was able to talk to Mr. Ong.
However, their sale transaction was not consummated because Mr. Ong had a visitor and told the
accused that he would just call again.

Upon accused['s] arrival at the vicinity of the said condominium on the 26th of January (the
second time that accused went to Little Baguio Condominium), he parked the Nissan Patrol car
along the road and proceeded to the guardhouse. The security guard on duty called up Mr. Ong.
The latter, together with his wife and son, came down and talked to the accused regarding the
aforesaid car which accused was selling at the price of Php450,000.00. Accused also agreed to
Mr. Ong's request for a test drive. Mr. Ong and his son drove away the car, leaving the accused
at the condominium guardhouse.

Although it was not his practice to entrust the cars he was selling to interested buyers, accused
agreed to allow Mr. Ong to test drive his car unaccompanied, since he (accused) knew that Mr.
Ong was a resident of Little Baguio Condominium. The latter's family-his wife and children-also
lived in the same condominium unit.

After the lapse of an how that Mr. Ong had not returned, accused contacted him through cellular
phone. Mr. Ong told him that he would be late, and that he was still in the bank to withdraw
money purposely to pay the accused after a consummated sale. Accused remained at the
guardhouse, talking to three security guards. He was not at all alarmed although Mr. Ong was
gone for another three to four hours. Mr. Ong's wife even provided snacks for the accused while
he was waiting at the guardhouse.

Also during the same period, police operatives arrived in two vehicles (a Toyota Corolla and a
van). They barged into the unit of Mr. Ong, looking for the latter. Thereafter, two of them
approached a guard and asked for the whereabouts of Mr. Ong. They introduced themselves as
regional mobile group operatives. Accused, who was in front of the guard to whom the
policemen were talking to, overheard the conversation. Accused butted in to advise the
policemen to wait for Mr. Ong because the latter was still test driving the car.

74 | P a g e
The police operatives waited for Mr. Ong for more or less three to four hours, with their cars
parked around the condominium area. At around 2:00 p.m., Mr. Ong and his son returned. While
still at the driver's seat of the Nissan Patrol, entering the gate of the condominium premises, Mr.
Ong was told by the accused that some persons were looking for him. Suddenly, one of the
policemen approached and pushed Mr. Ong inside the accused's car (Mr. Ong and his son had
not yet alighted therefrom). One of the policemen sat on the driver's seat of the car. As accused
realized that the police operatives were about to take Mr. Ong with them using his (accused) car,
the accused asked the policemen regarding the same. They directed the accused to just follow
them to Bicutan.

Accused boarded on the front seat of one of the police cars (the Toyota Corolla) and went with
them to Bicutan in order to keep track of his Nissan Patrol. On their way to Bicutan, he and the
policemen talked casually. They even asked him about his car, its selling price, and whether he
knew the person of Mr. Ong. Accused replied that he met Mr. Ong only twice. At the police
station in Bicutan, accused waited to get his car key until 7:00 p.m. He saw Mr. Ong and his son
handcuffed in another room.

At 4:00 a.m., the policemen came from the office of Col. Calungsud, Jr. and handcuffed the
accused. He protested because he did not know the reason for such. The policemen refused to
answer his questions and told him to just cooperate with them. Within the vicinity of the
headquarters, accused was brought for medical check-up and tattoo-finding. During the medical
examination, police officers told the accused that he was arrested for being a drug lord.

Also during the accused stay (sic) at the police station in Bicutan, Col. Calungsud, Jr. told the
accused that the alleged car sale transaction of the latter was only an alibi, the truth being that
accused was caught by police operatives in his act of selling shabu at the Little Baguio
Condominium. Accused vehemently denied the commander's accusations.

Upon returning to the police station after the medical examination, accused noticed that Mr. Ong
was already released by the police operatives and no longer there at the station. Afterwards,
accused was brought to the Fiscal's office where he was inquested and criminally charged. He
protested and refused to sign papers; however, he was told that he had to sign them and thereafter
engage the services of a lawyer.

Accused mentioned during his testimony that the police operatives entered the condominium unit
owned by Mr. Ong and it was there that the illegal drugs and unlicensed firearms were seized.
The police officers had to produce a suspect since the buy-bust operation was fully coordinated
with a higher police authority. Accused overheard their conversation via radio while he was at
the police station in Bicutan. However, instead of pressing charges against Mr. Ong, the
policemen attributed the drug activities to the accused because Mr. Ong allegedly gave bribe
money to the police officers during the investigation.

For failure of the defense to produce additional witnesses within the considerable lapse of time,
this Court submitted these cases for decision (Order, 9 February 2005).[3]
Judgment of the RTC

75 | P a g e
In the judgment rendered on April 13, 2005,[4] the RTC pronounced the accused guilty of the
offenses charged, and decreed thusly:
 
WHEREFORE, the Court finds herein accused ALEXIS DINDO SAN JOSE y SUICO:
 
1) in Criminal Case No. 8633-D, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 15,
Article III, RA 6425, as amended, and hereby imposes the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT. Accused is further ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
   
2) in Criminal Case No. 8634-D, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16,
Article III, RA 6425, as amended and hereby imposes the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT. Accused is further ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
   
3) in Criminal Case No. 117700, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms under PD 1866, as amended, and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its maximum period and a fine of P15,000.00 for illegal
possession of .38 caliber firearm, and the penalty of PRISION MAYOR in its minimum
period and a fine of P30,000.00 for illegal possession of .45 caliber firearm.
 

SO ORDERED.[5]
Decision of the CA

On appeal, the accused contended that:

 
I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S
FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND
TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE VERSION OF THE DEFENSE.
On its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought the affirmance of the convictions
for the violations of Section 15 and Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, but recommended
the acquittal of the accused on the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in
violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. Act No. 8294. [6]

76 | P a g e
Nonetheless, on April 27, 2007, the CA affirmed the three convictions, [7] viz.:
 
WHEREFORE, the 13 April 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
156 in Criminal Case Nos. 8633-34-D and 11700 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
 
 
ISSUE:
 
The accused submits that the CA's findings were contrary to the facts, the relevant law, and
applicable jurisprudence.[9]

The OSG counters that the guilt of the accused for the violations of Section 15 and Section 16 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, was established beyond reasonable doubt; [10] but urges that he
should be acquitted of the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294, in view of his commission of another crime.
 
RULING:
 
After a meticulous review of the records, the Court rules that the accused should be acquitted of
all the charges for the violations of Section 15 and Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, on
the ground of failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and of the charge for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, on
the ground of lack of legal basis.

 
1.
Violations of Section 15 and Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, were not established
beyond reasonable doubt

In prosecutions involving narcotics and other illegal drugs, the confiscated substances and allied
articles themselves constitute the corpus delicti of the offense. This is because the offense is not
deemed committed unless the substances and articles subject of the accused's illegal dealing or
illegal possession are themselves presented to the trial court as evidence. The fact of the
existence of the substances and articles is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[12] The concept of corpus delicti - the body, foundation, or substance of a crime
- consists of two elements, namely: (a) that a certain result has been established, for example,
that a man has died in prosecution for homicide; and (b) that some person is criminally
responsible for the result. The Prosecution has to prove the corpus delicti beyond reasonable
doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence. [13] Else, the
accused must be set free.

The process essential to proving the corpus delicti calls for the preservation and establishment of
the chain of custody. In drug-related criminal prosecutions, chain of custody specifically refers to
the documented various movements and custody of the subjects of the offense be they seized
drugs, controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs, and equipment for their
production - from the moment of seizure or confiscation to the time of receipt in the forensic

77 | P a g e
laboratory, to their safekeeping until their presentation in court as evidence and their eventual
destruction. The documentation includes the inventory, the identity of the person or persons who
held temporary custody thereof, the date and time when any transfer of custody was made in the
course of safekeeping until presentation in court as evidence, and disposition.

The safeguards of marking, inventory and photographing are all essential in establishing that
such substances and articles seized or confiscated were the very same ones being delivered to
and presented as evidence in court.

Yet, the following excerpts from the testimony of poseur buyer SPO1 Edwin A. Anaviso, the
State's main witness, bear out that no inventory and accounting of the confiscated substances
were made herein at the time and at the scene of the seizure, to wit:
 
Moreover, the chain of custody in drug-related prosecutions always starts with the marking of
the relevant substances or articles immediately upon seizure or confiscation. This, because the
succeeding handlers would be using the marking as reference. The marking further serves to
separate the marked substances or articles from the corpus of all other similar or related articles
from the time of the seizure or confiscation from the accused until disposal at the end of the
criminal proceedings, thereby obviating the hazards of switching, "planting," or contamination of
the evidence.[15] Verily, switching, or "planting," or contamination of the evidence destroys the
proof of the corpus delicti. The marking likewise insulates and protects innocent persons from
dubious and concocted searches as well as shields the sincere apprehending officers from
harassment claims based on false allegations of planting of evidence, robbery or theft. [16]

Under the Rules of Court, the Prosecution assumes the burden to establish its case with evidence
that is relevant, that is, the evidence must throw light upon, or, have a logical relation to, the
facts in issue. In all instances, the test of relevancy is whether evidence will have any value, as
determined by logic and experience, in proving the proposition for which it is offered, or whether
it will reasonably and actually tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue, or
corroborate other relevant evidence. The test of relevancy is satisfied if there is some logical
connection either directly or by inference between the fact offered and the fact to be proved.
Establishing the chain of custody of the contraband in drug-related prosecutions directly fulfills
the basic requirement of relevance imposed by our rules on evidence. As such, the need to
preserve the chain of custody applies regardless of whether the prosecution is brought for a
violation of R.A. No. 6425, or for violation of R.A. No. 9165. [17]

It is true that the requirement of marking was not found in R.A. No. 6425. Even so, the arresting
team of the accused herein still had to demonstrate the relevance of the substances and articles
they identified during the trial and presented as evidence of guilt to the substances and articles
seized or confiscated during the transaction with the accused. This is accomplished only by
showing an unbroken chain of custody vis-a-vis the corpus delicti. Without such showing, the
chain of custody would be broken, and the logical connection between the substances and
articles presented in court, on one hand, and the substances and articles seized or confiscated
from the accused, on the other, would be cut off.

The arresting officers of the accused herein were also very aware that they would be turning over

78 | P a g e
all the substances recovered during the supposed transaction with him to the evidence custodian
and to the laboratory. Such awareness imposed on them the duty to preserve the chain of custody
by marking the substances to prevent their being mixed up with other material in the custody and
keeping of the evidence custodian or the laboratory. The marking became crucial to the chain of
custody and ceased to be a mere measure of precaution once the arresting officers decided to
transport the arrestees and the pieces of evidence from the scene of the arrest to the police office,
which, physically speaking, was some distance.

As above discussed, the marking of the seized substances was admittedly done only at the police
office. That was another critical lapse on the part of the arresting lawmen because it broke the
chain of custody of the corpus delicti. Even if deferring the marking at the scene of the arrest and
seizure to a later time, at the police office, was probably the tolerated practice for buy-bust
arrests under R.A. No. 6425, the practice did not really justify the failure to do the marking
immediately after the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the substances if the objective
thereof was precisely to prevent planting, substitution or tampering of evidence. The arresting
officers had to explain the failure to do the marking immediately, for to dispense with the
reasonable explanation was to undervalue the chain of custody as the means of insulating the
evidence from the risks of planting, substitution or tampering. Yet, no explanation was tendered
during the trial.

We cannot presume that the marking could not be done at the place of the arrest because of risks
present thereat. Based on the records, the arresting officers were under no threat by virtue of their
anti-drug operation being actually backed up by four policemen from the Regional Mobile Group
of the National Capital Region Police Office.[18]

The State did not also establish that the substances presented during the trial had been
safeguarded from tampering or substitution in subsequent phases of the custodial chain. Poseur
buyer SPO1 Anaviso might have detailed the conduct of the buy-bust operation and attested to
the marking being done later at the police office, but no witness actually testified during the trial
about how the seized substances were sealed and transported to the crime laboratory for the
examination and confirmatory tests. The lack of such testimony signified that the seized
substances were not shown to have been kept intact while in transit from the scene of the arrest
to the police office, and from the police office to the laboratory.

In view of all the foregoing, the integrity of the evidence presented in court became suspect.

 
2.
The incrimination of the accused was highly doubtful

Another source of serious doubt about the proof of guilt was the shallow and shoddy
investigation that led to the filing of the charges against the accused alone for the very serious
crimes of drug dealing, illegal possession of dangerous drugs, and illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition.

The accused claimed to be a resident of Parañaque City at the time of his arrest in San Juan City.

79 | P a g e
Although drug dealers could conduct their operations outside of their own localities, it was very
strange for him be apprehended in the course of the buy-bust operation conducted inside the
premises of the residential unit of one Benjamin Ong located in the Little Baguio Gardens
Condominium without Ong being himself implicated. The accused actually declared that Ong
himself had been the target of the operation, and that he (accused) had gone to the condominium
of Ong on the day of his arrest only as an incident of his business of selling pre-owned motor
vehicles to show Ong the vehicle he was interested in. The accused recalled that Ong had
requested to test-drive the vehicle, and that it was while the accused was waiting at or near the
guardhouse of the condominium for Ong to return from the test drive when the lawmen came
looking for Ong. The team then arrested Ong upon his return from the test drive, and brought
him and the vehicle of the accused to the police office. The sequestration of his vehicle forced
the accused to tag along with them to recover his vehicle, but sadly for him the lawmen unjustly
placed him under arrest and charged him with the crimes that are now the subject of this appeal.
Strangely, Ong was released without charges.

It is incomprehensible why Ong, the registered tenant of the unit in which the arrest was
supposedly made, was not charged or investigated by the police for possible involvement in the
drug transaction and for the possession of the unlicensed firearms and ammunition recovered
from his place of residence despite his arrest.

It is notable that the arresting officers did not refute or rebut the version of the accused despite
such version directly contradicting their narrative about his arrest. At the very least, the State
could have presented Ong himself to clarify not only his role in the incrimination of the accused
in Ong's premises but also to explain why Ong had not been charged at all despite being the
owner or tenant of the place of the arrest. The non-presentation of Ong was suspicious, and
should have alerted the CA to examine the records more carefully and thoroughly with the view
to delving into the persistent claim of the accused of having been the victim of a vicious frame-
up.

To sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, the State must establish the guilt of the accused by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. "Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." [19]

In view of all the foregoing, reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused exists. A reasonable
doubt of guilt "is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a
captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the
defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed
the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree
of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of
your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a
mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of mistake."[20]

With the proof of the guilt of the accused not being beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to
acquittal as far as the charges for the violations of Section 14 and Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425
were concerned.

80 | P a g e
 
3.
There is no separate crime of illegal possession of firearms if another crime has been
committed

It is academic to discuss the criminal liability of the accused for illegal possession f firearms and
ammunition in view of the serious doubt surrounding the non-incrimination for the offense of
Ong despite his being the owner of the residential unit where the firearms and ammunition were
recovered. But we should nonetheless stress that the CA should have heeded the
recommendation of the OSG and dismissed the charge of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for lack of any legal basis for holding the accused liable therefor.

The OSG's recommendation to dismiss the charge of illegal possession firearms and ammunition
against the accused on the ground that there was no such separate crime if another crime was
committed fully accorded with the letter of the law. Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294 [21] states:
 
Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possess on of firearms or
ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44,
.45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .
22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of
two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
We have affirmed in People v. Ladjaalam[22] that there could be no offense of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition under R.A. No. 8294 if another crime was committed. With the
letter of the law itself being forthright, the courts have no discretion to give the law a meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of Congress, for our task is constitutionally
confined to applying the law and pertinent jurisprudence to the proven facts, which we must do
now in this case.[23]

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on April

27, 2007; ACQUITS accused Alexis Dindo San Josey Suico of the violations of Section 15 and
Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, on the ground of reasonable
doubt; DISMISSES the charges against him for violation of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294
(illegal possession of firearms and ammunition) for lack of legal basis; DIRECTS his
immediate RELEASE from the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City unless he is confined

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for some other lawful cause; and ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to
implement this decision, and to report his action hereon within 10 days from receipt hereof.
 
 
 
 
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8239 otherwise known as   “PHILIPPINE PASSPORT ACT OF
1996”

Digested by: Regin B. Manuel    

Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs

G.R. No. 169202, 5 March 2010

FACTS:

Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her
Philippine passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her
surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. While her
marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of
Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name
and surname in the replacement passport. When her request was denied, she made a similar
request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs denied the request,
holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husband’s name, use of
maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in
previous application. The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of Republic Act
No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert to her maiden
name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of the husband.

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretary’s ruling. The
CA also affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Remo
argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied
repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name
upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin v Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court [311
Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]

ISSUE:

Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can
revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her
marriage.

RULING:

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No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists.

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin v Honorable
Judge Shari’a District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to
use her husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her
maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil
status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle. RA 8239, including its implementing rules
and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport.
In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married
woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is
not required to adopt her husband’s surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new
passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage
certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The
DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may
not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section
5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden
name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

Yasin case not in point

Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, this involved a Muslim divorcee
whose former husband is already married to another woman, Remo’s marriage remains
subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement
passport, but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s
marriage.

Special law prevails over general law

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a
special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title
XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.

Implied repeals are disfavored

Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is
disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as
much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the

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two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable
with the latter act. This, Remo failed to establish.

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport

Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport application. If
her present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert
to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one’s name and identity in a
passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced.
Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport
applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it as
a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a
possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.

 
 
EDELINA T. ANDO v. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS G.R. No. 195432;
August 27, 2014
 FACTS: Petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National. After one year, Yuichiro
Kobayashi obtained and was granted a divorce in Japan. Said Divorce Certificate was duly
registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. Believing in good faith that said
divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner
married Masatomi Y. Ando. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken.
Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname
with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the Department of Foreign Affairs that
the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by competent court decision that her
marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared. Prescinding
from the foregoing, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief praying that
her marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando must be honored, considered and
declared valid, until otherwise declared by a competent court. Consequently, and until then,
petitioner therefore is and must be declared entitled to the issuance of a Philippine passport under
the name ‘Edelina Ando y Tungol.’ RTC dismissed the Petition for want of cause and action for
not complying with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is obtaining a
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country, thus not entitled to
the reliefs prayed for. Petitioner’s allegation that since no judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Ando was rendered does not make the same valid because such declaration under
Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable only in case of re-marriage. Petitioner moved for
Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a
Petition for Declaratory Relief is the proper remedy to compel the DFA to issue a new passport
to petitioner under her second husband’s name. 2. Whether or not petitioner’s second marriage is
valid. HELD: 1. With respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner

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incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed
before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was to question the DFA’s
refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husband’s name. The IRR of R.A. 8239
provides that before a married woman may obtain a passport under the name of her spouse, she
needed to present the following: (1) the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract
and one photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling
Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by
the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is
obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines. In this
case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine passport under her
second husband’s name. Should her application for a passport be denied, the remedies available
to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus: “Any person who feels
aggrieved as a result of the application of this Act of the implementing rules and regulations
issued by the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from
whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due course.” She should have filed an
appeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the denial of her application for a passport,
after having complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239. 2. With respect to her prayer for the
recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for
the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband. While it has been ruled that
a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for
declaratory relief, we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there
appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law of her
first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law.
Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete
submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an
action instituted in the proper forum.
 
De la Cruz v. Gracia GR# 177728 / July 31, 2009 594 SCRA 648
RA 9255 – “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father
(Amending Art. 176 of the Family Code)”; IRR of 9255 Passport Law (RA 8239)
 
FACTS:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and
then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique‘s
parents at Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or on
November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique‘s parents, gave birth to her
herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at Antipolo City. Jenie applied for
registration of the child‘s birth, using Dominique‘s surname Aquino, with the Civil Registrar of
Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child‘s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit
to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominique‘s father Domingo Butch Aquino. Jenie attached to the
AUSF a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote

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in his own handwriting, acknowledging that he is the father of Jenie‘s unborn child. The City
Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie‘s application
for registration of the child‘s name because he was born out of wedlock and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the
child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).
Jenie and the child filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against respondent
before the RTC of Antipolo City. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration
of the child‘s name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255, which permits an
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized
him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an
admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of
these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child‘s paternity;
hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. The trial court, however, dismissed
the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph
2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private
handwritten document" through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as an
instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and duly signed by him where he expressly
recognizes paternity to the child. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of the minor can be
considered as a recognition of paternity in a ―private handwritten instrument‖ within the
contemplation of Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, which entitles the
said minor to use his father‘s surname. 139
HELD: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the
private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child‘s paternity must be signed by the
putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of
the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus: Art.
175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children. Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must
affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2,
Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly
expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners. In the present case, however, special
circumstances exist to hold that Dominique‘s Autobiography, though unsigned by him,
substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. In Herrera v. Alba, the Court summarized the
laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part Articles 172
and 175 of the Family Code and the Rules on Evidence which include provisions on pedigree
under Sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary

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recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the
putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. In the case at
bar, there is no dispute
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization and was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of
his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.

Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistic’s
Office informed the petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent still subsists
under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of
1982.

Accordingly, the petitioner subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition
of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to
Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree provided that he no longer holds a
Philippine Passport available only to Filipino Citizens.

RULING:

No, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph
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in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.

 
Republic v. Orbecido

G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III, respondent married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City and had 2 children. The wife went to the
United States to work. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized
as an American citizen, obtained a divorce decree and married another man.

Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the lower court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and
recognized in the Philippines considering that his wife is an American Passport Holder.

RULING:

Yes, the respondent can remarry. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the lattertoremarry.

However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted as to the claim of
Orbecide that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration
could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his
favor. Thus, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.

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REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE ACT” 
Digested by: Gaoiran, Jennelyn  A.

G.R. No. 172707               October 1, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH,
TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING,
JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y
MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN
DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

 
FACTS:
Lucia Chan was a fish dealer based in Manila and was expecting fish deliveries from her
suppliers in the province. On August 11, 1998, Theng Dilangalen and another person arrived at
her house to inquire about a certain passport allegedly misplaced in one of the fish delivery
boxes. The passport was not found. The next day, Dilangalen with another person, Tony Abao
returned to the house. On the same evening, Dilangalen returned to the house with an
unidentified person and kidnapped Chan. Chan was forced to board a van and taken to a certain
house and was transferred to another house. The group demanded P400,000 as ransom and
instructed Chan’s son to deliver it at Chowking, Buendia Avenue. On August 14, 1998, the
group took the ransom money but were intercepted by the police. On October 16, 1998, the RTC
held the group including Perepenian who was 17 years old, for Kidnapping for Ransom. On June
28, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified Perepenian’s conviction from penalty of
death to penalty of reclusion perpetua considering that she was only 17 years old at the time the
offense was committed.
ISSUE: w/n the criminal liability of Perpenian is proper pursuant to RA 9344?
HELD: No. According to RA 9344, there is a need to determine whether Perenian acted with or
without discernment. The Court took note of the RTC’s observation during Perenian’s trial that
she lied about her real name, age, address because she was scared of being identified with the
group. The lying and the fear of being identified with people whom she knew had done wrong
are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being
committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the
consequences of the unlawful act.
Her minority cannot be considered as an exempting circumstance but a privileged mitigating
circumstance under Art. 68 of the RPC. Pursuant to section 40, RA 9344, sentence cannot be
suspended as the maximum age is 21 years old, where as Pernian was 31 years old at the

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promulgation of judgment. However, the Court held that the prosecution did not present
sufficient evidence to hold her liable as a principal since Perpenian entered the room where Chan
was being held and just conversed with the other members of the group that was not related to
the kidnapping. However, for being present and giving moral support, she liable as an
accomplice. As an accomplice, the imposable penalty under the RPC is Reclusion Temporal and
applying the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of Prision Mayor should
be imposed. Under the indeterminate sentence law, the Court imposed a minimum of 6 months
and one day of Prision Correcional to 6 years and one day of Prision Mayor as maximum. The
Court held that while section 51 of RA 9344 would have been applicable in confining Pernian in
an agricultural camp, Pernian had already served her actual term and exceeded the imposable
penalty for her offense and ordered her immediate release from detention.
 
People vs Mantalaba
 Facts: • The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City
received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was 17 years old at the
time, was selling shabu. • A team of police officers conducted a buy-bust operation. Using
marked money, two poseur-buyers approached Mantalaba and bought shabu from him. • After
the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an
inventory of the items recovered from Mantalaba which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which
they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-
10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill.
• The laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright
orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets,
separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride. • Two separate Informations were filed (eventually
consolidated) before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11
of RA 9165. • RTC found Mantalaba guilty. CA affirmed Ruling of RTC.
ISSUE: 1. Is he Guilty? 2. Can he avail automatic suspension of his sentence, following RA9344
 HELD: Yes. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt proved through evidence procured from buy-bust
operation and testimony of witnesses, plus all the requirements for the proper chain of custody
had been observed. The appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no
longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence,
because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened
if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The
records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when
RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been
elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he
was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions
of Article 192 of P.D. 603. Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition
under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children in
Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities.
 

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People vs Court of Appeals February 25, 2015
 Facts:
AAA, a 16 year old from Lanao del Norte, graduated highschool in March 25, 2004 and
celebrated the night out with friends, including the defendants: Carampatana, Alquizola (watcher
of Alquizola Lodging House), and Oporto (also a minor). They drank shots of Emperador
Brandy with Pepsi. AAA, refusing at first, consumed more or less five glasses of Emperador
Brandy. AAA, laid her head on Oporto’s lap, after feeling dizzy. Oporto started kissing her,
which angered AAA, but her companions just laughed at this. The accused continued to kiss and
give her shots of liquor. Things escalated and the next thing AAA knew was she found herself
naked on a bed, in Alquizola Lodging House, with Oporto on top of her, kissing her and having
intercourse with her. Carampatana and Alquizola were also in the room. She cried and fell
asleep. She woke up again and this time Carampatana was having intercourse with her. When
she went home that morning, she told her parents she was raped. Her mother beat her but also
sent her to the hospital for an examination. Hospital noted that there were old lacerations found
in AAA’s hymen (suggesting this was not her first time for intercourse) and semen. The RTC
found Carampatana, Alquizola (as an accomplice by providing the venue), and Oporto guilty of
rape. The CA reversed the RTC decision and based their reason entirely on the defendants’
testimonies (that AAA was promiscuous and consented to the sexual acts by not showing
physical resistance, discounting the fact that they got her intoxicated deliberately). CA also
stressed that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her was inconsistent with that of a
parent who found out her daughter was raped.
 Issue: WON the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion
 
 Held: YES. The CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due process. The CA acted in grave
abuse of its discretion when the prosecution’s right to due process was denied or that the trial
conducted was a sham. “It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the
evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution.” The CA
easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its own flimsy findings to
justify its decision of acquittal. First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious
during the whole ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out
for help, and never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the
sexual acts were indeed consensual. But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily
intoxicated at the time of the assault. the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under
twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more
than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously
inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly
deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA,
however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or
offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy
by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. The defense’s testimonies were

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seemingly unusual and incredible. The defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked
and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The SC also noted the defense
having a rehearsed witness. SC revered the CA decision but this time finding all three guilty of
conspiracy to rape AAA. Since Oporto was a minor during the time he raped AAA, RA 9344
must apply to him. For this reason, the case is remanded to the lower court for proper
application. Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other
Training Facilities.—A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in
an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD. Comments: CICL are entitled to
appropriate disposition under Section 51, RA 9344, which extends even to one who has exceeded
the age limit of 21 years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child. The case
took more than ten years to be resolved. This is an unfortunate speed, and not uncommon in the
country. Curiously, the Court of Appeals was quick to reverse the findings and decision of the
RTC (even though the investigation and facts laid out were strong and clear.)
 
 
SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. 173822 (2010)
FACTS: Petitioners Atizado and Monreal are accused of killing and murdering one Rogelio
Llona on April 1994. It was said that both petitioners barged in on the house of one Desder,
where the victim was a guest and suddenly shot at Llona. After the shooting, they fled. The
whole incident was over in a 5 minutes. For their defense, the petitioners interposed the alibi that
they were at their family residence. The RTC convicted Atizado and Monreal for the crime of
murder and sentenced them with reclusion perpetua. On appeal to the CA, the court affirmed the
conviction in 2005. It appears that Salvador Monreal was a minor of 17 years at the time of the
commission of the crime, as proved by his counter-affidavit, the police blotter, and the testimony
of one of the defense witnesses, and also the fact that the RTC minutes on the trial hearing on
March 9, 1999 stated that Monreal was 22 years old (thus making his age at the commission of
the offense 17 years old), including the fact that the main prosecution witness, Mirandilla, stated
that Monreal was a teenager and young looking at the fateful day. However no Birth Certificate
was ever presented during trial. RTC found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua,
which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the lower courts erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to Monreal
despite his minority at the time of the offense.
HELD: Yes, the penalty imposed on Monreal is incorrect in view of his minority. Under Article
248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying
circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado. But
reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but
under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s minority at the time of
the commission of the murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was
committed on April 18, 1994 as attested to by the numerous evidences in support thereof, though

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not expressly claimed in court. His counter-affidavit, the police blotter and trial records show
that Monreal was a minor at the time of the commission. Monreal’s minority was legally
sufficient, for it conformed with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No.
9344: Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until
he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. In all proceedings, law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at
determining the age of the child in conflict with the law. Per Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal
Code, when a minor commits an offense, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.
Hence, it should be reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable
penalty should be prision mayor in any of its periods, as a minimum period, up to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as the maximum. Monreal has been detained for over 16 years,
that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period
of Monreal’s detention should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41
of Republic Act No. 9344, the revision of the penalty warranted his immediate release from the
penitentiary. This is in consonance with the retroactivity of the law (RA 9344) for children who
have been convicted and are currently serving their sentences pursuant of Section 68 thereof.
COMMENTS: This case illustrates the application of retroactivity of the law insofar as it
benefits the minor even though he is already serving his sentence. This is but proper given the
benevolent purpose of the law, which is to express the application of restorative justice to
children in conflict with the law. Restorative justice is a system focusing on the rehabilitation of
the offender and their reintegration into society. Furthermore, this case illustrates the mandate of
the courts, and the prosecution, in exerting all efforts to ascertain the age of the accused. Even
despite the failure of presenting a birth certificate, the fact of minority can be established by
other facts, and should be properly appreciated by the courts. However, despite the express
provision of the law, personally it seems more appropriate to limit the extent of the application of
this leniency to minors depending on the severity of the crime committed. In this case, willingly
committing and conspiring to commit murder, using treacherous tactics, without provocation
whatsoever, is a heinous crime that deserves the maximum extent of punishment of the law.
However, such matter is best left to the discretion and wisdom of the legislature.
 
