Oabel, Jean Monique C.

#1. Types of arson include simple arson, destructive arson and other cases of arson.

Example of simple arson includes burning of inhabited houses or dwellings.

Examples of destructive arson include burning of any ammunition factory and other
establishment where explosives, inflammable or combustible materials are stored; any archive,
museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture, education or social
services; any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble; any
train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for transportation of persons or
property; any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative
or other official proceeding; any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement,
shopping center, public or private market, theater or movie house or any similar place or
building; or any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested
area.

Examples of other cases of arson include burning of any building used as offices of the
government or any of its agencies; any inhabited house or dwelling; any industrial
establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel; any plantation, farm, pasture
land, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest; any rice mill, sugar mill, cane
mill or mill central;
and any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
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#2. The crime committed is attempted arson if the offender commenced the commission of the
crime directly by overt acts but he does not perform all the acts of execution due to the timely
intervention of another who chases away the offender.

If that person is able to light or set fire but the fire was put out before any part of the building
was burned, it is frustrated.

But if before the fire was put out, it had burned a part of the building, it is consummated. Any
charring of the wood of a building, whereby the fiber of the wood is destroyed, is sufficient. It is
not necessary that the wood should be ablaze. Setting fire to the contents of a building constitutes
the consummated crime of setting fire to a building, even if no part of the building was burned.
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#3. No. None of those circumstances enumerated in PD 1613 was present to establish the fact of
arson since there was no sufficient evidence of malicious using of fire to cause destruction of
public and private structures property including houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms,
mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.
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#4. None. The crime of homicide is absorbed. P.D. No. 1613 provides that if by reason of or on
the occasion of arson, death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
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#12. Elements of Anti-Fencing Law include the following: 1. the crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes,
or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; the accused knows or should have known
that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or
another. (Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People, 234 SCRA 63 [1994])
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#16. Acts punishable under Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) include the
following:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense;

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit,
for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law;

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner
or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license,
in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this
Act;

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise
which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year
after his termination;

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions;

f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining directly
or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of
or discriminating against any other interested party;

(g) Entering, on behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby;
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest;

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having material interest
in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a
member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or
does not participate in the action of the board; committee, panel or group;

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the
approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transactions or acts by the board, panel
or group to which they belong;

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any
person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or
of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled; and

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him
on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in
advance of its authorized release date.
Oabel, Jean Monique C.
#18. LAURO G. SORIANO, JR. vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-65952 July 31, 1984

Facts: Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal
of Quezon City which was assigned investigation to Soriano, Jr. who was then an Assistant City
Fiscal.

In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for
dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set
up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills
were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision finding the accused GUILTY for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue: Whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal
is a "contract or transaction" so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Ruling: No. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.
Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which
precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit
transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner.
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#19. Tecson vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the offense charged in the Information, the
Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Upon the offer of Tecson, he and Mrs. Luzana
agreed to engage in an investment business. They would sell tickets and Luzana would buy
appliances and cosmetics at a discount, with the use of the proceeds of the sales of tickets, and
resell them. Tecson also acted as agent selling tickets.

After having already sold 40 tickets in the amount of P4,000.00, bringing with him a
Mayors Permit in the name of Mrs. Luzana for their business called LD Assurance Privileges, he
asked for a cash advance of P4,000.00 and he would not release the Mayors Permit unless the
cash advance was given him. Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded, saying that it was not the due
date yet, so he was getting the cash advances on his share. Tecson signed for the cash advance.
Mrs. Luzana secured a Business Permit in accordance with the instructions of Tecson. The
permit was in her name but the same was for the operation of Prosperidad Investment and Sub-
Dealership, the new name of the business.

With the revocation of her business permit, private complainant below filed an
administrative case against petitioner, for violation of Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019 and Section
60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local Government Code) with the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG).

Issue: Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling: Yes. The crime charged has four elements, namely:

(1) The accused is a public officer;
(2) That in any manner or capacity he secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain, for
a person any government permit or license;
(3) That he directly or indirectly requested or received from said person any gift, present
or other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another; and
(4) That he requested or received the gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit in
consideration for the help given or to be given.
The elements of the offense charged having been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
petitioners conviction must therefore stand.
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#20. DIONISIO B. COLOMA, JR vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 205561; September 24, 2014

Facts:

Coloma was the Director of the Philippine National Police Academy (PNPA) at the time
of the alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019. On November 19, 1999, he was designated as Special
Assistant and Action Officer to the Director, Logistics and Installation Services (LIS)of the
Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC). Gimenez assigned Coloma to assist in the search for a
suitable construction site of the Philippine National Police Regional Training Site.

Coloma’s designation as Special Assistant and Action Officer to the LIS-PPSC was
terminated, and he was transferred to the Philippine National Training Institute (PNPI). He was
likewise ordered torender a termination report relative to his participation and observation in the
construction of RTS 9.

SPO4 Concepcion stated that his team conducted an ocular inspection and interviewed
the supplier of materials and the Land Bank officials. Coloma was indicted in the Information
filed with the Sandiganbayan which reads that Coloma made it appear that the said project with
the budget of ₱5,727,278.59 was completed or almost completed as stated in his Memorandum
dated October 10, 2001, when upon ocular inspection conducted in June 2002, the fifty-capacity
barracks which was part of the project was not completed, and that the actual cost of the facilities
actually constructed is only Three Million One Hundred Eight Thousand Pesos (₱3,180,000.00),
to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Public Safety College in particular and the
government in general.

The Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision finding Coloma guilty as charged. It
found that all the essential elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
were present in the case

Issue: Whether or not Coloma’s conviction for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 was proper.

