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Radiological safety assessment of Brazilian industrial facilities with electron

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Article  in  Journal of Radiological Protection · July 2005

DOI: 10.1088/0952-4746/25/2/005 · Source: PubMed

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INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS PUBLISHING JOURNAL OF RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION
J. Radiol. Prot. 25 (2005) 169–179 doi:10.1088/0952-4746/25/2/005

Radiological safety assessment of Brazilian industrial

facilities with electron accelerators
M J M Lourenço, A T Ramalho1 , F C A Da Silva and J M O Godoy
Institute of Radioprotection and Dosimetry (IRD), National Commission of Nuclear Energy
(CNEN), Avenida Salvador Allende, PO Box 37750, Rio de Janeiro, 22780-160, Brazil

E-mail: adriana@ird.gov.br (A T Ramalho)

Received 13 August 2004, in final form 21 February 2005, accepted for

publication 6 April 2005
Published 7 June 2005
Online at stacks.iop.org/JRP/25/169

Abstract
Industrial electron accelerators are used by eight installations in Brazil, with a
total of 14 machines generating electron beams. These facilities are classified
into categories I or II, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) system. In category I are included the facilities with an integrally
shielded unit with interlocks, where human access during operation is not
physically possible owing to the configuration of the shielding. In category
II are included the facilities with a unit housed in a shielded room that is
kept inaccessible during operation by an entry control system. Of the 14
accelerators operational in Brazil, 11 belong to category I and three to category
II. In the present work a methodology for the assessment of the radiological
safety of these accelerator facilities was developed and applied, mainly on the
basis of specific recommendations from the IAEA. The main safety items were
evaluated at those eight installations. According to the results obtained here,
no inadequacies were observed at the three installations in category II, from
the radiological safety and radioprotection points of view. Nevertheless, two
out of the five installations in category I showed several deficiencies. Most of
these inadequacies have been corrected during this work, and the rest are in the
course of being corrected.
(Some figures in this article are in colour only in the electronic version)

1. Introduction

Particle accelerators are machines used to accelerate charged elementary particles or ions
to high energies. All particle accelerators have the same three basic parts: (a) a source of
elementary particles or ions; (b) a tube pumped to a partial vacuum in which the particles
can travel freely; and (c) some means of speeding up the particles. They accelerate charged
1 Author to whom any correspondence should be addressed.

0952-4746/05/020169+11$30.00 © 2005 IOP Publishing Ltd Printed in the UK 169

170 M J M Lourenço et al

Figure 1. Examples of self-shielding accelerators (category I): (a) for the sterilisation of medical
and pharmaceutical products; (b) for polymer modification (cross-linking).

particles—or ions—through an electric field in a hollow, evacuated tube. The paths of the
accelerating particles may be linear, spiral, or circular. Both the cyclotron—spiral path—and
the synchrotron—circular path—use strong magnetic fields to control the paths of particles.
The linear accelerator—linac—is the simplest type of accelerator, and was first conceived
in the late 1920s. Fundamentally it is a long line of coils—or drift tubes—through which
charged particles are accelerated. The simplest type of linear accelerator is the standing-
wave accelerator, in which particles travel along a cylindrical vacuum tank through a series
of drift tubes, separated by gaps. As the particles cross the gaps, standing electromagnetic
waves accelerate them. This type of accelerator can accelerate particles to 200 MeV, i.e. 200
million electron volts. Physicists mainly use them as a primary accelerator that feeds into a
synchrotron. In industry and medicine they can be used as powerful x-ray machines.
Accelerators are common in research, medical and industrial applications. The most
widespread industrial uses of electron beam facilities are for the sterilisation of medical
and pharmaceutical products, preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification,
eradication of insect infestation and even radiography. For example, the welded joints in
pipes that are used in critical applications can be x-rayed to make sure there are no unsafe
imperfections.
The main differences between the kinds of electron accelerators are in the mode of
accelerating the electron beam and in the method of producing the necessary high voltages.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency—the IAEA—in its publication Safety
Series 107 (1992), electron irradiation facilities are divided into two categories: (a) category I—
the accelerator is a self-shielding unit, i.e. the shield is integrated into the accelerator structure,
with interlocks; due to the configuration of the shielding (see figure 1) human access during
operation is allowed to the accelerator room but is not physically possible to the accelerator
itself; and (b) category II—the accelerator unit is housed in a larger shielded room that is
kept inaccessible while in operation by an entry control system which forbids access during
operation (see figure 2).
The safety record of the electron accelerator industry has been very good. Nevertheless,
there is a potential for accidents with serious consequences. Electron beam facilities produce
very high dose rates during irradiation, so a person accidentally present in the irradiation
chamber can receive a lethal dose within minutes or seconds. Precautions against any
unauthorised entry must therefore be taken. Indeed, as reported by IAEA (1996a), serious
accidents have in fact occurred in IL, USA, in 1965; in MD, USA, in 1991; and in Hanoi,
Vietnam, in 1991 (IAEA 1996b).
Safety assessment of Brazilian industrial facilities 171