G.R. No. 176102 November 26, 2014 ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 
Facts:  Around seven in the evening of March 30, 2000, petitioner Rosal Hubilla stabbed the
victim Jason Espinola in front of Dalupaon Elementary School in Camarines Sur using a bladed
weapon. The victim was later brought to the Bicol Medical Center where he stayed for more than
a month. Later, however, when the victim went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was
discovered that his stab wound had a complication. The victim was subjected to another
operation, but died the day after. According to the testimony of a medico-legal expert, the cause
of death of the victim was organ failure overwhelming infection, and that the underlined cause of
death was a stab wound. The petitioner was charged with homicide in the Regional Trial Court
of Naga City, and after trial was found guilty and was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate

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penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim
P81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral expenses, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but
modified the penalty and the civil liability. Thus, the petitioner has imputed grave error to the
CA for not correctly imposing the penalty, and for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile in
conflict with the law pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344.
Issues: I. W/N Petitioner was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence
under Republic Act No. 9344?
Held:  No, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefits of probation. Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty next
lower than the imposable penalty. The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his
indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six
years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No.
968. The petitioner’s insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor
Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further
reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to
impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law. Republic
Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the
penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for
probation. The petitioner is also not entitled to the suspension of his sentence.
As held in the case of People v. Sarcia (G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009), although Section
38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the
law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns
21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344. Thus, even if the petitioner
here was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months
and 28 days old when he committed the homicide, he was already well over 23 years of age at
the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of
his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible. II. W/N imposing the penalty of
imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other international
agreements? No, the penalty of imprisonment did not violate the provisions of RA 9344 because
the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation
and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the
shortestduration permitted by the law. International agreements on the administration of juvenile
justice are also consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of disposition,
provided it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period. Following Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve it
in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare
and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender child’s best interest. Such service of
sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.
 

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Republic Act 8353 The Anti-Rape Law of 1997

"AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE,

RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR THE PURPOSES

Digested by: LOVELY JOYCE S BULAN

 
Case No. 1
 
Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 194446               April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERMENIGILDO DELEN y ESCO BILLA, Accused-Appellant.
 
Facts:
 
            On January 29, 2008 the accused-appellant was charged for qualified rape. The alleged
crime of qualified rape was committed by the accused against AAA.
 
            That on or about January 17, 2005 at around 6:00 o’clock (sic) in the morning at [XXX]
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust
and lewd designs, through force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge on one [AAA], a 12-year old minor, against the latter’s will.
            That the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship, the victim being then a
12-year old minor and daughter of the accused, are attendant in the commission of the offense.5
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not the accused should be convicted of qualified rape?
 
Ruling:

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Yes, Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rape is qualified when the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. The minority of a rape victim and her relationship,  being the
father of the victim, the accused-appellant qualified the charge of rape.  
 
Case No. 2
Facts:
 
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together
since then and raised their four (4) children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.
But on July 16,1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC wherein it  was
alleged that the accused raped his wife on two separate occasions, the accused by means of force
upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, her  wife, against the latter's will.contrary to and in Violation of R.A.
8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
 
Issue:
 
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of rape?
 
Held:
 
Yes, under section 1 of R.A 8353, it defines the term “man” in defining rape. R.A. No. 8353
penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim. Although the
accused was the husband of the victim, the accused can still be convicted of the crime of rape as
long as all the elements that constitute rape are present.
 
the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known;
(b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse.
The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish
between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law
affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
  

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Case No.4
 
FACTS:
On May 5, 2004, the accused Pareja was charged for  the crime of rape by sexual assault. The
alleged crime of qualified rape was committed by the accused against AAA.
 
Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the common law spouse of the minor victim’s mother, through
force, threats and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
an act of sexual assault upon the person of [AAA3 ], a minor 13 years of age, by then and there
mashing her breast and inserting his finger inside her vagina against her will.
 
 
ISSUE:
 
            Whether or not the accused be convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault
 
HELD:
 
            Yes, Under section 2 of Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti–Rape Law of 1997, Rape is
committed by
any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
 
            AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis
into her anus.  While she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004
incident, she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly
establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual assault.  In other words, her testimony on this
account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.
 
Case No. 5
 
FACTS:

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On March 20, 2011,  the accused-appellant was charged for qualified rape. The alleged crime of
qualified rape was committed by the accused against AAA.
 
Roel Vegara y Clavero, being the common law spouse of the minor victim’s mother, , with force
and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge
with a minor, 9 years of age, [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
 
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment.
 
 
ISSue:
 
            Whether  or not the accused be convicted of statutory rape
 
Held:
 
Yes, Rape under paragraph 3 of article 266 of the Revised Penal Code is termed statutory rape as
it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is
carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and
physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age
of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does
not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is
immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
 
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA in the afternoon of September 12, 2004, when AAA
was just nine years old.

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R.A. NO. 7610 – SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT
DIGESTED BY:  PIA DEL PILAR BAYSAC
 

 
 
a.   People of the Philippines v. Leonardo Degay | G.R. No. 182526 | August 25, 2010 | J.
Perez
 
FACTS: At the time the crime of rape was complained by private respondent (AAA) she was
nine (9) years old and a grade III pupil. The accused is their neighbor with only five houses
separating them. During the second week of March, 2004, AAA was on her way to school when
she met the accused. The accused kissed AAA on the forehead several times, and he brought her
inside his house.  He laid her on the sofa, mounted her, and inserted his hard penis into her
vagina.  AAA felt pain in her vagina.  After satisfying himself, the accused gave AAA P5.00 and
warned her not to tell her mother about what happened. The said act was again repeated on
March 25, 2004.
 
CCC, AAA’s mother learned about what happened to her daughter. CCC confronted AAA and
she confirmed to CCC that she was raped by the accused. AAA and BBB, a four-year old girl
who is another complainant were examined at the Bontoc General Hospital. BBB confessed that
she is also raped by the accused when one day the accused brought her to the bedroom on the
second floor of the house. He laid her down on the bed and the accused went on top of her. She
felt pain in her vagina.
 
The defense presented seven witnesses including the accused himself. The accused denied that
he knew the victims and that he came to know them when he was detained at Bauko Municipal
Jail. The RTC found the accused guilty of three counts of statutory rape and it was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
 
ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of lascivious conduct and not statutory rape.
 
RULING: The accused argues that his acts of showing his penis to BBB and the touching of
AAA’s vagina, mashing of her breasts and letting his penis touch her vagina constitute lascivious
conduct and not statutory rape, citing Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting
and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, Republic Act No. 7610, which defines lascivious
conduct as “the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or

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mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals on pubic area of a person.”  He cites that the lascivious
conduct is supported by the medico-legal findings on AAA and BBB, when it was found that
there was no hymenal laceration on their organs.  The accused further faults the RTC for not
giving credence to his plausible alibi that he was in another place on 8 May 2004 and it was
impossible for him to have brought BBB to his house and raped her. 
 
On the other hand, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, in its brief argues
that it had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed statutory rape and not
just acts of lasciviousness.  It cited the categorical and straightforward testimonies of AAA and
BBB as corroborated by the medical findings showing both victims suffered erythema or redness
in the areas of their labias minora and majora.  It pointed out that this Court had held in People
v. De la Cuesta, that absence of hymenal lacerations on the private organs of the victims does not
negate rape.  It stressed that the RTC correctly convicted the accused of three counts of statutory
rape since the accused had sexual intercourse with the victims who are both under 12 years of
age.  It finally argued that the accused cannot exculpate himself from liability by alleging that
from the last week of February, 2004 to the first week of April, 2004, he was in Caboan,
Capangdanan because Caboan is only three kilometers away from Sabangan and could be
traversed in an hour or less.  It was therefore not physically impossible for the accused to be at
the crime scenes.
 
After review, we uphold the rulings of the appellate court and the RTC.
 
b.   People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Fragrante | G.R. No. 182521 | February 09, 2011
| J. Carpio
 
FACTS: Ernesto Fragrante was married to CCC; they had three children and the victim (AAA)
is their third child. Three or four months before her eleventh (11) birthday, she woke up early
because her father promised them that they will have driving lessons that day. Her father enterd
her room, lie beside her on her bed, he was talking about a lot of things to her and then he started
to fondle her breast and suck her nipples.
 
The said incident was repeated between June and August 1993 and on some other occasions. In
September 1995 when AAA is at the age of thirteen (13), she was raped by her father Ernesto.
She was told to get inside his room. He scolded her and told her to lie down on his bed. And then
he raped her. She bbegged and struggled for him to remove his penis inside her but despite all
her pleas he stayed on top of him.
 
In the evening of October 25, 1997 AAA was left home with his father because her mother and
siblings went to a wake. Her father started massaging her breast. Her father strangled her and
asked her whether she preferred to be strangled first and she answered no.  He started touching
her private parts and then she told him that her mother has arrived, that was the only time that
she was allowed to leave but she was warned to not tell her mother what happened. After that,
they report the incident to the NBI. The appellant was charged with nine (9) counts of acts of
lasciviousness and (1) count of rape.

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ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant's conviction for nine (9)
counts of acts of lasciviousness and one (1) count of rape
.
RULING: The court sustained the appellant’s conviction for (7) counts of acts of lasciviousness
and (1) count of rape. He was acquitted for (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
The prosecution sufficiently established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

 
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances:
 
1.   By using force or intimidation;

2.   When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3.   When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

 
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the essential elements of rape are present in this
case. The evidence on record clearly proves that appellant had carnal knowledge of his own
minor daughter AAA.

It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and
without consent. In People v. Orillosa, we held that actual force or intimidation need not be
employed in incestuous rape of a minor because the moral and physical dominion of the father is
sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. When a father commits the
odious crime of rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter
substitutes for violence and intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would
not affect the outcome of the case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of
the father over his daughter takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape
cases committed by an accused who did not have blood relationship with the victim.

In this case, AAA's testimony clearly showed how appellant took advantage of his relationship
with and his moral ascendancy over his minor daughter when he had carnal knowledge of her.
As found by the Court of Appeals, appellant instilled fear on AAA's mind every time he sexually
molested her, thus: [AAA] also admitted that after accused-appellant has started sexually
molesting her until she was raped, she was so frightened of him. In fact she could not tell her
mother of her ordeal, mindful of the serious threats on her life and of the chaos it would cause
their family.

We likewise find appellant's claim that the medical findings do not support the charge of rape
untenable. Aside from AAA's positive, straightforward, and credible testimony, the prosecution
presented the medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernadette Madrid and the latter's testimony

101 | P a g e
which corroborate AAA's claim that appellant raped her.

The Court is not impressed with appellant's claim that AAA's failure to immediately report the
incidents to the proper authorities affected her credibility. Delay could be attributed to the
victim's tender age and the appellant's threats. A rape victim's actions are oftentimes influenced
by fear, rather than reason. In incestuous rape, this fear is magnified because the victim usually
lives under the same roof as the perpetrator or is at any rate subject to his dominance because of
their blood relationship.
 
Appellant was charged with violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. These provisions state:
 
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. -- Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article,
shall be punished by prision correccional.

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:

x x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 are as
follows:
1.   The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2.   The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse.

3.   The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610 are present here.

First, appellant's repeated touching, fondling, and sucking of AAA's breasts and inserting his

102 | P a g e
finger into AAA's vagina with lewd designs undoubtedly constitute lascivious conduct under
Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610, to wit:

(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into
the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of a person.

Second, appellant, as a father having moral ascendancy over his daughter, coerced AAA to
engage in lascivious conduct, which is within the purview of sexual abuse. In People v.
Larin,  we held:
 
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.

Third, AAA is below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, based on her
testimony which was corroborated by her Birth Certificate presented during the trial. Section
3(a), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610 provides:
 
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -

(a) "Children" refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition;

Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of appellant for acts of
lasciviousness was proper.

In Criminal Case Nos. 98-652 and 98-658, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General,
representing the People, that the prosecution failed to prove appellant's guilt for acts of
lasciviousness beyond reasonable doubt. While AAA testified that appellant habitually molested
her, there was no specific evidence supporting the charge that appellant committed acts of
lasciviousness in May 1993 and September 1997, or on or about those dates. Hence, we find
appellant not guilty for two counts of acts of lasciviousness (Criminal Case Nos. 98-652 and 98-
658) on the ground of reasonable doubt.

As regards the other criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness, where appellant's guilt was proved
beyond reasonable doubt, we affirm appellant's conviction. In these cases, the alternative
circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code should be considered
against appellant. In People v. Fetalino, the Court held that, "in crimes against chastity, like acts
of lasciviousness, relationship is considered aggravating." In that case, the Court considered
relationship as an aggravating circumstance since the informations mentioned, and the accused
admitted, that the complainant is his daughter.

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In the instant case, the information expressly state that AAA is appellant's daughter, and
appellant openly admitted this fact. Accordingly, we modify the penalty imposed in Criminal
Case Nos. 98-657 and 98-659. Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Since there is an
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its
maximum period - reclusion perpetua. Besides, Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610 expressly
provides that "The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the
perpetrator is [a] x x x parent, x x x. In People v. Montinola and People v. Sumingwa, where the
accused is the biological father of the minor victim, the Court appreciated the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship and accordingly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Thus, appellant herein is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-657 and 98-659.

In Criminal Case Nos. 98-651, 98-653, 98-654, 98-655, and 98-656, where AAA was still below

12 years old at the time of the commission of the acts of lasciviousness, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610. This provision specifically states "[t]hat the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period."Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, as
explained, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. In People v. Velasquez, which
involved a two year old child sexually abused by her grandfather, the Court imposed the
indeterminate sentence of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, appellant herein is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Also, we modify the amount of moral damages and fine awarded by the Court of Appeals. We
reduce the amount of moral damages from P50,000 to P15,000 and the amount of fine from
P30,000 to P15,000 for each of the seven (7) counts of acts of lasciviousness. In addition, we
award civil indemnity in the amount of P20,000, and exemplary damages in the sum of P15,000,
in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, for each of the seven (7)
counts of acts of lasciviousness.
 
 
c.   People of the Philippines v. Bernabe Pangilinan | G.R. No.183090 | November 14,
2011 | J. Perez
 
FACTS:  AAA, a thirteen year old girl lived with her aunt BBB and her husband since she was
two years old until July 27, 2001. At around 10 p.m. of July 27, 2001, while her aunt was
working in Angeles, Pampanga, and she was watching television in their house, appellant arrived
and ordered her to cook chicken adobo which she did. Appellant approached her and pointed a
samurai at her. Appellant then kissed her neck and mashed her breast.  It was not the first time
that appellant did that to her. AAA testified that prior to the said incident; she was already
abused by the appellant several times. She said that the reason why she did not tell her aunt about
the molestation is because the appellant threatened to kill her and her aunt. She also said that her
aunt and appellant treated her like their own child.

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BBB denied all the allegations against him and on his defense he said that it was CCC, AAA’s
cousin who molested her and that AAA is only forced by her wife’s relatives to file charges
against him because they were against him and their relationship. His testimony was
corroborated by two other witnesses. The Trial Court found the accused guilty for rape and
sexual abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision but with modifications as to the
award for damages.
 
ISSUE: Whether the accused should be penalized for rape under RA 7610 or under Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code.
 
RULING: In this case, appellant was charged under two separate information for rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610,
respectively. However, we find the Information in Criminal Case No. 11769 for sexual abuse to
be void for being violative of appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. 
 
The allegations in the above-quoted Information would show the insufficiency of the averments
of the acts alleged to have been committed by appellant. It does not contain the essential facts
constituting   the offense, but a statement of a conclusion of law.  Thus, appellant cannot be
convicted of sexual abuse under such Information. The right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against an accused cannot be waived for reasons of public policy.  Hence,
it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet
its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged
to have been committed.
 
 Art. 266-A Rape; When and How Committed – Rape is Committed –
 
1)      By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
 
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present.
 
We find that AAA remained steadfast in her assertion that appellant raped her through force and
intimidation with the use of a samurai.   And even after the incident, appellant threatened AAA
that he would kill her and her aunt, i.e., appellant's wife, should AAA report the incident. 
 
A finding that the accused is guilty of rape may be based solely on the victim's testimony if such
testimony meets the test of credibility.  We held that no woman, much less a child of such tender
age, would willingly submit herself to the rigors, the humiliation and the stigma attendant upon

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the prosecution of rape, if she were not motivated by an earnest desire to put the culprit behind
bars.
 
Appellant argues that he could not be convicted of rape since based on the medical examination
report, AAA's genitalia had no hymenal laceration which corroborated AAA's testimony that
appellant merely kissed her and touched her breast on July 27, 2001.           
 
Proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. [53] An intact hymen does not negate a
finding that the victim was raped. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina,
even without laceration of the hymen, is enough to constitute rape, and even the briefest of
contact is deemed rape.[54]
 
While it appears from AAA's testimony that she was not raped precisely on July 27, 2001 as
what appellant did was kiss her lips and mash her breast on that day, however, her entire
testimony in the witness stand positively shows that appellant with the use of force and
intimidation had carnal knowledge of her at some other time. She testified that appellant violated
her since she was seven years old. The first time was when they were still staying in Angeles
City where appellant touched her private parts; the second time was when they were already in
Gerona, Tarlac, where appellant pointed a samurai at her and raped her; and the third time
happened on July 27, 2001 when appellant kissed her lips and mashed her breast. Indeed,
appellant may be convicted for rape in the light of AAA's testimony. For in rape cases, the date
of the commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its occurrence.
 
Notably, the information alleges that the crime of rape was committed “on or about July 27,
2001,” thus the prosecution may prove that rape was committed on or about July 27, 2001, i.e.,
few months or years before, and  not exactly on July 27, 2001. 
 
In his Supplemental Brief, appellant claims that he should have been prosecuted for rape under
RA No. 7610 since AAA was already more than 12 years old when the alleged rape was
committed which carries the penalty of reclusion  temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.    
 
We do not agree. In People v. Dahilig, wherein the question posed was whether the
crime committed was rape (Violation of Article 266-A, par. 1, in relation to Article 266-B,
1st paragraph of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 8353), or is it Child Abuse,
defined and penalized by Section 5, (b), RA No. 7610, we said:
           
            As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the
elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v.
Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated in that
case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with
either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article
266-A (except paragraph 1 [d] of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender
cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double
jeopardy will be prejudiced.  A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal
liability for a single criminal act. Specifically, Abay reads:

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Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353,if
the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender
should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under
Article 266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with
reclusion perpetua.  On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or
older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender
cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right
against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be
subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise,
rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA
7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex
crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot
be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
 
In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime
was committed against her. The Information against appellant
stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident.
Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1 [d]) of the Revised Penal Code. While the Information
may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the prosecution's
evidence only established that appellant sexually violated the
person of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening her
with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial
designs. Thus, rape was established.
 
Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be
convicted therefor. Considering, however, that the information correctly charged the
accused with rape in violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1 st par.
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and that he was convicted
therefor, the CA should have merely affirmed the conviction.
 
As in the present case, appellant can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be
convicted therefor. The prosecution's evidence established that appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening her with a samurai. Thus, rape was
established.  Considering that in the resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor,
he resolved the filing of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code for which appellant
was convicted by both the RTC and the CA, therefore, we merely affirm the conviction. 
 
 
d.   SPO1 Acuzar v. Jorolan and Hon. Apresa, People’s Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB) | G.R. No. 177878 | April 7, 2010 | J. Villarama Jr.
 

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FACTS: Aproniano Jorolan filed an Administrative Case against petitioner before the PLEB
charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with
respondent’s minor daughter. Jorolan also instituted a criminal case against the petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court of New Corella for Violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic
Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act.
 
Petitioner filed a Counter – Affidavit before the PLEB and he denied all the accusations against
him. He also attached the complainant’s daughter’s affidavit wherein she denied having
relationship with the petitioner. Upon receipt of the decision of PLEB whish found him guilty of
grave misconduct (Child Abuse), he filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC of Tagum City which annulled the
decision of PLEB. The respondent elevated the case to the CA which reversed and set aside the
ruling of the RTC.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s resort to certiorari was not
warranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB was available to him.
 
RULING: petitioner opted to file a petition for certiorari before the trial court on the pretext that
the PLEB had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until petitioner is convicted before
the regular court.  According to petitioner, although the case filed before the PLEB was
captioned as “Grave Misconduct,” the offense charged was actually for “Violation of Law,”
which requires prior conviction before a hearing on the administrative case can proceed.  Thus,
petitioner insists that the PLEB should have awaited the resolution of the criminal case before
conducting a hearing on the administrative charge against him. 
 
The contention however is untenable.  A careful perusal of respondent’s affidavit-complaint
against petitioner would show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in
an illicit affair with respondent’s minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation
of law, as petitioner would like to convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It
usually refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no
discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment. On the other
hand, “violation of law” presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized
under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. The settled rule is that criminal
and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
proceedings. The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints
against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case. 
 
In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he had
submitted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses.  He attended the hearings
together with his counsel and even asked for several postponements. Petitioner therefore cannot
claim that he had been denied of due process.  Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard

108 | P a g e
either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.  The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. In other words, it is not legally objectionable
for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on
position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of direct testimony.  Here, we note that petitioner had more than
enough opportunity to present his side and adduce evidence in support of his defense; thus, he
cannot claim that his right to due process has been violated. Wherefore, the petition is denied.
 

e.   Jojit Garingarao v. People of the Philippines | G.R. No. 192760 | July 20, 2011 | J.
Carpio  

FACTS: AAA, 16 years of age, was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her

father BBB and mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. AAA was admitted at the hospital
for further observation. The next day, her father and mother left the hospital to process AAA’s
Medicare papers and to attend to their store, respectively, leaving AAA alone in her room. When
her father returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go home. The doctor
allowed them due to AAA’s insistence but instructed her that she should continue her
medications. At home, AAA told her parents that Garingarao sexually abused her. They went
back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They inquired from the nurses’
station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day.
 
An Information was filed against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610.
During the trial, AAA testified that, Garingarao, entered her room to check her medications and
if she was still experiencing pains. Garingarao lifted AAA’s bra and touched her left breast and
insisted that he was only examining her. Garingarao also slid his finger inside AAA’s private
part and only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly period. 
 
In his defense, the accused testified that he went inside AAA’s room to administer her medicines
and check her vital signs. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was motivated by the
argument he had with AAA’s father about the administering of medicines. He was supported by
the testimony of the nursing aide, Tamayo. Garingarao further alleged that, assuming the charges
were correct, there was only one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as such, he
should have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610. The
RTC found Garingarao guilty as charged and gave credence to the testimony of AAA
over Garingarao’s denial, which was affirmed by the CA.
 
ISSUE:  Whether or not the single incident of act of lasciviousness would suffice to hold the
accused liable under RA 7610
 
RULING: Yes. The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of
the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. It is a settled rule
that denial is a weak defense as against the positive identification by the victim. Both denial and

109 | P a g e
alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a credible witness.  
 
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
 
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
1.      The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2.      The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and
3.      The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
 
Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610,
lascivious conduct is defined as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
 
In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAA’s breasts and inserted his
finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse
by pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was
doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAA’s objections. AAA twice
asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he was just examining her.
 
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the
victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent
to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free will. In this
case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was
examining her.
 
Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were true, he
should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident happened only
once. Garingarao alleges that the single incident would not suffice to hold him liable under RA
7610. This argument has no legal basis. The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that
sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the
abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to
hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610. The Court
finds Jojit Garingarao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610.
 

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REPUBLIC ACT No. 6539  “AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING

CARNAPPING”

Digested by: Jenna Serrano

G.R. No. 226846

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JEFFREY MACARANAS y FERNANDEZ, Accused-Appellant
 
FACTS:  An Information was filed against appellant, Richard Lalata and a certain John Doe
charging them of violation of R.A. No. 6539. Appellant pleaded "not guilty" during his
arraignment and after the pre-trial ended, the trial ensued. Appellant, on the other hand, testified
in his defense and denied the charges against him claiming that on February 18, 2007, he fetched
his cousin Richard Lalata before proceeding to his father Eming Macaranas' house at Brgy.
Lawa, where they usually eat and sleep. According to him, they left early in the morning of the
following day' and just slept the whole day at their house in Brgy. Daungan. Thereafter,
sometime in June, 2007, barangay officials arrested him and claimed that they beat and mauled
him in order to admit that he killed Frank THE OWNER OF THE MOTORCYCLE, and under
coercion, he pointed to his cousin Richard Lalata as the perpetrator.
The RTC, in its decision, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
and disposed the case. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification.
Appellant insists that the trial court and the CA committed an error in giving full credence to the
testimony of the lone witness and in rejecting his defense of denial and alibi.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not Accused should be held guilty for violation of RA6536
 
HELD:  YES.
This Court has consistently ruled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence, which deserves no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters and that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. In correctly
ruling that the defense of denial and alibi of appellant is inconsequential.

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In the face of the serious accusation, accused-appellant merely interposed the defense of denial
and alibi to prove his innocence. The Court finds inadequate the accused-appellant's defense of
alibi absent any credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, to exculpate him of the
crime charged.
 
 
G.R. No. 213913                                 September 02, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULKIPLI ASAMUDDIN y SALAPUDIN a.k.a
“JUL” and “REY”
 
FACTS: Sometime in 2006, Emelina Gloria hired appellant Asamuddin as a messenger in E.
Gloria Money Changer located at Mandaluyong City, and assigned him a blue Honda XRM
motorcycle with plate number UU-9142 for be used for work purposes. On July 11, 2007, at
12:30pm, Emelina handed to appellant the cash amount of P800,000.00 and various foreign
denominations with a peso value of P277, 995.00 and instructed him to bring them to her friend
Rina Rosalial, also a money changer, in Mabini, Manila. Thereafter, appellant left aboard his
service motorcycle. Said instruction and handing of the currencies was seen by Imee, a domestic
helper of Emelina, who was then inside the E. Gloria Money Changer.
After an hour, Rosalial called Emelina and told her that appellant has yet to arrive in her shop.
Emelina called appellant and his wife through their cellular phones, but to no avail. This
prompted Emelina to file a complaint against appellant at the PNP-CIDG, Camp Crame.
A month later, appellant’s service motorcycle was found abandoned in Silang, Cavite, and was
returned to Emelina.
On January 16, 2008, an Information was filed charging Asamuddin of violation of RA 6539 or
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 and the crime of Qualified Theft. The cases were temporarily
archived, but were revived when appellant was arrested in Zamboanga City in 2009. Asamuddin
pleaded not guilty to both charges and denied the accusation, saying that he resigned from his job
on July 10, 2007 and that the amount handed to him by Emelina was his last salary.
On October 15, 2012, the RTC of Madaluyong City, Branch 212 found Regaspi guilty of the
crime of Carnapping and Qualified Theft. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court’s decision.
Hence, this present petition.
 
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not there was no consent of Emelina when appellant took the subject service
motorcycle, in order to convict him of the crime of Carnapping.
2.) Whether or not appellant’s employment as messenger created a fiduciary relationship
between him and Emelina, that will qualify him for the crime of Qualified Theft.

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HELD:
1.) AFFIRMATIVE. Although it is true that Emelina herself tasked the appellant to proceed to
Mabini, Manila and permitted him to use the service motorcycle, it cannot be denied that
appellant’s failure to return the motorcycle to Emelina after his working hours constitutes
“unlawful taking.” If indeed appellant’s taking of the service motorcycle was consented by
Emelina, she should not have filed a complaint against the appellant for the loss of the subject
personal property. This just proves that appellant’s possession of the subject property after his
work hours was not authorized nor consented by Emelina.
 
2.) AFFIRMATIVE. One of the elements of the crime of Qualified Theft is that the crime must
be done with grave abuse of confidence. In the present case, there exists a fiduciary relationship
between appellant and Emelina, as his function of delivering amounts of money to the clients or
other money changers involves a total trust and high degree of confidence from his employer,
Emelina. Emelina routinely entrusts to appellant, on a daily basis, various amounts of money
from P50,000.00 to P500,000.00 without even requiring the latter to acknowledge receipt
thereof. Emelina even testified that she does not have proof that she handed to appellant
P800,000.00 and various foreign currency on July 11, 2007 because she has total trust and high
degree of confidence on appellant. “Tiwalaan lang po.” This exhibits the trust and confidence of
Emelina to the appellant which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of the
former.
 
            Therefore, the present appeal is dismissed, affirming the conviction of Asamuddin of the
crime of Carnapping and Qualified Theft.
People of the Philippines vs. Johnny Calabroso, et. al.
 
FACTS: Tranquilino Nacnac, a tricycle driver was found dead in Gabit, Barangay Nuesa. He
bore 22 stab wounds on the head, torso, and upper limbs. Upon investigation, the sidecar of a
motorcycle was spotted at the bottom of a 10-15 meter deep ravine. It was confirmed to be the
property of Nacnac as what was found with the sidecar, were his wallet, his driver’s license, and
his vehicle registration. It was found out that the night before the death of Nacnac, 4 men
boarded his tricycle. They were, Johnny Calabroso, Sonny Matos, Richard Sata, and Leonardo
Dumrique. Before these men boarded the tricycle of Nacnac, they were supposed to board the
tricycle of Danilo Cerveza. However, they were not able to push through with the trip as the
passengers wanted to pay 35 pesos instead of the 40 pesos that Cerveza asked them to pay.
Thereafter, they flagged down the tricycle of Nacnac, and he agreed to transport them to Gabit,
Barangay Nuesa, Roxas, Isabela.
 
It was gathered from the suspects that they were on their way to a party when they boarded the
tricycle of Nacnac. When they arrived, Dumrique gave Nacnac 12 pesos as he knew that the

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regular fare was 3 pesos per head. But Nacnac demanded 40 pesos. Dumrique refused to pay, so
Nacnac boxed him 5 times on the neck which caused him to fall to the ground. Matos pacified
them but Nacnac simultaneously drew a veinte nueve from his waist. Dumrique, who was still
lying on the ground, saw Nacnac near his feet. Taking advantage of the situation to disable
Nacnac, Dumrique kicked him at his sex organ. Nacnac doubled up in pain. Calabroso then
grabbed the knife from Nacnac. When Calabroso was about to step backwards, Nacnac held his
right elbow, so Calabroso stabbed Nacnac. For his part, Matos tried to stop Calabroso but the
latter kept on swinging the knife. Sata, seated inside the tricycle, was stunned. Dumrique was not
able to do anything because he was still reeling from the punches he received from Nacnac.
 
