Legal Ethics No.
2Page |1
EN BANC
[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP,
endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the
Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve,
as it hereby approves, the following Revised Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout
their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the
approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall
be constituted and shall commence the implementation of the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE . Members of the IBP not exempt
under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of
continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36
hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to
six (6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial
skills equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute
resolution equivalent to five (5) credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and
procedural laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit
units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral
advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and
international conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may
be prescribed by the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit
units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall begin
not later than three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the
initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment
of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall
begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE
requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR)
or Metro Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to
Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned
to Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity
wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with
the MCLE requirement.
 Legal Ethics No. 2Page |2

SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after 1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION
establishment of the program. Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
establishment of the program shall be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING
based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or readmission. COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the
first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as
that of all other members in the same Compliance Group. 2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period
after admission or readmission, the member is not required to comply
with the program requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member shall be required to
complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal education
activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance
period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member
shall be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal
ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the
compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next
whole number.
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)
2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK
LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS EDITOR
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY
INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED TECHNICAL
REPORT/PAPER
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE
LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED

LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL
SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT
HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement
under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyers participation in the 2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF
MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for computing credit units BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR
and the supporting documents required therefor: LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW
DIRECTOR
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION
PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED
PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES
SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or non-
1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF participatory.
ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH
NUMBER OF HOURS
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units may be
1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF
claimed for:
RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR
SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS
CERTIFICATION

(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences,
conventions, symposia, in-house education programs, workshops,
dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor,
commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in
approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory
credit units may be claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or
accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book,
or book review which contribute to the legal education of the author
member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the
members practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)
SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based
on actual time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour
reported in decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS
SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of the
Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the
Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members
of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by
the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial
education;
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |3
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government
Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have
teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in accredited law
schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of
Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial
Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE . The following Members of the
Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP
Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement  A
member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as
physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.)
from compliance with or modification of any of the requirements, including an
extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established
by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of
the month in which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this
Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of
the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF

EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program.  Subject to the implementing
regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal
education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the
provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets
the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated by
law to provide continuing legal education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities.  All continuing legal education
activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical
content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related
to legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross profession
activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal
skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing
and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate
professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive
written materials must be distributed to all participants. Such materials
must be distributed at or before the time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location
so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and other
distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
SECTION 1. Accreditation  of providers.  -- Accreditation of providers shall be
done by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers.  Any person or group
may be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be
renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal education
activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers.
Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |4
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers.  -- All approved accredited providers
shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be
maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the
completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official
record of attendance only if the members signature was obtained at
the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance
shall contain the members name and number in the Roll of Attorneys
and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of
the education activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the
MCLE COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of
________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as
appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities
prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE
COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying
the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing
legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP
Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP staff Board for
purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the
activity, the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors. The
provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE MCLE
COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation
Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy
furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this
program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be
subject to appropriate sanctions.

SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation.  The accreditation of a provider
may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply
with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education
activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any
provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE
Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER
SECTION 1. Payment of fees.  Application for approval of an education activity or
accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the
Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE
Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall
complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the education
requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such
Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later than the day after
the end of the members compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. --  Each member shall maintain
sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee.
The record required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to
Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a participatory
activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by the
member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance.  The following shall constitute
non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance
period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |5
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including
evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of
such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance
notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or
intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance.  -
Members failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific
deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a
response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the
requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language near the beginning of
the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE),
YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE
PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use
this period to attain the adequate number of credit units for compliance.
Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance
with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of the
requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward
meeting the current compliance period requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee.  -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in
non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member.  -- A member who fails to comply with the
requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be
listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by
the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee.  -- Membership fees shall continue to accrue
at the active rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent
member.
 Legal Ethics No. 2Page |6

Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,

SECTION 1. Process.  -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,  and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE JJ.,  concur.
requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the Kapunan, J.,  on official leave.
necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance
during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit units may not be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number
needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward
meeting the current compliance period requirement.

SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process.  The

termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall
be made by the MCLE Committee.

Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition.  The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5)

members, namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4)
members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law
center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law
professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They
shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall
receive such compensation as may be determined by the Court.

SEC. 2. Duty of committee.  The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt
such implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule
of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE  Committee.  Subject to approval by the Supreme

Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform
the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.

SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget.  The MCLE Committee shall submit to the

Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate
and maintain the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
 Legal Ethics No. 2Page |7

(a) Plaintiff refers to the party who initiated a small claims action. The term
includes a defendant who has filed a counterclaim against plaintiff;

(b) Defendant is the party against whom the plaintiff has filed a small claims
action. The term includes a plaintiff against whom a defendant has filed a
claim, or a person who replies to the claim;

(c) Person is an individual, corporation, partnership, limited liability

partnership, association, or other juridical entity endowed with personality
by law;

(d) Individual is a natural person;

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT (e) Motion means a party's request, written or oral, to the court for an order
Manila or other action. It shall include an informal written request to the court, such
as a letter;
A. M. No. 08-8-7-SC               February 1, 2016
(f) Good cause means circumstances sufficient to justify the requested order
or other action, as determined by the judge; and,
THE REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES

(g) Affidavit means a written statement or declaration of facts that are

RESOLUTION
sworn or affirmed to be true.

Section 1. Title. - These Rules shall be known as "The Revised Rules of

Section 5. Applicability. - The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Procedure for Small Claims Cases."
Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in
all actions that are purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the
Section 2. Scope. - These Rules shall govern the procedure in actions before the plaintiff is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money.
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal
Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) for payment of money
The claim or demand may be:
where the value of the claim does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.
(a) For money owed under any of the following:
Section 3. Objectives. -
1. Contract of Lease;
(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of persons to a speedy
disposition of their cases; 2. Contract of Loan;

(b) To provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the disposition of 3. Contract of Services;
small claims cases; and,
4. Contract of Sale; or
(c) To introduce innovations and best practices for the benefit of the
underprivileged. 5. Contract of Mortgage;

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:


(b) For liquidated damages arising from contracts;
(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration
award involving a money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 of
Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of
1991.
Section 6. Commencement of Small Claims Action. - A small claims action is
commenced by filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim
(Form 1-SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by a Certification Against Forum Shopping,
Splitting a Single Cause of Action, and Multiplicity of Suits (Form 1-A SCC), and two
(2) duly certified photocopies of the actionable document/s subject of the claim, as
well as the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence to support the claim. No
evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted
together with the Statement of Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission
of additional evidence.
The plaintiff must state in the Statement of Claims if he/she/it is engaged in the
business of lending, banking and similar activities, and the number of small claims
cases filed within the calendar year regardless of judicial station.
No formal pleading, other than the Statement of Claim/s described in this Rule, is
necessary to initiate a small claims action.
Section 7. Venue. - The regular rules on venue shall apply.
However, if the plaintiff is engaged in the business of lending, banking and similar
activities, and has a branch within the municipality or city where the defendant
resides, the Statement of Claim/s shall be filed where that branch is located.
Section 8. Joinder of Claims. - Plaintiff may join in a single statement of claim one or
more separate small claims against a defendant provided that the total amount
claimed, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00).
Section 9. Affidavits. - The affidavits submitted under this Rule shall state only facts
of direct personal knowledge of the affiants or based on authentic records, which are
admissible in evidence.
A violation of this requirement shall subject the party, and the counsel who assisted
the party in the preparation of the affidavits, if any, to appropriate disciplinary action.
The inadmissible affidavit(s) or portion(s) thereof shall be expunged from the record.
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |8
The non-submission of the required affidavits will cause the immediate dismissal of
the claim or counterclaim.
Section 10. Payment of Filing Fees. - The plaintiff shall pay the docket and other
legal fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, unless allowed to
litigate as an indigent. Exemption from the payment of filing fees shall be granted
only by the Supreme Court.
However, if more than five (5) small claims are filed by one party within the calendar
year, regardless of the judicial station, an additional filing fee of P500.00 shall be paid
for every claim filed after the fifth (5th) claim, and an additional P100.00 or a total of
P600.00 for every claim filed after the tenth (10th) claim, and another P100.00 or a
total of P700 for every claim filed after the fifteenth (15th) claim, progressively and
cumulatively.
If the plaintiff is engaged in the business of banking, lending and similar activities,
the amount of filing and other legal fees shall be the same as those applicable to
cases filed under the regular rules.
A claim filed with a motion to sue as indigent (Form 6-SCC) shall be referred to the
Executive Judge for immediate action in case of multi-sala courts. If the motion is
granted by the Executive Judge, the case shall be raffled off or assigned to the court
designated to hear small claims cases. If the motion is denied, the plaintiff shall be
given five (5) days within which to pay the docket fees, otherwise, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice. In no case shall a party, even if declared an indigent, be
exempt from the payment of the P1,000.00 fee for service of summons and
processes.
Section 11. Dismissal of the Claim. - After the court determines that the case falls
under these Rules, it may, from an examination of the allegations of the Statement of
Claim/s and such evidence attached thereto, by itself, dismiss the case outright on
any of the grounds for the dismissal of the case. The order of dismissal shall state if it
is with or without prejudice.
If, during the hearing, the court is able to determine that there exists a ground for
dismissal of the Statement of Claim/s, the court may, by itself, dismiss the case even
if such ground is not pleaded in the defendant's Response.
If plaintiff misrepresents that he/she/it is not engaged in the business of banking,
lending or similar activities when in fact he/she/it is so engaged, the Statement of
Claim/s shall be dismissed with prejudice and plaintiff shall be meted the appropriate
sanctions, such as direct contempt.

However, if the case does not fall under this Rule, but falls under summary or regular
procedure, the case shall not be dismissed. Instead, the case shall be re-docketed
under the appropriate procedure, and returned to the court where it was assigned,
subject to payment of any deficiency in the applicable regular rate of filing fees. If a
case is filed under the regular or summary procedure, but actually falls under this
Rule, the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for appropriate assignment.
Section 12. Summons and Notice of Hearing. - If no ground for dismissal is found,
the court shall forthwith issue Summons (Form 2-SCC) on the day of receipt of the
Statement of Claim/s, directing the defendant to submit a verified Response.
The court shall also issue a Notice of Hearing (Form 4-SCC) to both parties, directing
them to appear before it on a specific date and time for hearing, with a warning that
no unjustified postponement shall be allowed, as provided in Section 21 of this Rule.
The Summons to be served on the defendant shall be accompanied by a copy of the
Statement of Claim/s and documents submitted by plaintiff, and a blank Response
Form (Form 3-SCC) to be accomplished by the defendant.
A Notice of Hearing shall accompany the Summons and shall contain: (a) the date of
the hearing, which shall not be more than thirty (30) days from the filing of the
Statement of Claim/s; and (b) the express prohibition against the filing of a motion to
dismiss or any other motion under Section 16 of this Rule.
If Summons is returned without being served on any or all of the defendants, the
court shall order the plaintiff to cause the service of summons and shall inform the
court within thirty (30) days from notice if said summons was served or not;
otherwise, the Statement of Claim/s shall be dismissed without prejudice as to those
who were not served with summons.
Section 13. Response. - The defendant shall file with the court and serve on the
plaintiff a duly accomplished and verified Response within a non-extendible period of
ten (10) days from receipt of summons. The Response shall be accompanied by
certified photocopies of documents, as well as affidavits of witnesses and other
evidence in support thereof. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which
was not attached to or submitted together with the Response, unless good cause is
shown for the admission of additional evidence.
Section 14. Effect of Failure to File Response. - Should the defendant fail to file
his/her/its Response within the required period, and likewise fail to appear on the
date set for hearing, the court shall render judgment on the same day, as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the Statement of Claim/s.
Legal Ethics No. 2Page |9
Should the defendant fail to file his/her/its Response within the required period but
appears on the date set for hearing, the court shall ascertain what defense he/she/it
has to offer which shall constitute his/her/its Response, and proceed to hear or
adjudicate the case on the same day as if a Response has been filed.
Section 15. Counterclaims Within the Coverage of this Rule.  - If at the time the
action is commenced, the defendant possesses a claim against the plaintiff that (a) is
within the coverage of this Rule, exclusive of interest and costs; (b) arises out of the
same transaction or event that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim; (c) does
not require for its adjudication the joinder of third parties; and (d) is not the subject
of another pending action, the claim shall be filed as a counterclaim in the Response;
otherwise, the defendant shall be barred from suing on the counterclaim.
The defendant may also elect to file a counterclaim against the plaintiff that does not
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, provided that the amount and nature
thereof are within the coverage of this Rule and the prescribed docket and other legal
fees are paid.
Section 16. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the Statement of Claim/s;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for
reopening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any other
paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory
order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply and rejoinder;

(k) Third-party complaints; and
(l) Interventions.
Section 17. Availability of Forms; Assistance by Court Personnel.  - The Clerk of
Court or other court personnel shall provide such assistance as may be requested by
a plaintiff or a defendant regarding the availability of forms and other information
about the coverage, requirements as well as procedure for small claims cases.
Section 18. Appearance. - The parties shall personally appear on the designated
date of hearing.
Appearance through a representative must be for a valid cause. The representative of
an individual-party must not be a lawyer and must be related to or next-of-kin of the
individual-party. Juridical entities shall not be represented by a lawyer in any
capacity.
The representative must be authorized under a Special Power of Attorney (Form 7-
SCC) to enter into an amicable settlement of the dispute and to enter into stipulations
or admissions of facts and of documentary exhibits.
Section 19. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. - No attorney shall appear in
behalf of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or
defendant.
If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense
and needs assistance, the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is
not an attorney to assist that party upon the latter's consent.
Section 20. Non-appearance of Parties. - Failure of the plaintiff to appear shall be
cause for the dismissal of the Statement of Claim/s without prejudice. The defendant
who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on a
permissive counterclaim.
Failure of the defendant to appear shall have the same effect as failure to file a
Response under Section 14 of this Rule.1âwphi1 This shall not apply where one of
two or more defendants who are sued under a common cause of action and have
pleaded a common defense appears at the hearing.
Failure of both parties to appear shall cause the dismissal with prejudice of both the
Statement of Claim/s and the counterclaim.
Section 21. Postponement When Allowed. - A request for postponement of a
hearing may be granted only upon proof of the physical inability of the party to
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 10
appear before the court on the scheduled date and time. A party may avail of only
one (1) postponement.
Section 22. Duty of the Court. - At the beginning of the court session, the judge
shall read aloud a short statement explaining the nature, purpose and the rule of
procedure of small claims cases.
Section 23. Hearing. - At the hearing, the judge shall first exert efforts to bring the
parties to an amicable settlement of their dispute. If efforts at settlement fail, the
hearing shall immediately proceed in an informal and expeditious manner and be
terminated within the same day.
Any settlement (Form 8-SCC) or resolution of the dispute shall be reduced into
writing, signed by the parties and submitted to the court for approval (Form 9-SCC
and Form 10-SCC).
Section 24. Decision. - After the hearing, the court shall render its decision based on
the facts established by the evidence (Form 11-SCC), within twenty-four (24) hours
from termination of the hearing. The decision shall immediately be entered by the
Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served
on the parties.
The decision shall be final, executory and unappealable.
Section 25. Execution. - When the decision is rendered, execution shall issue upon
motion (Form 12-SCC) of the winning party.
Section 26. Certification of Documents. - All documents attached to the Statement
of Claim/s or Response that are required to be certified, except public or official
documents, shall be certified by the signature of the plaintiff or defendant concerned.
Section 27. Applicability of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  - The Rules of Civil
Procedure shall apply suppletorily insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Rule.
Section 28. Non-applicability. - The rules on mediation/judicial dispute resolution
shall not apply, inasmuch as the parties may enter into compromise at any stage of
the proceedings.
Section 29. Effectivity. - These Revised Rules shall take effect on February 1, 2016
following their publication in two newspapers of general circulation. They shall govern
all cases filed after their effectivity, and also all pending proceedings, except to the
extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or
would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed
shall govern.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 11

The following forms shall be used. Substantial compliance therewith shall be

sufficient.
(See attached forms)

INDEX OF SMALL CLAIMS STANDARD FORMS

FORM 1-SCC Statement of Claim/s

FORM 1-A-SCC Verification and Certification Against Forum

Shopping, Splitting a Single Cause of Action and
Multiplicity of Suits

FORM 2-SCC Summons

FORM 3-SCC Response

FORM 4-SCC Notice of Hearing

FORM 5-SCC Plaintiff’s Return/Manifestation

FORM 5-A-SCC Plaintiff’s Return/Manifestation (with substituted

service)

FORM 6-SCC Motion to Plead as Indigent

FORM 7-SCC Special Power of Attorney

FORM 8-SCC Joint Motion (for Dismissal)

FORM 9-SCC Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreement

FORM 10-SCC Decision based on Compromise Agreement

FORM 11-SCC Decision

FORM 12-SCC Motion for Execution


A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT
JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE
OF DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY MEASURES
RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the
Rules of Court submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed
Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the
Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures, the Court Resolved
to APPROVE the same. The said Rule is hereto attached as an integral part of this
Resolution.
The Rule shall take effect on August 16, 2004 following its publication in a newspaper
of general circulation not later than July 30, 2004.
GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF
COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF DEPOSITION-
DISCOVERY MEASURES
The use of pre-trial and the deposition-discovery measures are undeniably important
and vital components of case management in trial courts. To abbreviate court
proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases and decongest court dockets, and to
further implement the pre-trial guidelines laid down in Administrative Circular No. 3-
99 dated January 15, 1999 and except as otherwise specifically provided for in other
special rules, the following guidelines are issued for the observance and guidance of
trial judges and clerks of court:
I. PRE-TRIAL
A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint:
1.1 Summons shall be prepared and shall contain a reminder to defendant to
observe restraint in filing a motion to dismiss and instead allege the grounds thereof
as defenses in the Answer, in conformity with IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy
Guidelines dated March 12, 2002. A copy of the summons is hereto attached as
Annex "A;" and
1.2 The court shall issue an order requiring the parties to avail of
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 and request for admission by adverse party
under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of dispositions under Rule 23 or other
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 12
measures under Rules 27 and 28 within five days from the filing of the answer. 1 A
copy of the order shall be served upon the defendant together with the
summons and upon the plaintiff.
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, 2 the plaintiff must promptly
move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. 3If the plaintiff fails to
file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-
trial.
2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs
containing the following: 4
a. A statement of their willingness to enter into an amicable settlement
indicating the desired terms thereof or to submit the case to any of the alternative
modes of dispute resolution;
b. A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
c. The issues to be tried or resolved;
d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof.
(No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support
of a party's evidence-in-chief other than those that had been earlier identified and
pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court for good cause
shown);
e. A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail
themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners; and
f. The number and names of the witnesses, the substance of their
testimonies, and the approximate number of hours that will be required by the parties
for the presentation of their respective witnesses. A copy of the Notice of Pre-trial
Conference is hereto attached as Annex "B."The rule on the contents of the pre-trial
brief must strictly be complied with.The parties are bound by the representations and
statements in their respective pre-trial briefs.
3. At the start of the pre-trial conference, the judge shall immediately refer the
parties and/or their counsel if authorized by their clients to the PMC mediation unit
for purposes of mediation if available. 5 If mediation fails, the judge will schedule the
continuance of the pre-trial conference. Before then, the Judge may refer the case to
the Branch COC for a preliminary conference to assist the parties in reaching a
settlement, to mark the documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties and
copies thereof to be attached to the records after comparison and to consider such
other matters as may aid in its prompt disposition. 6
During the preliminary conference, the Branch COC shall also ascertain from the
parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of
the documents marked as exhibits. The proceedings during the preliminary
conference shall be recorded in the "Minutes of Preliminary Conference" to be signed
by both parties and/or counsel, the form of which is hereto attached as Annex "C".
The minutes of preliminary conference and the exhibits shall be attached by the
Branch COC to the case record before the pre-trial
4. Before the continuation of the pre-trial conference, the judge must study all the
pleadings of the case, and determine the issues thereof and the respective positions

