1
BALBIN VS. MEDALLA
NO. L-46410. OCTOBER 30, 1981.
DOCTRINES:
It is not the registration of an informacion
posesoria but the commencement of
proceedings for possessory information that
is required to be done within one-year
period, from April 17, 1894, of the
publication of the Maura Law or Royal
Decree of Feb. 13, 1894
An action for reconveyance of real property
on the ground of fraud must be filed within 4
years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place
from the issuance of an original certificate
of title
Holder of possessory information must be
actually in possession of the land,
otherwise he will lose his right thereto by
way of acquisitive prescription by another
Information posesoria may be lost by
prescription
. HELD:
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision
of CFI Occidental Mindoro.
On June 1962, Spouses Medalla purchased
from heirs of Juan Ladao an agricultural
land at Sitio Bacong, Tambunakan and
Ibunan, Barrio Balansay, Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro. Thereafter, they filed
application for registration of title with the
LRC using the (1) DOS (2) Informacion
Posesoria issued in name of Juan Ladao
together with tax declaration and tax
receipts (from May 1904 to Jan 1962) as
evidence of ownership. They continuously
paid the taxes up to present
The application for registration was
opposed by Balbin et al since they were
previously issued Original Certificates of
Title (OCTs) thru either Homestead or Free
Patent grant and used Mamburao Public
Subd plans as evidence.
Rosa Sta Maria Sytamco issued OCT
No. P-3088 under Homestead Patent No.
HV-85975
Basilio Sytamco issued OCT No. P-
3089 under Homestead Patent No. HV-
85975
Leocadio Sytamco issued OCT No. P-
3087 under Homestead Patent No.
HV85977
Lydia Reyes issued OCT No. P-
4010 under Homestead Patent No. HV-
85978
Amado Reyes Issued OCT No. P-
4011 under Homestead Patent No. V-
85976
Apolinario Reyes Issued OCT No. P-
3084 under Homestead Patent No. V-
85974
Ernesto Balbin Issued OCT No. P-919
under Free Patent No. V-58633
Mauricio Narag Issued OCT No. P-
4060 under Free Patent No. V-94632
Jose Oriña Issued OCT No. P-920
under Free Patent No. V-58631
LRC: Since Sps Medalla reserved to file a
separate action for the cancellation of
OCTs issued to Balbin et al, the LRC
abstained from ruling on the opposition.
LRC gave due course to the petition
CFI : rendered judgment in favor of Sps
Medalla since there exists a registered
Informacion Posesoria in the name of Juan
Ladao. Free Patents and OCTs declared
null & void; Balbin, Narag and Orina to pay
P200/HA in damages for possession and
cultivation of the land w/ 6% interest/annum
while Sytamco et al wont pay damages
since they don’t have actual
possession/cultivation; P2000 attorney’s
fees
ISSUE:
(1) WON court erred in holding the validity
of the Possessory information title of Juan
Ladao and ruling subject land was private
property
(2) WON Court erred in holding that COA
prescribed
(1) There exists a Information Posesaria in
the name of Juan Ladao and it was
registered May 25, 1895.
Eventho Balbin et al alleged that the
registration was done beyond the one year
period provided in the Maura Law (Apr 17
1894-Apr 17 1895) and thus the subject
land becomes part of public domain,the
Court ruled that the contention has no
merit.
In Aguinaldo de Romero v Dir of Lands and
Baltazar v Insular Govt, it is made clear that
what was required is merely the institution
of a possessory information proceeding
within the one-year period as provided in
the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894 or
the Maura Law
A distinction should be made between the
informacion posesoria issued in accordance
with Articles 390, 391, and 392 of the
Spanish Mortgage Law in connection with
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Royal Decree
of February 13, 1894 and the informacion
posesoria issued in accordance with
Articles 390, 391 and 392 of said law
without regard to the aforementioned
decree. The former was the basis of a
gratuitous title of ownership which was
issued upon application of the grantee and
the possessory title provided he complied
with the requisites prescribed by Articles 19
and 21 of the aforesaid decree and Articles
81 and 82 of the Chapter IV of the
Regulations for the execution of the same
decree. The requisites to be fulfilled and
steps to be taken are as follows:
1. The holder of the land must prove
possession or cultivation of the land under
the conditions presented by Article 19 of the
said decree.
2. The holder of the land had to institute the
possessory information proceeding within
one year from the date (April 17, 1894) of
the publication of the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894 (Article 21, Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894) (Italics
supplied).
3. After obtaining the informacion
posesoria, the holder of the land had to file
a petition with the General Director of Civil
Administration, attaching thereto a certified
copy of the informacion posesoria asking
for the issuance in his name of a gratuitous
title of ownership. If the said office was
satisfied that the applicant fulfilled the
conditions prescribed by the law, a
gratuitous title of ownership was issued to
him. Such title oftentimes called
composicion gratuita was to be registered
in the Registry of Property of the
provincewhere the land was located
Even Section 21 of the Maura Law invoked
by petitioners themselves does not speak of
registration, but merely perfection of
information title, which, as already
discussed, may be done by instituting
possessory information proceedings within
the said one-year period fixed by the
aforementioned Royal Decree of February
13, 1894, possibly ending in the registration
of the title, depending on the evidence
presented.
In the case at bar, it is admitted and
uncontroverted that there exists an
informacion posesoria registered on May
25, 1895 in the name of Juan Ladao. This
registration of the informacion posesoria
must have followed as the result or
outcome of a possessory information
proceeding instituted by the late Juan
Ladao in accordance with Section 19 of the
said Royal Decree of February 13, 1894,
and commenced within the oneyear period,
pursuant to Section 21 of the same decree.
Otherwise, if this were not so, no
registration of the said informacion
posesoria might have been effected in the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Occidental Mindoro, for if the registration
thereof on May 25, 1895 was violative of
the decree, for being beyond the one-year
period from April 17, 1894 to April 17, 1895,
the Register of Deeds would certainly not
have performed an illegal act.
Registration
Registration of title usually follows a
specified proceeding. The registration is the
act of a goverment official and may not be
controlled by the private party applying for
registration of his title. What is under his
control is the commencement or the
institution of the prescribed proceeding for
the perfection of his title for which he may
be penalized for tardiness of compliance.
The institution of the proper proceeding is
clearly what is required to be done within
the one-year period by the party seeking to
perfect his title, not the registration thereof,
if found legally warranted.
If the required proceedings are instituted,
as they have to be before the
corrresponding title may be issued and
registered, the registration may be possible

of accomplishment only after the one-year
period, considering the number of
proceedings that might have been instituted
within the nonextendible period of one year.
This is what apparently happened in the
instant case with the proceeding to perfect
the title commenced within the one-year
period, but the registration of the
possessory information title done thereafter,
or on May 25, 1895, after the prescribed
proceeding which is naturally featured with
the requisite notice and hearing
(2) An action for reconveyance of real
property resulting from fraud may be barred
by the statute of limitations, which requires
that the action shall be filed within four (4)
years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place
when the petitioners herein were issued
original certificate of title through either
homestead or free patent grants, for the
registration of said patents constitute
constructive notice to the whole world.
Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed only on
August 30, 1973, or more than 14 years
had already elapsed from the date of the
issuance of the respective titles of the
defendants. Consequently, the action for
reconveyance of land titled in the names of
defendants had already prescribed
Acquisitive prescription
Even from the viewpoint of acquisitive
prescription, petitioners have acquired title
to the nine lots in question by virtue of
possession in concept of an owner.
Petitioners herein were given either free
patent or homestead patent, and original
certificates of title in their names issued to
them, the latest on October 14, 1959. Said
public land patents must have been issued
after the land authorities had found out,
after proper investigation, that petitioners
were in actual possession of the nine lots in
question, particularly in the case of the free
patents. If petitioners were in actual
possession of the nine lots, then the heirs
of Ladao and the Medalla spouses were
never in actual possession of the said lots.
If the Medalla spouses were not in actual
possession of the nine lots, the alleged
possessory information would not justify the
registration of the said nine lots in the
names of the Medallas
A possessory information has to be
confirmed in a land registration proceeding,
as required in Section 19 of Act No. 496. “A
possessory information alone, without a
showing of actual, public and adverse
possession of the land under claim of
ownership, for a sufficient period of time, in
accordance with the law, is ineffective as a
mode of acquiring title under Act No. 496.”
Although converted into a title of absolute
ownership, an informacion posesoria may
still be lost by prescription.
On the other hand, the Torrens Titles
issued to the petitioners on the basis of the
homestead patents and free patents
obtained by them had become indefeasible
2
CFI decision reversed; Medalla complaint
dismissed
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUSTICE PUNO
IN CRUZ V. SECRETARY OF DENR
History of Philippine Land Laws
Doctrine: Grants of public land were
brought under the operation of the Torrens
system under Act 496, or the Land
Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the
Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all
public and private lands in the Philippines
under the Torrens system. The law is said
to be almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachusetts Land Registration Act of
1898, which, in turn, followed the principles
and procedure of the Torrens system of
registration formulated by Sir Robert
Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant
Shipping Acts in South Australia. The
Torrens system requires that the
government issue an official certificate of
title attesting to the fact that the person
named is the owner of the property
described therein, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or the law
warrants or reserves. The certificate of title
is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all
claims to the parcel of land are quieted
upon issuance of said certificate. This
system highly facilitates land conveyance
and negotiation.
Facts:
In 1997, RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act/IPRA) was passed. Isagani Cruz
and Cesar Europa filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus, questioning the
constitutionality of certain provisions of
IPRA: a) It allows the indigenous
people/cultural community to OWN
NATURAL RESOURCES ; b) It defines
ancestral lands and ancestral domains in
such a way that it may include private lands
owned by other individuals; c) It categorizes
ancestral lands and domains held by native
title as never to have been public land; d) It
violates due process in allowing NCIP
(National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples) to take jurisdiction over IP land
disputes and making customary law apply
to these. In the first deliberation of the SC,
the votes were 7‐7, so the case was re‐
deliberated upon.
Issue:
Did the IPRA violate the Regalian Theory?
A. IPRA: Under the IPRA law, lands
which have not been registered before, if
granted with a CADT/CALT, will be
recognized as privately owned by the IPs
from the beginning‐ thus, has never been
part of public domain.
B. Regalian Theory: Lands which
has not been recognized as privately
owned belongs to the State
Held:
No Final Decision. Petition dismissed due
to lack of votes; Law remained valid and
constitutional (7 to grant ‐7 to dismiss).
Justice Puno’s Separate Opinion: The IPRA
Law DID NOT VIOLATE the Regalian
Theory
1. These lands claimed by the IPs have
long been theirs BY VIRTUE OF NATIVE
TITLE; they have lived there even before
the Spanish colonization. “Native title refers
to ICCs/IPs’ pre‐conquest rights to lands
and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches.
These lands are deemed never to have
been public lands and are indisputable
presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest.”
2. AND Native Title is an Exception to the
Regalian Doctrine: ... Oh Cho vs Director of
Lands: “This exception would be any land
that should have been in the possession of
an occupant and of his predecessors‐in‐
interest since time immemorial”
3. Native Titles provide a different Type of
Private Ownership
“Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.
‐‐‐ Indigenous concept of ownership
sustains the view that ancestral domains
and all resources found therein shall serve
as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of
ownership generally holds that ancestral
domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers
sustainable traditional resource rights.”
4. It complies with Regalian Doctrine:
Natural Sources within ancestral domains
are not owned by the IPs
* The IPs claims are limited to “lands,
bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and
all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;”
* IPRA did not mention that the IPs also
own all the other natural resources found
within the ancestral domains
Discussion related to the topic of the
Torrens System and Mode of Acquiring
Ownership (land):
I. HISTORY ON THE MODE OF
ACQUIRING LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE
PHILIPPINES:
A. Laws of the Indies
“The Regalian Theory is a Western legal
concept first introduced by the Spaniards
into the country through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas.”
• By virtue of Spain’s "discovery"
and conquest of the Philippines, its lands
became the exclusive patrimony and
dominion of the Spanish Crown
• Back then, the Spanish
Government distributed the lands by issuing
royal grants and concessions to Spaniards,
both military and civilian
B. Valenton‐vs‐Murciano Case (1904,
American Regime)

• Long‐time occupation will not
necessarily lead to ownership of the land
• "While the State has always
recognized the right of the occupant to a
deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof
before the proper administrative officers,
and obtain from them his deed, and until he
did that the State remained the absolute
owner."
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens
System
1903: 1st Public Land Act (Act
No. 926)
3⁄4 Provides rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling,
and leasing of portions of the public domain
of the
Philippine Islands
1919: 2nd Public Land Act (Act
2874)
3⁄4 more comprehensive but limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos,
Americans and citizens of other countries
which gave Filipinos the same privileges
1936: Present Public Land Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 141)
3⁄4 Almost the same as Act 2874, except
that it gave the Filipino citizens and
corporations which were previously only
granted to Americans
**1903: Land Registration Law
(Act 496)
3⁄4 It placed all public and private
lands in the Philippines under the Torrens
system
3⁄4 almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachussetts Land Registration Act of
1898
II. TORRENS SYSTEM
Origin: Patterned after the Merchant
Shipping Acts in South Australia by Sir
Robert Torrens
Government’s Role:
The government must issue an official
certificate of title attesting to the fact that
the person named is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to such
liens and encumbrances as thereon noted
or the law warrants or reserves
Certificate of Title: The certificate of title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible and all
claims to the parcel of land are quieted
upon issuance of said certificate.
III. REGALIAN DOCTRINE
• Despite of several legal
developments on land distribution, the
Regalian doctrine is still retained in our
Constitution.
• Under this concept, all lands of
the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated therein, whether on
public or private land, belong to the State.
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA,
petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
3
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN
and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
FACTS: Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa
assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the following grounds:
(1) They amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
(2) By providing for an all-
encompassing definition of “ancestral
domains” and “ancestral lands” which might
even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the
rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: WON IPRA and its Implementing
Rules tantamount to unlawful deprivation of
the State ownership and violate the rights of
private landowners.
HELD: Seven (7) other members of the
Court voted to grant the petition. Seven (7)
voted to dismiss the petition. After
redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56,
Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the petition is DISMISSED.
Among the members of the court who voted
to dismiss the petition are: (1) Justice
Kapunan (2) Chief Justice and Justices
Bellosillo, (3) Quisumbing, (4) Santiago (5)
Justice Puno (6) Justice Mendoza.
OPINION OF JUSTICE KAPUNAN:
1) DEFINITION OF “INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES”
In Philippine constitutional law, the term
“indigenous peoples” pertains to those
groups of Filipinos who have retained a
high degree of continuity from pre-
Conquest culture. IPRA now employs the
politically-correct conjunctive term
“indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural
communities” as follows: “A group of
people or homogenous societies identified
by self-ascription and ascription by others,
who have continuously lived as organized
community on communally bounded and
defined territory, and who have, under
claims of ownership since time immemorial,
occupied, possessed and utilized such
territories, sharing common bonds of
language, customs, traditions, and other
distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-
indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority
of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall
likewise include peoples who are regarded
as indigenous on account of their descent
from the populations which inhabited the
country at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of
non-indigenous religions and cultures, or
the establishment of present State
boundaries, who retain some or all of their
own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or
who may have resettled outside
theirancestral domains.”
2) CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES
ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES & IPRA
IPRA was enacted precisely to implement
constitutional provisions. Under IPRA,
indigenous peoples may obtain the
recognition of their right of ownership over
ancestral lands and ancestral domains by
virtue of native title.
The term “ancestral lands” refers to lands
occupied by individuals, families and clans
who are members of indigenous cultural
communities, in eluding residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots. These lands
are required to have been “occupied,
possessed and utilized” by them or through
their ancestors “since time immemorial,
continuously to the present.
On the other hand, “ancestral domains” is
defined as “areas generally belonging to
indigenous cultural communities, including
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential
and agricultural lands, hunting grounds,
worship areas, and lands no longer
occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural
communities but to which they had
traditional access, particularly the home
ranges of indigenous cultural communities
who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators.
Ancestral domains also include inland
waters, coastal areas and natural resources
therein. Again, the same are required to
have been “held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously to the
present.
3) EXCEPTION TO THE
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
The theory of jura regalia is nothing more
than a natural fruit of conquest. The
Regalian theory, however, does not negate
native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial. the
recognition of the existence of native title to
land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by
virtue of possession under a claim of
ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish
Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura
regalia.
Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on
State ownership of public lands, mineral
lands and other natural resources should
be read together with the other provisions
thereof which firmly recognize the rights of
the indigenous peoples. As articulated in
the Constitution, the first goal of the
national economy is the more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth. Equity is given prominence as the

first objective of national economic
development.
4) WON IPRA DEPRIVES STATE
OF NATURAL RESOURCES
That IPRA is not intended to bestow
ownership over natural resources to the
indigenous peoples is also clear. The
concept of native title to natural resources,
unlike native title to land, has not been
recognized in the Philippines. The State
retains full control over the exploration,
development and utilization of natural
resources even with the grant of said rights
to the indigenous peoples, through the
imposition of requirements and conditions
for the utilization of natural resources under
existing laws, such as the Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991196 and the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995.
5) WON IPRA VIOLATES RIGHTS
OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERS
Private rights by the enactment of IPRA,
Congress did not purport to annul any and
all Torrens titles within areas claimed as
ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The
statute imposes strict procedural
requirements for the proper delineation of
ancestral lands and ancestral domains as
safeguards against the fraudulent
deprivation of any landowner of his land,
whether or not he is member of an
indigenous cultural community. In all
proceedings for delineation of ancestral
lands and ancestral domains, the Director
of Lands shall appear to represent the
interest of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA,
petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN
and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa assail the
constitutionality of the following provisions
of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on
the following grounds:
(1) They amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
 Section 3(a) which defines the
extent and coverage of ancestral domains,
and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;
 Section 5, in relation to section
3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources found
within ancestral domains are private but
community property of the indigenous
peoples;
4
 Section 6 in relation to section
3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition
of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
 Section 7 which recognizes and
enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;
 Section 8 which recognizes and
enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral lands;
 Section 57 which provides for
priority rights of the indigenous peoples in
the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be
their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization
of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not
more than 25 years; and
 Section 58 which gives the
indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof
which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas,
forest cover or reforestation.
(2) By providing for an all-
encompassing definition of “ancestral
domains” and “ancestral lands” which might
even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the
rights of private landowners.
The Court required respondents to
comment.
Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA They defend
the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray
that the petition be dismissed for lack of
merit.
Secretary of DENR and Secretary of DBM
IPRA is partly unconstitutional on
the ground that it grants ownership over
natural resources to indigenous peoples
and prays that the petition be granted in
part.
Intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan
Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr.
Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders
and members of 112 groups of indigenous
peoples They defend the constitutionality
of IPRA and pray for the dismissal of the
petition.
Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
Asserts that IPRA is an
expression of the principle of parens patriae
and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays
that the petition be dismissed.
Ikalahan Indigenous People and the
Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of
Natural Resources, Inc. IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray
that the petition for prohibition and
mandamus be dismissed.
ISSUE: WON IPRA and its Implementing
Rules tantamount to unlawful deprivation of
the State ownership and violate the rights of
private landowners.
HELD: Seven (7) other members of the
Court voted to grant the petition. Seven (7)
voted to dismiss the petition. After
redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56,
Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the petition is DISMISSED.
Among the members of the court who voted
to dismiss the petition are: (1) Justice
Kapunan (2) Chief Justice and Justices
Bellosillo, (3) Quisumbing, (4) Santiago (5)
Justice Puno (6) Justice Mendoza.
[No ratio included in the Resolution.
Separate opinions attached to main text.]
Kapunan: The theory of jura regalia was
nothing more than a natural fruit of
conquest; The Regalian theory does not
negate native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial.
Puno: The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) grants the indigenous cultural
communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) the ownership and possession of
their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands, and defines the extent of these lands
and domains, and the ownership given is
the indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law which traces its origin to
native title.
Indigenous Cultural Communities or
Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of
people or homogeneous societies who
have continuously lived as an organized
community on communally bounded and
defined territory. The State, by recognizing
the right of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral
lands and domains, has effectively upheld
their right to live in a culture distinctly their
own.
SEC. OF DENR VS. YAP, 568 SCRA 164,
OCTOBER 8, 2008
DOCTRINE: The 1935 Constitution
classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber. The 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks. Of these, only agricultural
lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of
these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain. The
Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. All lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State.

FACTS:
- These are consolidated cases
concerning the right of present occupants in
Boracay
- On April 14, 2976, the DENR
approved of the National Reservation
Survey of Boracay, which identified several
lots as being occupied or claimed by
persons
o Through PD 1081, Pres. Marcos
declared Boracay as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of
the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
- Respondent Yap et.al filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes
o They alleged that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over
their occupied lands. They declared that
they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay
since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for
tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them
o Since the Island was classified as
a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.
- OSG opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of
the public domain. It formed part of the
mass of lands classified as public forest,
which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code
- RTC rendered a decision in favor
of respondents-claimants
o RTC upheld respondents-
claimants right to have their occupied lands
titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular
No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay
were inalienable or could not be the subject
of disposition
- The OSG moved for
reconsideration but its motion was denied.
The Republic then appealed to the CA. On
In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto
the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought
reconsideration but it was similarly denied.
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
- On May 22, 2006, during the
pendency the petition in the trial court,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay
Island partly reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and partly agricultural
land (alienable and disposable).
o Proclamation likewise provided
for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side
of the centerline of roads and trails,
reserved for right-of-way and which shall
5
form part of the area reserved for forest
land protection purposes.
- On August 10, 2006, petitioners-
claimants Sacay,and other landowners in
Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.
o Alleged that the Proclamation
infringed on their “prior vested rights” over
portions of Boracay. They have been in
continued possession of their respective
lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
o Petitioners-claimants contended
that there is no need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land.
Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed
agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first
Public Land Act
- OSG argued that petitioners-
claimants do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island.
Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705.
Being public forest, the claimed portions of
the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. It is only the executive department, not
the courts, which has authority to reclassify
lands of the public domain into alienable
and disposable lands. There is a need for a
positive government act in order to release
the lots for disposition
ISSUE: W/N Private claimants have a
right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay
HELD and RATIO:
 Except for lands already covered
by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior
to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705
o PD No. 705 issued by President
Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of
the public domain as public forest. Section
3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest
as “a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not.”
o Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in
Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered
public forests. PD No. 705, however,
respects titles already existing prior to its
effectivity.
- A positive act declaring land as
alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive
act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable
and disposable. The burden of proof in
overcoming such presumption is on the
person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
- In the case at bar, no such
proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court.
The records are bereft of evidence showing
that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject
of a government proclamation that the land
is alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof
- Proc. No. 1801 cannot be
deemed the positive act needed to classify
Boracay Island as alienable and disposable
land. If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have
identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No.
1064. This was not done in Proclamation
No. 1801.
- The Regalian Doctrine dictates
that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
o All lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.
5. VICENTE SOTTO VS FILEMON SOTTO
G.R. NO. L-17768 SEPT. 1, 1922
DOCTRINE:
• The dominant principle of the
Torrens system of land registration is that
the titles registered thereunder are
indefeasible or as nearly so as it is possible
to make them.
• The final “decree of confirmation
and registration” cannot be reopened
(except for the reasons and in the manner
stated in Sec. 38 of the Land Registration
Act).
• The final “decree of confirmation
and registration” provided for in the Land
Registration Act is not the same as a
“judgment” within the meaning of section
513 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that
section is not applicable to decisions
covered or confirmed by such final decrees.
The remedy provided for in section 513 of
the Code of Civil Procedure may, in land
registration matters, be applied to
judgments not confirmed by final decrees.
FACTS:
• The petitioner alleged that he is
the owner of Lot No. 7510. In 1907, he
absented himself from the City of Cebu,
leaving the respondent in charge of the lot.
• In 1921, he discovered that the
respondent had fraudulently obtained the
registration of said lot in his own name and
that a certificate of title for said lot had been
issued.

• Due to petitioner’s long absence
from Cebu, he was unable to appear in
court in the Land Registration Proceedings
and to defend his rights. He therefore asks
the Court (SC) that the decision of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) be annulled.
• The contention of the petitioner in
going to the SC is based on Sec. 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. (Basically the
provision is about when a “judgment” is
rendered by a CFI and a party in unjustly
deprived of a hearing, the said party may
petition to the Supreme Court)
• The respondent now files a
demurrer and maintains that Sec. 513 is not
applicable to decisions in land registration
proceedings which are covered by a final
decree. Moreover, under the original Land
Registration Act (No.496) which established
the Torrens system of registration in Jan.1,
1903, Section 38 of the Act provides that
when a “decree of confirmation and
registration” is entered, “such decree shall
not be opened by reason of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
any court for reversing judgments or
decrees xxx” (Spoiler alert: respondent is
right)
• Argument of Petitioner: Act
No.1108 was enacted and amended
Section 14 of Act. 496 which allows to go
directly to the SC and be governed by
Sec.513.
ISSUE: WON Sec.513 can be applied to
decisions in land registrations proceedings
which are covered by final decree. - NO.
DECISION:
• The purpose of the amendment
of section 14 of the land Registration Act
was clearly to make the Court of Land
Registration coordinate with the Courts of
First Instance and to make its judgments
appealable to the Supreme Court instead of
to the Courts of First Instance. It must be
conceded that section 14, as amended, is
repugnant to several other sections of the
Land Registration Act, if we hold that the
final "decree of confirmation and
registration" provided for in section 38 of
the Act is a "judgment" within the meaning
of section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
• The Land Registration Act itself
distinguishes between a judgment and the
final decree. The final "decree of
confirmation and registration" is separate
and distinct from the “judgment” and cannot
be entered until at least thirty days after
such judgment has been rendered. The
contents of this final decree is thus
prescribed by section 40 of the Act:
"Every decree of registration shall bear the
day of the year, hour, and minute of its
entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It
shall state whether the owner is married or
unmarried, and the name of the husband or
wife. If the owner is under disability, it shall
state the nature of the disability, and if a
minor, shall state his age. It shall contain a
description of the land as finally determined
6
by the court, and shall set forth the estate of
the owner, and also, in such manner as to
show their relative priority, all particular
estates, mortgages, easements, liens,
attachments, and other incumbrances,
including rights of husband or wife, if any, to
which the land or owner’s estate is subject,
and may contain any other matter properly
to be determined in pursuance of this Act.
The decree shall be stated in a convenient
form for transcription upon the certificates
of title hereinafter mentioned.”
• As provided in the last sentence
of the section quoted, the decree is
transcribed literally upon the certificate of
title. Section 38 of the Act provides that it
"shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees.”
• It can readily be seen that such a
decree possesses very special
characteristics and that it differs not only in
form but also in character from the ordinary
judgment.
• Its features of finality and
indefeasibility constitute the cornerstone of
the Land Registration Act; if we eliminate
them we may still have a land registration
system but it will not be a Torrens system.
• To hold that the Legislature by a
mere reference in Act No. 1108 to section
513 of the Code of Civil Procedure intended
to include such final decrees in the term
"judgment" as employed in that section
would therefore be equivalent to holding
that it proposed in this casual manner to
abolish the Torrens system in these
Islands, a system which had given general
satisfaction, and to substitute therefor a
mongrel system with all the disadvantages
of Torrens registration but without its
principal advantages.
• Such an interpretation of the law
would be in conflict with the view of the
effect of final decrees expressed in all
decisions of this court upon the subject
from the time of the enactment of Act No.
1108 until the present time (with the sole
exception of the aforementioned dictum in
the case of Caballes v. Director of Lands –
judgment did not have a final decree). It
would lay a final land registration decree
open to successive attacks by persons
claiming to have been deprived of their
interest in the decreed land by default and
would throw the title back into the realm of
oral evidence, which, in land disputes in this
country, has always been found notoriously
unreliable.
• Moreover, an examination of the
Land Registration Act shows clearly that its
prime object is to give the greatest possible
protection to the bona fide holders of the
certificates of title provided for in the Act. If
a final decree of confirmation and
registration should be reopened and
cancelled, it is, of course, obvious that all
certificates of title issued under the decree
would fail whether the holders were guilty of
bad faith or not; as far as the validity of his
title might be concerned, the bona fide
holder of a transfer certificate — an
innocent third party — would be exactly in
the same position as the holder in bad faith
of the first certificate issued under a decree,
i. e., neither would have any legal title
whatever.
Hence, demurrer is GRANTED.
Note: The main issue and bulk of
discussion in the case is about procedure.
Medyo mahirap din siya intindihan because
they are discussing obsolete provisions
(case is 1922) which are very long. In the
book of Agcaoili, this case was merely
mentioned because of this line: “The
dominant principle of the Torrens system of
land registration is that the titles registered
thereunder are indefeasible or as nearly so
as it is possible to make them.”
CONSUELO LEGARDA, WITH HER
HUSBAND MAURO PRIETO,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. N.M.
SALEEBY, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
OCTOBER 2, 1915 G.R. NO. L-8936
Facts:
Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby are
owners of adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila.
Between their lots is a stone wall which is
located on the lot of the plaintiffs. On March
2, 1906, Consuelo and her husband
presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration to register their lot. The
registration was allowed on October 25,
1906. They were then issued an original
certificate and the title was registered. Both
included the wall.
On March 25, 1912, the predecessor of
N.M. Saleeby presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for registration.
The court decreed the registration of the
land which also included the wall. The
plaintiffs Consuelo and Mauro, her
husband, discovered that the wall has also
been registered to N.M. Saleeby. They
presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for adjustment and correction
of the error where the wall was indicated in
both registrations. However, the lower court
contended that during the pendency of the
petition for the registration of the
defendant’s land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot,
including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is the owner
of the wall and the land occupied by it?
RULING:
NO. The lower court’s decision would call
for the plaintiffs to be always alert and see
to it that no other parties will register the
wall and its land. Else, if they spotted
someone registering such wall in their own
name, plaintiff must immediately oppose.
Such would become defeat the real
purpose of the Torrens system of land
registration.