Figure 2. Example of a safety fence around a shielded room (accelerator in category II).

For the design of an irradiation facility, the main design principles that should be applied,
if necessary in combination, to achieve and maintain the required reliability are the following.
Defence in depth—this concept shall be applied to all safety activities to ensure that they
are covered by a series of provisions so that if a failure should occur it would be compensated
for or corrected.
Redundancy—the use of more than the minimum number of items needed to accomplish
a given safety function. Redundancy enables the failure or unavailability of one item to be
tolerated without loss of the function. For example, three or four interlocks might be provided
for a particular function when any two would be capable of carrying it out. For the purposes
of redundancy, identical or diverse components may be used.
Diversity—the term applied to redundant systems or components that perform the same
safety function by incorporating different attributes into the systems or components. Such
attributes can be different principles of operation, different physical variables, different
operating conditions, production by different manufacturers etc. The causes of potential
failures should be examined to determine where the principle of diversity could be applied
effectively.
Independence—this can be achieved in the design of systems through functional isolation
and physical separation. The reliability of systems can be improved by applying the following
principles for independence in design: (a) maintaining independence among redundant system
components; (b) maintaining independence between system components and the equipment
designed to mitigate the effects of incidents; (c) maintaining appropriate independence of
systems or components of different importance to safety; and (d) maintaining independence
between items important and not important to safety.
Programmable electronic systems (PES)—these are very much used in safety control
applications (HMSO 1987, IEC 1998). As problems can arise relating to the integrity of
the hardware and validation of the software, leading to faults in the system, it is extremely
important that only fully trained staff be allowed to alter software.
Safety analysis—each component within the system should be considered in turn. The
likely types of failure and their consequences for the system as a whole should be taken
into account. Examples include: (a) loss of access control; (b) malfunctions and failures
172 M J M Lourenço et al

of structures, systems and components; (c) electrical distribution faults, from very localised
faults to complete loss of external energy sources; (d) failure resulting from external causes;
(e) failure of personnel to observe proper, safe procedures; (f) breakdown of procedures for
preventing access to the facility by unauthorised persons; (g) breakdown of administrative
procedures, leading to unsafe practices.
For electron irradiation facilities the risk of accidental exposures can be kept to a minimum
by proper design and construction, with specific attention to such matters as shielding and
interlocks, and a good radiation protection programme with special emphasis on training
and access control. It is therefore essential that adequate radiation safety measures be taken
according to the objectives laid down in the BSS (IAEA 1996c). The system integrity level
(SIL) category that the protection system should be designed to meet is a very important matter.
It is the duty of the manufacturers and users of the safety systems to perform this decision.
Before commissioning an installation, the Brazilian National Commission of Nuclear Energy
(CNEN), which is responsible for the licensing, studies the safety features and devices of
the facilities, as well as the fault tree analysis provided by the manufacturers. Thus, CNEN
approves (or does not approve) them.
For electron accelerators of energies less than or equal to 10 MeV, the induced radioactivity
in any part of the equipment is insignificant. However, electron beam facilities operating
above 10 MeV also require monitoring for neutrons (BSI 1988b, IAEA 1979, NCRP 1976,
1977).
The maximum range of the electrons is small compared with that of the x-rays that are
generated as a consequence of the interaction between the electrons and the matter they strike.
Therefore in calculations of the shielding requirements of electron accelerator facilities, only
the x-rays generated need to be taken into account.
There are two kinds of x-rays generated by the interaction of electrons with matter:
bremsstrahlung and characteristic x-radiation. Characteristic x-radiation is an important factor
to consider only with electron accelerators up to 300 keV that are self-shielded with a heavy
element such as lead or depleted uranium. In most cases bremsstrahlung is more important
for radiation shielding. Shielding calculations should be performed under the assumption that
all electrons are absorbed by the heaviest element that may be exposed to the beam. Account
should be taken of the composition of the structural materials and products that might be
irradiated in the facility.
Attention should also be paid to ‘spurious’ x-radiations, particularly in accelerators
operating at high voltage levels. There are several causes for this spurious radiation. First,
backscattered electrons can possess sufficient energy to stream back through the accelerator
tube. This effect is particularly pronounced when high energy electrons impinge on a high
atomic number target for x-ray conversion. Second, during conditioning of the electron
accelerator and during operation under relatively poor vacuum conditions, dark currents in
the accelerator tube occur which generate x-rays.
Inadvertent exposure may result from investigation of equipment failure and maintenance
of operating accelerator subsystems with the accelerating stages improperly or only partially
disabled. As long as the acceleration capability remains there is the possibility of x-ray
generation from dark currents. While reliability of operation reduces the risk of inadvertent
exposure by reducing the need for repair and maintenance, a further reduction in that risk can be
achieved by designing for ease of troubleshooting. This may well reduce the chance of other
hazardous occurrences such as electric shock or overexposure to radiofrequency radiation.
Therefore—besides other requirements—the following features should be considered in
industrial accelerator design: (a) positive means of disabling the main acceleration system;
(b) built-in machine parameter monitoring; and (c) built-in remote machine diagnostics.
Safety assessment of Brazilian industrial facilities 173