of the parties thereon to enable him to intelligently steer the parties toward a
possible amicable settlement of the case, or, at the very least, to help reduce and
limit the issues. The judge should not allow the termination of pre-trial simply
because of the manifestation of the parties that they cannot settle the case. He
should expose the parties to the advantages of pre-trial. He must also be mindful that
there are other important aspects of the pre-trial that ought to be taken up to
expedite the disposition of the case. 7
The Judge with all tact, patience, impartiality and with due regard to the rights of the
parties shall endeavor to persuade them to arrive at a settlement of the
dispute. 8 The court shall initially ask the parties and their lawyers if an amicable
settlement of the case is possible. If not, the judge may confer with the parties with
the opposing counsel to consider the following:
a. Given the evidence of the plaintiff presented in his pre-trial brief to
support his claim, what manner of compromise is considered acceptable to the
defendant at the present stage?
b. Given the evidence of the defendant described in his pre-trial brief to
support his defense, what manner of compromise is considered acceptable to the
plaintiff at the present stage?
If not successful, the court shall confer with the party and his counsel separately.
If the manner of compromise is not acceptable, the judge shall confer with the
parties without their counsel for the same purpose of settlement.
5. If all efforts to settle fail, the trial judge shall:
a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial
proceedings and confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and
admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents;
b. Inquire if there are cases arising out of the same facts pending before
other courts and order its consolidation if warranted;
c. Inquire if the pleadings are in order. If not, order the amendments if
necessary;
d. Inquire if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve the same;
e. Consider the adding or dropping of parties;
f. Scrutinize every single allegation of the complaint, answer and other
pleadings and attachments thereto and the contents of documents and all other
evidence identified and pre-marked during pre-trial in determining further admissions
of facts and documents. To obtain admissions, the Court shall ask the parties to
submit the depositions taken under Rule 23, the answers to written interrogatories
under Rule 25 and the answers to request for admissions by the adverse party under
Rule 26. It may also require the production of documents or things requested by a
party under Rule 27 and the results of the physical and mental examination of
persons under Rule 28;
g. Define and simplify the factual and legal issues arising from the pleadings.
Uncontroverted issues and frivolous claims or defenses should be eliminated. For
each factual issue, the parties/counsel shall state all the evidence to support their
positions thereon. For each legal issue, parties/counsel shall state the applicable law
and jurisprudence supporting their respective positions thereon. If only legal issues
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 13
are presented, the judge shall require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda and the court can proceed to render judgment; 9
h. Determine the propriety of rendering a summary judgment dismissing the
case based on the disclosures made at the pre-trial or a judgment based on the
pleadings, evidence identified and admissions made during pre-trial; 10
i. Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates for continuous trial in
accordance with Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989; adhere to the case flow
chart determined by the court, which shall contain the different stages of the
proceedings up to the promulgation of the decision and use the time frame for each
stage in setting the trial dates. The One-Day Examination of Witness Rule, that is, a
witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day only, shall be strictly adhered to
subject to the courts' discretion during trial on whether or not to extend the direct
and/or cross-examination for justifiable reasons. On the last hearing day allotted for
each party, he is required to make his formal offer of evidence after the presentation
of his last witness and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose his
objection thereto. Thereafter, the Judge shall make the ruling on the offer of
evidence in open court. However the judge has the discretion to allow the offer of
evidence in writing in conformity with Section 35, Rule 132;
j. Determine the most important witnesses to be heard and limit the number
of witnesses (Most Important Witness Rule). The facts to be proven by each witness
and the approximate number of hours per witness shall be fixed;
k. At his discretion, order the parties to use the affidavits of witnesses as
direct testimonies subject to the right to object to inadmissible portions thereof and
to the right of cross-examination by the other party. The affidavits shall be based on
personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. The affidavits shall be in question and answer form, and shall comply with
the rules on admissibility of evidence;
l. Require the parties and/or counsel to submit to the Branch COC the
names, addresses and contact numbers of the witnesses to be summoned by
subpoena;
m. Order the delegation of the reception of evidence to the Branch COC
under Rule 30; and
n. Refer the case to a trial by commissioner under Rule 32
During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask questions on issues raised
therein and all questions or comments by counsel or parties must be directed to the
judge to avoid hostilities between the parties.
6. The trial judge shall schedule the pre-trial in the afternoon sessions and set as
many pre-trial conferences as may be necessary.
7. All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded. The minutes of each pre-trial
conference shall contain matters taken up therein more particularly admissions of
facts and exhibits and shall be signed by the parties and their counsel.
8. The judge shall issue the required Pre-Trial Order within ten (10) days after the
termination of the pre-trial. Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters

not disposed of and control the course of the action during the trial. A sample Pre-
Trial Order is hereto attached as Annex "D."
However, the Court may opt to dictate the Pre-Trial Order in open court in the
presence of the parties and their counsel and with the use of a computer, shall have
the same immediately finalized and printed. Once finished, the parties and/or their
counsel shall sign the same to manifest their conformity thereto.
9. The court shall endeavor to make the parties agree to an equitable compromise or
settlement at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment.
B. Criminal Cases
1. Before arraignment, the Court shall issue an order directing the public prosecutor
to submit the record of the preliminary investigation to the Branch COC for the latter
to attach the same to the record of the criminal case.
Where the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its
records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three days from
the filing of the complaint or information. The accused shall be arraigned within ten
days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial of his case shall be held within ten days
after arraignment unless a shorter period is provided for by law. 11
2. After the arraignment, the court shall forthwith set the pre-trial conference within
thirty days from the date of arraignment, and issue an order: (a) requiring the private
offended party to appear thereat for purposes of plea-bargaining except for violations
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and for other matters requiring
his presence; 12 (b) referring the case to the Branch COC, if warranted, for a
preliminary conference to be set at least three days prior to the pre-trial to mark the
documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties and copies thereof to be
attached to the records after comparison and to consider other matters as may aid in
its prompt disposition; and (c) informing the parties that no evidence shall be allowed
to be presented and offered during the trial other than those identified and marked
during the pre-trial except when allowed by the court for good cause shown. A copy
of the order is hereto attached as Annex "E". In mediatable cases, the judge shall
refer the parties and their counsel to the PMC unit for purposes of mediation if
available.
3. During the preliminary conference, the Branch COC shall assist the parties in
reaching a settlement of the civil aspect of the case, mark the documents to be
presented as exhibits and copies thereof attached to the records after comparison,
ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness
and due execution of documents marked as exhibits and consider such other matters
as may aid in the prompt disposition of the case. The proceedings during the
preliminary conference shall be recorded in the Minutes of Preliminary Conference to
be signed by both parties and counsel. (Please see Annex "B")
The Minutes of Preliminary Conference and the exhibits shall be attached by the
Branch COC to the case record before the pre-trial.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 14
4. Before the pre-trial conference the judge must study the allegations of the
information, the statements in the affidavits of witnesses and other documentary
evidence which form part of the record of the preliminary investigation.
5. During the pre-trial, except for violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, the trial judge shall consider plea-bargaining arrangements. 13 Where
the prosecution and the offended party agree to the plea offered by the accused, the
court shall:
a. Issue an order which contains the plea-bargaining arrived at;
b. Proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect of the case; and
c. Render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including the civil liability
or damages duly established by the evidence. 14
6. When plea bargaining fails, the Court shall:
a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial
proceedings, confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and admissions
on the genuineness and due execution of documents and list object and testimonial
evidence;
b. Scrutinize every allegation of the information and the statements in the
affidavits and other documents which form part of the record of the preliminary
investigation and other documents identified and marked as exhibits in determining
further admissions of facts, documents and in particular as to the following: 15
1. the identity of the accused;
2. court's territorial jurisdiction relative to the offense/s charged;
3. qualification of expert witness/es;
4. amount of damages;
5. genuineness and due execution of documents;
6. the cause of death or injury, in proper cases;
7. adoption of any evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation;
8. disclosure of defenses of alibi, insanity, self-defense, exercise of
public authority and justifying or exempting circumstances; and
9. such other matters that would limit the facts in issue.
c. Define factual and legal issues;
d. Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates and adhere to the flow
chart determined by the court which shall contain the time frames for the different
stages of the proceeding up to promulgation of decision and use the time frame for
each stage in setting the trial dates;
e. Require the parties to submit to the Branch COC the names, addresses
and contact numbers of witnesses that need to be summoned by subpoena; 16 and
f. Consider modification of order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense.
7. During the pre-trial, the judge shall be the one to ask questions on issues raised
therein and all questions must be directed to him to avoid hostilities between parties.

8. All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall
be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot
be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in
Section 1 of Rule 118 shall be approved by the court. (Section 2, Rule 118)
9. All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded, the transcripts prepared and
the minutes signed by the parties and/or their counsels.
10. The trial judge shall issue a Pre-trial Order within ten (10) days after the
termination of the pre-trial setting forth the actions taken during the pre-trial
conference, the facts stipulated, the admissions made, evidence marked, the number
of witnesses to be presented and the schedule of trial. Said Order shall bind the
parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of the action
during the trial. 17
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
Whereas, case congestion and delays plague most courts in cities, given the huge
volume of cases filed each year and the slow and cumbersome adversarial syste1n
that the judiciary has in place;
Whereas, about 40% of criminal cases are dismissed annually owing to the fact that
complainants simply give up con1ing to court after repeated postponements;
Whereas, few foreign businessmen make long-term investments in the Philippines
because its courts are unable to provide ample and speedy protection to their
investments, keeping its people poor;
Whereas, in order to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of
witnesses in cases under litigation, on February 21, 2012 the Supreme Court
approved for piloting by trial courts in Quezon City the compulsory use of judicial
affidavits in place of the direct testimonies of witnesses;
Whereas, it is reported that such piloting has quickly resulted in reducing by about
two-thirds the time used for presenting the testimonies of witnesses, thus speeding
up the hearing and adjudication of cases;
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 15
Whereas, the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
headed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and the Sub-Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on Civil Procedure, headed by Associate Justice Roberto A.
Abad, have recommended for adoption a Judicial Affidavit Rule that will replicate
nationwide the success of the Quezon City experience in the use of judicial affidavits;
and
Whereas, the Supreme Court En Banc finds merit in the recommendation;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the
following:
Section 1. Scope. - (a) This Rule shall apply to all actions, proceedings, and
incidents requiring the reception of evidence before:
(1) The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
and the Shari' a Circuit Courts but shall not apply to small claims
cases under A.M. 08-8-7-SC;
(2) The Regional Trial Courts and the Shari'a District Courts;
(3) The Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of
Appeals, and the Shari'a Appellate Courts;
(4) The investigating officers and bodies authorized by the
Supreme Court to receive evidence, including the Integrated Bar of
the Philippine (IBP); and
(5) The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, whose rules of
procedure are subject to disapproval of the Supreme Court, insofar
as their existing rules of procedure contravene the provisions of this
Rule.1
(b) For the purpose of brevity, the above courts, quasi-judicial bodies, or
investigating officers shall be uniformly referred to here as the "court."
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct
testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party,
personally or by licensed courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial or
preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing with respect to motions and
incidents, the following:

(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the
place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any, which
shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and marked as Exhibits A,
B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff, and
as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the
defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or
object evidence in his possession, he may, after the same has been
identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial
affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such affidavit is a faithful
copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or witness shall
bring the original document or object evidence for comparison during the
preliminary conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures,
failing which the latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the
original when allowed by existing rules.
Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. - A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the
language known to the witness and, if not in English or Filipino, accompanied by a
translation in English or Filipino, and shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the
witness;
(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the
examination of the witness and the place where the examination is being
held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him,
fully conscious that he does so under oath, and that he may face criminal
liability for false testimony or perjury;
(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers,
consecutively numbered, that:
(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the
facts upon which he testifies;
(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that
the case presents; and
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 16
(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and
establish their authenticity in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath
or an officer who is authorized by law to administer the same.
Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer. - (a) The judicial affidavit shall contain a
sworn attestation at the end, executed by the lawyer who conducted or supervised
the examination of the witness, to the effect that:
(1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the questions
he asked and the corresponding answers that the witness gave;
and
(2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting him
coached the witness regarding the latter's answers.
(b) A false attestation shall subject the lawyer mentioned to disciplinary
action, including disbarment.
Section 5. Subpoena. - If the government employee or official, or the requested
witness, who is neither the witness of the adverse party nor a hostile witness,
unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to
make the relevant books, documents, or other things under his control available for
copying, authentication, and eventual production in court, the requesting party may
avail himself of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under
Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to the
witness in this case shall be the same as when taking his deposition except that the
taking of a judicial affidavit shal1 be understood to be ex parte.
Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial affidavit. - The party
presenting the judicial affidavit of his witness in place of direct testimony shall state
the purpose of such testimony at the start of the presentation of the witness. The
adverse party may move to disqualify the witness or to strike out his affidavit or any
of the answers found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The court shall promptly rule
on the motion and, if granted, shall cause the marking of any excluded answer by
placing it in brackets under the initials of an authorized court personnel, without
prejudice to a tender of excluded evidence under Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.
Section 7. Examination of the witness on his judicial affidavit.  - The adverse party
shall have the right to cross-examine the witness on his judicial affidavit and on the

exhibits attached to the same. The party who presents the witness may also examine
him as on re-direct. In every case, the court shall take active part in examining the
witness to determine his credibility as well as the truth of his testimony and to elicit
the answers that it needs for resolving the issues.
Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits. - (a) Upon the termination of the
testimony of his last witness, a party shall immediately make an oral offer of evidence
of his documentary or object exhibits, piece by piece, in their chronological order,
stating the purpose or purposes for which he offers the particular exhibit.
(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse party shall state the
legal ground for his objection, if any, to its admission, and the court shall
immediately make its ruling respecting that exhibit.
(c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of the judicial
affidavits that describe and authenticate them, it is sufficient that such
exhibits are simply cited by their markings during the offers, the objections,
and the rulings, dispensing with the description of each exhibit.
Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. - (a) This rule shall apply to all
criminal actions:
(1) Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed
six years;
(2) Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits,
irrespective of the penalty involved; or
(3) With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the
penalties involved are.
(b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not
later than five days before the pre-trial, serving copies if the same upon the
accused. The complainant or public prosecutor shall attach to the affidavits
such documentary or object evidence as he may have, marking them as
Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial affidavit, documentary, or
object evidence shall be admitted at the trial.
(c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the
judicial affidavits of the prosecution, he shall have the option to submit his
judicial affidavit as well as those of his witnesses to the court within ten
days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of each on the public
and private prosecutor, including his documentary and object evidence
previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These affidavits shall serve
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 17
as direct testimonies of the accused and his witnesses when they appear
before the court to testify.
Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule.  - (a) A party
who fails to submit the required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be
deemed to have waived their submission. The court may, however, allow only once
the late submission of the same provided, the delay is for a valid reason, would not
unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less
than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00 at the discretion of the court.
(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to
appear at the scheduled hearing of the case as required. Counsel who fails
to appear without valid cause despite notice shall be deemed to have waived
his client's right to confront by cross-examination the witnesses there
present.
(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not
conform to the content requirements of Section 3 and the attestation
requirement of Section 4 above. The court may, however, allow only once
the subsequent submission of the compliant replacement affidavits before
the hearing or trial provided the delay is for a valid reason and would not
unduly prejudice the opposing party and provided further, that public or
private counsel responsible for their preparation and submission pays a fine
of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00, at the discretion of
the court.
Section 11. Repeal or modification of inconsistent rules.  - The provisions of the
Rules of Court and the rules of procedure governing investigating officers and bodies
authorized by the Supreme Court to receive evidence are repealed or modified insofar
as these are inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.1âwphi1
The rules of procedure governing quasi-judicial bodies inconsistent herewith are
hereby disapproved.
Section 12. Effectivity. - This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 following its
publication in two newspapers of general circulation not later than September 15,
2012. It shall also apply to existing cases.
Manila, September 4, 2012.

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC
EFFICIENT USE OF PAPER RULE
Whereas, to produce 500 reams of paper, twenty trees are cut and 100,000 liters of
water are used, water that is no longer reusable because it is laden with chemicals
and is just released to the environment to poison our rivers and seas;
Whereas, there is a need to cut the judicial system’s use excessive quantities of costly
paper, save our forests, avoid landslides, and mitigate the worsening effects of
climate change that the world is experiencing;
Whereas, the judiciary can play a big part in saving our trees, conserving precious
water and helping mother earth;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the
following:
Sec. 1. Title of the Rule– This rule shall be known and cited as the Efficient Use of
Paper Rule.
Sec. 2. Applicability. – This rule shall apply to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies
under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 3. Format and Style. – a) All pleadings, motions and similar papers intended for
the court and quasi-judicial body’s consideration and action (court-bound papers)
shall written in single space with one-and-a –half space between paragraphs, using
an easily readable font style of the party’s choice, of 14-size font, and on a 13 –inch
by 8.5- inch white bond paper; and
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 18
b) All decisions, resolutions and orders issued by courts and quasi-judicial bodies
under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court shall comply with these
requirements. Similarly covered are the reports submitted to the courts and
transcripts of stenographic notes.
Sec. 4. Margins and Prints  .— The parties shall maintain the following margins on all
court-bound papers: a left hand margin of 1.5 inches from the edge; an upper margin
of 1.2 inches from the edge; a right hand margin of 1.0 inch from the edge; and a
lower margin of 1.0 inch from the edge. Every page must be consecutively numbered.
Sec. 5.  Copies to be filed. – Unless otherwise directed by the court, the number of
court- bound papers that a party is required or desires to file shall be as follows:
a. In the Supreme Court, one original (properly marked) and four copies, unless the
case is referred to the Court En Banc, in which event, the parties shall file ten
additional copies. For the En Banc, the parties need to submit only two sets of
annexes, one attached to the original and an extra copy. For the Division, the parties
need to submit also two sets of annexes, one attached to the original and an extra
copy. All members of the Court shall share the extra copies of annexes in the interest
of economy of paper.
Parties to cases before the Supreme Court are further required, on voluntary basis for
the first six months following the effectivity of this Rule and compulsorily afterwards
unless the period is extended, to submit, simultaneously with their court-bound
papers, soft copies of the same and their annexes (the latter in PDF format) either by
email to the Court’s e-mail address or by compact disc (CD). This requirement is in
preparation for the eventual establishment of an e-filing paperless system in the
judiciary.
b. In the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, one original (properly marked)
and two copies with their annexes;
c. In the Court of Tax Appeals, one original (properly marked) and two copies with
annexes. On appeal to the En Banc, one Original (properly marked) and eight copies
with annexes; and
d. In other courts, one original (properly marked) with the stated annexes attached
to it.
Sec. 6. Annexes Served on Adverse Party. – A party required by the rules to serve a
copy of his court-bound on the adverse party need not enclose copies of those
annexes that based on the record of the court such party already has in his
possession. In the event a party requests a set of the annexes actually filed with the

court, the part who filed the paper shall comply with the request within five days
from receipt.
Sec. 7. Date of Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 after
publication in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Manila, November 13, 2012.
Adm. Case No. 2343. July 30, 1982.*
FACUNDO LUBIANO, complainant, vs. JOEL G. GORDOLLA, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Statements in motion for reconsideration
before the NLRC violative of Canons of Professional Ethics they being beyond the
bounds of propriety and civility.—While the aforequoted paragraph does not
constitute sufficient cause for disbarment of respondent, We are not inclined to
disregard the insouciant language used by respondent as merely trivial and
innocuous. The language of a lawyer, oral or written, must be respectful and
restrained, in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. It is through a
scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his
observance or respect due to the courts and judicial officers, as mandated by Section
20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Respondent’s choice of words manifestly falls short of this criterion. In describing the
award of separation pay to complainant Lubiano as “ill-gotten wealth”, the decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission, an administrative body exercising quasi-
judicial functions, as an “unknowing” one, and the sheriff’s office as a “partner in
‘crime’ ”, respondent precariously ventured beyond the bounds of propriety and
civility.
Same; Same; Same; Defense of zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of
lawyer’s duty to uphold client’s cause unavailing; First duty of lawyer not to client but
to the administration of justice.—Respondent’s attempt to escape responsibility by
attributing said statements to his zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of his duty
to uphold his client’s cause, is unavailing. x x x Respondent became unmindful of the
fact that in addressing the National Labor Relations Commission, he nonetheless
remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is
not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be
and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 19
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Absolute privileged communication; Lapses in
observance of duty of lawyer as member of the legal profession subject to Supreme
Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers despite rule that statements made in
pleadings are absolutely privileged communication.—We find no necessity to dwell at
length on the issue as to whether or not the statements in question are relevant, for
in either case this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its supervisory authority
over lawyer who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as
members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged communication absolves
beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal liability based on the statements made
in the pleadings. But like the member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from
civil and criminal liability arising from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan
or in any committee thereof, but nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary
authority of the legislature for said speech or debate, a lawyer equally remains
subject to this Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the
observance of his duty as a member of the legal profession.
Same; Same; Same; Fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency imposed
on erring lawyer.—Respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla is hereby ordered to pay a fine
of P200.00, payable to the Clerk of this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this
decision, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is further warned
that a repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more severely.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
ESCOLIN, J.:
The Canons of Professional Ethics imposes upon the lawyer the duty of maintaining a
respectful attitude towards the court. He is likewise expected to treat adverse
witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration. As such, he should never
minister to the malevolence or prejudice of a client in a trial or conduct of a cause1.
He should be temperate in acts and words, a paragon in civility.
For what is claimed as a failure of Atty. Joel G. Gordolla to observe this standard, his
disbarment is sought by complainant Facundo Lubiano.
Complainant describes the following statements contained in a motion for
reconsideration with prayer for restraining order filed by respondent Gordolla, as
counsel for Robina Farms, Inc., in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-22635-78-T:

“Meanwhile, the complainant, very eager to get hold of the illgotten wealth (thru
unknowing award by the Hon. Commission) has used the Sheriff’s Office as his
partner in ‘crime’ and the latter thru Sheriff Juanito Atienza, is now and about to
enforce the terror (sic) of the award thru Writ of Execution.”
While the aforequoted paragraph does not constitute sufficient cause for disbarment
of respondent, We are not inclined to disregard the insouciant language used by
respondent as merely trivial and innocuous. The language of a lawyer, oral or written,
must be respectful and restrained, in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.
It is through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best
demonstrates his observance or respect due to the courts and judicial officers, as
mandated by Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Respondent’s choice of words manifestly falls short of this
criterion. In describing the award of separation pay to complainant Lubiano as “ill-
gotten wealth”, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, an
administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, as an “unknowing” one, and
the sheriff’s office as a “partner in ‘crime’ ”, respondent precariously ventured beyond
the bounds of propriety and civility.
Respondent’s attempt to escape responsibility by attributing said statements to his
zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of his duty to uphold his client’s cause, is
unavailing. As this Court said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer2:
“It is but to repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is
not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if chanelled in the right
direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with
due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government.”
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor
Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound
servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law
and ethics3.
Respondent would argue that the statements in question, being relevant and
pertinent to the subject of inquiry in said case, are covered by the mantle of absolute
privileged communication; and that, as such, they cannot be used as basis for any
action, however false and malicious the statements may be. We find no necessity to
dwell at length on the issue as to whether or not the statements in question are
relevant, for in either case this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its
supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard
expected of them as members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged
communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal liability based
on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the member of the legislature who
enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising from any speech or debate
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 20
delivered in the Batasan or in any committee thereof4, but nevertheless remains
subject to the disciplinary authority of the legislature for said speech or debate5, a
lawyer equally remains subject to this Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers for
lapses in the observance of his duty as a member of the legal profession.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla is hereby ordered to pay
a fine of P200.00, payable to the Clerk of this Court within ten (10) days from notice
of this decision, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is further
warned that a repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro,
JJ., concur.
Respondent fined P200.00.
Notes.—The use of intemperate or highly derogatory language in a pleading, such as
“this is not the kind of administration of justice that should be made to prevail in this
court. This is obnoxious to the principle of the New Society, abhorrent to the
elementary principles of fair play,” constitutes direct contempt. The penalty of
suspension from the practice of law imposed by the trial court, however, is
disproportionate to the offense committed. (Calo, Jr. vs. Tapucar, 88 SCRA 78.)
Statements by attorney imputing irregularity in internal procedures of the Supreme
Court and laxity in similar matters are contemptuous. (Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals,
87 SCRA 67.)
Failure of attorney to file comment as required by Supreme Court within the period
provided by the Court and failure to provide satisfactory explanation for such
negligence justify the imposition of disciplinary action. (Luzon Mahogany Timber
Industries, Inc. vs. Castro, 69 SCRA 384.)
Counsel who filed a motion for inhibition by a judge on mistaken motion that a
relative of his client had filed an administrative case against the judge and who
sought forgiveness for such mistakes is admonished. (Mangahas vs. Perez, 72 SCRA
230.)
——o0o——

A.C. No. 3452. June 23, 2014.*
HENRY SAMONTE, petitioner, vs. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, respondent.  Same; Same; Preponderance of Evidence; In disciplinary proceedings against
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every
lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy.—In his
dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest,
imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and
demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the
Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that
every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the
Law Profession.
Same; Same; Lawyer’s Oath; By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not
only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or
out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to his clients.—By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only
to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of
court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe
and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by
others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
to wit: Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 21
Rule 11.02 — A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings. Rule 18.04 — A
lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
Same; Same; A lawyer ought to remember that honesty and integrity were of far
greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession than his transactions with
his client.—Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and
trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the
trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by superimposing “0” on “4” in order to
mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed the complaint in court on
June 10, 1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had
actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the belated
filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his
acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification,
because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by
whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and
integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession than
his transactions with his client.
lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers.—In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers. Preponderant evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than
that of the other. In order to determine if the evidence of one party is greater than
that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that the court
may consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;
(b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts
to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the
same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it
does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
Same; Same; Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices
to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting
public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and
highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession.—Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath.
Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law
Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover

up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public,
evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and
highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for
the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.  2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy of the
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Falsification of Documents, Dereliction
of Duty, Gross Negligence and Tardiness in Attending the Scheduled Hearings, and
Dishonesty.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.  as the counsel. In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty. Abellana noted the
BERSAMIN, J.: 
A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his
clients on the status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member of
the Law Profession. This is because he is always expected to be honest and forthright
in his dealings with them. He thereby merits the condign sanction of suspension from
the practice of law, if not disbarment.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative
complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had represented him as
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-6970 entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v.
Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.1 In the
administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional
misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:
1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed
Civil Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement,
although the complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988;
2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-à-vis the
answer with counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case;
(b) inform the trial court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a
scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for the plaintiff’s side an unexplained absence
detrimental to Samonte as the plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial
judge, only to eventually submit it three months later;
3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings; and
4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by
Samonte for his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.
To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following annexes,
namely:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 22
1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in the RTC and
of the cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;2
order issued on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that “[t]he formal offer
of plaintiff’s exhibits is rather very late;”3 and
3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana had
failed to promptly attend court hearings and to do other legal services required of him
motion subject to the reservation that his attorneys fees should still be paid.4
On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the
administrative complaint.
In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification
of documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on
June 14, 1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough
money to cover the filing fees and other charges totaling P5,027.76; and that
Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00, contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on
paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing fees. He
asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed the
reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer with counterclaim of the
defendants on August 2, 1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply (Annex 8
and Annex 9 of his comment);6 and that it was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled
the pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his nonattendance at the hearings in Civil
Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had informed the RTC of his
having been either stranded in another province, or having attended the arraignment
of another client in another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his
arrival in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal
offer of exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate
originals of the documentary exhibits despite his request because of the latter’s
absence from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had been
dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in
contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his acceptance
fees in addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered by receipts
issued by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued for the
P200.00/appearance fee conformably with the practice of most lawyers; and that
Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.
Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion to change
counsel,8 stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him
beforehand on the intention of not meeting his obligation to him as the counsel; that
Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check after the Branch Clerk of Court had
told him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried

Atty. Abellana’s conformity as the counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged the
check.9
On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samonte’s letter dated May 8, 199010
embodying additional charges of falsification of documents, dereliction of duty and
dishonesty based on the reply and the annexes Atty. Abellana had filed. Samonte
noted in the letter that the reply attached to the comment of Atty. Abellana was not
authentic based on the categorical statement of the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 5
of the RTC in Cebu City to the effect that no such reply had been filed in behalf of
Samonte; and that the rubber stamp affixed on the reply supposedly filed by Atty.
Abellana in Samonte’s behalf was not also the official rubber stamp of Branch 5.11
Samonte denied being the cause of delay in the submission of the formal offer of
exhibits, and reminded that the documentary exhibits concerned had been shown to
the trial court during his testimony, with the opposing party not even objecting to
their authenticity.
Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his legal
services stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the amount
demanded was P1.12 Million;12 that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of P7,027.00 for
filing expenses, plus P5,000.00 that he gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellana’s
services after discovering the latter’s inefficiency and fraudulent practices.
On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the administrative
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
Proceedings in the IBP
On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present their
evidence at 10:00 am on November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties sought
postponements.16 The hearing was reset several times more for various reasons,
namely: on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP Commissioner being out of town, but
telegrams were sent to the parties on December 6, 1994;17 on April 12, 2002, with
the hearing being cancelled;18 and on March 7, 2003, with the hearing being
cancelled until further notice.19
On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005 from
Atty. Abellana,20 seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the
lack of interest on the part of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte
had always sought the postponement of the hearings.
Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed
on February 9, 2005,21 declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative complaint
against Atty. Abellana.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 23
On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the
mandatory conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte
appeared;23 hence, the IBP just required the parties to submit their verified position
papers within 30 days from notice. Nonetheless, the IBP scheduled the clarificatory
hearing on August 18, 2005.24
Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August 9, 2005, Atty.
Abellana requested an extension of his period to submit his own position paper
allegedly to allow him to secure relevant documents from the trial court.26
On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case was
thereafter deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper,
reiterating his allegations against Atty. Abellana.27 Also on August 29, 2005, Atty.
Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated August 17, 2005,28 in which he
represented that although he had been at times late for the hearings he had
nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte; that he had
not caused any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who had been unavailable at
times because of his work as an airline pilot; that the complainant had discharged
him as his counsel in order to avoid paying his obligation to him; and that the
complainant filed this disbarment case after he lost his own civil case in the RTC. He
attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the complainant, except the
above stated replies.
On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana
negligent in handling certain aspects of his client’s case, like not filing a reply to the
defendants’ answer with counterclaims in order to deny the new matters raised in the
answer; resorting to falsehood to make it appear that he had filed the reply; and
being considerably late in submitting the formal offer of exhibits for Samonte, as
noted even by the trial judge in the order dated January 19, 1990. It observed that
although the negligence of Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice his client’s
case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to
falsehood and deceitful practices were a different matter;30 noted that he had twice
resorted to falsehood, the first being when he tried to make it appear that the
complaint had been filed on June 10, 1988 despite the court records showing that the
complaint had been actually filed only on June 14, 1988; and the second being when
he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the reply by producing a
document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively different from that of the trial
court’s; that he did not dispute the pieces of material evidence adduced against him;
that he had explained that the reason for his delay in the filing of the complaint had
been the complainant’s failure to pay the agreed fees on time; and that he had only
stated that he had filed a reply, without presenting proof of his having actually filed
such in court.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Abellana, observing as follows:
x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said respondent
has shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to cover-up
his delay and lack of diligence in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a
whole, the respondent’s acts are nothing short of deplorable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
Atty. Gines Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false
and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as
befits a member of the bar. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for
one year, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex “A,” and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and for resorting to falsehood and/or
deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits
member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year.31 (Bold emphasis supplied)
On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the
following grounds:32
A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned from the
practice of law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical conduct
committed by the respondent;
B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully supported with
evidence;
C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by testimonial evidence
so that it is hearsay and self-serving.
In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous arguments,
and stated that the “enumerations of failures are belied by the existence of Reply to
counterclaims, which were attached as Annexes “8” and “9” of the Position
Paper of respondent.”33 It is noted, however, that Annex 8 and Annex 9 of Atty.
Abellana’s position paper were different documents, namely: Annex 834
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 24
(Manifestation and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Counsel); and Annex
935 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were already part
of the records of the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch
Clerk of Court, did not execute any affidavit or certification to the effect that both
documents were inexistent. He reminded that Samonte had only said that both
documents “seemed to be falsified documents” based on the certification of Atty.
Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.
The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellana’s motion for
reconsideration.36
In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his allegations against
Atty. Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges against him;
and noted that the reply that Atty. Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not
even annexed either to his position paper and motion for reconsideration.
On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to
submit certified true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in the
RTC.38
On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39
On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration.40
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration
of Atty. Abellana.41
Ruling
We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of their
being substantiated by the records.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be
honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and
demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the
Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that
every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the
Law Profession, thus:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will

delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to
the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land
but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to
the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.
Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law
as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others.42 It is by no means a
coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically
reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 11.02 — A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule  18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and
trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the
trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by superimposing “0” on “4” in order to
mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed the complaint in court on
June 10, 1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had
actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the belated
filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his
acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification,
because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by
whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and
integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession than
his transactions with his client.
Atty. Abellana’s perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued misleading
Samonte in explaining his mishandling of the latter’s civil case. Worse, he also foisted
his dishonesty on the Court no less. To counter Samonte’s accusation about his not
filing the reply in the civil case, he knowingly submitted two documents as annexes of
his comment during the investigation by the IBP, and represented said documents to
have been part of the records of the case in the RTC. His intention in doing so was to
enhance his defense against the administrative charge. But the two documents
turned out to be forged and spurious, and his forgery came to be exposed because
the rubber stamp marks the documents bore were not the official marks of the RTC’s,
as borne out by the specimens of the official rubber stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 25
duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court.43 He
defended his dishonesty by lamely claiming that “court personnel were authorized to
accept filing of pleadings even without the usual rubber stamp.”44 In these acts, he
manifested his great disrespect towards both the Court and his client.
The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s case was entirely
warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He
filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do
so, a fact that he could not deny because the RTC Judge had himself expressly noted
the belated filing in the order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that the
RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and liberality by still admitting the belated offer
of evidence in the interest of justice.
In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty.
Abellana challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte,
contending that such proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving
evidence.
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers. Preponderant evidence
means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other.45 In order to determine if the evidence of one
party is greater than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
instructs that the court may consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number
of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.
The complainant’s evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of
Atty. Abellana. To start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the “0” on “4”
but justified himself by claiming that he had done so only because the complainant
had not given to him the correct amount of filing fees required. Secondly, Atty.
Abellana filed a spurious document by making it appear as one actually filed in court
by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp
imprint on his document was different from that of the official rubber stamp of the
trial court. He defended himself by stating that court personnel accepted papers filed
in the court without necessarily using the official rubber stamp of the court. He well
knew, of course, that such statement did not fully justify his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 26

Abellana did not present any proof of his alleged filings, like certified copies of the SO ORDERED.
papers supposedly filed in court. His omission to prove his allegation on the filings
conceded that he did not really file them. And, lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
the papers he had supposedly filed by stating that he was attaching them as Annex 8 Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of IBP Board of Governors affirmed with modification
and Annex 9 of his comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned out to be papers that Atty. Gines N. Abellana suspended for six (6) months from practice of law, with
different from those he represented them to be. stern warning against repetition of similar acts. 
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is Notes.—Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and
Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members violation of the lawyer’s oath. (Lahm III vs. Mayor, Jr., 666 SCRA 1 [2012])
of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting
artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the The privilege to practice law is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. As such, lawyers must at
law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the
deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions. public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. (Re: SC
Decision Dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of
The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and Court vs. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, 670 SCRA 366 [2012])
the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client’s
case, were unmitigated. Still, the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty.
Abellana actually finished presenting his client’s case; and that the latter initiated the
termination of Atty. Abellana’s engagement as his counsel only after their relationship ——o0o—— 
had been tainted with mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper sanction. In Maligaya
v. Doronilla, Jr.,46 the respondent lawyer was suspended for two months from the
practice of law for representing in court that the complainant had agreed to withdraw
the lawsuit when in truth the complainant had made no such agreement. The
respondent admitted the falsity of his representation, but gave as an excuse his
intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v. Magat,47 the respondent had
invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client by stating that the complainant had
filed a similar case of slight physical injuries in another court, but his invocation was
false because no other case had been actually filed. He was suspended from the
practice of law for six months for making the false and untruthful statement in court.
For Atty. Abellana, therefore, suspension from the practice of law for six months with
warning of a more severe sanction upon a repetition suffices.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the MODIFICATION
that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon receipt of this decision, with the stern warning that
any repetition by him of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N.
Abellana as a member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts in the country.

A.M. No. P-07-2366. April 16, 2009.*
[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 07-2519-P]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. MARIA CELIA A.
FLORES, Court Legal Researcher II, respondent.
Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases;
Definition of Dishonesty.—Dishonesty is defined as “intentionally making a false
statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception
or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion.” Thus,
dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a
question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty,
consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise
to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the
offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could
have had at that moment.
Same; Same; Same; The making of an untruthful statement in the Personal Data
Sheet (PDS) amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document that
warrant dismissal from the service even on the first offense.—The accomplishment of
the PDS is required under Civil Service Rules and Regulations for employment in the
government. The making of an untruthful statement therein amounts to dishonesty
and falsification of an official document that warrant dismissal from the service even
on the first offense.
Same; Same; Same; Truthful completion of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) is a
requirement for employment in the judiciary, the importance of  answering the same
with candor need not be gainsaid; Concealment of any information in the Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) warrants disciplinary action against an erring employee.—As
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 27
emphasized in Advincula v. Dicen, 458 SCRA 696 (2005), the PDS is an official
document required of a government employee and official by the Civil Service
Commission. It is the repository of all information about any government employee
and official regarding his personal background, qualification, and eligibility. Since
truthful completion of the PDS is a requirement for employment in the judiciary, the
importance of answering the same with candor need not be gainsaid. Concealment of
any information in the PDS, therefore, warrants disciplinary action against the erring
employee.
Same; Same; Same; No other office in the government service exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the
judiciary.—The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government
service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an
employee than in the judiciary. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from
the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of
integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As the assumption
of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the
highest standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for public office must observe
honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law.
Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court
lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the presence of
mitigating circumstances such as length of service in the government and being a
first time offender; Court deems it proper to impose the penalty of suspension for six
(6) months without pay.—While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable
by dismissal even at the first instance, jurisprudence is replete with cases where the
Court lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the presence
of mitigating circumstances such as length of service in the government and being a
first time offender. Since respondent has been in the service for fourteen (14) years
and since this is her first offense during employment in the judiciary, the Court deems
it proper to impose the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Dishonesty.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The instant administrative complaint was filed by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Maria Celia A. Flores with dishonesty for

failure to disclose in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) her suspension and dismissal
from previous employment.
An abstract of pertinent facts follows.
Respondent applied for and was appointed as Court Legal Researcher II in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City. She assumed her position on 12 April
1994.
In 2006, the OCA came across a labor case decision docketed as G.R. No. 109362
and promulgated on 15 May 1996, involving respondent as petitioner therein and the
Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) as private respondent. As
reported in said case, respondent was employed as clerk of the PPSTA from August
1973 until her termination in August 1990. She was dismissed for engaging a fellow
employee in a brawl. It was also found that she was disciplinarily charged six (6)
times.1 Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter
who ruled in her favor. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission declared
the dismissal valid. Respondent elevated the case to this Court through a petition for
certiorari. Pending resolution of said petition, respondent was appointed as Court
Legal Researcher II. Eventually, the validity of her dismissal was sustained by this
Court on 15 May 1996.
Upon learning of said case, the OCA looked into the 201 File of respondent but did
not find her PDS. As requested, the Civil Service Commission furnished the OCA with
a copy of the PDS. The significant portions of the PDS are quoted below, thus:
24. Have you ever been convicted for violating any law, decree, ordinance or
regulations by any court or tribunal? [ ] Yes [ ] No. Have you ever been convicted for
any breach or infraction by a military tribunal or authority, or found guilty of an
administrative offense? [ ] Yes [ √ ] No. If your answer is “Yes” to any of the
questions, give particulars.
25. Do you have any pending administrative/criminal case? If you have any, give
particulars. None
26. Have you ever been retired, dismissed, forced to resign from any employment
for reasons, other than lack of funds or dropped from the rolls? [ √ ] Yes [ ] No. If
“Yes”, give particulars. Petition for Certiorari, pending with the Supreme Court under
G.R. No. L-109362.(Emphasis supplied)2
Following the sketchy lead by respondent’s responses in the PDS, the OCA wrote a
letter to PPSTA requesting a copy of the records of the administrative case before it.3
As the PPSTA failed to furnish the requested documents, the OCA was constrained to
rely on the decision dated 15 May 1996 in G.R. No. L-109362 as basis of this
complaint.4
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 28
In a 1st Indorsement dated 3 January 2007, the OCA directed respondent to explain
why she failed to disclose her previous suspension, dismissal from the service, and
the administrative charges against her before the PPSTA.5
In her Comment, respondent maintained that she fully disclosed the fact of her
dismissal from PPSTA in the PDS when she cited the pendency of a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court. In invoking good faith, she reasoned that her failure
to indicate the suspension in 1977 was due to an honest mistake considering that the
suspension happened more than seventeen (17) years before she accomplished the
PDS on 11 February 1994.6
In a letter dated 12 April 2007, respondent asked for the inhibition of then Court
Administrator Christopher Lock from further conducting the investigation in light of
his alleged partiality against her for the following reasons, namely: (1) the
Indorsement was issued motu proprio by the Court Administrator despite absence of
any complaint by any party; (2) the Court Administrator disregarded the standard
procedure by causing the personal service of notices and orders upon respondent; (3)
there was no basis for the Indorsement, as no PDS was on file with the Office of
Administrative Services, and the OCA had to obtain a copy from the Civil Service
Commission; and (4) the Court Administrator virtually made himself a complainant,
prosecutor and judge.7
In his Comment on the letter dated 12 April 2007, the former Court Administrator
explained that the charge against respondent for dishonesty was not brought about
by any desire to harass her but by his sense of duty. He reiterated that it was within
his power to initiate investigations against erring employees and under the
circumstances in which the infraction of respondent was discovered, a private party
need not file a complaint. Denying having taken an unusual interest in the complaint
by personally serving the notices andorders upon respondent, the former Court
Administrator maintained that there was nothing irregular in the OCA obtaining a
copy of the PDS from the Civil Service Commission, as it is a normal procedure in
administrative investigations to obtain records from other offices.
On 4 May 2007, the OCA found respondent guilty of dishonesty and recommended
her dismissal from the service.
In a Resolution dated 10 September 2007, the Court resolved to re-docket the case
as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest whether they
were willing to submit this matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.8
In compliance with our Resolution, both parties filed their affirmative manifestations
on 18 October 20079 and 6 November 2007,10 respectively.
We adopt the findings of OCA.