The real purpose of that system is to quiet
title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once
a title is registered the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the
mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility
of losing his land.
So who owns the land? According to
Torrens system, the plaintiffs. Under our
law, once a party registers the land, final
and in good faith, no third parties may claim
interest on the same land. The rights of all
the world re foreclosed by the decree of
registration. The registration, under the
Torrens system, does not give the owner
any better title than he had. The registration
of a particular parcel of land is a bar to
future litigation over the same between the
same parties. It is a notice to the world and
no one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be
more in consonance with the purposes and
the real intent of the torrens system, we are
of the opinion and so decree that in case
land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different
persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
The presumption is that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. This presumption is
IRREBUTABLE. It cannot be overcome by
proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise
the very purpose and object of the law
requiring a record would be destroyed. The
rule is that all persons must take notice of
the facts which the public record contains is
a rule of law. The rule must be absolute.
Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.
DISPOSITION:
Judgment of the lower court was revoked.
The wall and the land where it sits is
awarded to the plaintiffs.
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION INC V.
PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. NO. L-16257 | JANUARY 31, 1963
FACTS.
1. Lot 378 is part of Hacienda
Mandalagan, consisting of Lots 378, 405,
407, 410, 1205, 1452 and 1641 of the
cadastral survey with aggregate area of
over 502 hectares originally registered in
the name of Agustin and Pilar Amenabar. It
has an area of 22,783 sqm covered by OCT
no. 1776 issued on August 25, 1916.
2. On November 30, 1920, the
Amenabars sold the hacienda to Jose
Benares for P300k. TCT no. 6295 was
issued in his name.
3. On March 12, 1921, the hacienda
had been mortgaged by Benares to the
Bacolod-Murcia Milling for P27,991.74. Said
hacienda was again mortgaged to PNB
subject to the first mortgage held by
7
Bacolod-Murcia Milling. These were
annotated on the TCT.
4. However, the mortgage in favor
of PNB was subsequently foreclosed
pursuant to a CFI decision and the bank
acquired the hacienda, including Lot 378,
as purchaser of the foreclosure sale. TCT
no. 6295 was cancelled and was
reconstituted due to loss as TCT RT-1371.
5. PNB agreed to sell the Hacienda
to Carlos Benares, the son of Jose, for
P400k subject to the condition that, until
full payment, title would remain in the bank.
Carlos transferred his rights under this
contract to Capitol Subdivision which
completed the payments due, thus TCT
1798 and deed of absolute sale was issued.
6. Despite the acquisition of the
Hacienda by PNB, it did not take
possession of the property as Jose Benares
claimed to be entitled to retain it under an
alleged right of lease. Thus, the deed of
promise to sell in favor of Carlos Benares
contained a “caveat emptor” stipulation.
7. Upon the execution of the deed
of absolute sale by PNB to Capitol
Subdivision, it was discovered that Lot 378
was the land occupied by the Provincial
Hospital of Negros Occidental so Capitol
sought clarification on the status of said
occupation. It eventually sought the present
action.
8. Capitol Subdivision seeks to
recover from the Province of Negros
Occidental the possession of Lot 378 of the
cadastral survey of Bacolod, Negros
Occidental, and a reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of
said lot from November 8, 1935.
9. On June 28, 1951, CFI rendered
judgment in favor of Capitol but on appeal,
the judgment was set aside by the SC in
G.R. no. L-6204 which remanded the case
to the lower court. The LC likewise
dismissed Capitol’s complaint and ordered
it to execute a deed conveying Lot 378 to
the Province, so Capitol appealed.
10. In its answer, the Province
maintained that it acquired Lot 378 through
expropriation proceedings in 1924 and had
adversely and continuously occupied the
same as owner. Title was never transferred
in its name and said lot was only placed in
its name for tax assessment purposes.
a. Claims that Capitol was in bad
faith in purchasing said lot from PNB as it
knew that the hospital was where it is up to
the present
ISSUE: W/N Province of Negros Occidental
had acquired Lot 378 in the expropriation
proceedings -- NO
HELD: The province of Negros Occidental
was not able to sufficiently prove that they
have acquired legal title over Lot 378 as the
expropriation had not been consummated
based on several circumstances.
First, the entries in the docket pertaining to
the expropriation case refer only to its filing
and the publication in the newspaper of the
notices. Second, there was an absence of a
deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour
of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third,
the property was mortgaged to Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have
been expropriated without the intervention
of the Milling Co and yet, the latter was not
made a party in the expropriation
proceedings. Fourth, a second mortgage
was constituted in favour of PNB, which
would not have accepted the mortgage had
Lot 378 not belonged to the mortgagor.
Neither could said lot have been
expropriated without the Bank’s knowledge
and participation. In the deed executed by
PNB, on November 8, 1935, promising to
sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos
Benares, it was explicitly stated that
portions of Lots 405, 407 and 410, forming
part of said Hacienda and designated as
Lots 405-A, 407-A; 407-B and 410-A, had
been expropriated by the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental, thus
indicating, by necessary implication, that
Lot 378 had not been expropriated.
Thus, the Province has not tried to prove
that the expropriation case had ever been
dismissed insofar as Lot 378 is concerned.
By the way, the contrary was intimated by
defendant's witness, Ildefonso Coscolluela,
for he testified that the expropriation case
was still pending in 1934, when he ceased
to be the provincial treasurer, and the
record before us suggests that since the
Province took possession of the land in
1924 or 1925 and completed the
construction of the hospital in 1926, there
were no further proceedings in said case.
According to appealed decision, the failure
of the government to secure the
corresponding transfer of title to Lot 378 lies
in the mistaken notion or belief that said lot
forms a part of Lot 405-B based on an
examination of the plan which shows that
while all the subdivided lots were properly
identified by lot numbers, that particular
portion at the lower corner of the plan
encircled with red pencil, marked Exhibit X-
1, is not labelled with the corresponding lot
number and that portion is precisely lot No.
378 where the hospital building was
constructed. With respect to the plan, there
is also no evidence that authorities had
been misled. The very evidence for the
defendant, specially the assessor's field
sheets and declarations of real property for
tax purposes show that the Government
had always regarded Lot 378, not Lot 405,
as part of the Provincial Hospital Site.
Furthermore, the 12k received by Jose
Benares from the Government could not
possibly be the price of Lot 378 for at the of
P1,000 a hectare, its price could not have
exceeded P3,000.00. Benares may have
mistaken the payment for his land included
in the Capitol site, as one intended for Lot
378, which was affected by the hospital site
as there were two expropriation
proceedings. Thus, the evidence on record
is far from sufficient to establish the alleged
acquisition by the Province of Lot 378,
which must be held, therefore, to be the
exclusive property of Capitol.
The purpose of the Torrens System is to
avoid possible conflicts of title in and to real
estate, and to facilitate transactions relative

thereto giving the public the right to rely
upon the face of Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such
further inquiry.
In the case at bar Capitol had no such
actual knowledge, it being an established
fact that he was not aware until 1949 that
the land on which the provincial hospital
stood was Lot 378. Furthermore, since the
year 1921, or before the expropriation case
for the hospital site had begun, said lot was
mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Co., and the mortgage, duly registered, as
well as annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, was not cancelled until
September 28, 1935. Prior to this date, or
on December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was
subjected to a second mortgage in favor of
the Bank, which acquired title thereto, thru
foreclosure proceedings, in 1934. When the
Bank agreed on November 8, 1935, to sell
the property to Carlos P. Benares and the
latter, subsequently conveyed his rights to
plaintiff herein, as well as when the bank
executed the deed of absolute sale in
plaintiff's favor on September 20, 1949, the
title to the property was in the name of the
Bank. In short, Capitol is a purchaser in
good faith and for value.
As regards compensation, Capitol is
entitled to recover from Province the fair
and full equivalent to Lot 378 as of the time
when possession was actually taken. Case
should be remanded for reception of
evidence on date of actual taking and
amount of compensation collectible.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. SANTIAGO
G.R. NO. L-41278
APRIL 15, 1988
DOCTRINES:
Possession in the concept of an owner: As
sales applicants, they manifestly
acknowledge that they do not own the land
and that the same is a public land under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands, to
which the applications were submitted.
Therefore, their possession was not that of
an owner, as required by law.
Only agricultural lands are subject to
registration: Registration in this instance
cannot be granted on the basis of Section
48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act
which applies exclusively to agricultural
lands of the public domain. The subject
matters in question were forest lands and
only later declared as alienable or
disposable by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and
set aside the orders and decision of the
respondent Judge, and mandamus to order
the respondent Judge to give due course to
the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial. The
petitioner also prays for the dismissal of the
respondent corporation’s application for
registration.
8
On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land
registration was filed by respondent Garcia
in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the
application was forwarded to the Solicitor
General through the Director of Lands.
On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director of lands filed
an opposition to this application, and at the
same time the Solicitor General entered his
appearance and authorized the Provincial
Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing
of the same. Subsequently, respondent
Imperial Development Corporation, with the
conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a
Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from
Maria Garcia to Imperial Development
Corporation without amending the
boundaries of the area stated in the original
application. Said motion was granted by the
respondent Judge Santiago.
On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial
hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel
was present; an order of general default
was issued by the respondent Judge on the
same date. The respondent Judge
rendered the questioned decision and
adjudicated the lands in favor of the
Imperial Development Corporation
Petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial. The
motion was denied.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Santiago
erred in admitting the amended application
for registration and adjudicating the parcels
of land in favor of Imperial Development
Corporation.
HELD:
YES. The decree of registration issued is
declared VOID. The respondent
corporation’s subject application for land
registration is DISMISSED.
The lower court gravely abused its
discretion when it granted the respondent
corporation’s application for registration,
without sufficient proof that the applicant
possessed an imperfect and incomplete title
that is registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by
Republic Act 6236, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act.
The Supreme Court is not convinced with
the conclusion of the respondent Judge and
with the arguments of the respondent
corporation that the latter, through its
predecessors-in- interest, has been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years.
First, it appears that Maria Garcia and
Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent
corporation purchased the subject lots,
have pending sales applications as
evidenced in the plans submitted to the
land registration court by Maria Garcia
herself. As such sales applicants, they
manifestly acknowledge that they do not
own the land and that the same is a public
land under the administration of the Bureau
of Lands, to which the applications were
submitted. Therefore, their possession was
not that of an owner, as required by law.
The private respondents were
conspicuously silent on this point, as if they
were trying to conceal this vital fact.
Secondly, if it is true that the original owner
and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had
been in possession since 1925, why were
the subject lands declared for taxation
purposes for the first time only in 1968.
They constitute at least proof that the
holder had a claim of title over the property.
More than anything else, however,
registration in this instance cannot be
granted on the basis of Section 48,
paragraph b, of the Public Land Act as said
provision applies exclusively to agricultural
lands of the public domain.
SEC 48. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
It appears from Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971,
that the subject lands were forest lands and
only later declared as alienable or
disposable by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the
assumption that the applicant herein,
through its predecessors-in-interest, had
been in possession for at least thirty years,
such possession never ripened into private
ownership. The respondent Garcia and
Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales
patents precisely because they wanted to
acquire ownership over the subject lands.
An examination of the dates will show that
the filing of the sales applications,
apparently on October 24, 1971, was done
after the lands had been declared as
alienable and disposable.
The respondent corporation’s subject
application for land registration is
dismissed.
BARROGA VS. ALBANO
G.R. NO. L-43445, JANUARY 20, 1988
TOPIC: BASIC CONCEPTS AND
PRINCIPLES

Doctrines:
• There is no provision in the Land
Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a
civil action, except the proceedings to place
the winner in possession by virtue of a writ
of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal.
• A writ of possession can be
issued not only against the original
oppositors in a land registration case and
their representatives and successors-in-
interest, but also against any person
unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot
at any time before and up to the issuance of
the final decree.
• Neither laches nor the statute of
limitations applies to a decision in a land
registration case.
Facts:
• In a Cadastral Proceeding of the
then CFI of Ilocos Norte, a decision was
rendered adjudicating a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 9821 in favor of Delfina
Aquino.
• One of the oppositors, Ruperta
Pascual, was declared in default.
• For reasons not disclosed by the
record, the decree of registration did not
issue except until after the lapse of fourteen
(14) years or so; and it was only after
twenty-four (24) years had passed, that an
original certificate of title was issued in
Delfina Aquino's name.
• After the decree of registration
had been handed down but before title
issued in Delfina Aquino's favor, the
children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual
(appellants Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina
Padaca) brought suit in the same CFI
against the children and heirs of Delfina
Aquino (appellees Angel Albano, et al).
• Barroga et al argued: that they,
and their mother, Ruperta Pascual, had
been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941
and were the real owners thereof. They
prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided
and cancelled, that the defendants be
commanded to reconvey the land to them,
and that a new title be made out in their
names.
• Meanwhile, Delfina Aquino's title
encroached upon a 4-square-meter portion
of an adjoining lot, Lot 9822, belonging to a
Cesar Castro. Castro filed a complaint in
intervention for the recovery thereof.
• CFI: dismissed Barroga’s and
Padaca's complaint, and declared
intervenor Castro owner of the 4-square-
meter portion overlapped by Delfina
Aquino's title.
• The familiar doctrine of res
adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of
success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for
recovery of title Lot No. 9821. Their action
was clearly barred by the prior judgment in
the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina
Aquino's ownership over the property, and
in which proceeding the former's
predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual,
9
had taken part as oppositor but had been
declared in default.
• The judgment of the cadastral
court was one "against a specific thing" and
therefore "conclusive upon the title to the
thing." It was a judgment in rem, binding
generally upon the whole world, inclusive of
persons not parties thereto, and particularly
upon those who had actually taken part in
the proceeding (like the appellants'
predecessor, Ruperta Pascual, who had
intervened therein as an oppositor) as well
as their successors in interest, litigating for
the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity.
• The judgment became final and
executory.
• The Cadastral Court then
promulgated an Order granting the motion
of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of
possession as regards Lot No. 9821, and
later issued a writ of possession.
• Again Barroga and Padaca
sought to frustrate acquisition of possession
by Angel Albano, et al. by filing a motion to
nullify Order and to revoke Writ of
Possession issued. Their argument was
that as possessors of the lot in question,
they could not be ejected therefrom by a
mere motion for writ of possession.
Issue: W/N they can be ejected by Writ of
Possession. YES
Ratio: The Court stated that the writ of
possession could properly issue despite the
not inconsiderable period of time that had
elapsed from the date of the registration
decree, since the right to the same does not
prescribe pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of
Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero
v. Loot. It also declared that the segregation
of the 4-square meter portion from Lot 9821
and its restoration as integral part of Lot
9822, had no effect whatever on the
Albanos' right to the writ of possession,
which was the appropriate process for the
enforcement of the judgment in the
cadastral case.
The appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be
declared to be entitled to a writ of
possession over Lot No. 9821 in
enforcement of the decree of registration
and vindication of the title issued in favor of
their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q.
Aquino; the writ may correctly be enforced
against the appellants, Barroga and
Padaca, as successors-in-interest of
Ruperta Pascual, who was a party in the
registration proceedings which resulted in
the declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the
owner of the land subject thereof; and the
appellees are entitled to said writ of
possession, despite the lapse of many,
many years, their right thereto being
imprescriptible at least as against the
persons who were parties to the cadastral
case or their successors-in-interest.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN,
PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
Doctrines:
(a) In complying with Section 14 (2)
of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property
is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run.
(b) Patrimonial property is private
property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property
by prescription under the Civil Code is
entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(c) There are two kinds of
prescription by which patrimonial property
may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership
of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in
good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person's uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title,
ripens into ownership.
Facts:
• On 20 February 1998, Mario
Malabanan filed an application for land
registration before the RTC of Cavite-
Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated
in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he
had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty
(30) years.
• Velazco testified that the property
was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and
Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it
among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s
wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited
by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino.
After the death of Esteban and Magdalena,
their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot
9864-A, which originally belonged to his
uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco
to Malabanan.
• Among the evidence presented
by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by
the CENRO-DENR, which stated that the
subject property was "verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established

under Project No. 20-A and approved as
such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.
• RTC ruled in favor of Malabanan.
• The Republic interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and
that the RTC had erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.
• On 23 February 2007, the Court
of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing
the RTC and dismissing the application of
Malabanan. The appellate court held that
under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the
lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of
possession.
• Malabanan died while the case
was pending with the Court of Appeals;
hence, it was his heirs who appealed the
decision of the appellate court.
Issues:
1. In order that an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain may
be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree,
should the land be classified as alienable
and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant
for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier?
2. Are petitioners entitled to the registration
of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree or both?
Ratio: No.
• Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms
that “those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945” have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
• Since Section 48(b) merely
requires possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the lands should
have been alienable and disposable during
the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it
is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act. The right
to register granted under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
10
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
• In complying with Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property
is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run.
• Patrimonial property is private
property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property
by prescription under the Civil Code is
entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
• There are two kinds of
prescription by which patrimonial property
may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership
of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in
good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person’s uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title,
ripens into ownership.
• The evidence of petitioners is
insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject
property under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. There is no substantive evidence
to establish that Malabanan or petitioners
as his predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners
can date back their possession, according
to their own evidence—the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular—
is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail
themselves of registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
• Neither can petitioners properly
invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in
1982, there is no competent evidence that
is no longer intended for public use service
or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of
the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does
not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the
Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
G.R No. 101387 dated March 11, 1998
PETITIONERS: SPOUSES MARIANO
AND ERLINDA LABURADA,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT, MANUEL SANTOS, JR.
RESPONDENT: LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY
Facts:
• Petitioners were the applicants in
LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration
of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in
Mandaluyong City.
• On January 8, 1991, the trial
court, acting as a land registration court,
found that the petitioners had a registrable
title over the said parcel of land and
ordered the registration of their title thereto.
• After the finality of the decision,
the trial court, upon motion of petitioners,
issued an order dated March 15, 1991
requiring the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of
registration.
• However, the LRA refused on the
ground that the issuance of the
corresponding decree sought by the
petitioners would result in the duplication of
titles over the same parcel of land, and thus
contravene the policy and purpose of the
Torrens registration system, and destroy
the integrity of the same.
• Hence, petitioners filed this action
for mandamus.
Issue: Whether or not respondent LRA can
be compelled to issue the corresponding
decree in LRC Case NO. N11022 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, branch LXVIII
Held:
• No, the petition was dismissed
and remanded to the court of origin in Pasig
City.
• It is settled that a land registration
court has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of land already decreed in the
name of another in an earlier land
registration case. A second decree for the
same land would be null and void, since the
principle behind original registration is to
register a parcel of land only once. Thus, if
it is proven that the land which petitioners
are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance
of a decree of registration to petitioners will
run counter to said principle.
• The issuance of a decree of
registration is part of the judicial function of
courts and is not a mere ministerial act
which may be compelled through
mandamus.
• Indeed, it is well-settled that the
issuance of such decree is not compellable
by mandamus because it is a judicial act
involving the exercise of discretion.
• Likewise, the writ of mandamus
can be awarded only when the petitioners’
legal right to the performance of the
particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. Under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal
right is a right which is indubitably granted
by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If
the right is clear and the case is
meritorious, objections raising merely
technical question will be disregarded. But
where the right sought to be enforced is in
substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case,
mandamus cannot issue.

12. HEIRS OF LOPEZ v DE CASTRO
FACTS:
• This was case about two
applications for registration over a single
parcel of land in span of 12 years from
different CFIs.
• July 25, 1956, Pedro Lopez et al
filed application of 69 hectare land in
Tagaytay with CFI Cavite. Asst. Fiscal
Legaspi (counsel for Cavite) went against
this application contending that land was
Cavite’s patrimonial property since 1930 –
and an earlier case provided that applicants
were NEVER in possession of the said
land. NEVERTHELESS, (1969) lower court
ruled in favor of Lopez saying that
Municiplaity of SIlang had no personality
over the case for the land was under the
TAGAYTAY and NOT SILANG, said if there
was even cause of action, it was
TAGAYTAY who had standing.
• Report by CLERK of Court
Rolando Diaz – since time immermorial
Micaele, Fernando, Ciriaco, and Catalino
De los Reyes owned the possessed land.
On 1870 sold to Trinidad and Francisco
Dimaranan and finally passed on to Pedro
Lopez and Maxima on 1892, as heirs. After
death of Pedro Lopez and Maxima –
passed on to heirs (APPLICANTS) and
were partitioned. COURT APPROVED
THIS REPORT and ordered partition in
their favor.
• Municipality of Silang appealed
and appealed until SC via 65 but to no
avail.
NOW THE JUICY PART:
• While records were being
examined in LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSION – it was DISCOVERED that
land had been decreed in favor of herein
respondents Honesto de Castro et al (Totoo
ba to? Honest ka ba talaga?)
• It was found that sometime 1967
(habang dinidribble ni Silang yung kaso nila
Lopez) Honesto filed with different Branch
of Cavite CFI an application for registration
of same land – called for hearing 1968, and
in only 8 days, favourable decree was
awarded.
• The ruling of the court was based
on its finding that one Hermogenes Orte,
who originally owned the land sought to be
registered, sold it in 1932 to Marciano de
Castro. The deed was ALLEGED to have
been destroyed during the Japanes
Occupation – nevertheless – continued
occupation till 1940. Marciano’s wife
together with children (which included
Honesto) continued possession.
• CONFLICT WAS NEVER
EXPLAINED BECAUSE head of geodetic
engr of LRC never appeared in court. 
• SEVEN YEARS later, heirs of
Pedro Lopez went sought execution of their
earlier partition case and cancellation of the
de Castro titles. They were UNDULY
DEPRIVED OF THEIR LAND on account of
wrongful registration.
• De Castro group alleged
Estoppel and Failure to state cause of
action. Also Lopez no longer owners,
because land was sold to them and that
they were buyers in good faith.
11
• Lower court: held that it could not
enforce the judgment against the
respondents considering they were not
made parties to the case. Nor can it order
the register of deeds of Tagaytay City to
cancel the title of respondents since it was
not also made a party to the case thus the
court does not acquire jurisdiction over it.
Further, the court held that the action
brought by the petitioners would be
tantamount to the nature of collaterally
attacking the validity of the title of the
respondents.
• Court of appeals: Upon appeal to
the CA, it re-affirms the lower court’s
decision with emphasis on the
indefeasibility of the Torrens Title while
citing the Civil Code provisions on Article
1544 on sale of property to different
vendees where in case the land has been
registered in the name of two different
persons, the earlier in date of registration
shall prevail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners
LOPEZ can question the validity of the title
of the respondents de Castro over the
property in dispute?
HELD:
The court held that a land registration is an
in rem proceeding which involves a
constructive notice against all persons
including the state which is effective
through the publication of the application for
land registration. The court held that when
more than one certificate of title is issued
over the land, the person holding the prior
certificate of title is entitled to a better right
against the person who relies on the
subsequent certificate. This rule refers to
the date of the certificate of title and not on
the date of filing the application for
registration of title. In land registration
proceedings, all interested parties are
obliged to take care of their interests and to
zealously pursue their objective of
registration on account of the rule that
whoever first acquires title to a piece of land
shall prevail. The publication made with
respect to the application of the
respondents served as a constructive
notice against the whole world thus the
court upheld the validity of their title and its
indefeasibility against collateral attack from
the petitioners.
Granting that the petitioners did not have
actual knowledge about the respondent’s
application to the land, they waited for 7
more years after knowing that the property
was already registered in the name of the
respondents to demand for the execution of
judgment and cancellation of the
respondent’s title. Therefore the SC finds
them guilty of latches. Petitioner’s petition
was denied.
NOTES:
Jurisdiction issue:
The governing law when the respondent
sought registration of their land was the
Judiciary Act of 1948 providing permanent
station of 2 district judges in Cavite, thus
the application was filed before the court in
Cavite. This was later amended providing
for the 4 judges to preside in the Province
of Cavite, the cities of Cavite and Tagaytay.
Following the rule on jurisdiction, the court
of the place where the property is located
should take cognizance over the
registration of property therefore upon the
creation of Tagaytay City branch of court,
the application should have been
transferred from Cavite to Tagaytay branch.
Retaining the venue of the application in
Cavite however is in order since venue is
merely procedural not jurisdictional and
may be waived in lieu of convenience to the
parties. The petitioner’s assailing the
jurisdiction of the Cavite branch rendering
decision in favor of the respondent’s title
over the property located in Tagaytay
cannot be sustained by the court.
13) ARCEO V. CA
Topic: Grant of Title- Venue
FACTS:
Sps. Abdon and Escolastica Arceo were
owners of four parcels of unregistered land
(6 were involved but only 4 were disputed)
in Pulilan, Bulacan  Escolastica died in
1942 while Abdon passed away in 1953
They had one son, Esteban, who died in
1941 he had five children: Jose, Pedro,
Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera
Jose married Virginia Franco and they had
six children: Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo,
Manuel, Cesar, and Romeo.
Jose died in 1970.
Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are
the private respondents while Jose’s widow,
Virginia and their children are petitioners.
(Virginia and children v. her brother in laws)
It appears that October or September 27,
1941, the Arceos executed a deed of
donation inter vivos marked as Exhibit J, in
which Sps. Arceo bestowed the property in
favor of Jose  since 1942, Jose had been
paying taxes thereon and took personal
possession and worked thereon since 1949
On October 3 (or 30), 1941, Sps. Arceo
supposedly signed a deed of donation,
marked as exhibit 1 revoking exhibit J and
giving away the properties in question in
favor of all his grandchildren including Jose
 only notarized in 1944 after Escolastica’s
death
In 1950, in also appears that Sps. Arceo
executed another deed of donation, marked
exhibit T disposing of the properties further
in favor of Jose.
On January 1972, Virginia with her children,
filed with the cadastral court an application
for registration in their names of the four
lots in dispute on the strength of exhibits J
and T.

Pedro, Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotero
opposed the application on the basis of
exhibit 1.
The cadastral court rejected all documents
(exhibits J, T, and 1) and distributed the
properties according to law on intestate
succession.
Virginia filed MR with CA  AFFIRMED
cadastral court’s decision
Hence, this present petition.
Petitioners argue that the cadastral court
was bereft of the power to determine
conflicting claims of ownership, and that its
authority was solely to confirm an existing
title, and that anyway, all the lots should
have been awarded to them by virtue of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession since 1941 (when Jose took
possession of the lands) or by acquisitive
prescription.
Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera
contend that the cadastral court had the
jurisdiction to decide the questions of
ownership of property.
ISSUE: WON the cadastral court has
jurisdiction to decide the questions of
ownership of property- YES
RULING:
-It has been held that under Section 2 of the
Property Registration Decree, the
jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as a land
registration court, is no longer as
circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496,
the former land registration law
-The Decree has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in
the regional trial court and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former
law when acting merely as a cadastral court
-The amendment was aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits, the change has
simplified registration proceedings by
conferring upon the required trial courts the
authority to act not only on applications for
original registration but also over all
petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising from such applications or
petitions
-The exceptions on the limited jurisdiction
rule governing land registration courts are:
1. Where the parties mutually
agreed or have acquiesced in submitting
controversial issued for determination
2. Where they have been given full
opportunity to present their evidence
3. Where the court has considered
the evidence already of record and is
convinced that the same is sufficient for
rendering a decision upon such
controversial issues
-The rule is not, in reality, one of
jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure,
which may be waived
12
-Where the issue if of ownership, it is
ineluctably tied up with the question of right
of registration, the cadastral court commits
no error in assuming jurisdiction over it
 in this case, where both parties rely on
their respective exhibits to defeat one
another’s claims over the parcels sought to
be registered, in which case, registration
would not be possible or would be unduly
prolonged unless the court first decided it
On the issue on who has right to the
property (irrelevant to topic):
-As to exhibit T, the finding of the CA that it
was defective is just as controlling on this
Court, that is, that "it was signed by Abdon
Arceo after the death of his wife on
September 16, 1942 and does not contain
the acceptance ... by Jose Arceo."
-It cannot be said that exhibit "1" had validly
revoked exhibit "J"  The weight of
authority is that a valid donation, once
accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on
account of officiousness, failure by the
donee to comply with charges imposed in
the donation, or by reason of ingratitude.
There is simply no proof that Abdon when
he executed exhibit "1", was in possession
of a legal ground for annulment
-It is therefore this Court's ruling that the
disposition under exhibit "J" in favor of Jose
(whose rights were transmitted to Virginia,
et al.) should be respected
14. SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC V.
ANGELA V. MADAYAG
G.R. No. 164687 , February 12, 2009
DOCTRINE - VENUE
. questions arising from an application for
FACTS:
1. On July 2001, Respondent Madayag filed
with RTC Urdaneta an application for
registration of 1,492 sqm lot in Brgy
Anonas, Urdaneta. Attached to the
application was a tracing cloth of Survey
Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land
Management Services (LMS) of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region 1, San
Fernando City
2. On Aug 2001, petitioner SM Prime
Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the
Region 1 Chief, Regional Survey Division,
DENR demanding cancellation of the
respondent’s survey plan because the lot
encroached on the properties it recently
purchased from several lot owners and that,
despite being the new owner of the
adjoining lots, it was not notified of the
survey conducted on June 8, 2001.
3. SM filed its opposition to the
respondent’s application for registration.
SM alleged that it had recently bought
seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas,
Urdaneta, delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G,
H and I in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan
No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the
Land Registration Commission on August
26, 1976, and previously covered by Survey
Plan No. Psu-236090 approved by the
Bureau of Lands on December 29, 1970.
These parcels of land are covered by
separate certificates of title, some of which
are already in the name of the petitioner
while the others are still in the name of the
previous owners.
4. OSG and heirs of Romulo Visperas also
filed their oppositions.
5. RTC - declared a general default, except
as to the petitioner, the Republic, and the
heirs of Romulo Visperas. Thereafter,
respondent commenced the presentation of
evidence.
6. Re SM’s request for cancellation of
survey plan, DENR Asst Reg Exec Director
Barcena advised SM to file a petition for
cancellation in due form. On March 2002,
SM filed petition alleging (1) there is no
such thing as alienable or disposable
property which is the subject lot in this case
(2) no notice was made upon SM (as
adjoining landowner and who bears interest
over the subject lot) much less the owners
of adjoining lands (3)the circumstances
evidently show that bad faith and/or malice
attended the approval of plan.
7. SM filed Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings in the land registration case,
alleging that the court should await the
DENR resolution of the petition for the
cancellation "as the administrative case is
prejudicial to the determination" of the land
registration case.
RTC- granted Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings; emphasizing that a survey
plan is one of the mandatory requirements
in land registration proceedings. MR denied
CA- RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion; orders declared null and void;
survey plan which was duly approved by
the DENR should be accorded the
presumption of regularity, and that the RTC
has the power to hear and determine all
registration. MR denied
ISSUE:
WON Court has jurisdiction over
registration of lands over DENR
HELD:
The fundamental purpose of the Land
Registration Law (Presidential Decree No.
1529) is to finally settle title to real property
in order to preempt any question on the
legality of the title – except claims that were
noted on the certificate itself at the time of
registration or those that arose subsequent
thereto. Consequently, once the title is
registered under the said law, owners can
rest secure on their ownership and
possession.
Petitioner posits that it is the DENR that has
the sole authority to decide the validity of
the survey plan that was approved by the
LMS. It cites Section 4(15), Chapter 1, Title
XIV, Administrative Code of 1987 which
provides that the DENR shall “exercise (of)
exclusive jurisdiction on the management
and disposition of all lands of the public
domain and serve as the sole agency
responsible for classification, sub-
classification, surveying and titling of lands
in consultation with appropriate agencies.”

Court held that, as an incident to its
authority to settle all questions over the title
of the subject property, the land registration
court may resolve the underlying issue of
whether the subject property overlaps the
petitioner’s properties without necessarily
having to declare the survey plan as void.
It is well to note at this point that, in its bid
to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote
the expeditious resolution of cases,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529
eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and
the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting
merely as a land registration court. Land
registration courts, as such, can now hear
and decide even controversial and
contentious cases, as well as those
involving substantial issues.When the law
confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter
is deemed to have all the necessary powers
to exercise such jurisdiction to make it
effective.It may, therefore, hear and
determine all questions that arise from a
petition for registration.
In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a
land registration court has the duty to
determine whether the issuance of a new
certificate of title will alter a valid and
existing certificate of title.An application for
registration of an already titled land
constitutes a collateral attack on the
existing title which is not allowed by law.
But the RTC need not wait for the decision
of the DENR in the petition to cancel the
survey plan in order to determine whether
the subject property is already titled or
forms part of already titled property. The
court may now verify this allegation based
on the respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis
the certificates of title of the petitioner and
its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a
survey plan precisely serves to establish
the true identity of the land to ensure that it
does not overlap a parcel of land or a
portion thereof already covered by a
previous land registration, and to forestall
the possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining
land.
Should the court find it difficult to do so, the
court may require the filing of additional
papers to aid in its determination of the
propriety of the application, based on
Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529.The court may
also directly require the DENR and the
Land Registration Authority to submit a
report on whether the subject property has
already been registered and covered by
certificates of title, like what the court did in
Carvajal v. Court of Appeals.
15. BUREAU OF FORESTRY VS. CA AND
GALLO G.R. NO. L-37995 AUGUST
31, 1987
Doctrine: As provided for under Sec. 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was
lifted from Act No. 2874, the classification
or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest
lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not of
13
the courts. With these rules, there should
be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of
lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch
of the Government, through the Office of
the President. Hence, it was grave error
and/or abuse of discretion for the
respondent court to ignore the
uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed
area is within a timberland block and (2) as
certified to by the then Director of Forestry,
the area is needed for forest purposes.
Facts:
• On July 11, 1961, 4 parcels of
land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo containing
an approximate area of 30.5943 hectares
were the subject of an application for
registration by Mercedes Diago.
• She alleged among others that
she occupied said parcels of land having
bought them from the testate estate of the
late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had
bought the lands in turn from Canuto
Gustilo on June 21, 1934.
• The Director of Lands opposed
her application on the ground that neither
the applicant nor her predecessors-in-
interest have sufficient title over the lands
applied for, which could be registered under
the Torrens systems, and that they have
never been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lands for
at least 30 years prior to the filing of the
application.
• The Director of Forestry on the
other hand anchored his opposition
principally on the ground that certain
specific portions of the lands subject matter
of the application, with an area of
approximately 194,080 square meters are
mangrove swamps and are within
Timberland Block "B " of Buenavista, Iloilo.
• On June 30, 1965, respondent
Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the
subject parcels of land from Mercedes
Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be
substituted in place of the latter, attaching
to his motion an Amended Application for
Registration of Title substantially
reproducing the allegations in the
application of Mercedes Diago.
• Petitioner Philippine Fisheries
Commission also moved on August 30,
1965 to be substituted in place of petitioner
Bureau of Forestry as oppositor over a
portion of the land sought to be registered,
supervision and control of said portion
having been transferred from the Bureau of
Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries
Commission.
RTC= Ordered the registration of 4 parcels
of land in the name of respondent Gallo
after excluding a portion which is the
municipal hall of Buenavista and subjecting
others to the road of way of 15m width.
CA= Affirmed RTC. MR= Denied.
Issue: WON respondent court erred in not
holding that the determination of whether a
public land is agricultural or still forest rests
exclusively upon the Director of Forest
Development, Sec. of Natural Resources
and President of PH. (YES.)
Held:
• Out of the 30.5943 hectares
applied for registration under the Torrens
System, 11.1863 hectares are coconut
lands and admittedly within the disposable
portion of the public domain. These are
more particularly Identified as parcels "B,"
B-1", "B-2" and "B-3" of the sketch plan
Exh. "1-A."
• The rest, consisting of 19.4080
hectares and Identified as parcels A, A-1,
A-2 and A-3 of the same plan Exh. "1-A," is
now the center of controversy of the
present appeal.
• [PETITIONERS ARGUMENT]
Petitioners contend that respondent court
completely ignored the undisputed facts
that (1) the controverted area is within
Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38,
L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo and
that (2) the certification of February 18,
1956 of the then Director of Forestry to the
effect that the area in question is needed
for forest purposes.
• [RESPONDENT COURT’S
ARGUMENT] Respondent court in affirming
the decision of the Iloilo trial court ruled that
although the controverted portion of
19.4080 hectares are mangrove and nipa
swamps within Timberland Block "B," L.C.
Project No. 38, same cannot be considered
part of the public forest not susceptible of
private ownership since petitioners failed to
submit convincing proof that these lands
are more valuable for forestry than for
agricultural purposes, and the presumption
is that these are agricultural lands.
o Respondent court based its
conclusion upon the premise that whether
or not a controverted parcel of land is forest
land, is a question of fact which should be
settled by competent proofs, and if such a
question be an issue in a land registration
proceeding, it is incumbent upon the
Director of Forestry to submit to the court
convincing proofs that the land in dispute is
not more valuable for agriculture than for
forest purposes.
o It is the position of respondent
that respondent court did "not hesitate to
apply this presumption with full force
particularly where, as in the case at bar, the
lands applied for have been possessed and
cultivated by the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest for a long number
of years without the government taking any
positive step to dislodge the occupants from
their holdings which have passed from one
to another by inheritance or by purchase."
(p. 9, Brief for private respondents)
Otherwise stated, it is Our impression that
private respondents claim the rule of
prescription against the government.
• Such contentions of private
respondents do not hold water.
o Admittedly the controversial area
is within a timberland block as classification
of the municipality and certified to by the
Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956
as lands needed for forest purposes and
hence they are portions of the public
domain which cannot be the subject of
registration proceedings.
• Clearly therefore the land is
public land and there is no need for the

Director of Forestry to submit to the court
convincing proofs that the land in dispute is
not more valuable for agriculture than for
forest purposes, as there was no question
of whether the land is forest land or not.
• Be it remembered that said forest
land had been declared and certified as
such by the Director of the Bureau of
Forestry on February 18, 1956, several
years before the original applicant of the
lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed
it on July 11, 1961. In the case of
Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Abella, 49 Phil. 49, cited by private
respondents themselves in their brief, We
held —
Following the decision of Ankon vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (40
Phil. 10), it is again held, that whether a
particular parcel of land is more valuable for
forestry purposes than for agricultural
purposes, or vice versa, is a fact which
must be established during the trial of the
case. Whether the particular land is
agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question
to be settled in each particular case unless
the Bureau of Forestry has, under the
authority conferred upon it by law, prior to
the intervention of private interest, set aside
said land for forestry or mineral resources.
(Italics for emphasis)
• As provided for under Sec. 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was
lifted from Act No. 2874, the classification
or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest
lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not of
the courts. With these rules, there should
be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of
lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch
of the Government, through the Office of
the President. Hence, it was grave error
and/or abuse of discretion for the
respondent court to ignore the
uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed
area is within a timberland block and (2) as
certified to by the then Director of Forestry,
the area is needed for forest purposes.
• Furthermore, private respondents
Cannot claim to have obtained their title by
prescription inasmuch as the application
filed by them necessarily implied an
admission that the portions applied for are
part of the public domain which cannot be
acquired by prescription, unless the law
expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that
possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership
(Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA
1184).
SC= CA Decision is SET ASIDE. New one
is hereby rendered, declaring that:
(1) Parcels "B," "B-1," "B-2 and "B-3" of the
sketch plan Exhibit "1-A" consisting of
11.1863 hectares of coconut land and
admittedly within the disposable portion of
the public domain are hereby ordered
registered in the name of the applicant
Filomeno Gallo and/or his successors-in-
interest as provided for by the Public Land
Law; and
(2) Parcels "A," "A-1," and "A-2," and "A-3"
of the same plan Exh. "1-A," consisting of
14
19.4080 hectares, are forest lands or lands
of the public domain of the Republic of the
Philippines and are therefore inalienable.
16) MARTINEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
56 SCRA 647
TOPIC: VENUE
FACTS:
OWNERSHIP OF THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY:
There are 2 parcels of land involved in this
case. Both parcels of land are fishponds.
The disputed property, the 2nd parcel of
land, was originally owned by the following:
1) Paulino Montemayor.
2) After the death of Paulino, the
property passed to his successors-in-
interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata
Montemayor.
3) The property was thereafter sold
to Potenciano Garcia.
Allegedly, Potenciano Garcia was
prevented by the municipal president of
Lubao from restoring the dikes of the
contested property. As such, Potenciano
filed a civil case with the CFI against the
municipal president to restrain the him from
“molesting Potenciano Garcia in the
possession of the 2nd parcel.” He also
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction,
which was issued against said municipal
president. The Court declared permanent
the preliminary injunction, which, decision,
on appeal, was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the
registration of both parcels of land in his
name and the CFI of Pampanga, sitting as
land registration court, granted the
registration, despite the opposition of the
Attorney-General and the Director of
Forestry. Pursuant to the Court’s decision,
an OCT was issued to Potenciano Garcia.
Thereafter, the ownership of these
properties changed hands until eventually
they were acquired by spouses ROMEO
MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ who
hold them by virtue of a transfer certificate
of title.
ON THE DISPUTE OF WON THE LOT IS A
PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMAIN OR
PRIVATE PROPERTY:
To avoid any untoward incident, the
disputants in this case agreed to refer the
matter to the Committee on Rivers and
Streams. This committee thereafter
appointed a Sub-Committee to investigate
the case and to conduct an ocular
inspection of the contested property. Sub-
Committee submitted its report to the
Committee on Rivers and Streams to the
effect that Parcel No. 2 was not a public
river but a private fishpond owned by the
spouses.
The Committee on Rivers and Streams
rendered its decision wherein it ordered that
the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor
Suarez should be restored to the exclusive
possession, use and enjoyment of the
creek, which forms part of their registered
property.
The municipal officials of Lubao, led by
Acting Mayor Mariano Zagad, apparently
refused to recognize the above decision.
As such, the spouses Romeo Martinez and
Leonor Suarez instituted a civil case before
the CFI of Pampanga against said Mayor
Zagad, praying that the latter be enjoined
from molesting them in their possession of
their property and in the construction of the
dikes. The writ of preliminary injunction
applied for was issued against the
municipal Mayor, who immediately elevated
the injunction suit for review to the Supreme
Court, which dismissed the Mayor’s
petition.
With this dismissal order issued, appellee
spouses proceeded to construct the dikes
in the disputed parcel of land.
Some 4 years later, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, ordered
another investigation of the said parcel of
land, directing the spouses to remove the
dikes they had constructed, on the strength
of the authority vested in him by R.A 2056
or “An Act To Prohibit, Remove and/or
Demolish the Construction of Dams, Dikes,
Or Any Other Walls In Public Navigable
Waters, Or Waterways and In Communal
Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in
Such Waters or Waterways And In
Communal Fishing Grounds, And To
Provide Penalties For Its Violation, And For
Other Purposes”
The said order which gave rise to the
instant proceedings, embodied a threat that
the dikes would be demolished should the
herein appellees fail to comply
therewith within thirty (30) days.
1959: The spouses Martinez replied to the
order by commencing on 1959 the present
case, which was decided in their favor by
the lower Court. The Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON Lot No. 2 covered by the
spouses’ Transfer Certificate of Title is a
public stream and in effect its title can be
cancelled through a collateral attack.
HELD: Lot No. 2 is a public stream. The
Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction
over non-registerable properties. Hence,
the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga with regard to Lot No. 2’s
Certificate of Title in the name of
petitioners-appellants may be attacked at
any time, either directly or collaterally.
Article 339 of the old Civil Code which
reads as follows: “Property of public
ownership is: “1. That destined to the public
use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports, and bridges constructed by the State,
and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of
a similar character.”