Thereafter, Dumrique started the engine of the tricycle while Calabroso pulled Matos and joined
Sata inside the tricycle. All 4 companions fled to Kiangan, Ifugao, leaving the bloodied Nacnac
behind. After removing the sidecar of the tricycle, they gathered at the house of the former
employer of Matos, with the motorcycle in tow. The other three, decided to dispose of the
motorcycle and left Matos behind. They came back 2 days later, the motorcycle was still in their
possession. It was at that time, that they were brought in to be questioned by the police.
 
They were charged with carnapping for taking away, in conspiracy with one another, a TMX
Honda motorized tricycle owned and driven by Tranquilino Nacnac, with intent to gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation. They were also charged with robbery with homicide
for taking away on the same day 40 pesos belonging to Nacnac, again in conspiracy with one
another, also with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation; and, on the occasion
and by reason thereof, inflicted upon Nacnac multiple stab wounds on different parts of his body
which directly caused his death.
 
The trial court appreciated the presence of conspiracy among the 4 accused in taking away the
tricycle of Nacnac as demonstrated by them when they all boarded the same tricycle and sped
away from the crime scene. As to the charge of robbery with homicide, the trial court ruled that
the claim that the victim was robbed of his money was not duly established, but was nonetheless
convinced that Calabroso and Dumrique were responsible for his death. The court ratiocinated
that since it was already nighttime, Nacnac was justified in asking 40 pesos from the passengers;
in fact, it was the amount previously demanded by Cerveza. It further reasoned out that
Dumrique started the fight by refusing to pay the amount demanded by Nacnac while Calabroso
had no compelling reason to stab Nacnac, repeatedly at that, considering that the latter had
already been reportedly disarmed and was in fact alone. Nevertheless, the lower court convicted
Calabroso and Dumrique of robbery with homicide, instead of homicide alone, and exonerated
Sata and Matos since it was its finding that Sata did not participate in the fight while Matos only
attempted to pacify the protagonists.
 
Accused-appellants Calabroso and Dumrique argued that the trial court erred in convicting them
of robbery with homicide since its discussion was clear that the prosecution failed to establish
the robbery. They also alleged that they did not conspire in carnapping the tricycle. Moreover,

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they alleged that they used the tricycle only as a getaway vehicle, without intent to gain, for
when they reached Kiangan the following morning they intended to surrender it, as they did, to
the police.
 
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in its conviction of the accused-appellants of robbery with
homicide, and carnapping (conspiracy)
 
Robbery with homicide:
The trial court was categorical in its finding that "[n]obody declared that the victim was robbed
of anything."Yet it convicted Calabroso and Dumrique of robbery with homicide. This is a
glaring error. Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as
to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted only of the offense proved. To
be specific, absent any evidence that the accused indeed robbed the victim the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide cannot stand. Having ruled out robbery for want of evidence and
satisfied of the equal liability of Calabroso and Dumrique for the death of Nacnac, the trial court
should have convicted them only of homicide.
 
Dumrique did not actively participate in killing Nacnac nor did he join in any other manner to
further the objective of Calabroso. Conspiracy, which exists when two (2) or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decide to commit it, was not
established between Dumrique and Calabroso. The trial court, while ruling out conspiracy
between the 2 in the killing of Nacnac, erroneously held that Dumrique was equally responsible
with Calabroso for the victim's death; hence, Dumrique must be acquitted.
 
Carnapping (conspiracy):
All the elements of carnapping were present in the instant case. After Nacnac was fatally stabbed
Dumrique started the engine of the tricycle, while Calabroso dragged Matos into the tricycle to
join Sata who was already seated inside. Intent to gain is presumed when one takes a property
belonging to another against his will. The intent to gain became an established fact when
accused-appellants remained in possession of the motorcycle even after the lapse of 2 days from
the commission of the crime.
 
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.
When Calabroso, Matos and Dumrique joined Sata inside the tricycle and fled towards Kiangan
after Nacnac was stabbed they performed well-coordinated acts indicating a common purpose to

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steal the vehicle. Conspiracy is also inferred not only from their conduct before and during the
commission of the crime but also thereafter, showing that they acted in unison with each other.
  
People vs Tan                       GR No. 135904 (Jan. 21, 2000)
Facts:
Tan was charged by See, his friend, for violation of RA 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972).
See alleged that he turned over the possession of a car to Tan for test driving but Tan never
returned the same. After several months, See formally filed a complaint for carnapping alleging
that See had withdrawn the consent initially given by him to Tan when the latter went beyond
test driving and appropriated the car to his own use and benefit. The Trial Court, affirmed by the
CA, ruled against Tan on the ground that Tan’s failure to return the car and his consequent
appropriation thereof constituted unlawful taking – the gravamen of the crime charged. Tan
asserts, however, that the CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, should not have employed as
bases for his conviction the basic principles in theft.
Issue:
WON the basic principles in theft (and robbery) are applicable in the crime of carnapping
penalized under RA 6539.
Held:
Yes.
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crimes of
robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. But a careful comparison of this special
law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and
characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging
to another is taken without the latter’s consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly
deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles .Hence, a motor vehicle is said to have been
carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner’s consent, whether the
taking was done with or without violence or intimidation of persons or with or without the use of
force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle
would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the
enactment of said statute.
Thus, as an element common to theft, robbery and carnapping, unlawful taking — its import,
intention and concept — should be considered as also common to these crimes.
It is therefore the finding of the SC that there was no unlawful taking in the case at bar. An
unlawful taking takes place when the owner or juridical possessor does not give his consent to
the taking; or, if the consent was given, it was vitiated. See neither withheld his consent nor
withdrew the same during the seven month period the car was with Tan. At the very least, See
tolerated TAN’s possession of the car. Hence, Tan cannot be convicted under RA 6539.
 

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARLON DELA CRUZ, ET AL.G.R. No.   174658,
February 24, 2009

FACTS:

Two Informations, one for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (the Anti-Carnapping Law), and
the other for Robbery with Homicide, were filed against 1) appellant Marlon dela Cruz (DELA
CRUZ), together with 2) Adriano Melecio (Melecio), 3) Jessie Reyes (REYES), and 4) Jepoy
Obello (Obello) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. Melecio and Obello
have remained at large.
 
From information gathered from bystanders, the police learned that de la Cruz, a notorious thief
who had previously been convicted for theft, and an unidentified man were seen riding on a red
Yamaha motorcycle  on June 4, 2001, that from a surveillance conducted, de la Cruz was not in
his Dagupan residence; and that his mother Maria Rosario (Maria) is living in the municipality of
San Quintin. The carnapped motorcycle was owned by a certain Juliana Tamin.
 
De la Cruz’s friends Angelica Perez (Angelica) and Anna Datlag (Anna), who were at the time
staying at Maria’s house, were invited for questioning.

 Anna further related: On June 6, 2001, she asked de la Cruz who owns the red motorcycle to
which he replied that he took it from an old man who was sleeping after he hit the old man with a
stone and Melecio stabbed him at the right side of his body, following which they took the
money of the old man.

Upon the other hand, de la Cruz put up alibi, claiming that he was asleep in his house at Callejon
Extension, Dagupan City on the night of January 3, 2001; that on waking up the following day,
January 4, 2001, Obello and Melecio arrived and invited him to, as he did join them to San
Quintin on board a motorcycle which the two claimed belongs to their uncle; that the group went
first to Lupao, Nueva Ecija where they met Anna and Angelica who, on his invitation, joined
them in San Quintin where they stayed for a few days.
After trial, Branch 43 of the Dagupan City RTC convicted DELA CRUZ of both charges. It
acquitted Reyes. The conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Among others, DELA CRUZ argues that even if the allegation on the loss of some cash were
true, the same should be absorbed in carnapping since carnapping and robbery have the same
element of taking with intent to gain.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the loss of cash be absorbed in the crime of carnapping?

HELD:
 
 No. Carnapping refers specifically to the taking of a motor vehicle. It does not cover the taking

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of cash or personal property which is not a motor vehicle. As the Court of Appeals noted:

x x x Two (2) articles were taken from TEOFILLO, SR., his tricycle and some cash. The taking
of the tricycle constitutes a violation of the anti-carnapping law, RA 6539, while the taking of the
cash from tEOFILO, SR. by hitting him with a stone and stabbing him in the chest constitutes the
crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
 
 
PD 1613 AS AMENDED
AMENDING THE LAWS ON ARSON
Digested by: ARIEL M LIOAD
 

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1613

AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON

WHEREAS, findings of the police and intelligence agencies of the government reveal that fires
and other crimes involving destruction in Metro Manila and other urban centers in the country
are being perpetrated by criminal syndicates, some of which have foreign connections;

WHEREAS, the current law on arson suffers from certain inadequacies that impede the
successful enforcement and prosecution of arsonists;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving
destruction be prevented to protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and
political stability of the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of

the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the
land, the following:

Section 1. Arson. Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be punished
by Prision Mayor.

The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under
circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of another.

Section 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to

Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any ammunition factory and other establishment where explosives, inflammable or

combustible materials are stored.

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 2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture,
education or social services.

3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble.

4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for

transportation of persons or property

4. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative
or other official proceedings.

5. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center,
public or private market, theater or movie house or any similar place or building.

6. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested

area.

Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;

4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest;

4. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and

5. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.

Section 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. The penalty in any case of arson shall
be imposed in its maximum period;

1. If committed with intent to gain;

2. If committed for the benefit of another;

3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the
property burned;

4. If committed by a syndicate.

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The offense is committed by a syndicate if its is planned or carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons.

Section 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of or on the occasion of the arson death
results, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death shall be imposed.

Section 6. Prima Facie evidence of Arson. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute
prima facie evidence of arson:

1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or
establishment.

2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the

building note necessary in the business of the offender nor for household us.

3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or

materials soaked therewith or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical,
or electronic contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing
are found in the ruins or premises of the burned building or property.

4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the
time of the issuance of the policy.

4. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires
have occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender
and/or insured.

5. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in a
building or property had been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course
of business.

6. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in
exchange for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of the person or property of
the victim.

Section 7. Conspiracy to commit Arson. Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by

Prision Mayor in its minimum period.

Section 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. The building which is the object of arson including
the land on which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner
thereof can prove that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite the exercise
of due diligence on his part.

Section 9. Repealing Clause. The provisions of Articles 320 to 326-B of the Revised Penal Code
and all laws, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

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Section 10. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately upon publication thereof at
least once in a newspaper of general circulation.

Done in the City of Manila, this 7th day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-nine.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1744

AMENDING ARTICLE THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY OF THE REVISED PENAL

CODE PROVISIONS ON ARSON

WHEREAS, there have been rampant and wanton burnings of residential houses, public
buildings, markets, hotels, and other commercial establishments;

WHEREAS, to effectively discourage and deter the commission of arson, and to prevent
destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent people, it is necessary that the capital
punishment be imposed upon arsonists;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of

the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree that Article 320,
Revised Penal Code be amended:

Section 1. Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code shall read as follows:

"Article 320 Destructive Arson. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as
result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions;

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the use of the public in
general, or where people usually gather or congregated for a definite purpose such as but
not limited to official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce,
trade, worship, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such
as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyance or stops or
terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said
building or edifice at the time it is set on fire, and regardless also of whether the building
is actually inhabited or not.

3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or

convenience, or public use, entertainment or leisure.

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.

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 5. Any building, the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or
defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.

Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of
death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more
persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy
the building or the edifice, or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or
another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death shall also be imposed upon
any person who shall burn:

(a) Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance
storehouse, archives or general museum of the government.

(b) In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive

materials.

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death or
injury results, or any valuable documents, equipment, machineries, apparatus, or other valuable
properties were burned or destroyed, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed."

Section 2. Provisions of Articles 320, 321 and 322 of the Revised Penal Code which are or may
be inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

Section 3. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.

 
People v. Macabando, G.R. No 188708, 31 July 2013
 
FACTS
At 4:00pm on December 21, 2001, appellant broke bottles on the road holding G.I. pipe,
and shouted that he wanted to get even (“manabla ko”). Afterwards, he uttered that he would
burn his house. At 6:35 pm, Cornelio saw smoke coming from appellant’s house.
He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor,
ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning
house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the
appellant then fired 3 shots in the air.
The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be
killed. Appellant’s Defense: He admitted that he felt angry because one of his radio cassettes for

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sale had been stolen. He appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing
radio cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up.
He denied making a threat to burn his house and maintained that he did not own a gun.
He added that the gunshots came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use
during the New Year celebration.
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article
320 of the RPC. The RTC found him guilty and sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant is guilty.
RULING
The following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of circumstantial events that
leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his
house. The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that
the appellant set fire to his house.
We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors from
putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with
the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones
and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of things for a person
to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property.
By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to
repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a
traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on
his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his
house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up.
Clearly, the appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards
the people who tried to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house,
belied his claim of innocence.
Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.
PD 1613 governs simple arson. Section 3. Other Cases of Arson.
The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following: 2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it
have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson.

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 The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both
these elements have been proven. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own
house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established
during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate
courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection
which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional.
Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development Department
likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified
that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. The acts committed under Art. 320 of
The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the
other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words,
Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson.
Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson
is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The court also applied the ISL sentencing accused to
I 0 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 16 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
 
 
People vs. Cedenio GR. No. 93485
 
FACTS
 
On November 26, 1986, Dorio residence was gutted with fire. Five members of the
family, then occupying the house were burned to death. The five bodies retrieved were those of
Mario Hilario Dorio, with wounds on the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a wound on the leg
and head almost severed, Mario Dorio with wounds on the leg and left nipple, Nicanora Tabanao
with a wound in the stomach and infant Dioscora with no wounds at all but charred to the bone.
 
Two witnesses testified that the three appellants namely, Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and
Felipe Antipolo were seen running out of the burning house, holding bolos stained with blood.
 
Another witness testified that Pedro Cedenio borrowed from him a bolo on the night of
November 26, and the following morning, the bolo was returned to him with a bloodstain on the
handle. The accused Pedro Cedinio, also told him “do not worry, if this incident reaches the
court, I will answer (for) everything”
 
The trial court found the accused-appelants guilty of Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and
penalized under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613.

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ISSUE
 
Whether or not the appellant should be charged by a complex crime of arson with murder.
 
RULING
 
No. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites Groizard-
 
…when the fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in the house and
that the objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal
Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be
purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life.
In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder.
But if the main objective is the burning of a building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by
the crime of arson.
 
From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the victims were hacked and stabbed to
death, appellants set the house afire to hide their gruesome act. Thus, the appellant are guilty of a
separate crime of four counts of murder and arson. And not the complex crime of arson with
murder.
 
 
 
People v. Acosta G.R. No. 126351. February 18, 2000
 
FACTS
 
            Complainant’s grandson, Elmer Montesclaros, in the belief that Acosta and his wife were
the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the house of appellant and burned their
belonings.
In the afternoon of February 27, 1996, witness Aquino saw Acosta and approached him.
When she asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, he replied that he would burn the
house of complainant.
In the morning of February 28, 1996, witness Videña, saw complainant's house burning.
She noticed the presence of appellant standing alone in front of the burning house. Appellant was
just watching the blaze and not doing anything to contain it. When the fire truck arrived,  the
house was already razed to the ground.
After the conduct of the investigation, the investigator did not find any incendiary device;
hence, the cause of fire remained undetermined.  However, trial court found appellant guilty with
the crime of arson.
 
ISSUE
 
 Whether circumstantial evidences can justify appellant’s conviction for the crime of arson.

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RULING
 
YES. Appellant's conviction for the crime of arson rests on circumstantial evidence.
Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 4. Circumstantial
evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal
responsibility of the accused.
 
Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, SC agreed with the
trial court holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and
on record:
 
First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary,
nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient
motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the witnesses. It was duly proved that at around 4:30
in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, complainant's grandson, stormed the house of appellant
and his wife and burned their belongings. When appellant was informed of the incident, he got
mad, and as his common-law wife testified, appellant threw a tantrum.
 
Second, appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to
set on fire a bed inside the same house (private complainant's) which was burned later in the
night. Witness Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she asked
appellant what he was going to do with the stove he was carrying that time, he answered that he
was going to burn the house of private complainant.  When she peeped in the kitchen, she saw
that appellant entered the house of private complainant and started pouring gas on a bed and then
lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's wife rushed in and extinguished the fire with
a broomstick. The two later left the house.
 
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was
seen inside the yard of the burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the
morning of February 28, 1996, witness Videña, through the holes of the GI sheets, saw appellant
latter that day standing alone inside private complainant's yard watching the house
burning. Appellant even looked happy with a canine smile and crazy-looking expression.
 
Fourth, appellant's actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At
around 12:00 noon of February 28, 1996, private complainant went with witness Videña to the
place of Kagawad Tecson. They were about to leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant
asked him why he burned her house and appellant answered, "So what if I burned your house?"
 

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 Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "in the crime of arson, the enormity of
the offense is not measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but rather by the
human lives exposed to destruction."
 
 
People vs. Malngan, G. R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
 
DOCTRINE
 
There is no complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide. In cases where both
burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated—
whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor.
 
FACTS
 
Brgy. Chairman Remigio’s group discovered that a fire gutted the house of Roberto Separa,
Sr. Gruta, a tanod, reported that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw Edna, one hired
as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., coming out of the house of the latter. Mendoza, neighbor
of Separa and whose house was also burned, identified accused-appellant EDNA.
 
Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside EDNA’s bag. Thereafter, EDNA
confessed to Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents that she set her
employer’s house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she
wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going
home.
 
When Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the
opportunity to ask EDNA at the latter’s detention cell how she burned the house, EDNA told her:
“Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw
ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay”.
 
When interviewed by a reporter of ABS-CBN, EDNA was heard by SPO4 Danilo Talusan as
having admitted the crime and even narrated the manner how she accomplished it. SPO4 Talusan
was able to hear the same confession, this time at his home, while watching the television
program “True Crime” hosted by Gus Abelgas. The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house
of Separa and other adjoining houses and the death of Separa, his wife and their four (4)
children.
 
ISSUES
 
1. Did accused commit complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide? NO.
2. Which kind of arson is EDNA guilty of? SIMPLE ARSON.
 
RULING
 

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NO. Crime is simply arson.
There are two (2) laws that govern the crime of arson where death results therefrom—Article
320 of RPC, as amended by RA 7659, and Section 5 of PD No. 1613.

Art. 320 with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of PD No. 1613 respecting
other cases of arson provide that if by reason of or on the occasion of arson, death results, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. The crime of homicide is absorbed. The
laws provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or
otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison d'être is that arson is itself the end and death
is simply the consequence.

(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason
or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;

(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a
building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only; lastly,

(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and
distinct crimes committed—homicide/murder and arson.

The instant case falls under (a). From a reading of the body of the Information:

“That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA x x x that
by reason and on the occasion of the said fire [the victims] sustained burn injuries which
were the direct cause of their death immediately thereafter”

Edna is being charged with the crime of arson. It is clear from her intent was merely to
destroy her employer’s house through the use of fire.

SIMPLE ARSON. There are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson
under Art. 320 and 2) simple arson, under PD 1613. Said classification is based on the kind,
character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused.
 
Art. 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.
 
On the other hand, PD 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private
structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320 and classified as other cases of arson.
These include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus
stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.
 

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 Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and
national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson
may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying
circumstances present.
 
As stated in the body of the Information, Edna was charged with having intentionally burned
the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and
destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. As it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and
sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson.
 
Edna guilty of simple arson.
NOTES
 
In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are immaterial in that intent to kill them
particularly is not one of the elements of the crime.
 
People v. Soriano, GR 142565, July 29, 2003
FACTS
There was a disagreement between Soriano and Rosario regarding their child. It stemmed
from the fact that Honey’s brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child out without the consent of
accused-appellant who wanted both Honey and Otoy instead to return with him to Manila. But
Honey refused.
As their discussion wore on accused-appellant intimated to Honey his desire to have sex with
her, which he vigorously pursued the night before with much success. This time Honey did not
relent to the baser instincts of Nestor; instead, she kicked him as her stern rebuke to his sexual
importuning.
In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the forehead. You are hurting me, she
snapped back, just like what you did to me in Manila. Nestor then moved away as he muttered: It
is better that I burn this house, and then took a match from the top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette
and set fire to the plastic partition that served as divider of Honeys room. He also set on fire the
clothes. As a result, the house occupied by Honey was totally burned together with five (5)
neighboring houses.
RTC ruled that the crime committed was destructive arson.
 
ISSUE
WON the defendant has committed the crime of destructive arson.
RULING
No. Under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD 1613, Arson is
classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and (2) other cases of arson (PD
1613).

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 This classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned,
regardless of the value of the damage caused. Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.
The classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321
to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree
contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not
included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes
with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty.
In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic,
political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under
Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying
circumstances present. In the present case, the act committed by accused appellant neither
appears to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as
distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code.
No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson.
The special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner or occupant of the property burned cannot be appreciated in the present case
where it appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than
real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego.
Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing
circumstances that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house.
Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par.
2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.
 
 
Buebos v. People, GR 163938, March 28, 2008
FACTS

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            On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 oclock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her
house watching over her sick child. She heard some noise around the house, got up and looked
through the window and saw the four accused congregating in front of her hut.
When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help.
Instead of coming to her immediate succor, the four fled. At some distance away, Olipiano
Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help, immediately ran to the place and saw a number of
people jumping over the fence.  When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify
Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. He also saw Rolando Buela running
away.
On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando
Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson.
 RTC held them guilty of arson and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The CA lowered the penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum opined that the accused could only be
convicted of simple arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited
house, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information failed to allege with specificity the
actual crime committed. Hence, the accused should be found liable only for arson in its simple
form.
 
ISSUE
Whether accused were guilty of arson of an inhabited place which merits a penalty of up
to reclusion perpetua?
RULING
 No. The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what
is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Admittedly, there is a confluence of the
foregoing elements here.
However, the information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an
inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation of the
offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances.
Otherwise stated, the accused will not be convicted of the offense proved during the trial
if it was not properly alleged in the information.
Here, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned by petitioners and their
cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully,

131 | P a g e
unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B.
BORBE, to the latters damage and prejudice.
Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the petitioners were
convicted by the RTC on April 7, 1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary that
rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.
 
 
 
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 “AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND
ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES”.
Digested by: JUSTIN GABRIEL R. LLANA
 
 
 
ERLINDA C. SAN MATEO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. G.R. No. 200090, 6 March 2013
 
Facts:
            Petitioner Erlinda San Mateo ordered assorted yarns from ITSP through its the Vice
President for Operations, Ravin A. Sehwani. In partial payment, thereof, she issued 11 postdated
checks.
But whenever a check matured, San Mateo would call Sehwani requesting him not to
deposit the checks.
Sehwani finally deposited one check, but was it dishonored due to insufficient funds. He
informed San Mateo of the dishonor, who asked him to defer depositing the other checks since
she was encountering financial difficulties.
Sehwani deposited another check but was dishonored due to a stop payment order.
Sehwani deposited the remaining checks which were all dishonored because the account had
been closed. Sehwani attempted to contact San Mateo but she never responded.
Sehwani’s counsel then sent a demand letter to San Mateo’s residence but the security
guard of the townhouse complex refused to accept the letter. Thereafter, he sent a copy of the
demand letter to San Mateo by registered mail which was returned to his counsel’s office with
the notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05" and that San Mateo did not claim it despite three notices
to her.
San Mateo was charged with 11 counts of violation of B.P. 22, and was found guilty of
10 counts by the MTC. On appeal, the ruling was affirmed by the RTC and the CA.
 
Issue:
            W/N San Mateo was guilty of violating B.P. 22.
 
Ruling:
            No.
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present:

132 | P a g e
 1.   The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
2.   The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and
3.   The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
In this case, the third element is present and had been adequately established. The first
element had also been established since San Mateo herself admitted that she drew and issued the
same as payment for the yarns she ordered from ITSP. Besides, the issue of lack of valuable
consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is
immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
However, the second element was not sufficiently established. Section 2 of B.P. 22
creates the presumption that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when
he issued a check and the bank dishonored it. This presumption, however, arises only after it is
proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor.
Here, when Sehwani's counsel's attempted to serve the notice by leaving a copy with the
security guard, there was no showing that the letter ever reached San Mateo.
On the second occasion, Sehwani's counsel sent a demand letter to San Mateo by
registered mail. However, the prosecution must not only prove that a notice of dishonor was sent
to the accused, it must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service
provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused.
Since there is insufficient proof that San Mateo actually received the notice of dishonor,
the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of her funds cannot arise. For this reason, the
Court cannot convict her of violation of B.P. 22.
Nevertheless, San Mateo’s acquittal does not entail the extinguishment of her civil
liability for the dishonored checks. An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not preclude the award of civil damages.
 
 
VICKY MOSTER VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES  G.R. No. 167461, February 19,
2008
 
Facts:
            Petitioner obtained from Presas a loan of P450,000, for which the petitioner issued as
payment three postdated PhilBank checks. The three checks were all payable to cash. Presas
testified she did not deposit the checks on their due dates upon petitioner’s request and assurance
that they would be replaced with cash. When she could not wait any longer, Presas deposited
Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 in her Westmont Bank account, only to be notified later that the
checks were dishonored because the account had been closed. Presas said she did not deposit
Check No. 026137 after she agreed to petitioner’s request to withhold its deposit as it had not yet
been funded. After receiving notice that Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 had been dishonored,
Presas immediately informed petitioner thereof and demanded payment for the value of the
checks. This demand, however, went unheeded.
            In a letter, Presas through counsel, demanded from petitioner the settlement of P367,602,
representing the total value of the three checks, within five days from receipt. Petitioner,

133 | P a g e
however, did not comply. Thus, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed
against petitioner.
 
Issue:
            W/N petitioner is guilty of a violation of BP 22?
 
Ruling:
            NO. B.P. Blg. 22 punishes as malum prohibitum the mere issuance of a worthless check,
provided the other elements of the offense are proved. Section 1 enumerates the elements of B.P.
Blg. 22, as follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or
for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
            Upon careful examination of the records, however, the Court found that only the first and
third elements have been established by the prosecution. By her own admission, petitioner issued
the three subject checks, two of which were presented to PhilBank but were dishonored and
stamped for the reason “Account Closed”. Under Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 22, the introduction in
evidence of the dishonored check, having the drawee’s refusal to pay stamped or written thereon,
or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of the
making or issuing of the said checks and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the
dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or
attached thereto by the drawee on such dishonored checks.
As to the second element, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates the presumption that the
issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and the bank
dishonored it. This presumption, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a written notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to
pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.
Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. But in criminal cases,
the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the
prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter allegedly sent to petitioner through
registered mail and the registry return card. There was no attempt to authenticate or identify the
signature on the registry return card. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the
registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that
of petitioner or her authorized agent remains a mystery. Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as
proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. Unfortunately, the prosecution
presented only the testimony of Presas to prove mailing and receipt of the demand letter.
 
 
 
AMES SVENDSEN VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 175381, February 26,
2008
 
Facts:

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            Cristina Reyes (Cristina) extended a loan to petitioner in the amount of P200,000, to bear
interest at 10% a month.  After petitioner had partially paid his obligation, he failed to settle the
balance thereof which had reached P380,000 inclusive of interest.
 Cristina thus filed a collection suit against petitioner, which was eventually settled when
petitioner paid her P200,000 and issued in her favor an International Exchange Bank check
postdated February 2, 1999 (the check) in the amount of P160,000 representing interest.  The
check was co-signed by one Wilhelm Bolton.
When the check was presented for payment on February 9, 1999, it was dishonored for
having been Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF).
Cristina, through counsel, thus sent a letter to petitioner by registered mail informing him
that the check was dishonored by the drawee bank, and demanding that he make it good within
five (5) days from receipt thereof.
No settlement having been made by petitioner, an  Information for violation of BP 22 was
filed against the two.
 
Issue:
W/N petitioner is guilty of a violation of BP 22?
 
Ruling:
            NO. For petitioner to be validly convicted of the crime under B.P. Blg. 22, the following
requisites must thus concur: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Petitioner admits having issued the postdated check to Cristina.  The check, however, was
dishonored when deposited for payment in Banco de Oro due to DAIF.  Hence, the first and the
third elements obtain in the case.
The evidence for the prosecution failed to prove the second element.  While the registry
receipt, which is said to cover the letter-notice of dishonor and of demand sent to petitioner, was
presented, there is no proof that he or a duly authorized agent received the same.  Receipts for
registered letters including return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly
authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
Petitioner is civilly liable, however.  For in a criminal case, the social injury is sought to
be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, whereas with respect to the
personal injury of the victim, it is sought to be compensated through indemnity, which is civil in
nature.
 
 
 
JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES & CRISTINA YAO G.R.
No. 195248, November 22, 2017
 
Facts:

135 | P a g e
            Sometime in the year 2000, petitioner's mother mentioned that her son would be reviving
their sugar mill business and asked whether Yao could lend them money. Yao acceded and
loaned petitioner ₱1 million on 3 January 2001; ₱1 million on 7 January 2001; and ₱l.5 million
on 16 February 2001. She also lent petitioner an additional ₱2.5 million in June 2001. As
payment petitioner issued four (4) checks in these amounts but which were dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account. Upon dishonor of the checks, Yao personally
delivered her demand letter to the office of the petitioner which was received by his secretary.
Petitioner was thus charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
            Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove actual receipt of the notice.
 
Issue:
            Whether or not petitioner is guilty of B.P.22.
 
Ruling:
            No. To be liable for violation of B.P. Big. 22, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2)
the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
 
The Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Yao testified
that the personal secretary of petitioner received the demand letter, yet, said personal secretary
was never presented to testify whether she in fact handed the demand letter to petitioner who,
from the onset, denies having received such letter. It must be borne in mind that it is not enough
for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the accused. The prosecution
must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is
reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused.
 
Ratio Decidendi: 
The presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought
into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that
within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for its payment.
 
Gist:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Orders of the RTC, which affirmed
the Decision, finding petitioner guilty of four (4) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (B.P. Big. 22).
 
 
 
Amada Resterio vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 177438 ; 24 September 2012
 
Facts:

136 | P a g e
            The petitioner was charged for violation of B.P. 22 when she issued a postdated check
sometime on May 2002 allegedly being aware that the account to be drawn against does not have
sufficient funds. During trial, the accused contends that she does not own the check she used as
collateral thus she should not be held liable for B.P. 22.
 