Dishonesty is defined as “intentionally making a false statement in any material fact,
or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his
examination, registration, appointment or promotion.” Thus, dishonesty, like bad
faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention.
In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must
be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act
committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense
was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could
have had at that moment.11
In the instant case, respondent admitted that she failed to disclose her previous
suspension but attributed such failure to “human frailty” and “honest mistake.” It is
indeed implausible that respondent could have easily forgotten her suspension
considering that it was one of the grounds cited by PPSTA for her eventual
termination. As aptly observed by OCA:
“The defenses of good faith, human frailty and honest mistake deserve scant
consideration. It is inconceivable that Ms. Flores could have forgotten her suspension
in 1977 when she was accomplishing her Personal Data Sheet in 1994. A suspension
is not something that occurs in one’s career regularly that it can easily be forgotten.
It is a blemish in [one’s] career and definitely leaves a deep and lasting impression in
one’s mind which the lapse of seventeen (17) years can not easily erase. Besides it is
not as if the issue of her suspension was laid to rest after Ms. Flores served it in
1977. The decision in G.R. No.109362 shows that her suspension and other
administrative infractions were raised by the Philippine Public School Teachers
Association in order to justify her dismissal. It appears from the decision that the
Association dismissed Ms. Flores in September 1990 and in dismissing her, the
Association sent her a Memorandum dated August 31, 1990 recounting her previous
administrative offenses, including her suspension. The issue of the legality of her
dismissal became the subject of a labor case. On December 29, 1992, the National
Labor Relations Commission rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of Ms. Flores
as valid. She then filed a petition before this Court. On February 11, 1994, she
accomplished her Personal Data Sheet. Verily, the proceedings in her labor case,
which occurred just a few years before she accomplished her Personal Data Sheet,
could not have failed to remind Ms. Flores of her employment history when she was
still a clerk in the Philippine Public School Teachers Association. Besides, the fact that
Ms. Flores did not inform this Office of the decision in G.R. No. 109362 for ten (10)
years belies any claim of good faith on her part.”12  2007 for the purpose of applying for a lateral transfer to Branch 72, Regional Trial
Anent respondent’s claim that she fully disclosed the fact of her dismissal in the PDS
by citing the pendency of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, such
assertion deserves scant attention. Two questions relating to administrative charges
were asked in the PDS to which respondent explicitly answered in the negative. While
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 29
respondent may have mentioned a pending petition for certiorari, said answer only
begged further details, which respondent herself failed to provide. On its face, an
ongoing petition for certiorari does not say much. But having answered in this
manner and having failed to give the requisite particulars only demonstrated
evasiveness on the part of respondent and lent suspicion that she intended to conceal
the pendency of the administrative case against her. On this point, we quote with
approval the observation of the OCA, to wit:
“There is no doubt that Ms. Flores is guilty of dishonesty. Ms. Flores, while she was
still a clerk of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association was charged with
refusing to accept the responsibilities and duties assigned to her; she was charged
administratively six (6) times in 1977 for misconduct, violation of rules and
regulations, absenteeism and tardiness and as a consequence she was suspended for
fifteen (15) days starting on March 29, 1977. She did not reveal any of these facts
and infractions in her Personal Data Sheet. The questions in the Personal Data Sheet,
specifically numbers 24, 25, and 26 are quite clear and straightforward. Question
number 24 asked her if she has been found guilty of an administrative offense. Her
answer is “No” which should have been “Yes” precisely because she was previously
suspended fifteen (15) days in 1977. Question number 25 asked her if she has any
pending administrative case. Her answer was “None” which should have been “Yes”
because at the time she was accomplishing her Personal Data Sheet on February 11,
1994 her petition for certiorari questioning her dismissal by the Philippine Public
School Teachers Association was pending before this Court. In Question number 26,
she was asked if she has been retired, dismissed or forced to resign from any
employment for reason other than lack of funds or dropped from the rolls. This time
her answer was “Yes” and she added “Petition for Certiorari pending with the
Supreme Court under G.R. No. L-109362.” Although Ms. Flores revealed the docket
number of her petition and its status, this does not comply with what was asked for
because Ms. Flores was also required to give details if her answer was “Yes.” The
docket number and status of the case are not sufficient to allow the Selection and
Promotion Board for Lower Courts to intelligently assess the fitness of Ms. Flores to
join the Judiciary. Her answer was intended to avoid giving the essential details of her
administrative case, such as the numerous administrative charges against her and her
previous suspension for obvious reasons. If the Selection and Promotion Board for
the Lower Courts knew about these details then for sure Ms. Flores would not have
been recommended to the position of Court Legal Researcher II.
Interestingly, in a Personal Data Sheet which Ms. Flores accomplished on February 6,
Court, Olongapo City, she disclosed her previous administrative infractions. She
admitted that she was formally charged by PPSTA with tardiness and/or violation of
office rules. She admitted that she was suspended in March 1977. Finally, she stated
that she was dismissed from her employment by the PPSTA as per this Court’s
decision in G.R. No. 109362. Nothing can better illustrate the dishonesty of Ms. Flores
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 30

than a comparison of the Personal Data Sheet dated February 6, 2007, wherein she
openly admitted that she was previously suspended, charged administratively and
dismissed from service, with the Personal Data Sheet she accomplished on February
11, 1994 wherein these facts were completely hidden by Ms. Flores from this
Court.”13
The accomplishment of the PDS is required under Civil Service Rules and Regulations
for employment in the government. The making of an untruthful statement therein
amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document that warrant dismissal
from the service even on the first offense.14
Since respondent has been in the service for fourteen (14) years and since this is her
first offense during employment in the judiciary, the Court deems it proper to impose
the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay.24
WHEREFORE, respondent Maria Celia A. Flores, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City is found GUILTY of dishonesty and SUSPENDED
for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that the commission of similar or
graver offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

As emphasized in Advincula v. Dicen,15 the PDS is an official document required of a Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
government employee and official by the Civil Service Commission. It is the repository
of all information about any government employee and official regarding his personal
background, qualification, and eligibility. Since truthful completion of the PDS is a
requirement for employment in the judiciary, the importance of answering the same
with candor need not be gainsaid. Concealment of any information in the PDS,
therefore, warrants disciplinary action against the erring employee.16

This Court has in the past punished similar infractions pertaining to making untruthful
statements in the PDS with the severe penalty of dismissal such as failing to state
previous employment and the fact of separation for cause therefrom,17 falsely
declaring passing the career service professional examination when in fact one did
not,18 and neglecting to declare the pendency of a criminal case.19

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee
than in the judiciary.20 Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the
highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity,
probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As the assumption of public
office is impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the highest
standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for public office must observe
honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law.21

While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even at the

first instance22, jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court lowered the
penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the presence of mitigating
circumstances such as length of service in the government and being a first time
offender.23

A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998.*
JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG,
respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Immorality; Disbarment; Good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar.—Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent
to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be
suspended or disbarred.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Immoral conduct is that conduct which is
so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community.—Immoral conduct has been defined as that
conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the common sense of decency.
Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but
must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards.—We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol
that, “as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 31
member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself
as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards.”
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Quantum of Proof; The burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and the Supreme Court will exercise its disciplinary power only
if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.—
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order
to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the
Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Handwritings; Handwriting may be proved
through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the
respondent as genuine.—Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love
letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly
manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his
own. In addition, complainant also submitted as evidence the cards that she herself
had received from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a
comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the respondent
as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by one and the
same person. Besides, respondent did not present any evidence to prove that the
love letters were not really written by him; he merely denied that he wrote them.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; While the burden of proof is upon the
complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court to
show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar.—While the burden of
proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also
to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial
does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to
continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges
squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this
Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. This he failed to
do.
Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Parents have not only rights but also
duties—e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right
precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and
understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance.—Respondent may have
provided well for his family—they enjoyed a comfortable life and his children finished
their education. He may have also established himself as a successful lawyer and a
seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral
fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. We remind
respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties—e.g., to support,

educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example;
and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and
spiritual guidance. As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his wife; to observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and support.
Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; A husband is not merely a man who has
contracted marriage—he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his
wife and remain faithful to her until death.—Although respondent piously claims
adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A husband is not
merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly
sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death. We reiterate
our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova: “The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of
a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.” In Toledo vs. Toledo, the
respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful
wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; A lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.—In the present case, the complainant was able to establish,
by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and
exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa
vs. Cabanting, “a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.”
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Bugaring, Piedad, Oliva and Associates Law Offices for complainant.
     Domingo Cayosa, Jr. for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the
bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the
Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint1 for
disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of
having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers.2
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 32
The complainant narrated:
“The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M.
Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts and
Sciences and as a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17
years old and a first year college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty. Narag.
Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of the legal
profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag
courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded to his
wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community,
but which they managed to keep from me. It therefore came as a terrible
embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain when my husband
abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the
Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of
gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her
sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has
abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former
student in the tertiary level[.]”3
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.4
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from
complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She
alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate
and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the respondent and Gina
Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from “emotional confusion arising
from extreme jealousy.” The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a
faithful and responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered
into an amorous relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family.5
Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of Desistance6 and a Motion to Dismiss,7
attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP commission on bar
discipline.8 In a Decision dated October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors9
dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute.10
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this Court11
received another letter12 from the complainant, with her seven children13 as co-
signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained that

she had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats
against her.14
In his Comment on the complainant’s letter of November 11, 1991, filed in
compliance with this Court’s Resolution issued on July 6, 1992,15 respondent prayed
that the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that he had
threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had voluntarily
executed her Affidavit of Desistance16 and Motion to Dismiss,17 even appearing
before the investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath “that she
prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and
affirmed the contents thereof.”
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning
his family to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife as a person
emotionally disturbed, viz.:
“What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and
possessive woman, and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off
letters or complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all without
basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of her ‘loving’
jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off,
she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus, when she
wrote the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts
of jealousy.”18
On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of
respondent to the IBP.19 In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose,
respondent alleged the following:20
“2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a
square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and
meaningful education. Complainant comes from what she claims to be very rich
parents who value material possession more than education and the higher and
nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love,
forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and raised in
an entirely different environment. Her value system is the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in thirty-
eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his family
sustenance, a comfortable home, love, education, companionship, and most of all, a
good and respected name. He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife and
children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and never inflicted violence
on them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully
employed. x x x
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 33
x x x      x x x      x x x
Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.
On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant has
been systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their marriage
and their family. Their marriage has become a torture chamber in which Your
Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED, TORTURED,
ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by the
Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his
misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their
family and their marriage. But this is not to be. The Complainant never mellowed and
never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she became more fierce
and predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not
seem in sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from enslavement.
Paraphrasing Dorfman in ‘Death and the Maiden,’ can the torturer and the tortured
co-exist and live together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind whose
only obsession now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with
perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage,
Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. x x x.
5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your
Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He preserved
the good name and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the marital vow to
love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for worse, in sickness and in health . . .
Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed anything derogatory to his wife. It
is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells
everyone, everywhere, that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and
immoral. She goes to colleges and universities, professional organizations, religious
societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil, bad and
immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or
any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this love? Since
when did love become an instrument to destroy a man’s dearest possession in life—
his good name, reputation and dignity?

Because of Complainant’s virulent disinformation campaign against her husband,
employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your Respondent
has been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your
Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been mercilessly scandalized
and crucified by the Complainant.”21
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent presented
as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against him and Gina
Espita:
“3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x
3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. x x x
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 89-
114. x x x
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and Concubinage. OMBUDSMAN
Case No. 1-92-0083. x x x
3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061. DISMISSED.
3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-
109. DISMISSED. (x x x). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration. DENIED. (x x
x).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (x x x) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (x x x).
DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (x x x). Re-instituted (x x x).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (x x x). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (x x x). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela.
Pending.”22
In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:
“I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (x x x), picture (x x x) are
inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in ‘Cecilia Zulueta vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.,’ G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (x x x).
x x x      x x x      x x x
II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina Espita in
the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said
woman in the DTI. He never had or is having any illicit relationship with her
anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as husband and wife anywhere at any
time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any other place. He never
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 34
begot a child or children with her. Finally, respondent submits that all the other
allegations of Mrs. Narag are false and fabricated, x x x
x x x      x x x      x x x
III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons forcibly
drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to
return to the conjugal home many times with the help of mutual friends to save the
marriage and the family from collapse. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs.
Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case, he offered to return
home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of
respondent Narag. x x x
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive,
scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who
incessantly beat, battered, brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated
respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, and psychologically, x x x.
V. Complainant Julieta Narag’s claim in her counter-manifestation dated March 28,
1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27,
1996 was obtained through force and intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr.,
executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and absolutely without force or intimidation,
as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of Respondent
Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal
Case No. 12439, People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et al., before the Tuguegarao MTC
on May 3, 1996. x x x.x x x      x x x      x x x
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man—a senior citizen of 63 years—sickly,
abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout
and arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His very physical, medical,
psychological, and economic conditions render him unfit and unable to do the things
attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the attached medical certificates, x x
x, among many other similar certificates touching on the same ailments. Respondent
is also suffering from hypertension.”23
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report,24 recommending the
indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of
said report read as follows:
“Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the
contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case,
namely:
a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of respondent’s
own family and [whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita;

b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita
(Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of
respondent’s Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love letters, the due execution and
contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility for being allegedly
forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness stand much less presented and
offered proof to support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses whose testimonies tend to
depict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and possessive
woman suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did not present
himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his sworn comment;
much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the
adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten their illegitimate
children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse,
respondent’s denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for disciplinary
sanction (Marcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to
disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession.”25
In its Resolution26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the
investigating commissioner’s recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the
respondent.27 Subsequently, the complainant sought the disbarment of her husband
in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP granted this
stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented
by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the
penalty of disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
“Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.”
“CANON 7—A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03—A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 35
Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent28 to the practice of law,
but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is
found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.29
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community.30 Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree31 or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.32
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, “as officers of the court, lawyers must
not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but
must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards.”
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order
to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the
Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence.34
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself,35 were: Charlie Espita,36
Magdalena Bautista,37 Bienvenido Eugenio,38 Alice Carag,39 Dr. Jervis B. Narag,40
Dominador Narag, Jr.,41 and Nieves F. Reyes.42
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated
complainant’s charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave to
the investigating officer:
“Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?
A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.
Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?
A Yes, sir. (Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
ATTY. NARAG: Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.

CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together
as husband and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and
Kyle Dominador.
x x x      x x x      x x x”43
During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita
repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom
she had two children:
“Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband
and wife. You claim that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have
already two children and I know that that is really an immoral act which you cannot
just allow me to follow since my moral values don’t allow me that my sister is living
with a married man like you.
Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in
the house?
A Yes, si[r].
x x x      x x x      x x x
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic
and Kyle Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family.”44
In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the
love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to
dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment proceedings.45
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this wise:
“Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 36
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?A Because he was always going to
the house of my son-in- law by the name of Charlie Espita.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of
Atty. Narag?
A Yes, sir.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as
husband and wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir.”46
Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that
she learned from the Narag children—Randy, Bong and Rowena—that their father left
his family, that she and her husband prodded the complainant to accept the
respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when the respondent “went
back to his woman,” and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife.47
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to
establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman.
Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely
against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had
sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her
two children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant also
submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had received from him. Guided by
the rule that handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings
with those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two
sets of evidence were written by one and the same person.48 Besides, respondent
did not present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by
him; he merely denied that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only
to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of

the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed,
such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he
must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of
Attorneys.49 This he failed to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the
same time, he depicts his wife as a “violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending,”
and as an “insanely and pathologically jealous woman,” whose only obsession was to
“destroy, destroy and destroy” him as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly
unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he
presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence50 and ten (10)
witnesses.51
We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not
establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the profession
that would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did their testimonies
destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned his family and
lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of them testified on
matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information
from either respondent himself or other people, while others were presented to
impeach the good character of his wife.
Respondent may have provided well for his family—they enjoyed a comfortable life
and his children finished their education. He may have also established himself as a
successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not
sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble
profession of law.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties—e.g., to
support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good
example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral
and spiritual guidance.52 As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his wife; to
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and support.53
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from
home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work;
instead, he abandoned his family to live with her paramour, who bore him two
children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good
husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of their
mother, must have scarcely felt the warmth of their father’s love.
Respondent’s son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his father’s moral
frailties in his testimony:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 37
“Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there
a fault that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional
part of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although I am a God-fearing
person, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or her to at least
realize his mistakes, sir.
x x x      x x x      x x x
COMR. JOSE: I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your
father is the worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have
him dis barred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a
lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all
the pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime.
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your
flesh, his bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst
man on earth, is that what you are saying?
A Sort of, sir.
Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has
sinned, you have no more father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid
because my father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that?
Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure, sir, you did not give me love.”54 Another
son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the trauma he
went through:
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your
father is maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission
the effect on you?
A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters,
especially my married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and
my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted ways. This is
one reason that affected us.
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?

A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could
not face the people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a
wellknown family in our community.
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so
well that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.
Q In your wife’s family?
A In our family, sir.
Q And what do you mean by that?
A What I meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father
went to the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a “puta” in provincial
government, which my mother-in-law hated him so much for this, which really
affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit relationship
with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and
Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your Honor.”55
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts
prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage.
Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and
remain faithful to her until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova:56 “The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for
instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.”
In Toledo vs. Toledo,57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when
he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him
a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,58 the respondent was disbarred after the
complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married woman. This Court declared that respondent failed to
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 38
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the
bar.
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set
for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting,59 “a lawyer may
be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”
WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal
record of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bello-sillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Respondent disbarred, name ordered stricken from Roll of Attorneys.
Notes.—Proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for administrative
discipline against a judge if he is not charged for immorality prior to his appointment.
(Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239 [1993])
Penalty of disqualification from appointment to any public office earlier imposed on a
judge for immorality lifted after he has shown sincere repentance and after
considering his contributions during the period that he was judge. (Castillo vs.
Calanog, Jr., 239 SCRA 268 [1994])
Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment
to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of the former, is
neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary
sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of
wedlock. (Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr., 276 SCRA 445 [1997])
The act of a court employee of eloping with and getting impregnated by a married
man constitutes gross immorality which the Supreme Court will never sanction on its
employees. (Masadao, Jr. vs. Glorioso, 280 SCRA 612 [1997])

SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997.*
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR.,
respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Gross Immorality; Words and Phrases; A person’s
engaging in premarital sexual relations with another, making promises to marry,
suggests a doubtful moral character but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct; A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.—Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971
because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also
claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar
examinations. We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a
doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act
is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.” It is a willful, flagrant, or
shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.
Same; Same; Same; Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom
possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 39
the part of the former, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship
a child was born out of wedlock.—We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite
relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess
no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part
of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warranT the imposition
of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was
born out of wedlock.
Same; Same; Same; Marriages; The Supreme Court cannot castigate a man for
seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond
which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.—Respondent
and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.
We do not find complainant’s assertions that she had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent’s girlfriend even after
she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and
intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress
with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their
relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray.
Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another
woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of
love, not for any other reason.
Same; Same; Same; Even assuming that a person’s indiscretions are ignoble, the
twenty-six years that he has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment therefor.—We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of
revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to
make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession
he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions
are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a
lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be
no other indiscretion attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of
age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Pablo S. Tolentino for complainant.
     Jose Rome S. Maranon for respondent.
RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had
passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts
in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed
the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a
child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated
promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in
June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo.
Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent
even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in
1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.1 It
was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he
would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued
and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He
gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter’s birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another
woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant’s motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of
witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant’s failure to comment
on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid
testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had
justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains
interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondent’s motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground
of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.2 Respondent’s third
motion to dismiss was noted in the Court’s Resolution dated September 15, 1982.3 In
1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this
case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer’s oath upon payment of the required fees.5
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 40
Respondent’s hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainant’s opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking.
On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971 because of the
charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore
an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he
did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The
Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree.”6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy
between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither
so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainant’s assertions that she had been forced into
sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent’s girlfriend even
after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable
and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual
congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively
pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led
astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with
another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into
because of love, not for any other reason.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 41

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman

scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent
suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very
hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute
sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other
indiscretion attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age,
should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon

Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper
fees.

SO ORDERED.

     Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

     Narvasa (C.J.), On official leave.

     Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., On leave.

Petition denied, Respondent allowed to take lawyer’s oath.