The above-mentioned properties are parts
of the public domain intended for public
use, are outside the commerce of men and,
therefore, not subject to private
appropriation.
The incontestable and indefeasible
character of a Torrens certificate of title
does not operate when the land covered
thereby is not capable of registration.
The Land Registration Court has no
jurisdiction over non-register able
properties, such as public navigable rivers
which are parts of the public domain, and
cannot validly adjudge the registration of
title in favor of a private
applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga as regards
the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title No.
15856 in the name of petitioners-appellants
may be attacked at any time, either directly
or collaterally, by the State which is not
bound by any prescriptive period provided
for by the Statute of Limitations. The right of
reversion or reconveyance to the State of
the public properties fraudulently registered
and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not
prescribe.
When it comes to registered properties, the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works
& Communications under Republic Act
2056 to order the removal or obstruction to
navigation along a public and navigable
creek or river included therein, has been
definitely settled and is no longer open to
question.
Note: Spouses are not considered
purchasers in good faith - Before
purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be
contended that the appellants who were the
vendees did not know exactly the condition
of the land that they were buying and the
obstacles or restrictions thereon that may
be put up by the government in connection
with their project of converting Lot No. 2 in
question into a fishpond. Nevertheless, they
willfully and voluntarily assumed the risks
attendant to the sale of said lot. One who
buys something with knowledge of defect or
lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that
he acquired it in good faith. The ruling that
a purchaser of a registered property cannot
go beyond the record to make inquiries as
to the legality of the title of the registered
owner, but may rely on the registry to
determine if there is no lien or
encumbrances over the same, cannot be
availed of as against the law and the
accepted principle that rivers are parts of
the public domain for public use and not
capable of private appropriation or
acquisition by prescription.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 103882,
NOVEMBER 25, 1998
DOCTRINE: A Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of
a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued
or not, may be posed only in an action
brought to impugn or annul it.
15
Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is
the germane provision of Section 48 of P.D.
1529, that a certificate of title can never be
the subject of a collateral attack. It cannot
be altered, modified, or cancelled except in
a direct proceeding instituted in accordance
with law.
FACTS:
- These are consolidated petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 under
the ROC
- RA 1899 was approved which
authorized the reclamation of foreshore
lands by chartered cities and municipalities
o Section 1 of the law says: Section
I of said law, reads: SECTION 1. Authority
is hereby granted to all municipalities and
chartered cities to undertake and carry out
at their own expense the reclamation by
dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to
establish, provide, construct, maintain and
repair proper and adequate docking and
harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in
consultation with the Secretary of Finance
and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications
- The Pasay City Council, under
the guise of RA 1899, passed Ordinance
No. 121 for the reclamation of 300 hectares
of foreshore lands in Pasay
o This empowered the City Mayor
to award and enter into reclamation
contracts, and prescribe terms and
conditions therefor.
o The Ordinance was then
amended by Ordinance No. 158, which
authorized the Republic Real Estate
Corporation (RREC) to reclaim foreshore
lands of Pasay City under certain terms and
conditions.
- On April 1959, Pasay City and
RREC entered into an Agreement for the
reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay
City.
- The Republic then filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Preventive Injunction and Mandatory
Injunction in the CFI of Rizal
o It filed an Amended Complaint
questioning subject Agreement between
Pasay City and RREC on the grounds that
the subject-matter of such Agreement is
outside the commerce of man, that its terms
and conditions are violative of RA 1899,
and that the said Agreement was executed
without any public bidding.
- Pasay City and RREC countered
that the object in question is within the
commerce of man because RA 1899 gives
a broader meaning on the term “foreshore
land” than that in the definition provided by
the dictionary.
- RTC rendered judgment in favor
of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision
was affirmed by the CA with modifications.
- On November 1973, the Republic
and the Construction Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP)
signed a Contract for the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road Project (Phases I and II)
which contract included the reclamation and
development of areas covered by the
Agreement between Pasay City and RREC.
o Then PD 1085 was passed which
transferred to the Public Estate Authority
(PEA) the rights and obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines under the
contract between the Republic and CDCP.
ISSUE: W/N Pasay Ordinance No. 158 and
the agreement between Pasay City and
RREC were valid- NO
HELD and RATIO:
 Petition is GRANTED
- Section 1 of RA 1899, reads:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby granted to
all municipalities and chartered cities to
undertake and carry out at their own
expense the reclamation by dredging,
filling, or other means, of any foreshore
lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor
facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in
consultation with the Secretary of Finance
and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
- Republic says there are no
foreshore lands along the seaside of Pasay
City, that what Pasay has are submerged or
offshore areas outside the commerce of
man which could not be a proper subject
matter of the Agreement between Pasay
City and RREC in question as the area
affected is within the National Park, known
as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established
under Proclamation No. 41, pursuant to Act
No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has
been in open, continuous and peaceful
possession since time immemorial.
- Foreshore land definition and
meaning- That part of the shore between
high water and low-water marks usually
fixed at the line to which the ordinary
means tide flows: also, by extension, the
beach, the shore near the waters edge.
o If we were to be strictly literal the
term foreshore or foreshore lands should be
confined to but a portion of the shore, in
itself a very limited area.
- Respondents’ contention is
erroneous and unsustainable regarding RA
1899, the term foreshore lands includes
submerged areas.
o Respondent court unduly
stretched and broadened the meaning of
foreshore lands, beyond the intent of the
law, and against the recognized legal
connotation of foreshore lands. Well
entrenched, to the point of being
elementary, is the rule that when the law
speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. So
also, resort to extrinsic aids, like the records
of the constitutional convention, is
unwarranted, the language of the law being
plain and unambiguous. Then, too, opinions
of the Secretary of Justice are unavailing to
supplant or rectify any mistake or omission
in the law
- There is a complete dearth of
evidence to prove that RREC had really
reclaimed 55 hectares. The letter of

Minister Baltazar Aquino relied upon by
RREC is no proof at all that RREC had
reclaimed 55 hectares. Said letter was just
referring to a tentative schedule of work to
be done by RREC, even as it required
RREC to submit the pertinent papers to
show its supposed accomplishment, to
secure approval by the Ministry of Public
Works and Highways to the reclamation
plan, and to submit to a public bidding all
contracts and sub-contracts for subject
reclamation project but RREC never
complied with such requirements and
conditions sine qua non.
o No contracts or sub-contracts or
agreements, plans, designs, and/or
specifications of the reclamation project
were presented to reflect any
accomplishment.
o No witness ever testified on any
reclamation work done by RREC
o Not a single contractor, sub-
contractor, engineer, surveyor, or any other
witness involved in the alleged reclamation
work of RREC testified on the 55 hectares
supposedly reclaimed by RREC.
- It is clear that RREC and Pasay
City never complied with such prerequisites
for the lifting of the writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Consequently, RREC had no
authority to resume its reclamation work
which was stopped by said writ of
preliminary injunction
- There was indeed no legal and
factual basis for the Court of Appeals to
order and declare that the requirement by
the trial court on public bidding and the
submission of RRECs plans and
specification to the Department of Public
Works and Highways in order that RREC
may continue the implementation of the
reclamation work is deleted for being moot
and academic. Said requirement has never
become moot and academic. It has
remained indispensable, as ever, and non-
compliance therewith restrained RREC
from lawfully resuming the reclamation work
under controversy, notwithstanding the
rendition below of the decision in its favor
- A Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of
a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued
or not, may be posed only in an action
brought to impugn or annul it.
- Unmistakable, and cannot be
ignored, is the germane provision of
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of
title can never be the subject of a collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding
instituted in accordance with law.
- Although Pasay City and RREC
did not succeed in their undertaking to
reclaim any area within subject reclamation
project, it appearing that something
compensable was accomplished by them,
following the applicable provision of law and
hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no
one, not even the government, shall
unjustly enrich oneself/itself at the expense
of another, we believe; and so hold, that
Pasay City and RREC should be paid for
the said actual work done and dredge-fill
poured in.
18. DENR SEC. ALVAREZ VS PICOP
16
G.R. NO. 162243
NOVEMBER 29, 2006
FACTS: ***In 1969, then President Marcos
signed a “Document” to enter into an
Integrated Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA) with PICOP.
Years later, PICOP was granted Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 covering
an area of 75,545 hectares in Surigao del
Sur, Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley,
and Davao Oriental, which was about to
terminate on April 25, 2002. On 23
December 1999, DENR promulgated DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 99-53
mandating the conversion of the TLA into
IFMA (Integrated Forest Management
Agreement) that is primarily aimed at
sustaining the raw materials for the
continuous operation of the integrated wood
processing plant of the company. Pursuant
to this, PICOP signified its intention to
convert its TLA into IFMA.
A Performance Evaluation Team was
created to conduct performance evaluation
indicating violations by PICOP of such as
the non-submission of its five-year forest
protection plan and seven-year
reforestation plan as required by the DENR
rules and regulations. Also there are
alleged unpaid and overdue forest charges
of PICOP.
Furthermore, PICOP initially sought to
comply with the requirement under Sections
26 and 27 of the Local Government Code to
procure prior approval of the Sanggunians
concerned. However, only one of the many
provinces affected approved the issuance
of an IFMA. PICOP nevertheless submitted
to the DENR the purported resolution of the
Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the
approval of PICOP’s application for IFMA
conversion. It also failed to get certification
with the NCIP.
It was the position of the DENR members
that PICOP’s application for the IFMA
conversion should undergo the processes
mentioned as provided in DAO No. 99-53.
However, PICOP representative Atty.
Caingat, claimed that "the conversion of
TLA into IFMA has already been
completed" and indicated that they had "no
choice except to decline participation in the
ongoing meeting and bring our issues to the
proper public and legal forum."
Accordingly, the Secretary of DENR claims
that further processing of PICOP’s
application for the conversion of TLA
cannot proceed until PICOP complies with
the requirements.
Insisting that the conversion of its TLA had
been completed due to the “Document” that
Pres. Marcos signed, PICOP filed a Petition
for Mandamus against then DENR
Secretary Alvarez before the RTC of
Quezon City.
The cause of action of PICOP in its Petition
for Mandamus with the trial court is clear:
the government is bound by contract, a
1969 Document signed by then President
Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an IFMA
with PICOP. Hence, such non-compliance
of the DENR would result to the
constitutional violation of non-impairment
clause.
The RTC rendered a Decision granting
PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus. On
appeal, CA affirmed the Decision of the
RTC. Hence, this petition by the DENR
assailing that the mandamus filed by
PICOP should be out rightly dismissed on
the ground that RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case since
the acts questioned herein are related to
the licensing regulation and management of
forest resources. Furthermore, RTC is
prohibited to issue TRO, writs of preliminary
injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction as provided by PD605 and
RA8975.
ISSUE: WON the trial court had jurisdiction
to take cognizance of this case because the
subject matter thereof pertains to the
exclusive administrative domain of the
DENR secretary. --- YES
HELD: The Petition filed before the RTC
was one for mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction with damages. It
sought to compel the DENR Secretary to:
(1) sign, execute and deliver the IFMA
documents to PICOP; (2) issue the
corresponding IFMA number assignment;
and (3) approve the harvesting of timber by
PICOP from the area of TLA No. 43.
In its petition for mandamus, [PICOP]
asserted that "DENR Secretary Alvarez
acted with grave abuse of discretion or in
excess of his jurisdiction in refusing to
perform his ministerial duty to sign, execute
and deliver the IFMA contract and to issue
the corresponding IFMA number to it." What
is at stake is not the scope of the DENR
jurisdiction but the manner by which it
exercises or refuses to exercise that
jurisdiction. The courts have the duty and
power to strike down any official act or
omission tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Since PICOP alleges grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR
Secretary, it behooves the court to
determine the same. An outright dismissal
of the case would have prevented such
determination.
The Court do not agree with Secretary’s
argument that PICOP’s immediate resort to
the trial court was precipitated based on the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is disregarded
when there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention, which
are averred to be extant in this case, citing
PICOP’s employment of a sizable number
of workers and its payment of millions in
taxes to the government. Moreover,
contrary to the DENR Secretary’s claim, the
approval of an application for IFMA
conversion is not purely discretionary on
the part of the DENR Secretary since the
approval of an IFMA conversion depends

upon compliance with the requirements
provided under DAO No. 99-53.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the
approval of an IFMA conversion involves
the exercise of discretion by the DENR
Secretary, the writ of mandamus may be
issued to compel the proper exercise of that
discretion where it is shown that there was
grave abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice, or palpable excess of authority.
DENR Sec is wrong in invoking the
provisions of PD605 and RA8975. These
statutes merely proscribe the issuance of
temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction. They cannot, under
pain of violating the Constitution, deprive
the courts of authority to take cognizance of
the issues raised in the principal action, as
long as such action and the relief sought
are within their jurisdiction. Hence, the
outright dismissal of the mandamus prayed
for by DENR herein is hereby denied.
(NOTE: The Court resolved here a lot of
issues, one of which was the issue of RTC
jurisdiction. However, the case was still
ruled against PICOP. Although it ruled that
the court can take cognizance of the
Petition for Mandamus, the Mandamus was
still not granted. See the discussion in the
2009 Resolution)
G.R. No. 162243 (RESOLUTION)
December 3, 2009
PICOP was not able to prove either of the
two things it needed to prove to be entitled
to a Writ of Mandamus against the DENR
Secretary. The 1969 Document is not a
contract recognized under the non-
impairment clause and, even if we assume
for the sake of argument that it is, it did not
enjoin the government to issue an IFMA in
2002 either. These are the essential
elements in PICOP's cause of action, and
the failure to prove the same warrants a
dismissal of PICOP's Petition for
Mandamus, as not even PICOP's
compliance with all the administrative and
statutory requirements can save its Petition
now.
In the assailed Decision, SC’s ruling was
based on two distinct grounds, each one
being sufficient in itself for us to rule that
PICOP was not entitled to a Writ of
Mandamus: (1) the 1969 Document, on
which PICOP hinges its right to compel the
issuance of an IFMA, is not a contract; and
(2) PICOP has not complied with all
administrative and statutory requirements
for the issuance of an IFMA.
Issue 1:
Whether the 1969 Document is a contract
recognized under the non-impairment
clause by which the government may be
bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)
Held:
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v.
Factoran that a timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the non-
17
impairment clause is edifying. We declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It
is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the
non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC.
10. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed." cannot be
invoked.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any
manner, be construed as a contractual
undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive
possession and enjoyment of its
concession areas. Such an interpretation
would result in the complete abdication by
the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign
power to control and supervise the
exploration, development and utilization of
the natural resources in the area.
Issue 2:
Whether PICOP complied with the LGC
requirement of obtaining prior approval of
the Sanggunian concerned by submitting a
purported resolution of the Province of
Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of
PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion.
Held:
NO. This cannot be deemed sufficient
compliance with the foregoing provision.
Surigao del Sur is not the only province
affected by the area covered by the
proposed IFMA. The approval of the
Sanggunian concerned is required by law,
not because the local government has
control over such project, but because the
local government has the duty to protect its
constituents and their stake in the
implementation of the project. Again,
Section 26 states that it applies to projects
that "may cause pollution, climatic change,
depletion of non-renewable resources, loss
of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and
extinction of animal or plant species." The
local government should thus represent the
communities in such area, the very people
who will be affected by flooding, landslides
or even climatic change if the project is not
properly regulated, and who likewise have a
stake in the resources in the area, and
deserve to be adequately compensated
when these resources are exploited.
Indeed, it would be absurd to claim that the
project must first be devolved to the local
government before the requirement of the
national government seeking approval from
the local government can be applied.
EPILOGUE AND DISPOSITION
“PICOP’c cause of action consists in the
allegation that the DENR Secretary, in not
issuing an IFMA, violated its constitutional
right against non-impairment of contracts.
We have ruled, however, that the 1969
Document is not a contract recognized
under the non-impairment clause, much
less a contract specifically enjoining the
DENR Secretary to issue the IFMA. The
conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a
contract recognized under the non-
impairment clause has even been disposed
of in another case decided by another
division of this Court, PICOP Resources,
Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources
Corporation, the Decision in which case has
become final and executory. PICOP’s
Petition for Mandamus should, therefore,
fail.
Furthermore, even if we assume for the
sake of argument that the 1969 Document
is a contract recognized under the non-
impairment clause, and even if we assume
for the sake of argument that the same is a
contract specifically enjoining the DENR
Secretary to issue an IFMA, PICOP’s
Petition for Mandamus must still fail. The
1969 Document expressly states that the
warranty as to the tenure of PICOP is
"subject to compliance with constitutional
and statutory requirements as well as with
existing policy on timber concessions."
Thus, if PICOP proves the two above-
mentioned matters, it still has to prove
compliance with statutory and
administrative requirements for the
conversion of its TLA into an IFMA.
While we have withdrawn our
pronouncements in the assailed Decision
that (1) PICOP had not submitted the
required forest protection and reforestation
plans, and that (2) PICOP had unpaid
forestry charges, thus effectively ruling in
favor of PICOP on all factual issues in this
case, PICOP still insists that the
requirements of an NCIP certification and
Sanggunian consultation and approval do
not apply to it. To affirm PICOP’s position
on these matters would entail nothing less
than rewriting the Indigenous Peoples’
Rights Act and the Local Government
Code, an act simply beyond our jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for
Reconsideration of PICOP Resources, Inc.
is DENIED.”
(DISCLAIMER: There were a lot of issues
raised in this case, aside from the 2 issues I
wrote here. My advanced apologies if
magtanong ng details si ma’am and may
butas yung digest ko. If you wanna be sure,
read the full text, but this case is fairly long
)
(NOTE: Please also be advised that in our
syllabus, this is under the topic of VENUE
and what is listed is the 2009 Resolution.
But I included the prior case (the 2006)
because it is the one that tackled the issue
on jurisdiction. Pero wala talagang
discussion sa case na ‘to about “venue” ,
so I dunno)
HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC VS.
HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC
G.R. No. 149679. May 30, 2003
Doctrine: Ownership should not be
confused with a certificate of title.
Registering land under the Torrens System
does not create or vest title, because
registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or tide over the
particular property described therein.
Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of
the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Facts:

1. Respondents claim that they are
the owners of the various parcels of real
property that form part of Lot No. 666,
situated in Mandaue City, Cebu, which lot
allegedly belonged originally to Claudio
Ermac.
2. Upon the Claudio Ermac’s death,
the said Lot No. 666 was inherited and
partitioned by his children, namely,
Esteban, Pedro and Balbina. Siblings Pedro
and Balbina requested their brother
Esteban to have their title over the property
registered.
3. Esteban, however, was unable to
do so, and the task of registration fell to his
son, Clemente. Clemente applied for
registration of the title, but did so in his own
name, and did not include his father’s
brother and sister, nor his cousins.
4. Despite having registered the lot
in his name, Clemente did not disturb or
claim ownership over those portions
occupied by his uncle, aunt and cousins
even up to the time of his death.
5. Among the occupants of Lot No.
666 are the respondents in this case.
Respondents-heirs of Vicente Ermac claim
ownership over the portions of Lot No. 666
now occupied by them by right of
succession as direct descendants of the
original owner, Claudio Ermac.
Respondents Luisa Del Castillo and
Estaneslao Dionson allegedly derived their
title by purchase from the children of
Claudio Ermac.
6. Respondent Vicente Dionson, on
the other hand, bought his land from the
heirs of Pedro Ermac, while Respondents
Emigdio Bustillo and Liza Parajele derived
their ownership from the Heirs of Balbina
Ermac-Dabon.
7. Respondents’ ownership and
possession had been peaceful and
undisturbed, until recently when the
petitioners-heirs of Clemente Ermac filed an
action for ejectment against them.
8. The filing of the said ejectment
caused a cloud of doubt upon the
respondents’ ownership over their
respective parcels of land, prompting them
to file this action for quieting of title.
9. Petitioners, on the other hand,
denied the material allegations of the
respondents, and claimed that the
respondents have no cause of action
against them. It is essentially claimed that it
was Clemente Ermac and not his
grandfather Claudio Ermac who is the
original claimant of dominion over Lot No.
666. During his lifetime, Clemente Ermac
was in actual, peaceful, adverse and
continuous possession in the concept of an
owner of the entire Lot No. 666.
10. RTC rendered its decision,
finding that the original owner of the lot in
question was Claudio Ermac, and therefore,
the property was inherited upon his death
by his children Esteban, Balbina and Pedro.
All the heirs of Claudio Ermac, therefore,
should share in the ownership over Lot No.
666, by right of succession.
11. The CA held that the factual
finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
should not be disturbed on appeal. The
latter found that Lot No. 666 was originally
owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his
18
death, was inherited by his children—
Esteban, Ralbina and Pedro. It ruled that
respondents were able to prove
consistently and corroboratively that they—
as well as their predecessors-in-interests—
had been in open, continuous and
undisturbed possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of owners.
12. According to the appellate court,
“the fact that petitioners have in their
possession certificates of title which
apparently bear out that it was Clemente
Ermac alone who claimed the entire
property described therein has no
discrediting effect upon plaintiffs’ claim, it
appearing that such titles were acquired in
derogation of the existing valid and adverse
interests of the plaintiffs whose title by
succession were effectively disregarded.
Issues:
1. Whether or not O.C.T. No. RO-
752 issued in the names of Spouses
Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco is
indefeasible and incontrovertible under the
Torrens System.
2. Whether or not the alleged tax
declarations and tax receipts are sufficient
to defeat the title over the property in the
names of petitioner’s predecessors-in-
interest Spouses Clemente Ermac and
Anunciacion Suyco.
3. Whether or not laches has set in
on the claims by the respondents on
portions of Lot No. 666.
Ruling
1. Petitioners posit that pursuant to
Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property
Registration Decree), the certificate of title
issued in favor of their predecessor-in-
interest, Clemente Ermac, became
incontrovertible after the lapse of one year
from its issuance. Hence, it can no longer
be challenged.
SC: NO. While it is true that Section 32 of
PD 1529 provides that the decree of
registration becomes incontrovertible after a
year, it does not altogether deprive an
aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The
acceptability of the Torrens System would
be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate
fraud against the real owners.
Furthermore, ownership is not the same as
a certificate of title. Registering a piece of
land under the Torrens System does not
create or vest title, because registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership.
A certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular
property described therein. Its issuance in
favor of a particular person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be co-owned with persons not
named in the certificate, or that it may be
held in trust for another person by the
registered owner.
2. Petitioners claim that the CA
erred in relying on the hearsay and
unsubstantiated testimony of respondents,
as well as on tax declarations and realty tax
receipts, in order to support its ruling that
the land was owned by Claudio Ermac.
SC: NO. Tax declarations and realty tax
receipts do not conclusively prove
ownership, they may constitute strong
evidence of ownership when accompanied
by possession for a period sufficient for
prescription. Considering that respondents
have been in possession of the property for
a long period of time, there is legal basis for
their use of tax declarations and realty tax
receipts as additional evidence to support
their claim of ownership.
3. Petitioners assert that the
ownership claimed by respondents is
barred by prescription and laches, because
it took the latter 57 years to bring the
present action.
SC: NO. When a party uses fraud or
concealment to obtain a certificate of title to
property, a constructive trust is created in
favor of the defrauded party. Since Claudio
Ermac has already been established in the
present case as the original owner of the
land, the registration in the name of
Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held
the land in trust for all the heirs of the
former. Since respondents were in actual
possession of the property, the action to
enforce the trust, and recover the property,
and thereby quiet title thereto, does not
prescribe.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Petition is
hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v
IGLESIA NI CRISTO
G.R. no. 180067 | June 30, 2009
FACTS.
11. INC, represented by Manalo, as
corporate sole, filed its Application for
Registration of Title before the MCTC in
Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the
application were the sepia or tracing cloth
of plan Swo-1-001047 (technical description
of Lot 3946), the Geodetic Engineer’s
Certificate, Tax Declaration 508026 and the
September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale executed
by Badanguio in favor of INC.
12. The Republic, through OSG,
deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of
Laoag City to appear on its behalf, and filed
an opposition to INC’s application.
13. For processing of its application
for judicial confirmation of title, lot 3946 of
the Currimao cadastre was surveyed and
consisted of 4,201 sqm.
14. In 1954, Badanguio was issued
TD 006114 for the bigger lot and
subsequently sold a small portion of the
bigger lot to INC for which a deed of
absolute sale was executed (Jan. 8, 1959).
15. Alcantara, the property custodian
of INC, testified to the purchases
constituting the subject lot and the issuance
of TDs covering it.
16. On Sept. 7, 1970, Badanguio
executed a Deed of Sale in favor of INC
formally ceding and conveying to INC the
lot which still formed part of the TD of the
bigger lot under his name. (This was
testified to by Tulali who became a tenant
of the bigger lot in 1965 and continued
under Badanguio).

17. TD 6485 was issued in 1970 in
the name of INC pursuant to the Sept. 7,
1970 Deed of Sale and was replaced by TD
406056 in 1974, TD 508026 in 1980 and
TD 605153 in 1985.
18. In 2005, MCTC (acting as
cadastral court) --> granted the application
as all the essential requisites for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title was
complied with based on documentary and
testimonial evidence
a. Established during trial that the
lot formed part of a bigger lot owned by
Sabuco and that he sold a small portion of
the bigger lot to INC which built a chapel.
The bigger lot less the small portion was
sold to Badanguio.
b. Sacayanan, who became an INC
member in 1948, testified to the sale by
Sabuco and erection of a small chapel by
INC in 1952.
c. INC had continuous possession
of the lot for over 40 years after its
acquisition and that Badanguio and
Sabuco, predecessors in interest of INC,
were never disturbed in their possession.
19. CA --> affirmed MCTC, the
evidence established the continuous, open,
and peaceful possession and occupation of
the lot in concept of owner by INC
20. Republic contends that the lot
was certified as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain only on May 16,
1993 and contends that prior to said date,
the lot remained to be of the public domain
so INC or its predecessors cannot confer
ownership and any period of possession
prior to the date when classified as
alienable and disposable should be
excluded in computation of period of
possession.
a. Since application was filed only
on November 19, 1998, INC fell short of the
30 year period required under Section
48(b), CA 141.
21. INC counters that what is
required by Sec. 14(1), PD 1529, is that the
property sought to be registered is already
alienable and disposable at the time of the
application for registration is filed.
ISSUE: W/N a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title prosper when the subject
property has been declared as alienable
only after June 12, 1945 --
HELD: It is well-settled that no public land
can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the
government, and it is indispensable that the
persons claiming title to public land should
show that their title was acquired by the
State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. In this case, it is
undisputed that the lot has already been
declared alienable and disposable by the
Government on May 16, 1993 (5 years
before application for registration was filed
by INC).
In Heirs of Malabanan v Republic, the Court
ruled that the more reasonable
interpretation of Sec. 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for
19
registration of title is filed. If the State, at
the time the application is made, has not
yet deemed it proper to release the property
for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership
in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith.
Thus, the period of possession is reckoned
not from the time of declaration of the
property as alienable and disposable.
INC is entitled to registrable right over
subject lot. The possession of INC has
been established not only from 1952 and
1959 when it purchased the respective
halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked
on to the possession of its predecessors-in-
interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter
possessing the subject lot way before June
12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of
which the subject lot is a portion, from his
parents. These possessions and
occupationfrom Sabuco, including those of
his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to
Badanguio to INChad been in the concept
of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under
a bona fideclaim of acquisition of property.
These had not been disturbed as attested
to by respondents witnesses.
The petition is DENIED.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs PUBLIC
ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI
COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002
FACTS:
1973: The Comissioner on Public Highways
entered into a contract to reclaim areas of
Manila Bay with the Construction and
Development Corportion of the Philippines
(CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created
by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing
reclaimed lands. These lands were
transferred to the care of PEA under P.D.
1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and
Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and
PEA entered into an agreement that all
future projects under the MCRRP would be
funded and owned by PEA.
1988: President Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA.
It was followed by the transfer of three
Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the
Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA
covering the three reclaimed islands known
as the Freedom Islands.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint
venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a
Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA
which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when
Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public
domain.
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a
taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against
the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA.
Following these events, under President
Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered
into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves
claim that the contract is null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer to AMARI lands
reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the JVA between AMARI and
PEA violate Sec 2 and 3 Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING:
YES. The Amended JVA violates Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and
declaration only after PEA has reclaimed
these submerged areas. Only then can
these lands qualify as agricultural lands of
the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer
to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas.
Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable,
and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such

reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban on
Acquisition of Public Lands
In actual practice, the constitutional ban
strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the
allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain. Without the constitutional ban,
individuals who already acquired the
maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable
public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would
allow him. An individual could even hide his
ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and
convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by
individuals of alienable lands of the public
domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable
land of the public domain to a qualified
individual. This constitutional intent is
safeguarded by the provision prohibiting
corporations from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain, since the vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional intent is
removed. The available alienable public
lands are gradually decreasing in the face
of an ever-growing population. The most
effective way to insure faithful adherence to
this constitutional intent is to grant or sell
alienable lands of the public domain only to
individuals. This, it would seem, is the
practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted
in our legal system. Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public
domain and are inalienable. Lands
reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas also form part of the public domain
and are also inalienable, unless converted
pursuant to law into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. Historically,
lands reclaimed by the government are sui
generis, not available for sale to private
parties unlike other alienable public lands.
Reclaimed lands retain their inherent
potential as areas for public use or public
service. Alienable lands of the public
domain, increasingly becoming scarce
natural resources, are to be distributed
equitably among our ever-growing
population. To insure such equitable
distribution, the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions have barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Those
who attempt to dispose of inalienable
natural resources of the State, or seek to
circumvent the constitutional ban on
20
alienation of lands of the public domain to
private corporations, do so at their own risk.
OH CHO, applicant-appellee, vs. THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-
appellant.
Topic: III. Applicants
DOCTRINE:
o GR: All lands are acquired from
the Government, either by purchase or by
grant.
o EXCEPTION: Lands under
private ownership since time immemorial.
o Application for decree of
registration is a condition precedent to
acquisition of title. Non-compliance gives
rise to mere possessory right.
o An alien cannot acquire title to
lands of the public domain by prescription.
FACTS:
Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China,
Rafael Lagdameo a parcel of land located
in the residential district of Guinayangan,
Tayabas, which has been in the continuous,
public, and adverse possession of their
predecessors in interest as far back as
1880. on June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for
the registration of said parcel of land. The
Director of Lands opposed the application
because, among other grounds, the
Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring
public or private agricultural lands.
One of the witnesses for the applicant, on
cross-examination, expressly admitted that
the land in question is susceptible of
cultivation and may be converted into an
orchard or garden. Rodolfo Tiquia,
inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying
as a witness for the government, stated that
the land, notwithstanding the use to which it
is actually devoted, is agricultural land in
accordance with an opinion rendered in
1939 by the Secretary of Justice.
Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First
Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision
on August 15, 1940, overruling the
opposition without must explanation and
decreeing the registration prayed for the
applicant. The Director of Lands appealed
from the decision, and the Solicitor General
appearing for appellant, maintains that the
applicant, not being a citizen of the
Philippines, is disqualified to buy or acquire
the parcel of land in question and that the
purchase made in question and that the
purchase made in 1938 is null and void.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not Oh Cho had title.
NO
o Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled
to a decree of registration. NO
HELD:
1. The applicant failed to show that
he has title to the lot that may be confirmed
under the Land Registration Act. He failed
to show that he or any of his predecessors
in interest had acquired the lot from the
Government, either by purchase or by
grant, under the laws, orders and decrease
promulgated by the Spanish Government in
the Philippines, or by possessory
information under the Mortgaged Law
(section 19, Act 496). All lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant below to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be
any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that
it had been a private property even before
the Spanish conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular
Government) The applicant does not come
under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first
predecessors in interest begun in 1880.
2. As the applicant failed to show
the title to the lot, and has invoked the
provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems
unnecessary to make pronouncement in
this case on the nature or classifications of
the sought to be registered.
a. It may be argued that under the
provisions of the Public Land Act the
applicant immediate predecessor in interest
would have been entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot had they applied for its
registration; and that he having purchased
or acquired it, the right of his immediate
predecessor in interest to a decree of
registration must be deemed also to have
been acquired by him. The benefits
provided in the Public Land Act for
applicant's immediate predecessors in
interest should comply with the condition
precedent for the grant of such benefits.
The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had
been in possession at least since July 26,
1894. This the applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest failed to do. They
did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to the title which was
transmissible to the applicant. The only
right, if it may thus be called, is their
possession of the lot which, tacked to that
of their predecessors in interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person to apply for
its registration but not by a person as the
applicant who is disqualified.
b. It is urged that the sale of the lot
to the applicant should have been declared
null and void. In a suit between vendor and
vendee for the annulment of the sale, such
pronouncement would be necessary, if the
court were of the opinion that it is void. It is
not necessary in this case where the
vendors do not even object to the
application filed by the vendee.
CONCURRING OPINION: J. PERFECTO
This is the question squarely reversing to
us for decision. The majority, although
reversing the lower court's decision and
dismissing the application with we agree,
abstained from the declaring null and void
the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as
prayed for the appellant.