Issues:
1.   Whether or not B.P. 22 requires that the dishonored check must be owned by the accused
2.   Whether or not the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal to a case for violation of
B.P. 22
 
Ruling:
1.   No, the law did not look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account
against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or
issuer.
 
2.   Yes, second element or the knowledge of the petitioner as the issuer of the check that at
the time of issue there were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment is inexistent.
 
To establish the existence of the second element written notice of the dishonor to the
drawer should be presented. The private complainant sent his notice of dishonor by registered
mail and presented the registry return receipt. However, the mere presentment of registry return
receipts is not sufficient but must be accompanied by the authenticating affidavit of the person
who had actually mailed the written notices of dishonor. The authentication by affidavit of the
mailer or mailers is necessary in order for the giving of the notices of dishonor by registered
mailto be regarded as clear proof of the giving of the notices of dishonor to predicate the
existence of the second element of the offense.
 
 
RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) Digests
Digested by : John Alen Aggabao
 
 
People of the Philippines vs. Federico Seneres, Jr. y Ajero alias Junior/Wally
G.R. No. 231008, November 5, 2018
Third Division, Peralta, J.:
 
FACTS: On September 14, 2011, at around 12 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential informant
reported to PCI Payao of the Taguig City Police Station Anti-Illegal Drugs that a certain Dennis
was illegally selling dangerous drugs. As such, PCI Payao briefed and designated PO2 More as a
poseur-buyer and PO2 Saez as backup in a buy-bust operation. Thereafter, the team went to
Marker! Market! Mall foodcourt. Thereafter, the confidential informant, introduced PO2 More to
appellant and one Valencia as the one who wanted to buy Shabu from them. PO2 More gave the
money to Valencia who later took a sachet of Shabu in his pocket and gave it to PO2 More.

137 | P a g e
Subsequently, the latter initiated the pre-arranged signal and, immediately thereafter, PO2 Saez
approached them and held appellant while PO2 More held Valencia. The OIC of the security
division of Market! Market! was asked to witness the preparation by PO2 More of the inventory
of the seized Shabu. Thereafter, charges were instituted against appellant for violation of Section
5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
ISSUE: Whether the arresting team complied with Section 21 or the rule on chain of custody.
RULING: NO. Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in illegal sale of prohibited drugs,
the following must concur: "xxx(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale
and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor".
Meanwhile, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was amended by R.A. No. 10640. It is now mandated
that the conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items mus be in the presence
of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel; (2) an elected public official; and (3) a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies fo the inventory and be
given a copy thereof. 
 
In this case, during the physical inventory and photograph of the items seized there were no
representatives from eh media and the DOJ, and there was no elected public official present.
Instead, only a security guard of the mall witnessed the said inventory. An explanation of the
absence of the required witnesses is also no provided nor was there any evidence to prove that
the police officers  exerted any effort to seek their presence.
 
As a reminder, this Court, in People vs. Romy Lim, laid down a guideline, which is prospective
in nature, that must be followed in order that the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 must
be well-enforced and duly proven in courts, thus:
 
In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their  compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.
In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the
justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.
lf there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits,
the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she
must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence
of probable cause.
If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion
to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case
outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court.
(Citation omitted)
There being no justifiable reason in this case for the non-compliance of Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, this Court finds it necessary to acquit the appellant for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG, accused-
appellant.
G.R. No. 208093
February 20, 2017
 
 
 
 
Facts:
 
 
On August 25, 2003, a confidential informant reported to SPO4 Araneta, Chief of the
Intelligence Division of the Culianan Police Station in Zamboanga City, that Ismael Salim was
engaged in selling shabu at Barangay Talabaan near the Muslim cemetery. After verifying the
report, SPO4 Araneta formed a buy-bust team. It was then agreed that SPO1 Santiago would act
as poseur buyer with SPO1 Rodriguez as back up.
 
Upon arrival at Barangay Talabaan, SPO1 Santiago, the confidential informant and SPO1
Rodriguez alighted from their vehicle then walked towards appellant and told the latter that he
wanted to buy shabu. He then gave appellant the ₱100.00 marked money and the latter took from
his left pocket one plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance which he handed over
to SPO1 Santiago. Upon seeing the exchange, SPO1 Rodriguez, rushed in and arrested appellant.
The police officers then brought appellant to the Culianan Police Station. At the station, the
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation, the two
plastic sachets also containing white crystalline substance, and marked money were respectively
turned over by SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez to, PO3 Napalcruz, who likewise turned
these over to the Duty Investigator, PO2 Tan, the latter then placed his initial on the items
recovered from appellant. Appellant on the other hand denied both charges.
 
The RTC finds the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Sections 5 and
11,Article II of RA 9165, and sentenced the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
Appellant appealed to the CA, but the CA affirmed in toto the RTC's Judgment.
 
 
Issue:
 
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting accused- appellant when his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
 

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Held:
 
Yes. In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug seized
from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance
that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved.
"The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."
 
It is clear from the testimonies that SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago did not mark the seized
drugs immediately after they were confiscated from appellant. At this stage in the chain, there
was already a significant break such that there can be no assurance against switching, planting,
or contamination. The Court has previously held that, "failure to mark the drugs immediately
after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence warranting an
acquittal on reasonable doubt."
 
The arresting officers also failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the
presence of the appellant to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were properly
preserved. They likewise failed to make an inventory and take photographs of the seized drugs.
These break in the chain tainted the integrity of the seized drugs presented in court.
 
Wherefore, the SC reversed and set aside the decision of the CA. Accordingly, appellant Salim
R. Ismael is acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
 
 
 
People of the Philippines vs. Susan M. Tamaño and Jaffy B. Gulmatico
G.R. No. 208643. December 5, 2016
 
Facts
On July 30, 2004, appellants were charged with Violation of Section 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs), Section 11 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Section 12 (Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drug Paraphernalia), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in five (5) separate Informations.
Upon arraignment on September 13, 2004, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the respective
charges against them.
 
The evidence of the prosecution may be summed up as follows: On July 22, 2004, P03 Gepaneca
of the PDEA was informed by a confidential agent that one alias "Susan Kana" was selling shabu
in Brgy. Gustilo, Zone 6, Lapaz, Iloilo City. The following day, P03 Gepaneca and the agent
conducted a surveillance of the said area wherein the agent pointed to a woman identified as
"Susan Kana." 

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On July 27, 2004, after confirmation from the agent that that they could purchase shabu from
"Susan Kana," a buy-bust team was formed by P/Sr. Inspector Rapiz. Around 11 :30 in the
morning, the team proceeded to the target area in Brgy. Gustilo. After waiting for a while,
appellants arrived. P03 Gepaneca was introduced by the agent to one Susan Kana who turned out
to be appellant Susan Tamafio. Then, P03 Gepaneca took the P500 buy-bust money and handed
it to appellant Tamafio who, in tum, told appellant Gulmatico to give a sachet of shabu to P03
Gepaneca. After appellant Gulmatico handed to P03 Gepaneca one (1) plastic sachet of shabu
weighing 0.220 gram (Exhibits "J-1 "), the latter took off his cap as a signal that the transaction
was consummated. At that point, PO1 Aguenido immediately arrested and searched the persons
of appellants. The P500.00 bill (Exhibits "M-1 ") was recovered from the right hand of appellant
Tamafio; and from her right pocket, a big plastic sachet was recovered containing three (3)
plastic sachets of suspected shabu with markings "Susan", "Merriam and "Kelly" (Exhibits "J-2
", "J-3 ", "J-4") with a total weight of 0.345 gram. Also, four (4) empty plastic sachets and two
(2) pieces of disposable lighters (Exhibits "P-1 " and "P-2 "), among others, were recovered from
the bag of appellant Tamañio. 

On the other hand, POI Aguenido recovered from the right pocket of appellant Gulmatico
twenty-four (24) sachets of suspected shabu (Exhibits "K-2" to "K-25 ", "E-2-A ") with a total
weight of 8.695 grams and two (2) small sachets of suspected shabu (Exhibits "K-27" and "K-
28"); and, from his plastic bag were recovered fifteen (15) empty plastic sachets, one (1) plastic
straw (Exhibits "L-1 ") and nine (9) sliced aluminum foils (Exhibits "T-1" to "T-9 "). The seized
items were brought to the police officers' office and were accordingly marked by SP03 Calaor
and turned over to PDEA Exhibit Custodian SP04 Gafate. The following day, SP03 Calaor took
the same items to the Iloilo City Prosecution Office where they were all inventoried. Thereafter,
SP03 Calaor submitted some of the items, including the sachets of suspected shabu, to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. P/Insp. Ompoy, Forensic Chemical Officer, examined the
sachets, and the contents turned positive to the test for methampheatmine hydrochloride (shabu),
while the plastic straw revealed traces of shabu, as stated in Chemistry Report No. D-17304
(Exhibits "E" and "E-3 ''). 
 
On May 29, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellants of Violation of Sections 5,
11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. On August 31, 2012, the CA affirmed the appellants'
conviction.
 
Issues:
1.   Whether the buy-bust operation conducted by the police was valid.
2.   Whether the chain of custody rule was complied.
 
Rulings:
1. Yes. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu in this case, the
following elements must be sufficiently proved to sustain a conviction therefor: ( 1) the identity
of the buyer, as well as the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the dangerous drugs seized as

141 | P a g e
evidence. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug
from the seller. Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer went through the operation as
a buyer and his offer was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former,
the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of the goods.
 
The appellants who were caught in flagrante delicto were positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses as the same persons who sold one (I) plastic sachet containing 0.220 gram of white
crystalline substance, later confirmed as shabu, for a consideration of P500.00. The said plastic
sachet of shabu was presented in court, which the prosecution identified to be the same object
sold by appellants. Likewise, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses established how the
transaction with appellants happened from the moment the informant introduced P03 Gepaneca,
the poseur-buyer, to appellants, as someone interested in buying their stuff, up to the time P03
Gepaneca handed to appellant Tamafio the P500.00 bill and, in turn, appellant Gulmatico handed
to him the plastic sachet of suspected shabu, thus, consummating the sale transaction between
them. SP03 Calaor caused the plastic sachet of suspected shabu be examined at the PNP Crime
Laboratory. The item weighing 0.220 gram was tested positive to the test for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), as evidenced by Chemistry Report No. D-17304 prepared by P/Insp.
Ompoy, the Forensic Chemical Officer. It must be noted that the defense admitted the expertise
of P/Insp. Ompoy who examined the drug specimens. Thus, the collective evidence presented
during the trial by the prosecution adequately established that a valid buy-bust operation was
conducted. Appellants conspired and confederated with each other to sell shabu. Appellant
Tamafio received the P500 bill, while appellant Gulmatico handed the shabu to the buyer. Their
respective acts lead to no other conclusion except that they have a common design and purpose
-to sell shabu. 
 
With respect to the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts
must be proved: (a) the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs, (b) such possession was
not authorized by law, and ( c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in
possession of dangerous drugs. We also conform to the lower courts' findings that all the
elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs were adequately proven by the prosecution.
When an accused is caught in flagrante delicto in accordance with Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the police officers are not only authorized, but are
duty-bound, to arrest him even without a warrant.18 Thus, since appellants' arrest was legal, the
search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful.
 
2. Yes. We find untenable the contention of appellants that since the provision of Section 21,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, the prosecution allegedly
failed to prove the identity and integrity of the seized prohibited drugs. 
 
In the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself constitutes
the very corpus delicti of the offense and, in sustaining a conviction therefor, the identity and
integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement
necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized

142 | P a g e
drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal
drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165 fails. In this regard, the aforesaid provisions
outline the procedure to be observed by the apprehending officers in the seizure and custody of
dangerous drugs.
 
However, under the same proviso aforecited, non-compliance with the stipulated procedure,
under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officers.
 
In the cases at bar, PO1 Aguenido immediately searched the persons of appellants. From the
right pocket of appellant Tamafio, a big plastic sachet was recovered containing three (3) plastic
sachets of shabu with a total weight of 0.345 gram. On the other hand, PO I Aguenido recovered
from the right pocket of appellant Gulmatico twenty-four (24) sachets of shabu with a total
weight of 8.695 grams and two (2) small sachets of shabu. The seized items were brought to the
police officers' office and were accordingly marked by SP03 Calaor and turned over to PDEA
Exhibit Custodian SP04 Gafate. The following day, SP03 Calaor took the same items to the
Iloilo City Prosecution Office where they were all inventoried. Thereafter, SP03 Calaor
submitted some of the items including the sachets of shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. P/Insp. Ompoy, Forensic Chemical Officer, examined the sachets and the contents
were positive to the test for methampheatmine hydrochloride (shabu). During the trial of the
cases, P03 Gepaneca, P/Sr. Inspector Rapiz, PO1 Aguenido, SP03 Calaor, SP04 Gafate and
P/Insp. Ompoy testified for the prosecution. They properly identified the Chemistry Repmi and
the subject specimens when presented in court. From the foregoing, the prosecution was able to
demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs had not been
compromised because it established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized item
from the time it was first discovered until it was brought to the court for examination. 
 

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00762
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the fine imposed in Criminal Case No. 04-59520.
For Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, JAFFY B. GULMATICO is
hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS and ONE (I)
DAY TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P400,000.00).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOAN SONJACO

GR No. 196962      June 8, 2016

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 FACTS:

Based on information received on 6 August 2005, that appellant and a certain alias Kenkoy were

engaged in illegal drug trade in Barangay Olympia, Makati City, P/Supt. Valerio formed a buy-
bust team composed of POI Marmonejo, POI Mendoza, POI Randy Santos and SP03 Luisito
Puno and two (2) other anti-drug agents Eduardo Monteza and Herminia Facundo. After a
surveillance of the area and coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
were made, P/Supt. Valerio briefed the team. POI Marmonejo was designated as poseur-buyer
and two (2) pieces of Pl00 bills marked with the initials “MMV” were provided for the
operation.

At five o’clock in the afternoon of that day, PO1 Marmonejo and the police asset, on board a
tricycle driven by PO1 Mendoza, proceeded to the target area. The other members of the buy-
bust team positioned themselves nearby. The police asset called appellant and told her that PO1
Marmonejo wanted to buy shabu. Appellantasked POI Marmonejo how much, to which he
replied, “katorse lang” or P200.00 worth of shabu. Appellant then took out from her pocket two
(2) transparent plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance, one of which she handed
to POI Marmonejo in exchange for two Pl00 bills. Appellant pocketed the other plastic sachet.

Upon consummation of the transaction, POI Marmonejo revealed that he was a police officer. He
immediately apprehended appellant, apprised her of her constitutional rights and asked her to
empty her pockets. POI Marmonejo recovered money in the amount of P540.00, a mobile phone,
and three (3) other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. POI Marmonejo
marked the sachet sold to him as “BONG” while the three (3) other sachets as “JOAN,” “JOAN
l,” and JOAN 2.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.

HELD: YES.

Elements of illegal sale of dangerousdrugs

1.   Proof that the transaction or sale took place

2.   The presentation in court of the corpusdelicti or the illicit drug as evidence.

The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires
the consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the
drug from the seller. The crime is already consummated once the police officer has gone through
the operation as a buyer whose offer was accepted by the accused, followed by the delivery of
the dangerous drugs to the former.

In this case, accused was apprehended, indicted and convicted by way of a valid buy-bust
operation.

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 Elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs

1.   The accused is in possession of an item or object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated

drug

2.   Such possession is not authorized by law

3.   The accused freely and consciously possessed said drug

Mere possession of drugs constitutes animus possidendi

The Court held that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation of such possession. The burden of evidence to explain the absence of
animus possidendi rests upon the accused, and this, in the case at bar, the appellant failed to do.

PEOPLE vs. OPIANA G.R. No. 200797 January 12, 2015 R.A. No. 9165, Illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs

JULY 10, 2018

FACTS:

Appellant Manolito Opiana was charged with the crimes of violations of Section 5 (sale of illegal
drugs; 0.05 gram) and Section 11 (possession of dangerous drugs; 0.74 gram) of R.A. 9165 in a
buy-bust operation on appellant who was reportedly engaged in illegal drug trade. Appellant was
apprehended and when bodily frisked, 19 heat-sealed sachets were recovered from his
possession. Laboratory examination revealed that all 20 heat-sealed sachets yielded positive
results for shabu.

Appellant was convicted by the trial court.

Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA. The appeal was denied and the tria court’s Decision
was affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant was correctly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.

RULING:

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For the violation of Section 5, the prosecution satisfactorily established the following elements:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti
or the illicit drug in evidence.

Similarly, the prosecution satisfactorily established the following elements for the illegal
possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11, to wit:

1.   appellant was shown to have been in possession of 0.74 gram of shabu, a

prohibited drug;

2.   his possession was not authorized by law; and

3.   that he freely and consciously possessed the said illegal drug.

Appellant Manolito Opiana is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
 
 
 

Republic Act No. 7438             April 27, 1992 AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF
PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS
WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Digested by:  Alvir Castillo

G.R. No. 117321 February 11, 1998  
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y VERZO,
accused-appellant.  
 
FACTS:  Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he
will drive Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that
Freddie was seen alive. His body was later found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab
wounds. 
 
Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in

146 | P a g e
connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena
City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually
transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the
loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold
the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of
appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same. 
 
Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder 
 
Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters,
he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a
suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in
Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted
that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance
of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing. 
 
In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant. 
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon
invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him. 
 
HELD: No. 
 
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and
whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against
the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of
persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads: 
 
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation"
to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law. 
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases
to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the
suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. 
 
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the
investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must
correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A
mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice. 
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in

147 | P a g e
writing. 
 
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be
"voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of
counsel." 
 
Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of
truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The evidence for
the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters,
he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him,
however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain
silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This
Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a
condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of
government." 
 

G.R. No. 208404, February 24, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICENTE LUGNASIN AND

DEVINCIO GUERRERO, Accused-Appellants.

 
 
FACTS:  The Department of Justice filed an Information against Vicente, Devincio and four
other individuals, namely, Tito E. Lugnasin (Tito), Excelso B. Lugnasin (Excelso), Elmer A.
Madrid (Elmer), Rogelio D. Baldaba (Rogelio), and five other unidentified individuals: John
Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe, George Doe, and James Doe, for the crime of kidnapping for
ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
Accused-appellant Vicente pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Accused-appellant Devincio
likewise pleaded not guilty when he was arraigned. Accused-appellant Devincio insists that his
warrantless arrest was illegal for not falling under the permissible warrantless arrests enumerated
in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. This being the case, accused-appellant Devincio
says, the RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgement over his person. He also claims that there
was no showing that he was informed of his Constitutional rights at the time of his arrest and his
rights under Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7438 during investigation.
 Devincio claims that his rights under Republic Act No. 7438,  were violated, the Court of
Appeals pointed out that he neither offered any evidence nor executed an extrajudicial
confession or admission for such allegation As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that

148 | P a g e
accused-appellant Devincio raised none of these issues anytime during the course of his trial.
These issues were raised for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not Accused-Appellants rights under RA7438 were violated
 
HELD: No.
He has offered no evidence to sustain such claim; and appellant Devincio (or appellant Vicente,
for that matter) has not executed an extrajudicial confession or admission for, as stated in 
People vs. Buluran and Valenzuela 
 
There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation
since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the records show
that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during custodial investigation. Any
allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction. As regards accused-appellant Devincio's argument that his warrantless
arrest was illegal since it did not fall under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure, as
amended, the Court of Appeals held that accused-appellant Devincio's right to question his arrest
and subsequent inquest/preliminary investigation is deemed waived due to his failure to raise
such argument before his arraignment.
 
 
 
 

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165       June 7, 2002

AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF

2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

 
 
G.R.No.191061,February9,2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ROSELLE SANTIAGO y PABALINAS,

Appellant.

FACTS: The public prosecutor of Makati charged the accused Roselle Santiago y Pabalinas

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alias Tisay (Roselle) with violation of Sections 5 and 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 for selling
drugs at her house.

After a buy-bust operation, police officer Esguerra turned over Roselle and the seized sachet to
the investigator. When the contents of the first and second sachets (with “@ Tisay” and “RPS”
markings) were examined, these were confirmed to be Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu). A confirmatory test also found Roselle positive for the use of shabu.

In her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabu to Esguerra. She claims that the case was a
product of a mistaken identity, as she was not known as Tisay in the area but Roselle. She
narrated how she was forcibly taken from her house and into custody.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the police conducted a valid arrest in Roselle’s case.

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that the prosecution evidence
established her guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt

HELD:

The petition lacks merit.

CRIMINAL LAW: Waiver  of right to question legality of arrest

First Issue:

Roselle claims that the police did not make a valid arrest in her case since they arrested her
without proper warrant and did not apprise her of the rights of a person taken into custody as the
Constitution and R.A. 7438 provide. But Roselle raised this issue only during appeal, not before
she was arraigned. For this reason, she should be deemed to have waived any question as to the
legality of her arrest.

 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: Chain of custody

Second Issue:

Although the prosecution established through Esguerra the acts constituting the crime charged in
the drug-pushing case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of the allegedly prohibited
substance that the police seized from Roselle.

The request for laboratory exam reveals that it was not Esguerra who delivered the specimen to
the crime laboratory. It appears that Esguerra gave it to a certain SPO3 Puno who in turn

150 | P a g e
forwarded it to a certain PO2 Santos. No testimony covers the movement of the specimen among
these other persons. Consequently, the prosecution was unable to establish the chain of custody
of the seized item and its preservation from possible tampering.

CA decision is REVERSED.
 
 
 
 
G.R. No. 221424
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs.
ROBELYN CABANADA y ROSAURO, Accused-Appellant
 
FACTS: Accused-appellant Cabanada was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft. Cabanada
pleaded not guilty at her arraignment. Subsequently, the trial on the merits ensued. In the course
of the interview at the Victoria's residence, Cabanada admitted to PO2 Maximo Cotoner, Jr. that
she took the money. She led them to her room and took a pouch (white envelope) containing
₱16,000.00 cash. She also showed a white leather wallet containing the missing master key of
Victor's vehicle. Thereafter, Cabanada was brought at the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU) for
further investigation. Cabanada apologized to Catherine, and admitted that she still had some of
the missing jewelry in her house at Mandaluyong City. The police went to her house and
recovered the Technomarine, Pierre Cardin, Relic and Santa Barbara watches and a pair of
earrings with diamonds placed in a tool box.
On the other hand, the defense narrated a different set of events. At around 9:00 a.m. on April
12, 2009, Cabanada went to Catherine's house to work as a stay-out housemaid, and left around
9:00 p.m. upon arrival of the Victoria family. On the same date, the plantsadora came around
9:00 a.m. and left at 3:00 p.m. In the morning of April 13, 2009, Cabanada returned to the house
to resume her work. She was washing clothes at around 9:00 a.m. when Catherine called her and
asked about the missing items. She denied any knowledge of the same. The police came and
asked her and her sister Rose to board the police mobile. For half an hour, Catherine was talking
with the police, while Cabanada and her sister stayed in the mobile. Thereafter, they were
brought to the police station, and while in a small room, she was asked thrice if she mortgaged
the missing jewelry, to which she denied any knowledge. She was not assisted by a lawyer at the
police station nor was allowed to call her relatives.
The RTC found Cabanada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. It held
that the prosecution was able to establish the continuous series of events which undoubtedly
point to Cabanada as the perpetrator of the crime charged. the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. The CA ruled that Cabanada's admissions were not obtained under custodial investigation
as it was established that she was not yet arrested at that time. The "uncounselled admissions"
were given freely and spontaneously during a routine inquiry.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Cabanada’s admissions were obtained under custodial investigation
 
HELD: YES.
 
he circumstances surrounding Cabanada's appearance before the police station falls within the
definition of custodial investigation. Despite the claim that she was not considered as a suspect at
that time, the fact remains that she confessed to having committed the crime and was able to
produce the money from her room. The investigation, therefore, ceased to be a general inquiry
even if they contemplated that she was covering for someone.
The subsequent confession of Cabanada at the CIU office can be considered as having been done
in a custodial setting because (1) after admitting the crime, Cabanada was brought to the police
station for further investigation; (2) the alleged confession happened in the office of the chief; (3)
PO2 Cotoner was present during Cabanada's apology and admission to Catherine. The
compelling pressures of custodial setting were present when the accused was brought to the
police station along with Catherine.
In People v. Javar,28 it was ruled that any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional
provision, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance
of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if
it had been voluntarily given.29 Cabanada's confession without counsel at the police station,
which led to the recovery of the other items at her house, is inadmissible
Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of Cabanada's admission made in CIU does not necessarily
entitle her to a verdict of acquittal. Her admission during the general inquiry is still admissible
 
 
PEOPLE V. MOJELLO Ynares-Santiago, J. March 9, 2004
 
FACTS: Appellant who was accused of the crime of rape with homicide is assailing the
admissibility of his confession because allegedly the confession was not freely, intelligently and
voluntarily entered into and that he was not assisted by a counsel. The Court convicted appellant
of rape but is acquited as to the killing.  Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a group. On
his way home, he saw his niece, Lenlen with appellant Dindo Mojello, a nephew of Roger
Capacito, walking together. Since he was used to seeing them together, he did not find anything
strange about this.  The following day, the Rayco family was informed that the body of Lenlen
was found.  Mojello was arrested while attempting to board a motor launch. On an investigation
conducted by SPO2 Giducos, he admitted to the rape and the killing. His confession was
witnessed by Barangay Captains Bastobalanos and Landao. Batobalanos testified that after it was
executed, the contents of the document were read to the appellant who later on voluntarily signed

152 | P a g e
it. Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Jaca. Appellant Mojello was
charged with the crime of rape with homicide.  The trial court rendered judgment finding
appellant guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. Appellant alleges that the lower court
gravely erred in admitting evidence the alleged extrajudicial confession. Appellant avers that the
confession which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into. He
argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights before the
confession was taken from him.
 
 ISSUES:
WON the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence  
WON appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide
DECISION: Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Mojello found GUILTY
of statutory rape.
 
HELD:
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par 1 of the
Constitution in relation to RA No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional
requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the appellant
is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.  Appellant was undoubtedly apprised of his
Miranda rights under the Constitution. The court observed that the confession itself expressly
stated that the investigating officers informed him of such rights. Atty. Giduquio testified that
while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by the Chief of Police to
assist appellant. Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel,
with the latter categorically stating that before the investigaion was conducted and appellant's
statement taken, he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio represented
appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case. The phrase “preferably of his
own choice” does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling the defense.  On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened,
thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against
the person who threatened him, nor did he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he
did not understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialects, yet he
admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse. ◦ The presumption of voluntariness
of appellant's confession remain unrebutted by his failure to present independent evidence that
the same was coerced. The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled
with the corpus delicti as established by Medico-Legal Report and the testimony of Rogelio
Rayco, leads the Court to no other conclusion than that of appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen.
However, the records do not adequately show that appellant admitted to killing the victim.
Neither is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that by reason or on the occasion of
the rape a homicide was committed by the appellant.
 

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G.R. No. 173051             July 31, 2007

[Formerly G.R. No. 161678]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 

vs.
GERARDO ORTEZA, appellant.

Facts:

Gerardo Orteza was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 64, with
illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 1 (R.A. No.
9165). The Information dated 20 November 2002 against him reads:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor (detailed), upon his inquest

investigation, accuses GERARDO ORTEZA y Orteza, a resident of Block 9, San
Nicolas, Tarlac City and presently detained at Camp Macabulos, Tarlac City of the crime
of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165, (Dangerous Drug of 2002),
committed as follows:

That on November 19, 2002, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Tarlac City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally sell, dispense and deliver .063 gram of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, to poseur buyer SPO1 Rodolfo
Ramos for P100.00, without being authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.3 During trial, the prosecution adopted
the Joint Affidavit of Arrest4 dated 20 November 2002 executed by PO2 Allan J. Lagasca, PO3
Daniel I. Lingsay, SPO1 Rodolfo L. Ramos, and SPO4 Pascual M. Delos Reyes as their
testimonies. Delos Reyes and Lagasca appeared in court and confirmed their statements in the
Joint Affidavit.5

According to the Joint Affidavit, a team comprised of the above-mentioned police officers was
formed to conduct a buy-bust operation at Block 9, San Nicolas, Tarlac City on 19 November
2002 to apprehend suspected drug peddlers. The suspects have previously been under a week-
long surveillance after the police officers received reports about their illegal activities.6

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The team with its back-up arrived at the place at around nine o'clock in the evening of said date.
The appointed poseur-buyer SPO1 Ramos, together with the informant, approached the two (2)
suspects Leng Leng and Buboy while the back-up team positioned itself nearby. SPO1 Ramos
purchased one (1) sachet of shabu for One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) from Buboy. Then, SPO1
Ramos gave the pre-arranged signal. Immediately, the rest of the team rushed to the scene and
placed the two (2) suspects under arrest. After a body search, the marked money was recovered
from Buboy and another sachet of shabu was confiscated from Leng Leng. Thereafter, the
suspects were brought to Camp Macabulos where Buboy identified himself as Gerardo Orteza.7

Later upon examination, Engr. Marcene Agala of the Regional Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
San Fernando, Pampanga, confirmed that the two (2) sachets recovered from the scene were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.8

As lone witness for the defense, appellant testified that on 19 November 2002 at around 5:30
p.m., he was about to enter the house when he was halted by PO2 Lagasca. Then, Lagasca
allegedly forced him to go with him. Lagasca supposedly asked appellant not to make a scene as
he would be freed later on. Subsequently, appellant was taken to Camp Macabulos. Appellant
denied selling shabu. He denied ever speaking to SPO1 Ramos, the poseur-buyer. He also denied
knowing a certain Leng Leng.9

After trial, the trial court rendered a Decision10 dated 4 April 2002, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises above considered finding the guilt of the accused proven
beyond reasonable doubt by the Prosecution for violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act [No.] 9165, this Court sentences Gerardo Orteza y Orteza to [a] penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Ph[P]500,000.00 to
Ph[P]10,000,000.00 cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED.11

The judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for automatic review. In a
Resolution12 dated 8 November 2005 of the Court in G.R. No. 161678,13 the case was transferred
to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Efren Mateo.14

Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that the trial court erred: (1) in giving credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; and (2) in finding him guilty of violating Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. 15

Except for some modifications, the Court of Appeals in a Decision 16 dated 28 February 2006, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 01813, affirmed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the decision appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED save for a modification in the imposed penalty which is now fixed
at life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.