Note.—Thirty-two years of having been denied admission to the Bar is sufficient

chastisement for a man who, though morally delinquent in his younger years, has
made up for it by observing a respectable, useful and religious life since then as
attested by prominent citizens and his children from the three women he married. (In
Re: Socorro Ke. Ladrera, 147 SCRA 350 [1987])

——o0o——

EN BANC
[A.C. NO. 7902 : September 30, 2008]
TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, Complainant, v. ATTY. GODWIN R.
VALDEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Godwin R. Valdez from the practice of law
for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct. The
complainant alleges that despite receipt of legal fees in compliance with a Retainer
Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his obligations under their
contract for legal services, ignored the complainant's requests for a report of the
status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected demands for return of the
money paid to him.
On December 16, 2005, the complainant, Torben B. Overgaard, a Dutch national,
through his business partner John Bradley, entered into a Retainer Agreement 1 with
the respondent, Atty. Godwin R. Valdez. For the amount of PhP900,000.00, the
complainant engaged the services of the respondent to represent him as his legal
counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed against him, all pending in
Antipolo City; including a dismissed complaint which was appealed before the
Department of Justice. The Agreement stipulated that fees would cover acceptance
and attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, other legal incidental expenses, and
appearance fees.2
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 42
The cases filed by the complainant included a complaint for Estafa, Grave Threats,
Coercion, Unjust Vexation and Oral Defamation3pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Antipolo and a civil case for Mandamus, Injunction with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Damages4 which is on trial at Branch 71, Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City. On the other hand, the cases filed against the
complainant included a criminal case for Other Light Threats at Branch 2 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo,5 and violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No.
9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 6 before the
Family Court of Antipolo City. A complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms was also
filed against Torben Overgaard which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor of
Antipolo City. This was appealed to the Department of Justice by way of Petition for
Review.7
Upon the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the complainant paid the respondent
USD16,854.00 through telegraphic bank transfer, 8 as full payment for the services to
be rendered under the Agreement. The respondent then assured the complainant
that he would take good care of the cases he was handling for the complainant. 9
On April 11, 2006, four months after the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the
complainant, through his business partner John Bradley, demanded from the
respondent a report of the action he had taken with respect to the cases entrusted to
him. However, despite his continued efforts to contact the respondent to inquire on
the status of the cases, he was unable to reach him; his phone calls were not
answered and his electronic mails were ignored.10
The complainant had no knowledge of the developments of the cases that the
respondent was handling for him. Upon his own inquiry, he was dismayed to find out
that the respondent did not file his entry of appearance in the cases for Other Light
Threats and Violation of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Children Act.11The respondent also did not inform him that he was entitled to prepare
a Counter-Affidavit to answer the complaint for Other Light Threats. The complainant
had no knowledge that there had already been arraignments for the criminal cases
against him, and that there were already warrants of arrest 12 issued for his failure to
attend the arraignments. He was constrained to engage the services of another
lawyer in order to file a Motion to Lift the Warrant of Arrest in the case for Other
Light Threats,13 and an Omnibus Motion to Revive the Case and Lift the Warrant of
Arrest in the case for Violation of Section 5(a) of the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act.14
The complainant alleges that the respondent did not do a single thing with respect to
the cases covered under the Retainer Agreement. Not only did the respondent fail to
enter his appearance in the criminal cases filed against the complainant, he also
neglected to file an entry of appearance in the civil case for Mandamus, Injunction
and Damages that the complainant filed. The respondent also did not file a Comment
on the complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms which was dismissed and under
review at the Department of Justice.15

Due to the above lapses of the respondent, on November 27, 2006, the complainant
wrote the respondent and demanded the return of the documents which were turned
over to him, as well as the PhP900,000.00 that was paid in consideration of the cases
he was supposed to handle for the complainant.16 However, complainant was unable
to get any word from the respondent despite repeated and continuous efforts to get
in touch with him.
Hence, on December 28, 2006, Torben Overgaard was constrained to file an
administrative complaint against Atty. Godwin R. Valdez before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, alleging that the respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful conduct.17 Despite the order to submit an Answer to the complaint
against him,18 the respondent failed to comply. A Mandatory Conference was set on
September 21, 2007,19 but the respondent failed to attend despite being duly
notified.20 This prompted the Commission on Bar Discipline to issue an Order
declaring the respondent in default for failure to submit an Answer and failure to
attend the Mandatory Conference.21 The investigation proceeded ex parte.
The complainant submitted his position paper on October 5, 2007,22with a prayer that
the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, and to be ordered to return the
amount of PhP900,000.00. A Clarificatory Hearing was scheduled on December 11,
2007,23 and again, it was only the complainant who was in attendance; the
respondent failed to attend the hearing despite notice. The case was then submitted
for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the complainant and the hearings
conducted.24
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Antonio S. Tria, to
whom the instant disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and
recommendation, found the respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Canon 16, Rule
16.01, Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In his Report dated January 29, 2008, he recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.
The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-126, dated March 6,
2008, approved the recommendation of Commissioner Tria, and further ordered the
complainant to return the PhP900,000.00 to the complainant within 60 days from
receipt of the notice.
We agree. We find the respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez to have committed
multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court provides, viz:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 43
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance
as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended
for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.
The respondent has indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded of
members of the bar. He did not merely neglect his client's cause, he abandoned his
client and left him without any recourse but to hire another lawyer. He not only failed
to properly handle the cases which were entrusted to his care, he refused to do a
single thing in connection with these cases. He did not file any pleading to defend his
client; he did not even enter his appearance in these cases. Moreover, he disregarded
the complainant's letters and electronic mails and rejected the complainant's phone
calls. All the complainant was asking for was a report of the status of the cases but
the respondent could not be reached no matter what the complainant did to get in
touch with him. After receipt of the full amount of fees under the Retainer
Agreement, he simply disappeared, leaving the client defenseless and plainly
prejudiced in the cases against him. Warrants of arrest were even issued against the
complainant due to the respondent's gross and inexcusable negligence in failing to
ascertain the status of the case and to inform his client of the arraignment. It was not
a mere failure on the respondent's part to inform the complainant of matters
concerning the cases, it was an unmistakable evasion of duty. To hide from the
complainant, avoid his calls, ignore his letters, and leave him helpless is unforgivable;
and to commit all these acts and omissions after receiving the full amount of legal
fees and after assuring the client of his commitment and responsibility violates the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Deceitful
conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary to justice,
modesty or good morals.25 It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.26Representing to the
complainant that he would take care of the cases filed against him,27 assuring the

complainant that his property involved in a civil case would be safeguarded, 28 and
then collecting the full amount of legal fees of PhP900,000.00, only to desert the
complainant after receipt of the fees, were manifestly deceitful and dishonest.
The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client." Necessity and public
interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and truthful when dealing with his client. A
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.29 However, instead of devoting himself to the client's
cause, the respondent avoided the complainant, forgot about the cases he was
handling for him and ostensibly abandoned him. The client reposed his trust in his
lawyer with full faith that the lawyer would not betray him or abscond from his
responsibilities. By assuring the complainant that he would take care of the cases
included in the Retainer Agreement, and even accepting fees, the respondent
defrauded the complainant when he did not do a single thing he was expected to do.
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.30 A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.31Respondent should indeed be held liable, for he was not just
incompetent, he was practically useless; he was not just negligent, he was indolent;
and rather than being of help to the complainant, he prejudiced the client.
Respondent's inaction with respect to the matters entrusted to his care is obvious;
and his failure to file an answer to the complaint for disbarment against him and to
attend the hearings in connection therewith, without any explanation or request for
resetting, despite proper notice from the IBP, is clear evidence of negligence on his
part.
The Code of Professional Responsibility further provides that a lawyer is required to
keep the client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.32 The respondent did the opposite.
Despite the complainant's efforts to consult him and notwithstanding numerous
attempts to contact him, simply to ask for an update of the status of the cases, the
respondent was able to avoid the complainant and never bothered to reply.
After months of waiting for a reply from the respondent, and discovering that the
respondent had been remiss in his duties, the complainant demanded the return of
the documents he had turned over to the respondent. He also demanded the return
of the money he had paid for the legal services that were not rendered and expenses
of litigation which were not incurred. However, the respondent rejected the
complainant's demands.
Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that "a
lawyer shall account for all money and property collected or received for and from the
client." The complainant paid $16,854.00 to the respondent via telegraphic bank
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 44
transfer. This was considered as complete payment for the PhP900,000.00 that was
stipulated as the consideration for the legal services to be rendered. However, since
the respondent did not carry out any of the services he was engaged to perform, nor
did he appear in court or make any payment in connection with litigation, or give any
explanation as to how such a large sum of money was spent and allocated, he must
immediately return the money he received from the client upon demand. However,
he refused to return the money he received from the complainant despite written
demands, and was not even able to give a single report regarding the status of the
cases.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for
a specific purpose - such as for filing fees - but not used for failure to file the case,
must immediately be returned to the client on demand. 33
In Sencio v. Calvadores,34 the respondent lawyer Sencio was engaged to file a case,
which he failed to do. His client demanded that he return the money which was paid
to him but he refused. Sencio similarly failed to answer the complaint and
disregarded the orders and notices of the IBP on many occasions.35 The respondent
lawyer was ordered to return the money that he received from the complainant with
interest at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the resolution until
the return of the amount.36
The practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good
moral character.37 The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing.38 Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether
they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, 39 and a violation of the high
moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate
penalty, including suspension and disbarment.40
The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of
responsibility to the courts and his client but also a wanton disregard for his duties as
a lawyer. It is deplorable that members of the bar, such as the respondent, betray
not only the trust of their client, but also public trust. For the practice of law is a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who
are qualified and who possess good moral character. 41 Those who are unable or
unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession
are unworthy of the privilege to practice law. We must protect the administration of
justice by requiring those who exercise this function to be competent, honorable and
reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.
In this case, we find that suspension for three years recommended by the IBP is not
sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The
acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as
attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 45

courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him
as a member of the bar. We could not find any mitigating circumstances to
recommend a lighter penalty. For violating elementary principles of professional
ethics and failing to observe the fundamental duties of honesty and good faith, the
respondent has proven himself unworthy of membership in this noble profession.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED to
immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal interest of
six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of extra-judicial
demand. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu of six percent (6%),
shall be imposed on such amount from the date of promulgation of this decision until
the payment thereof. He is further ORDERED to immediately return all papers and
documents received from the complainant.

Copies of this Decision shall be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, CJ., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona,* Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro, Andbrion, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 7360. July 24, 2012.*
ATTY. POLICARPIO I. CATALAN, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSELITO M.
SILVOSA, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interests; A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
facts.—Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that “A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.” Atty. Silvosa, on the
hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that “A lawyer shall not reject, except for
valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed” and on Canon 14 which
provides that “A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.” We agree with
Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts.”
Administrative Law; Prescription; Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter
how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained
of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and
bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.—Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa,
mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar
does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not
prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of
the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring
members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
Disbarment; Attorneys; Disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested
person.—Disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 46
can be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper
authority acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with
the duties of the office and from which conduct the public might or does suffer
undesirable consequences.
Same; Same; Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment; The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.—
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. x x x The crime of direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Same; Same; Atty. Silvosa’s excuse that his conviction for direct bribery was not in
his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the
unmistakable lack of integrity in his character.—Atty. Silvosa’s representation of
conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the
penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of direct bribery
clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We
are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find
that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and
decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in
his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the
unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and
Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty.
Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against
Atty. Silvosa: (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case
for which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then
colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros. Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B.
Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and
recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice
modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to
a suspension of two years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa
appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, “People of the
Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al.” (Esperon case), for the complex
crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private
complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the
case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also alleged that,
apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the
same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused’s favor. Atty.
Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against
the position of the private prosecutor.
In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s request to
relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment
convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa,
as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail
pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In
a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros.
Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense
from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before
Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time,
Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of
frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18
May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of
desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law,
Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two
years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case
and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty.
Silvosa. GMA 7’s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual
entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and
viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No.
27776 reads:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 47
“WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one
month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six
months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.”2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as
prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its
decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail.
Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the
reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and
the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as
“self-serving” and “purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue
persecution.”
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that “conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral
turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to a crime.’” He further claims
that “it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a
public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling under
the category of crimes against public officers x x x.”
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found
that:
“As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal
Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would
be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the
facts of said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such
would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty.
Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to Post Bail Bond
Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient
to establish a lawyer-client relation.

As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations
are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty.
Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone
unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred more
than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on
November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the
veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has
no personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was
he ever involved in said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding
upon this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a
disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged
extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the
First Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
should be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.”3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and
suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another
Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty
of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension from the practice of law to two years. The Office of the
Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1
March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.” Atty. Silvosa, on the hand,
relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that “A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid
reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed” and on Canon 14 which
provides that “A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.”
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he
entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 48
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts.”
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two
occasions can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public
prosecutor was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He
likewise claims his subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited only
to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our
ruling in Hilado v. David:4
“An attorney is employed—that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a
lawyer or counselor—when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his
case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause
in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said
in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as
to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate
the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.”
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although
the attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its
veracity by emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm.
Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with
certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling,
however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio
and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed
bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the
IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false
testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the
accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the
bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must

meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he
still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of
him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint
against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent.
Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from
the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of
the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining
arm of the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are
not binding in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can
be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority
acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the
duties of the office and from which conduct the public might or does suffer
undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
“Section 1. How Instituted.—Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in government
service.
x x x x”
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No.
27776, and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in
the present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal
Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan
supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his
interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 49
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
“Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of
conviction.10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.
COMELEC,11 we ruled:
“By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime
of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself
or through another;
3.  such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public
officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of
an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected
with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender
agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains
from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his
fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of
his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a
conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and
good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.”
(Italicization in the original)
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 50

Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing
Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction
of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s
conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than
suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting
standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that
his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is
unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The
practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise
this privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his

name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,

Villarama, Jr., Perez, Sereno, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Leonardo-De Castro, J., On Official Leave.

Brion and Mendoza, JJ., On Leave.

Peralta, J., On Official Business. 

Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa disbarred.

Notes.—Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. (Vargas vs. Ignes, 623 SCRA 1 [2010])

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney. (Rodriguez vs.
Blancaflor, 645 SCRA 286 [2011])

A.C. No. 6672. September 4, 2009.*
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Malpractice; Solicitations;
Advertisements; Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of
law is a profession and not a business—lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares.—Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers
must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made
known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides: CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING
KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED
AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. Time and time again,
lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business;
lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,
degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, an actuation
which constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.—Rule 2.03 of the CPR
provides: RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT
DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence, lawyers are prohibited
from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ambulance Chasing; Words and Phrases;
Ambulance chasing is the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment.—Rule 2.03
should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: RULE 1.03. A
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 51
LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY
SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE. This rule proscribes
“ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure
to protect the community from barratry and champerty.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services.—With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR,
settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the
latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his
services. Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers
in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s “referrals.” Furthermore, he
never denied Labiano’s connection to his office. Respondent committed an unethical,
predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule
8.02 of the CPR.
Same; Same; Lending to Clients; The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his
client; Exception.—The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The
only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic
notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling
for the client.
Same; Same; Solicitations; Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.—As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice
which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-
solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective
client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere
to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Same; Same; Advertisements; Calling Cards; Professional calling cards may only
contain the following details: (a) lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with which
he is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number; and, (e) special branch of law
practiced.—A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason,
lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law
lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain
the following details: (a) lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is
connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number; and, (e) special branch of law
practiced.

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
   The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Offices for complainant.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a
loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card:6
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01  Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar                Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City                   Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 52
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied) 
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting
cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27,
Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we
modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the
means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the
CPR provides:
CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT
OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise
their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability
to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar
is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT
DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE.
This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.18  the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of
the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to
prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted
it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03,
and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that
a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by
a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the
Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labiano’s “referrals.” Furthermore, he never denied
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 53
Labiano’s connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of
the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
“Rule 16.04 — A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing
fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with
the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the
case or an additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead
settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24 
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls
for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation
statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for
the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a
mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of
simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 54

(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” The phrase
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to
lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the
integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
The act of a judge in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements
constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct where said judge was not motivated by any corrupt motive but a
persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for
recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon
donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges
seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they
must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe. As to the charge that
Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court
his qualifications, such is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the
courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of
lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of
insecurity. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Floro, Jr., 486 SCRA 66 [2006])
——o0o——
Linsangan vs. Tolentino, 598 SCRA 133, A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.

Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.

Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino suspended from practice of law for one (1) year for
violation of Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 Rules of Court, with stern warning against
repetition of similar acts.

Notes.—The acts of a judge of posting advertisements for restaurant personnel on

the court bulletin board, using his court address to receive the applications, and of
screening applicants in his court constitute involvement in private business and
improper use of office facilities for the promotion of the family business in violation of
the Code of Judicial Ethics. (Dionisio vs. Escano, 302 SCRA 411 [1999])

G.R. No. 198075. September 4, 2013.*
KOPPEL, INC. (formerly known as KPL AIRCON, INC.), petitioner, vs.
MAKATI ROTARY CLUB FOUNDATION, INC., respondent.
Civil Law; Mines and Mining; Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 7942); Arbitrators; Panel of
Arbitrators of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (PA-MGB); Jurisdiction; The
Supreme Court pointed out to the provisions of R.A. No. 7942, or the Mining Act of
1995, which granted the PA-MGB with exclusive original jurisdiction only over mining
disputes, i.e., disputes involving “rights to mining areas,” “mineral agreements or
permits,” and “surface owners, occupants, claimholders or concessionaires” requiring
the technical knowledge and experience of mining authorities in order to be resolved.
—Gonzales decided the issue in the negative. In holding that the PA-MGB was devoid
of any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for arbitration, this Court
pointed out to the provisions of R.A. No. 7942, or the Mining Act of 1995, which
granted the PA-MGB with exclusive original jurisdiction only over mining disputes, i.e.,
disputes involving “rights to mining areas,” “mineral agreements or permits,” and
“surface owners, occupants, claimholders or concessionaires” requiring the technical
knowledge and experience of mining authorities in order to be resolved. Accordingly,
since the complaint for arbitration in Gonzales did not raise mining disputes as
contemplated under R.A. No. 7942 but only issues relating to the validity of certain
mining related agreements, this Court held that such complaint could not be
arbitrated before the PA-MGB. It is in this context that we made the pronouncement
now in discussion: Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when
there is a disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the contract
between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular
knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when
one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or agreement
on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract
cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the
execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 55
law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application and interpretation
of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function.
Same; Doctrine of Separability; Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration
agreement is considered as independent of the main contract. Being a separate
contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may thus be invoked regardless of the
possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract.—Under the doctrine of separability,
an arbitration agreement is considered as independent of the main contract. Being a
separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may thus be invoked regardless
of the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract. Once again instructive is
Cargill, wherein this Court held that, as a further consequence of the doctrine of
separability, even the very party who repudiates the main contract may invoke its
arbitration clause.
Same; Arbitration; Mediation; “Mediation” and “Arbitration,” Distinguished.—The JDR
framework is based on the processes of mediation, conciliation or early neutral
evaluation which entails the submission of a dispute before a “JDR judge” who shall
merely “facilitate settlement” between the parties in conflict or make a “non-binding
evaluation or assessment of the chances of each party’s case.” Thus in JDR, the JDR
judge lacks the authority to render a resolution of the dispute that is binding upon
the parties in conflict. In arbitration, on the other hand, the dispute is submitted to
an arbitrator/s — a neutral third person or a group of thereof — who shall have the
authority to render a resolution binding upon the parties.
Same; Same; It is clear that under the law, the petitioner and the respondent should
have been referred to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract.—It is clear that under the law, the instant unlawful detainer action should
have been stayed; the petitioner and the respondent should have been referred to
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. The MeTC,
however, did not do so in violation of the law — which violation was, in turn, affirmed
by the RTC and Court of Appeals on appeal.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals..
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  JGLaw for petitioner.
  Chavez, Miranda, Aseoche Law Offices for respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
This case is an appeal1 from the Decision2 dated 19 August 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 116865.