The Solicitor General argued in his brief as
follows:
I. The lower court erred decreeing the
registration of the lot in question in favor of
the applicant who, according to his own
voluntary admission, is a citizen of the
Chinese Republic.
(a) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in
the Act of the Congress of July 1, 1902, in
the Public Land Act includes residential
lots.
In this jurisdiction lands of public domain
suitable for residential purposes are
considered agricultural lands under the
Public Land Law. The phrase "agricultural
public lands" has well settled judicial
definition. It was used for the first time in
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known
as the Philippine Bill. Its means those public
lands acquired form Spain which are
neither mineral nor timber lands. In the
case of Mapa vs. Insular Government,
supra, the Supreme Court, in defining the
meaning and scope of that phrase from the
context of the sections 13 and 15 of that
Act, said:
The phrase "agricultural public lands" as
defined by the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, which phrase is also to be found in
several sections of the Public Land Act (No.
926) means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are neither mineral timber
lands.
"More specially, in the case of Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, the
Supreme Court held that a residential or
building lot, forming part of the public
domain, is agricultural land, irrespective of
the fact that it is not actually used for
purposes of agriculture for the simple
reason that it is susceptible of cultivation
and may be converted into a rural estate,
and because when a land is not mineral or
forestal in its nature it must necessarily be
included within the classification of a
agricultural land.
(b) Under the Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land
Act), the phrase (Public Land Act), the
phrase "public agricultural land" includes
lands of the public domain suitable for
residential purposes.
"The disposition exploitation, development
or utilization of the natural resources,
including agricultural lands of the public
domain is limited to citizens of the
Philippines or to the corporations or
associations therein mentioned. It also
clearly appears from said provision that
natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, are not subject to
alienation.
"On November 7, 1936, or more than one
year after the adoption of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the
Public Land Act, was approved. Under this
Act the lands of the public have been
classified into three divisions: (a) alienable
21
or disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral
lands. The lands designated alienable or
disposable correspond to lands designated
in the Constitution as public agricultural
lands, because under section 1, Article XII,
public agricultural lands are the only natural
resources of the country which are subject
to alienation or deposition.
"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
provide that the alienable or disposable
public lands shall be classified, according to
use or purposes to which they are destined,
into a agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would
seem that under this classification
residential land is different from agricultural
land. The difference however, is more
apparent than real. 'Public agricultural land '
as that phrase is used in the Constitution
means alienable lands of the public domain
and therefore this phrase is equivalent to
the lands classified by the Commonwealth
Act No. 141 as alienable or disposable. The
classification provided in section 9 is only
for purposes administration and disposition,
according to the purposes to which said
lands are especially adopted. But
notwithstanding this of all said lands are
essentially agricultural public lands because
only agricultural public lands are subject to
alienation or disposition under section 1,
Article XII of the Constitution. A contrary
view would necessarily create a conflict
between Commonwealth Act No. 141 and
section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution,
and such conflict should be avoided , if
possible, and said Act construed in the light
of the fundamental provisions of the
Constitution and in entire harmony
therewith.
"By the way of illustration, let us supposed
that a piece or tract of public land has been
classified pursuant to section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential
land. If, by reason of this classification, it is
maintained that said land has ceased to be
agricultural public land, it will no longer be
subject to alienation or disposition by
reason of the constitutional provision that
only agricultural lands are alienable; and
yet such residential lot is alienable under
section 58, 59, and 60 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations mentioned
in section 1, Article XII of the Constitution.
Therefore, the classification of public
agricultural lands into various subdivisions
is only for purposes of administration,
alienation or disposition, but it does not
destroy the inherent nature of all such lands
as a public agricultural lands.
"(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause
or phrase use in the law, controlling.
"The judicial interpretation given to the
phrase "public agricultural land" is a
sufficient authority for giving the same
interpretation to the phrase as used in
subsequent legislation, and this is
especially so in view of the length of time
during which this interpretation has been
maintained by the courts.
"Furthermore, when the phrase "public
agricultural land" was used in section 1 of
Article XII of the Constitution, it is presumed
that it was so used with the same judicial
meaning therefor given to it and therefor the
meaning of the phrase, as used in the
Constitution, includes residential lands and
another lands of the public domain, but
excludes mineral and timber lands.
II. The lower court erred in not declaring
null and void the sale of said land to the
appellant (appellee).
"Granting that the land in question has
ceased to be a part of the lands of the
public domain by reason of the long
continuous,, public adverse possession of
the applicant's predecessors in interest, and
that the latter had performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant
and were entitled to a certificate of title
under section 48, subsection (b), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, still the sale of
said land of December 8, 1938, to the
applicant as evidenced by Exhibits B and C,
was null and void for being contrary to
section 5, Article XII of the Constitution,
which reads as follows:
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain
of the Philippines."
"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is
disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain (section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution; section 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141), and
consequently also disqualified to buy and
acquire private agriculture land.
"In view of the well settled judicial meaning
of the phrase public agricultural land,' as
hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase
'private agricultural land,' as used in the
above quoted provision, can only mean
land of private ownership, whether
agricultural, residential, commercial or
industrial. And this necessarily so, because
the phrase 'agricultural land used in the
Constitution and in the Public Land Law
must be given the same uniform meaning to
wit, any land of the public domain or any
land of private ownership, which is neither
mineral or forestal.
"This interpretation is in harmony with the
nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our
Constitution and laws, to wit, `to conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation,' as
solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the
Constitution.
"A narrow and literal interpretation of the
phrase 'private agriculture land' would
impair and defeat the nationalistic aim and
general policy of our laws and would allow
a gradual, steady, and unlimited
accumulation in alien hands of a substantial
portion of our patrimonial estates, to the
detriment of our national solidarity, stability,
and independence. Nothing could prevent
the acquisition of a great portion or the
whole of a city by subjects of a foreign

power. And yet a city or urban area is more
strategical than a farm or rural land.
"We conclude, therefore, that the residential
lot which the applicant seeks to register in
his name falls within the meaning of private
agricultural land as this phrase is used in
our Constitution and, consequently, is not
subject to acquisition by foreigners except
by hereditary succession."
The argument holds water. It expresses a
correct interpretation of the Constitution and
the real intent of the Constitutional
Convention.
One of our fellow members therein,
Delegate Montilla, said:
The constitutional precepts that I believe
will ultimately lead us to our desired goal
are; (1) the complete nationalization of our
lands and natural resources; (2) the
nationalization of our commerce and
industry compatible with good international
practices. With the complete nationalization
of our lands and natural resources it is to be
understood that our God-given birthright
should be one hundred per cent in Filipino
hands. ... Lands and natural resources are
immovable and as such can be compared
to the vital organs of a person's body, the
lack of possession of which may cause
instant death or the shortening of life. If we
do not completely nationalize these two of
our most important belongings, I am afraid
that the time will come when we shall be
sorry for the time we were born. Our
independence will be just a mockery, for
what kind of independence are we going to
have if a part of our country is not in our
hands but in those of foreigner?
From the same book of Delegate Aruego,
we quote:
The nationalization of the natural resources
of the country was intended (1) to insure
their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2)
to serve as an instrument of national
defense, helping prevent the extension into
the country of foreign control through
peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to
prevent making the Philippines a source of
international conflict with the consequent
danger to its internal security and
independence.
All the foregoing show why we, having been
a member of the Constitutional Convention,
agree with Solicitor General's position and
concur in the result in this case, although
we would go as far as the outright
pronouncement that the purchase made by
appellee is null and void.
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES,
respondent
Doctrines:
• Conversion of forest land as
alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in
reckoning compliance with the thirty-year
possession requirement under
Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the
Public Land Act. The rules on the
22
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest
land is released through an official
proclamation to that effect. Then and only
then will it form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain
• The possession of public land,
however long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon
the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does
not operate against the State unless the
occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years
to constitute a grant from the State.
Facts:
• Petitioner's late mother, Flora
Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for
registration of a vast tract of land located in
Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the
then CFI Nueva Ecija on 1976. She alleged
that she possessed the land as owner and
worked, developed and harvested the
agricultural products and benefits of the
same continuously, publicly and adversely
for more or less 26 years.
• The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application
because the land in question was within the
Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation
(FMMR), established by virtue of
Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237) in
1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed
part of the public domain.
• Significantly, the Supreme Court
already ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes
that the property subject of Garcia's
application was inalienable as it formed part
of a military reservation. Moreover, the
existence of Possessory Information Title
No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of
a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5,
1895), on which therein respondent
Parañaque Investment and Development
Corporation anchored its claim on the land,
was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of
registration issued in its favor was declared
null and void.
• Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI
ruled in Garcia's favor in a decision. The
parties entered into a compromise
agreement with the Republic withdrawing
its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares
supposedly outside the FMMR. For her
part, petitioner withdrew her application for
the portion of the property inside the military
reservation. The appellate court approved
the compromise agreement, it directed the
Land Registration Administration to issue
the corresponding decree of registration in
petitioner's favor. This was later on annulled
by CA.
• Petitioner wrote identical letters,
first addressed to Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and
then to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
himself that there was a miscarriage of
justice and that the petitioner was tempted
to go to media regarding the situation.
Issues: Whether the land can be registered
to the petitioner.
Ratio: No.
• The ruling in the case of the
Director of Lands vs Reyes is applicable in
this case and thus constitutes res judicata.
The SC ruled that registration cases filed
under the provision of the Public Land Act
for the judicial confirmation of an
incomplete and imperfect title, an order
dismissing an application for registration
and declaring the land as part of the public
domain constitutes res judicata, not only
against the adverse claimant, but also
against all persons.
• By way of a background, SC
recognized in Reyes that the property
where the military reservation is situated is
forest land. Before the military reservation
was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for it is
shown by the evidence that the land
involved is largely mountainous and
forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of
the hearing, it was conceded that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land
consist of public forest. Concomitantly,the
Court stated therein, and reminded the
petitioner , that forest lands are not
registrable under CA 141.
• Even more important, Section
48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public agricultural land.
Forest lands or area covered with forest are
excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is
incapable of registration; and its inclusion in
a title, whether such title be one issued
using the Spanish sovereignty or under the
present Torrens system of registration,
nullifies the title.
• However, it is true that forest
lands may be registered when they have
been reclassified as alienable by the
President in a clear and categorical manner
coupled with possession by the claimant as
well as that of her predecessors-in-interest.
Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not
able to produce such evidence.
• Accordingly, her occupation
thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-
interest, could not have ripened into
ownership of the subject land. This is
because prior to the conversion of forest
land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in
reckoning compliance with the thirty-year
possession requirement under
Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the
Public Land Act. The rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest
land is released through an official
proclamation to that effect. Then and only
then will it form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
• Petitioner's contention that her
"private rights" to the property, meaning her
and her predecessors' possession thereof
prior to the establishment of the FMMR,
must be respected, the same is untenable.
As earlier stated, we had already
recognized the same land to be public
forest even before the FMMR was
established.
• Therefore, even if possession
was for more than 30 years, it could never
ripen to ownership. But even assuming that
the land in question was alienable land
before it was established as a military
reservation, there was nevertheless still a
dearth of evidence with respect to its

occupation by petitioner and her
predecessors-in-interest for more than 30
years. In Reyes, Court noted that Melecio
Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900,
barely five (5) years after the inscription of
the informacion possessoria, could not
have converted the same into a record of
ownership twenty (20) years after such
inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the
Spanish Mortgage Law.
• During the lifetime of Melecio
Padilla, only a small portion thereof was
cleared and cultivated under the 'kaingin'
system, while some portions were used as
grazing land. After his death, his daughter,
Maria Padilla, caused the planting of
vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants
for the purpose. During the Japanese
occupation, Maria Padilla died. . . .
• A mere casual cultivation of
portions of the land by the claimant, and the
raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. In
that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the State. While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be
considered with other acts of dominion to
show possession, the mere occupancy of
land by grazing livestock upon it, without
substantial inclosures, or other permanent
improvements, is not sufficient to support a
claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.
The possession of public land, however
long the period may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with
regard to public land does not operate
against the State unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.
Baguio City vs. Masweng
G.R. No. 188913
February 19, 2014
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE:
• Although the NCIP has the
authority to issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of injunction, there must
exist a right to be protected and that the
acts against which the order or injunction is
directed are violative of said right.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the final Decision in G.R. No.
180206, petitioner issued demolition
advices notifying the private claimants in
the case that Demolition Orders for illegal
structures that had been constructed on a
portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation
located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without
the required building permits will be
enforced in July 2009 and advised them to
voluntarily dismantle their structures built on
the Busol Watershed.
Thereafter, private claimants in this present
case filed petitions for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a
writ of preliminary injunction on the subject
23
Demolition Orders. The private claimants
are indigenous peoples occupying
residential structures in the Busol
Watershed and assert the identification,
delineation and recognition of their
ancestral land and enforcement of their
rights as indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples (NCIP
Case No. 29-CAR-09) and aver the
recognition of their possession of residential
houses and other improvements by virtue of
transfers in accordance with traditions and
customary laws from the ancestral lands
claimants, namely the Heirs of Molintas and
the Heirs of Gumangan (NCIP Case No.
31-CAR-09).
Respondent in his capacity as the Regional
Hearing Officer of the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera
Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR) issued
the following separate TROs and
injunctions orders:
1) 72-Hour TRO dated July 27,
2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 (which
extended the 72-Hour TRO to 17 days) and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case
No. 31-CAR-09; and
2) 72-Hour TRO dated July 27,
2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 (which
extended the 72-Hour TRO to 17 days) and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case
No. 29-CAR-09.
Hence, this petition asserting that the TROs
and writs were issued in willful disregard,
disobedience, defiance and resistance of
this Court’s Decision in G.R. No.180206
which dismissed the previous injunction
case. Petitioner contends that respondent’s
act of enjoining the execution of the
demolition orders and demolition advices is
tantamount to allowing forum shopping
since the implementation of the demolition
orders over the structures in the Busol
Forest Reservation had already been
adjudicated and affirmed by this Court.
Respondent claims that he issued the
TROs and writs in NCIP Cases because his
jurisdiction was called upon to protect and
preserve the rights of the petitioners (in the
NCIP cases) who were undoubtedly
members of the indigenous cultural
communities or indigenous peoples. In
addition, he maintains that the orders and
writs he issued did not disregard the earlier
ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 180206
because the Court has in fact affirmed the
power of the NCIP to issue TROs and writs
of injunction without any prohibition against
the issuance of said writs when the main
action is for injunction. Further, petitioners
(in the NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09) that
their ancestral land claim was recognized
by Proclamation No. 15 and that their right
thereto may be protected by a writ of
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: W/N the ancestral land claim of
private respondents was indeed recognized
by Proclamation No. 15.
HELD: No, Proclamation No. 15 does not
appear to be a definitive recognition of
private respondents’ ancestral land claim.
The proclamation merely identifies the
Molintas and Gumangan families, the
predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents, as claimants of a portion of
the Busol Forest Reservation but does not
acknowledge vested rights over the same.
Before a writ of preliminary injunction may
be issued, there must exist a right to be
protected and that the acts against which
injunction is directed are violative of said
rights.
Likewise, Proclamation No. 15 explicitly
withdraws from sale or settlement the Busol
Forest Reservation which was declared by
the Court as inalienable in Heirs of
Gumangan v. Court of Appeals. The
declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation
as such precludes its conversion into
private property. Relatedly, the courts are
not endowed with jurisdictional competence
to adjudicate forest lands.
On the issue whether respondent should be
cited in contempt of court for issuing the
subject TROs and writs of preliminary
injunction, the Court rules in the affirmative.
The subject TROs and writs clearly
contravene the court’s ruling in G.R. No.
180206 that Elvin Gumangan, et.al. who
are owners of houses and structures
covered by the demolition orders issued by
petitioner are not entitled to the injunctive
relief previously granted by respondent.
This Court ruled that although the NCIP has
the authority to issue TROs and writs of
injunction, it was not convinced that private
respondents were entitled to the relief
granted by the Commission. Proclamation
No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents’
ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies
the Molintas and Gumangan families as
claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation, but does not acknowledge
vested rights over the same. Since it is
required before the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction that claimants show
the existence of a right to be protected, this
Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately
granted the petition of the City Government
of Baguio and set aside the writ of
preliminary injunction issued therein.
The same legal issues are thus being
litigated in G.R. No.180206 and in the case
at bar, except that different writs of
injunction are being assailed. In both
cases, petitioners claim (1) that Atty.
Masweng is prohibited from issuing
temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction against government
infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio City
is beyond the ambit of the IPRA; and (3)
that private respondents have not shown a
clear right to be protected. Private
respondents, on the other hand, presented
the same allegations in their Petition for
Injunction, particularly the alleged
recognition made under Proclamation No.
15 in favor of their ancestors.
While res judicata does not apply on
account of the different subject matters of
the case at bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they
assail different writs of injunction, albeit

issued by the same hearing officer), the
Court is constrained by the principle of
stare decisis to grant the instant petition.
Respondent's willful disregard and defiance
of this Court's ruling on a matter submitted
for the second time before his office cannot
be countenanced. By acting in opposition to
this Court's authority and disregarding its
final determination of the legal issue
pending before him, respondent failed in his
duty not to impede the due administration of
justice and consistently adhere to existing
laws and principles as interpreted in the
decisions of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for contempt is
GRANTED. The assailed Temporary
Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009,
Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case No. 31-
CAR-09, and Temporary Restraining Order
dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31,
2009 and Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09 are hereby all
LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
The Court finds respondent Atty. BRAIN S.
MASWENG, Regional Hearing Officer,
National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region
(NCIP-CAR), GUILTY of Indirect Contempt
and hereby imposes on him a fine of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00).
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR v. EBIO
GR No. 178411 – June 23 2010 –
Villarama, Jr
FACTS:
• Mario Ebio, and 5 others
(respondents) claim that they are the
absolute owners of a parcel of land. Said
land was an accretion of Cut-Cut creek.
• Respondents assert that the
original occupant and possessor of the said
parcel of land was their great grandfather,
Jose Vitalez; that sometime in 1930, Jose
gave the land to his son Pedro Vitalez, who
continuously and exclusively occupied and
possess the said lot; that in 1961,
respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s
daughter, Zenaida.
• Upon Pedro’s advice, the couple
established their homes on the said lot
• In 1964, Mario Ebio secured
building permits from the Paranaque
municipal office for the construction of their
house with the said compound.
• In 1966, executing an affidavit
declaring possession and occupancy,
Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration
over the said property in his name.
• In April 21 1987, Pedro executed
a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his
claim over the entire parcel of land in favor
of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax
declaration under Pedro’s name were
cancelled and new ones were issued in
Mario Ebio’s name.
• In 1999, a resolution was passed
for the construction of a road which will
traverse the lot occupied by the
respondents. The city government advised
all the affected residents to vacate but
respondents immediately asserted their
24
opposition thereto. As a result, the road
project was temporarily suspended.
• In 2003, however, respondents
were surprised when several public officials
proceeded to cut 8 coconut trees planted
on the said lot.
• In 2005, the City Administrator
send a letter to the respondents ordering
them to vacate the area within the next 30
days, or be physically evicted from the said
property.
• Threatened of being evicted,
respondents went to the RTC and applied
for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners. In the course of the
proceedings, respondents admitted before
the trial court that they have a pending
application for the issuance of a sales
patent before the DENR.
RTC: denied the petition for lack of merit.
Reasoned that respondent were not able to
prove successfully that they have an
established right to the property since they
have not instituted an action for
confirmation of title and their application for
sales patent has not yet granted. Also, they
failed to implead the State, which is an
indispensable party.
CA: ruled in favor of the respondents.
Supposedly, applying Art 457 of the Civil
Code, it could be concluded that
Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the
accreted property considering its ownership
of the adjoining Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8).
However, it was almost 50 years from the
time Pedro Vitalez occupied the adjoining
accreted property when Guaranteed
Homes, Inc., donated RL 8 to the local
government of Parañaque. Thus,
respondents, through acquisitive
prescription, have the right over the
property in question.
ISSUE: WON the ownership of the disputed
accreted portion of the Cut-cut creek is
vested to the respondent.
HELD: Yes.
The SC does not agree with the petitioners’
contention that the disputed land is a part of
the public domain and that respondent
should have included the State as it is an
indispensable party to the action.
Since the subject land was formed from the
alluvial deposits that have gradually settled
along the banks of the Cutcut creek, the law
that governs ownership over the accreted
portion is Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of
Waters, in relation to Art. 457 of the Civil
Code.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing
provisions that alluvial deposits along the
banks of a creek do not form part of the
public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added.
The only restriction provided for by law is
that the owner of the adjoining property
must register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may
be subject to acquisition through
prescription by 3rd persons.
For more then 30 years, neither
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Paranaque in its corporate
or private capacity sought to register the
accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents
are deemed to have acquired ownership
over the subject property through
prescription.
Further, respondents’ application for sales
patent should not be used to prejudice or
derogate what may be deemed as their
vested right over the subject property. The
sales patent application should instead be
considered as a mere superfluity
particularly since ownership over the land,
which they seek to buy from the State, is
already vested upon them by virtue of
acquisition prescription. Moreover, the
State does not have any authority to convey
a property through the issuance of a grant
or a patent if the land is no longer a public
land.
Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can
give what he does not have  Such
principle is equally applicable even against
a sovereign entity that is the State.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for
lack of merit. The decision of the CA is
affirmed.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. REYES
G.R. No. L-27954 | G.R. No. L-28144
November 28, 1975
ANTONIO, J.
DOCTRINES:
• Execution pending appeal is not
applicable in a land registration proceeding.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a
judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is
violative of the explicit provisions of the
Land Registration Act which requires that a
decree shall be issued only after the
decision adjudicating the title becomes final
and executory, and it is on the basis of said
decree that the Register of Deeds
concerned issues the corresponding
certificate of title.
• Unless the applicant has shown
by clear and convincing evidence that the
property in question was ever acquired by
the applicant or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information
title, or any other means for the acquisition
of public lands, the property must be held to
be part of the public domain.
• In application for judicial
confirmation of titles, the submission of
original tracing cloth plan approved by the
Director of Lands is mandatory. Applicant is
not relieved from duty of submitting in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan of
land applied for even if a blue print copy of
the plan was superimposed in the military
plan of the area declared as a reservation.
FACTS:
• On February 24, 1964, Alipio
Alinsunurin, later substituted by Parañaque
Investment and Development Corporation,
sought to register under Act 496 (Land
Registration Act of 1902), a parcel of land

of more or less 16,800 hectares in Nueva
Ecija indisputably inside the boundary of
Fort Magsaysay and included within the
area reserved for military purposes under
Presidential Proclamation No.237, dated
December 19, 1955.
o Applicant claimed that his
predecessors acquired the land by virtue of
a possessory information title issued during
the Spanish Regime on March 5, 1895.
o Government, through the Director
of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, opposed
the application claiming that the applicant
was without sufficient title and was not in
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application and that approximately 13,957
hectares of said land consist of the military
reservation of Fort Magsaysay.
• On November 19, 1966, the
lower court, through Judge Reyes of CFI
Nueva Ecija branch 3, ruled that (a) 2/3
portion of the land in favor of the
corporation, subject to the rights of one
Ariosto Santos per a manifestation
submitted in court, and (b) 1/3 portion to
Roman Tamayo. Within the extended
period, the Government filed the
corresponding Record on Appeal, copies of
which were duly served upon the
corporation and Tamayo.
• On March 11, 1967, pending
approval of the Record on Appeal, and on
the motions of the corporation and of
Tamayo, the lower court directed the
issuance of a registration decree of the
entire parcel applied for, 1/3 pro-indiviso in
favor of Tamayo, and 2/3 pro-indiviso in
favor of the corporation, and declared that
as to Tamayo's share, the court's decision
had become final, but as to the share of the
corporation, the registration shall be subject
to the final outcome of the appeal.
• On May 29, 1967, the
Government instituted a special civil action
for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction (L-27594), seeking to
nullify the registration decree, to command
the respondent court to certify the entire
proceedings, and to allow appeal to the
Supreme Court
• The Supreme Court issued a writ
of preliminary injunction restraining 1)
Judge Reyes from issuing a writ of
possession, 2) the corporation and Tamayo
from exercising acts of ownership over the
property, and 3) the register of deeds from
accepting for registration documents on the
land until a notice of lis pendens is filed.
• During the pendency of the
appeal in the registration case, a certain
Honofre A. Andrada and others filed with
branch 1 the CFI of Nueva Ecija (not the
land registration court) a complaint against
the corporation and Tamayo for
reconveyance of a portion of the land in
question.
• Despite the pendency of the
appeal, the lower court assumed jurisdiction
over, and decided, the case in favor of
Andrada. Pursuant to the lower court’s
decision in favor of Andrada, but In violation
of the Supreme Court's injunction, the
25
corporation executed a subdivision plan of
the parcel subject of the land registration
and the lower court subsequently ordered
the Register of Deeds to cancel the original
certificate of title and to issue new titles to
Andrada "free from all liens and
encumbrances."
ISSUES:
1) W/N the lower courts (branches 3
and 1) erred in directing the issuance of a
registration decree pending an appeal and
in deciding on the complaint for
reconveyance, respectively.
2) W/N applicant Corporation or
Alipio Alinsunurin have a registrable title
over the land claimed.
HELD:
1) Yes, the lower courts acted
without jurisdiction or exceeded its
jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a
decree of registration despite the appeal
and in deciding on the complaint for
reconveyance. The Supreme Court ruled
that execution pending appeal is not
applicable in a land registration proceeding.
It is fraught with dangerous consequences.
Innocent purchasers may be misled into
purchasing real properties upon reliance on
a judgment which may be reversed on
appeal. A Torrens title issued on the basis
of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as
it is violative of the explicit provisions of the
Land Registration Act which requires that a
decree shall be issued only after the
decision adjudicating the title becomes final
and executory, and it is on the basis of said
decree that the Register of Deeds
concerned issues the corresponding
certificate of title. An action to reconvey
land involved in a pending land registration
case is barred by pendency of appeal in
latter case such that trial court has no
jurisdiction to order Register of Deeds to
cancel the original certificate of title subject
of pending dispute and order issuance of
new titles free from all liens and
encumbrances.
2) No. On the basis of the facts in
the record, neither applicant Parañaque
Investment and Development Corporation
nor Alipio Alinsunurin nor the latter's
predecessors-in-interest have been "in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation" of the property
in question, "under a bona fideclaim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title." A
mere casual cultivation of portions of the
land by the claimant, and the raising
thereon of cattle, do not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. In
that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State. The mere
occupancy of land by grazing livestock
upon it, without substantial inclosures or
other permanent improvements, is not
sufficient to support a claim of title thru
acquisitive prescription.
Likewise, the original tracing cloth plan of
the land applied for, which must be
approved by the Director of Lands, was not
submitted in evidence. One of the
distinguishing marks of the Torrens System
is the absolute certainty of the identity of a
registered land as shown in the plan and
technical descriptions duly approved by the
Director of Lands. Hence, the applicant is
not relieved of his duty of submitting the
original tracing cloth of the survey plan of
the land duly approved by the Director of
Lands. Further, the applicant attempts to
justify the non-submission of the original
tracing cloth plan by claiming that the same
must be with the Land Registration
Commission which checked or verified the
survey plan and the technical descriptions
thereof. It is not the function of the LRC to
check the original survey plan as it has no
authority to approve original survey plans.
If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth
plan was forwarded there, the applicant
may easily retrieve the same therefrom and
submit the same in evidence which was not
done.
DECISION: The Court granted the petition
for certiorari and dismissed the application
for registration.
30 BENIN VS. TUASON
G.R. NO. L-26127, JUNE 28, 1974,
ZALDIVAR, J.:
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
FACTS:
Benin et al., Alcantara et al., Pili et al., filed
three separate complaints. They uniformly
alleged, in their respective complaint, that in
1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful
possession of their lands, J.M. Tuason and
Co. Inc. et al., through their agents and
representatives, with the aid of armed men,
by force and intimidation, using bulldozers
and other demolishing equipment, illegally
entered, defaced, demolished and
destroyed the dwellings and construction of
their lessees, as well as the rice paddies
(pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees, and
permanent improvements such as old
roads, old bridges and other permanent
landmarks within and outside the lands. As
a result, plaintiffs were deprived of the
rentals received from their lessees. The
plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the claim
of defendants, and discovered that their
lands had either been fraudulently or
erroneously included, by direct or
constructive fraud, in the Santa Mesa
Estate, in the names of the defendants,
Tuason et al.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the
registered owners in OCT No. 735 applied
for the registration of 2 parcels of land
(Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate),
which were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of
the Court of Land Registration. Before the
decision was handed down in LRC No.
7681, the area, boundaries and technical
descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered
and amended, and such were never
published (different from the original
application which was published). LRC
rendered a decision based on the amended
plan that led to the issuance of a decree of

registration which registered the 2 parcels
of land in the name of the applicants. The
plaintiffs are alleging that the decision is
null and void because the LRC had no
jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of
publication, and likewise the decree issued
is also null and void as it is based on a void.
With the same arguments, OCT No. 735,
referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is
also null and void.
The plaintiffs prayed that the court: (1) to
declare them owners and entitled to the
possession of the land; (2) to revoke the
decision of LRC, and to declare Decree No.
17431 null and void with respect to Santa
Mesa Estate in OCT No. 735 which include
the lands of the plaintiffs; (3) declare OCT
No. 735 also null and void; (4) to declare
null and void all TCTs issued by the
Register of Deeds subsequent to, and
based on, OCT No. 735; (5) to order the
defendants, to reconvey and transfer title
over the land; (6) defendants pay the
market value of the lands in case of
inability to reconvey; (7) defendants pay
damages; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction from disturbing the ownership
and possession of the plaintiffs during the
pendency of these cases.
The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were
allowed by the trial court to litigate as
paupers. Only J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was
actually served with summons. The other
defendants were ordered summoned by
publication. Only J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
appeared while the others were all declared
in default. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a
motion to dismiss in each of the three cases
but was denied by the trial court. The trial
court issued an order granting the writ of
preliminary injunction but was was later on
upon posting by J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of
bonds. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a
motion for reconsideration for the denial of
motion to dismiss, however to no avail.
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer
specifically denied the claims of ownership
of the lands argued that (1) the cause of
action is barred by prior judgment and res
judicata in view CFI order of dismissal
affirmed in toto by SC; (2) failure to state
facts; (3) prescribed either under Act No.
496 or under statutes governing
prescription of action; (4) that it is a buyer in
good faith; (5) that the registration
proceedings had in LRC was in accordance
with law, and the requirements for a valid
registration of title were complied with.
After the plaintiffs had presented their
evidence, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
presented a motion to dismiss the cases
upon the grounds that (1) the actions were
barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that
the actions were barred by a prior
judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not
presented any evidence to prove their claim
of ownership. It later filed a motion to
withdraw the third ground of its motion to
dismiss. The plaintiffs opposed the motion
to dismiss, as well as to the motion to
withdraw. Trial court granted motion to
withdraw but denied the motion to dismiss.
26
The trial court favored the plaintiffs and
ordered to restore the possession of the
lands. A motion for new trial was filed by J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc.. However, before the
motion for new trial was resolved, it filed a
notice of appeal to SC and an appeal bond,
and later on filed the record on appeal. The
record on appeal was approved.
Trial Court decision: (1) the decision and
the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and
void ab initio, having been rendered by a
court without jurisdiction; (2) OCT is null
and void, having been issued pursuant to a
void decree; (3) all TCTs derived from the
void OCT No. 735 are likewise null and
void; and (4) the plaintiffs are the owners
and entitled to the possession of the
parcels of land described in their respective
complaints.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the LRC had
jurisdiction to render LRC No. 7681
decision based on amended plan. (YES)
Whether or not the OCT No. 735 was null
and void because it is based from the LRC
decision. (NO)
HELD:
 Publication of amended
application not necessary. It involves
exclusion of certain areas.
Under Section 23 of Act 496, the
registration court may allow, or order, an
amendment of the application for
registration when it appears to the court
that the amendment is necessary and
proper. Under Section 24 of the same act
the court may at any time order an
application to be amended by striking out
one or more parcels or by severance of the
application. The amendment may be made
in the application or in the survey plan, or in
both, since the application and the survey
plan go together. If the amendment
consists in the inclusion in the application
for registration of an area or parcel of land
not previously included in the original
application, as published, a new publication
of the amended application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to
give notice to all persons concerned
regarding the amended application.
Without a new publication the registration
court can not acquire jurisdiction over the
area or parcel of land that is added to the
area covered by the original application,
and the decision of the registration court
would be a nullity insofar as the decision
concerns the newly included land. The
reason is because without a new
publication, the law is infringed with respect
to the publicity that is required in
registration proceedings, and third parties
who have not had the opportunity to pre-
sent their claim might be prejudiced in their
rights because of failure of notice. But if the
amendment consists in the exclusion of a
portion of the area covered by the original
application and the original plan as
previously published, a new publication is
not necessary. In the latter case, the
jurisdiction of the court over the remaining
area is not affected by the failure of a new
publication.
In the case at bar the Court finds that the
original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2
that accompanied the application for
registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended
in order to exclude certain areas that were
the subject of opposition, or which were the
subject of another registration case; and the
Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of
Land Registration was ordered to determine
whether the amended plan included lands
or areas not included in the original plan. In
compliance with the order of the registration
court said Chief of the Survey Division
informed the court that no new parcels were
included in the new (or amended) plan.
And so, in the supplemental decision of the
Court of Land Registration in LRC No.
7681, the report of the Chief of the Survey
Division was taken into consideration and
the court ordered the registration of the
lands applied for by the applicants as
described in the amended plan. It is thus
shown that the amended plan in LRC No.
7681 did not cover parcels, or areas, that
were not previously included in the original
plan which accompanied the application
that had been published in the Official
Gazette. There was, therefore, no
necessity for a new publication of the
amended plan in order to vest the Court of
Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear
and decide the application for registration in
LRC No. 7681 and to order the issuance of
Decree of Registration No. 17431 upon
which Original Certificate of Title No. 735
was based.
 Minor Discrepancies between
Original and Amended Application
We believe that this difference of 27.10
square meters is too minimal to be of
decisive consequence in the determination
of the validity of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735. It was error on the part of the
lower court to lay stress on this
circumstance and made it a basis for ruling
that because in the amended plan there is
this increase in area as compared to the
area appearing in the application as
published, the Land Registration Court did
not have jurisdiction to render the decision
decreeing the registration of Parcel 1 in
LRC No. 7681. xxx this seeming increase of
27.10 square meters had been brought
about "by the fact that when the
amendment of the plan was made, the
distances and bearings in a few points
along the southwestern boundary were
brought to the nearest millimeter and to the
nearest second respectively; whereas, the
computation of the survey in the original
plan was to the nearest decimeter and to
the nearest minute only".
Moreover, no evidence was presented to
identify this area of 27.10 square meters,
nor to show its location, in relation to the
entire area of Parcel 1. The appellees did
not even attempt to show that this excess
area of 27.10 square meters is included
within the parcels that they are claiming.
xxx Neither is there a showing that this