155 | P a g e
 SO ORDERED.17

The Court of Appeals held that the requisites of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs were
borne out by the evidence on record. The identity of appellant as the seller was established by the
positive testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team; the test conducted on the crystalline
substance sold by appellant showed that it was positive for shabu; third, the exchange between
the poseur-buyer and appellant was for a consideration and in fact the marked money was
recovered from appellant when a body search was conducted on his person.18

Although the poseur-buyer was not presented in court, the appellate court ruled that the
unswerving and compatible testimonies of the two members of the buy-bust team, who were
eyewitness to the transaction, sufficed to pin down appellant. 19 Against these positive
declarations, appellant only professed bare denials which cannot sway judgment when
unsupported, the appellate court noted.20

The Court of Appeals however modified the penalty imposed considering the trial court's failure
to specify the actual penalty to be suffered by appellant and the amount of fine he was supposed
to pay. Instead, it sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine
of P500,000.00.21

Appellant is now before the Court reiterating his contention that the prosecution was not able to
establish with moral certainty the actual transaction or sale of shabu as a fact. He maintains that
the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal to this case as the two police officers who
testified were, by their own admission, located at a distance and could not hear the alleged
conversation between appellant and the poseur-buyer.22 Through his Manifestation (In Lieu of
Supplementary Brief) dated 9 August 2006,23 appellant stated that he had exhaustively argued all
the relevant issues in his Accused-Appellant's Brief filed before the Court of Appeals and that
the filing of a supplemental brief might result in a repetition of the same arguments. Thus, he
manifested that he was adopting the Accused-Appellant's Brief as Supplemental Brief. 24 The
Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief.25

There is merit in the appeal.

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is the burden of the prosecution to overcome such
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. Corollarily, the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. In fact,
if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may logically not
even present evidence in its own behalf. In which case, the presumption of innocence shall
prevail and hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence
is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof
and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest each upon the certainty of guilt.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a criminal charge, but moral
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.26

156 | P a g e
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the
transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence;
and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. 27 What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or
regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked
money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.28

The Court believes that the prosecution was not able to establish with certainty all the elements
necessary for the conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu.

First, there appears nothing in the records showing that police officers complied with the proper
procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim,29 i.e., any apprehending
team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure
or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement
raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was
actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been
regularly performed by the police officers.

In People v. Laxa,30 where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana
immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the
standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the
marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity
of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura,31 where the Narcom operatives failed to
place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the
procedure and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People,32 the Court held that the material inconsistencies with
regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the
seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus
acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of
the shabu.

Significantly, Engr. Agala, the chemical engineer who conducted the laboratory test on the two
(2) sachets, testified in part as follows:

ON CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY ATTY. ABRENICA

xxxx

157 | P a g e
 Q - Likewise, you did not conduct the fingerprint examination to find out or dusting of
fingerprint on these sachets to find out if these indeed were handled by the accused
Gerardo Orteza, correct?

A - Yes, ma'am.33

Secondly, the Court observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had
personal knowledge of the transaction. In People v. Uy,34 the Court ruled that the non-
presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal only if there is no other eyewitness to the illicit
transaction. This doctrine was reiterated in People v. Ambrosio.35 In both cases, however, not
only were there other eyewitnesses to the illegal sale, the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer
was also satisfactorily explained. In People v. Uy, the police officer who acted as the poseur-
buyer at the time of the trial was paralyzed and confined in a hospital due to gunshot wounds.
In People v. Ambrosio, the poseur-buyer was working on another buy-bust operation. The Court
therein stated that to require her to testify in open court would divulge her identity and expose
her to danger considering that there was another buy-bust operation going on.

In this case, though, after the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Ramos, failed to appear in court despite
having been subpoenaed six (6) times,36 the prosecution did not even bother to offer any
explanation for his non-appearance considering that he, a police officer, was no different from
the other witnesses who were presented in the end by the prosecution. In Ramos's place, the
prosecution presented two other police officers, who although members of the back-up team of
the buy-bust operation were, in the Court's view, not reliable eyewitnesses to the transaction.
Pertinently, PO2 Lagasca feebly testified as follows:

ON CROSS-EXAMINATION BY

ATTY. ABRENICA- Counsel for the Accused

Q – Mr. Witness, this is your first time to see the accused [sic]?

A – No, ma'am.

Q – What do you mean no[?] [H]ave you seen him before?

A – Yes, ma'am.

Q – Did you conduct surveillance on him, Mr. Witness?

A – Yes, ma'am.

Q – Then you could have easily gotten a search warrant or a warrant of arrest for him[,]
isn't it[?] [O]r you did not, did you, Mr. Witness?

A – Buy-bust operation, ma'am.

158 | P a g e
 Q – Prior to this, you have not arrest [sic] the accused, is that correct?

A– Not yet, ma'am.

Q – Do you know SPO1 Rodolfo Lindo Ramos?

A – Yes, ma'am.

Q – And you are the back-up in this incident or his arrest[,] Mr. Witness, or you are the
poseur-buyer?

A – I was the back-up, ma'am.

Q – So as a back-up, you positioned yourself at a place where you will not be seen by the
accused, correct?

A – We can see then, ma'am.

Q – But he cannot see you?

A – Yes, ma'am.

Q – And it was Lindo Ramos who acted as a poseur buyer?

A – Yes, ma'am.

Q – Now it was only when this Lindo Ramos gave a pre- arranged signal that you
approached the accused, is that correct?

A – Yes, ma'am.

Q – So from a distance you can only see the signal, what was that signal, Mr. Witness?

A – By waving his right hand, ma'am.

Q – So you cannot hear or what they were talking about, is that correct?

A – Yes, ma'am.37

Moreover, the testimonies of the two police officers did not include any positive face-to-face
identification in open court of appellant as the seller of shabu, an aspect which was crucial to
establish appellant's role in the alleged transaction. It is likewise unclear in the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest, which was adopted by the two police officers as their direct testimony, whether the two
had a clear and close view of the alleged sale of shabu to support the assertion that they were
eyewitnesses to it. The affidavit only stated that the back-up men "who were then placed in a
strategically [sic] position near the vicinity are watching the on going deal." 38 As such, the

159 | P a g e
testimony of the poseur-buyer, in this case Ramos, was pivotal as only he could testify on what
had really transpired during the moment of the alleged sale of shabu. His non-presentation in this
case was fatal, absent any explanation for his non-appearance and reliable eyewitness who could
testify in his place.

Another befuddling point was the non-prosecution of Leng Leng for the same crime. It was
testified that both he and appellant participated in the illegal sale but records were silent as to
why he was not indicted for the crime especially since the amount of shabu mentioned in the
information was the total sum of the shabu found in the two (2) sachets recovered from the
scene, one from appellant and the other one from Leng Leng.39 In addition, no proof of
conspiracy was adduced to hold appellant liable for the sale of both sachets. In fact, the second
sachet was never sold as it was confiscated from Leng Leng after a body search. While Section
5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 prohibits and penalizes the illegal sale of shabu regardless of the
amount, the paucity of evidence on these material points engender reasonable doubt on the
credibility of the prosecution's theory.

All told, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case did not support appellant's
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense. Accordingly, the presumption of
innocence should prevail and the exoneration of appellant declared as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 October 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City,
Branch 64 in Criminal Case No. 12420 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant GERARDO
ORTEZA y ORTEZA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt
and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other
lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith
and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was
actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio.

G.R. No. 179940             April 23, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
NORBERTO DEL MONTE y GAPAY @ OBET, accused-appellant.

Facts

160 | P a g e
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070
dated 28 May 2007 which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, finding accused-
appellant Norberto del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, guilty of violation of Section 5,3 Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of

Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 10th day of December 2002, in the municipality of Baliuag, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and
transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing 0.290 gram.4

The case was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 3437-M-02.

When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not
Guilty" to the charge.5On 17 February 2003, the pre-trial conference was concluded. 6 Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr., the poseur-buyer
in the buy-bust operation conducted against appellant, and a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) assigned with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office
3/Special Enforcement Unit (SEU) stationed at the Field Office, Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag,
Bulacan.

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, a confidential informant went to
the office of the PDEA SEU in Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan and reported that appellant
was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said information, a briefing on a buy-bust operation against
appellant was conducted. The team was composed of SPO2 Hashim S. Maung, as team leader,
PO1 Gaudencio Tolentino, Jr. as the poseur-buyer, and PO1 Antonio Barreras as back-up
operative. After the briefing, the team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to
Poblacion Dike for the execution of the buy-bust operation.

When the team arrived at appellant’s place, they saw the appellant standing alone in front of the
gate. The informant and PO1 Tolentino approached appellant. The informant introduced PO1
Tolentino to appellant as his friend, saying "Barkada ko, user." PO1 Tolentino gave
appellant P300.00 consisting of three marked P100 bills.7 The bills were marked with "GT JR,"
PO1 Tolentino’s initials. Upon receiving the P300.00, appellant took out a plastic sachet from his
pocket and handed it over to PO1 Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a

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cigarette signifying that the sale had been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested appellant
and recovered from the latter the marked money.

The white crystalline substance8 in the plastic sachet which was sold to PO1 Tolentino was
forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory
examination to determine the presence of the any dangerous drug. The request for laboratory
examination was signed by SPO2 Maung.9 Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002,10 the
substance bought from appellant was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.

The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer who examined the
substance bought from appellant, was dispensed after both prosecution and defense stipulated
that the witness will merely testify on the fact that the drugs subject matter of this case was
forwarded to their office for laboratory examination and that laboratory examination was indeed
conducted and the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.11

For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together with his common-law wife,
Amelia Mendoza; and nephew, Alejandro Lim.

From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like this:

On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister’s house in Poblacion Dike when a
commotion woke him up. His nephew, Alejandro Lim, was shouting because the latter, together
with appellant’s common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and a niece, was being punched and
kicked by several police officers. When appellant tried to pacify the policemen and ask them
why they were beating up his common-law wife and other relatives, the policemen arrested him,
mauled him, punched him on the chest, slapped him and hit him with a palo-palo. He sustained
swollen face, lips and tooth. His common-law wife was likewise hit on the chest with the palo-
palo.

The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a house located in the middle of
a field where the former demanded P15,000.00 for their liberty. The next day, appellant was
brought to the police station.

Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as the police officers who
manhandled them and who demanded P15,000.00 so that she and appellant could go home. The
following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her child and cousin arrived with the P15,000.00. She was
released but appellant was detained. She does not know why the police officers filed this case
against appellant. What she knows is that they were asking money from them.

Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant and Amelia Mendoza.

On 8 March 2004, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of Violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P5,000,000.00. The dispostive portion of the decision reads:

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 WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds accused Norberto del
Monte y Gapay @ Obet GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of
Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P5,000,000.00. With cost.

The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government. The Branch of this Court is directed to turn over the same to the Dangerous
Drugs Board within ten (10) days from receipt hereof for proper disposal thereof.12

The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr. to be credible and
straightforward. It established the fact that appellant was caught selling shabu during an
entrapment operation conducted on 10 December 2002. Appellant was identified as the person
from whom PO1 Tolentino bought P300.00 worth of shabuas confirmed by Chemistry Report
No. D-728-2002. On the other hand, the trial court was not convinced by appellant’s defense of
frame-up and denial. Appellant failed to substantiate his claims that he was merely sleeping and
was awakened by the screams of his relatives who were being mauled by the police officers.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004. 13 With the filing thereof, the trial court
directed the immediate transmittal of the entire records of the case to us. 14 However, pursuant to
our ruling in People v. Mateo,15 the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition.16

On 28 May 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision but reduced the fine
imposed on appellant to P500,000.00. It disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision dated March 8, 2004 of the
RTC, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, finding accused-
appellant Norberto del Monte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5,
Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine
imposed upon him is reduced from P5,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.17

A Notice of Appeal having been timely filed by appellant, the Court of Appeals forwarded the
records of the case to us for further review.18

In our Resolution19 dated 10 December 2007, the parties were notified that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. Both appellant and
appellee opted not to file a supplemental brief on the ground they had exhaustively argued all the
relevant issues in their respective briefs and the filing of a supplemental brief would only contain
a repetition of the arguments already discussed therein.

Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE

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 INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM FOR FAILURE OF THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 21 OF R.A. 9165.20

Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemen’s failure to strictly comply with Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures of him together with the alleged
confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon his arrest as shown by the testimony of the
lone prosecution witness. He adds that PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police
officers who had initial custody of the drug allegedly seized and confiscated, did not conduct a
physical inventory of the same in his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest. Their
failure to abide by said section casts doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of the
evidence adduced against him.

At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers’ alleged non-compliance
with Section 2121 of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is
too late in the day for him to do so. In People v. Sta. Maria22 in which the very same issue was
raised, we ruled:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever

justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in
this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did
not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police
officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not
raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In
no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in
the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party
desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal.(Emphases supplied.)

In People v. Pringas,23 we explained that non-compliance with Section 21 will not render an
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case
at bar, appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of the drug that was taken from
him. In fact, he stipulated that the drug subject matter of this case was forwarded to PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory examination which
examination gave positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We
thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug seized from appellant not to have
been compromised.

We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making
of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the
drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For
evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is

164 | P a g e
no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that
will accorded it by the courts. One example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court wherein a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and
appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must
account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the document inadmissible in evidence.
This is clearly provided for in the rules.

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the
non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is
not of admissibility, but of weight – evidentiary merit or probative value – to be given the
evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances
obtaining in each case.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.24 What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.25

All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution clearly showed that the
sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and
identified in court. The poseur buyer positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per
Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the
substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by PO1 Tolentino from appellant in
consideration of P300.00, was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu).

In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, together with the dangerous
drug taken from appellant, more than sufficient to prove the crime charged. Considering that this
Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies
upon the assessment of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct
and demeanor of the witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial
courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no
glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a
better position to decide the credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.26

The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court
of Appeals.27Finding no compelling reason to depart from the findings of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, we affirm their findings.

Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting that he was framed, the evidence
against him being "planted," and that the police officers were exacting P15,000.00 from him.

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In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the subject of a buy-bust
operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no
longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s
plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence,
must simply fail.28 Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it
is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of
defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 29 For this claim to prosper, the
defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that
government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.30 This,
appellant failed to do. The presumption remained unrebutted because the defense failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty
or that they were inspired by an improper motive.

The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his nephew, Alejandro Lim, to
support his claims fails to sway. We find both witnesses not to be credible. Their testimonies are
suspect and cannot be given credence without clear and convincing evidence. Their claims, as
well as that of appellant, that they were maltreated and suffered injuries remain unsubstantiated.
As found by the trial court:

The accused, on the other hand, in an effort to exculpate himself from liability raised the
defense of frame-up. He alleged that at the time of the alleged buy bust he was merely
sleeping at the house of his sister. That he was awakened by the yells and screams of his
relatives as they were being mauled by the police officers. However, this Court is not
convinced. Accused failed to substantiate these claims of maltreatment even in the face of
his wife’s and nephew’s testimony. No evidence was presented to prove the same other
than their self-serving claims.31

Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that the witnesses
for the defense cannot even agree on what time the arresting policemen allegedly arrived in their
house. It explained:

To elaborate, appellant testified that it was 3 o’clock in the afternoon of December 10,
2002 when he was roused from his sleep by the policemen who barged into the house of
his sister (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 2). His common-law wife, however, testified that it was
10-11 o’clock in the morning when the policemen came to the house (TSN, Oct. 13,
2003, p. 6). On the other hand, Alejandro Lim testified that he went to sleep at 11 o’clock
in the morning and it was 10 o’clock in the morning when the policemen arrived (TSN,
Feb.2, 2004, p. 6). He thus tried to depict an absurd situation that the policemen arrived
first before he went to sleep with appellant.32

Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the illegal sale of
drugs, we are constrained to uphold appellant’s conviction.

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Said section
reads:

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 SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and purity, is
punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. For
selling 0.290 gram of shabu to PO1 Tolentino, and there being no modifying circumstance
alleged in the information, the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals, correctly
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in accordance with Article 63(2)33 of the Revised Penal
Code.

As regards the fine to be imposed on appellant, the trial court pegged the fine at P5,000,000.00
which the Court of Appeals reduced to P500,000.00. Both amounts are within the range provided
for by law but the amount imposed by the Court of Appeals, considering the quantity of the
drugs involved, is more appropriate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007, sustaining the conviction of
appellant Norberto Del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

 
 
G.R. No. 184037               September 29, 2009
ANTONIO LOPEZ y DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2  dated January 31, 2008, which
affirmed
the Decision 3  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, dated July
21,

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2006, convicting petitioner Antonio Lopez y dela Cruz (petitioner) of the crime of Illegal
Possession
of Drugs.
Petitioner was charged in an Information, 4  dated April 24, 2003, that reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of April 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized
to
possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.10
gram
of white crystalline substance, found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The prosecution, through the testimony of arresting officer, Police Officer 2 Apolinario Atienza
(PO2
Atienza), a member of Task Force Mapalakas of the Mandaluyong City Police Station,
established
that on April 23, 2003 at about 3:00 a.m., while conducting a routinary foot patrol along
Pantaleon
Street, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City, PO2 Atienza saw petitioner at a distance of seven (7)
meters walking in his direction; that, as the place was well-lit, he saw petitioner, walking with
head
bowed, looking at his hand, which held a plastic sachet containing a crystalline substance; and
that
he approached petitioner, held the latter’s hand and asked, "Ano yan?" but petitioner
did not answer.
Thereafter, PO2 Atienza introduced himself to petitioner as a member of the Mandaluyong
police,
arrested him, and informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. He
then
brought petitioner to the Mandaluyong Medical Center for a check-up. He also confiscated the
plastic
sachet and brought it to the police station. He prepared a request and then placed the markings

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"APA"–his initials―on the plastic sachet. 5
Chemistry Report No. D-737-03E 6  prepared by Police Senior Inspector and Forensic Chemical
Officer Annalee R. Forro, whose testimony was made subject of stipulation by both parties, 7
revealed
the following results:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
A – One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "APA" containing
0.10 gram of
white crystalline substance.
 
xxxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the
tests
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A contains Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The testimony of PO1 Julius B. Bacero (PO1 Bacero), companion of PO2 Atienza, was also
dispensed with, as both the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following: a) that he
was a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned to the Mandaluyong City Police Force;
b)
that he was one of the members of the buy-bust team as backup, which operated against
petitioner
on April 23, 2003 along Pantaleon St., Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City; c) that as a back-up,
his
duty was only to secure the premises; and d) that he had no personal knowledge as to the
circumstances surrounding the arrest of petitioner, as the former only saw the latter when he was
already being brought by PO2 Atienza to their vehicle. 8
The testimony of Senior Police Officer 1 Jaime Masilang -- who took the statement of the
arresting
officers, prepared and forwarded the referral letter, the arrest report, the affidavit of arrest, and
the

169 | P a g e
request for a drug test to the Prosecution Office, and put the markings on the evidence recovered
--
also became the subject of stipulation. 9
As sole witness for the defense, petitioner testified that, on April 23, 2003 at around 2:00 to 3:00
a.m., he went to a bakery about 30 meters away from his house in Barangay Hulo to buy
pandesal.
Suddenly, two vehicles stopped in front of him. PO2 Atienza and his companion, PO1 Bacero,
alighted from the vehicle and frisked him. When PO2 Atienza found nothing in his possession,
the
two police officers pushed him inside their vehicle and handcuffed him. He was then brought to
the
office of one Major Kalag. Petitioner insisted that he was framed and that the shabu was taken by
PO2 Atienza from the drawer of the table of Major Kalag. Afterwards, he was detained at the
Criminal Investigation Division and charged with illegal possession of shabu. On cross-
examination,
petitioner testified that, prior to his arrest, he did not know Major Kalag or PO2 Atienza, or the
two
had any ill motive against him. 10 1avvphi1
On July 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of drugs. The RTC gave credit to the positive testimony of PO2 Atienza, who was
able to
recall the incident vividly and to identify the evidence in open court. The RTC held that the acts
of
PO2 Atienza enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. Thus,
the
RTC disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt[,] he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE
(12)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱300,000.00).
Accused is credited in full of the preventive imprisonment [he has] already served in
confinement.
Let the physical evidence subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the

170 | P a g e
State and referred to the PDEA.
 
SO ORDERED. 11
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. 12  On January 31, 2008, the CA affirmed the decision
of the
RTC. The CA held that the shabu was not a product of an illegal search and, therefore,
admissible in
evidence. The CA opined that the plain-view doctrine was applicable to the seizure of the shabu,
ratiocinating that the prohibited substance was within the plain view of PO2 Atienza who was on
a
routinary foot patrol, and that the police officer inadvertently came across petitioner, who was
caught
in flagrante delicto. Moreover, the CA held that petitioner was estopped from questioning the
failure
of the arresting officers to comply with Section 21 13  of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, 14 in
view of the
admission by the defense of the Chemistry Report prepared by the Forensic Chemical Officer
which
positively identified the sachet’s contents as shabu. Affirming the findings of the RTC, the CA
likewise accorded the police officers the benefit of the presumption of regularity in the
performance
of their official duties.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 15  which the CA, however, denied
in its
Resolution 16 dated August 1, 2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the following issues:
I.
 
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
PETITIONER GUILTY
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS ARREST WAS MADE
WITHOUT A
WARRANT.

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II.
 
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
PETITIONER GUILTY
OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE
FOR
HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9165.
 
III.
 
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING SCANT
CONSIDERATION
TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER, WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE
THAN
THAT OF THE PROSECUTION. 17
Petitioner, through the Public Attorney's Office, avers that PO2 Atienza is not a member of
the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the PNP and has no training with respect to drug cases; thus, the latter was
not
in a position to immediately identify the plastic sachet as containing shabu. Furthermore, at the
time
of arrest, petitioner was merely holding a plastic sachet, an act that did not constitute a crime that
would justify his warrantless arrest; that considering the time and place where the arrest took
place,
it was improbable and incredible for PO2 Atienza, at a distance of seven (7) meters, to have
easily
determined that the plastic sachet, so small in size, contained shabu. Petitioner submits that in the
absence of evidence and corroborating testimony of any other witness, his alleged culpability,
based
on the sole testimony of PO2 Atienza, shows that there was lack of probable cause, at the outset,
to
arrest him. Accordingly, the search made on petitioner, as an incident to the illegal arrest, was

172 | P a g e
likewise illegal.
Moreover, petitioner claims that PO2 Atienza's failure to comply with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9165
casts doubt on the validity of the arrest and the admissibility of the evidence allegedly seized
from
 
him. He says that Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 2 18  of Regulation No. 1 of the
Dangerous
Drugs Board, Series of 2002, were violated. In addition, the plastic sachet containing the shabu
was
marked inside the police headquarters and not at the scene of the crime.
Petitioner asseverates that these violations cast a serious doubt on the identity and integrity of the
shabu allegedly confiscated from him. In the same manner, there was utter failure on the part of
the
prosecution to prove the crucial link in the chain of custody of the shabu, which constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense. Lastly, petitioner argues that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty of police officers should not by itself prevail over the presumption
of
innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of an individual. 19
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General
(OSG), asserts that petitioner's warrantless arrest is valid pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule
113 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests; that
petitioner was validly searched because he was caught in flagrante delicto or in "plain
view"
committing an offense; and that any objection involving petitioner's arrest, which should
have been
made before he entered his plea, is deemed waived because petitioner had been arraigned,
participated in the trial and presented his evidence. The OSG also claims that non-compliance
with
the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution that
would render inadmissible the plastic sachet confiscated from petitioner, pointing out that there
was

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continuity in the handling of the prohibited drug from the time it was confiscated until it was
delivered
for examination. Thus, its integrity and evidentiary value had been preserved, justifying its
admission
and consideration by the RTC and the CA. Lastly, the OSG insists that petitioner's guilt
was
sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt as found by both the RTC and the CA, giving the
police
officers the benefit of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions and
discarding petitioner's defense of frame-up. 20
The Petition is impressed with merit.
In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized
by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 21
Given the factual milieu of this case, we find our ruling in Guido Catuiran y Necudemus v.
People of
the Philippines 22  instructive:
We begin with the precept that in criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the
elemental acts constituting the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical
and
only requisite to a finding of guilt. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance
itself
constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a
judgment
of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Of prime importance therefore in these cases is that the
identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words,
it
must be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as
evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place. The chain of
custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning
the
identity of the evidence are removed.

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As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person
who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
 
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and
the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the
testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be
derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.
In this case, PO2 Atienza himself testified that he confiscated the prohibited drug and brought it
to
his office. He then prepared the request and only then―in the office―did he place his initials
“APA”
on the plastic sachet. The prosecution also failed to establish that petitioner was present when
PO2
Atienza marked the said plastic sachet. These shortcomings militate against the
prosecution's case.
In the similar case of Ronald Carino and Rosana Andes v. People of the Philippines, 23  this
Court
emphasized the requirement of law that the prohibited drug seized be marked in the
presence of the accused. Such flaw not only casts doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti but
also
tends to negate, if not totally discredit, the claim of regularity in the conduct of official police
operation.

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All told, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The
courts below heavily relied on the testimony of PO2 Atienza and, in the same way, banked on
the
presumption of regularity. It bears stressing that this presumption only arises in the absence of
contradicting details that would raise doubts on the regularity in the performance of official
duties.
Where, as in this case, the police officers failed to comply with the standard procedure
prescribed by
law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption. 24
With the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss petitioner’s submission that the
arrest
and subsequent seizure were attended by a constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 214, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Antonio Lopez y dela Cruz is
ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt and is ordered immediately RELEASED from
detention,
unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to
report
to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
 
G.R. No. 184804               June 18, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs.
RASHAMIA HERNANDEZ y SANTOS and GRACE KATIPUNAN y CRUZ, Accused-
Appellants.
Facts:
For review is the Decision 1  of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02465, dated 26
May

176 | P a g e
2008, affirming in toto the Decision, 2  dated 14 August 2006, of the Manila Regional Trial
Court
(RTC), Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 04-222804, finding accused-appellants Rashamia
Hernandez
y Santos and Grace Katipunan y Cruz guilty of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
and
imposing upon them the penalty of life imprisonment.
The records of the case bear the following facts:
On 19 January 2004, an Information 3  was filed before the RTC against appellants for illegal
sale
of shabu under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the
information reads:
The undersigned accuses RASHAMIA HERNANDEZ y SANTOS and GRACE KATIPUNAN y
CRUZ
of Violation of SEC. 5 Article II [of] Republic Act [No.] 9165, committed as follows:
That on or about January 14, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping each other, not being authorized by law to sell,
trade, deliver, or give away any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly sell or offer for sale One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO
POINT ZERO FOUR SEVEN (0.047) gram of white crystalline substance known as
"SHABU"
containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug.
When arraigned on 13 February 2004, appellants, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
"Not Guilty"
to the charge. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Officer 2 Gloybell Dimacali (PO2 Dimacali) and
Police Officer 2 Joenardine Carandang (PO2 Carandang), both of whom are members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and assigned at the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Unit of Central
Market, Sta. Cruz Manila Police Station 3. Their testimonies, taken together, produced the
following
narrative:

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On 14 January 2004, at around 6:00 p.m., an informant went to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs
(SAID)
Unit of Central Market, Sta. Cruz Manila Police Station 3 (police station) and reported to Police
Chief
Inspector Jimmy A. Tiu (Inspector Tiu), head of SAID, and PO2 Dimacali, the drug trafficking
activities of a certain Larry and appellants in Callejon Flores, Solis Street, Tondo, Manila.
Inspector
Tiu formed a team and planned a buy-bust operation. The team agreed that PO2 Dimacali would
act
as the poseur-buyer, while PO2 Carandang, a certain PO2 Leonard Cipriano, PO2 Napoleon
Osias
and PO2 Marvin Flores would act as back-up during the buy-bust operation. Inspector Tiu gave
PO2
Dimacali two one-hundred peso bills to be utilized as buy-bust money. PO2 Dimacali marked the
monies with "SAID." 4
 
At about 8:00 p.m., the team, together with the informant, went to the house of Larry at Callejon
Flores, Solis Street, Tondo, Manila. Upon arriving thereat, PO2 Dimacali and the informant
proceeded inside Larry’s house while the rest of the team positioned themselves outside the
house.
PO2 Dimacali and the informant approached appellants who were then inside the house. PO2
Dimacali told appellant Katipunan that he would buy two hundred pesos worth of shabu.
Appellant
Katipunan told appellant Hernandez, "Akin na ang natitira mong isa." Appellant
Hernandez brought
out from her pocket one transparent plastic sachet containing shabu and handed it to appellant
Katipunan. The latter then gave the plastic sachet to PO2 Dimacali. PO2 Dimacali handed the
buy-
bust money to appellant Katipunan who, in turn, gave it to appellant Hernandez. At this juncture,
PO2 Dimacali removed his bull cap as a pre-arranged signal to his back-up team. PO2 Dimacali
introduced himself as a police officer and held the hands of appellant Katipunan. Appellant
Hernandez ran away but the back-up team chased and caught her, and recovered from her the
buy-

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bust money. 5
Appellants, as well as the transparent plastic sachet of shabu and the buy-bust money recovered
from them, were immediately brought to the police station. Thereupon, the plastic sachet
of shabu recovered from appellants was marked by PO2 Dimacali with "GKC"
(initials for Grace
Katipunan Cruz, the full name of appellant Katipunan) and submitted it, together with the buy-
bust
money, to Inspector Tiu. The plastic sachet of shabu recovered from appellants was forwarded to
the PNP Crime Laboratory of the Western Police District, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, for
laboratory
examination. PNP Forensic Chemist Judycel A. Macapagal found the contents thereof to be
positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Upon being weighed, the plastic sachet
contained
0.047 gram of shabu. 6
The prosecution also adduced documentary and object evidence to buttress the testimonies of its
witnesses, to wit: (1) letter-request for laboratory examination (Exhibit A); 7  (2) one transparent
plastic
sachet of shabu (Exhibit B); 8  (3) chemistry report of PNP Forensic Chemist Macapagal
(Exhibit
C); 9  (4) buy-bust money (Exhibit D); 10  (5) affidavit of apprehension executed by PO2
Dimacali, PO2
Carandang and PO2 Cipriano (Exhibit E); 11  and (6) pre-operation/coordination sheet (Exhibit
F). 12
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of appellants and their corroborating witnesses
–
namely, Maria Victoria Hernandez (Victoria) and Marileth Jacob (Marileth) – to refute the
foregoing
accusations. Appellants denied any liability and claimed that they were framed.
Appellant Hernandez testified that she visited appellant Katipunan at the latter’s house in Tondo,
Manila, on the afternoon of 14 January 2004. Later that day, she fell asleep inside the said house.
At
around 8:00 p.m., she was awakened by a commotion inside the same house. She stood up and
saw male persons inside the house arresting appellant Katipunan. She was also apprehended.