Table 1. Main characteristics of the 14 industrial electron accelerators in use in Brazil.

Maximum Maximum
Facility high tension current
code no Category Manufacturer Model (kV) (mA) Application
1 I Energy Sciences Inc. EC/300 300 500 Vulcanisation
a
2 II Varian Inc. 838049 4000 300 R m −1 Radiography
3b I Cryovac Inc. ECLU-1, 2, 3, 4 500 30 Polymerisation
4 I Energy Sciences Inc. CB200/060/070 210 168 Polymerisation
5b I Leybold-Heraeus ESW-55/15-60 60 250 Metal fusion
I PTR Präzisionstechnik EBW-P2/7.5-60 60 125 Metal fusion
GmbH
I Torvac Inc. CVE-68D 60 130 Metal fusion
I Fasstress Metro D. Inc. 1500 AEGFK6CR 35 10 Diffractometry
6 I RPC BroadBeam 300 600 Polymerisation
7 II Acome/RDI DPC 1000 550 66 Polymerisation
8 II SureBeam Linac 26 1000c Irradiation of foodstuffs
a Varian equipment indicates only the upper limit in a dose rate unit.
b Installations No 3 and No 5 have four accelerators in each.
c The maximum final energy of the electrons is 10 MeV.

Until recently—the year 2000—the Brazilian nuclear regulatory authority—the National

Commission of Nuclear Energy, CNEN—did not perform compliance inspections in
accelerator facilities operative in Brazil. The main focus of the present work was to develop
and apply a methodology for the assessment of the radiological safety of operating Brazilian
industrial electron accelerator facilities, as well as on the aspects of radiological protection of
the individuals occupationally exposed. Another aim was to provide information and guidance
to persons intending to purchase and operate electron beam facilities and also to the Brazilian
regulatory authority responsible for regulating the use of them. It was also intended to establish
a suitable timetable for the periodic tests that shall be performed by the industrial accelerator
installations.

2. Methodology
Industrial linear accelerators are used by eight installations in Brazil,with a total of 14 machines
generating electron beams. These facilities are classified into categories I or II, according to
the IAEA (1992). From the 14 accelerators in use in Brazil, 11 belong to category I and three
to category II. The main characteristics of those 14 facilities are described in table 1.
Regulatory inspections were conducted at those eight operative Brazilian electron
accelerator installations. Those inspections were carried out to: (a) check that the operation
of the facility meets all the conditions of the pertinent regulations issued by CNEN (1988a,
1988b, 1995, 1998) and that the facility is well maintained; (b) review the results of surveys,
maintenance programmes, personal dosimetry, medical surveillance and the timetable adopted
for the periodic testings carried out during operation; and (c) check the emergency plans
and preparedness and conduct a survey of the availability and appropriateness of emergency
equipment.
The following items were checked during the compliance inspections. This methodology
was based on the main specific recommendations from IAEA (1992). The standards IEC 61508
(1998) describe the current level of technology related to functional safety, which depends on a
system or equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs. However, the safety systems
and devices studied in the present work were manufactured before this year. Therefore, they
do not support automatic presumption of compliance with these standards.
174 M J M Lourenço et al

2.1. Shielding
Penetrations of the shield are necessary for personnel and product entry and exit and for
ventilation and other ducting. Radiometric surveys were carried out to ensure that there was
no direct radiation leakage path and that the use of maze entrances was sufficient to reduce the
radiation fields at the point of exit to acceptable levels. Thus, all significant radiation paths
were fully evaluated.