small area of 27.10 square meters belongs
to any person and that person had been
deprived of his property, or had failed to
claim that particular area because of the
non-publication of the amended plan. On
the other hand, there is the report of the
Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of
Land Registration stating that the amended
plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not
include any land which was not included in
the original plan.
 LRC has Jurisdiction and Decree
of Registration valid
The settled rule, further, is that once the
registration court had acquired jurisdiction
over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in
the registration proceedings in virtue of the
publication of the application, that
jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands
mentioned and described in the application.
If it is later shown that the decree of
registration had included land or lands not
included in the original application as
published, then the registration proceedings
and the decree of registration must be
declared null and void in so far but only in
so far as the land not included in the
publication is concerned. This is so,
because the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the land not included in the
publication-the publication being the basis:
of the jurisdiction of the court. But the
proceedings and the decree of registration,
relating to the lands that were included in
the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is
shown that a certificate of title had been
issued covering lands where the
registration court had no jurisdiction, the
certificate of title is null and void insofar as
it concerns the land or lands over which the
registration court had not acquired
jurisdiction.
In the three cases, even granting that the
registration court had no jurisdiction over
the increased area of 27.10 square meters
(as alleged by appellees), the most that the
lower court could have done was to nullify
the decree and the certificate of title insofar
as that area of 27.10 square meters is
concerned, if that area can be identified.
But, certainly, the lower court could not
declare, and should not have declared, null
and void the whole proceedings in LRC No.
7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred
in declaring null and void ab initio Original
Certificate of Title 735 xxx This declaration
by the lower court, if sanctioned by this
Court and given effect, would nullify the title
that covers two big parcels of land (Parcels
1 and 2). The trial court also declared null
and void all transfer certificates of title that
are derived, or that emanated, from Original
Certificate of Title No. 735, regardless of
whether those transfer certificates of title
are the results of transactions done in good
faith and for value by the holder of those
transfer certificates of title. xxx It must also
be noted that both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2
have been subdivided into numerous lots
which have already been acquired by
numerous persons and/or entities that are
now holding certificates of title which can be
traced back to Original Certificate of Title
No. 735. The decision of the lower court,
27
however, would render useless Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 and all transfer
certificates of title emanating, or derived,
therefrom. The decision of the lower court
would certainly prejudice the rights of the
persons, both natural and juridical, who had
acquired portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2,
relying on the doctrine of the indefeasibility
of Torrens title.
 OCT is valid
The lower court erred in declaring Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 void and of no
effect. We have held that Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a
result of the registration proceedings in
LRC No, 7681 which was regular and that
said certificate of title is valid and effective.
The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem,
the decree of registration issued pursuant
to the decision rendered in said registration
case bound the lands covered by the
decree and quieted title thereto, and is
conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application, notice or citation,
or included in the general inscription "To
whom it may concern", and such decree will
not be opened by reason of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in
any court for reversing judgment or decree.
Such decree may only be reopened if any
person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration
obtained by fraud would file in the
competent court of first instance a petition
for review within one year after entry of the
decree, provided no innocent purchaser for
value had acquired an interest on the land,
and upon the expiration of said period of
one year, the decree, or the certificate of
title issued pursuant to the decree, is
incontrovertible. In the case now before Us,
the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in
LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is
undisputed that no person had filed any
petition for review of the decree of
registration in LRC 7681 within the period of
one year from July 8, 1914. That decree of
registration, and Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 issued pursuant thereto, therefore,
had been incontrovertible since July 9,
1915.
 J.M Tuason and subsequent
buyers are innocent purchasers for value
The lower court declared that herein
appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a
purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any
evidence in the record that would sustain
such a finding of the lower court. One
reason given by the lower court in declaring
appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a
purchaser in bad faith is the fact that the
incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.
and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. were practically the same persons
belonging to the same Tuason family. We
do not see anything wrong if some
incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc.
are also incorporators of the J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. xxx Besides, as has been shown,
the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the
land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title
No. 735) from the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, the receiver of the properties of the
Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was
authorized, and subsequently approved, by
the court. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. paid
the sum of P763,950.80 for the property.
Certainly if the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. had
acquired the land originally covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in a
transaction that was authorized by the
court, for a valuable consideration, thereby
acquiring a good title over the property as a
purchaser in good faith and for value, the
title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. when it sold same property to the
latter was also a good title, and J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in
good faith and for value — even if it
appears that the incorporators of the two
corporations belong to the same Tuason
family. The records of these cases are
bereft of any evidence which would indicate
that the sale of Parcel 1 in question by the
Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. was fraudulent.
The evidence shows that appellant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the land
originally covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735, including the six parcels
claimed by appellees into a subdivision,
and numerous persons and entities had
purchased the subdivision lots, and the
purchasers in turn were issued transfer
certificates of title covering the lots that they
bought, based on the transfer certificate of
title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc.
The buyers of the lots relied upon the
certificate of title in the name of J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they paid
for the lots they certainly are purchasers in
good faith and for value. The purchasers of
these lots have built thereon residential
houses, office buildings, shops, hospital,
even churches. But the lower court,
disregarding these circumstances, declared
null and void all transfer certificates of title
that emanated, or that were derived, from
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. xxx The
possessors of the lots comprised within the
six parcels of land in question, and who
hold certificates of title covering the lots that
they bought, are not parties in the present
cases, and yet the decision of the lower
court would annul their titles and compel
them to give up the possession of their
properties. To give effect to the decision of
the lower court is to deprive persons of their
property without due process of law. The
decision of the lower court would set at
naught the settled doctrine that the holder
of a certificate of title who acquired the
property covered by the title in good faith
and for value can rest assured that his title
is perfect and incontrovertible.
 J.M. Tuason & Co. had acquired
a valid title
It has been shown that appellant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title
over the land which includes the six parcels
that are claimed by the appellees. The fact,
that the predecessors in interest of the
appellees or any person, for that matter had
not filed a petition for the review of the
decree of registration in LRC No. 7681

within a period of one year from July 8,
1914 when the decree of registration was
issued, is a circumstance that had forever
foreclosed any proceeding for the review of
said decree. As We have adverted to, that
decree of registration had become
incontrovertible. xxx Neither may the action
of the appellees for reconveyance of the
lands in question be entertained because
such action had already prescribed, barred
by laches, considering that Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 had been issued
way back in 1914 and the complaint in the
present cases were filed only on May 19,
1955, or after a lapse of some 41 years.
Moreover, as of the time when these
complaints were filed the six parcels of land
claimed by the appellees are no longer
covered by the certificate of title in the
names of the persons who procured the
original registration of those lands. The title
to Parcel 1, which includes the six parcels
of land claimed by the appellees, had
passed to the hands parties who were
innocent purchasers for value. xxx It is very
clear, therefore, that an action for
reconveyance cannot prosper against
appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., much less
against the registered owners of the lots
that form parts of the six parcels of land that
are claimed by the appellees. 47
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City Branch) in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622
and 3623, appealed from, is reversed and
set aside. The bond filed by appellant in
the three cases in the court below for the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction is
ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as
to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
 Facts of the 3 similar complaints:
In Civil Case No. 3621, the Benin et al.,
alleged that they were the owners and
possessors of the three parcels of
agricultural lands, described in paragraph V
of the complaint, located in the barrio of La
Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the
municipality (now city) of Caloocan,
province of Rizal and that they inherited
said parcels of land from their ancestor
Sixto Benin; In Civil Case No. 3622 the
Alcantara et al. alleged that they were the
owners and possessors of two parcels of
agricultural land, described in paragraph V
of the complaint, and that these parcels of
land were inherited by them from their
deceased father Bonoso Alcantara. In Civil
Case No. 3623, Pili et al. alleged that they
are the owners and possessors of a parcel
of agricultural land located in the Barrio of
La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of
Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area
of approximately 62,481 square meters;
that this parcel of land was inherited by
plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili
who in turn inherited the same from his
parents; and they and their predecessors in
interest had been in open, adverse and
28
continuous possession of the same; had
said lands declared for taxation purposes.
 J.M Tuason & Co.’s Counterclaim
(If asked):
J.M. Tuason was contending that the case
should’ve been dismissed due to res
judicata because the Alcantara case ruling
sets as bar to the actions filed against it.
Alcantara case: Court declared that "the
decree of registration, in pursuance of
which defendants' title was issued, binds
the land and quiets title thereto and is
conclusive against the plaintiffs." In other
words, in virtue of that decision, the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among
them Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and
Pascual Pili, and their successors-in-
interest, could no longer question the
validity of Original Certificate of Title No.
735, nor claim any right of ownership over
any portion of the land that is covered by
said certificate of title.
Supreme Court: YES. Alcantara ruling is a
bar to the actions. Extends to other plaintiffs
by Stare Decisis.
 Identity of Subject Matter and
Cause of Action: the object or purpose of
the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership
and possession of the same parcels of land
 Identity of Parties: It would
appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3621 Elias Benin is the only one who was a
plaintiff in Alcantara Case; of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who
is still living, is the only one who was a
plaintiff in Alcantara case; of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual Pili, who is still
living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in
Alcantara case. [Each of their co-plaintiffs
per case died already and was succeeded
by their respective heirs]
28) SM PRIME HOLDINGS V. MADAYAG
(REPEATED CASE)
Topic: Procedure
FACTS:
Respondent Angela Madayag filed with
RTC Pangasinan an application for
registration of a parcel of land located in
Brgy. Anonas, attaching to the application
the Survey Plan approved by the Land
Management Services (LMS) and DENR.
Subsequently, petitioner SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. wrote to the DENR
demanding the cancellation of respondent
Madayag’s survey plan because the lot
encroached on the properties it recently
purchased from several lot owners and that,
despite being the new owner of the
adjoining lots, it was not notified of the
survey previously conducted.
Petitioner SM manifested its opposition to
respondent’s application for registration; the
Republic of the PH, through SolGen, and
the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their
respective oppositions.
Petitioner SM alleged that it had recently
bought 7 parcels of land in Brgy. Anonas
which was approved by the Land
Registration Commission and these parcels
of land were covered by separate
certificates of title, some of which were
already in the name SM while the others
were still in the name of the previous
owners.
RTC declared a general default, except as
to petitioner SM, the Republic, and the heirs
of Romulo Visperas.
Petitioner SM formally filed with the DENR
a petition for cancellation of the survey
plan.
A few months later, petitioner SM filed an
Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings in
the land registration case filed by Madayag
alleging that the court should await the
DENR resolution of the petition for
cancellation of the survey plan as the
administrative case is prejudicial to the
determination of the land registration case
 GRANTED by RTC and held that since
the survey plan is one of the mandatory
requirements in land registration
proceedings, the cancellation would be
prejudicial to the petition for land
registration
Repsondent filed MR with RTC  DENIED
Respondent filed petition for certiorari with
CA  GRANTED finding that RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
suspending proceedings and ruled that the
survey plan which was duly approved by
the DENR should be accorded the
presumption of regularity, and that RTC has
the power to hear and determine all
questions arising from an application for
registration
Petitioner filed MR with CA  DENIED
Petitioner contends that since respondent
Madayag’s cause of action in the land
registration case depends heavily on the
survey plan, it was only prudent for RTC to
suspend the proceedings pending the
resolution of the petition for cancellation of
the survey plan by DENR  insisting that
recourse to a petition for certiorari was not
proper considering that respondent was not
deprived of her right to prosecute her
application for registration
ISSUE: WON the RTC correctly granted the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings of the
application for registration since the
cancellation of the survey plan would be
prejudicial to the petition for land
registration- NO
RULING:
-Every order suspending proceedings must
be guided by the following precepts: it shall
be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits
and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting
judgments, confusion between litigants and
courts, or when the rights of parties to the
second action cannot be properly
determined until the questions raised in the
first action are settled  otherwise, the
suspension will be regarded as an arbitrary

exercise of the court’s discretion and can
be corrected only by a petition for certiorari
-The fundamental purpose of the Land
Registration Law (PD No. 1529) is to finally
settle title to real property in order to
preempt any question on the legality of the
title – except claims that were noted on the
certificate itself at the time of registration or
those that arose subsequent thereto 
consequently, once the title is registered
under the said law, owners can rest secure
on their ownership and possession
-In the present case, none of the
circumstances that would justify the stay of
proceedings is present  in fact, to await
the resolution of the petition for cancellation
would only delay the resolution of the land
registration case and undermine the
purpose of land registration
-The petition for cancellation raises
practically the very same issues that
petitioner SM raised in its opposition to
respondent Madayag’s application for
registration (alleges that the survey plan
should be cancelled because it includes
portions of the 7 properties it purchased)
-As an incident to its authority to settle all
questions over the title of the subject
property, the land registration court may
resolve the underlying issue of whether the
subject property overlaps the petitioner’s
properties without necessarily having to
declare the survey plan as void
-In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a
land registration court has the duty to
determine whether the issuance of a new
certificate of title will alter a valid and
existing certificate of title
-An application for registration of an already
titled land constitutes a collateral attack on
the existing title, which is not allowed by law
 but the RTC need not wait for the
decision of the DENR in the petition to
cancel the survey plan in order to determine
whether the subject property is already
titled or forms part of already titled property
-The court may now verify this allegation
based on the respondent’s survey plan vis-
à-vis the certificates of title of the petitioner
and its predecessors-in-interest  after all,
a survey plan precisely serves to establish
the true identity of the land to ensure that it
does not overlap a parcel of land or a
portion thereof already covered by a
previous land registration, and to forestall
the possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining
land
-Should the court find it difficult to do so, the
court may require the filing of additional
papers to aid in its determination of the
propriety of the application, based on
Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:
SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts
and papers; ocular inspection. – The court
may require facts to be stated in the
application in addition to those prescribed
29
by this Decree not inconsistent therewith
and may require the filing of any additional
papers.
-The court may also directly require the
DENR and the Land Registration Authority
to submit a report on whether the subject
property has already been registered and
covered by certificates of title, like what the
court did in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.
Winner: respondent Madayag
29. GENEROSO MENDOZA V. COURT
OF APPEALS, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ AND
DOLORES MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-36637 | 14 July 1978
DOCTRINE:
1) Section 29 of the Land Registration Act
authorizes the registration of land (subject
of a registration proceeding) in the name of
the buyer or of the person to whom the land
was conveyed during the time between the
filing of the application for registration and
issuance of the decree of title.
2) The law does not require that the
application for registration be the “buyer” or
the “person to whom the property has been
conveyed” as the applicant. Neither does it
require that the “buyer” or the “person to
whom the property has been conveyed” be
a party to the case.
3) A decree of registration may be set aside
only on the ground of fraud in obtaining the
same, not on the ground of failure of the
vendee to pay the purchase price.
FACTS
1. Generoso Mendoza filed with the CFI an
application for the registration of 2 parcels
of land in Bulacan.
• After a notice was issued,
published, posted and served, and nobody
appeared to oppose, the court ordered a
general default and allowed the applicant to
present his evidence ex parte.
2. From the evidence presented, it was
proven that Generoso and his wife
(Mendozas) were the owners of the parcels
of land. They sold the same, during the
pendency of the application for registration
before the CFI, to the Spouses Cruz,
subject to the vendor’s (Mendozas’)
usufructuary rights.
• The Deed of Sale was presented
as Exhibit I.
• The registration court ordered the
registration of the 2 parcels of land in the
names of the vendees (Sps. Cruz).
• After confirmation of the title to
the land and registration of the same in the
names of Sps. Cruz, an OCT was issued to
them.
4. After 3 years, Generoso filed an urgent
petition for reconsideration to cancel the
said OCT, because the vendees (Sps.
Cruz) had failed to pay the purchase price
of the lands.
• The registration court ordered the
cancellation of the OCT, and directed the
registration of the lands in the names of the
Mendozas.
• The CA set aside the order of the
registration court.
ISSUE
1) W/N the registration of land in the names
of the vendees is valid even though they
were not parties in the original registration
proceedings – YES.
2) W/N the registration proceedings in this
case may be set aside on the ground that
the vendees failed to pay the purchase
price – NO.
HELD
1) Yes. The SC upheld CA’s decision and
ruled in favor of Sps. Cruz.
Generoso insists that the court could not
legally order the registration of the land in
the names of the vendees (Sps. Cruz) who
were neither (a) the applicants nor (b) the
oppositors in the registration case below.
He is wrong.
• Sec. 29 of the Land Registration
Act (LRA) authorizes the registration of the
land (subject matter of a registration
proceeding) in the name of the buyer or of
the person to whom the land has been
conveyed by an instrument executed during
the interval of time between the filing of the
application for registration and the issuance
of the decree of title. The only requirements
are:
(1) That the instrument (evidencing that the
land has been sold or encumbered) be
presented to the court by the interested
party together with a motion that the same
be considered in relation with the
application; and
(2) That prior notice be given to the parties
to the case.
• In this case, the requirements
have been complied with.
o First requirement (Presentaion of
Instrument): The Deed of Sale was
presented in court by Generoso himself and
testified that he did sell the land to Sps.
Cruz. He even file a motion for the issuance
of the decree of confirmation of title.
o Second requirement (Prior
Notice): Culled from the facts, an order of
general default had been issued prior to the
presentation of the deed of sale by
Generoso, since nobody filed an opposition
to the application for registration. Thus, the
only person who should have been entitled
to a notice from the court was Generoso
himself, as the only party with a legal
standing in the proceedings.
• The law does not require that the
application for registration be amended by
substituting the “buyer” or the “person to
whom the property has been conveyed” for
the applicant. Neither does it require that
the “buyer” or the “person to whom the
property has been conveyed” be a party to
the case. He may be a total stranger to the
land registration proceedings (As long as
the 2 requirements above are present).
 30

2) No. What the applicant (or Generoso cause a notice of initial hearing to be • This is a petition for review on
here) actually invokes in is not fraud in published once in the Official Gazette and certiorari against the decision of the CA,
obtaining the decree of registration but the once in a newspaper of general circulation which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
alleged failure of the vendees-respondents in the Philippines: Provided, however, that • The previous case, Miguel
to pay the purchase price of the the publication in the Official Gazette shall Alvarez vs Lydia Gaya, was a case of re-
landholdings. be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the conveyance involving a piece of land in
court… Naga City. Miguel Alvarez (the original
• Breach of contract is not a plaintiff and now substituted by heirs as
ground for a petition for a review. And the [Read DOCTRINE]. respondents herein) filed against Lydia
registration court has no jurisdiction to Gaya, who was the predecessor-in-interest
decide the issue of whether or not the deed As has been ruled, a party as an owner of the petitioner.
of sale, Exh. “1”, should be rescinded for seeking the inscription of realty in the land • Alvarez alleged, that he was in
the alleged failure of the vendees to pay the registration court must prove by satisfactory continuous and notorious possession of the
purchase price. The issue on the breach of and conclusive evidence not only his land, that Gaya initiated the subdivision of
contract has to be litigated in the ordinary ownership thereof but the identity of the the lot without his knowledge, that Gaya
court. same, for he is in the same situation as one willfully failed to notify him of the cadastral
who institutes an action for recovery of proceedings, and that due to such fraud he
realty. He must prove his title against the sustained losses and damages.
30. DIR. OF LANDS VS. CA
whole world. • On the other hand, Gaya alleges
276 SCRA 276 | July 28, 1997 |
This task, which rests upon the applicant, in her answer that Alvarez had not been in
Panganiban, J
can best be achieved when all persons continuous possession, that she was the
TOPIC: Procedure
concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who one in peaceful and continuous possession
have rights to or interests in the subject of the land from 1936, that she acquired an
DOCTRINE: Land registration is a
property are notified and effectively invited imperfect title which was confirmed in 1966,
proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such
to come to court and show cause why the that the CFI ordered the registration of the
proceeding requires constructive seizure of
application should not be granted. The land in her and her husband’s name, that
the land as against all persons, including
elementary norms of due process require the title was now indefeasible. She also
the state, who have rights to or interests in
that before the claimed property is taken claims that the complaint was now barred
the property. An in rem proceeding is
from concerned parties and registered in by the statute of limitations.
validated essentially through publication.
the name of the applicant, said parties must • Alvarez died during trial, thus his
This being so, the process must strictly be
be given notice and opportunity to oppose. heirs substituted him in the proceedings.
complied with. Otherwise, persons who
• Petitioner Adviento traced his title
may be interested or whose rights may be
2. It may be asked why publication to one Fidel Cu, who bought the same
adversely affected would be barred from
in a newspaper of general circulation property form Lydia Gaya. The petitioner
contesting an application which they had no
should be deemed mandatory when the law adopted the allegations of Lydia Gaya. He
knowledge of.
already requires notice by publication in the also alleged that Mighel Alvarez
OG as well as by mailing and posting, all of constructed a building, which was illegally
FACTS
which have already been complied with in encroaching on his property.
1. Respondent Teodoro Abistado
the case at hand. • RTC ruled in favor of
filed a petition for original registration of his
respondents-heirs, and the CA affirmed on
title over 648 square meters of land under
The reason is due process and the reality appeal.
PD 1529 with the RTC. As he died, he was
that the OG is not as widely read and • Petitioner now comes to the SC,
substituted by his heirs.
circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes contending that the title should not vest to a
2. The RTC found that the
delayed in its circulation, such that the riparian owner when there is a road
applicants through their predecessors-in-
notices published therein may not reach the bordering the land and the adjunct waters.
interest had been in open, continuous,
interested parties on time, if at all. This issue was raised for the first time in
exclusive and peaceful possession of the
Additionally, such parties may not be court.
subject land since 1938. However, it
owners of neighboring properties, and may
dismissed the petition on the ground of lack
in fact not own any other real estate. 1st ISSUE: WON the newly presented issue
of jurisdiction for applicants’ failure to
pertaining to the title vesting to a riparian
comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1)
In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature owner should be entertained
of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to
of land registration cases, the
publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a
consequences of default orders issued HELD:
newspaper of general circulation in the
against the whole world and the objective of • No. The court cannot entertain
Philippines despite that it was published in
disseminating the notice in as wide a the issue due to it being un-procedural.
the Official Gazette (OG).
manner as possible demand a mandatory Doing so would call for a determination of
3. On appeal, the CA set aside the
construction of the requirements for facts after the presentation of evidence. It is
RTC decision and ordered the registration
publication, mailing and posting. settled in rule that the SC is not a trier of
of the title in the name of Abistado holding
facts.
that publication in the OG shall be sufficient
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED • The SC found no reason to
to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
and the application for land registration is disturb the following findings of the lower
4. Hence this petition by the
DISMISSED without prejudice. courts:
Director of Lands.
G.R. No. 150844 o The claim of Alvarez is based on
possession
ISSUE: W/N the land registration court can
CEFERINO T. ADVIENTO VS HEIRS OF o The claim was found by both the
validly confirm and register title without
MIGUEL ALVAREZ, NAMELY: MARIA P. TC and the CA sustained by evidence
publication in a newspaper of general
ALVAREZ, CARPIO, DR. BEDA P. o It was held that Alvarez acquired
circulation given that there is publication in
ALVAREZ, JR., CORONA MIGUEL the lot by purchase from ALATCO, and the
the OG.
ALVAREZ, JR., AZCUNA, AND DR. latter’s OCT was cancelled in favor of
AGUSTINA A. BALUYOT, LEONARDO- Alvarez’s TCT
HELD: NO
DE CASTRO, JJ. SEVERINO P. o The land in question was
1. Sec. 23 (1) of PD 1529 provides:
ALVAREZ, ANICIA LEE, AZUCENA S. previously possessed since time
HUSHEY, AND immemorial by ALATCO
Upon receipt of the order of the court
ALEXANDER P. ALVAREZ; o Alvarez further proved his
setting the time for initial hearing, the
possession when he applied for a building
Commissioner of Land Registration shall
FACTS:

permit to construct a building along the
bank of Naga River
2nd ISSUE: WON the respondents’
admission to the trial court that there exists
a title in the name of the petitioner, she
does not need to prove ownership
HELD:
• No. Distinction should be drawn
in taking judicial notice of sources,
documents, and materials without formal
proof of the genuineness or authenticity
from taking notice of facts related to such
admissions and materials.
• As the lower court explained,
where the court finds that it is the while the
source is genuine, the facts therein are not
clearly indisputable and should be subject
to proof.
• The totality of proof adduced by
the parties shows that the title of petitioners
predecessor-in-interest is bereft of any legal
basis.
3rd ISSUE: WON the decision of the
appellate court failed to recognize the
validity in the earlier case, which resulted in
the decree of registration in favor of the
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest
HELD:
• No. The applicable law at that
time is Section 21 of Act No. 496, Land
Registration Act, which requires that
applications for registration should contain
a notification to all the occupants of the land
and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if
not known, it shall state what search has
been made to find them.
• In the case at bar, petitioner
admitted the lack of the notice to
respondents. Lack of notice is a denial of
due process to respondents. It is
elementary that no person can be denied
his property without due process of law.
• We also reject petitioner’s
argument that the registration decree binds
the RTC and the CA. The argument goes
against the very grain of judicial review. The
RTC and the CA are not bound by the land
registration decree especially when it is
assailed on the ground of fraud.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(REPUBLIC) V. MARIA P. LEE (LEE)
G.R. NO. 64818, 13 MAY 1991
FERNAN, C.J.
ELINZANO
DOCTRINE:
1. In land registration cases, the
burden of proof is upon the applicant to
show that he is the real and absolute owner
in fee simple.
2. Equally basic is the rule that no
public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or
implied, from government. A grant is
conclusively presumed by law when the
claimant, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the
land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
31
under a claim of title since July 26, 1894 or
prior thereto.
3. The bare statement of the
applicant that the land applied for has been
in the possession of her predecessors-in-
interest for more than 20 years, does not
constitute the “well-nigh incontrovertible”
and “conclusive” evidence required in land
registration cases.
FACTS:
1. On June 29, 1976, Lee applied
for a registration of a 6,843 square meters
parcel of land before the CFI (now RTC).
2. The Director of Lands filed an
opposition, alleging:
a. That neither Lee nor her
predecessors-in-interest have acquired the
land under any of the Spanish titles or any
other recognized mode for the acquisition of
title;
b. That neither Lee nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land in concept of owner
at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application; and
c. That the land is a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic.
3. The CFI then confirmed the title
of Lee over the parcel of land and
adjudicated the same in the name of
Spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, as
their conjugal property.
4. Republic appealed to the then
IAC (now CA), which however affirmed the
CFI in toto.
5. Lee contends:
a. That she was able to prove her
title to the land in question through Deeds
of Sale and tax declarations and receipts as
well as her testimony that her
predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land in question for more
than 20 years;
b. That said testimony deserves
weight and credence considering its
spontaneity;
c. that in any event, the attending
fiscal should have cross-examined her on
that point to test her credibility; and
d. That, the reason said fiscal failed
to do so is that the latter is personally
aware of facts showing that the land being
applied for is a private land.
ISSUE: Does the bare statement of Lee
that “the land she applied for has been in
the possession of her predecessors-in-
interest for more than 20 years” constitute
the well-nigh incontrovertible and
conclusive evidence required in
proceedings of this nature?
HELD:
No. [SEE DOCTRINES]. It is
incumbent upon Lee to prove that the
alleged twenty year or more possession of
her predecessors, Sps. Diaz and Vinluan
which supposedly formed part of the thirty
(30) year period prior to the filing of the
application, was open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and in concept of
owners. Lee failed to discharge this burden.
The bare assertion that the Sps. Diaz and
Vinluan had been in possession of the
property for more than 20 years found in
Lee’s declaration is hardly the “well-nigh
incontrovertible” evidence required in cases
of this nature. Lee should have presented
specific facts that would have shown the
nature of such possession. The phrase
“adverse, continuous, open, public,
peaceful and in concept of owner” by which
she described her own possession in
relation to that of her predecessors-in-
interest are mere conclusions of law which
require factual support and substantiation.
Lee having failed to prove by convincing,
positive proof that she has complied with
the requirements of the law for confirmation
of her title to the land applied for, it was
grave error on the part of the lower court to
have granted her application.
DISPOSITION: Republic’s petition is
granted. The decision confirming Lee’s title
was DENIED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
HON. SAYO
GR No. 60413 | October 31, 1990
FACTS:
1. Sps. Casiano Sandoval and Luz
Marquez, filed an application for registration
for Lot 7454 of the Saniago Cadastre, with
an area of 33, 950 hectares. The land was
formerly part of the Municipality of
Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been
transferred to Nueva Vizcaya.
2. The registration was opposed by
Republic, through the Director of Lands and
the Director of Forestry, and some others,
including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua
3. The case went on until after
about 20 years, a compromise agreement
was entered into by all of the parties. Under
such, the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (as
applicants) renounced their claims and
ceded the following:
a. in favor of the Bureau of Lands,
an area of 4,109 heactares;
b. in favor of the Bureau of Forest
Development, 12, 341 hectares;
c. in favor of the Heirs of Liberato
Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
d. in favor of Philippines Cacao &
Farm Products Inc., 8,000 hectares.
4. The remaining area of 5,500
hectares was, adjudicated to and
acknowledged as owned by the Heirs off
Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area,
1,500, hectares were assigned by the
Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C.
Reyes, in payment of his attorney’s fees. All
the parties also mutually waived and
renounced all their prior claims over Lot
7454 of the Santiago Cadastre.

5. Respondent Judge approved the
compromise agreement and confirmed the
title and ownership of the parties.
6. The Republic, thru OSG, sought
to annul respondent Judge’s decision,
imputing grave abuse of discretion and
contended that: no evidence was adduced
by the parties as to their petitions for
registration; the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forest Development had no
legal authority to enter into the compromise
agreement; and that he was not notified of
the proceedings and so, was not able to
take part therein.
7. The respondents contend that the
lot in question is not a public land because
of the following facts submitted by them as
evidence that the land is private land: the
possessory information title in their name
and their predecessors-in-interest, the pre-
war certification of the National Library
appearing on the Bureau of Archives
(where it is stated that Lot 7454 was
registered under the Spanish system of
land registration as private property owned
by applicants’ predecessors-in-interest);
and the fact that the proceeding of
registration was brought under the Torrens
Act which presupposes a title to be
confirmed by the court (distinguishing it
from proceedings under the Public Land act
where the presumption is always that the
Land involved belongs to the State).
ISSUE: W/N the pieces of evidence
submitted by respondents are sufficient to
warrant that the lot is of private character.
HELD: NO. The decision of respondent
Judge is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
1. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Hence it is that all
applicants in land registration proceedings
have the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land thus sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing
by clear and convincing evidence that the
property involved was acquired by him or
his ancestors either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other
means for the proper acquisition of public
lands, the property must be held to be part
of the public domain. The applicant must
present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim; he may not rely on
general statements, or mere conclusions of
law other than factual evidence of
possession and title.
2. Here, the principal document
relied upon and presented by the applicants
for registration, was a photocopy of a
certification of the National Library to the
effect that the property was registered
under the Spanish system of land
registration as private property of Don
Liberato Bayaua, applicants’ predecessors-
in-interest. But, that Spanish document (the
Estadistica de Propiedade), cannot be
considered a title to property, it not being
32
one of the grants made during the Spanish
regime, and obviously not constituting
primary evidence of ownership. It is
inefficacious document on which to base
any finding of the private character of the
land in question.
3. It thus appears that the decision
of the Registration Cout a quo is based
solely on the compromise agreement of the
parties. But that compromise agreement
included private persons who had not
adduced any competent evidence of their
ownership ove the land subject of the
registration proceedings. Portions of the
land in controversy were assigned to
persons or entities who had presented
nothing whatever to prove their ownership
of any part of the land. What was done was
to consider the compromise agreement as
proof of title of the parties taking part
therein, which is a totally unacceptable
proposition.
4. The assent of the Director of
Lands and Forest Development to the
compromise agreement did not and could
not supply the absence of evidence of title
required of the private respondents.
5. As to the informacion posesoria
invoked by the private respondents, it
should be pointed out that under the
Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a
mode of acquiring title to public lands,
subject to 2 conditions: first, the inscription
thereof in the Registry of Property; second,
actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted
possession of the land for 20 years (later
reduced to 10 years); but where, as here,
proof of fulfillment of these conditions is
absent, the infomacion posesoria cannot be
considered as anything more than prima
facie evidence of possession.
6. Finally, it was error to disregard
the Solicitor General in the execution of the
compromise agreement and its submission
to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the
Solicitor General, who is the principal
counsel of the Government; this is the
reason for our holding that “Court orders
and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as
agent of the Solicitor General in land
registration cases, are not binding until they
are actually received by the Solicitor
General.”
ONG V. REPUBLIC
GR NO. 175746 – MARCH 12, 2008 –
REYES
FACTS:
July 1 1999 - Charles Ong (petitioner), in
his behalf and as duly authorized
representative of his brothers, filed an
Application for Registration of Title over Lot
15911 situated in Barangay Anolid,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. They alleged that:
• they are the co-owners of the Lot
15911;
• Lot 15911 is their exclusive
property having acquired the same by
purchase from spouses Tony Bautista &
Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998;
• Lot 15911 is presently
unoccupied; and
• They and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and
peaceful possession of the Lot 15911 in the
concept of owners for more than 30 years.
After due notice and publication, only
Republic of the Philippines (respondent),
represented by the OSG, opposed the
application for registration of title.
Respondent asserted that:
• Neither applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have in OCENPO
of Lot 15911 since June 12, 1945 or earlier
as required by Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as
amended;
• Applicants failed to adduce any
muniment of title to prove their claims;
• The tax declaration appended to
the application does not appear genuine
and merely shows pretended possession of
recent vintage;
• The application was filed beyond
the period allowed under PD 892; and
• Lot 15911 is part of the public
domain which cannot be the subject of
private appropriation.
Trial Court: rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. The pieces of evidence
presented by the applicant indubitably
established sufficient basis to grant the
application for registration.
CA: reversed and set aside TC’s decision.
Petitioner failed to prove that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in
adverse possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, as mandated by Sec. 14 (1) of PD
1529 (Property Registration Decree), since
the tax declaration presented by petitioner
is dated 1971. They also failed to prove that
they actually occupied the subject lot prior
to the filing of the application.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has registrable
ownership over Lot 15911.
HELD: No. Petition is denied. CA decision
is affirmed.
Under Sec. 14 (1) of Property Registration
Decree, as amended, applicants for
registration of title must prove:
(1) that the subject land forms part of
the disposable and alienable land of the
public domain, and
(2) that they have in OCENPO of the
same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
First requisite. There is not dispute that the
subject lot is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. The
Report dated January 17, 2000 of the
Bureau of Lands stated that the subject lot
is within the alienable and disposable zone
as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map 698
and released and classified as such on
November 21, 1927. This finding is,
likewise, embodied in the Report dated
January 7, 1999 of the DENR-CENRO and
the blue print Copy of the plan covering the
subject lot.