179 | P a g e
When she asked the reason for their arrest, one of the male persons retorted, "Huwag na
lang
kayong magmatapang, sumama na lang kayo." The males introduced themselves as
policemen.
Subsequently, she, appellant Katipunan, and a certain Reynaldo Soriano (Soriano) -- appellant
Katipunans alleged uncle who was with them inside the house during the arrest -- were brought
to
the police station. Soriano was beaten up by the policemen in the said station, but was released
two
days after the arrest. 13
Appellant Katipunan declared she was in her house at 1022 Callejon Flores, Solis Street, Tondo
Manila on 14 January 2004. At about 5:00 p.m., appellant Hernandez arrived at her house. At
about
8:00 p.m., while watching television inside her house with Soriano, she saw four males
destroying
the window of her house. These persons entered through the window, ransacked the house, and
told her that they were looking for Larry. Thereafter, she, appellant Hernandez and Soriano were
arrested and forcibly brought to the police station. Soriano was subsequently released from
 
detention, because he gave money and a television set to the police officers. The policemen
demanded from her ₱50,000.00 in exchange for her freedom, but she refused to accede. 14
Victoria, mother of appellant Hernandez, narrated that she lived in the same house with appellant
Hernandez at 2109 Pista Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila; that on 14 January 2004, at about 4:00 p.m.,
she
arrived home but could not find appellant Hernandez; that she looked for appellant Hernandez in
her
relatives’ house and in the nightclub where the latter worked as Guest Relations Officer, but to
no
avail; that on the following day, she was informed by a friend that appellant Hernandez was
arrested;
that she went to the police station and found appellant Hernandez therein; and that appellant
Hernandez was not a drug pusher. 15
Marileth, friend and neighbor of appellant Katipunan, stated that four males entered appellant

180 | P a g e
Katipunan’s house during the incident by destroying its window. She reported the incident to the
police, but this was not blottered. 16
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellants guilty of violating Section 5, Article
II of
Republic Act No. 9165 and imposing upon them the penalty of life imprisonment. They were
also
ordered to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, finding both accused,
Rashamia
Hernandez y Santos and Grace Katipunan y Cruz, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of
Sec. 5 Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, they are hereby sentenced each to life
imprisonment and
to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
costs.
The specimen is forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court,
accompanied by
the Branch Sheriff, is directed to turn over with dispatch and upon proper receipt the said
specimen
to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in accordance with the
law
and rules. 17
Aggrieved, appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 26 May 2008, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed
decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. 18
Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on 11 June 2008. 19
In their Brief, 20  appellants assigned the following errors:
I.
 
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
OF THE

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CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE
IDENTITY OF
THE PROHIBITED DRUG CONSTITUTING THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE OFFENSE.
 
II.
 
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
 
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. In prosecutions for illegal sale
of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In the case at bar, the prosecution was
able to establish through testimonial, documentary and object evidence the said elements. 21
PO2 Dimacali, the poseur-buyer, testified that appellants sold to him shabu during a legitimate
buy-
bust operation. His positive identification of appellants and direct account of the transaction are
clear, thus:
Asst. Pros. Yap:
Police Officer Dimacali, what was your participation in this police operation against Rashamia
Hernandez and Grace Katipunan?
Witness: I was the poseur-buyer in this operation, sir.
Q Now, when was (sic) this operation took (sic) place?
A On January 14, 2004 at 8:00 p.m., sir.
Q Where?
A Along Callejon Flores, Solis Street, Tondo, Manila.

182 | P a g e
Q Now, who was the target person of this operation?
A A certain Larry, Mia and Grace, sir.
Q Who furnished you of these particular names, these target persons?
A Our CI, sir.
Q When?
A Personally appeared in our office on January 14.
Q What time?
A At about 6:00 p.m., sir.
Q Aside from these names, what other details submitted by this informant?
A The informant gave information attended by our Chief, SAID regarding the illegal drug
activities of
certain Larry, Grace and Mia.
Q So, what was the response of this Police Commander?
 
A Major Tiu formed a team composed of PO1 Cipriano, PO1 Carandang, myself and I was given
a
specific assignment.
Q What was the assignment of these Cipriano and Carandang?
A Back up and arresting officers, sir.
Q What happened after the team was formed?
A We were briefed and we were tasked by Major Tiu, sir.
Q What were the tasks?
A Back up operatives and I was tasked as poseur-buyer, sir.
Q What happened next, Mr. Witness?
A We were given ₱200.00 by Major Tiu, sir.
Q When was that?
A Past 6:00 of January 14, sir.
Q What was that ₱200.00 bill for?
A For our buy bust operation, sir.
Q How were you able to identify that that is the same money bill used?

183 | P a g e
A I put marking on the buy-bust money describing the name of our office and have it xeroxed,
sir.
Q In relation to that bill, what portion of the bill it was marked?
A Below the seal of the money, sir.
Q Now, you mentioned about a photocopy of the bill. Can you recognize that bill?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who made that machine copy?
A I, sir.
Q When?
A After the briefing made by Major Tiu, sir.
Q Where is the genuine money bill now?
 
A In my possession, sir.
Q Can you produce that, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Tell us, why this evidence in your possession?
A I was subpoenaed so I got the records in our office.
Asst. Pros. Yap:
Your Honor, I ask counsel to stipulate the xerox copy with the genuine money if the same
faithful
reproduction.
Atty. Caing:
Admitted, your Honor.
Asst. Pros. Yap:
Show to us the marking of these two bills?
Witness:
Here, sir, below the seal Central Bank of the money.
Asst. Pros. Yap:
We ask to be marked as Exhibit E, faithful reproduction, and Exhibit E-1.
COURT:

184 | P a g e
Mark them.
Asst. Pros. Yap:
So, what happened next after receipt of the money?
Witness:
We waited till night and then we proceeded to the target area with the confidential informant.
Q How far is that from your station?
A It takes about 25 to 30 minutes, sir.
Q What means of transportation did you take?
 
A Revo car of Cipriano, sir.
Q So, upon reaching thereat, what exactly did you do?
A The confidential informant and I walked towards the house of a certain Larry.
Q What part? Describe to us the house of a certain Larry?
A It is made of wood and there is a (sic) stairs and composed of two small rooms, sir.
Q What happened when you arrived in that place?
A We approached a pregnant woman Grace and told her that we will buy shabu.
Q Now, who identified this pregnant woman by the name of Grace?
A The confidential informant told me that the person can be easily identified because she is
pregnant
and her name is Grace.
Q Where was the informant at that time?
A He was with me, sir.
Q What exactly did you do or say to her?
A Grace, kukuha ako ng halagang dalawang piso.
Q So, what was the response of Grace?
A Without replying, she told to a woman there by the name Mia that – Akin na ang natitira mong
isa.
Q Who uttered that words?
A Grace, sir.
Q It was directed to whom?

185 | P a g e
A To Mia, sir.
Q Where was Mia at that time?
A She was halfway of the stairs, sir.
Q What happened when she said that to Mia?
A Mia brought out a sachet and handed it to Grace and Grace handed it to me, sir.
Q What was that given to Grace by Mia?
 
A A small transparent plastic sachet, sir.
Q What happened thereafter when Grace received the same?
A I gave a pre-arranged signal by removing my bull cap, sir.
xxxx
Q How about the ₱200.00 bills? What happened to it?
A Cipriano recovered the money from Mia, sir.
Q Prior to your raising of bull cap, what happened to the ₱200.00 bill?
A It was recovered by PO2 Cipriano.
Q When?
A After the transaction, sir.
Q So, what did you do after that?
A I introduced myself as police officer. When Mia heard the word – pulis, they ran away and my
co-
police officers chased them.
Q How about you? What did you do?
A I already held Grace, sir.
Q How about Rashamia? What happened to her?
A Rashamia was arrested by Cipriano, sir.
Q So, what was recovered from Rashamia?
A The buy-bust money, sir.
Q How about Grace? What was recovered from her?
A None, sir, because the item that I bought from her was already in my possession.
Q Now, you mentioned about Grace. Can you identify her if she is in the Courtroom now?

186 | P a g e
A Yes, sir.
Q Please do so …?
A Yes, sir.
 
Clerk of Court:
Witness stepped down from the witness stand and approached to a woman inside the Courtroom
and tapped her shoulder, when asked and answered the name of Grace Katipunan.
Asst. Pros. Yap:
How about Rashamia Hernandez?
Witness:
This one, sir. (also tapped her shoulder, when asked and gave her name Rashamia Hernandez,
one
of the accused in this case)
Q Now, where did you bring these two persons?
A We brought them to our station, sir.
Q How about the plastic sachet?
A The same, sir.
Q Where did you submit the same?
A In the office of Major Tiu, sir.
Q How about the buy-bust money?
A The same, sir.
Q Please tell us if you can recognize this transparent plastic sachet submitted to Major Tiu?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is your basis in telling us today?
A I put the marking the initial of Grace Katipunan, sir.
Q What is the initial?
A GKC, sir.
Q What is the meaning of that GKC?
A Grace Katipunan Cruz.
Q When did you put this marking?

187 | P a g e
A In our office, sir.
 
Q When?
A When we brought them to our station, sir.
Q After this marking, what happened to this plastic sachet?
A We made a request for laboratory examination, sir.
Q To your knowledge, what was the result?
A Gave positive result, sir. 22
PO2 Carandang corroborated the aforesaid testimony of PO2 Dimacali on relevant points. 23
The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the documentary and object evidence submitted by
the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of PO2 Dimacali and
PO2
Carandang to be credible. Both courts also found no ill motive on their part to testify against
appellants.
The prosecution adduced as its documentary and object evidence the transparent plastic sachet
of shabu sold by appellants to PO2 Dimacali during the buy-bust operation, 24  the chemistry
report of
PNP Forensic Chemist Macapagal confirming that the plastic sachet sold by appellants to PO2
Dimacali contained 0.047 gram of shabu, 25 and the marked money used during the buy-bust
operation. 26
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. 27  It is clear from the
testimony of
PO2 Dimacali that appellants were of one mind in selling shabu to him as shown by their series
of
overt acts during the transaction, to wit: (1) when PO2 Dimacali told appellant Katipunan that he
would buy two hundred pesos worth of shabu, appellant Katipunan told appellant Hernandez to
give
her (appellant Katipunan) one sachet of shabu; (2) appellant Hernandez immediately brought out
from her pocket one plastic sachet containing shabu and handed it to appellant Katipunan; (3)
after
188 | P a g e
receiving the plastic sachet of shabu from appellant Katipunan, PO2 Dimacali handed the buy-
bust
money to the former who, in turn, gave it to appellant Hernandez; (4) When PO2 Dimacali
introduced
himself as a police officer and announced the arrest, appellants tried to escape; and (5) the buy-
bust
money was recovered from the possession of appellant Hernandez. 28  No other logical
conclusion
would follow from the appellants’ concerted action except that they had a common purpose and
community of interest. Conspiracy having been established, appellants are liable as co-principals
regardless of their participation. 29
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect, because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as
they testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the
trial
court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding
upon
this Court. 30
To rebut the overwhelming evidence for the prosecution, appellants interposed the defense of
denial
and frame-up. Appellants denied they sold shabu to PO2 Dimacali during the buy-bust operation
and
claimed that the arresting officers tried to extort money from them in exchange for their freedom.
 
The defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it
can
easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of
the
Dangerous Drugs Act. 31 In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved
with
strong and convincing evidence. 32  In the case before us, appellants miserably failed to present
any
evidence in support of their claims. Aside from their self-serving assertions, no plausible proof
was

189 | P a g e
presented to bolster their allegations.
Appellants admitted that they did not know PO2 Dimacali, PO2 Carandang and the rest of the
back-
up team prior to their arrest and could not state any reason why they were arrested and charged
with
selling shabu, hence negating any improper motive on the part of the arresting officers. 33  When
the
police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no ill motive to testify against the
accused, the
courts shall uphold the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. 34  Further,
appellants have not filed a single complaint for frame-up or extortion against the arresting
officers.
This inaction clearly betrays appellants’ claim of frame-up.
It is true that Victoria and Marileth testified in behalf of appellants. However, their testimonies
refer
only to peripheral matters and not to the actual buy-bust transaction itself. They were not present
in
the crime scene during the transaction. In short, they have no personal knowledge of what
actually
transpired during the actual buy-bust operation. Their testimonies, therefore, deserve scant
consideration.
Given the foregoing circumstances, the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses prevail over the defense of denial and frame-up of appellants.
Appellants, nonetheless, averred that the buy-bust team did not comply with the procedure in the
custody of seized/confiscated dangerous drugs as provided under Section 21, Article II of
Republic
Act No. 9165, viz:
ARTICLE II
UNLAWFUL ACTS AND PENALTIES
xxxx
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. –

190 | P a g e
xxxx
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody of all dangerous drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given
a copy thereof;
Appellants also contended that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited
drug
allegedly seized from them based on the following reasons: (1) PO2 Dimacali, PO2 Carandang
and
the rest of the back-up team did not write their initials on the one transparent plastic sachet
allegedly
containing shabu immediately after recovering the same from appellants; (2) no inventory or
 
identifying mark was made at the crime scene; (3) the confiscated drug was belatedly marked by
PO2 Dimacali at the police station; and (4) Inspector Tiu was not presented as a witness to
corroborate PO2 Dimacali’s testimony that the latter turned over to the former the seized
transparent
plastic sachet of shabu after appellants’ arrest. Thus, there is doubt on whether the specimen
examined by PNP Forensic Chemist Macapagal and eventually submitted to the RTC was the
same
specimen recovered from appellants. Moreover, the alleged buy-bust operation and buy-bust
money
was not recorded in the police blotter. 35
It should be noted that appellants tried to raise the buy-bust team’s alleged non-compliance with
Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. This, they cannot do.
It is
too late in the day for them to do so. In People v. Sta. Maria, 36  in which the very same issue
was
raised, we held:

191 | P a g e
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds
may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying
with
Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping
of
the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of
Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first
time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were
lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. (Emphases supplied.)
Moreover, we have held in several cases 37  that non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of
Republic
Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 38  In the case at bar, the integrity of the
drug
seized from appellants was preserved. The chain of custody of the drug subject matter of the
instant
case was shown not to have been broken.
Records disclosed that after PO2 Dimacali confiscated the one transparent plastic sachet
containing shabu from appellants, he immediately brought the same to the police station where
he
marked it "GKC" and turned it over to Inspector Tiu. 39  The latter then forwarded
the said plastic
sachet of shabu marked "GKC" to the PNP Crime Laboratory of the Western Police
District, U.N.
Avenue, Ermita, Manila, for laboratory examination. 40  After a qualitative examination
conducted on

192 | P a g e
the contents of the plastic sachet marked "GKC," PNP Forensic Chemist Macapagal
found it to be
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 41  Upon being weighed, the plastic
sachet
was determined to be containing 0.047 gram of shabu. 42
When the prosecution presented the plastic sachet of shabu marked "GKC," PO2
Dimacali positively
identified it as the one he bought from appellants in the buy-bust operation. 43  The plastic
sachet
containing 0.047 gram of shabuhad the marking "GKC" as attested by PNP Forensic
Chemist
Macapagal in her chemistry report. 44  The existence, due execution, and genuineness of the said
chemistry report, as well as the qualifications of PNP Forensic Chemist Macapagal as an expert
witness, were admitted by the defense. 45  Further, PO2 Dimacali categorically declared during
the trial
that he put the "GKC" marking on the one transparent plastic sachet
of shabu recovered from
appellants. 46  Clearly, the identity of the drug recovered from appellants has been duly
preserved and
established by the prosecution. Hence, there is no doubt that the plastic sachet marked
"GKC"
submitted for laboratory examination and later on found to be positive for shabu was the same
one
sold by appellants to PO2 Dimacali during the buy-bust operation.
 
Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of
bad
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Appellants in this case bear the
burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption
that
there was regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers, and that the latter properly
discharged their duties. 47  Appellants failed to produce convincing proof that the evidence
submitted
by the prosecution had been tampered with.1avvphi1

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The fact that Inspector Tiu was not presented as a witness to corroborate PO2 Dimacali’s
testimony
does not warrant appellants’ acquittal of the crime charged. Not all people who came into contact
with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165
or in
any rule implementing the same that imposes such a requirement. As long as the chain of
custody of
the seized drug was clearly established to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail
to
identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came
into
possession of the drugs should take the witness stand. In People v. Zeng Hua Dian, 48  we ruled:
After a thorough review of the records of this case we find that the chain of custody of the seized
substance was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs
seized
in this case. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the
evidence
custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the officer on duty, is not a crucial point against the prosecution.
The
matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The
prosecution
has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to
present as witnesses.
Appellants’ assertion that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were fabricated because
the
alleged buy-bust operation and buy-bust money were not recorded in the police blotter is
unmeritorious. The buy-bust operation conducted on appellants was duly recorded in the police
blotter, as shown in the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet made and signed by Inspector Tiu. 49
With
regard to the non-recording of the buy-bust money in the police blotter, suffice it to state that
neither
law nor jurisprudence requires that the buy-bust money be entered in the police blotter. 50  At
any rate,
the non-recording of the buy-bust operation and buy-bust money in the police blotter is not
essential,
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since they are not elements in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As earlier discussed, the only
elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof that the illicit transaction took place,
coupled
with the presentation in court of the dangerous drug seized as evidence. Both were satisfactorily
proved in the present case.
Since appellants’ violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 was duly
established by
the prosecution’s evidence, we shall now ascertain the penalties imposable on them.
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless
of its
quantity and purity, carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00).
Pursuant, however, to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act
Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," only life imprisonment and fine shall be
imposed.
Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in imposing the penalty of life
imprisonment
and fine of ₱500,000.00 on each of the appellants.
 
 
Case 1: RA 9165
 
G.R. No. 175928               August 31, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs.
ALVIN PRINGAS y PANGANIBAN Accused-Appellant.
 
Facts
On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the

195 | P a g e
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess drug paraphernalia, did then and there
willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in is possession, custody and control, the following to wit:
(a) one (1) small tape-sealed transparent plastic bag containing four (4) smaller unsealed
transparent plastic bags each with traces of white crystalline substance;
(b) one (1) improvised water pipes containing traces of white crystalline substance;
(c) two (2) empty strips of aluminum foil;
(d) one (1) pin;
(e) one (1) pair of scissors;
(f) one (1) improvised bamboo tongs;
(g) one (1) pack of empty small transparent plastic bag;
(h) one (1) improvised burner; and
(i) two (2) disposable lighters.
all are fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting any dangerous drug into
the
body. 8
On 30 April 2003, appellant, having been charged without the benefit of a preliminary
investigation,
filed a motion for reinvestigation. 9  On 14 May 2003, the trial court granted the motion and
ordered
the Pasig City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. 10  With the finding of the City
Prosecutor that no cogent reason existed to modify or reverse its previous finding of probable
cause
against accused-appellant, the trial court set the cases for arraignment and trial. 11
When arraigned on 4 September 2003, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio,
pleaded
not guilty to the crimes charged. 12
 
During the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted the existence and the contents of the Request
for
Laboratory Examination 13  and the Forensic Chemist Report, 14  with the qualification that the
subject of

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the forensic report was not taken from him, and if ever same was taken from him, it was obtained
illegally. 15
With the termination of the pre-trial conference, the cases were heard jointly.
The prosecution presented two witnesses: PO1 Joselito Esmallaner 16  and SPO3 Leneal
Matias, 17  both members of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Station.
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
On 22 April 2003, SPO4 Danilo Tuaño, Officer-in-Charge of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit
of
the Pasig City Police Station, designated PO1 Joselito Esmallaner to act as a poseur-buyer in a
buy-
bust operation to be conducted against appellant along Beverly Street, Barangay Buting, Pasig
City.
At around 10:30 p.m., the buy-bust team headed by SPO3 Leneal Matias arrived at the target
area.
PO1 Esmallaner and the informant proceeded to the unnumbered house of appellant, while SPO3
Matias and the other members of the team positioned themselves around ten (10) meters away to
serve as back-up.
After the informant knocked on appellant’s front door, the latter came out. Upon recognizing the
informant, appellant asked, "Pare, ikaw pala. Bibili ka ba?" The informant who was
standing next to
PO1 Esmallaner replied "Oo, itong kasama ko kukuha." Appellant then asked PO1
Esmallaner how
much drugs he intended to buy to which PO1 Esmallaner replied, "₱100 lang." PO1
Esmallaner
thereafter gave a one hundred peso (₱100.00) bill to the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant went
inside the house. Appellant returned and handed to PO1 Esmallaner a plastic sachet containing a
white crystalline substance later found to be shabu. 18
Upon receiving the plastic sachet, PO1 Esmallaner grabbed appellant’s hand and got the ₱100.00
bill from the right front pocket of appellant’s pants. He introduced himself as a police officer and
informed the appellant of his violation and his constitutional rights. PO1 Esmallaner then marked
the
plastic sachet 19  and placed his initials "JE" on the upper right portion of the
₱100.00 20  bill with serial

197 | P a g e
number FX230133. 21
After seeing that PO1 Esmallaner tried to grab the hand of appellant, who was able to run inside
the
house and tried to lock the door, SPO3 Matias and the other members of the team followed PO1
Esmallaner inside appellant’s house. Matias saw three pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets 22  containing a white crystalline substance which turned out to be shabu, two disposable
lighters, 23  six strips of aluminum foil with traces of shabu, 24  improvised water pipe used as
tooter, 25  improvised burner, 26  wooden sealer, small scissors, 27  14 pieces of transparent
plastic
sachets, 28  and one small needle 29  on top of a small chair (bangkito). The items confiscated
were
marked and turned over to the Investigator who requested laboratory examination on said items.
On 23 April 2003, Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E 30  was issued with the conclusion that the
four
sachets, together with four other unsealed transparent plastic bags and a water pipe used as
tooter,
taken from appellant, were positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). On the same
date,
poseur-buyer PO1 Esmallaner and team leader SPO3 Matias executed their Joint Affidavit of
Arrest. 31
For the defense, appellant 32  took the witness stand together with his common-law wife, Gina
Dean. 33
 
Appellant and his common-law wife deny that a buy-bust occurred. Appellant claims that at
about
10:00 p.m. of 22 April 2003, he and his common-law wife were with their three children in their
house
in Beverly Street, Buting, Pasig City, when somebody kicked the door of their house. Appellant
was
in the comfort room, while his common-law wife was in the bedroom taking care of their
children.
Thereafter, four persons, later identified as police officers Esmallaner, Mapula, Espares and
Familiara, entered without any warrant of arrest or search warrant. He asked them what they
wanted

198 | P a g e
and he was told that they were going to arrest him. When he asked for the reason why he was
being
arrested, he was told that he would just be informed in their office. With his hands on his back,
appellant was handcuffed. The policemen subsequently conducted a search in the house, but they
neither recovered nor took anything. After that, appellant was brought to the police station,
investigated and placed in jail. He added that the violent entry made by the policemen was
witnessed by some of his neighbors, namely, Buboy, Macmac and Zaldy, who were then having
a
drinking session.
On 19 August 2004, the trial court promulgated its decision finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It disposed of the cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ALVIN PRINGAS is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00.
Accused ALVIN PRINGAS is also found GUILTY OF Violation of Section 11 of the same law
and he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY
to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P400,000.00 and also of
violation of
Section 12 of R.A. 9165, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment from SIX (6)
MONTHS
(and) ONE (1) DAY as minimum to THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as maximum, and
to pay a
fine of ₱10,000.00.
Considering the penalty imposed, the immediate commitment of the accused to the National
Bilibid
Prisons is ordered.
The Court fully realizes that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense committed by the
accused
is quite severe. However, the Court will not question the wisdom of the law and of the legislators
who

199 | P a g e
passed it. Dura lex, sed lex. The only thing that the Court can do is to recommend that the
accused
be pardoned after he shall have served the minimum period of the penalty imposed on him. 34
On 3 September 2004, appellant, through counsel, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
via
a Notice of Appeal. 35  With the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the trial court transmitted 36  the
records of
the case to the Court of Appeals for review pursuant to People v. Mateo. 37
In its Decision dated 31 August 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed appellant’s appeal and
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. 38
Unsatisfied, appellant appealed his conviction before this Court by way of a Notice of Appeal.
39
With the elevation of the records to the Court and the acceptance of the appeal, the parties were
required to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from
notice. 40  The parties manifested that they were not filing supplemental briefs, arguing that the
issues
of the case had been discussed in their respective briefs. 41
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error, to wit:
 
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF
THE OFFENSES CHARGED DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE
HAVING
BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 21 AND 86, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
Appellant argues that the apprehending police officers’ failure to comply with the provisions
(Sections 21 and 86) of Republic Act No. 9165 casts doubt on the validity of appellant’s arrest
and
the admissibility of the evidence allegedly seized from him. He maintains that since the
procurement
of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, during the buy-bust operation was violative
of
said law and of his constitutional right against illegal arrest, the same should not have been
received

200 | P a g e
in evidence to prove his guilt they being inadmissible under the law.
Appellant claims that the police officers violated Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the
alleged buy-bust operation that led to the apprehension of appellant was conducted without the
involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). It is his contention that
nowhere in
the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by the members of the arresting team was it shown that the
buy-bust operation was conducted with the assistance, coordination, knowledge or consent of the
PDEA.
We find this claim untenable.
In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, it is stated that "That, on or about 10:30 PM April 22,
2003, as
instructed by SPO4 DANILO TUAÑO, OIC/SDEU, this Office effected a coordination to (sic)
Metro
Manila Regional Office of PDEA and formed a team of SDEU operatives with a confidential
informant to conduct anti-narcotics/Buy-bust operation against the said person x x x." 42
This portion
of the affidavit clearly negates appellant’s claim that the buy-bust operation subject of the case
was
not with the involvement of the PDEA. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
aforementioned
statement was not contained in the affidavit, appellant’s claim of lack of involvement of the
PDEA will
render neither his arrest illegal nor the evidence seized from him inadmissible. Quoting People v.
Sta. Maria, 43  we resolved the very same issue in this wise:
Appellant would next argue that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of Sections
21
and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any
involvement
of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Prescinding therefrom, he concludes that
the
prosecution’s evidence, both testimonial and documentary, was inadmissible having been
procured
in violation of his constitutional right against illegal arrest.

201 | P a g e
The argument is specious.
Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
Sec. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the
PDEA
and Transitory Provisions. – The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the NBI
and
the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished; however they shall continue with
the
performance of their task as detail service with the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time
that
the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates of the
PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are
affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their
original
mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by the
head
of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall
be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and
privileges
granted to their respective positions in their original mother agencies.
 
The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this
Section
shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That
personnel
absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide to joint the
PDEA.
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP
on all
other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the
investigation being conductetd by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be
a
violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP
or

202 | P a g e
any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That
the
NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all
drug
related matters.
Cursory read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on the part of the
law enforcers to transfer drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 is also silent on the matter. But by no
stretch
of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without
the
participation of PDEA illegal nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result
from a
particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great
mischief
done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction
was
not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.
As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the "lead
agency" in the
investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies
still
possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will
eventually be transferred to the latter. Additionally, the same provision states that PDEA, serving
as
the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board, ":shall be responsible for the
efficient and
effective law enforcement of all the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor
and essential chemical as provided in the Act." We find much logic in the Solicitor
General’s
interpretation that it is only appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement
authorities be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the "lead agency" in the
campaign against the
203 | P a g e
menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having a
centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the
efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86(a) of the IRR emphasizes this
point by providing:
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies. – The PDEA shall be the lead
agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement
agencies
shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA x x x. Provided, finally,
that
nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and
seizures in
consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
As regards the non-participation of PDEA in a buy-bust operation, we said:
[T]he challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation of PDEA, did not
violate
appellant’s constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic
Act No.
9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made
without
the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest
inadmissible.
Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests. 44
 
As regards Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, appellant insists there was a violation of said
section when pictures, showing him together with the confiscated shabu, were not immediately
taken
after his arrest. He added that the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of the apprehending team did not
indicate
if the members thereof physically made an inventory of the illegal drugs in the presence of the
appellant or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department

204 | P a g e
of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory
and given a copy thereof. In short, appellant insists that non-compliance with Section 21
regarding
the custody and disposition of the confiscated/seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia, i.e., the
taking of pictures and the making of an inventory, will make these items inadmissible in
evidence.
We do not agree. Section 21 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and
have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given
a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there
is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. 45  Its non-
compliance will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. In the case under consideration, we find that the integrity and the

205 | P a g e
evidentiary value of the items involved were safeguarded. The seized/confiscated items were
immediately marked for proper identification. Thereafter, they were forwarded to the Crime
Laboratory for examination.
Though the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21 was not expressly stated by
the
arresting/buy-bust team, this does not necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest was illegal or the
items seized/confiscated inadmissible. In the case at bar, as in Sta. Maria, the justifiable ground
will
remain unknown because appellant did not question during the trial the custody and disposition
of
the items taken from him. Assuming that Sections 21 and 86 were indeed breached, appellant
should have raised these issues before the trial court. This, he did not do. Never did he question
the
custody and disposition of the items that were supposedly taken from him. It was only on appeal
before the Court of Appeals that he raised them. This, he cannot do. We held:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds
may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying
with
Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping
of
the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of
Republic Act 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were raised instead for the first time
on
appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the
 
safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to
evidence
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal. 46
Appellant was charged with violations of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Appellant

206 | P a g e
was charged with violation of Section 5 for selling 0.03 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride
(shabu). The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity
of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the
payment therefor. 47  What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
the proof
that the transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti. 48
The evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements. The poseur-buyer
and
the team leader of the apprehending team narrated how the buy-bust happened, and that the
shabu
sold was presented and identified in court. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Joselito Esmallaner, identified
appellant as the seller of the shabu. Esmallaner’s testimony was corroborated by the team leader,
SPO3 Leneal Matias. The white crystalline substance weighing 0.03 grams which was bought
from
appellant for ₱100.00 was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) per
Chemistry
Report No. D-733-03E.
In this jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-bust operation is a common and accepted mode of
apprehending those involved in the illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been
proven
to be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug dealers and of luring them out of
obscurity. 49  Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust
team
were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their
testimonies on
the operation deserve full faith and credit. 50
In the case at bar, we find the testimonies of PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias
credible. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and
which
involve credibility are accorded respects when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts
and
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speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The
reason
for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having
heard
their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 51  The
rule
finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of
Appeals. 52  Finding no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals,
we stand by their findings.
We, likewise, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Said
presumption was not overcome, as there was no evidence showing that PO1 Joselito Esmallaner
and SPO3 Leneal Matias were impelled by improper motive. Appellant and his common-law
wife
testified that the members of the buy-bust team were complete strangers. 53
Appellant’s defense that there was no buy-bust operation deserves scant consideration. Having
been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted.
Against
the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s plain denial of the offenses
charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail. 54  Being
his
common-law wife, we find Gina Dean not to be a credible witness. Appellant said three of his
neighbors witnessed the violent entry made by the policemen in his house, but he failed to
present
them or any of them to prove his point.
Appellant was, likewise, charged with possession of three sachets of shabu with a total weight of
0.29 gram. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in
 
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 55  All
these
elements have been established.