2.2. Access to the radiation room and interlocked systems

Particular attention was paid to the accessibility of the radiation room in electron beam
facilities in category II. Persons cannot have access to the radiation room while the source is
energised. Such control of access relies heavily on the use of interlocked systems. Sequentially
interlocked controls shall be provided for personnel access, locking of the radiation room and
irradiation operations. Any attempt to override the controls or apply them out of sequence
must automatically abort the intended operation and require the sequence to be restarted. The
following items were evaluated.
Personnel access door interlocks—this door must be closed and secured before the
irradiation process can begin. The door interlocks shall be integrated with the master control
system such that violation of the interlock system or use of the door will cause the irradiation
to be automatically terminated. Any failure of the control system shall generate visible and
audible alarm signals. Opening the access door shall also switch off the high voltage supply
for the electron beam facility.
Product entry and exit port interlocks—suitable means shall be provided at these sites to
prevent inadvertent entry of personnel into high radiation areas. The ports shall be interlocked
such that a visible or audible alarm indicates when the entry/exit port control mechanism has
malfunctioned or been overridden or tampered with. The irradiation shall be terminated when
this occurs and shall not be restarted unless the cause has been remedied.

2.3. Fixed radiation monitor with alarms

A monitoring system with built-in redundancy shall be provided to detect the radiation level
in the radiation room when the irradiation is indicated to be terminated. The monitor shall be
integrated with the personnel access door interlocks to prevent room access when the monitor
detects a radiation level in excess of that specified, malfunctions or is turned off. The monitor
shall generate visible and audible alarm signals if the radiation level exceeds that specified
when the irradiation is indicated to be terminated. The test that the monitor is functioning
properly is done by exposing the monitor probe to a check source until the alarm sounds.

2.4. Control console

Each irradiator must have a master control that shall be used to prevent unauthorised operation.
This control may be a key operated switch. The following items were checked.
Access key—a single multipurpose key shall be used to operate the irradiator during normal
use. This key may be used to operate the control console, to gain access to the radiation room
and to actuate the safety delay timer. In systems employing two or more keys, one key must
remain captive when the other keys are being used.
Indicators—see section 2.9.
Emergency stop device—a clearly labelled emergency stop device shall be provided at the
control console to prevent, quickly interrupt or abort irradiator operations and terminate the
irradiation at any time.
Safety assessment of Brazilian industrial facilities 175

2.5. Radiation room

The evaluated items were as follows.
Safety delay timer with alarms—this device will automatically generate visible and audible
signals to alert persons in the area that the source exposure sequence has begun. The timer
shall allow sufficient time for the operator to make a complete search of the area to ensure
that no one else is present and then to leave the area. The timer shall be integrated with the
master control system such that irradiation cannot begin unless the start-up sequence has been
properly completed within a preset time.
Emergency stop device—means shall be provided within the radiation room to prevent,
quickly interrupt or abort irradiator operations and terminate the irradiation at any time. The
device shall be clearly labelled and readily accessible to workers in the radiation room, and
shall cause a visible or audible signal to be given outside the room.
Emergency exit—for the protection of anyone inadvertently shut inside the radiation room,
a system for opening the personnel access door from inside the radiation room shall be provided.

2.6. Fire protection

During extended periods of static irradiation of combustible materials, heat build-up can lead
to actual combustion. Heat and smoke sensing devices with visible and audible alarms shall be
provided to detect combustion in the radiation room. The triggering of the devices shall cause
the accelerator to switch off. A fire extinguishing system may be provided in the radiation
room.

2.7. Electrical power failure

It is necessary to ensure that the safety control system will not be compromised in the event
of a power failure. Such electrical equipment should be designed to appropriate standards
(e.g. BSI 1986, 1988a).