Second requisite. However, petitioner failed
to prove that he or his predecessors-in-
interest have been in OCENPO of the
subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The records show that petitioner and his
brothers bought the subject lot from
spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil
on August 24, 1998, who in turn purchased
the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera
and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997.
The latter bought the subject lot from
Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and
Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10,
1979. The earliest tax declaration which
was submitted in evidence was Tax
Declaration No. 25606 issued in 1971 in the
names of spouses Agustin Cacho and
Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations
are not conclusive proof of ownership, they
constitute good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner and a claim of title over
the subject property. Even if we were to
tack petitioners claim of ownership over the
subject lot to that of their alleged
predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin
Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971,
still this would fall short of the required
possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Further, possession alone is not sufficient
to acquire title to alienable lands of the
public domain because the law required
possession and occupation. ‘Possession is
broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words
OCEN, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of a land consists
in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property’
(Republic v. Alconaba).
In the case, it was admitted by petitioner
that neither he nor his brothers occupied
the subject lot after they bought it. No
improvements were made thereon and the
most that they did was to visit the lot on
several occasions.
Lastly, the burden of proof in land
registration cases rests on the application
who must show by clear, positive and
convincing evidence that his alleged
possession and occupation of the land is of
the nature and duration required by law.
Petitioners evidence do not constitute the
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence
necessary in cases of this nature.
REPUBLIC VS ZENAIDA GUINTO-
ALDANA
G.R. NO. 175578 AUGUST 11, 2010
Doctrine: the non-submission, of the
original tracing cloth plan is fatal to the
registration application, since the same is
mandatory in original registration of title.
However, in this case there was
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE because it
was previously transmitted by the Guinto to
LRA in a previous registration case
involving the same properties.
33
Facts:
• In 2002, respondents Zenaida
Guinto-Aldana (Zenaida), together with her
siblings filed with RTC Las Pinas
Application for Registration of Title over 2
pieces of land in Las Pinas These lands,
identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in
Conversion Consolidation Subdivision Plan
1,509 square meters and 4,640 square
meters.
• Respondents professed
themselves to be co-owners of these lots,
having acquired them by succession from
their parents Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and
Lucia Rivera-Guinto (Lucia).
• In support of their application,
respondents submitted to the court the
blueprint of Plan as well as copies of the
technical descriptions of each lot, a
certification from the geodetic engineer and
the pertinent tax declarations, together with
the receipts of payment therefor. Expressly,
they averred that the property’s original
tracing cloth plan had previously been
submitted to the RTC of Las Pinas City.in
connection with the proceedings in LRC
Case, a previous registration case involving
the subject property which, however, had
been dismissed without prejudice.
• Petitioner, through the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas City
opposed the said application.
• Furthermore, Zenaida 61 years
old, declared that she has known that the
subject lots were owned by her family since
she was 5 years old, her grandparents had
lived in the subject lots until the death of her
grandmother in 1961. She implied that
aside from her predecessors there were
other persons, caretakers supposedly, who
had tilled the land and who had lived until
sometime between 1980 and 1990. She
remembered her grandmother having
constructed a house on the property, but
the same had already been destroyed.
Also, sometime in 1970, her family built an
adobe fence around the perimeter of the
lots and later, in the 1990s, they reinforced
it with hollow blocks and concrete after an
inundation caused by the flood. She
claimed that she and her father, Sergio, had
been religious in the payment of real estate
taxes as shown by the tax declarations and
tax receipts which she submitted to the
court and which, following identification,
were forthwith marked in evidence.
• Zenaidas claim of prior, open,
exclusive and continuous possession of the
land was corroborated by Josefina Luna
(Josefina), one of the adjoining lot owners.
Josefina, then 73 years old, strongly
declared that the subject lots were owned
by Zenaidas parents, Sergio Guinto and
Lucia Rivera, since she reached the age of
understanding, and that she had not come
to know of any instance where a third party
had placed a claim on the property. When
asked whether there was anyone residing
in the property and whether there were
improvements made thereon, she said
there was no one residing therein and that
there was nothing standing thereon except
for a nipa hut.
TC Denied application of registration of
Guinto et al.
CA Reversed and Set Aside TC.
Petitioner’s argument/s: under Sec 17 of
P.D. No. 1529, the submission in court of
the original tracing cloth plan of the property
is a mandatory requirement in registration
proceedings in order to establish the exact
identity of the property. Petitioner suggests
that the blueprint of the subdivision plan
submitted by respondents cannot
approximate substantial compliance with
the requirement. Lastly, petitioner attacks
respondents claim of prior possession.
Issue: In the case at bar, does the blueprint
copy of the survey plan suffice for
compliance with the requirement?
R: Yes, it operates as SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE.
In the case at bar, we find that the
submission of the blueprint of Plan together
with the technical description of the
property, operates as SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE with the legal requirement of
ascertaining the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5
applied for registration.
In the instant case, the Guintos do not deny
that only the blueprint copy of the plan of
the subject lands and not the original
tracing cloth plan thereof was submitted to
the court a quo since they had previously
submitted the original tracing cloth plan to
the Land Registration Authority. Likewise,
when the blueprint copy of the plan was
offered in evidence, the oppositor-apellee
did not raise any objection thereto. Such
silence on the part of the Land Registration
[Authority] and the oppositor-appellee can
be deemed as an implied admission that
the original tracing cloth plan and the
blueprint copy thereof are one and the
same, free from all defects and clearly
identify the lands sought to be registered. In
this regard ,the blueprint copy of the plan,
together with its technical descriptions, is
deemed tantamount to substantial
compliance with the requirements of law
On issue of possession: Guinto have been
in possession and occupation of the lands.
It is clear that respondents possession
through their predecessor-in-interest dates
back to as early as 1937. In that year, the
subject property had already been declared
for taxation by Zenaidas father, Sergio, Yet,
it also can be safely inferred that Sergio
and Toribia had declared the land for
taxation even earlier because the 1937 tax
declaration shows that it offsets a previous
tax number.
Land registration proceedings are governed
by the rule that while tax declarations and
realty tax payment are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
are a good indication of possession in the
concept of owner. These documents
constitute at least proof that the holder has
a claim of title over the property, for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only ones

sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property.
Indeed, that respondents herein have been
in possession of the land in the concept of
owner open, continuous, peaceful and
without interference and opposition from the
government or from any private individual
itself makes their right thereto
unquestionably settled and, hence,
deserving of protection under the law.
SC: Petition Denied, CA AFFIRMED.
36. SERRA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 34080 | 22 March 1991
DOCTRINE: The purpose of the
reconstitution of any document, book or
record is to have the same reproduced in
the same form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred.
Reconstitution does not confirm or
adjudicate ownership over the property
covered by the reconstituted title as in
original land registration proceedings
where, in the latter, a writ of possession
may be issued to place the applicant-owner
in possession.
FACTS
1. The Hernaezes filed a petition with then
CFI of Bacolod City for reconstitution of
allegedly lost original certificates of title in
the name of their predecessor-in-interest,
Eleuterio Hernaez covering Lots Nos. 1316,
2685 and 717.
• The petition was supported by a
certification from the Register of Deeds that
no certificates of titles had been issued
covering the properties.
2. The petition was granted and the
Register of Deeds issued reconstituted
OCTs. After the Hernaezes presented a
“declaration of heirship” TCT Nos. T-
51546, T-51547 and T-51548 were issued
in their names.
3. After learning of the above TCTs, The
Serras filed with the Registry of Deeds an
adverse claim against the reconstituted
certificates of title in the name of the
Hernaezes. They also filed a motion for
cancellation of said certificates of title
claiming that they are holders of valid
existing certificates of titles and that they
are in actual possession of the subject
properties since before the war.
• The motion was forwarded to the
CFI of Negros Occidental which denied it
without conducting a formal hearing.
4. The Hernaezes filed a motion praying
that they be placed in possession of the
subject properties, subject to the grant of
their petition for reconstitution. The CFI of
Negros issued the writ of possession, which
was challenged by the Serras before the
CA.
• The CA set aside the writ of
preliminary injunction it previously issued
thereby giving effect to the writ of
possession. It was questioned by the
Serras.
34
5.While the above case was pending, the
Serras filed with the CFI of Negros a case
against Garaygay and SONEDCO Southern
Negros Development Corp. It was alleged
that the Serras owned sugarcanes, which
they entrusted to SONEDCO for milling in
the latter’s sugar central. Now, Garaygay
cut, hauled and milled the sugarcanes with
SONEDCO. The Serras, hence, prayed for
the delivery of sugar quedans covering
several truckloads of sugarcane harvested
by Garaygay, and for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain
SONEDCO from issuing the quedans to
Garaygay. The writ was granted.
6. Garaygay filed a motion to dismiss
claiming that he obtained from the
Hernaezes a contract to harvest and
dispose of the sugar canes produced from
the disputed lots.
7. The Court ordered the consolidation of
the two cases and issued a TRO restraining
the Hernaezes from interfering with the
Serras right of possession of Lots Nos.
1316, 2685 and 717, and directed
Garaygay to return to the Serras the value
of the sugarcanes covered by the sugar
quedans.
ISSUE
1) W/N it is proper to issue a writ of
possession in a reconstituted title.
2) W/N the Serras are bound by the order
granting reconstitution because the
reconstitution proceedings was heard after
notices were sent to alleged boundary
owners and the petition was published in
the Official Gazette.
HELD
1) NO. The issuance of the writ of
possesion in this case was not proper.
Consequently, the lifting of the previously
issued writ of preliminary injunction
resulting in the enforcement of the writ of
possession issued by the trial court and the
dispossession of the Serras of the subject
properties was a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction.
A writ of possesion may be issued in the ff
cases:
(1) In a land registration proceeding (a
proceeding in rem)
(2) In an extrajudicial foreclosure of a realty
mortgage
(3) In a judicial foreclosure of mortgage (a
quasi in rem proceeding – provided that the
mortgagor is in possession of the
mortgaged realty and no third person had
intervened to the foreclosure suit)
(4) In execution sales
In a land registration case, a writ of
possession may be issued only pursuant to
a decree of registration in an original land
registration proceeding against anyone
adversely occupying the land or any portion
thereof during the proceedings up to the
issuance of the decree.
It cannot however, be issued in a petition
for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or
destroyed certificate of title. Reconstitution
does not confirm or adjudicate ownership
over the property covered by the
reconstituted title as in original land
registration proceedings where, in the latter,
a writ of possession may be issued to place
the applicant-owner in possession.
A person who seeks a reconstitution of a
certificate of title over a property he does
not actually possess cannot, by a mere
motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, which is summary in nature,
deprive the actual occupants of possession
thereof. Possession and/or ownership of
the property should be threshed out in a
separate proceeding.
In this case, the Serras were not mere
possessors of the properties covered by the
reconstituted titles. They are possessors
under claim of ownership. Actual
possession under claim of ownership raises
a disputable presumption of ownership. The
true owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of the property, not
summarily through a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
Furthermore, the Serras were holders of
existing certificates of titles to the same
properties covered by the reconstituted
certificates of title of the Hernaezes.
2) NO. The Serras in this case, who were in
actual possession of the properties, were
not notified.
In petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual
owners and possessors of the lands
involved must be duly served with actual
and personal notice of the petition.
REPUBLIC VS. NILLAS
G.R. No. 159595, January 23, 2007
Doctrine: The Republic observes that the
Property Registration Decree (PD No.
1529) does not contain any provision on
execution of final judgments; hence, the
application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite
the contrary, it is precisely because PD No.
1529 does not specifically provide for
execution of judgments in the sense
ordinarily understood and applied in civil
cases, the reason being there is no need
for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of
execution in order to obtain the title, that
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is not applicable to land
registration cases in the first place.
Facts:
• On 10 April 1997, respondent
Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition
for Revival of Judgment with the RTC of
Dumaguete City.
• It was alleged therein that on 17
July 1941, the then CFI of Negros Oriental
rendered a Decision Adicional in
Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as
El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban
Abingayan y Otros.
o In the decision, the CFI
adjudicated several lots, together with the
improvements thereon, in favor of named
oppositors who had established their title

and their continuous possession thereof
since time immemorial and ordered the
Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, upon the finality to issue the decree
of registration.
o Among these lots was Lot No.
771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which was
adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion
(married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia
Calingacion, both residents of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental.
o Nillas further alleged that her
parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra,
eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its
entirety.
• By way of a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia
Calingacion sold her undivided one-half
(1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses
Abierra, the parents of Nillas.
• On the other hand, the one-half
(1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia
Calingacion was also acquired by the
Spouses Abierra through various purchases
they effected from the heirs of Eugenia
between the years 1975 to 1982.
• In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No.
771 from her parents through a Deed of
Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994.
• Despite these multiple transfers,
and the fact that the Abierra spouses have
been in open and continuous possession of
the subject property since the 1977 sale, no
decree of registration has ever been issued
over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the
1941 CFI Decision.
• Thus, Nillas sought the revival of
the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration for Lot
No. 771.
• The records do not precisely
reveal why the decree was not issued by
the Director of Lands, though it does not
escape attention that the 1941 Decision
was rendered a few months before the
commencement of the Japanese invasion
of the Philippines in December of 1941.
• No responsive pleading was filed
by the OSG, although it entered its
appearance on 13 May 1997 and
simultaneously deputized the City
Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear
whenever the case was set for hearing and
in all subsequent proceedings.
• Trial on the merits ensued. The
RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and
received her documentary evidence. No
evidence was apparently presented by the
OSG.
RTC= Found merit in the petition for revival
of judgment, and ordered the revival of the
1941 Decision, as well as directing the
Commissioner of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding
decree of confirmation and registration
based on the 1941 Decision.
CA= Denied Appeal of OSG. CA said that
Section 6, Rule 39 of ROC which impose a
prescriptive period for enforcement of
judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil
actions and not to special proceedings such
as land registration cases. The Court of
Appeals also noted that it would have been
especially onerous to require Nillas to first
request the LRA to comply with the 1941
35
decision considering that it had been
established that the original records in the
1941 case had already been destroyed and
could no longer be reconstructed.
Issue: WON prescription or laches may bar
a petition to revive a judgment in a land
registration case. (NO.)
Held:
• The most extensive explanation
of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v.
Menla, decided in 1961, wherein the Court
refuted an argument that a decision
rendered in a land registration case wherein
the decree of registration remained
unissued after 26 years was already final
and enforceable. The Court, through
Justice Labrador, explained:
o We fail to understand the
arguments of the appellant in support of the
assignment [of error], except insofar as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a
land registration case has become final, it
may not be enforced after the lapse of a
period of 10 years, except by another
proceeding to enforce the judgment or
decision. Authority for this theory is the
provision in the Rules of Court to the effect
that judgment may be enforced within 5
years by motion, and after five years but
within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule
39). This provision of the Rules refers to
civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration
case. This is so because a party in a civil
action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to
enforce the same within a reasonable time
as provided in the Rules makes the
decision unenforceable against the losing
party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose
is to establish a status, condition or fact; in
land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
sought to be established. After the
ownership has been proved and confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or
losing party had been in possession of the
land and the winning party desires to oust
him therefrom.
o Furthermore, there is no
provision in the Land Registration Act
similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the
execution of a judgment in a civil action,
except the proceedings to place the winner
in possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal. x x x
o x x x x There is nothing in the law
that limits the period within which the court
may order or issue a decree. The reason is
xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory
in character and does not need to be
asserted or enforced against the adverse
party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the
judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the
clerk to issue the decree for the reason that
no motion therefor has been filed can not
prejudice the owner, or the person in whom
the land is ordered to be registered.
• Within the last 20 years, the Sta.
Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the
rules on prescription and laches to land
registration cases has been repeatedly
affirmed.Apart from the three (3) cases
mentioned earlier, the Sta. Ana doctrine
was reiterated in another three (3) more
cases later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v.
Albano, Cacho v. Court of Appeals, and
Paderes v. Court of Appeals. The doctrine
of stare decisis compels respect for settled
jurisprudence, especially absent any
compelling argument to do otherwise.
Indeed, the apparent strategy employed by
the Republic in its present petition is to
feign that the doctrine and the cases that
spawned and educed it never existed at all.
Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of
Court, which provides for the five (5)-year
prescriptive period for execution of
judgments, is applicable to land registration
cases either by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and
convenient. The Republic further observes
that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has
no provision on execution of final
judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should
apply to land registration proceedings.
• We affirm Sta. Ana not out of
simple reflex, but because we recognize
that the principle enunciated therein offers a
convincing refutation of the current
arguments of the Republic.
o Rule 39, as invoked by the
Republic, applies only to ordinary civil
actions, not to other or extraordinary
proceedings not expressly governed by the
Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other
specific law or legal modality such as land
registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil
actions governed by the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the intent of land registration
proceedings is to establish ownership by a
person of a parcel of land, consistent with
the purpose of such extraordinary
proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a
status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the
finality of a decision adjudicating such
ownership, no further step is required to
effectuate the decision and a ministerial
duty exists alike on the part of the land
registration court to order the issuance of,
and the LRA to issue, the decree of
registration.
o The Republic observes that the
Property Registration Decree (PD No.
1529) does not contain any provision on
execution of final judgments; hence, the
application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite
the contrary, it is precisely because PD No.
1529 does not specifically provide for
execution of judgments in the sense
ordinarily understood and applied in civil
cases, the reason being there is no need
for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of
execution in order to obtain the title, that
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is not applicable to land
registration cases in the first place.

• The provision lays down the
procedure that interposes between the
rendition of the judgment and the issuance
of the certificate of title. No obligation
whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on
the prevailing applicant or oppositor even
as a precondition to the issuance of the
title. The obligations provided in the Section
are levied on the land court (that is to issue
an order directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue in turn the
corresponding decree of registration), its
clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of
the judgment and the order to the
Commissioner), and the Land Registration
Commissioner (that is to cause the
preparation of the decree of registration and
the transmittal thereof to the Register of
Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial
on the officers charged with their
performance and thus generally beyond
discretion of amendment or review
• The failure on the part of the
administrative authorities to do their part in
the issuance of the decree of registration
cannot oust the prevailing party from
ownership of the land. Neither the failure of
such applicant to follow up with said
authorities can. The ultimate goal of our
land registration system is geared towards
the final and definitive determination of real
property ownership in the country, and the
imposition of an additional burden on the
owner after the judgment in the land
registration case had attained finality would
simply frustrate such goal.
• Clearly, the peculiar procedure
provided in the Property Registration Law
from the time decisions in land registration
cases become final is complete in itself and
does not need to be filled in. From another
perspective, the judgment does not have to
be executed by motion or enforced by
action within the purview of Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Following these premises, it can
even be posited that in theory, there would
have been no need for Nillas, or others
under similar circumstances, to file a
petition for revival of judgment, since revival
of judgments is a procedure derived from
civil procedure and proceeds from the
assumption that the judgment is susceptible
to prescription. The primary recourse need
not be with the courts, but with the LRA,
with whom the duty to issue the decree of
registration remains. If it is sufficiently
established before that body that there is an
authentic standing judgment or order from a
land registration court that remains
unimplemented, then there should be no
impediment to the issuance of the decree of
registration. However, the Court sees the
practical value of necessitating judicial
recourse if a significant number of years
has passed since the promulgation of the
land court's unimplemented decision or
order, as in this case. Even though
prescription should not be a cause to bar
the issuance of the decree of registration, a
judicial evaluation would allow for a
thorough examination of the veracity of the
judgment or order sought to be effected, or
a determination of causes other than
prescription or laches that might preclude
the issuance of the decree of registration.
36
• What about the two cases cited the property appearing in the Manotok
by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of titles, the latter’s property indeed
Lopez? Even though the Court applied the encroached on the property described in
doctrines of prescription and laches in CLT’s title. CA affirmed the decision of the
those cases, it should be observed that trial court.
neither case was intended to overturn the
Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any Petition 2:
express declaration to such effect. 1) Dimson filed with the then CFI a
Moreover, both cases were governed by complaint for recovery of possession and
their unique set of facts, quite distinct from damages against Araneta Institute of
the general situation that marked both Sta. Agriculture, Inc.
Ana and the present case. a) Dimson alleged that he was the
absolute owner of part of the Maysilo Estate
in Malabon covered by TCT No. R-15169 of
SC = Petition DENIED.
the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan.
38) MANOTOK REALTY, INC. VS. CLT
b) Araneta for its part admitted
REALTY DEVELOPMENT
occupancy of the disputed land. It was
CORPORATION (2007)
alleged that Dimson’s title to the subject
TOPIC: GRANT OF TITLE – PROCEDURE
land was void and hence he had no cause
of action.
DOCTRINE:
2) Trial Court and CA: The trial court
FACTS:
ruled for Dimson. The Court of Appeals
2 petitions involve properties covered by
affirmed the lower court’s decision.
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994
which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares
Both petitions involved interrelated
of the Maysilo Estate. The tract of land
challenges against the validity of the
stretches over three (3) cities, comprising
parties’ separate titles to portions of the
an area larger than the sovereign states of
greater Maysilo Estate, they were thus
Monaco and the Vatican. Despite their
consolidated, and the Republic of the
prime location within
Philippines sought and was allowed
Metropolitan Manila, the properties included
intervention in these cases.
in OCT No. 994 have been beset by
controversy and fraud.
ISSUE: WON the titles issued in the name
Petition 1:
of Dimson and of CLT are valid.
1) CLT Realty Development
Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from
(1) Manotok Realty, Inc. and (2) Manotok
HELD: The instant cases are REMANDED
Estate Corporation the possession of Lot 26
to the Special Division of the Court of
of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed
Appeals for further proceedings.
before the RTC.
a) CLT’s claim was anchored on
EXISTENCE OF OCT NO. 994
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
177013 issued in its name, which title in
There was an error in the MWSS v. Court of
turn was derived from Estelita Hipolito
Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals
(Hipolito) by virtue of a Deed of Sale with
decisions, which confirmed validity of OCT
Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 December
No. 994 dated 17 April 1917.
1988. Hipolito’s title emanated from Jose
Dimson’s (Dimson) TCT No. R-15169, a
The Court, through this case, is able to
title issued pursuant to an order of the CFI
make the following conclusions:
of Caloocan City. Dimson’s title was
allegedly sourced from OCT No. 994 dated
1) First, there is only one OCT No.
17 April 1917.
994. As it appears on the record, that
“mother title” was received for transcription
b) The Manotoks challenged the
by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917,
validity of the title relied on by CLT,
and that should be the date which should
claiming that Dimson’s title, the proximate
be reckoned as the date of registration of
source of CLT’s title, was irregularly issued
the title.
and, hence, void. The Manotoks asserted
their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed
2) Second. Any title that traces its
that they derived it from several awardees
source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917
and/or vendees of the National Housing
is void, for such mother title is inexistent.
Authority. The Manotok title likewise traced
as its primary source OCT No. 994.
a) The fact that the Dimson and
CLT titles made specific reference to an
2) Trial court and CA: It was
OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts
established that the entire Maysilo Estate
doubt on the validity of such titles since
was registered under Act No. 496 by virtue
they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error
of which OCT No. 994 was issued by the
alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the
Register of Deeds of Rizal that Lot 26 was
Dimson and CLT claims over the subject
transferred to CLT by Hipolito whose title
property if singular reliance is placed by
was derived from the Dimson title and that
them on the dates appearing on their
on the basis of the technical descriptions of
respective titles.

b) Considering that CLT and the
Dimsons clearly failed to meet the burden
of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the
action for annulment of title and recovery of
possession, there is a case to be made for
ordering the dismissal of their original
complaints before the trial court. However,
such solution may not satisfactorily put to
rest the controversy surrounding the
Maysilo Estate, as such the instant cases
are remanded to the Special Division of the
CA for further proceedings.
DISCUSSION RE: DISSENTING OPINION
1) The dissent is hard-pressed in
defending the so-called 19 April 1917 OCT
from which the Dimson and CLT titles are
sourced. The dissent’s focus is placed on
the purported flaws of the titles held by the
Manotoks and Araneta notwithstanding that
said parties were the defendants before the
lower court and, therefore, the burden of
proof did not lie on them.
a) The established legal principle in
actions for annulment or reconveyance of
title is that a party seeking it should
establish not merely by a preponderance of
evidence but by clear and convincing
evidence that the land sought to be
reconveyed is his. In an action to recover,
the property must be identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title
and not on the weakness of the defendant’s
claim.
2) It is also the theory of the dissent
that there are 2 competing sources of title:
a) OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917
arising from the issuance of Decree No.
36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429;
and
b) OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917
based on the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan
City in Cadastral Case No. 34.
3) It is further opined that the registration of
lands pursuant to Cadastral Case No. 34,
even if the date of such registration is 3
May 1917, is void since such registration
could not supplant the earlier decision of
the land registration court.
a) The supposition blatantly runs
counter to long-established principles in
land cases. The reality that cadastral courts
may have jurisdiction over lands already
registered in ordinary land registration
cases was acknowledged by this Court in
Pamintuan v. San Agustin.
b) Such jurisdiction is limited to: the
necessary correction of technical errors in
the description of the lands, provided such
corrections do not impair the substantial
rights of the registered owner, and that
such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive
a registered owner of his title.
c) It was further clarified in Timbol v.
Diaz that the limited jurisdiction of the
cadastral court over such lands even
extends to the determination of “which one
37
of the several conflicting registered titles Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994
shall prevail[, as such power would seem to dated 3 May 1917
be necessary for a complete settlement of
the title to the land, the express purpose of
HELD and RATIO:
cadastral proceedings, and must therefore
 The titles of Dimson and CLT
be considered to be within the jurisdiction of
were declared void ofor being derived from
the court in such proceedings.”
an inexistent title
- OCT No. 994 to begin with was
4) What is prohibited in a cadastral
already declared inexistent, thus having no
proceeding are:
basis on whose title was it
a) The registration of land, already issued in
- Heirs of Dimson offered no
the name of another, divesting the
explanation as to why their titles reflect the
registered owner of the title already issued
erroneous date of April 19, 1917, which,
in his favor;
according to CLT, was just a typographical
b) The making of such changes in the title
error.
as to impair his substantial rights.
- Dimson’s title was nullified
because of their reliance on previous
39. MANOTOK REALTY INC. VS. CLT
Orders which were in fact not signed by the
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Judge or was not an LRC case but rather,
G.R. NO. 123346, MARCH 31, 2009
just an ordinary civil case.
- Regarding CLT’s title and as to
FACTS:
why it was nullified, the Court said that
- There are two cases stemming
since CLT traced its title from Dimson’s
from this decision by the Supreme Court
claims, it altogether invalidates the claims
- In Dimson vs. Araneta:
of all persons seeking to derive ownership
o Jose Dimson filed a complaint for
from it.
recovery of possession of land and of
o CLT’s title carried with it
damages against Araneta Institute of
annotations identical to those of Dimson
Agriculture. Dimson alleged among others,
and included defects in Dimson’s title, and
that he was the absolute owner of a 50-
the fact that typographical errors were not
hectare land
at anytime cured by subsequent
o Eventually, Dimson sold the
compliance with administrative
property to Virgilio Enriquez. It was
requirements or subject to administrative
discovered thereafter that Araneta was
correction altogether strengthens the
occupying the property who built thereon an
invalidity of CLT’s title
“agricultural school house”
 Araneta’s title was VALID
o Araneta says it has been in
- Araneta’s predecessor-in-interest
possession of the land since 1974,
was Jose Ma. Rato who was one of the co-
presenting certifications from the Land
heirs in OCT no. 994. He was allotted a
Registration Commission, which stated that
share in the Maysilo Estate. The issued
the subject lands are named under Araneta
TCT covered 5 subdivided lots. After further
o RTC decided in favor of Dimson;
subdividing the property, another TCT was
CA affirmed the RTC decision
provided unto Rato. In all the certificates of
- In CLT vs. Manotok
title including the one passed to Araneta, it
o CLT alleges in its complaint that it
maintained the designation of the lot as
is the owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate
belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3,
in Caloocan, a DERIVATIVE of the earlier
which retained its identity
Lot in Dimson vs. Araneta
 What is actually issued by the
o CLT averred that it had acquired
register of deeds is the certificate of title
Lot 26 from its former owner, Hipolito.
itself, not the decree of registration, as he is
Hipoloto’s title was a direct transfer from
precisely the recipient from the land
Dimson, who got its title by virtue of the
registration office of the decree for
court order from 1966
transcription to the certificate as well as the
o On the other hand, Manotok
transcriber no less.
claims that the validity of their titles came
- Since what is now acknowledged
from the derivatives of OCT No. 994
as the authentic OCT No. 994 indicates that
o The properties covered by the
it was received for transcription by the
titles were expropriated by the Republic,
Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917,
which were later on subdivided by the NHA
it is that date that is the date of registration
into 77 lots and sold to qualified vendees
since that was when he was able to
o RTC ruled in favor of CLT, CA
transcribe the decree in the registration
affirmed the RTC, SC affirmed the RTC and
book, such entry made in the book being
CA (2005 decision)
the original certificate of title.
o However, the SC reversed its
- Moreover, it is only after the
earlier decision and stated in its 2007
transcription of the decree by the register of
decision that OCT no. 994 should be
deeds that the certificate of title is to take
invalidated, which was the basis of Dimson.
effect
It held that such OCT No. 994 was
- A decree of registration is an
inexistent
order issued under the signature of the
o The Special Proceedings before
Commissioner of Land Registration in the
the Special Division gave the Heirs of
name of the Judge to the fact that the land
Dimson and CLT the chance to prove the
described therein is registered in the name
validity of their claims on the title
of the applicant or oppositor or claimant as
ISSUE:  Which of the contending parties
the case maybe. When this is transcribed or
are able to trace back their claims to
spread in toto in the registration book and

signed by the register of deeds, the page
on which the transcription is made become
the “original certificate of title,” more
commonly called the Torrens title.
- The land becomes a registered
land only upon the transcription of the
decree in the original registration book by
the register of deeds, the date and time of
such transcription being set forth in the
process and certified to at the foot of each
entry or certificate of title.
- The issuance of the original and
owner’s duplicate certificates are basic for
the valid existence of the title. Issuance of
additional copies are permissive and their
non-existence does not affect the status of
title. A certificate of title is deemed as
regularly issued with the issuance of the
original copy and owner’s duplicate.
40. ROSALES VS. BURGOS
577 SCRA 264 | January 30, 2009 |
Leonardo-De Castro, J
TOPIC: Procedure
DOCTRINE: An innocent purchaser for
value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in it, and
who pays a full and fair price at the time of
the purchase or before receiving any notice
of another person’s claim. The burden of
proving the status of a purchaser in good
faith and for value lies upon one who
asserts that status. This onus probandi
cannot be discharged by mere invocation of
the ordinary presumption of good faith.
FACTS
5. Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe
(ADORACION) and her husband Angel
(ANGEL) acquired the parcel of land
subject to this case. Petitioners Alfredo and
Rodrigo are their children. (Petitioners shall
be hereinafter referred as THE RUFLOES)
6. 1974: Angel died.
7. 1978: Respondent Elvira Delos
Reyes (DELOS REYES) forged the
signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a
Deed of Sale to make it appear that they
sold the subject land to her. She obtained a
TCT in her name.
8. 1979: Thus, the Rufloes filed a
complaint for damages against Delos
Reyes with the RTC. They also filed a
notice of adverse claim.
9. 1984: During the pendency of the
case against Delos Reyes, the latter sold
the land to respondent siblings Anita,
Angelina, Angelito and Amy (BURGOS
SIBLINGS). A TCT was issued in their
names.
10. 1985: The Burgos siblings sold
the land to their aunt Leonarda
(LEONARDA) but this sale was not
registered and thus no title was issued in
her name.
11. 1989: The RTC declared that the
Deed of Sale in favor of Delos Reyes was
falsified and ruled that she never acquired
ownership over the property.
12. 1990: The Rufloes filed their
complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Contract and Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Titles against respondents
38
Leonarda and the Burgos siblings, and
Delos Reyes. They alleged that inasmuch
as the Deed of Sale in favor of Delos Reyes
was falsified, no valid title was ever
conveyed to the Burgos siblings.
Furthermore, the Burgos siblings executed
a simulated deed of sale in favor of
Leonarda knowing fully well that their title
was a nullity.
13. Respondents maintained that
they bought the property in good faith after
they were shown a genuine copy of the title
of the disputed property by Delos Reyes.
They also insisted that they were innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value.
14. The RTC declared that Leonarda
and the Burgos siblings were not innocent
purchasers for value and directed the RoD
to reinstate the title of the Sps. Rufloe.
15. The CA however reversed the
RTC decision, declaring that Leonarda and
the Burgos siblings were purchasers in
good faith and for value.
16. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Leonarda and the Burgos
siblings were innocent purchasers in good
faith and for value despite the forged deed
of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes.
HELD: NO.
Innocent Purchaser Defined
3. It has been consistently ruled that
a forged deed can legally be the root of a
valid title when an innocent purchaser for
value intervenes.
[Read DOCTRINE].
4. As a general rule, every person
dealing with registered land, as in this case,
may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and will in
no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the
property.
However, this rule admits of an
unchallenged exception: a person dealing
with registered land has a right to rely on
the Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further
except when the party has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such inquiry or when the purchaser
has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title
in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce
a reasonably prudent man to inquire into
the status of the title of the property in
litigation.
The presence of anything which excites or
arouses suspicion should then prompt the
vendee to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing
on the face of said certificate. One who falls
within the exception can neither be
denominated an innocent purchaser for
value nor a purchaser in good faith and,
hence, does not merit the protection of the
law.
Notice of Adverse Claim
5. In this case, the Rufloes caused
a notice of adverse claim to be annotated
on the title of Delos Reyes in 1979.
The annotation of an adverse claim is a
measure designed to protect the interest of
a person over a piece of real property, and
serves as a notice and warning to third
parties dealing with said property that
someone is claiming an interest on the
same or may have a better right than the
registered owner thereof.
Despite the notice of adverse claim, the
Burgos siblings still purchased the property
in question.
Pending Cases
6. Also, at the time the Burgos
siblings bought the subject property, an
action for damages and a criminal case for
estafa against Delos Reyes was pending
before the RTC. This circumstance should
have alerted the Burgos siblings as to the
validity of Delos Reyes’ title and her
authority and legal right to sell the property.
Lack of Possession by Seller
7. Equally significant is the fact that
Delos Reyes was not in possession of the
subject property when she sold the same to
the Burgos siblings. None of them exerted
any effort to personally verify with the
Register of Deeds if Delos Reyes’
certificate of title was clean and authentic.
They merely relied on the title as shown to
them by the real estate broker.
In the same vein, Leonarda cannot be
categorized as a purchaser in good faith.
Since it was the Rufloes who continued to
have actual possession of the property,
Leonarda should have investigated the
nature of their possession.
Simulated Sale
8. Importantly the sale, which
occurred between Leonarda and the
Burgos siblings, was simply a scheme
designed to cleanse the title passed on to
them by the forger Delos Reyes.
Respondents had to resort to this strategy
because they were fully aware that their
title, having originated from the forged deed
of sale of Delos Reyes, was not a clean and
valid title.
Patently, the Burgos siblings were not
innocent purchasers for value and the
simulated sale to Leonarda did not remove
the defect in their title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The CA decision is REVERSED and the
RTC decision is REVIVED.
41. PAJOMAYO V. MANIPON
G.R. No. L-33676
June 30, 1971
FACTS:
On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs (the
Pajomayos) filed in the CFI of Pangasinan
a complaint alleging that they are owners
pro-indiviso of the parcel of land which is
covered by OCT No. 1089 in the name of
Diego Pajomayo. They claim that they had