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SPO3 Leneal Matias narrated how he discovered the three pieces of heat-sealed transparent
plastic
sachets containing a white crystalline substance and other drug paraphernalia on top of a small
chair
(bangkito) in the house of appellant.
Q. After the accused handed something to PO1 Esmallaner, what else happened?
A. I saw PO1 Esmallaner try to grab the hand of the accused, but the accused was able to
run inside their house, and tried to close the door, sir.
Q. As a member of the back-up team upon seeing this incident, what did you do, if any?
A. We gave support to PO1 Esmallaner, sir.
Q. Will you please tell us what kind of support did you give to PO1 Esmallaner?
A. To arrest the accused, sir.
Q. What did you do in particular?
A. PO1 Esmallaner followed the accused inside me and my group followed Esmallaner also
inside the house, sir.
Q. So, in other words you, and your co-members also went inside the house?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When [you] went inside the house, what did you find out if any?
A. PO1 Esmallaner accosted the accused, while I discovered three (3) pieces of heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing undetermined amount of white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu, and other paraphernalia on top of the small "bangkito," sir.
Q. Were these three (3) sachet and paraphernalia were scattered on the small "bangkito?
"
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what did you do, if any when you discovered the presence of these items?
A. I confiscated it and then I marked it, sir.
Q. When you said it what would this?
A. The drug paraphernalia, and the heat plastic sachet, sir.
Q. Could you remember one by one what are those paraphernalia that you confiscated and
marked it?

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A. The paraphernalia are two (2) disposable lighter colored red and yellow, six (6) pieces of
small stripe of aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu improvised water pipe used as
tooter, improvised burner, wooden sealer, and the three (3) pieces heat plastic sachet,
fourteen (14) pieces of transparent plastic sachet. That is all I can remember, sir.
Q. Did you place markings on that items that you confiscated?
A. Yes, sir. 56
Appellant was indeed the owner of these items for they were found in his house on top of the
bangkito following the buy-bust operation and after his arrest. The substance in the plastic
sachets
was shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E. Finally, the drug paraphernalia
seized
are sufficient to prove that appellant also violated Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Reviewing the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we find
them
to be in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00303 dated 31 August 2006 which affirmed in toto the
decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154, convicting accused-appellant Alvin
Panganiban Pringas of Violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

 
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AS
AMENDED BY R.A. 3047 AND B.P. BLG. 195 –
Digested by CONCHITA R. MADDELA

FRANKLIN P. BAUTISTA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 136082, May 12, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J:
 

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Facts:
 
Petitioner Franklin P. Bautista, incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Malita, Davao del Sur,
was charged for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019. The letter-complaint, which was
prepared by the Contractors Association of Davao del Sur and initiated by the Good Government
Employees of Davao del Sur,
alleged, among others, that petitioner caused the hiring of one hundred and
ninety-two (192) casual employees in the municipal government for political
considerations and that the payment of their honoraria and salaries was charged to the peace and
order fund of the municipality.
 
Despite arguing in his counter-affidavit that the hiring of 192 casual employees and the use of
the peace and order fund for their honoraria and salaries did not justify the charges filed against
him, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO II) Corazon A. Arancon, in his Resolution, found a prima
facie case for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, which was approved by the Ombudsman.
An Information for such violation was filed against the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan,
which read –
 
[…] the abovenamed accused, a high ranking public officer, being the Mayor,
Municipality of Malita, Davao del Sur, while in the performance of his official functions,
taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office, with
manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally caused the
hiring of some one hundred ninety-two (192) casual employees in flagrant disregard of
Secs. 288 and 289 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), the
honoraria and salaries of whom were charged to the peace and order fund and to the
project component and other services activity fund, respectively and which represented
72.5% of the total personnel services expenditures, thereby giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference to the said casuals, causing undue injury to the Municipality of
Malita.
 
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, stating that the acts charged did not constitute
the offense indicated in Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, and that more than one (1) offense was
charged in the Information – the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to the
casual employees in question and causing undue injury to the Municipality. The Sandiganbayan
denied the Motion by stating that all the essential elements for the crime charged were
sufficiently alleged in the Information which charged only 1 offense.
 
 
Issue:
 
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the
Information despite the fact that there were two (2) offenses charged, and as such, should be
charged in separate Informations.
 
Ruling:
 

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No, the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Information
since the latter was only charged with 1 offense.
 
There were two (2) ways of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, namely, (a) by causing undue
injury to any party, including the Government, and (b) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that
either act qualifies as a violation, or as different modes of committing the offense (Santiago v.
Garchitorena). This does not indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather,
that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.
 
For hiring 192 casuals and the charging of their honoraria and salaries to the peace and order
fund, the petitioner gave them unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference and caused undue
injury to the Municipality of Malita; or thereby caused undue injury to the Municipality of
Malita. In either case, the Information will not suffer any defect, as it is clear that petitioner is
charged with violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, as amended, with either mode of
commission obtaining or with both manners of violation concurring.
 
 
 
JOSE REYES Y VACIO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 177105-06, August 4, 2010
BERSAMIN, J:
 
Facts:
 
Belen Lopez Vda. de Guia (Belen) was the registered absolute owner of two parcels of
agricultural land with an area of 197,594 square meters located in Santa Barbara, Baliwag,
Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 209298 of the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan. On March 19, 1975, Belen's son, Carlos de Guia (Carlos), forged a deed of sale, in
which he made it appear that his mother had sold the land to him. The Register of Deeds of
Bulacan cancelled TCT No. 209298 and issued TCT No. 210108 in Carlos’ name.
 
On March 20, 1975, Carlos sold the land to Ricardo San Juan (Ricardo). The latter registered the
deed of sale in the Registry, which cancelled TCT No. 210108 and issued TCT No. 210338 in
Ricardo’s name. He subsequenty mortgaged the land to Simeon Yangco (Simeon).
 
Upon learning the transfers of her land, Belen filed a civil action for cancellation of sale,
reconveyance, and damages against Carlos, Ricardo and Simeon, before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Baliwag, Bulacan but was dismissed. Her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC) was also dismissed for non-payment of docket fees.
 
Ricardo executed a deed of reconveyence in favor of the tenants. Due to this, TCT No. 210338
was cancelled and TCT No. 301375 was issued in the names of the tenants. The land was
subdivided into several lots, and individual TCTs were issued in the names of the tenants. Upon
discovering for the first time that her appeal had been dismissed for non-payment of docket fees,
Belen filed a motion to reinstate her appeal. The IAC granted the appeal (AC-GR CV-02883),

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declaring as null and void the deed of sale executed by and between Belen and Carlos, ordering
Ricardo to to reconvey to Belen the lands, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to
cancel and/or annul TCT No. 210338 and 210108 and to reinstate TCT No. 209298 in the name
of Belen. The IAC decision became final on March 15, 1986.
 
On December 18, 1986,Belen filed a motion for execution before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) which was subsequently granted. Upon learning about the deed of reconveyance, she also
filed before the a motion to declare Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court for
circumventing the final and executory judgment. The RTC held the latter in contempt of court
and ordered each of them to pay Php 200.00. Despite their appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the RTC order with modifications.
 
Meanwhile, Belen, through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Melba G. Valenzuela (Melba),
filed in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for
ejectment and collection of rents against the tenants. Petitioner Jose Reyes Y Vacio, as
Provincial Adjudicator, dismissed her complaint in favor of the tenants; the TCTs issued in the
name of the tenants, respectively, were consequently affirmed (DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88).
Despite the appeal and the urgent motion to set aside the writ of execution (following the grant
of the tenant’s motion for execution), DARAB Central Office affirmed the petitioner’s ruling on
October 24, 1994.
 
In due course, the CA reversed and set aside the decision, and was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
 
On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations in the
Sandiganbayan, one charging the petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for
“acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality [when he] willfully, unlawfully and
criminally render his decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 favorable to the tenants […]
thereby ignoring and disregarding the final and executory CA decision in AC-GR CV-02883
which declared [Belen] as the true owner of the lands subject of the litigation […]”. He was also
charged with usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Despite pleading not guilty to each Information, the Sandiganbayan found the petitioner
guilty of both charges.
 
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his
decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL-88 when he disregarded the final and executory decision
of the CA and declared Belen as the true owner of the 2 parcels of lands.
 
Ruling:
 
Yes, the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 when he disregarded the final
and executory decision of the CA and declared Belen as the true owner of the 2 parcels of lands
in his Decision.
 
The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following:

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 1.   The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions;
2.   He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3.   His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
 
The petitioner was a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB discharging the duty of adjudicating
the conflicting claims of Parties when he rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL-
88. This establishes the first element.
 
The second element includes the different and distinct modes by which the
offense is committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence. Proof of the existence of any of the modes suffices to warrant conviction under
Section 3 (e).
 
Manifest partiality, which is synonymous with bias, exists when the accused has a clear,
notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or one person rather than another.
 
The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 Decision, having
actually admitted to having read and examined the following documents, to wit: (1) Belen's
position paper in the DARAB Case in which she stated that the decision in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883 had become final and executory; (2) The entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883; (3) Belen's TCT No. 209298, reflecting the entry of judgment issued in AC-G.R. CV No.
02883 and the cancellation of the TCTs of the tenants, and (4) Addendum to Belen's position
paper, mentioning the decree in the AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 Decision. He thereby exhibited
manifest partiality when he rendered his decision in the DARAB Case that completely
contradicted and disregarded the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883. His granting the tenants'
motion for execution made his partiality towards the tenants and bias against Belen.
 
Similiarly, the petitioner's evident bad faith displayed itself by his arrogant refusal to recognize
and obey the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, despite his obligation as Provincial
Adjudicator to abide by the CA's ruling.
 
Lastly, the expenses incurred by Belen and the needless prejudicial delay in the termination of
the cases unduly deprived her of exclusive ownership over the parcels of land. This sufficiently
establishes the third element.
ROLANDO E. SISON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403, March 9, 2010
CORONA, J:
 
On July 18, 1994, state auditor Elsa E. Pajayon conducted a post-audit investigation which
revealed that during petitioner Rolando E. Sison's incumbency as municipal mayor of Calintaan,
Occidental Mindoro, no public bidding was conducted for the purchase of a Toyota LandCruiser,
one hundred nineteen (119) bags of Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain

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constructionmaterials, two (2) Desert Dueler tires, and a computer and its accessories. Pajayon
alsofound out that there were irregularities in the documents supporting the acquisitions.
 
Along with Municipal Treasurer Rigoberto de Jesus, petitioner was indicted before the
Sandiganbayan in seven (7) separate Informations for 7 counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019 to which the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Accused de Jesus has remained at large.
 
During the presentation of evidence, the petitioner was called to the witness stand where he
admitted that no public bidding was conducted and that the purchases were done through
personal canvass. He further stated that no public bidding could be conducted because all the
dealers of the items were based in Manila; it was useless to invite bidders since nobody would
bid anyway.
 
The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as charged. A warrant of arrest was also issued
against de Jesus. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, praying for an acquittal because his
guilt was not allegedly proven beyond reasonable doubt.
 
Issue:
 
Whether or not petitioner is guilty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 when, during his
incumbency as municipal mayor, personal canvass instead of a public bidding was effected by
the petitioner for the purchase of the items.
 
Ruling:
 
Yes, the petitioner is guilty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for effecting a personal
canvass instead of a public bidding for the purchase of a a Toyota LandCruiser, 119 bags of
Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain constructionmaterials, 2 Desert Dueler tires,
and a computer and its accessories.
To be found guilty under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the following elements must concur:
1.   The offender is a public officer;
2.   The act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or
judicial functions;
3.   The act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
4.   The public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
 
It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the case at bar. The third element may
be committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts
mentioned in Section 3 (e) is enough to convict.
 
Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong.
It is a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will, and partakes of the nature
of fraud. In this case, the petitioner’s admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the

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suppliers already contained his signatures and that he knew about the provisions of RA 7160 on
personal canvass but he did not follow the law because he was merely following the practice of
his predecessors was an admission of a mindless disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality,
which is truly unacceptable. As municipal mayor, he should have been the first to follow the law
and see to it that it was followed by his constituency to assure the public that despotic, irregular
or unlawful transactions in the acquisition of government items do not occur.
 
Lastly, the fact that the petitioner repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on
personal canvass proves that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the
winning suppliers. This establishes the fourth element.
 
 
ELIAS C. QUIBAL AND ANTONIO U. DENIEGA VS THEHON. SANDIGANBAYAN
(SECOND DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 109991, May 22, 1995
PUNO, J:
 
On November 27, 1987, the municipality of Palapag, Northern Samar, represented by its OIC
vice-mayor Teodoro C. Bello, entered into a contract  with the Floters Construction Company,
represented by accused Eduardo C. Guevarra, for the construction of the municipal public
market. The period for the completion of the project was one hundred (100) days and was set
with a price of Php 652,562.60. From February 16  to April 12, 1988, petitioners Mayor Elias C.
Quibal and Municipal
Treasurer Antonio U. Deniega, issued four (4) PNB checks in favor of the contractor in the total
amount of P650,000.00. However, sometime in June 1988, after receipt of said payments, the
contractor abandoned the project.
 
On August 31, 1988, a COA Special Audit Team inspected the progress of the construction of
the market and found out that only about 36.24% of the construction of has been completed
despite the lapse of the contract period. The actual cost of the finished work on the project was
only P301,746.65, with the value of the unfinished work evaluated at  Php 348,235.35. It was
also established that the contractor had already been paid Php 650,000.00 despite the non-
completion of the building; its accompanying disbursement vouchers were also not properly
filled-up  (e.g. unsigned by the Deniega) and the required supporting documents were not
attached. The disbursement vouchers. Likewise, the payment to the contractor in the amount of
Php 340,000.00 was not accompanied by any Certificate of Acceptance issued by the COA, as
required. After the submission of an inspection report by Provincial Auditor Marissa Bayona to
the COA Regional Director, the Ombudsman informed petitioner Quibal of the charges filed
against him by the COA. The latter’s request for a re-audit was also denied.
 
Sometime in November 1989, petitioners still continued the construction of the municipal
market; this was completed at the end of December 1989.
 
Petitioner Deniega admitted that he disbursed P650,000.00 to the contractor but claimed that he
submitted complete and signed vouchers and the required supporting documents to the Office of

216 | P a g e
the Provincial Auditor. Furthermore, he insisted that the unsigned vouchers presented in court by
the prosecution were not the vouchers which supported the payments they made.
 
For his part, petitioner Quibal explained that he paid the contractor more than his accomplished
work to enable the latter to immediately purchase construction materials which were then selling
at a low price and further maintained that the audit team should have included the value of these
construction materials (still unused at the time of audit) in its evaluation of the project, which
were worth approximately Php 348,235.35, justifying his payments to thecontractor.
 
After trial on the merits, respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division) promulgated a Decision
finding accused public officials guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In their petition before the
Supreme Court, petitioners insist their guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt for
they did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence nor
did they cause any injury or damage to the municipal government for the construction of the
municipal market was eventually completed.
 
Issue:
 
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not resolving that the guilt of the petitioners has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt because petitioners did not act with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence.
 
Ruling:
 
No, the Sandiganbayan did not err in not resolving that the guilt of the petitioners has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt because petitioners did not act with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence.
 
Gross negligence is the pursuit of a course of conduct which would naturally and reasonably
result in injury. It is an utter disregard of or conscious indifference to consequences. In cases
involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.
 
Petitioners' acts and omissions demonstrated an utter lack of care in enforcing the contract for the
construction of the public market and a reckless disregard of the COA rules and regulations
regarding disbursement of municipal funds. Petitioners contend that they released P650,000.00
of the contract price to enable the contractor to take advantage of the low cost of construction
materials prevailing at that time. Plainly petitioners' act violates the provision of the contract
requiring that payment shall be made on the basis of the percentage of completion of the project.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, “The escalation of prices of
construction materials which allegedly prompted Quibal to pay the contractor prematurely is not
a justification that would absolve [him] from criminal liability. The parties could have included
an escalation clause in the contract […] Moreover, there is a law which authorizes
the adjustment of contract price (R.A. 5979, as amended by PD No. 454)”
 
 

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ODON PECHO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 111399, November 14, 1994
DAVIDE, JR., J:
 
Odon Pecho, a Customs Guard of the Miscellaneous Bonded Warehouse Division, Bureau of
Customs, along with private individual Jose Catre, went to the office of customs broker
Constantino Calica and introduced themselves as duly authorized representatives of Eversun
Commercial Trading. For an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of the authorized brokerage
fee, Pecho and Catre engaged with Calica to prepare and file with the Bureau of Customs (BOC)
the necessary Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration covering Eversun's shipment,
which was declared as two (2) agricultural disc blades and three (3) irrigation water pumps with
the computed taxes and duties amounting to Php 53,164.00.
 
On March 16, 1989 Dennis Calica, son of Constantino and also a custom broker, proceeded to
the Entry Processing Division of the Bureau of Customs of the Manila International Container
Port (MICP) and filed the import entry and internal revenue declaration and other supportive
documents. On March 21, 1989 Dennis and Catre met for the processing of the examination
request, which was addressed by BOC Chief Intelligence Officer Baltazar Morales to the BOC
District Intelligence Officer for a one hundred percent (100%) examination of the shipment
consigned to Eversun Commercial Trading. After a spot check on the questioned shipment by
Customs Senior Agent Ruperto Santiago, it was discovered that the contents contained three
hundred (300) units of automotive diesel engines, contrary to what was stated in the import entry
and revenue declaration. The computation of the taxes made by Customs Appraiser Mamerto
Fernandez also showed a discrepancy in the total amount of P1,027,321.00. Consequently, a hold
order and a warrant of seizure and detention were issued by the District Collector of BOC. Their
verification with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) disclosed that Eversun Commercial Trading is a non-existent firm and that
the tax account number used by Eversun in making the Import Entry Declaration was non-
existent.
 
After appropriate preliminary investigation, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan
which concluded that all elements of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 are present in the case, to wit:
 
1.   The accused is a public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with him;
2.   Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his official
duties or in relation to his public position;
3.   He causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or private party;
4.   Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such parties; and
5.   The public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
 
Issue:
 
1.   Whether or not the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 committed by the
petitioners reached only the attempted stage.

218 | P a g e
 2.   Whether or not an attempted violation of such provision subject the petitioners to the
same penalty as if he hadcommitted the consummated crime.
 
Ruling:
 
1. Yes, the violation committed by the petitioners reached only the attempted stage because the
perpetrators had commenced the commission of the offense directly by overt acts but failed to
perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony as a consequence by
reason or some cause other than their own spontaneous desistance, namely, the 100%
examination and the subsequent issuance of a hold order and a warrant of seizure and detentionof
alert customs officials before the release of the cargoes.
 
2. No, an attempted violation of such provision does not subject the petitioners to the same
penalty as if he had committed the consummated crime.
 
It has already been established that the third element of the offense, which is "causing undue
injury to any party, including the Government, was absent due to the timely intervention of the
alert customs officials.
 
There are two principal reasons why Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, can be said to
penalize only consummated offenses.
 
Firstly, the penalty imposed therefor per Section 9 is “imprisonment for not less than six (6)
years and one (1) month nor more than fifteen (15) years, perpetual disqualification from office,
and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.” The
imposable imprisonment penalty does not have the nomenclature and duration of any specific
penalty in the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there can be no valid basis for the application
of, inter alia, Articles 50 and 51 on the penalty to be imposed on the principal of a frustrated and
attempted felony. The penalty of perpetual disqualification is onlyfrom office, unlike either the
perpetual absolute andperpetual special disqualifications under Articles 30 and 31 of the
RevisedPenal Code.
 
Secondly, the third element of Section 3(e) used the word ‘causing’, which is thepresent
participle of the word ‘cause’. As a verb, the latter means “to be the cause or occasion of; to
effect as an agent; to bring about; to bring into existence; to make to induce; to compel.” The
word ‘undue’means "more than necessary”; And the word injury means "any wrong or damage
done to another or the invasion of any legally protected interest of another."Taken together,
proof of actual injury or damage is required. Thus, in Alejandro vs. People, which involves a
prosecution for the violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, as amended, this Court, in
acquitting the accused declared, “there should be undue injury caused to any party [however] the
decision of the respondent Sandiganbayan  [recognized] that there was no proof of damage
caused to the employees of the hospital […]”.
 
Since no actual injury or damage having been caused to the Government due to the timely 100%
examination of the shipment and the subsequent issuance of a hold order and a warrant of seizure

219 | P a g e
and detention, the petitioner must, perforce, be acquitted of the violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019.
 
 
 

Republic Act No. 7080  July 12, 1991  AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE
CRIME OF PLUNDER

Digested by:  Victoria Manguilin

 
 
G.R. No. 136916. December 14, 1999]
FLEURDELIZ B. ORGANO, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and the JAIL WARDEN OF
MANILA, Respondents.
Facts:
"In an Information filed before the Sandiganbayan on August 15, 1997, Dominga S.
Manalili,
Teopisto A. Sapitula, Jose DP. Marcelo, Lilia B. Organo, Gil R. Erencio, Reynaldo S. Enriquez
and Luis S. Se, Jr. were charged with the violation of RA No. 7080 (Plunder) committed as
follows:
That on or about 05 November 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dominga S. Manalili,
Teofisto A. Sapitula, Joel DP. Marcelo, Lilia B. Organo, being then public officers and taking
advantage of their official positions as employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Region 7,
Quezon City, and Gil R. Erencio, Reynaldo S. Enriquez and Luis S. Se, Jr., conspiring,
confabulating and confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass and acquire funds belonging to the National Government by opening an
unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the Philippines, West Triangle Branch,
Diliman, Quezon City, for and in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and deposit therein
money belonging to the government of the Philippines, consisting of revenue tax payments then
withdraw therefrom the sum of Pesos: One Hundred Ninety Three Million Five Hundred Sixty
Five Thousand Seventy Nine & 64/100 (P193,565,079.64) Philippine Currency, between
November, 1996 to February, 1997, without proper authority, through checks made payable to
themselves and/or the sole proprietorship firms of the above-named private persons, thereby
succeeding in misappropriating, converting, misusing and/or malversing said public funds
tantamount to a raid on the public treasury, to their own personal gains, advantages and benefits,
to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 24100, was raffled to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
On August 20, 1997, Lilia B. Organo filed a Motion to Quash Information for lack of jurisdiction
and to defer the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Thereafter, with the creation of [the] 4th and 5th Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the case was
unloaded to the respondent court, 4th Division.

220 | P a g e
On September 29, 1997, respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused in
Criminal Case No. 24100.
 
On October 1, 1997, Organo filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and /or Quash Warrant of Arrest
Pending Resolution on the Issue of Lack of Jurisdiction and Other Incidents. The motion was
opposed by the prosecution.
In a Resolution dated November 20, 1997, respondent court denied Organo's motion.
On December 9, 1997, Organo filed with the respondent court a Motion for Reconsideration of
the November 20, 1997 Resolution.
On April 28, 1998, respondent court denied Organo's Motion for Reconsideration ruling as
follows:
The Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9, 1997 filed by accused Lilia Organo, through
counsel, is hereby denied, there being no valid and compelling reason to set aside our Resolution
dated November 28, 1997 denying her Motion to Quash Information for Lack of Jurisdiction.
Besides, accused movant is still a fugitive from justice and continues to evade arrest so that
jurisdiction over her person has not yet been acquired by this Court.
Hence, movant Organo has no right to file with this Court her said Motion to Quash which was
denied, and subsequently her subject Motion for Reconsideration.
Movant Organo should first surrender and place her person under the jurisdiction of this Court
before she may file any further pleading with this Court.
With the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Organo filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against herein
respondents People of the Philippines and the 4 th  Division of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
alleges in the main that respondent court has no jurisdiction over a case of plunder if the officials
or employees fall below salary grade 27 and that respondent court gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in failing to act on her motion to Quash before issuing a
warrant of arrest. x x x.
With the warrant of arrest issued by the respondent court, Organo was arrested and detained by
the National Bureau of Investigation in its detention cell. Thereafter, she was transferred to the
Manila City Jail. 3
Issue: Does the Respondent Court, the Honorable Sandiganbayan, have jurisdiction over a case
of plunder when none of the accused occupy Salary Grade 27 or higher as provided under
Republic Act No. 6758
Held: The Petition is meritorious.
True, Section 3 of Republic Act 7080, the law penalizing plunder, states that [u]ntil otherwise
provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. When the crime charged was allegedly committed, however, already in effect
were RA 7975 5  and RA 8249, 6  which confined the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to public
officials
 
with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Since not one of the accused occupies such position, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 24100.
We agree. The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over petitioners mother and the other accused in
Criminal Case No. 24100 has been resolved by the Supreme Court in Lilia B. Organo v.
Sandiganbayan. 7  In that case, we ruled that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
crime

221 | P a g e
of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. The Court explained that the crime of plunder
defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was provisionally
placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan until otherwise provided by law. Republic
Act No. 8249, enacted on February 5, 1997, is the special law that provided for the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan otherwise than that prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080. (Italics supplied)
Section 4 of RA 8249 is reproduced in full as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office
of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
 
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may

222 | P a g e
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
It is true that a violation of RA 7080 penalizing plunder is not mentioned in Section 4 (a) of RA
8249. However, the crime falls squarely under Section 4 (b), which we again quote below:
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
Plunder is clearly a crime committed by public officials in relation to their office. Hence, there is
no doubt that this crime is covered by Section 4 (b). Clearly, RA 7080 was impliedly repealed by
RA 8249, such that prosecutions for plunder are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan only when the
accused is a public official with Salary Grade 27 or higher.
 
[G.R. No. 133535. September 9, 1999]
LILIA B. ORGANO, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facxts:
On August 15, 1997,., an Information against petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, together
with others, for the crime of "plunder" or violation of R. A. No. 7080, as amended by
R. A. No.
7659.
On August 20, 1997, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash information for
lack of jurisdiction, contending that the Sandiganbayan no longer had jurisdiction over the case
under R. A. 8249, approved on February 5, 1997.
On September 29, 1997, without first resolving petitioner's motion to quash information,
the
Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against all the accused in the case.
On November 28, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion
to
quash the information for lack of merit.
On December 9, 1997, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration.
On April 28, 1998, after one hundred forty (140) days from its filing, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration ruling that she should first
surrender to
the court before she may file any further pleading with the court.
At issue is whether the Sandiganbayan at the time of the filing of the information on August 15,
1997 had jurisdiction over the case, in view of the enactment on February 5, 1997 of Republic
Act No. 8249, vesting in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over offenses and felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by public officers and employees mentioned
in subsection (a) of Section 4 in relation to their office where the accused holds a position with
salary grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
Petitioner contends that since none of the accused holds a position with Salary Grade
"27" and
higher, jurisdiction over the case falls with the Regional Trial Court.
On the other hand, respondent Sandiganbayan's position is that Republic Act No. 7080
which

223 | P a g e
defines and penalizes the crime of "plunder" vests in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
thereof, and
since it is a special law, it constitutes an exception to the general law, Republic Act No. 8249.
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdictiom over the case?
Held:
 
This latest enactment collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
It is a special law enacted to declog the Sandiganbayan of "small fry" cases. In an
unusual
manner, the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on
the penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and
salary grade of accused government officials and employees.
However, the crime of "plunder" defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Republic Act
No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "until
otherwise
provided by law." 10  Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5, 1997 is the special
law that
provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "otherwise" than that prescribed
in Republic
Act No. 7080.
Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder
unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade
"27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act
No. 6758) in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though none of the accused occupied positions with
Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, entitling
petitioner to the relief prayed for.
 
Issuesdtgdfgfg
 
G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First
Division), Respondents
FACTS:
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and
Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and  PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other
officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges were later dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and

224 | P a g e
Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under
Section 2 (b)  of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
 
The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the
Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all public officers
committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their
respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public
treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which
were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was
strong.
 
After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas  then separately filed their
demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against
them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to
show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration
filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective
petitions for certiorari.
 
ISSUES:
Procedural:
1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the
demurrers to evidence.
Substantive:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently   established the existence of conspiracy among GMA,
Aguas, and Uriarte ;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder: (a)
Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total
amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate act of raiding the public
treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?
RULING:
Re procedural issue:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order
issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order
denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not
be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to
this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the
demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal
the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal
that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do

225 | P a g e
so “x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of
the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are
to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’
So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.”
The exercise of this power to correct  grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted
by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is
because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion
whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character
and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could
avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence
of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
 
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions
prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege
that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel
conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
 
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February
26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient
if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the
basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding
would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking
about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but
rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080
as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not
only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because it was
essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the
charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to
suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the facts that constituted the offense charged.
Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the
Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the
mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even
worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.
 
In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to
the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be

226 | P a g e
informed of the charges against each of them.
Re second substantive issues:
(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50
Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead
to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired
ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence
showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest
possibility that the CIFs [Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted
to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
 
(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury
 (under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds [See
Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory
construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase
that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by
considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is
associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own;
to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a
good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;”
and malversation occurs when “any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds
all the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that
raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the
property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the property
taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation
and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the
maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the
property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE
the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6,
2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’ respective demurrers to evidence;

227 | P a g e
DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the
immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs
of suit.
 