2.8. Ventilation
Ozone (O3 ), oxides of nitrogen and other noxious gases are produced by radiolysis. Measures
shall be taken to protect personnel against exposure to concentrations of such gases above the
threshold limit values prescribed by health authorities. The plant should be designed to prevent
the migration of the ozone produced in an irradiator into areas that may be occupied and where
the concentration could potentially build up to exceed the currently accepted limit, which is
0.1 ppm (OSHA 2004). This can be achieved by using a ventilation system that creates a
negative pressure in the radiation room. Ozone, being very reactive, is readily reduced to the
normal form of oxygen (O2 ). When a large capacity, continuously operated ventilation system
is used, the radiation room can normally be entered a few minutes after the termination of
irradiation. For controlling personnel access until the ozone level is at an acceptable level in
the radiation room, a time delay interlock mechanism which prevents personnel access doors
from being opened before a preset time has elapsed after termination of irradiation must be
provided.

2.9. Warning signs and symbols

Irradiation device warning sign—there shall be a clearly visible sign at the personnel access
door to the radiation room bearing the radiation symbol and warnings.
176 M J M Lourenço et al

Irradiation status indicators—clearly visible irradiation status indicators shall be provided

at the control console to indicate: (a) when the irradiation is terminated (source de-energised);
(b) when the irradiation is in progress (source up or energised); (c) when the irradiation is in
preparation (source about to be energised). An irradiation status indicator shall be visible at
each personnel or product entry/exit port.
Audible signals—each audible signal shall be distinct and loud enough to gain the
immediate attention of persons in the area and should not be capable of being confused with
any other signals in use in the area.
Status indicator colours—the following colours are recommended for use when
illuminated or colour coded controls are used: (a) emergency (stop buttons or lights): red; (b)
warning: hazard international trefoil or red;(c) critical information (irradiation in malfunction):
red; (d) caution (not an emergency, but some function taking place to be aware of): yellow or
orange; (e) normal (irradiation not in use, or function safe): green; and (f) information: blue.

2.10. Periodic testing and maintenance of equipment

The operating organisation shall ensure that all safety functions are regularly tested by setting
up a formal programme of maintenance with a suitable timetable for the testings. All safety
interlock components must be periodically tested for correct operation. Portable radiation
meters shall be calibrated before they are first used, after repair and at intervals specified by
the competent authority.
The Brazilian nuclear regulatory authority (CNEN) does not indicate a specific timetable
for the periodic testings that shall be adopted by accelerator facilities. Thus, data about the
periodicity for the testings put into practice by each installation were collected during the
compliance inspections. The aim was to check the concordance among the installations about
the periodicities, and also to recommend a suitable timetable.

2.11. Records
The results of all tests related to the items described above, maintenance tasks, modifications
or changes to the irradiator shall be recorded on a formal checklist signed by the radiation
protection officer who has witnessed the tests. All use of the irradiator shall also be recorded.
During the compliance inspections performed, particular attention was paid to those records,
since failure of the safety systems can lead to serious radiation exposure to personnel.

2.12. Other systems

Main acceleration system disabling mechanism—this mechanism must inactivate the
acceleration capability in such a manner as to allow as many other subsystems as possible
to function for diagnostic purposes. The disabling feature must be clearly identified.
Built-in machine parameter monitoring—continuous monitoring of operating parameters
is essential. It offers the opportunity of event logging of failure sequence information for
maintenance engineers and for planning repairs.
Built-in remote machine diagnostics—strategic electronic test points must be located in
the control room in order to permit operators and maintenance crews to carry out accelerator
diagnostics on the total system without resorting to disabling the main acceleration system or
bypassing access interlocks. For some kinds of accelerators closed circuit television monitoring
may be helpful.
Operating parameters—the operating parameters of accelerators (voltage and current)
should be interlocked with the product transport mechanism.
Safety assessment of Brazilian industrial facilities 177

Table 2. Inadequacies observed in two installations in category I, in decreasing level of importance.

Observed inadequacies Frequency

Absence of periodic radiation survey monitoring 1
Inadequate signalling 1
Lack of the emergency programme and preparedness 1
Lack of a substitute for the radiation protection officer 1
Lack of periodical tests of the radiation meters 1
Absence of records about personnel training 1
Absence of a record containing the technical data for the accelerator 1
Absence of periodical clinical and medical exams of personnel 1
Radioprotection planning out of date (no longer current) 1
Lack of a central file with the records from the radiation protection office 2

2.13. Emergency response planning

Adequate written emergency procedures shall be prepared by the operating organisation (IAEA
1989, CNEN 1988a). The most likely events leading to significant radiation exposure are
malfunction or deliberate defeat of the safety control system, and fire inside the shielded room.
Emergency procedures should be written for each type of emergency that may reasonably be
foreseen. These should be concise, easily followed instructions. They must include a list with
the name and telephone number of the persons to be notified. This list should be displayed
in a prominent location adjacent to the control panel. Any incident shall be reported to the
regulatory authority—the CNEN.