Ruling: Yes. Coloma was charged with the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
which has the following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his functions. As observed by the Sandiganbayan, all these
elements exist in this case.
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#21. EFREN L. ALVAREZ vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192591; June 29, 2011

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Muñoz passed a resolution authorizing petitioner to enter into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with API for the project in connection with the municipal
government’s plan to construct a four-storey shopping mall ("Wag-wag Shopping Mall"), a
project included in its Multi-Development Plan.

Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
(SB-06-CRM-0389). The Sandiganbayan rendered judgment convicting the petitioner after
finding that: (1) petitioner railroaded the project; (2) there was no competitive bidding; (3) the
contractor was totally unqualified to undertake the project; and (4) the provisions of the BOT law
and relevant rules and regulations were disregarded and not followed. The said court also found
that the municipal government suffered damage and prejudice with the resulting loss of several
of its buildings and offices, and having deployed its resources including equipment, personnel
and financial outlay for fuel and repairs in the demolition of the said structures. Damage suffered
by the municipal government was quantified at ₱4.8 million, or 2% of the total project cost of
₱240 million, representing the amount of liquidated damages due under the performance security
had the same been posted by the contractor as required by law. As to the allegation of
conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan held that such was adequately shown by the evidence, noting that
this is one case where the Ombudsman should have included the entire Municipal Council in the
information for the latter had conspired if not abetted all the actions of the petitioner in his
dealings with API to the damage and prejudice of the municipality.
Issue: Whether or not damage or injury need to be proven to warrant the conviction of the
Accused-Petitioner.

Ruling: NO. The third element of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in three
ways, i.e., through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of
any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 is enough to convict. Damage or injury caused by petitioner’s acts though alleged in the
information, thus need not be proven for as long as the act of giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference either through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence was satisfactorily established. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, the prosecution was able to successfully demonstrate that he acted with manifest
partiality and gross inexcusable negligence in awarding the BOT contract to an unlicensed and
financially unqualified private entity.
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#22. No. Damage or injury need not be proven for as long as the act of giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference either through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence was satisfactorily established.
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#23. Yes. Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if
found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance
with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

#24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HENRY T. GO

G.R. No. 168539; March 25, 2014

Facts:

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III).

Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019.
Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary
Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable
cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer
indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.Thus, in
an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB.

ISSUE: Whether or not herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for
conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.

HELD: YES. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile’s death, there is no longer any
public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not
mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that
their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove
the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the
death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.
Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may
be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A.
3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.
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Oabel, Jean Monique C.

(Cont.)

#25. JUAN CONRADO vs.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 94955 August 18, 1993

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner, Juan Coronado, for violation of Section 3 (f)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, from
which the decision this petition for review on certiorari was filed. Accused JUAN CONRADO,
JR., a public officer being the Process Server was accused to have unlawfully neglected and
refused to serve within reasonable time, a copy of the Order issued by Executive Judge Antonio
V. Benedicto in a civil case denying plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dismissing their complaint for Cancellation of Title, upon plaintiffs' counsel without sufficient
justification, despite due demand and request, the copy of said Order being served late on
plaintiffs' counsel, for the purpose of giving undue advantage in favor of the plaintiffs and
discrimination against defendants in said case by delaying the finality of the order of dismissal
and allowing the plaintiffs to prolong their stay on the land in litigation.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the petitioner to successfully serve and Order warrants his
conviction under Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Ruling: No. To warrant conviction for a violation of Section 3 (f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the law itself additionally requires that the accused's dereliction, besides being
without justification, must be for the purpose of (a) obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any
person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an
interested party or (b) discriminating against another interested party. The severity of the penalty
imposed by the law leaves no doubt that the legislative intent is to consider this element to be
indispensable.

The record is bereft of evidence, albeit alleged, to indicate that the petitioner's failure to
act was motivated by any gain or benefit for himself or knowingly for the purpose of favoring an
interested party or discriminating against another. It is not enough that an advantage in favor of
one party, as against another, would result from one neglect or refusal. Had it been so, the law
would have perhaps instead said, "or as a consequence of such neglect or refusal undue
advantage is derived by an interested party or another is unduly discriminated against."
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#26. JOEY P. MARQUEZ vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 182020-24

Facts: FACTS:

Marquez and Caunan, along with four other local government officials of Parañaque City and
Antonio Razo were charged of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Information were filed based on the findings of the COA that there was overpricing in certain
purchase transactions of Parañaque City.

To ascertain the prevailing price of walis tingting for the years 1996 to 1998, the audit team
made a canvass of the purchase prices of the different merchandise dealers of Parañaque City.
The Audit team attempted to purchase walis tingting from the name suppliers of Parañaque City
but when the audit team went to the listed addresses of the suppliers, they were occupied by
other business establishments. Thereafter, the audit team purchased from a supplier that sold
walis tingting in Las Piñas City.

The Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioners Caunan and Marquez, along with
Silvester de Leon and Marilou Tanael, guilty of violating Sec. 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are guilty of violation of Sec. Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

RULING:
No. The prosecution was not able to demonstrate the requisite burden of proof beyond
reasonable doubt where what was only shown was that the audit team reached a conclusion of
gross overpricing based on the documents which, at best, would merely indicate the present
market price of walis tingting of a different specification, purchased from a non-supplier of
Parañaque City, and the price of walis tingting in Las Piñas City – the prosecution should have
presented evidence of actual price of the particular walis tingting purchased at the time of the
audited transaction or, at least an approximation thereof. Falling in these, there is no basis to
declare that there was a glaring overprice resulting in gross and manifest disadvantage to the
government.