The facts:
The Donation
Fedders Koppel, Incorporated (FKI), a manufacturer of air-conditioning products, was
the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Km. 16, South Superhighway,
Parañaque City (subject land).3 Within the subject land are buildings and other
improvements dedicated to the business of FKI.4
In 1975, FKI5 bequeathed the subject land (exclusive of the improvements thereon)
in favor of herein respondent Makati Rotary Club Foundation, Incorporated by way of
a conditional donation.6 The respondent accepted the donation with al its
conditions.7 On 26 May 1975, FKI and the respondent executed a Deed of Donation8
evidencing their consensus.
The Lease and the Amended Deed of Donation
One of the conditions of the donation required the respondent to lease the subject
land back to FKI under terms specified in their Deed of Donation.9 With the
respondent’s acceptance of the donation, a lease agreement between FKI and the
respondent was, therefore, effectively incorporated in the Deed of Donation.
Pertinent terms of such lease agreement, as provided in the Deed of Donation, were
as follows:
1. The period of the lease is for twenty-five (25) years,10 or until the 25th of May
2000;
2. The amount of rent to be paid by FKI for the first twenty-five (25) years is
P40,126.00 per annum.11
The Deed of Donation also stipulated that the lease over the subject property is
renewable for another period of twenty-five (25) years “upon mutual agreement” of
FKI and the respondent.12 In which case, the amount of rent shall be determined in
accordance with item 2(g) of the Deed of Donation, viz.:
g. The rental for the second 25 years shall be the subject of mutual agreement and
in case of disagreement the matter shall be referred to a Board of three Arbitrators
appointed and with powers in accordance with the Arbitration Law of the Philippines,
Republic Act 878, whose function shall be to decide the current fair market value of
the land excluding the improvements, provided, that, any increase in the fair market
value of the land shall not exceed twenty five percent (25%) of the original value of
the land donated as stated in paragraph 2(c) of this Deed. The rental for the second
25 years shall not exceed three percent (3%) of the fair market value of the land
excluding the improvements as determined by the Board of Arbitrators.13
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 56
In October 1976, FKI and the respondent executed an Amended Deed of Donation14
that reiterated the provisions of the Deed of Donation, including those relating to the
lease of the subject land.
Verily, by virtue of the lease agreement contained in the Deed of Donation and
Amended Deed of Donation, FKI was able to continue in its possession and use of the
subject land.
2000 Lease Contract
Two (2) days before the lease incorporated in the Deed of Donation and Amended
Deed of Donation was set to expire, or on 23 May 2000, FKI and respondent
executed another contract of lease (2000 Lease Contract)15 covering the subject
land. In this 2000 Lease Contract, FKI and respondent agreed on a new five-year
lease to take effect on the 26th of May 2000, with annual rents ranging from
P4,000,000 for the first year up to P4,900,000 for the fifth year.16
The 2000 Lease Contract also contained an arbitration clause enforceable in the event
the parties come to disagreement about the “interpretation, application and
execution” of the lease, viz.:
19. Governing Law — The provisions of this [2000 Lease Contract] shall be
governed, interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this [2000
Lease Contract] shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted in
accordance with the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the majority of
the arbitrators shall be binding upon [FKI and respondent].17 (Emphasis supplied)
2005 Lease Contract
After the 2000 Lease Contract expired, FKI and respondent agreed to renew their
lease for another five (5) years. This new lease (2005 Lease Contract)18 required FKI
to pay a fixed annual rent of P4,200,000.19 In addition to paying the fixed rent,
however, the 2005 Lease Contract also obligated FKI to make a yearly “donation” of
money to the respondent.20 Such donations ranged from P3,000,000 for the first
year up to P3,900,000 for the fifth year.21
Notably, the 2005 Lease Contract contained an arbitration clause similar to that in the
2000 Lease Contract, to wit:
19. Governing Law — The provisions of this [2005 Lease Contract] shall be
governed, interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this [2005
Lease Contract] shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted in
accordance with the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the majority of
the arbitrators shall be binding upon [FKI and respondent].22 (Emphasis supplied)
The Assignment and Petitioner’s Refusal to Pay
From 2005 to 2008, FKI faithfully paid the rentals and “donations” due it per the 2005
Lease Contract.23 But in June of 2008, FKI sold all its rights and properties relative to
its business in favor of herein petitioner Koppel, Incorporated.24 On 29 August 2008,
FKI and petitioner executed an Assignment and Assumption of Lease and Donation25
— wherein FKI, with the conformity of the respondent, formally assigned all of its
interests and obligations under the Amended Deed of Donation and the 2005 Lease
Contract in favor of petitioner.
The following year, petitioner discontinued the payment of the rent and “donation”
under the 2005 Lease Contract.
Petitioner’s refusal to pay such rent and “donation” emanated from its belief that the
rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract, and even of the 2000 Lease Contract,
cannot be given effect because they violated one of the “material conditions” of the
donation of the subject land, as stated in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed
of Donation.26
According to petitioner, the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation
actually established not only one but two (2) lease agreements between FKI and
respondent, i.e., one lease for the first twenty-five (25) years or from 1975 to 2000,
and another lease for the next twenty-five (25) years thereafter or from 2000 to
2025.27 Both leases are material conditions of the donation of the subject land.
Petitioner points out that while a definite amount of rent for the second twenty-five
(25) year lease was not fixed in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of
Donation, both deeds nevertheless prescribed rules and limitations by which the same
may be determined. Such rules and limitations ought to be observed in any
succeeding lease agreements between petitioner and respondent for they are, in
themselves, material conditions of the donation of the subject land.28
In this connection, petitioner cites item 2(g) of the Deed of Donation and Amended
Deed of Donation that supposedly limits the amount of rent for the lease over the
second twenty-five (25) years to only “three percent (3%) of the fair market value of
the [subject] land excluding the improvements.29
For petitioner then, the rental stipulations of both the 2000 Lease Contract and 2005
Lease Contract cannot be enforced as they are clearly, in view of their exorbitant
exactions, in violation of the aforementioned threshold in item 2(g) of the Deed of
Donation and Amended Deed of Donation. Consequently, petitioner insists that the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 57
amount of rent it has to pay thereon is and must still be governed by the limitations
prescribed in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation.30
The Demand Letters
On 1 June 2009, respondent sent a letter (First Demand Letter)31 to petitioner
notifying the latter of its default “per Section 12 of the [2005 Lease Contract]” and
demanding for the settlement of the rent and “donation” due for the year 2009.
Respondent, in the same letter, further intimated of cancelling the 2005 Lease
Contract should petitioner fail to settle the said obligations.32 Petitioner received the
First Demand Letter on 2 June 2009.33
On 22 September 2009, petitioner sent a reply34 to respondent expressing its
disagreement over the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract — calling them
“severely disproportionate,” “unconscionable” and “in clear violation to the nominal
rentals mandated by the Amended Deed of Donation.” In lieu of the amount
demanded by the respondent, which purportedly totaled to P8,394,000.00, exclusive
of interests, petitioner offered to pay only P80,502.79,35 in accordance with the
rental provisions of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation.36
Respondent refused this offer.37
On 25 September 2009, respondent sent another letter (Second Demand Letter)38 to
petitioner, reiterating its demand for the payment of the obligations already due
under the 2005 Lease Contract. The Second Demand Letter also contained a demand
for petitioner to “immediately vacate the leased premises” should it fail to pay such
obligations within seven (7) days from its receipt of the letter.39 The respondent
warned of taking “legal steps” in the event that petitioner failed to comply with any of
the said demands.40 Petitioner received the Second Demand Letter on 26 September
2009.41
Petitioner refused to comply with the demands of the respondent. Instead, on 30
September 2009, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque
City a complaint42 for the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of Donation and
Amended Deed of Donation against the respondent. This case is currently pending
before Branch 257 of the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.
The Ejectment Suit
On 5 October 2009, respondent filed an unlawful detainer case43 against the
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City. The
ejectment case was raffled to Branch 77 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2009-
307.
On 4 November 2009, petitioner filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.44 In
it, petitioner reiterated its objection over the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease
Contract for being violative of the material conditions of the Deed of Donation and

Amended Deed of Donation.45 In addition to the foregoing, however, petitioner also
interposed the following defenses:
1. The MeTC was not able to validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant unlawful
detainer case in view of the insufficiency of respondent’s demand.46 The First
Demand Letter did not contain an actual demand to vacate the premises and,
therefore, the refusal to comply therewith does not give rise to an action for unlawful
detainer.47
2. Assuming that the MeTC was able to acquire jurisdiction, it may not exercise the
same until the disagreement between the parties is first referred to arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract.48
3. Assuming further that the MeTC has jurisdiction that it can exercise, ejectment still
would not lie as the 2005 Lease Contract is void ab initio.49 The stipulation in the
2005 Lease Contract requiring petitioner to give yearly “donations” to respondent is a
simulation, for they are, in fact, parts of the rent.50 Such grants were only
denominated as “donations” in the contract so that the respondent — a non-stock
and non-profit corporation — could evade payment of the taxes otherwise due
thereon.51
In due course, petitioner and respondent both submitted their position papers,
together with their other documentary evidence.52 Remarkably, however, respondent
failed to submit the Second Demand Letter as part of its documentary evidence.
Rulings of the MeTC, RTC and Court of Appeals
On 27 April 2010, the MeTC rendered judgment53 in favor of the petitioner. While the
MeTC refused to dismiss the action on the ground that the dispute is subject to
arbitration, it nonetheless sided with the petitioner with respect to the issues
regarding the insufficiency of the respondent’s demand and the nullity of the 2005
Lease Contract.54 The MeTC thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case x x x, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.55
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). This appeal was assigned
to Branch 274 of the RTC of Parañaque City and was docketed as Civil Case No. 10-
0255.
On 29 October 2010, the RTC reversed56 the MeTC and ordered the eviction of the
petitioner from the subject land:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 58
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing duly considered, the appealed Decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 77, Parañaque City, is hereby reversed, judgment is
thus rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant and against the defendant-appellee,
and ordering the latter —
(1) to vacate the lease[d] premises made subject of the case and to restore the
possession thereof to the plaintiff-appellant;
(2) to pay to the plaintiff-appellant the amount of Nine Million Three Hundred Sixty
Two Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Six Pesos (P9,362,436.00), penalties and net of
5% withholding tax, for the lease period from May 25, 2009 to May 25, 2010 and
such monthly rental as will accrue during the pendency of this case;
(3) to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000.00 plus appearance fee of
P3,000.00;
(4) and costs of suit.
As to the existing improvements belonging to the defendant-appellee, as these were
built in good faith, the provisions of Art. 1678 of the Civil Code shall apply.
SO ORDERED.57
The ruling of the RTC is premised on the following ratiocinations:
1. The respondent had adequately complied with the requirement of demand as a
jurisdictional precursor to an unlawful detainer action.58 The First Demand Letter, in
substance, contains a demand for petitioner to vacate when it mentioned that it was
a notice “per Section 12 of the [2005 Lease Contract].”59 Moreover, the issue of
sufficiency of the respondent’s demand ought to have been laid to rest by the Second
Demand Letter which, though not submitted in evidence, was nonetheless admitted
by petitioner as containing a “demand to eject” in its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim.60
2. The petitioner cannot validly invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract while, at the same time, impugn such contract’s validity.61 Even assuming
that it can, petitioner still did not file a formal application before the MeTC so as to
render such arbitration clause operational.62 At any rate, the MeTC would not be
precluded from exercising its jurisdiction over an action for unlawful detainer, over
which, it has exclusive original jurisdiction.63
3. The 2005 Lease Contract must be sustained as a valid contract since petitioner
was not able to adduce any evidence to support its allegation that the same is
void.64 There was, in this case, no evidence that respondent is guilty of any tax
evasion.65

Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 19 August 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed66 the decision of the RTC:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, in Civil Case No. 10-0255 is AFFIRMED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 67
Hence, this appeal.
On 5 September 2011, this Court granted petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order68 staying the immediate implementation of the
decisions adverse to it.
Our Ruling
Independently of the merits of the case, the MeTC, RTC and Court of Appeals all
erred in overlooking the significance of the arbitration clause incorporated in the 2005
Lease Contract. As the Court sees it, that is a fatal mistake.
For this reason, We grant the petition.
Present Dispute is Arbitrable Under
the Arbitration Clause of the 2005
Lease Agreement Contract
Going back to the records of this case, it is discernable that the dispute between the
petitioner and respondent emanates from the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease
Contract. The respondent insists upon the enforceability and validity of such
stipulations, whereas, petitioner, in substance, repudiates them. It is from petitioner’s
apparent breach of the 2005 Lease Contract that respondent filed the instant
unlawful detainer action.
One cannot escape the conclusion that, under the foregoing premises, the dispute
between the petitioner and respondent arose from the application or execution of the
2005 Lease Contract. Undoubtedly, such kinds of dispute are covered by the
arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract to wit:
19. Governing Law – The provisions of this [2005 Lease Contract] shall be
governed, interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 59
Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this [2005
Lease Contract] shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted in
accordance with the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the majority of
the arbitrators shall be binding upon [FKI and respondent].69 (Emphasis supplied)
The arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract stipulates that “any disagreement”
as to the “interpretation, application or execution” of the 2005 Lease Contract ought
to be submitted to arbitration.70 To the mind of this Court, such stipulation is clear
and is comprehensive enough so as to include virtually any kind of conflict or dispute
that may arise from the 2005 Lease Contract including the one that presently besets
petitioner and respondent.
The application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract in this case
carries with it certain legal effects. However, before discussing what these legal
effects are, We shall first deal with the challenges posed against the application of
such arbitration clause.
Challenges Against the Application
of the Arbitration Clause of the 2005
Lease Contract
Curiously, despite the lucidity of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract,
the petitioner, as well as the MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals, vouched for the
non-application of the same in the instant case. A plethora of arguments was hurled
in favor of bypassing arbitration. We now address them.
At different points in the proceedings of this case, the following arguments were
offered against the application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract:
1. The disagreement between the petitioner and respondent is non-arbitrable as it
will inevitably touch upon the issue of the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract.71 It
was submitted that one of the reasons offered by the petitioner in justifying its failure
to pay under the 2005 Lease Contract was the nullity of such contract for being
contrary to law and public policy.72 The Supreme Court, in Gonzales v. Climax
Mining, Ltd.,73 held that “the validity of contract cannot be subject of arbitration
proceedings” as such questions are “legal in nature and require the application and
interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function.”74
2. The petitioner cannot validly invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract while, at the same time, impugn such contract’s validity.75
3. Even assuming that it can invoke the arbitration clause whilst denying the validity
of the 2005 Lease Contract, petitioner still did not file a formal application before the
MeTC so as to render such arbitration clause operational.76 Section 24 of Republic

Act No. 9285 requires the party seeking arbitration to first file a “request” or an
application therefor with the court not later than the preliminary conference.77
4. Petitioner and respondent already underwent Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)
proceedings before the RTC.78 Hence, a further referral of the dispute to arbitration
would only be circuitous.79 Moreover, an ejectment case, in view of its summary
nature, already fulfills the prime purpose of arbitration, i.e., to provide parties in
conflict with an expedient method for the resolution of their dispute.80 Arbitration
then would no longer be necessary in this case.81
None of the arguments have any merit.
First. As highlighted in the previous discussion, the disagreement between the
petitioner and respondent falls within the all-encompassing terms of the arbitration
clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. While it may be conceded that in the arbitration of
such disagreement, the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract, or at least, of such
contract’s rental stipulations would have to be determined, the same would not
render such disagreement non-arbitrable. The quotation from Gonzales that was used
to justify the contrary position was taken out of context. A rereading of Gonzales
would fix its relevance to this case.
In Gonzales, a complaint for arbitration was filed before the Panel of Arbitrators of
the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (PA-MGB) seeking the nullification of a Financial
Technical Assistance Agreement and other mining related agreements entered into by
private parties.82 Grounds invoked for the nullification of such agreements include
fraud and unconstitutionality.83 The pivotal issue that confronted the Court then was
whether the PA-MGB has jurisdiction over that particular arbitration complaint. Stated
otherwise, the question was whether the complaint for arbitration raises arbitrable
issues that the PA-MGB can take cognizance of.
Gonzales decided the issue in the negative. In holding that the PA-MGB was devoid of
any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for arbitration, this Court pointed
out to the provisions of R.A. No. 7942, or the Mining Act of 1995, which granted the
PA-MGB with exclusive original jurisdiction only over mining disputes, i.e., disputes
involving “rights to mining areas,” “mineral agreements or permits,” and “surface
owners, occupants, claimholders or concessionaires” requiring the technical
knowledge and experience of mining authorities in order to be resolved.84
Accordingly, since the complaint for arbitration in Gonzales did not raise mining
disputes as contemplated under R.A. No. 7942 but only issues relating to the validity
of certain mining related agreements, this Court held that such complaint could not
be arbitrated before the PA-MGB.85 It is in this context that we made the
pronouncement now in discussion:
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a
disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the contract between
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 60
them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge
and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the
parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or agreement on the
ground of fraud or oppression as in this case. The validity of the contract cannot be
subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of
a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These
questions are legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws
and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function.86 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court in Gonzales did not simply base its rejection of the complaint for arbitration
on the ground that the issue raised therein, i.e., the validity of contracts, is per se
non-arbitrable. The real consideration behind the ruling was the limitation that was
placed by R.A. No. 7942 upon the jurisdiction of the PA-MGB as an arbitral body.
Gonzales rejected the complaint for arbitration because the issue raised therein is not
a mining dispute per R.A. No. 7942 and it is for this reason, and only for this reason,
that such issue is rendered non-arbitrable before the PA-MGB. As stated beforehand,
R.A. No. 7942 clearly limited the jurisdiction of the PA-MGB only to mining
disputes.87
Much more instructive for our purposes, on the other hand, is the recent case of
Cargill Philippines, Inc. v. San Fernando Regal Trading, Inc.88 In Cargill, this Court
answered the question of whether issues involving the rescission of a contract are
arbitrable. The respondent in Cargill argued against arbitrability, also citing therein
Gonzales. After dissecting Gonzales, this Court ruled in favor of arbitrability.89 Thus,
We held:
Respondent contends that assuming that the existence of the contract and the
arbitration clause is conceded, the CA’s decision declining referral of the parties’
dispute to arbitration is still correct. It claims that its complaint in the RTC presents
the issue of whether under the facts alleged, it is entitled to rescind the contract with
damages; and that issue constitutes a judicial question or one that requires the
exercise of judicial function and cannot be the subject of an arbitration proceeding.
Respondent cites our ruling in Gonzales, wherein we held that a panel of arbitrator is
bereft of jurisdiction over the complaint for declaration of nullity/or termination of the
subject contracts on the grounds of fraud and oppression attendant to the execution
of the addendum contract and the other contracts emanating from it, and that the
complaint should have been filed with the regular courts as it involved issues which
are judicial in nature.
Such argument is misplaced and respondent cannot rely on the Gonzales case to
support its argument.90 (Emphasis ours)
Second. Petitioner may still invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract
notwithstanding the fact that it assails the validity of such contract. This is due to the
doctrine of separability.91

Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as
independent of the main contract.92 Being a separate contract in itself, the
arbitration agreement may thus be invoked regardless of the possible nullity or
invalidity of the main contract.93
Once again instructive is Cargill, wherein this Court held that, as a further
consequence of the doctrine of separability, even the very party who repudiates the
main contract may invoke its arbitration clause.94
Third. The operation of the arbitration clause in this case is not at all defeated by the
failure of the petitioner to file a formal “request” or application therefor with the
MeTC. We find that the filing of a “request” pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No. 9285
is not the sole means by which an arbitration clause may be validly invoked in a
pending suit.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 9285 reads:
SEC. 24. Referral to Arbitration.—A court before which an action is brought in a
matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least one
party so requests not later that the pre-trial conference, or upon the request of both
parties thereafter, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. [Emphasis
ours; italics original]
The “request” referred to in the above provision is, in turn, implemented by Rules 4.1
to 4.3 of A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC or the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution (Special ADR Rules):
RULE 4: REFERRAL TO ADR
Rule 4.1. Who makes the request.—A party to a pending action filed in violation of
the arbitration agreement, whether contained in an arbitration clause or in a
submission agreement, may request the court to refer the parties to arbitration in
accordance with such agreement.
Rule 4.2. When to make request.—(A) Where the arbitration agreement exists
before the action is filed.—The request for referral shall be made not later than the
pre-trial conference. After the pre-trial conference, the court will only act upon the
request for referral if it is made with the agreement of all parties to the case.
(B) Submission agreement.—If there is no existing arbitration agreement at the
time the case is filed but the parties subsequently enter into an arbitration
agreement, they may request the court to refer their dispute to arbitration at any
time during the proceedings.
Rule 4.3. Contents of request.—The request for referral shall be in the form of a
motion, which shall state that the dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 61
Apart from other submissions, the movant shall attach to his motion an authentic
copy of the arbitration agreement.
The request shall contain a notice of hearing addressed to all parties specifying the
date and time when it would be heard. The party making the request shall serve it
upon the respondent to give him the opportunity to file a comment or opposition as
provided in the immediately succeeding Rule before the hearing. [Emphasis ours;
italics original]
Attention must be paid, however, to the salient wordings of Rule 4.1. It reads: “[a]
party to a pending action filed in violation of the arbitration agreement x x x may
request the court to refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with such
agreement.”
In using the word “may” to qualify the act of filing a “request” under Section 24 of
R.A. No. 9285, the Special ADR Rules clearly did not intend to limit the invocation of
an arbitration agreement in a pending suit solely via such “request.” After all, non-
compliance with an arbitration agreement is a valid defense to any offending suit
and, as such, may even be raised in an answer as provided in our ordinary rules of
procedure.95
In this case, it is conceded that petitioner was not able to file a separate “request” of
arbitration before the MeTC. However, it is equally conceded that the petitioner, as
early as in its Answer with Counterclaim, had already apprised the MeTC of the
existence of the arbitration clause in the 2005 Lease Contract96 and, more
significantly, of its desire to have the same enforced in this case.97 This act of
petitioner is enough valid invocation of his right to arbitrate.
Fourth. The fact that the petitioner and respondent already underwent through JDR
proceedings before the RTC, will not make the subsequent conduct of arbitration
between the parties unnecessary or circuitous. The JDR system is substantially
different from arbitration proceedings.
The JDR framework is based on the processes of mediation, conciliation or early
neutral evaluation which entails the submission of a dispute before a “JDR judge”
who shall merely “facilitate settlement” between the parties in conflict or make a
“non-binding evaluation or assessment of the chances of each party’s case.”98 Thus
in JDR, the JDR judge lacks the authority to render a resolution of the dispute that is
binding upon the parties in conflict. In arbitration, on the other hand, the dispute is
submitted to an arbitrator/s — a neutral third person or a group of thereof — who
shall have the authority to render a resolution binding upon the parties.99
Clearly, the mere submission of a dispute to JDR proceedings would not necessarily
render the subsequent conduct of arbitration a mere surplusage. The failure of the
parties in conflict to reach an amicable settlement before the JDR may, in fact, be
supplemented by their resort to arbitration where a binding resolution to the dispute