acquired the land as an inheritance from
their late father Diego Pajomayo; that they
and their predecessor-in-interest had been
in OCENCO for a period of more than 70
years until the early part of the year 1956
when the defendants dispossessed them of
said property, resulting in their having
suffered annual damages amounting to
around P1,100.00 representing the value of
the crops of rice; mongo, corn and
vegetables that they failed to harvest.
The defendants on the other hand alleged
that they are the exclusive owners of the
land covered by OCT No. 14043. The said
land having been adjudicated to them in a
cadastral proceedings of the Malasique
cadastre. The defendants claim they had
acquired the land by inheritance from their
deceased father Pioquinto Manipon. As
affirmative defenses, the defendants allege
that plaintiffs' action is barred by res-
judicata.
When the case was called for trial it waThat
parties agree that the land in question is
covered by two Certificates of Title, one in
the name of Diego Pajomayo (OCT No.
1089), issued under Free Patent; and one
in the name of the Defendant Rodrigo
Manipon ( OCT No. 14034), issued in
Cadastral Case of Malasique Cadastre.
CFI: made a finding that OCT No. 1089
held by the plaintiffs was issued earlier than
OCT No. 14034 held by the defendants.
Hence it ordered the defendants to vacate
the land and for the Register of Deeds to
cancel the OCT of the defendants.
ISSUES:
1. WON Pajomayo’s title should prevail
over the defendant’s title. - YES
HELD:
Necessarily when one of the two titles is
held to be superior over the other, one
should be declared null and void and
should be ordered cancelled. And if a party
is declared to be the owner of a parcel of
land pursuant to a valid certificate of title
said party is entitled to the possession of
the land covered by said valid title.
Contrary to the claim of defendants, the
doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied in
their favor in the present case.
The undisputed fact is that the plaintiffs
base their claim of title to the land in
question on OCT No. 1089 issued to their
father, Diego Pajomayo, in 1931 in virtue of
a free patent that was granted to him. The
law requires that the homestead patent
must be registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds of the province where
the land covered by the patent lies.
It has been ruled by this Court that once a
homestead patent granted in accordance
with the Public Land Act, the certificate of
title issued in virtue of said patent has the
force and effect of a Torrens Title. In the
cage of Aquino vs. Director of Lands, this
Court held:
The procedure under the Land Registration
Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI
of the Public Land Law are the same in that
both are against the whole world, both take
the nature of judicial proceedings, and for
both the decree of registration issued is
conclusive and final.
In the case of Lahora, et al. vs.
Dayanghirang, et al.,, held:
39
Where land is granted by the government to
a private individual, the corresponding
patent therefor is recorded, and the
certificate of title is issued to the grantee;
thereafter, the land is automatically brought
within the operation of the Land
Registration Act, the title issued to the
grantee becoming entitled to all the
safeguards provided in Section 38 of said
Act. In other words, upon the expiration of
one year from its issuance, the certificate of
title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible
like a certificate issued in a registration
proceeding.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that
where two certificates of title are issued to
different persons covering the same land in
whole or in part, the earlier in date must
prevail as between the original parties, and
in case of successive registration where,
more than one certificate is issued over the
land the person holding under the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against
the person who relies on the second
certificate.
Here, Pajomayo OCT was issued in Nov.
27, 1931 and Manipon OCT wsa only
issued in April 1, 1957.
Hence Pajomayo OCT, and TCT of his
children (herein plaintiffs) thereafter
prevails.
FILESTATE MANAGEMENT, INC. VS.
TRONO
G.R. No. 130871. February 17, 2006.
Doctrine: A decree of registration that has
become final shall be deemed conclusive
not only on the questions actually contested
and determined, but also upon all matters
that might be litigated or decided in the land
registration proceedings.
Issues:
1. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction
over respondents’ application for
registration of a parcel of land. YES.
2. Whether respondents’ application for
registration (LRC Case No. M228) is a
collateral attack against petitioners’ land
titles. YES AND IS NOT PERMITTED
UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF
INDEFEASIBILITY OF A TORRENS TITLE.
Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of
the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Facts:
1. On November 9, 1994, George,
Ma. Teresa, Edgardo, Ma. Virginia, Jesse,
Ma. Cristina, Inocencio, Jr., Carmen, and
Zenaida, all surnamed Trono, herein
respondents, filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 255, Las Piñas City, an
application for registration of a parcel of
land, docketed as LRC Case No. M228.
The land is located at Bo. Almanza, Las
Piñas City, Metro Manila consisting of
245,536 square meters.
2. Mr. Salvador L. Oriel, Chief of the
Docket Division, Land Registration
Authority (LRA), issued a Notice of Initial
Hearing, stating, among others, that:
NOTE: This lot is covered portion of Lot
2271 that which is overlapped by Lot 10,
Psu-80886 Lot 2276, that which is
overlapped by Lot 2, Psu-56007 which is
also Lot 6, Psu-80886; Lot 2270, portion of
that which is overlapped by Lot 7, Psu5-
6007 and the whole Lot 8, Psu56007.
3. On August 11, 1995, the above-
named petitioners filed their opposition to
LRC Case No. M228 alleging that as per
Survey Plan Psu31086, respondents’
property partly overlaps their lot. As early
as April 28, 1989, this lot was registered in
their names under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T9182 of the Registry of
Deeds of Las Piñas City.
4. Earlier, or on July 25, 1995,
Ayala Land, Inc. (Ayala Land) also filed an
opposition to respondents’ application for
registration anchored on the ground that the
land applied for overlaps the parcels of land
covered by TCTs registered in its name in
the Registry of Deeds, same city.
5. During the hearing, respondents
presented the July 24, 1995 Report of the
LRA and the Survey Report of the Land
Management Services, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources,
showing that the land they sought to
register under Plan Psu-31086 overlaps the
property already registered in the names of
petitioners.
6. Thereafter, petitioners and Ayala
Land filed their respective motions to
dismiss respondents’ application for
registration on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. They claimed that “since the
property was previously Torrens registered
in their names, the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
proceedings.”
7. On March 4, 1996, the trial court
issued a Resolution denying the motions to
dismiss, holding that the Regional Trial
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
all applications for original registration of
title to lands. Petitioners then filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
8. CA granted the petition for
certiorari, holding that: “The
incontrovertibility of a title prevents a land
registration court from acquiring jurisdiction
over a land that is applied for registration if
that land is already decreed and registered
under the Torrens System.”
9. Petitioners then filed their motion
for partial reconsideration praying that LRC
Case No. M228 be dismissed with prejudice
and to declare that the right of respondents
to file any action for reconveyance of the
property has prescribed.
10. Meanwhile, on July 9, 1997,
Ayala Land and respondents executed a
Compromise Agreement. On July 10, 1997,
they filed with the Court of Appeals a
“Motion for Judgment Based on
Compromise Agreement.”
11. On July 25, 1997, the Court of
Appeals rendered an Amendatory Decision,
holding that in view of the Compromise
Agreement, the case as between Ayala
Land and respondents has become moot
and academic. In a Resolution dated
September 5, 1997, the Appellate Court
denied petitioners’ motion for partial
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.
Rule:
1. Section 2 of Presidential Decree (PD)
1529 partly provides:
Sec. 2. Nature of registration proceedings;
jurisdiction of courts.— Judicial proceedings
for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem, and shall be
based on the generally accepted principles
underlying the Torrens System. Courts of
First Instance shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and
over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. x x x
Pursuant to the above provisions, the
Regional Trial Court
(formerly Court of First Instance) has the
authority to act,
not only on applications for original
registration of title to
land, but also on all petitions filed after the
original registration of title. Thus, it has the
authority and power to hear and determine
all questions arising from such applications
or petitions.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in
ruling that the Regional Trial Court, Branch
255, Las Piñas City has no jurisdiction over
LRC Case No. M228 on the ground that the
land subject of respondents’ application for
registration was already registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
2. Section 48 of PD 1529 provides: Sec. 48.
Certificate not subject to collateral attack.—
A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
Respondents’ application for registration of
a parcel of land already covered by a
Torrens title is actually a collateral attack
against petitioners’ title not permitted under
the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens
title. It is well settled that a Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked; the issue on
the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was
fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an
action expressly instituted for the purpose.
Hence, whether or not respondents have
the right to claim title over the property in
question is beyond the province of the
instant proceeding. That should be
threshed out in a proper action. It has been
invariably stated that the real purpose of the
Torrens System is to quiet title to land and
to stop forever any question as to its
legality. Once a title is registered, the owner
may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting
on the “mirador su casa” to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
A decree of registration that has become
final shall be deemed conclusive not only
on the questions actually contested and
determined, but also upon all matters that
40
might be litigated or decided in the land
registration proceedings.
As per records of the Registry of Deeds of
Las Piñas City, TCT No. T9182 was
registered in petitioners’ name
as early as April 28, 1989, or five (5) years
before the filing of respondents’ application
for registration. Thus, it is too late for them
(respondents) to question petitioners’ titles
considering that the Certificates of Title
issued to the latter have become
incontrovertible after the lapse of one year
from the decree of registration.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.
R. SP No. 40263 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents’ application for
registration of land in LRC Case No. M228
pending before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 255, Las Piñas City is ordered
DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
BAUTISTA-BORJA V BAUTISTA
G.R. no. 136197 | December 10, 2008
Facts:
1. The Spouses Pablo Bautista and
Segundina Tadiaman Bautista died
intestate. Pablo was the registered owner of
several agricultural lands situated in
Ramon, Isabela totaling 30 hectares, and in
Llanera, Nueva Ecija totaling 17 hectares.
They begot 5 children, namely: Iluminada,
Aurea, Francisco, Simplicio, and Natividad.
2. Natividad claims that
respondents Iluminada, Aurea, Simplicio
(survived by heirs) and Francisco (survived
by heirs) convinced her to take possession
and cultivate the above-stated parcels of
land which would eventually be partitioned;
that unknown to her, the titles were
cancelled by virtue of Deeds of Sale
purportedly executed on different dates by
her parents in favor of her siblings Simplicio
and Francisco – which she knew only in
1994.
3. June 9, 1994: Thus, she filed a
complaint for annulment of the deeds of
sale and/or partition of properties before the
RTC, alleging that the deeds of sale are
either forgeries or falsifications conferring
no valid and legal right to transferees.
4. RTC, acting on respondents’
MTD anchored on prescription and lack of
cause of action, dismissed the complaint,
holding that Natividad’s complaint, though
denominated as annulment of sale, was
based on an obligation conferred by law
(implied trust) and thus it had prescribed
having been filed 20 years after implied
trust commenced (based on Art. 1456 &
1144) . Her cause of action also prescribed
as actions for reconveyance based on
implied trust prescribes in 10 years.
5. Natividad went up to CA,
contending that nature of her complaint was
one for annulment of void contracts thus
imprescriptible.
6. CA affirmed RTC decision,
further stating that she was guilty of laches,
and assuming that transfer was procured
through fraud, her action should have been
filed within 4 years from discovery of the
fraud.
7. Natividad now insists that since
her cause of action is for annulment of
inexistent contracts, her cause of action
had not prescribed (based on Art. 1390,
1391 & 1410) . Even if there was implied
trust, her cause of action has not prescribed
because it is anchored on the annulment of
a void or inexistent contract. It at all a
resulting trust (not constructive trust) was
established, as she only gave her consent
to respondents upon representation that
they would take possession of properties
with understanding that it would later be
partitioned among them, the
imprescriptibility of actions to recover
property held in trust apply to resulting
trusts so long as the trustee has not
repudiated the trust.
8. Furthermore, she also contends
that the continued assurances of
respondents that partition proceedings were
just dragging on despite their having
transferred titles in their names is a clear
indication that they have not repudiated the
resulting trust and that registration of land
under Torrens system is not equivalent to a
notice of repudiation.
9. As for support that her parents
never executed the Deed of Sale, she
submitted affidavits of Iluminada and Aurea
averring that during their lifetime, their
parents could not have sold the properties
to their brothers and signed deeds as they
were illiterate.
Issue/s: W/N Natividad’s cause of action
had already prescribed -- NO
Held: It is clear that the action is one for
declaration of nullity of Deed of Sale which
Natividad claims to be either falsified
(because Pablo was already ill and
bedridden at the time of execution so he
could not have appeared before Notary
Public or understood) or no consideration.
Thus, based on Article 1410 of the Civil
Code , Natividad’s action is imprescriptible.
Even if her complaint were taken as one for
reconveyance, it is also imprescriptible.
Thus, if the trial court finds that the deed of
sale is void, then the action for the
declaration of the contracts nullity is
imprescriptible. Indeed, the Court has held
in a number of cases that an action for
reconveyance of property based on a void
contract does not prescribe. However, if the
trial court finds that the deed of sale is
merely voidable, then the action would have
already prescribed.
Since the complaint on its face does not
indicate that the action has prescribed, the
court in Pineda v Heirs of Guevarra held
that an allegation of prescription can
effectively be used in a motion to dismiss
only when the complaint on its face shows
that indeed the action has already
prescribed. Otherwise, the issue of
prescription is one involving evidentiary
matters requiring a full-blown trial on the
merits and cannot be determined in a mere
motion to dismiss.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. The
case is remanded to TC which is directed to
reinstate petitioner’s complaint to its docket
and conduct appropriate proceedings.
G.R. No. 170318
JOSEPH REMENTIZO vs. HEIRS OF
PELAGIA VDA. DE MADARIETA
FACTS:
• Petition for review assailing the
amended decision and resolution of the CA.
The CA set aside its earlier decision by
declaring void an Emancipation Patent
issued to petitioner Joseph Rementizo
• The controversy began when a
complaint for annulment and cancellation of
OCTs EP-195 and EP A-028390-H was
filed by the late Pelagia Vda. De Madarieta
against Rementizo.
• She claimed to be the owner of a
parcel of land, Lot 153-F, in the name of
ther late husband Angel Madarieta. The
land was situated in Camiguin.
• She alleged that Rementizo was
a tenant of Roque Luspo, and thus
Rementizo was issued OCTs EP-185 and
174. It was also alleged that DAR
mistakenly included Lot 153-F as part of
Luspo;s property. Thus, EP A-028390-H
was issued to Rementizo. By virtue of such
emancipation patent, OCT EP-195 was
registered in Rementizo’s name.
• Petitioner on the other hand
alleges that he has possessed the subject
land in the concept of owner since 1987,
and even constructed a house on said land
after registration. He denied that the lot
153-F was owned by Angel, stating the land
was adjoining Lot 153, which is owned by
Luspo. He also alleged that respondent was
guilty of laches.
• Subsequently, the provincial
adjudicator issued an order declaring OCT
EP-195 and EP A-028390-H as null and
void, directing the occupants to vacate.
• Upon appeal to the DARAB-
Central Office, the said office reversed the
provincial adjudicator’s order, and ruled in
favor of Rementizo.
• When the respondents raised the
issue to the CA, they held that when they
filed the action on November of 1998, more
than 10 years had passed after the
issuance of Rementizo’s title. Such
rendered the title inconvertible.
• However upon a motion for
reconsideration by respondent, the court
partially granted such in its amended
decision. In said decision, the appellate
court applied the exception to the rule that
an action for re-conveyance of a
fraudulently registered real property
prescribes in 10 years:
o The appellate court held that Lot
No. 153-F was erroneously awarded to
Rementizo. The entire Lot No. 153 was
indeed covered by the Operation Land
Transfer. Hence, Lot No. 153 was
subdivided into: (1) Lot No. 153-B, declared
in the name of Alberto Estanilla; (2) Lot No.
153-C, declared in the name of Eusebio
Arce; (3) Lot No. 153-D, declared in the
name of Feliciano Tadlip; and (4) Lot Nos.
153-E and F, retained and declared in the
41
name of Angel. Nowhere in the records is it
shown that Rementizo was a beneficiary or
tenant of Lot No. 153-F.
• The Court of Appeals granted the
petition insofar as the cancellation of EP
No. A-028390-H was concerned.
ISSUE: WON the action for the annulment
of the emancipation patent, which ultimately
seeks the reconveyance of the title issued
to Rementizo, has already prescribed
HELD:
• Yes. Petition granted, CA’s
amended decision was set aside.
Complaint for annulment and cancellation
of title and patent dismissed due to
prescription.
• Madarieta was claiming the
subject property as surviving spouse of
Angel. However, there is no evidence
showing that during his lifetime, Angel
opposed the occupation of the petitioner. It
was only after the death of angel that the
opposition began.
• Additionally, the issuance of the
emancipation patent and the OCT was
issued when Angel was still alive.
Rementizo even constructed a house, but
no opposition came from Angel.
• There is no allegation or proof
that there was fraud in the issuance of EP
No. A-028390-H and OCT No. EP-195.
• Madarieta’s evidence at the most
tends to show that the DAR committed a
mistake in issuing EP No. A-028390-H in
favor of Rementizo. Considering that there
appears to be a mistake in the issuance of
the subject emancipation patent, the law
prescribes a specific remedy reserved to
the rightful owner of the erroneously
registered property, that is, an action for
reconveyance. The prescriptive period of an
action for reconveyance is 10 years.
• Madarieta’s discovery in 1997,
through a relocation survey, of the
ownership of the subject land can not be
considered as the reckoning point for the
computation of the prescriptive period. EP
No. A-028390-H, by virtue of which OCT
No. EP-195 was registered, was issued in
1987, when Angel who is the declared
landowner was still alive.
• Considering that there is an
absence of fraud in this present case, the
reckoning point for the computation of the
10-year prescriptive period is the date of
the issuance of EP No. A-028390-H and
registration of OCT No. EP-195 in the name
of Rementizo.
45) SPOUSES SANTOS v. HEIRS OF
LUSTRE
Topic: Remedies- Action for Reconveyance
Petitioners: Sps Santos, Natividad Santos,
Froilan Santos, Cecilia Macaspac, and R
Transport Corporation
Respondents: Heirs of Dominga Lustre
(Tarcisio Maniquiz, Teresita Burgos, Florita
Reyes, and Lermie Maniquiz)
FACTS:
Dominga Lustre, who died in 1989, owned
a residential lot located in San Antonio,
Nueva Ecijia which she mortgaged to
petitioner Spouses Sofronio and Natividad
Santos for P38k.
A few years later, Dominga sold the
property to Natividad for P15K through a
Deed of Absolute Sale and the mortgaged
was subsequently cancelled  the
cancellation of mortgage and sale of
property were both inscribed at the back of
TCT No. NT-50384.
As a result of the sale, the TCT was
cancelled a new one was issued in the
name of Sps. Santos.
Subsequently, Sps. Santos executed a
Deed of Sale transferring the property to
their son, petitioner Froilan Santos  a new
TCT was then again issued in Froilan’s
name
FIRST CIVIL CASE- 14 April 1994
Petitioner Cecilia Macaspac and Tarcisio
Maniquiz, both heirs of Dominga Lustre,
filed with the RTC a Complaint for
Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract,
Annulment of Title, Reconveyance, and
Damages against Froilan.
According to the Complaint:
1. plaintiffs Cecilia and Tarcisio are
legitimate children, while Eusebio is the
spouse of Dominga Lustre, who allegedly
left them the subject property when she
died
2. the sale to Natividad was
simulated and that they discovered that
Sps. Santos transferred the property to
Froilan when Froilan filed an ejectment suit
against them
3. Froilan, through fraud and deceit,
succeeded in transferring the property
SECOND CIVIL CASE- 14 May 1999 While
the first civil case was pending,
respondents Dominga Lustre’s other heirs,
filed a Complaint for Annulment of Transfer
of Certificate of Title and Deed of Absolute
Sale against Sps. Santos, Froilan, Cecilia,
R Transport Corporation, and the Register
of Deeds of Cabanatuan City
*Cecilia was impleaded as defendant
because she refused to join the other heirs
as plaintiffs
The complaint alleged that:
1. Sps. Santos simulated the DOS
by forging Dominga Lustre’s signature
2. Sps. Santos simulated another
DOS transferring the property to Froilan
which lead to the new TCT
3. R Transport Corporation was
claiming that it brought the property from
Froilan but there was no evidence to prove
such claim
4. That herein respondents have
been residing in the property since birth and
the house was built by their ancestors
Petitioners filed an MTD alleging that the
right of action for annulment of the DOS
and TCTs had prescribed and was barred
by laches; they later on filed an
Omnibus/Supplemental MTD on the ground

of litis pendentia  DENIED by RTC; MR
likewise DENIED
Petitioners filed petition for certiorari with
CA  DENIED for lack of merit and held
that:
1. respondents were not guilty of
forum shopping
2. there was no identity of parties
because Cecilia, was plaintiff in the first civil
case and defendant in the second, and
there were several additional defendants in
the second civil case
3. the reliefs demanded were
different
4. an action for the declaration of
the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe, and laches could not have set in
since there was no unreasonable delay in
the filing of the case
ISSUE: WON the action has prescribed and
plaintiffs are barred by laches- NO
RULING:
-The action for reconveyance on the ground
that the certificate of title was obtained by
means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually
an action for the declaration of its nullity,
which does not prescribe
- Moreover, a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes, by operation of
law, a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the real owner of the property
-An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years and in
such case, the prescriptive period applies
only if there is an actual need to reconvey
the property as when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property
-Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the
property, prescription does not commence
to run against him
-Thus, when an action for reconveyance is
nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature
of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible
-It follows then that the respondents present
action should not be barred by laches
 laches is a doctrine in equity, which may
be used only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law; obviously, it cannot
be set up to resist the enforcement of an
imprescriptible legal right
-It is true that an action for reconveyance
will not prosper when the property sought to
be reconveyed is in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value  in this case,
however, the protection of the rights of any
alleged innocent purchaser is a matter that
should be threshed out in the main case
and not in these proceedings
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.
Winner: Respondents
DOMINGO A. CANERO (Canero) V.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (UP)
G.R. NO. 156380, 8 SEPTEMBER 2004
42
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
1. Canero filed a petition for
reconstitution of title of a lot in Barangay
Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. He
alleged that the lot had been registered by
the Register of Deeds of QC in the name of
the spouses Cañero, as evidenced by a
TCT.
2. Allegedly, however, the original
copy of the said TCT, in the custody of the
Register of Deeds, was burned when the
Quezon City Hall was razed by a fire on
June 11, 1998.
3. The spouses had declared the lot
for taxation purposes in the year 1992.
They prayed that the reconstitution should
be based on their owner’s duplicate copy
and other documents in their possession.
4. RTC then notified all interested
persons. Despite these notices, no
opposition was filed. Hence, RTC granted
the petition for reconstitution and the
Register of Deeds issued TCT in favor of
the Cañero spouses.
5. Later, Canero learned that UP
had claimed title and secured a tax
declaration in its name for the SAME lot.
6. Moreover, the Tax Declaration
issued by the City Assessor in Canero’s
name carried an annotation that the lot
appeared to duplicate the property of UP
under the latter’s Tax Declaration.
7. Canero then filed an action to
quiet the title of the said lot with the RTC
against UP and the City Assessor.
8. Canero relied on his reconstituted
title. He averred:
a. That even before the title was
issued in his and his wife’s name, his father
had been in open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the lot.
b. That his “designated caretakers”
occupy the lot at present.
c. That UP has no legal title or claim
over the lot since it failed to raise objections
during the reconstitution proceedings.
9. UP filed a Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that:
a. It had been in open, continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the said lot
from the year 1914.
b. The government owned several
parcels of land in Diliman, Quezon City. On
March 1, 1949, the Republic sold these lots
to UP. Thereafter, a TCT was issued in the
name of UP, which was later subdivided
into five (5) titles, whichincludes the lot
being claimed by Cañero.
c. UP owns or maintains several
buildings in the area.
d. Canero was never in possession
of the lot, and his cause of action, whether
for quieting of title or annulment of title, has
already prescribed.
10. RTC: Denied UP’s Motion to
Dismiss. It ruled that Canero has sufficient
cause of action for the complaint to quiet
title, and that it has not prescribed.
11. CA: Dismissed Canero’s
complaint for quieting of title as it has
already presecribed.
ISSUE: Can Canero’s file an action to quiet
title?
HELD:
NO. CA correctly ruled that
Canero’s action to quiet title had
prescribed. Canero tried to avoid the bar of
prescription by averring that his “designated
caretakers” had been occupying the lot at
his behest. From the inception of
petitioner’s action to quiet title until the filing
of his petition for certiorari before us,
neither hide nor hair of Canero’s
“designated caretakers” was ever seen or
mentioned in any pleading filed before this
Court or before the lower courts. Even
when faced with the threat of dismissal of
his action, petitioner still maintained the
anonymity of his “designated caretakers.”
His posture leads us to no other conclusion
but that these “designated caretakers” do
not exist and are merely part of the myth he
propagated to substantiate his claim of
ownership of the lot.
In contrast, respondent UP was able to
prove that it was in possession of the lot by
showing the existence therein of buildings
and structures it had erected, and which it
controls and maintains. Both parties were
given more than ample opportunity to
substantiate their claims during the hearing
of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.
The CA is also correct in holding that RTC
should have dismissed the complaint to
quiet title. Canero’s reconstituted title is his
basis for filing the action to quiet title
against respondent UP. The reconstituted
title and the proceedings from which it
hailed from are, however, void.
R.A. No. 26 provides for a special
procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens
certificates of title that are missing but not
fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It
is an absolute absurdity to reconstitute
existing certificates of title that are on file
and available in the registry of deeds. If we
were to sustain petitioner’s stance, the
establishment of the Torrens system of land
titling would be for naught, as cases dealing
with claims of ownership of registered land
would be teeming like worms coming out of
the woodwork. It is self-evident that the trial
court’s judgment could not be sustained.
When a judgment is void for lack of
jurisdiction and its nullity is shown by virtue
of its own recitals, it may be said to be a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
CA acted in accordance with law when it
granted respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
and set aside petitioner’s title.
We further note that even if the subject lot
had not already been registered in the
name of UP, still the reconstitution
proceedings are void for lack of notice to
adjoining property owners.
DISPOSITION: CA AFFIRMED.
RUMARATE vs. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 168222. April 18, 2006
FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Teodulo and Rosita
Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance
of real property and/or quieting of title with
damages against respondent heirs of the
late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta. Teodulo averred that Lot No. 379
was previously possessed and cultivated by
his godfather, Santiago, who used to live
with the Rumarate family in San Pablo City.
Santiago and the Rumarate family
transferred residence to avail of the land
distribution in Quezon. Santiago occupied
Lot No. 379 cultivating five hectares
thereof. Santiago orally bequeathed his
rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo and
entrusted to him a copy of a Decision of the
CFI of Tayabas, recognizing his Santiago
rights over Lot No. 379. Their family
thereafter cleared the land, built a house
and planted coconut trees, corn, palay and
vegetables thereon. Santiago executed an
"Affidavit (quit-claim)" ratifying the transfer
of his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo.
From 1929, Teodulo and later, his wife and
11 children possessed the land as owners
and declared the same for taxation, the
earliest being in 1961.
In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses
Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta,
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, were
able to obtain a title over Lot No. 379. He
did not immediately file a case against
respondents because he was advised to
just remain on the land and pay the
corresponding taxes thereon.
Respondents claimed that on November
11, 1964, Santiago sold the questioned lot
to their parents, the spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. Respondents
alleged that the CFI rendered a Decision,
declaring Lot No. 379 as a public land and
recognizing Santiago as claimant thereof in
the Cadastral Proceeding. However, no title
was issued to Santiago because he failed
to file an Answer. Spouses Cipriano
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta filed a motion
to re-open the Cadastral Proceeding. The
CFI rendered a decision adjudicating Lot
No. 379 in favor of the spouses, in whose
name an OCT was issued. Cipriano
Hernandez planted coconut trees on the
land through the help of a certain Fredo
who was instituted as caretaker. Fredo
informed Cipriano Hernandez that he will no
longer stay on the land because there are
people instructing him to discontinue tilling
the same.
After the death of the spouses, respondents
executed a deed of partition over the
subject lot
The trial court rendered a decision in favor
of petitioners. CA reversed and set aside
the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant appeal.
ISSUE:
The issue to be resolved is to whom should
Lot No. 379 be awarded? To petitioners
who possessed and cultivated the lot since
1929 up to the present, but do not have a
certificate of title over the property, or to
43
respondents who have a certificate of title
but are not in possession of the
controverted lot?
RULING:
In an action for quieting of title, the court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of
the parties so that the complainant and
those claiming under him may be forever
free from any danger of hostile claim. Under
Article 476 of the Civil Code, the remedy
may be availed of only when, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on
the complainant's title to real property or
any interest therein. Article 477 of the same
Code states that the plaintiff must have
legal or equitable title to, or interest in the
real property which is the subject matter of
the suit.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur,
namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy
A careful examination of the evidence on
record shows that Teodulo possessed and
occupied Lot No. 379 in the concept of an
owner. After his demise, all his 11 children,
the youngest being 28 years old, continued
to till the land. From 1929 to 1960, Santiago
never challenged Teodulo’s possession of
Lot No. 379 nor demanded or received the
produce of said land. For 31 years Santiago
never exercised any act of ownership over
Lot No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed
that he is no longer interested in asserting
any right over the land by executing in favor
of Teodulo a quitclaim.
The oral donation in 1929 as well as the
1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to
Teodulo are void for non-compliance with
the formalities of donation, they
nevertheless explain Teodulo and his
family’s long years of occupation and
cultivation of said lot and the nature of their
possession thereof.
It follows therefore that Teodulo’s open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379
for 30 years, or from 1929 to 1959 in the
concept of an owner, earned him title over
the lot in accordance with Sec. 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act. Considering that Lot No.
379 became the private property of Teodulo
in 1959, Santiago had no more right to sell
the same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta in 1964. Consequently, the
latter and herein respondents did not
acquire ownership over Lot No. 379 and the
titles issued in their name are void.
In the instant case, Santiago’s short-lived
possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379
could not vest him title. While he tilled the
land in 1925, he ceased to possess and
cultivate the same since 1928. He
abandoned the property and allowed
Teodulo to exercise all acts of ownership.
Hence, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta and herein respondents did not
acquire any right over the questioned lot
and the title issued in their names are void,
because of the legal truism that the spring
cannot rise higher than the source.
The land was awarded to the petitioners.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JOSEFINA L. MORATO,
SPOUSES NENITA CO and ANTONIO
QUILATAN AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Facts
In December, 1972, respondent Morato
filed a Free Patent Application on a parcel
of land with an area of 1,265 square meters
situated at Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon.
In 1974, the patent was approved and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon at Lucena
City issued an Original Certificate of Title.
Both the free patent and the title specifically
mandate that the land shall not be alienated
nor encumbered within five (5) years from
the date of the issuance of the patent.
Subsequently, the District Land Officer,
acting upon reports that respondent Morato
had encumbered the land in violation of the
condition of the patent, conducted an
investigation. It was established that the
subject land is a portion of the Calauag
Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep under water
during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low
tide, and not suitable to vegetation. It was
also revealed that on October 24, 1974, a
portion of the land was mortgaged by
respondent Morato to respondents Nenita
Co and Antonio Quilatan for P10,000.00.
The spouses Quilatan constructed a house
on the land. Another portion of the land
was leased to Perfecto Advincula on at
P100.00 a month, where a warehouse was
constructed.
On November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an
amended complaint against respondents
Morato, spouses Nenita Co and Antonio
Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon for the cancellation of title and
reversion of a parcel of land to the public
domain, subject of a free patent in favor of
respondent Morato, on the grounds that the
land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged
and leased within the five-year prohibitory
period.
• Petitioner contends that the grant
of Free Patent and the subsequent
issuance of Original Certificate of Title to
Respondent Josefina L. Morato were
subject to the conditions provided for in
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. It
alleges that nine (9) months and eight (8)

days after the grant of the patent,
Respondent Morato, in “violation of the
terms of the patent, mortgaged a portion of
the land” to Respondent Nenita Co, who
thereafter constructed a house thereon.
Likewise, on February 2, 1976 and “within
the five-year prohibitory period,”
Respondent Morato “leased a portion of the
land to Perfecto Advincula at a monthly rent
of P100.00 who, shortly thereafter,
constructed a house on the subject land.”
Further, petitioner argues that the defense
of indefeasibility of title is “inaccurate.” The
original certificate of title issued to
Respondent Morato contains the seeds of
its own cancellation”: such certificate
specifically states on its face that “it is
subject to the provisions of Sections 118,
119, 121, 122, 124 of CA No. 141, as
amended.
• Respondent Morato counters by
stating that although a “portion of the land
was previously leased,” it resulted “from the
fact that Advincula built a warehouse in the
subject land without [her] prior consent.”
The mortgage executed over the
improvement “cannot be considered a
violation of the said grant since it can never
affect the ownership.”
• Respondent-Spouses Quilatan,
on the other hand, state that the mortgage
contract they entered into with Respondent
Morato “can never be considered as [an]
‘alienation’ inasmuch as the ownership over
the property remains with the owner.”
Besides, it is the director of lands and not
the Republic of the Philippines who is the
real party in interest in this case, contrary to
the provision of the Public Land Act which
states that actions for reversion should be
instituted by the solicitor general in the
name of Republic of the Philippines
After trial, the lower court, dismissed
petitioner’s complaint. It ruled that there
was no violation of the 5-year period ban
against alienating or encumbering the land,
because the land was merely leased and
not alienated. It also found that the
mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio
Quilatan covered only the improvement and
not the land itself. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
The Issues
• W/N respondent Court erred in
holding that the patent granted and
certificate of title issued to Respondent
Morato cannot be cancelled and annulled
since the certificate of title becomes
indefeasible after one year from the
issuance of the title.
• W/N the respondent Court erred
in holding that the questioned land is part of
a disposable public land and not a
foreshore land.”
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
HELD: Petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Indefeasibility of a Free Patent
Title
44
Sec. 118, 121, 122,and 124 of the Public
Land Act clearly proscribe the
encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired
under a free patent or homestead within
five years from the grant of such patent.
Furthermore, such encumbrance results in
the cancellation of the grant and the
reversion of the land to the public domain.
Encumbrance has been defined as
“[a]nything that impairs the use or transfer
of property; anything which constitutes a
burden on the title; a burden or charge
upon property; a claim or lien upon
property.” It may be a “legal claim on an
estate for the discharge of which the estate
is liable; an embarrassment of the estate or
property so that it cannot be disposed of
without being subject to it; an estate,
interest, or right in lands, diminishing their
value to the general owner; a liability resting
upon an estate.”
Do the contracts of lease and mortgage
executed within five (5) years from the
issuance of the patent constitute an
“encumbrance” and violate the terms and
conditions of such patent? The Supreme
Court believes that it does.
It is indisputable that Respondent Morato
cannot fully use or enjoy the land during the
duration of the lease contract. This
restriction on the enjoyment of her property
sufficiently meets the definition of an
encumbrance under Section 118 of the
Public Land Act, because such contract
“impairs the use of the property” by the
grantee. In a contract of lease which is
consensual, bilateral, onerous and
commutative, the owner temporarily grants
the use of his or her property to another
who undertakes to pay rent therefor. During
the term of the lease, the grantee of the
patent cannot enjoy the beneficial use of
the land leased. As already observed, the
Public Land Act does not permit a grantee
of a free patent from encumbering any
portion of such land. Such encumbrance is
a ground for the nullification of the award.
• Morato’s resort to equity, i.e. that
the lease was executed allegedly out of the
goodness of her heart without any intention
of violating the law, cannot help her.
Equity, which has been aptly described as
“justice outside legality,” is applied only in
the absence of, and never against, statutory
law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive
rules prevail over all abstract arguments
based on equity contra legem.
The questioned mortgage falls squarely
within the term “encumbrance” proscribed
by Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
Verily, a mortgage constitutes a legal
limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure
of such mortgage would necessarily result
in the auction of the property. Even if only
part of the property has been sold or
alienated within the prohibited period of five
years from the issuance of the patent, such
alienation is a sufficient cause for the
reversion of the whole estate to the State.
As a condition for the grant of a free patent
to an applicant, the law requires that the
land should not be encumbered, sold or
alienated within five years from the
issuance of the patent. The sale or the
alienation of part of the homestead violates
that condition.
The prohibition against the encumbrance --
lease and mortgage included -- of a
homestead which, by analogy applies to a
free patent, is mandated by the rationale for
the grant, viz:
• “It is well-known that the
homestead laws were designed to distribute
disposable agricultural lots of the State to
land-destitute citizens for their home and
cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent
intention the State prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead (Section
116) within five years after the grant of the
patent. After that five-year period the law
impliedly permits alienation of the
homestead; but in line with the primordial
purpose to favor the homesteader and his
family the statute provides that such
alienation or conveyance (Section 117)
shall be subject to the right of repurchase
by the homesteader, his widow or heirs
within five years. This section 117 is
undoubtedly a complement of section 116.
It aims to preserve and keep in the family of
the homesteader that portion of public land
which the State had gratuitously given to
him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with
this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold,
that the right to repurchase exists not only
when the original homesteader makes the
conveyance, but also when it is made by
his widow or heirs. This construction is
clearly deducible from the terms of the
statute.”
The prohibition against any alienation or
encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso
attached to the approval of every
application. Prior to the fulfillment of the
requirements of law, Respondent Morato
had only an inchoate right to the property;
such property remained part of the public
domain and, therefore, not susceptible to
alienation or encumbrance. Conversely,
when a “homesteader has complied with all
the terms and conditions which entitled him
to a patent for [a] particular tract of public
land, he acquires a vested interest therein
and has to be regarded an equitable owner
thereof.” However, for Respondent Morato’s
title of ownership over the patented land to
be perfected, she should have complied
with the requirements of the law, one of
which was to keep the property for herself
and her family within the prescribed period
of five (5) years. Prior to the fulfillment of
all requirements of the law, Respondent
Morato’s title over the property was
incomplete. Accordingly, if the
requirements are not complied with, the
State as the grantor could petition for the
annulment of the patent and the
cancellation of the title.
Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine
of the indefeasibility of her Torrens title to
bar the state from questioning its transfer or
encumbrance. The certificate of title issued
to her clearly stipulated that its award was