3. Results

After the compliance inspections performed at the eight facilities operative in Brazil, no
inadequacies were observed in the three installations in category II, i.e. in those that possess a
radiation room. However, in two out of the five installations in category I, i.e. self-shielding
units, several inadequacies were observed, described in table 2.
The total number of occupationally involved individuals at the eight accelerator
installations operative in Brazil is around 120. Nevertheless, none of the individuals had any
monthly recorded dose in excess of the lower limit of detection of the individual monitoring
technique employed (film badge or thermoluminescent dosimeters—TLD).
During the compliance inspections, data about the periodicity for the testings put into
practice by each installation were collected. There was little agreement observed among the
different installations regarding the tests of the safety interlock components and the radiation
survey monitoring. However, the most prevalent timetable for the testings adopted by the
installations are presented in table 3.
Also included in table 3 is a new timetable with the recommended periodicities for the
testings that should be performed by industrial electron accelerator facilities. It was created
mainly on the basis of recommendations of the IAEA (1992). Disagreement between the
current practice and the recommended periodicity was observed in about half of the items.

4. Discussion

Until recently—the year 2000—the Brazilian nuclear regulatory authority—the CNEN—

did not perform compliance inspections in accelerator installations operative in Brazil. In
178 M J M Lourenço et al

Table 3. Periodicity observed and recommended timetable for the periodic tests (Note:
W = weekly; M = monthly; T = trimestrial).

Current Recommended
Tests of safety interlock components and radiation survey practice periodicity
Programmable electronic systems (PES) for the accelerator operation W W
Fixed radiation monitor with alarms W W
Interlocks (category I): contacts of mobile shielding M W
Interlocks (category II): personnel access door; product entry and exit ports M W
System against electrical power failure M M
Ventilation system for O3 exhaustion M M
Safety delay timer with alarms M M
Heat and smoke sensing devices with visible and audible alarms (category II) M M
Irradiation device warning signals (visible and audible) M M
Control console: emergency stop device M W
Emergency exit device inside radiation room (category II) M W
Control console: indicators T W
Control console: access key T M
Radiation survey around shielding T M

the present work we developed and put into practice a methodology for the assessment
of the radiological safety of the operating Brazilian industrial electron linear accelerator
facilities. Indeed, several non-compliances were observed in two out of eight installations,
thus corroborating the need for such compliance inspections. The most critical inadequacies
have already been corrected and the remainder are in the process of being dealt with.
No inadequacies were observed in the three installations in category II, i.e. in those that
possess a radiation room. Installations in category II present higher risk compared to those
in category I. Perhaps this makes the former installations exert more strict control over safety
aspects.
The timetable currently recommended for the periodic testing that shall be performed by
the industrial accelerator installations can serve as guidance to persons who operate electron
beam facilities and also to the Brazilian regulatory authority responsible for regulating the use
of them.
The standards IEC 61508 (1998) describe the current level of technology related to
functional safety, which is part of the overall safety that depends on a system or equipment
operating correctly in response to its inputs. The safety systems and devices studied at the
present work were manufactured before this year. Therefore, they do not support automatic
presumption of compliance with these standards. Thus, it is strongly recommended that
the installations with accelerators should review equipment in detail against these up-to-date
standards, in order to identify major weaknesses.
Its is also the installation’s duty, as well as the regulators’, to decide which system integrity
level (SIL) category the protection systems should be designed to meet, and to perform the
assessment of the systems using something like fault tree analysis.
For electron accelerators of energies less than or equal to 10 MeV the induced radioactivity
is insignificant; thus the operation manuals do not recommend that the inside of the enclosures
should be monitored with a portable monitor on each entry. However, implementing such a
final check with a portable monitor would be the only absolute test to guarantee that all is well
and a major overexposure is not about to happen.
Failed bulbs are detected by the system during the period of start-up. Any detected failed
bulb must be replaced in order for the system to work. However, once the irradiation starts,
 Safety assessment of Brazilian industrial facilities 179

a failed bulb, even if detected, will not interrupt irradiation, in order not to spoil the products
under irradiation. Nevertheless, past experience has shown that failed indicators are one of the
main causes of incidents. Therefore, for important signs, multiple bulbs are recommended.

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to IRD/CNEN and to all of those who, direct or indirectly, collaborated
in the preparation of this manuscript.

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