could finally be achieved. This situation precisely finds application to the case at
bench.
Neither would the summary nature of ejectment cases be a valid reason to disregard
the enforcement of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract.
Notwithstanding the summary nature of ejectment cases, arbitration still remains
relevant as it aims not only to afford the parties an expeditious method of resolving
theiz dispute.
A pivotal feature of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution is that it
is, first and foremost, a product of party autonomy or the freedom of the parties to
“make their own arrangements to resolve their own disputes.”100 Arbitration
agreements manifest not only the desire of the parties in conflict for an expeditious
resolution of their dispute. They also represent, if not more so, the parties’ mutual
aspiration to achieve such resolution outside of judicial auspices, in a more informal
and less antagonistic environment under the terms of their choosing. Needless to
state, this critical feature can never be satisfied in an ejectment case no matter how
summary it may be.
Having hurdled all the challenges against the application of the arbitration clause of
the 2005 Lease Agreement in this case, We shall now proceed with the discussion of
its legal effects.
Legal Effect of the Application of the Arbitration Clause
Since there really are no legal impediments to the application of the arbitration clause
of the 2005 Contract of Lease in this case, We find that the instant unlawful detainer
action was instituted in violation of such clause. The Law, therefore, should have
governed the fate of the parties and this suit:
R.A. No. 876
Section 7. Stay of civil action.—If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an issue
arising out of an agreement providing for the arbitration thereof, the court in which
such suit or proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the action or proceeding
until an arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement:
Provided, That the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration. [Emphasis supplied]
R.A. No. 9285
Section 24. Referral to Arbitration.—A court before which an action is brought in a
matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least one
party so requests not later that the pre-trial conference, or upon the request of both
parties thereafter, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 62
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. [Emphasis
supplied]
It is clear that under the law, the instant unlawful detainer action should have been
stayed;101 the petitioner and the respondent should have been referred to
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract. The MeTC,
however, did not do so in violation of the law — which violation was, in turn, affirmed
by the RTC and Court of Appeals on appeal.
The violation by the MeTC of the clear directives under R.A. Nos. 876 and 9285
renders invalid all proceedings it undertook in the ejectment case after the filing by
petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim — the point when the petitioner and the
respondent should have been referred to arbi-tration. This case must, therefore, be
remanded to the MeTC and be suspended at said point. Inevitably, the decisions of
the MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals must all be vacated and set aside.
The petitioner and the respondent must then be referred to arbitration pursuant to
the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract.
This Court is not unaware of the apparent harshness of the Decision that it is about
to make. Nonetheless, this Court must make the same if only to stress the point that,
in our jurisdiction, bona fide arbitration agreements are recognized as valid;102 and
that laws,103 rules and regulations104 do exist protecting and ensuring their
enforcement as a matter of state policy. Gone should be the days when courts treat
otherwise valid arbitration agreements with disdain and hostility, if not outright
“jealousy,”105 and then get away with it. Courts should instead learn to treat
alternative means of dispute resolution as effective partners in the administration of
justice and, in the case of arbitration agreements, to afford them judicial restraint.106
Today, this Court only performs its part in upholding a once disregarded state policy.
Civil Case No. CV 09-0346
This Court notes that, on 30 September 2009, petitioner filed with the RTC of
Parañaque City, a complaint107 for the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of
Donation and Amended Deed of Donation against the respondent. The case is
currently pending before Branch 257 of the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CV 09-
0346.
This Court recognizes the great possibility that issues raised in Civil Case No. CV 09-
0346 may involve matters that are rightfully arbitrable per the arbitration clause of
the 2005 Lease Contract. However, since the records of Civil Case No. CV 09-0346
are not before this Court, We can never know with true certainty and only speculate.
In this light, let a copy of this Decision be also served to Branch 257 of the RTC of
Parañaque for its consideration and, possible, application to Civil Case No. CV 09-
0346.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 63

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, We ——o0o—— 

hereby render a Decision:
**  Per Raffle dated 10 October 2011. Koppel, Inc. vs. Makati Rotary Club
1. SETTING ASIDE all the proceedings undertaken by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Foundation, Inc., 705 SCRA 142, G.R. No. 198075 September 4, 2013
Branch 77, of Parañaque City in relation to Civil Case No. 2009-307 after the filing by
petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim;

2. REMANDING the instant case to the MeTC, SUSPENDED at the point after the
filing by petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim;

3. SETTING ASIDE the following:

a. Decision dated 19 August 2011 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No.

116865,

b. Decision dated 29 October 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274, of
Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 10-0255,

c. Decision dated 27 April 2010 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 77, of
Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 2009-307; and

4. REFERRING the petitioner and the respondent to arbitration pursuant to the

arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract, repeatedly included in the 2000 Lease
Contract and in the 1976 Amended Deed of Donation.

Let a copy of this Decision be served to Branch 257 of the RTC of Parañaque for its
consideration and, possible, application to Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Abad**  and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

Notes.—No adverse claim, protest or opposition involving mining rights shall be

accepted for filing unless verified and accompanied by the prescribed docket fee and
proof of services to the respondent(s) either personally or by registered mail. (Pyro
Copper Mining Corporation vs. Mines Adjudication Board-Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, 594 SCRA 195 [2009])

The panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the
following: a) disputes involving rights to mining areas; b) disputes involving mineral
agreements or permits. (Ibid.)
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 64

  YNARES-SANTIAGO,

EN BANC   SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

    CARPIO,

    MARTINEZ,

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460   CORONA,

Petitioner,     CARPIO MORALES,

- versus -   JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., CALLEJO,

    Respondent. AZCUNA,

JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.,     TINGA,

Respondent.   CHICO-NAZARIO, and

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x   GARCIA, JJ.

Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF   Promulgated:

JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
   
x------------------------x
  March 31, 2006
LUZ ARRIEGO,
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Petitioner,
   
 
   
 
  DECISION
   
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
   
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)
  CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 
   
Present:
   
 
- versus - Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless
PANGANIBAN, C.J., lives.
 
PUNO,  
 
QUISUMBING, Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran[1]

THE CASES
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 ( Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge  Florentino  V.  Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-
requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services
(SC Clinic) revealed (e)vidence of ego disintegration and developing psychotic
process. Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he
applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-
esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded
that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private
practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty.
Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, MalabonCity,
on 4 November 1998.
Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.[2]
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-
Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L.
Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum [3] to then Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report
be considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge
Floro be subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental examination.Court
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 65
Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under
preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation against him.
In a Resolution[4] dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc  adopted the
recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in
view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as reported by the audit
team:
(a)                The act of circulating calling cards containing self-
laudatory statements regarding qualifications and for
announcing in open court during court session his
qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of
Judicial Conduct;
 
(b)               For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping
quarters;
(c)                For rendering resolutions without written orders in
violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
 
(d)               For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he
declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon
2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e)                For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No.
46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83,
Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07,
Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from
engaging in the private practice of law;
 
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 66

(f)                 For appearing in personal cases without prior (m)              For violation of Circular No. 13[5] dated 1 July 1987.
authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the
corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the  
scheduled dates of hearing;
Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired
 
Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report
(g)                For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for
Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without the and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was directed to
presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding
questions in the form of examination of the custodian of comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an
the accused;
appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the proper office
  of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.In the
(h)                For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under preventive suspension for
to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-
MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him.He was
civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even barely eight months into his position.
without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set
 
forth both affirmative and negative defenses [6] while he filed his Answer/Compliance
(i)                  For motu proprio  and over the strong objection of
the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical on 26 August 1999.
examination of the accused based on the ground that the
accused is mahina ang pick-up; On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of
  his case for failure to prosecute.[7] However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself
(j)                 For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies as his first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez. [8] Subsequently, on 7
from that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide; July 2000, Judge Floro filed a Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification against Justice

  Ramirez as investigator[9] which was denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11

(k)               For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial July 2000.[10] Judge Floros motion for reconsideration [11]suffered the same fate.
Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and [12]
the Philippine justice system;  On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirezs

inhibition/disqualification to this Court. [13] On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled against
 
the inhibition of Justice Ramirez.[14]
(l)                  For the use of highly improper and intemperate
language during court proceedings;
 
 
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 67

4.                  AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia, Court

On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-
Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of
comment on Judge Floros motion to dismiss, [15] recommended that the same should
the Office of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda
be denied. G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon[21]

 
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001.[16] The day after, Justice
5.                  AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against former
Ramirez came out with a Partial Report recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro Court Administrator Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.)
Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court
from office by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform
Administrator[22]
the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
 
Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.[17]
6.                  A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A.
Ramirez[23]
  In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him
 
and even after Justice Ramirez came out with his report and recommendation on 7
7.                  A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A.
March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against those he Ramirez[24]
perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.  

A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling
1999 preventive suspension follows:
seven, be dismissed.[25] On 14 February 2006, the Court granted the motion to

  dismiss.[26]

1.                  OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz  Arriego  v. Judge  Florentino  V.  Floro,
Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial Audit Jr.)
Team, Office of the Court Administrator[18]
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge h in A.M. No. RTJ-99-
 
1460: (f)or using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
2.                  OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin
Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling
72, Malabon City[19]
the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to
 
sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor. The
3.                  AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo L.
Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.[20] complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No.

  20385-MN.

 
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer
Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal
Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5
September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified
against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro filed a
Memorandum in this case.[27]
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated  11 May 1999  of
Judge  Florentino  V.  Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by
Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN In Re: Petition
To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner. The resolution
disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner
in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty.
David S. Narvasa, the petitioners counsel. [28] The OCA, through Court Administrator
Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for
inhibition and declared it as null and void. However, he ordered the
raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the
petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be
assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should
have continued hearing and taking cognizance of the case. It is
improper for him to order the raffle of the case anew as this
violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12,
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 68
Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which
provides to wit:
8. Raffle of Cases:
 
x x x x
 
8.3 Special raffles should not be
permitted except on verified application of
the interested party who seeks issuance of
a provisional remedy and only upon a
finding by the Executive Judge that unless
the special raffle is conducted, irreparable
damage shall be suffered by the
applicant. The special raffle shall be conducted
by at least two judges in a multiple-sala station.
xxxx
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu
proprio order the special raffle of a case since such is only allowed
upon a verified application of the interested party seeking a
provisional remedy and only upon the Executive Judges finding that
if a special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will suffer
irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s order is contrary
to the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even
mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is
his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship.It is not unusual to
hear a judge who speaks highly of a padrino (who helped him get
his position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep
gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious impression
about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting and
expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges
concerned. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 69

relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2,

Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct). Court, in a Letter dated 28 February 2006, her willingness to submit her case for

  decision based on the pleadings already submitted and on the evidence previously

The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his
on the motion for reconsideration are judicial matters which this preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and
Office has no authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not
administrative.[29] A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.

The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are

raffle of the case in violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on consolidated cases, we resolve to render as well a consolidated decision.

page 5 of the subject resolution that Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped

But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding
undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x.
Judge Floros alleged mental illness and its effects on his duties as Judge of a

In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc  adopted the Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed

recommendations of the OCA.[30] Judge Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator appointed

on 22 October 1999[31] which was noted by this Court on 7 December 1999. On 11 by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving as it does a

January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to depend on the findings of the mental

resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is simply to wade

report and recommendation. through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order to determine

once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him.  If the
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this
evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next issue is to determine the
case as well as in the second case ( i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution
appropriate penalty to be imposed.
dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as the other parties in

these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are willing to submit A.M. Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil

RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings mind or because of a psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this

filed and the evidence so far submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. question hinges the applicability of equity.

RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges (c and g, h and j,
Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its willingness to submit A.M. No.
e and f) will be jointly discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the
99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings and the evidence submitted

therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this

 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 70

OCA. These charges involve common facts and to treat them separately will be residence is not improper and that the word title should be broad enough to include a

superfluous. Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even

his Law School.Moreover, other lawyers do include in their calling cards their

 
former/present titles/positions like President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so
DISCUSSION  where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro argues that his cards were
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends or by reciprocity
penalty of dismissal against Judge Floro
to other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling
cards containing self-laudatory to seek other professional employment.
statements regarding
qualifications AND for As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge
announcing in open court
during court session his Floro counters that it was his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon,
qualifications in violation of
Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of who suggested that during his initial court session, she would briefly announce his
Judicial Conduct appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law

practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the introduction was done only during the
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his
first week of his assumption into office.
name as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein

that he is a bar exams topnotcher (87.55%) and with full second honors from the
Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B. [32]
 The audit team likewise reported that:
(b)efore the start of court session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law
practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila University with second honors, and a bar
topnotcher during the 1983 Bar Examinations with an average score of
87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of
Revelationaccording to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were
given the opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions
were asked; hence the session commenced. [33]
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain
terms that a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory. A parallel
proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. This means that lawyers and
judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot
debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As
succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, (i)f lawyers are

prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory

Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, [34] the use of
statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of
professional cards containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 71

Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from serious charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount

seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or to gross misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it may amount to simple

politicians, who thrive by publicity.[35] misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may simply be a case of vulgar and/or

unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.

 

 
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card,

did Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct? Misconduct is defined as wrong or improper conduct while gross connotes

something out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant;

In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.,[36] we explained that the use of an ordinary and
shameful.[40] For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be
simple professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card may contain only a
corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
known legal rules.[41]
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. In herein case,

Judge Floros calling cards cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating

therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in

topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that

judges. Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see

from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly,

Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these
the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be
were just given by him as tokens and/or only to a few who requested the same.
[37]
human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against
 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise. An eye-
judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as
witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these cards.
[38]
they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.
Worse, Judge Floros very own witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch,

testified that Judge Floro gave her one of these cards.[39] As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had

been announcing in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should
of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary
be measured against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-
publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their
10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before its
qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might
amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 72

interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as Genova[43] wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct

the bastion of justice confident, competent and true. And to discover that this is not prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and his family used his

so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the

and their lawyers approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary. electrical bills.

  Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such

familiarity from his aide as this becomes fodder for gossip as what had apparently
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a
happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and attuned to the
week, Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct only.
sensibilities of his staff who were understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon
(b) Re: Charge of allowing the use of his
chambers as sleeping quarters arrangement of a judge allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed.

(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions

The audit team observed that inside Judge Floros chamber[s], there is a without written orders in
violation of Rule 36, Section 1,
folding bed with cushion located at the right corner of the room. A man, who was
1997 Rules of Procedure
later identified as Judge Floros driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing the audit
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the
team, the driver immediately went out of the room.[42] hearing on the Motion for
Release on Recognizance filed
by the accused without the
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The
presence of the trial prosecutor
man the audit team saw sleeping on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floros and propounding questions in
the form of examination of the
aide or alalay whom he allows to rest from time to time (in between periods and custodian of the accused
especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not The memorandum report reads:
sleeping during that time that the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the
absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded with
when he saw the members thereof.
the hearing of the following matters:

This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in  

Judge Floro having allowed another person to use his folding bed for short periods of (c-1) Motion for Release on Recognizance  filed by the
accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442
time during office hours and while there is no one else in the room. The situation entitled People vs. Luisito Beltran, People vs. Emma Alvarez, et
would have been different if there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of al., People vs. Rowena Camino, and People vs. John Richie Villaluz ,
respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr.
government funds and/or facilities such as in the case of Presado v. propounded questions (in a form of direct examination) to the
custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn by the

administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the
Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the accused under oath prior
to the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The
hearing on the aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous
hearing wherein the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would
automatically inform the accused that they are qualified to apply for
probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to
draft the application in behalf of the accused so that a motion for
release on recognizance will immediately be heard and be
consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing
(attached herewith as Annexes 3 to 6 ), the custodians of the
accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a
member of the lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order
granting the motion for release on recognizance is being issued by
Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither rules nor circular
mandates the issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting
the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the
minutes of the session. Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4,
1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN
are hereto attached as Annexes 3 to 5.
 
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and
20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion without issuing
a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto attached as
annexes 6 to 7.[44]
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule
of procedure with respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of
Court refers only to final and not interlocutory orders. Only final
orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and entered.
x x x x
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at
bar, herein respondent faithfully complied with the requirements of
Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the applications for
release on recognizance, thus:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 73
a.                   The application for release on recognizance,
although captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE ON
RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D.
968, a Special Law on Probation.
 
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due
course/taken cognizance of by respondent, if on its face,
the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the
Office of the City/Public Prosecutor.
 
c.                   The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO
MANILA (all courts), especially in RTC, MALABON, and in
Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-
1998 almost 14 years), [and especially the practice of
former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro
Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers,
regarding his being a responsible member of the
community where the accused reside/resides; the
questions propounded are in the form of direct and even
cross examination questions.
d.                  The accused is not required to be placed on the
witness stand, since there is no such requirement. All that
is required, is to inform the accused regarding some
matters of probation (optional) such as whether he was
sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he has
had previous cases, etc.
e.                   Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court
hearings on application for release on recognizance,
respondent, for caution in most of the applications,
included the interview/hearing on the applications for
release on recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where
a fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at other times, the
hearing is held in the chambers.[45]
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of
the rules on probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as
amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an accused on recognizance

entails more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the
Probation Law,[46] and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares,[47] it is incumbent
upon the Judge hearing the application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a
disqualified offender as (p)utting the discharge of the accused on hold would have
allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request for provisional liberty.
Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he completely
did away with the requirement for an investigation report by the probation
officer.Under the Probation Law, the accuseds temporary liberty is warranted only
during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the
application for probation and the resolution thereon. [48] As we explained in Poso v.
Judge Mijares[49]:
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of
actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on
application for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to
underscore the interim character of the provisional liberty
envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated differently, the
temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective no longer
than the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation
report and the resolution of the petition,  which the law mandates
as no more than sixty (60) days to finish the case study and report
and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for
the trial judge to resolve the application for probation. By
allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even before
the order to submit the case study and report, respondent
Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem  discharge of
the accused to the detriment of the prosecution and the
private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an
accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the
transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals[50] wherein
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 74
we held that no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical
existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e.,
delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and
implementation. Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when
he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the
accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, People
v. Luisito Beltran, People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.,  People v. Rowena
Camino, and People v. John Richie Villaluz.[51] From his explanation that such written
orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to
inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of
probation cases. First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without
the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose
said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the
probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the
accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on recognizance was
not reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on
recognizance, as well as his eventual probation, was already a done deal even before
the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the accused by
instructing his staff to draft the application for probation. This, Judge Floro did not
deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a
matter of policy, had been approving applications for release on recognizance hastily
and without observing the requirements of the law for said purpose. Verily, we having
nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 75

salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants . In herein case, however, The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in

we cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as the unsolicited fervor to release the criminal cases, he is always pro-accused particularly concerning detention prisoners

accused significantly deprived the prosecution and the private complainants of their and bonded accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on their bonds

right to due process.[52] during the pendency of their cases.

   

Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart

in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of

basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[53] having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be

tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the
well to Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the
law fully and uphold it conscientiously. [54] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala
owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of
from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there
gross ignorance of the law.[55] True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the
is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he
law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions.
[56]
sided with the accused.
 To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic

and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments. [57] This rule, however, admits of Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically

an exception as good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the

parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer

and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially

error.[58] Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he those under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-

should be held administratively liable. [59] law of so many unfounded offenses. [60]

  Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible

(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal especially since it is corroborated by independent evidence, [61] e.g.,
cases where he declared that
he is pro-accused which is Judge Florosunwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on
contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, recognizance as previously discussed.
Canons of Judicial Conduct
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 76

important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on

Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: A judge should so his impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of
judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of

the judiciary. This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense  
justice should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed
 
and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest as well. [62] Like Caesars wife, a
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking
judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. [63] Judge Floro, by broadcasting to advantage of his moral
his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal
regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should Case No. 20385-MN (for
frustrated homicide) in the
reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of guise of settling the civil aspect
bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the
public confidence in the judiciary. [64] His language, both written and spoken, must be accused to sign the settlement
even without the presence of
guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. [65] the trial prosecutor.