G.R. No. 219162
RAMON "BONG" B. REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts: The cases before us stemmed from the Information dated 5 June 2014 filed by the Office
of the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan charging petitioners Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles,
among others, with the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7080, as amended. The Amended Information 8  reads:
In 2006 to 2010, or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court's
jurisdiction,
above-named accused RAMON "BONG" BAUTISTA REVILLA, JR., then a
Philippine Senator
and RICHARD ABDON CAMBE, then DIRECTOR III at the Office of Senator Revilla, Jr.,
both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring
with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN B. LIM, and JOHN
RAYMUND S. DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass,
accumulate and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least TWO HUNDRED TWENTY
FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php224,512,500.00), through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:
a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after
the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and REVILLA, JR. and/or CAMBE received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from REVILLA, JR.'s Priority
Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of REVILLA, JR.'s endorsement, directly or
through
CAMBE, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES' non-government
organizations
which became the recipients and/or target implementors of REVILLA, JR.'s PDAF
projects,
which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to
misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Napoles and Cambe pleaded not guilty to the charge against them, while
petitioner Revilla refused to enter any plea; thus, the Sandiganbayan entered a plea of not guilty
in his behalf pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution 11  dated 19 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against
Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles. On the same day, Revilla voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and filed a Motion to Elect Detention Facilities Ad Cautelam praying for

228 | P a g e
his detention at the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame. On 20 June 2014, Cambe also
voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and filed an Urgent Motion to Commit Accused to
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) 13  pending trial of the case.
 
In two separate Resolutions 14  both dated 20 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan ordered the turn
over
of Revilla and Cambe to the PNP CIDG, Camp Crame, Quezon City for detention at its PNP
Custodial Center Barracks.
 
Revilla assails the Resolution dated 5 February 2015 of the Sandiganbayan granting the
prosecution's motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the
Resolution dated 28 May 2015 denying his motion for reconsideration.
 
Issues:
1) Revilla alleged that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the State's Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a
writ of
preliminary attachment considering that:
 
A. the issuance of the assailed writ is erroneous and premature. The plunder law does
not allow the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, as it amounts to a
prejudgment and violates petitioner's constitutional rights to presumption of
innocence and due process; and
 
Held:
We find that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment against
Revilla's monies and properties.
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by RA 10660, provides that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction to jointly determine in the same proceeding the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability, considering that the filing of the
criminal action before the Sandiganbayan is deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the
civil action. The same law provides that the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court
shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Rules of Court state
that the provisional remedies in civil actions, insofar as they are applicable, may be availed of in
connection with the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action.
The grounds for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment have been provided in Rule
57 and Rule 127 of the Rules of Court. Rule 127 states that the provisional remedy of attachment
on the property of the accused may be availed of to serve as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered from the accused when the criminal action is based on a claim
for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the
accused who is a public officer, in the course of his employment as such, or when the
accused has concealed, removed or disposed of his property or is about to do so. Similarly,
Rule 57 provides that attachment may issue: "x x x (b) in an action for money or property
embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer x x x;
(c) in an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained or

229 | P a g e
converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or
 
disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person; x x
x." 96
It is indispensable for the writ of preliminary attachment to issue that there exists a prima
facie factual foundation for the attachment of properties, and an adequate and fair opportunity to
contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Considering the harsh and rigorous
nature of a writ of preliminary attachment, the court must ensure that all the requisites of the law
have been complied with; otherwise, the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.
Thus, for the ex-parte issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment to be valid, an affidavit of
merit and an applicant's bond must be filed with the court in which the action is
pending. For the
affidavit of merit, Section 3 of the same rule states that: "[a]n order of attachment shall be
granted only when it is made to appear by the affidavit of the applicant or some other person who
personally knows of the facts that a sufficient cause of action exists, that the case is one of those
mentioned in Section 1 hereof, that there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be
enforced by the action, and that the amount due to applicant or the value of the property the
possession of which he is entitled to recover is as much as the sum for which the order is granted
above all legal counterclaims." The mere filing of an affidavit reciting the facts required by
Section 3, however, is not enough to compel the judge to grant the writ of preliminary
attachment. Whether or not the affidavit sufficiently established facts therein stated is a question
to be determined by the court in the exercise of its discretion.The sufficiency or insufficiency of
an affidavit depends upon the amount of credit given it by the judge, and its acceptance or
rejection, upon his sound discretion. On the requirement of a bond, when the State is the
applicant, the filing of the attachment bond is excused.
We find that the Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction since all the requisites for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment have been complied with.
Revilla, while still a public officer, is charged with plunder, committed by amassing,
accumulating, and acquiring ill-gotten wealth, through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts, as follows:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
 
other form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or

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6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence
to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. 104  (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the crime of plunder is based on a claim for public funds or property misappropriated,
converted, misused, or malversed by the accused who is a public officer, in the course of his
employment as such. The filing of the criminal action for plunder, which is within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, 105  is deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the
civil
action. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary attachment is an available provisional remedy in the
criminal action for plunder.
Even assuming that plunder is not based on a claim for public funds or property misappropriated,
converted, misused or malversed by the public officer, the prosecution nevertheless alleged that
Revilla has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, which is
another ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. The AMLC report,
attached to the Motion, states that many investment and bank accounts of Revilla were
"terminated immediately before and after the PDAF scandal circulated in [the]
media," and
Revilla himself publicly confirmed that he closed several bank accounts when the PDAF scam
was exposed. Revilla failed to rebut these allegations with any evidence.
Considering that the requirements for its issuance have been complied with, the issuance of
the writ of preliminary attachment by the Sandiganbayan is in order.
B .There is neither legal nor factual basis for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment
or garnishment.
 
Held:
a writ of preliminary attachment may issue even without a hearing. Section 2, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court states that: "[a]n order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon
motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the
property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as
may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless such party makes deposit or
gives a
bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the
amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the property to be
attached as
stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs. x x x
 
application for preliminary attachment is not generally necessary unless otherwise directed by
the trial court in its discretion." In the same case, the Court declared that "[n]othing
in the Rules
of Court makes notice and hearing indispensable and mandatory requisites for the issuance of a
writ of attachment." Moreover, there is an obvious need to avoid alerting suspected
possessors of
"ill-gotten" wealth and thereby cause that disappearance or loss of property precisely
sought to
be prevented. 112  In any case, Revilla was given an adequate and fair opportunity to contest its

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issuance.
Also, contrary to Revilla's allegation, there is no need for a final judgment of ill-gotten
wealth,
and a preliminary attachment is entirely different from the penalty of forfeiture imposed upon the
final judgment of conviction under Section 2 of RA 7080. By its nature, a preliminary
attachment is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching
party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action;
it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during the
pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain
rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in
the case. The remedy of attachment is provisional and temporary, designed for particular
exigencies, attended by no character of permanency or finality, and always subject to the control
of the issuing court.
On the other hand, Section 2 of RA 7080 requires that upon conviction, the court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of
the State. The State may avail of the provisional remedy of attachment to secure the preservation
of these unexplained wealth and income, in the event that a judgment of conviction and forfeiture
is rendered. The filing of an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is a
necessary incident in forfeiture cases. It is needed to protect the interest of the government and to
prevent the removal, concealment, and disposition of properties in the hands of unscrupulous
public officers. Otherwise, even if the government subsequently wins the case, it will be left
holding an empty bag. 1
 
G.R. No. 218232, July 24, 2018
RAMON "BONG" B. REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts: Revilla contends that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's application for admission to bail
despite
the fact that the evidence on record do not show a clear and strong evidence of his guilt for the
crime of plunder
Held:
Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual
opinion and
the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while
allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them
from getting out of control. We have held that discretion is guided by: first, the applicable
provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may
promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the
laws of the land. The discretion of the court, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor
controlled by mandamus save in instances where such discretion has been so exercised in an
arbitrary or capricious manner.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be

232 | P a g e
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court emphasizes that offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offinse punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
The grant or denial of bail in an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, such as plunder,
hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This
requires the conduct of bail hearings where the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong, subject to the right of the defense to cross-examine witnesses and
introduce evidence in its own rebuttal. The court is to conduct only a summary hearing, or such
brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence
for purposes of bail.
 
The order granting or refusing bail which shall thereafter be issued must contain a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution. The summary of the evidence shows that the evidence
presented
during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been presented and most importantly,
considered. The summary of the evidence is the basis for the judge's exercising his judicial
discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in the summary will the
judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong based on his discretion. Thus, judicial discretion is not unbridled but must be supported by
a finding of the facts relied upon to form an opinion on the issue before the court. It must be
exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof
is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim, caprice, and outright arbitrariness.
In the present case, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it denied bail to Cambe and Napoles, upon a finding of strong
evidence that they committed the crime of plunder in conspiracy with one another.
Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following
elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) hereof; and (c) that the
aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00
 
 
 
REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED
VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER

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PURPOSES.
Digested by: ROBERTO BERKEY C. QUINTERO
 
 
 
 
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995 SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood"
and in a
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and
public policy." 1 In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event
and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of
the confrontation made by petitioner
Issue:
WON Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation
Ruling:
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides: Sec. 1. It shall be
unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
 
from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200. Any doubts about the
legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest
by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by
Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill
 
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

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GR No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 [145 SCRA 112]
Facts:
A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito
Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to
Laconico to give their terms for withdrawal of their complaint.
Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to come to his office to
advise him about the proposed settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico requested
appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to
hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. After enumerating the conditions,
several calls were made to finally confirm if the settlement is agreeable to both parties.
As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at
the office of the Department of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the
complainant himself.
After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents of the Philippine
Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the exchange.
Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the
complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant.
In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act as the appellant heard the telephone conversation without complainant's
consent.
Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the Republic Act No.
4200 or also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner contends that telephones or extension
telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or
recording
 
devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by
law.
However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the
term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or
portion of a
complete set of a telephone apparatus.
Issue:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act,
such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line
Ruling:
No.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200
“Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise

235 | P a g e
described.”
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in
the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or
in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.
 
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein,
should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments
the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation of Republic Act
No. 4200.
 
Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National Telecommunications Commission,
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
Facts:
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes
involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and
Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or
airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he
stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations
“found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.”
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by
government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that
they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the “Hello Garci”
taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping

236 | P a g e
Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned
that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a
just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations
issued to the said media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa
Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among
 
others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled
responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the
NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing
the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form
of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
Ruling:
1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and
of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. [T]he great evil which government
wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law.
The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence
falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the
Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity
of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions,
one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the
evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent,
especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner
of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case.
Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would
violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide
 
norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a person’s private
comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their
violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In
fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in
adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious
effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred
status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of

237 | P a g e
speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference
of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court
should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law
should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to
repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free
press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to
uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of
the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a
form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or
followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made
by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent
Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the
regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an
“act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that
should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to
free speech and press.
 
[G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999]
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
 
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City went to the police
station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At
the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim
was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist
blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on
tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the
victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated
discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of
the accused.

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Ruling:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications
(Ramirez v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted
sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended
party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and
must immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a
person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The
exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed
that he had no intent to kill the latter.
 
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
Facts:
During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election
the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC
regional director, regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of
his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the house of
representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court
praying that such playing of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or
the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be
prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there was no
proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the
unlawfully seized documents.
Issue:

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Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further
proceed with their investigation?
Ruling:
 
No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the
House
of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of
publication
of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication is indeed
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in
the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published
in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet
web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
followed by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the
internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original)
of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make the internet a medium
for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated
cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
 
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its
duly
published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the
reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the

240 | P a g e
Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required
publication will put a person’s life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law.
Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their web
page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the
court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to conduct
such inquiry in aid of legislation.
 

 
 
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042 (ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT)
Digested by: Richard Vincent Angangan
 

1.  People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Domingo Panis (G.R No. L-58674-77)
 
FACTS:
 
Four separate criminal complaints were filed against Abug for operating a fee-charging
employment agency without first securing a license for the same. Abug filed a motion to quash
alleging that the information did not charge an offense as he was charged with illegal recruitment
only for one person in each of the four information filed. Abug claimed that 13(b) of the Labor
code is only applicable when two or more persons in any manner were promised or offered any
employment for a fee.
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether the number of persons is an essential element of Illegal Recruitment.
 
RULING:
 
No, the court ruled that the number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the
crime of Illegal Recruitment and Placement of workers, even if only one prospective worker was
involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in
consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the
individual entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the recruitment and
placement of workers. Hence, Abug act of engaging in the recruitment and placement of workers
without the proper license from the POEA constitutes Illegal Recruitment.  
 

 People of the Philippines v. Loma Goce y Olalia, Dan Goce, and Nelly Agustin (G.R. No.
113161)
 

FACTS:
 

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 Four complainants filed an information for Illegal Recruitment committed by herein
accused. On or about and during the period compromised between May 1986 and 25 June 1987,
complainants met accused Nelly Agustin, who presented herself to the former as the manager of
the Clover Placement Agency. Agustin, as complained, presented to the complainants that she is
able to send workers abroad with a promise of employment for a fee, however without any
license or authorization from the POEA.
Accused Agustin, in her defense, allege that she was merely forwarding the complainants to
spouses Goce, her co-accused. Nelly anchored her arguments to the following: a.) her act of
introducing complainants to her co-accused does not fall within the  meaning of illegal
recruitment and placement of workers;  b.)There is no proof of conspiracy to commit illegal
recruitment among her and spouses goce; and c.) There is no proof that she offered to the
complainants or promised overseas employment to the complainants.   
 

ISSUE:
Whether Nelly Agustin is guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale.
 

RULING:
 
Yes, the complainants commonly averred that it was thru Nelly Agustin that they learned
about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they have to submit, and it was after
they had talked to her that they met the spouses Goce, which is a clear evidence of referral. Next,
it was undisputed that Agustin gave the complainants the distinct impression that she had the
capacity to send workers abroad for work, which the former were convinced and gave Agustin
payments. Lastly, the evidence presented by the prosecution clearly establish that Agustin
confabulated with the spouses Goce. All of these, constitutes the act of Illegal Recruitment
committed in large scale.
 

 People of the Philippines v. Benzon Ong (G.R No. 119594)

 

FACTS:
 
Herein accused met the complainants on separate occasions in Baguio city, wherein he 
represented himself to the latter that he has contact in Taiwan, Republic of China, who were
looking for workers. According to the accused, his mother, who was in Taiwan, can help them to
get a job. The accused was able to seal their deal and asked for their placement and processing
fees, in which the complainants promptly complained. Several days after the said payment, the
complainants attempted to inquire the status of their papers but to no avail, because the accused
was nowhere to be found in his office in Baguio City. 
 
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is guilty of Illegal Recruitment and Placement of Workers in Large
Scale.
 

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 RULING:
 
Yes, under the Art. 13 (b) of the Labor code in relation to R.A 8042, "Recruitment and
placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. In the case at bar, the defence of the accused that
he merely suggest them to work abroad constitutes as “referral” under the labor code. Hence, his
act of referring, collecting fees, and promises work abroad for a fee without any license or
authority to so constitutes Illegal Recruitment. Furthermore, Illegal Recruitment is considered to
be committed in large scale when if the same is committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group. In the present case, there are three complainants who were victimized
by the accused. Thus, applying the law, the accused acts falls squarely in the requisites of Illegal
Recruitment committed in large scale.
 

 People of the Philippines v. Corazon Navarra, Rodolfo Navarra Sr., and Job Navarra (G.R No.
119361)   
 

FACTS:
 
Job and Rodolfo, along with Corazon, operated an agency which purported to the authority
to recruit and place workers for employment in Taiwan. The agency during the course of its
business was able to victimized several hapless victims on separate occasions in 1992. Based on
the established facts of the case, the complainants commonly alleged that they sought the aid of
the said agency for purpose of securing a job in Taiwan. They were all required to pay a
placement fee for the promise of job. However, to their dismay, they were never deployed and
sooner discovered that the said agency was not registered under the POEA. The accused, in their
defense, denied all the allegations. 
 
ISSUE:
Whether the accused are guilty of Illegal Recruitment in large scale. 
RULING:
 
Yes, under the Art. 13 (b) of the Labor code in relation to R.A 8042, "Recruitment and
placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. In the case at bar, the mere denial of facts which
is proven by clear and convincing evidence does not sway the judgement. Hence, their act of
collecting fees and promises work abroad for a fee without any license or authority to do so
constitutes Illegal Recruitment. Furthermore, Illegal Recruitment is considered to be committed
in large scale when if the same is committed against three or more persons individually or as a
group. In the present case, there are seven complainants who were victimized by the accused.

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Thus, applying the law, the accused acts falls squarely in the requisites of Illegal Recruitment
committed in large scale.
 

People of the Philippines v. Iluminada Delmo Valle

 
FACTS:
 
Between the period from August 1995 to March 1996 in Makati City, Metro Manila, the
accused represented herself to 89 persons that she has the capacity to send workers to London as
sales ladies, waitresses, service crews, cooks or helpers in a fastfood chains or departments store
for a certain salary, requesting to the said persons a placement and processing fee which the
complainants promptly deliver and paid to the accused. However, to their dismay, they were
never sent abroad nor their applications were processed, further, they later discovered that the
accused was operating without any license or authorization from the POEA. The accused, in her
defense, alleged that she was an employee of a licensed recruitment agency from which she
based her authority.
 
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is guilty of Illegal Recruitment in large scale.
 
RULING:
 
Yes, under the Art. 13 (b) of the Labor code in relation to R.A 8042, "Recruitment and
placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. 
In the case at bar, the defense of the accused bears no merit since she failed to establish her
employer-employee connection from the licensed agency that she claims that she is affiliated.
Hence, her act of collecting fees and promises work abroad for a fee without any license or
authority to do so constitutes Illegal Recruitment. Furthermore, Illegal Recruitment is considered
to be committed in large scale when if the same is committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group. In the present case, there are eighty-nine complainants who were
victimized by the accused. Thus, applying the law, the accused acts falls squarely in the
requisites of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale.

REPUBLIC ACT 9372 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “HUMAN SECURITY

ACT OF 2007”

DIGESTED BY: JADE Q. LACAR

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REPUBLIC v. HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE
GR No. 204603, Sep 24, 2013 ]

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari[1] are the April 23, 2012[2] and July 31, 2012[3] Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92 (RTC) in Special Civil Action (SCA) No.
Q-07-60778, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss (subject motion to dismiss) based on
the
following grounds: (a) that the Court had yet to pass upon the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9372,[4] otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of 2007," in the
consolidated
cases of Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council[5]
(Southern Hemisphere); and (b) that private respondents' petition for declaratory relief was
proper.
Facts :
On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition[6] for declaratory relief before the RTC,
assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3,[7] for being
void for vagueness;[8] (b) Section 7,[9] for violating the right to privacy of communication and
due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships;[10] (c) Section 18,[11] for
violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125[12] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;[13]
(d) Section 26,[14] for violating the right to travel;[15] and (e) Section 27,[16] for violating the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[17]
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings,[18] averring that certain petitions (SC petitions)
raising the issue of RA 9372's constitutionality have been lodged before the Court.[19] The
said
motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007.[20]
On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision[21] in the Southern Hemisphere cases
and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.
On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss,[22] contending that private
respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the
constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere
cases.
In their Comment/Opposition,[23] private respondents countered that: (a) the Court did not
resolve the issue of RA 9372's constitutionality in Southern Hemisphere as the SC petitions
were

dismissed based purely on technical grounds; and (b) the requisites for declaratory relief were
met.
The RTC Ruling
On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order [24] which denied the subject motion to dismiss,
finding that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private
respondents' petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration [25] which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order
dated July 31, 2012.[26] The RTC observed that private respondents have personal and

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substantial interests in the case and that it would be illogical to await the adverse consequences
of the aforesaid law's implementation considering that the case is of paramount impact to
the
Filipino people.[27]
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismiss.
Asserting the affirmative, petitioners argue that private respondents failed to satisfy the
requirements for declaratory relief and that the Court had already sustained with finality the
constitutionality of RA 9372.
On the contrary, private respondents maintain that the requirements for declaratory relief have
been satisfied and that the Court has yet to resolve the constitutionality of RA 9372, negating any
grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part.
Ruling :
The petition is meritorious.
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such
act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.[28] It is well settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as
"grave" must be
so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.[29] In this relation, case law states that not every
error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.[30] The degree of gravity, as above-described, must be met.
Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be

ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents' petition had met all the requisites for an
action
for declaratory relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was altogether
improper.
To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive
ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases
were dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari was
improper;[31] (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi;[32] and (c) petitioners therein failed to
present an actual case or controversy.[33] Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion.
The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the RTC's ruling on the
sufficiency of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief.
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the
subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must have been no
breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or
the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the
issue must be

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ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.[34]
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first,[35]
second,[36] and third[37] requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth
requirements, however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.[38]
Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts
may be
dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the
asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The
concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the
issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.[39]
A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they have
failed
to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed
from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert

general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could
prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their
petition would disclose, private respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on
remarks of
certain government officials which were addressed to the general public.[40] They, however,
failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action
geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no
particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
"double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and
the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for
lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present
petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to
RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse
must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.[41] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere
cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds
of one), the RTC should have dismissed private respondents' petition for declaratory relief
all the
same.
It is well to note that private respondents also lack the required locus standi to mount their

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constitutional challenge against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA 9372
since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case.[42] While it has been
previously held that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that the
petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury,[43] it
must be stressed that cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.[44] Towards this end, compelling State and
societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of
locus standi,[45] as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of
locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.[46]
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the
controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-
discussed allegations in private respondents' petition, remain highly-speculative and merely
theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[47] This private respondents
failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on

the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents
exists in the first place.
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for declaratory
relief, as well as the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents' petition for
declaratory relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the same, it cannot
be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the April 23, 2012 and July 31, 2012
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92 in SCA No. Q-07-60778 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition for declaratory relief before the said court is
hereby DISMISSED.

NAVALES V ABAYA
GR NO. 162318 October 25, 2004
Facts:
On July 27, 2003 more than 300 junior officers and enlisted men mostly from the elite units of
the AFP quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the
security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). The soldiers then
made a statement through ABS-CBN News network that they went to Oakwood to air their
grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo and ammunition to
the ‘enemies’ of the State, etc. They declared the withdrawal of support from the chain of
command and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo
administration. After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the Government team led
by Ambassador Cimatu an agreement was forged between the two groups. Subsequently DOJ
charged the 3221 soldiers who took part in the “Oakwood incident” with violation of Article 134
A coup d’ etat of the RPC.
Thereafter several of the accused filed in the RTC (branch 61) an Omnibus Motion praying that
the RTC assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military tribunal. While such
motion was pending, DOJ issued a Resolution finding probable cause for coup d’ etat against
only 31 of the original 321 accused and the charges against them were dismissed. RTC (branch

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61) admitted the Amended Information charging only 31 of the original accused withthe crime of
coup d’ etat defined under Article 134 of the RPC. However, 1Lt. Navales, et. al who were
earlier dropped as accused in the crime of coup d’ etat were charged before the General Court
Martial with violations of the Articles of War. At this point the RTC acted on the Omnibus
Motion filed by the 243 of the original accused declaring the petition for the court assume
jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military court and requiring the prosecution to
produce evidence to establish probable cause as MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Furthermore, it
declared that all the charges before the court-martial against the accused are hereby declared
NOT SERVICECONNECTED BUT IS ABSORBED AND INFURTHERANCE TO THE
ALLEGED CRIME OF COUP D’ETAT. March 1, 2004, the General Court-martial has set the
arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles of War. Petitions for the
issuance of temporary restraining order were filed and the court directed that parties to observe
the status quo prevail before the filing of the petition.
Issue :

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
Ruling :
No. The Order of the RTC declaring that all the charges before the court-martial against accused
were not service-connected but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’ etat, cannot
be given effect. When RTC resolved the Omnibus Motion to assume jurisdiction over all the
charges filed before the military tribunal had already been rendered moot and academic when the
RTC accepted the Amended Information under which only 31 of the accused were charged and
dismissing the case as against the other 290.It has become moot against those charges that were
dismissed. However in said order it further declared that “all the charges before the court-martial
against the accused and former accused are not service-connected”, believing that the crimes
defined in and penalized by the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d’état
and thus absorbed by the said crime. Thus, insofar as those whose case against them was
dismissed, there was nothing left to be resolved after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot
and academic. This dismissal made the petitioners no longer parties to the case and no further
relief could be granted to them.
1Lt Navales, et al. since they are strangers to the proceedings in the criminal case are not bound
by any judgment rendered by the court, thus they cannot find solace in the declaration of the
RTC that the charges filed against them before the General Court-Martial were not service
connected. In view of the clear mandate of RA 7055 that military courts have jurisdiction to try
cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles95 to 97 of the
Articles of War as these are considered “service connected” crimes. It even mandates that it
should be tried by the court martial. The RTC thus has no legal basis to rule that the violation of
the following Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup
d’ etat and as such absorbed by the latter crime. In making such a declaration the RTC acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction and is NULL AND VOID.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODRIGO AWID AND MADUM GANIH

G.R. No. 185388, June 16, 2010
June 16, 2010

Facts:

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On January 9, 2000 only Mrs. Lee was left in the house, accompanied by three housemaids, and
the accused Ernesto Andagao, a gardener-houseboy. They all slept in an extension of the main
house, which extension had three rooms. Mrs. Lee was in one with her 11 Japanese Spitz
puppies. Next to hers was the room where Andagao slept, and then there was the room of the
housemaids.
Part of Mrs. Lee’s night routine was to let her puppies out of her room about midnight so they
could take a leak. At the early dawn of January 10, 2000, after opening the door of her room to
let her puppies out, Mrs. Lee was surprised to see a stranger, a man, standing a few meters from
her door. She immediately went back in and tried to shut her door close but the man succeeded in
pushing the door open and pulling her out of the room just as another man appeared. Someone
struck Mrs. Lee with a gun on both shoulders and kicked her on the ribs. When she fell down,
she received a kick on her buttocks.
Although she cannot recognized the faces of her abductors because she was blindfolded and
covered by black cloth, she noticed that they left Zamboanga City. After traveling three to four
hours, they arrived in a house which she later knew that it belonged to a certain Suod Hussain.
On January 10, 2000, Mrs. Lee met accused Madum Ganih. She was held for 20 days and during
that time she communicated her husband with the order of Ganih to prepare a ransom of P15,
000,000. Mr. Lee asked the kidnappers to lower the amount since he could only raise an amount
of P1, 000,000. Calling her family a third time, the kidnappers reduced their demand to P4
million and threatened to cut off Mrs. Lee’s head unless this was paid.
In the evening of May 5, 2000, Ganih told Mrs. Lee that they would release her the next day. At
about 4:00 a.m. of May 6, 2000, her abductors brought Mrs. Lee to Arena Blanco in Zamboanga
City where Ganih gave her P100.00 for fare and an M203 bullet as memento. She eventually got
home.
Sometime after, the police arrested some men which in a police line-up, Mrs. Lee later positively
identified as her abductors. For his part, Ganih denied the allegations and claimed an alibi that he
was in his house at the said incident.
On May 21, 2002 the RTC rendered judgment, convicting Ganih of the crime charged and

sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The RTC, however, acquitted Awid for
insufficiency of evidence.

Issue :
Is accused Ganih, in conspiracy with others, guilty of kidnapping for ransom?
Ruling :
To prove the crime charged, the prosecution had to show (a) that the accused was a private
person; (b) that he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty;
(c) that the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (d) that the victim was kidnapped or
detained for ransom. All these have been proved in this case.
Significantly, Ganih offered nothing but his bare denial and unsubstantiated alibi to counter the
overwhelming evidence that the prosecution adduced against him. His other contention is that the
police made Mrs. Lee identify him, not in a proper police line-up but in a mere show-up after
giving her some improper suggestions.
What the Court condemns are prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that point out the
suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified. Besides, granting that the out-of-court
identification was irregular, Mrs. Lee’s court testimony clearly shows that she positively

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identified Ganih independently of the previous identification she made in front of the police
station. Mrs. Lee could not have made a mistake in identifying him since she had ample
opportunities to study the faces and peculiar body movements of her kidnappers in her almost
four months of ordeal with them. Indeed, she was candid and direct in her recollection, narrating
events as she saw them take place. Her testimony, including her identification of the appellant,
was positive, straightforward, and categorical.
            The totality of the prosecution’s evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that Ganih and
the others with him kidnapped Mrs. Lee for ransom. The crime was punishable by death at the
time of its commission but, with the enactment of Republic Act 9346 that prohibits the
imposition of such penalty, the CA was correct in lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Laurel vs. Misa

GR No. L-409 75, Phil 906; January 30, 1947
Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, asserting that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the
enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for
the crime of treason for the reasons: (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government of the
Philippines and the correlative allegiance of the Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; (2)
there was a change of sovereignty over the islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
Issue:

Whether or not enemy occupation has the effect of suspending the allegiance of a Filipino citizen
to their government.
Ruling:

NO. Absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy
of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or government de jure is not transferred thereby to
the occupier, as held in the case of Co Kim Chan vs Valdez Tan Keh.

People vs. Marcaida

79 Phil 293 GR No L- 953, September 18, 1947
Facts:
The case is an appeal by Pedro Marcaida, who was convicted of the crime of treason, He points
out three errors incurred by the Court of Pueblo, one of which is that his citizenship was
sufficiently tested. The defense contends that the evidence of record does not prove citizenship.
The defense argues that the witness testified in Tagalog saying, “Taga Lopez”, referring to
Lopez, Quezon Province, and that he was born in Lopez. However, no such thing is found in the
records, therefore, his Philippine Citizenship is not properly tested.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant shall be convicted of treason.
Held:
No. The defendant then, according to the evidence of records, may be a Filipino or a foreigner.

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His Philippine citizenship is not sufficiently tested or proven. The defendant is called Pedro
Marcaida. By his name, he can be a Filipino, Spanish, or South American. There is no proof of
the citizenship of his parents. He can be a descendant of Spanish subjects who opted to remain
Spanish and retain their loyalty to the Crown of Spain, in accordance with the provisions of the
Treaty of Paris. It may also happen that he is a descendant of a South American, with his father
refusing to use the provisions of Naturalization law, thereby acquiring the nationality of his
father. Certainly, his citizenship cannot be ascertained.

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