“subject to the conditions provided for in
Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124 of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141.”
Because she violated Section 118, the
reversion of the property to the public
domain necessarily follows, pursuant to
Section 124.
Second Issue: Foreshore Land Reverts to
the Public Domain
There is yet another reason for granting this
petition. Although Respondent Court found
that the subject land was foreshore land, it
nevertheless sustained the award thereof to
Respondent Morato. Petitioner correctly
contends, however, that Private
Respondent Morato cannot own foreshore
land:
• “Through the encroachment or
erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, a
portion of the subject land was invaded by
the waves and sea advances. During high
tide, at least half of the land (632.5 square
meters) is 6 feet deep under water and
three (3) feet deep during low tide. The
Calauag Bay shore has extended up to a
portion of the questioned land.
• While at the time of the grant of
free patent to respondent Morato, the land
was not reached by the water, however,
due to gradual sinking of the land caused
by natural calamities, the sea advances had
permanently invaded a portion of subject
land. As disclosed at the trial, the land was
under water during high tide in the month of
August 1978. The water margin covers half
of the property, but during low tide, the
water is about a kilometer. Also, in 1974,
after the grant of the patent, the land was
covered with vegetation, but it disappeared
in 1978 when the land was reached by the
tides. In fact, the lower court observed that
the erosion of the land was caused by
natural calamities that struck the place in
1977.
As a general rule, findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon this Court, unless such
factual findings are palpably unsupported
by the evidence on record or unless the
judgment itself is based on a parcel of land applied for is a portion of the
misapprehension of facts. The application
for a free patent was made in 1972. From
the undisputed factual findings of the Court
of Appeals, however, the land has since
become foreshore. Accordingly, it can no
longer be subject of a free patent under the
Public Land Act.
In comparison, Article 420 of the Civil Code
provides:
“Art. 420. The following things are property
of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use,
such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
When the sea moved towards the estate
and the tide invaded it, the invaded property
became foreshore land and passed to the
realm of the public domain. In fact, the
Court in Government vs. Cabangis annulled
45
the registration of land subject of cadastral
proceedings when the parcel subsequently
became foreshore land. In another case,
the Court voided the registration decree of
a trial court and held that said court had no
jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any
private person or entity. The subject land in
this case, being foreshore land, should
therefore be returned to the public domain.
Petition GRANTED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(REPUBLIC), AND THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS
V.
HON. ABRAHAM VERA , (CFI JUDGE),
AND LUISITO MARTINEZ (MARTINEZ)
G.R. NO. L-35778, 27 JANUARY 1983
DE CASTRO, J.
DOCTRINE:
A land subjected to cadastral adjudication
under the Land Registration Act cannot be
subject to registration by voluntary
proceedings, except where the applicant
can still petition for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
Possession of public lands, however long
never confers title upon the possessor,
unless the occupant can prove occupation
of the same under claim of ownership for
the required period to constitute a grant
from the State.
The Land Registration Commission has no
authority to approve original survey plans.
FACTS:
1. Two petitions are involved in this
case. SC decided them jointly.
G.R. No. L-35778 (Respondent: Martinez)
2. Martinez filed with the CFI an
application for registration of title under Act
496 of 1 parcel of land, situated in the
Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan.
3. CFI issued an order of general
default except as to the Republic and the
Province of Bataan.
4. Republic filed with the CFI an
opposition to the application stating that the
public domain belonging to the Republic,
not subject to private appropriation.
5. CFI ordered that the subject land
was a subject of cadastral proceeding and
that this land was assigned as Lot No. 626,
and that this case is ordered re-opened.
6. The Commissioner of Land
Registration submitted to CFI a report
stating that the parcel of land applied for
registration is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of
the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province
of Bataan.
7. Records show that in the hearing
of this case in the CFI, Martinez testified:
a. That he is the owner of the land
applied for, having inherited the same from
his parents;
b. That he started possessing the
land in 1938;
c. That about 8 hectares of the land
is planted to palay, and there are about 42
mango trees;
d. That kamoteng kahoy is also
planted thereon;
e. That he declared the land for
taxation purposes only in 1969 because all
the records were lost during the war; and
f. That possession was continuous,
open, undisturbed and in the concept of
owner.
G.R. No. L-35779 (Respondent: Tanalega)
8. Respondent Thelma Tanalega
(Tanalega) filed an application for
registration under Act No. 496 in the CFI of
two (2) parcels of land located in Mariveles,
Bataan.
9. The corresponding notice of initial
hearing was duly issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
10. CFI issued an Order of General
Default against all persons, with the
exception of the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forestry.
11. The provincial fiscal filed his
opposition in behalf of the Directors of
Lands and of Forestry, alleging that the
parcels of land applied for are portions of
the public domain belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines, not subject to private
appropriation.
12. During trial, Tanalega testified
that she had possessed the land “openly,
adversely, notoriously and in the concept of
owner since February 2, 1970 when the
said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas
who allegedly possessed this land” in the
same manner since 1935; that the applicant
had paid for the taxes of the land for the
years 1970-1972.
13. In both cases, the CFI in two
separate decisions confirmed the titles to
subject parcels of land and adjudicated
them in favor of applicants Martinez and
Tanalega, now respondents herein.
14. In the instant petitions for review,
the Republic argued that Lot 626, Mariveles
Cadastre was declared public land by the
decision of the Cadastral Court dated
October 11, 1937 and such being the case,
the CFI is without jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the application for
voluntary registration under Act 496.
Petitioner likewise stressed that the lands in
question can no longer be subject to
registration by voluntary proceedings, for
they have already been subjected to
compulsory registration proceedings under
the Cadastral Act.
ISSUE: Does the CFI still have jurisdiction
over the two applications in view of a
previous decision by the Cadastral court
declaring the lands applied for as public
lands?
HELD:
No. In the instant cases,
Respondents apparently either did not file
their answers in the aforesaid cadastral
proceedings or failed to substantiate their
claims over the portions they were then
occupying, otherwise, titles over the
portions subject of their respective claims
would have been issued to them. The
Cadastral Court must have declared the
lands in question public lands, and its

decision had already become final and
conclusive. Respondents are now barred by
prior judgment to assert their rights over the
subject land, under the doctrine of res
judicata. A Cadastral proceeding is one in
remand binds the whole world. Under this
doctrine, parties are precluded from re-
litigating the same issues already
determined by final judgment.
Even granting that respondents can still
petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title over the lands subject matter of the
instant cases, the same must necessarily
fail. It is to be noted that in the instant cases
evidence for the respondents themselves
tend to show that only portions of the entire
area applied for are cultivated. A mere
casual cultivation of portions of the land by
the claimant does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership. In that sense,
possession is not exclusive and notorious
so as to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the State. The possession of public
land however long the period thereof may
have extended, never confers title thereto
upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does
not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years
to constitute a grant from the State.
Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit
convincing proof of actual, peaceful and
adverse possession in the concept of
owners of the entire area in question during
the period required by law.
Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans
submitted by petitioners were not approved
by the Director of Lands but by the Land
Registration Commission. The Land
Registration Commission has no authority
to approve original survey plans in this
particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No.
6389 relied upon by respondents applies
only to lands subject of tenancy relation
which are expropriated and subdivided in
favor of new amortizing-owner-
beneficiaries. The submission of the plan is
a statutory requirement of mandatory
character and unless the plan and its
technical description are duly approved by
the Director of Lands, the same are not of
much value.
50. PAMINTUAN VS SAN AGUSTIN G.R.
No. 17043 June 22, 1922
Pamintuan vs Judge San Agustin, The
Espinosas and David.
Facts: In land registration case No. 11732,
dated April 19, 1917, lot No. 625, was
decreed in favor of Florentino Pamintuan,
the petitioner, by the CFI Pampanga, and
certificate of title No. 540 covering the lot
was issued to him in June, 1918. (LAND
REGISTRATION CASE)
In the meantime cadastral case No. 132,
was instituted. This case embraced the
district in which the lot in question was
situated and the lot was given its cadastral
number in the proceedings and was marked
on the plans as land in regard to which
registration proceedings were pending
46
under Act. No. 496. Florentino Pamintuan
inadvertently failed to claim the lot of trial of
the cadastral case, and the Court of First
Instance in a decision dated April 29, 1919,
awarded it to the respondents Nico Medes,
Maria, Mercedes, Rose and Eusebia
Espinosa, and ordered the cancellation of
certificate of title No. 540. (CADASTRAL
CASE)
The person to whom the land had been
adjudged subsequently conveyed their
interest to the respondent Francisca David,
in favor of whom the Court of First Instance
issued a writ of possession, placing her in
possession of the land. The possession
was restored to the petitioner by virtue of
the preliminary injunction issued by this
court on November 30, 1920. It may be
noted that no final decree has as yet been
issued in the cadastral case in regard to the
lot.
Florentino Pamintuan knew nothing about
the adjudication of the land in favor of the
Espinosa until the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga required him to
surrender his certificate of title for
cancellation. He then presented a motion to
the Court of First Instance, asking that the
decision of the court in regard to the lot in
the cadastral case be set aside and that the
writ of possession issued by virtue of said
decision be recalled.
Pamintuan filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari, requiring the respondent judge of
the Court of First Instance to certify to this
court the record in land registration case
No. 11732, and as much of the record of
cadastral case No. 132, as pertains to lot
No. 625, of the cadaster of Mabalacat,
Province of Pampanga. The petitioner
further prays that upon said records being
so certified, all proceedings had in said
cadastral case in relation to said lot No.
625, be declared null and void.
ISSUE: WON the court in cadastral cases
have jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an
earlier land registration case?
HELD: No, In a cadastral case the court
has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an
earlier land registration case, thus the
second decree is considered null and void.
The jurisdiction of the court in cadastral
cases over lands already registered is
limited to the necessary correction of
technical errors in the description of the
lands.
We are of the opinion that the court below
exceeded its jurisdiction in undertaking to
decree in a cadastral case land already
decreed in another land registration case.
Cadastral proceedings are authorized and
regulated by Act No. 2259. The scope and
purpose of this Act is expressed in its title:
"An Act providing of land titles." What is
understood by "settlement and
adjudication" is very clearly indicated in
section 11 of the Act, which reads as
follows:
SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at
any convinient place within the province in
which the lands are situated or at such
other place as the court, for reasons stated
in writing and filed with the record of the
case, may designate, and shall be
conducted in the same manner as ordinary
trials and proceedings in the Court of Land
Registration, and shall be governed by the
same rules. Orders of default and
confession shall also be entered in the
same manner as in ordinary cases in the
same court and shall have the same effect.
All conflicting interest shall be adjudicated
by the court and decrees awarded in favor
of the person entitle to the lands or the
various parts thereof, and such decrees,
when final, shall be the basis for original
certificates of title in favor of said persons,
which shall have the same effect as
certificates of title granted on application for
registration of land under the Land
Registration Act, and except as herein
otherwise provided all of the provisions of
said Land Registration Act, as now
amended, and as it hereafter may be
amended, shall be applicable to
proceedings under this Act, and to the titles
and certificate of title granted or issued
hereunder.
The title to the land is therefore fully as well
settled and adjudicated, within the meaning
of the Cadastral Act, by a final decree in an
ordinary land registration case as it would
be by a similar decree in cadastral case
and, obviously, it cannot have been the
intention of the Legislature to provide a
special proceeding for the settlement and
adjudication of titles already settled and
adjudicated. It is, indeed, more than
doubtful if the Legislature would have the
power to enact such a provision had it so
desired; the landholder who possesses a
settled and adjudicated title to his land
cannot be deprived of that title through
another settlement and adjudication of a
similar character.
We hold that in cadastral case the
jurisdiction of the court over lands already
registered is limited to the necessary
correction of technical errors in the
description of the lands, provided, such
corrections, do not impair the substantial
rights of the registered owner, and that
such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive
a registered owner of his title.
The petition is granted, and the
proceedings in the court below in regard to
lot No. 625 of the cadaster of Mabalacat are
declared null and void, with costs against
the respondents Nicomedes Espinosa,
Maria Mercedes Espinosa, Eusebia
Espinosa, and Francisca David, jointly and
severally. So ordered.
G.R No. L-47847 dated July 31, 1981
PETITIONER: DIRECTOR OF LANDS
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS
AND MANUELA PASTOR
Facts:
• This is a petitioner for review on
certiorari filed by the petitioner, Director of
Lands, seeking to set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Batangas. The CFI of Batangas granted
the application for registration under R.A
No. 496 of thirteen (13) parcels of land in
the name of herein private respondent,
Manuela Pastor.

• On May 8, 1974, the respondent
filed with the CFI of Batangas an
application for confirmation of imperfect title
over the said 13 lots – 7 of which were
allegedly inherited from her parents, and
the remaining 6 were allegedly inherited
from her aunt - situated in Gulod and
Pallocan, Batangas City.
• In her application, the respondent
claims that she and her predecessors-in-
interest had been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and
notorious possession of the lots under claim
of ownership for more than thirty (30) years.
• On June 24, 1974, the application
was amended to correct the description of
two (2) lots.
• The petitioner filed an opposition
to the application on the ground that
applicant and her predecessors-in-interest
neither had title in fee simple nor imperfect
title under Section 48 of the Public Land
Law, as amended, over the lots in question.
• The applicant submitted the
following:
o A certification of the Land
Registration Commission that Lot No. 9330
of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas
Record No. 1706 was declared ‘public land’
in the decision rendered in Cadastral Case
No. 41 which was further certified that copy
of the said decision relative to the
aforementioned lot is not available in the
Commission;
o A certification of the Land
Registration Commission, that no decrees
of registration have as yet been issued to
lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402
of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas; and
o A certification issued by officer-in-
charge Records Division of the Bureau of
Lands to the effect that the 13 lots situated
in Barrios Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas
City, are not covered by any kind of public
land, application or patent.
• The CFI of Batangas decreed the
registration in favor of the applicant finding
the application for confirmation and grant of
title under Act 496, as amended, to be well-
founded and fully substantiated by evidence
sufficient and requisite under the law.
• The Court of Appeals rendered
judgment affirming in toto the decision of
the CFI of Batangas.
• Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the decision rendered
in cadastral Case No. 41 declaring Lot No.
9330 as ‘public land’ constitutes res
adjudicata as to the nature of the lots in
question and therefore, a bar to the
application (NO)
Held:
• In the proceedings before the CFI
of Batangas, the oppositor Director of
Lands did not interpose any objection nor
set-up the defense of res adjudicate with
respect to the lots in question. Such failure
on the part of the oppositor is a procedural
infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal.
• All defenses therefore not
interposed in a motion to dismiss or in an
answer are deemed waived in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
47
• Thus, the defense of res
adjudicate when not set-up either in a
motion to dismiss or in an answer is
deemed waived. It cannot be pleaded for
the first time at the trial or an appeal.
• But granting for a moment, that
the defenses of res adjudicate was properly
raised by petitioner, the Supreme Court still
hold that there is no prior final judgment at
all to speak of. The decision in Cadastral
Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to
the application the respondent since a
decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring
a lot public land is not the final decree
contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the
Land Registration Act.
ANACLETO NAVARRO V THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS
GR NO. L-18814 | JULY 31, 1962
Makalintal, J.
FACTS:
• Director of lands filed a cadastral
proceeding to settle and adjudicate title to
the lots in question (Lots No. 1 & 2 of Plan
Psu – 117149).
• The Republic claimed them as
part of the public domain.
• Anacleto Navarro filed an
application for registration of the properties
in his name pursuant to Sec. 48, par. B of
the Public Land Act.
• Director of lands:
o opposed because the lots applied
for are part of the public domain belonging
to the State
o filed a motion to dismiss on two
grounds: (1) that the application was barred
by prior judgement; and (2) the same was
improper as an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Sec.
48, par. b of Public Land Law, which
applies only to public agricultural lands and
not to those which are residential in
character.
• CFI: denied Navarro’s application
and declared the lots public lands.
• CA: affirmed CFI on the ff.
grounds:
o The evidence of Navarro stems
mainly from his own testimony declaring
that since 1936, he was lessee of the two
lots from Sps. Jimenez; that he fenced it
and built a dike, made fillings in the
property, planted coconuts thereon and
built two houses; and that he later learned
that the property was sold from one person
to another until he was able to lease and
buy it from one Caridad Cortez.
o Navarro admits that neither
Caridad Cortez nor her predecessors ever
declared the property for taxation purposes
and that none of them paid taxes on said
property.
o All lands are presumed to be a
part of the public domain. To overcome this
presumption, evidence must be more than
a mere preponderance and that vague and
indecisive proofs are insufficient even in the
absence of opposition on the part of the
government.
o Pursuant to the sketches of the
Director of Lands, readily show that the lots
are not private property. The whole of Lot
No. 1 and part of Lot No. 2 were originally
under water forming part of Manila Bay;
while the remainder of Lot No. 2 forms part
of the mouth of Estero Maytubig which
flows into the Bay.
• CA: From the foregoing, it is clear
that Navarro had not possessed the lands
in question for even the 30 years now
asserted by him. Such findings is
conclusive on the question of possession
and precludes any new litigation concerning
it.
ISSUE: W/N the lower courts erred in
dismissing Navarro’s application for
registration.
HELD: NO. Order appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
DOCTRINES: Where, as in the present
case, the parcels of land sought to be
registered are the same lots already
declared public lands in a cadastral
proceeding where the applicant and the
Director of Lands were parties, and the
applicant failed to show acquisition of the
lands by any of the legal modes of
acquiring public lands, the decision
declaring the lots part of the public domain
must be deemed res judicata.
The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties
ought not to be permitted to litigate the
same issue more than once; that, when a
right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial
has been given, the judgment of the court,
so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties, and those in
privity with them in law or estate.
Additional Notes:
Requisites of res judicata:
(1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the first and
second actions, (a) identity of parties (b)
identity of subject matter and (c) identity of
cause of action.
The only controversy here is with respect to
the last element, namely, identity of cause
of action, the others being concededly
present.
The cause of action in both the present
case and the former cadastral proceeding is
the registration of the two lots in question.
The specific issue involved is whether the
lots applied for are part of the public domain
or have so far been possessed by appellant
that he must be deemed to have acquired
title thereto which is sufficient for
registration in his name. The declaration by
final judgment in the cadastral proceeding
that they are public lands settled this issue
once and for all.

REPUBLIC V. JUDGE AQUINO
GR No. L-33983 – January 27, 1983 –
Relova
FACTS:
Gonzalo Lorenzo filed a homestead
application of the lot in question with the
Bureau of Lands. The application was given
due course on July 12, 1939.
February 29, 1956 –Lorenzo sold the
property to Vivencio Angeles, who filed his
own homestead application.
March 14, 1958 – Vivencio’s homestead
application was approved and he was
allowed to enter into the possession of the
land so as to comply with the cultivation
requirements of CA 141 (Public Land Act).
March 16, 1969 –Angeles filed with the CFI
an application for judicial confirmation of
title in accordance with RA 2061, in
connection with RA 931, and to avail of the
benefits of Sec. 48 of CA 141 (Public Land
Act). As a consequence of this application,
he withdrew his homestead application.
An opposition (not the Republic) was filed
on Angeles’ application for judicial
confirmation. One of the grounds of the
opposition is that the subject property was
declared public land by the CFI in a
decision dated October 31, 1935, entitled:
“Isabelo Lorenzo v. Director of Lands.”
Lower Court: rendered judgment “finding
the applicant to have a registrable title to
the parcel of land … hereby confirms his
title thereto and order the registration
thereof in his name.” The opposition was
dismissed.
Hence, the Republic filed an appeal to the
SC.
ISSUE:
1. WON the LC erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the application for
registration of title and in ruling that Angeles
has a registrable title over the lot in
question. – Yes
2. WON the Republic has
personality to file the petition considering
that he had been declared in default for not
having filed its opposition to Angeles’
application for land registration and that it
did not even file a motion to lift the order of
default nor file a motion for reconsideration.
–No.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision of the
lower court is hereby SET ASIDE and
accordingly, private respondent Vivencio P.
Angeles’ application in the land registration
case is hereby DISMISSED.
1. In the case entitled ““Isabelo
Lorenzo v. Director of Lands”, it was
already declared that the subject property is
a public land. The decision therein had long
become final and, therefore, cannot be
disturbed anymore on the ground of res
judicata. Likewise, RA 931 does not apply
to persons claiming title to land which has
48
been declared public land in an ordinary
registration proceeding.
Respondent-applicant
based his registration on Sec. 48 (b) of CA
141(Public Land Act), which allowed “those
who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in
OCENPO of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition, of ownership for at least 30
years immediately preceding the filing of
the application.”
In the case, the fact that Vivencio
Angeles had filed a homestead application
over the property is an admission that their
possession was not a concept of an owner.
Hence, neither Vivencio Angeles nor his
predecessor-in-interest, Gonzalo Lorenzo,
can rightfully claim that they have been in
OCENP of the subject property under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Differences between the Land
Registration Law and the Public Land Law
(the basis of Angeles’ application):
Land Registration Law Public Land
Law (CA 141)
There exists already a title which is to be
confirmed by the court. The
presumption always is that the land applied
for pertains to the State, and that the
occupants and possessors claim an interest
only in the same virtue of their imperfect
title or continuous, open and notorious
possession.
The court may dismiss the application of
the applicant with or without prejudice to the
right to file a new application for the
registration of the same land. The court
has jurisdiction or power to adjudicate land
in favor of any of the conflicting claimants.
The only risk that an applicant runs is to
have his application denied. The
applicant runs the risk of losing the land
applied for.
The goal at which the two laws finally arrive
is the same, namely, a Torrents title, which
aims at complete extinguishment once and
for all of right adverse to the record title.
1. Although the Director of Lands or
that the government did not oppose the
application of the respondent-applicant, and
an order of general default was issued by
the court, such do not constitute estoppel
on the part of the government. It is a well-
known and settled rule in our jurisdiction
that the Republic, or the government, is
usually not estopped by mistake or error on
the part of its officials or agents.
53 LAHORA VS DAYANGHIRANG 37
SCRA 346
DOCTRINE: (SEE HELD)
FACTS:
• This’s actually a really short case
• On November 26, 1965 appellant
Francisco Lahora and Toribia Moralizon
petitioned the cpurt for registration of 9
parcels of land in Davao.
• Registration of one of the parcels
of land identified as lot no. 2228 was
opposed by appellee Emilio Dayanghirang
who alleged that said lot was already
registered in the name of his wife.
• Director of Lands also filed
opposition to the petition arguing that
appellants never had sufficient title over
such land sought to be registered nor were
they been in open, continuous or notorious
possession of said lot.
• On 14 June 1967, counsel for the
private oppositor filed a motion for
correction of the number of the certificate of
title covering Lot No. 2228, erroneously
referred to as OCT No. P-6055, when it
should properly be OCT No. P-6053. It is
likewise prayed in the same motion that the
petition be dismissed insofar as it includes
Lot No. 2228, for the reason that said lot
was already registered and titled in the
name of oppositor's wife as of 21 June
1956.
• In its order of 18 June 1967,
which was amended on 29 June 1967, the
court granted the oppositor's motion and
directed the dismissal of the petition as
regards Lot No. 2228, on the ground that it
having been previously registered and
titled, said parcel of land can no longer be
the subject of adjudication in another
proceeding. Hence, this appeal by the
petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for the original registration
of lot no. 2228 is valid? (NO)
HELD:
(DOCTRINE) The rule in this jurisdiction,
regarding public land patents and the
character of the certificate of title that may
be issued by virtue thereof, is that where
land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent
therefor is recorded, and the certificate of
title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the
land is automatically brought within the
operation of the Land Registration Act1, the
title issued to the grantee becoming entitled
to all the safeguards provided in Section 38
of the said Act.2 In other words, upon
expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title shall become irrevocable
and indefeasible like a certificate issued in
a registration proceeding
The registration of lot no. 2228 is invalid as
the lot has already been registered under
the name of oppositor’s wife. It was not
denied by the appellants that said land was
a public land grant in favor of oppositor’s
wife, because when the Government grants
land to a private individual a patent thereof
is recorded and a certificate of title is issued
to the grantee then it comes within the land
registration act that after 1 year of issuance
said title becomes indefeasible,
incontrovertible and irrevocable. And as the
court ruled in Pamintuan vs. San Agustin
that a cadastral court cannot decree a
registration over a land which has already
been registered in an earlier case, and a
second decree for said land is null and void.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order
appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
(NICE TO KNOW) Even assuming
arguendo, that there indeed exists a proper

case for cancellation of the patent for
intrinsic fraud, the action for review of the
decree should have been filed before the
one year period had elapsed. 6 Thereafter,
the proper party to bring the action would
only be the person prejudiced by the
alleged fraudulent act — the owner and
grantor,7and not another applicant or
claimant. Furthermore, the relief provided
by the law in such instance may be secured
by the aggrieved party, not in another
registration, for land already registered in
the name of a person can not be the
subject of another registration8, but in an
appropriate action such as one for
reconveyance or reversion9, or for
damages in case the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value. 10
53. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
G.R. No. 154953 | 26 June 2008
FACTS
1. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. (TAN) filed for an
application for Original Registration of Title
of a portion (Lot 10705-B) of Lot 10705.
When the trial court called the case for
initial hearing, after notice of such hearing
was published in the Official Gazette and
People’s Journal Taliba, and was posted on
the bulletin board of the Municipal Building
and in the land, there was no oppositor
other than the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands (DIR).
2. During the hearings, TAN presented
three witnesses whose testimonies showed
that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy)
had peaceful, adverse, open, and
continuous possession of the land in the
concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his
death, Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio), his
son, succeeded him. On 27 Sept 1960,
Antonio executed a Deed of Donation
covering the land in favor of one of his
children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato).
3. Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato
another piece of land. The land in question
was adjudicated to one of Antonio’s
children, Prospero Dimayuga (PORTING).
On 8 Aug. 1997, Porting sold the land to
TAN.
Summary: Kabesang Puroy -> Antonio ->
Porting -> TAN
4. RTC: In favor of TAN.
Republic: Appealed. It alleged that RTC
was wrong in granting the application for
registration absent clear evidence that the
applicant (TAN) and its predecessors-in-
interest have complied with the period of
possession and occupation as required by
law.
CA: Affirmed RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the land is alienable and
disposable – NO.
2. Whether TAN or its predecessors-in-
interest had open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorios possession and occupation of
the land in the concept of an owner since
49
June 1945 or earlier (for at least 30 yrs) –
NONE.
3. Whether TAN (a private corporation) is
qualified to apply for registration of a public
land under the Public Land Act – NO.
HELD
First Issue: No.
-> The rule is that all lands not appearing to
be clearly of private dominion presumably
belong to the State. Anyone who applies
for registration has the burden of
overcoming otherwise.
-> In this case, TAN submitted two
certifications issued by DENR.
(a) Certification by the CENRO (Community
Environment and Natural Resources
Offices) which certified the subject land as
within the Alienable and Disposable Zone
under Project 30.
(b) The second certification in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court issued by
FMS-DENR (Forest Management Services
of the DENR) which stated that the subect
area falls within an alienable and
disposable land.
-> The certifications, however, are not
sufficient. Why?
(a) CENRO – issues certificates of land
classification status for areas below 50
hectares. (It is the PENRO that issues
certificates for lands covering 50 hectares).
Here, the area of the subject land covers
over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters).
The CENRO certificate covered the entire
Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square
meters which is beyond the authority of the
CENRO to certify as alienable and
disposable.
(b) FMS-DENR – has no authority under
DAO (DENR-Admin Order) to issue
certificates of land classification.
-> Moreover, it is not enough for the
PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for
land registration must prove that (1) the
DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and (2) released the land of
the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that (3) the land subject of
the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO.
In addition, the applicant for land
registration must (4) present a copy of the
original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. TAN failed to do so.
-> Furthermore, CENRO and FMS-DENR
certifications are not public documents. The
certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original
official records in the legal custody of a
government office. They are conclusions
unsupported by adequate proof, hence, no
probative value.
Second issue: None.
-> The trial court relied on the testimoies of
Evangelista (72-year old resident near the
subject land) and Torres (TAN’s Operations
Manager).
(a) Evangelista – testified that Kabesang
Puroy had been in possession of the land
before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked
on the land for 3 yrs.
- Also, Evangelista testified that Kabesang
Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. Take
note, they are neighbors. However, he
admitted that he did not know the exact
relationship between Kabesang Puroy and
Fortunato, which is rather unusual for
neighbors in a small community.
He did not also know the relationship
between Fortunato and Porting. In fact,
Evangelista’s testimony is contrary to the
factual finding of the trial court that
Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by
Antonio, and not Fortunato.
- The Court find’s Evangelista’s
uncorroborated testimony insufficient to
prove that TAN’s predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the land in the
concept of an owner for more than 30
years.
(b) Torres – while he claimed to be related
to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their
possession of the land was hearsay. He did
not even tell the trial court where he
obtained his information.
-> Moreover, the tax declarations presented
were only for the years starting 1955. TAN
did not present any credible explanation
why the realty taxes were only paid starting
1955 considering the claim that the
Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of
the land before 1945. The payment of the
realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the
presumption that the Dimayugas claimed
ownership or possession of the land only in
that year.
Third issue: No.
-> The 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 3)
absolutely prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Private corporations are
allowed to hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. Why?
-> In actual practice, the constitutional ban
strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the
allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain. Without the constitutional ban,
individuals who already acquired the
maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable
public lands. The corporation is a
convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by
individuals of alienable lands of the public
domain.
-> To enable a corporation to file for
registration of alienable and disposable
land (and only land not more than 12
hectares), the corporation must have
acquired the land when its transferor had
already a vested right to a judicial
confirmation of title to the land by virtue of
his open, continuous and adverse
possession of the land in the concept of an
owner for at least 30 years since 12 June
 50

1945. (In short, the land was already a

private property at the time it was acquired
by the corporation).

-> In this case, TAN acquired the land on 8

August 1997 from Porting, who, along with
his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown
to have been, as of that date, in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the
land for 30 years since 12 June 1945.
Hence, TAN failed to prove that any portion
of the land was already private land when it
acquired it from Porting in 1997.