On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an (j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8
March 1999 which varies from
independent judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, that which he issued in open
court in Criminal Case No.
Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in 20385-MN, for frustrated
serious doubt, necessarily eroding the publics trust in his ability to render justice.As homicide.

we held in Castillo v. Juan[66]:

The memorandum report states:
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No.
judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no
20385-MN entitled: People vs. Nenita Salvador, Judge Floro, Jr., in
less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give
the absence of the public prosecutor and considering that the
the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding
private complainant was not being represented by a private
to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions
prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince
or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself
the private complainant to settle and eventually cause the dismissal
open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of
of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making the
being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and
private complainants and the accused sign the settlement. ( Copy of
predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public
the signed stenographic notes is hereto attached as Annex 8).
that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that
he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the x x x x
risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not
necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No.
is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on record

the manifestations of the private complainant and the accused
relative to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of the case. In
the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said
settlement until after the public prosecutor has given his
comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch
73, the aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation
from the original order given in open court. Actually, the said
criminal case was already settled even without the presence of the
public prosecutor. The settlement was in the nature of absolving
not only the civil liability of the accused but the criminal liability as
well. It was further reported that the private complainants signed
the compromise agreement due to the insistence or persuasion of
Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the
stenographic notes (unsigned draft order) and the revised order
(signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order
are hereto attached as Annexes 8, 13, and 14. (Note: the
stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as
A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint[67] dated 9 August 1999,
she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughters
case against the accused therein despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When
the parties could not agree on the amount to be paid by the accused for the medical
expenses incurred by complaining witness, they requested respondent that they be
given time to study the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that
the case be settled immediately, uttering, ngayon na! ngayon na! Moreover, Judge
Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the accused
against the complaining witness would likewise be dismissed, so they agreed to settle
the case. However, the written Order issued by respondent Judge did not reflect the
agreement entered into by the parties in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint
filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only in
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 77
accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants concerned
as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit
of reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties suggested that they would file the
necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the
TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a
conversation between Judge Floro and Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter
opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of
compromise in criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some
cases. With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the hearing on even date was
superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras stance that he has
no power to revise an Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend or revise
any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of
Appeals[68]  wherein we declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has
juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed
and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court
for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that
indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until
and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the
modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment
has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties,
or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof
somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after
promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after
service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court
rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and
amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any
party or even motu proprio,  provided that in the case of a final

order or judgment, the same has not attained finality.   (Emphasis
supplied)
In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open
court ostensibly a judicial approval of a compromise agreement which was amended
or revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the written order merely
stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the manifestations of the
parties to enter into a compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have
submitted its comments thereto. [69]
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to
revise his oral order per the Echaus  ruling and factoring in his explanation for
resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty
(under paragraph j of the complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise
of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the
accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the
same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial settlement never came to
pass. It was not judicially approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999,
thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause for complaint. She cannot, on one hand,
complain that the written order did not reflect the agreement reached during the
hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached under duress
at the instance of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio  and over the strong
objection of the trial
prosecutor, ordering the
mental and physical
examination of the accused
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 78
based on the ground that the
accused is mahina ang pick-up
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal
Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro motu proprio  ordered the physical and mental
examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is mahina ang pick-up.[70]
In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the
demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the
manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO
lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor,
Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a.                   Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the
accused opted to enter a plea of not guilty;
b.                  But upon query of the Court, the accused
approached the bench and he appeared trembling and
stammering;
 
c.                   Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily
admitted that accused is nauutal, has difficulty of
reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
 
d.                  Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often
changed his mind regarding the plea, from not guilty to
guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;
e.                   Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon
citation by the Court/respondent of the pertinent
provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental

Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec.
5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue
orders to conform to justice), manifested orally that the
accused is mahina ang pick-up;
f.                    Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in
issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support,
since it is well-settled that the court may order a physical or
MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental
condition is material to the issues involved. (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf.
MARTIN, p. 107, id.).[71]
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro.  He
testified that he moved for the suspension of the arraignment of the accused
Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for trial. [72] As reflected
in the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his
Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused is mahina ang pick-up.
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the
arraignment motu proprio  and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor. It
must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999
when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment.  The arraignment shall be
suspended, if at the time thereof:
 
(a)                The accused appears to be
suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 79
thereto. In such case, the court shall
order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such
purpose.
 
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant
to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the suspension be made upon motion
by the proper party.[73] Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order
the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio  based on his own assessment of the
situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the
proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make
a proper defense.[74] As we underscored in People v. Alcalde[75]:
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that
an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or
imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it
be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not,
with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the
court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a
proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. x x x.
x x x x
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it
the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the
information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. At
the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of
the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the
accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the
trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair
trial with the assistance the law secures or gives. x x x.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 80

Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the
accuseds mental fitness for trial is already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred
in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the case, is not an actionable
wrong.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr.
has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan,
Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is appearing and
filing pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and
even indicating in the pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of
Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.

 
 

(e) Re: Charge of appearing and signing Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge
pleadings in Civil Case No. 46- Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the Regional Trial
M-98 pending before Regional Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-
Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, M-98, entitled: In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner -
Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial versus Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro. In this case Judge
Conduct which prohibits a Floro, Jr. filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Entry of
judge from engaging in the Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission wherein he
private practice of law signed as the petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is
the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila.
(f)               Re: Charge of appearing in Court stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos,
personal cases without prior Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached
authority from the Supreme a copy of his oath taking and his picture together with President
Court and without filing the Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the said
corresponding applications for Motion is hereto attached as Annex 9.
leaves of absence on the
scheduled dates of hearing Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management
Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to appear as counsel or
collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the above-
  mentioned case) pending before lower courts.[76]

In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states: Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the

  private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally

i. Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal
cases pending before the lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted that
Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just
signing the pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as
collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the cases,
Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an application for
leave of absence.
states that: No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar
or give professional advice to client. Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: A judge shall not engage in the private
practice of law.

Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired
lawyers to attend to his personal cases.[77]
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any
concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared as counsel in his personal cases after
he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared a pleading (Ex
Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial
Admission) jointly with his counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case
he filed against his brothers for the custody of their mild, mentally-retarded
brother. He explained, however, that he prepared the said pleading in the heat of
anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case. [78] He likewise
explained that the pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he
had rectified the same by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit.
[79]
 Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed the
subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel.[80]
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on
sound public policy, thus:
 
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It
also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to
their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to
their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality
in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated
by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public
interest.[81]
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 81
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is
envisioned by private practice is more than an isolated court appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. [82] In herein case,
save for the Motion for Entry of Judgment, it does not appear from the records that
Judge Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court proceedings in
connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floros
act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not in
any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that
Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the
petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized
practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading
wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City
and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-
taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro
was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing
that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. [83] Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency. By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a
fellow judge in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro
has been attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing for leave of
absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was incumbent
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 82

dahil sa kanila maraming nagkakaproblema,

upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that although masyadong maraming eh ako wala
akong pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa ko lang
administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the
yon Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi
liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na
sa akin except na hindi papayag kasi
by the fundamental requirement of due process.[84] marami diyang
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the  
Rules of Court and the
Philippine justice system In another proceeding conducted on a different day,
Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in open court,
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper the case involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine
and intemperate language justice system and manifested his disgust on the unfairness of the
during court proceedings system. Thus, he said:
   
  Sabi ko paano
The memorandum report reads: ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng
eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to napakayaman, ako walang pera.
observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court proceedings. With
the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to obtain a  
tape-recorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is He continued:
the transcript of the proceedings ( Annex 15). The tape record of
the court proceedings is also submitted along with this report  
as Exhibit A.
Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha
x x x x kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid
ko retarded, bawal. In memory of my brother,
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni
certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the plaintiff while Atty. Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun ganun
Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant.During the Sabi ko
hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were guiding paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos
Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial. ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindiko pa
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko
Court, to wit: na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala
akong nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid
  ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung
ang isang court eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung
Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay abogado niya malakas na malakas
ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang Rules doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto
of Court natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law (laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito.[85]
of California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh

Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all
hearsay fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled
RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives ( i.e., to allegedly cover-up their consistent
tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were all unearthed
by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the
Philippine judicial system, Judge Floro contends that this recording was done
clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic Act No.
4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof.They
also made it appear that the conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in
fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question
were submitted to the OCA sans the yellow notes and the official transcribed copy
thereof. [86]
 This means that the transcribed copy that was submitted by the audit
team as Annex 15 is but an unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove that what
was being recorded was a court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes,
without concrete proof that they were taken officially during a court proceeding,
cannot be used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized recording of a private
conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. [87]
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus
left with only Judge Floros word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who
testified under oath as to Judge Floros alleged propensity to criticize the judiciary and
to use intemperate language. Resolving these particular charges would therefore
depend upon which party is more credible.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 83
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of
Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of
Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in
branch 73 the alleged kabulukan ng hustisya. Time and
again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said that
since theory and the practice of law are very different, the
Rules of Court does not always apply to different
cases. Not only the justice system did he criticize but
likewise Judges and Justices. He told us . . . and I
quote Dyan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na Judges
. . . Sa Court of
Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan.
 
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very
institution he is now serving? Where is his respect to the
court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold
courts as temples of justice if he himself did not believe in
the justice system?
x x x x
Q What can you say about charge letter L which reads for the use
of highly improper and intemperate language during court
proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence
of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe
a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding practitioners
in our court. There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady
lawyer, he said, Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan  and
then he would call even not during court session, but
during office hours our Court Interpreter malandi, luka-
luka, may fruit of the sun . So, it did not surprise us one
time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for
Civil Case No. 25-86-MN Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado, he
uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take
the transcription of this court proceeding is already
adapted by the Court Administrator. It was the content of
the tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for

consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro
discussed in open Court, before all of us, the court staff
present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the
defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or
not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even
the actual transcription of the proceedings because it
contained offensive languages against the justice system,
against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court
named Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with.
In fact, instead of discussing the merit of the case or the
possibility of the amicable settlement between the parties,
he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of
Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to
advise the stenographer to indeed present the same or
attach the same in the record because it contained
offensive languages highly improper and intemperate
languages like for example, putang ina, words like ako
ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera.[88]
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward
and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs from
Judge Floro himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject
utterances are consistent with Judge Floros claims of intellectual superiority for
having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having
placed 13  in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial
th
system on account of his perception of injustice in the disposition of his brothers case
are not far removed from his reactions to what he perceived were injustices
committed against him by the OCA and by the persons who were either in charge of
the cases against him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently,
although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have
said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as well as
evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 84
more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is
thus guilty of unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of
proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence
as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [89] In this case,
there is ample and competent proof of violation on Judge Floros part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No.
13-87 dated 1 July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses
matters involving his personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03
provides that [a] judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in
the court. A disorderly judge generates disorderly work. An
indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to
maintain order and proper decorum in court. When the judge
respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is orderly,
others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted
formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be characterized with
honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a
judicial trial called to ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to
detract from this atmosphere must be avoided. And the judge is
supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any
detraction therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice)
dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be conducted
efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and
direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior,
appearance and movements. He must always keep in mind that he
is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that
he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and
sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has
unseen little friends are manifestations of his psychological
instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the
functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject
Judge Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to
ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary.[90]
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 85

Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as suspended from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not

its title would suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of justice exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not

following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. exceeding P40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In herein case,

considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was slammed with
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that
these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor. And, considering
the 13 charges are inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness
further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt
which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the functions of his
motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in
office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims
the maximum, i.e.  P 40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct
himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to
and unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances.[91]
people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen little friends in
Judge  Floro  must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to
determining the transcendental issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain in a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the
functions of his office
office.
 
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty

to be imposed for the seven of the 13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly

have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13 charges unrelated accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against

against him. Thus: Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an appropriate mental

or psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension pending

1)                 Charge a - simple misconduct
investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the

2)                 Charges c and g gross ignorance of the law functions of his office notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges,

there had been no finding of dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.
3)                 Charge d unbecoming conduct

The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when
4)                 Charge e unbecoming conduct
the latter applied for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way
5)                 Charges k and l unbecoming conduct back in September 1995. The psychological report, as prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas,

M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140
in part:
as amended, a judge guilty of a serious charge may be dismissed from the service,
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:

There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the
interview. He was argumentative and over solicitous of questions
asked, giving the impressions of marked suspiciousness. He
centered on his academic excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate
of the College of Law, rated top 13 th place in the bar
examination. He emphasized his obsessive and compulsive method
of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether it was
school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and
graduated Law as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and
self-organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements,
tend to be a perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize
his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he related that, for the
past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing Psychic vision every
morning and that the biggest secret of the universe are the unseen
things. He can predict future events because of power in psychic
phenomenon as when his bar results was to be released, he saw
lights in the sky no. 13-1, and he got the 13 th place. He has been
practicing parapsychology seeing plenty of dwendes around him.
 
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be
irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego
disintegration are prominent findings, both in the interview
(conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious level).[92]
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to
the Supreme Court Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC
Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and
Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he
takes pride in this. During the interview, he was quite reluctant to
reveal information about his family background and would rather
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 86
talk about his work and academic achievements. However, he failed
to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize
to cope with the various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him
confused and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate with decision-
making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood swings
with the slightest provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in
his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private
practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social and
interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and showed
discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness of others motives as well as perceptual distortions
were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild mental
retardation (68) which is below the expected cognitive efficiency of
a judge. Despite his impressive academic background and
achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems
with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness
and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic
phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may
cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in
dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually
and emotionally equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a judge
and he may decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and
stress-laden situation.[93]
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge
Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460,
however, resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological capacity to preside
over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered
Judge Floro to submit to appropriate psychological or mental examination.
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, [94] the Court
clarified that the appropriate psychological or mental examination being adverted to
in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC Clinic. The Court
thereby directed Judge Floro to submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 87

mental examination, within ten (10) days from notice. [95] Judge Floro sought examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he shall be ordered arrested and

reconsideration which was denied by the Court on 22 February 2000.[96] detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x.[105]

The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000.[106] He

Clinic was reiterated by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge likewise sought the services of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who

Floros failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary sanctions. [97]

came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January 2001.[107]

On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in

2000 Resolution with a conjunctive special motion for him to undergo psychiatric December 2000, this time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. FrancianinaG.

examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution. [98] This was Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer reported that (o)ver all

denied by the Court on 14 November 2000.[99] data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid

direction. Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:

 
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is
basically a cautious, and suspicious individual with a compulsion to
On 10 November 2000,  Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the
analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status,
inhibition or disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic cognitive assets and impressive educational background, his current
functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
doctors [100]
 andpsychologist [101]
 with a manifestation that he filed cases against them
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine
for revocation of licenses before the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the situations. However, his test protocol is characterized by disabling
indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which is an
Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP [102] for alleged gross incompetence
indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to make an objective
and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to
misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to perceptual
of Medical Ethics.[103] distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such
that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator and divine gifts of healing have become incorporated in a
delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has
Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to interfered and tainted his occupational and social
functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing his court
comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000 resolutions. According to
duties as a judge.[108]
Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr.

Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the latters intention to disregard and disobey the Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro,

legal orders of the Court. [104] The Court en banc  agreed in the report of Justice Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief

Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to psychological and mental Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 88

The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his
thus substantially supported by evidence. Based on the three [3] undertakings. Achievement-oriented, he sets high personal
psychological tests and evaluation of the two [2] psychiatrists, standards and tends to judge himself and others according to these
the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that standards. When things do not develop along desired lines, he may
Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties become restless and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his
as a Judge, effective immediately. social stature and can be expected to comply with conventional
social demands.[109] 
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier
Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-
psychological evaluations conducted by several mental health professionals which
examination that psychologically speaking, Judge Floro was not fit to be a
were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations were in connection with his
judge.Thus:
application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having failed
JUDGE AQUINO:
the examination given by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September
 
1998 by staff psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma.
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his
Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in testimony here and on every available records of the
part: proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed
with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the
interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you about
  his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS  
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS x x x x
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope  
with everyday demands. He is able to handle both concrete and
abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details, he has a logical A: Yes, Sir.
approach in evaluating the relationship between things and ideas.
 
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can
consider solid facts to arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook
Task-oriented, he can organize procedures and details so as to get of the patient?
things done correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional
 
standards to determine personal progress. Set in his views, he may
not readily accept others ideas and contributions especially if these A: Yes, Sir.
oppose his own.
 
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is
expected of FFJ. Generally, he prefers to control his emotions and x x x x
does not let this get in the way of his judgment and decisions.
 
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 89

Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these]
proceedings and you were here when we were cross-
examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned
in the course of our cross-examination. Would you
consider his failure to tell you about his power of by
location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his
psychological outlook?
x x x x
 
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Fatal [flaw]?
A: Yes, Sir.
 
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that
he is capable of being in a trance?
 
Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will
not be pronouncing or making pronouncement concerning
his psychic powers. Is this not correct?
 
x x x x
A: Yes sir.
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is
capable of having trances in the course of his private
activities and even in the course of the performance of his
official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with that?
A: I agree with you, Sir.
Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented
person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha naman na
ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by location,
na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng ibat iba pang
bagay at the same time. Yan ay hindi compatible sa
pagiging reality oriented?

A: He did not.  

  A: Yes, Sir.

Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type  
letters? Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a
  Judge.

A: He did not.  

  x x x x

x x x x  

  Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.

 
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 90

x x x x
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floros witness, Dr.
 
Jurilla clarified that the interview had its limitations [113] and he might have missed out
A: Yes, Sir. [110]

certain information left out by his patient. [114] The following exchange is thus

Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant instructive:

Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3 September
 
1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro
JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that
  he has little unseen, unheard friends known as duwendes?

[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current  

issues, able to discuss a wide variety of topics intelligently without
hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality DR. JURILLA: He did not.
based. He is well oriented, intelligent, emotionally stable, with very  
good judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological
disturbances.[111] x x x x

 
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you
September 1998, who stated in his report that information about his claim to be the number five psychic
in the country?
 
 
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-
spectacled person with graying hair. When interviewed he was x x x x
somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his  
answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and
articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual A: No, Your Honor.
disturbances. Stream of thought was logical and goal-
directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to be  
argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas,
Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called,
thought blocking, looseness of associations or
psychic phenomena?
neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and
appropriate but mood was anxious. There were no abnormal  
involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is
intact. Judgment, insight, and other test for higher cortical A: He did not.
functions did not reveal abnormal results.
 
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of
x x x x
Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his nomination and
appointment to the post he is seeking.[112]  
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 91

  interview, would you not say you have more reason to

have your evaluation altered?
Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to
another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he used to ride  
on a big white or whatever it is, horse?
A: Yes.
 
 
A: Not during our interview.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge
  Floro has been proclaiming himself as the number five
psychic in the country [where] no one has called him as a
x x x x psychic at all?
   
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor x x x x
you might have missed some information or it is possible
that our clients or patients might not [have] told us  
everything.
Q: Would it be really more altered?
 
 
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as
those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you in the A: I would say so.
course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would  
be altered a little?
x x x x
x x x x
 
 
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview,
A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be which are confirmations of what Judge Floro did not tell
altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of any you during the interview, would your finding of
corroborative contradiction. [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you that
  he is capable or possessed of the power of bilocation?

Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired  

after the interview, would that be correct? x x x x
   
A: The interview has its limitations. A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
   
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge
interview are confirmed by events that transpired after the Floros mental and psychological x x x?

A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you
suspect that there was abnormality in the person of Judge
Floro?
A: Given the data.
 
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you
also have your evaluation favorable to Judge Floro
drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge
Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is capable of
typing a letter?
 
x x x x
 
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998,
probably drastically altered.[115]
 
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T.
Maaba, M.D.,[116] dated 3 January 2001, the relevant portions of which state:
 
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was
observed. Content of thought did not reveal delusional thought. He
was proud of his achievements in line with his profession and
expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction with the way his
colleagues are handling his pending administrative cases. He was
observed to be reality-oriented and was not suffering from
hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 92
respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and
decision-making capacity were adequately functioning.
x x x x
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic
on December 26, 2000. He talked about his family and academic
achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for prophecy and
a gift of healing. He also talked about a covenant made during a
dream between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and
Angel. He reported that the first part of his ministry is to cast illness
and/or disease and the second part is to heal and alleviate
sufferings/pain from disease.
 
A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro
on December 28, 2000. The battery of test consisted of the
following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language
Test (3) Purdue Non-Language Test (4) Sacks Sentence Completion
Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation
showed an individual with an Above Average
Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive
person who is meticulous to details and strive for perfection in
tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and is deemed capable
of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as
professional decisions. Confusion with regard to sexual
identification, was further observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the
psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was
found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is
not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is not deluded
nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in
making sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is
culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 93

 
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding
as a witness about hallucinatory matters would turn out to
Judge Floro was unfit to be a judge.[117] The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba be fit to become a judge?
and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:  
xxxx
   

JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a
a judge who shall claim that he is possessed with power of major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an organic
[bi-location]? mental disorder, this individual suffering from
  hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge,
xxxx however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a
  non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in could be transient and short in duration.
two (2) places at one time.  
  Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
Q: And that something must be wrong?  
  A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
A: Yes.  
  Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge practicing with psychiatry.
claiming in the course of his testimony and in this very  
case that while [he] was so testifying there is another A: Yes.
spirit, another person, another character unseen who is  
with him at the same time or in tagalog sumapi sa kanya. Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial,
  quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings particularly in
xxxx the course of his testimony that while he was doing so, he
  was under trance normal.
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen  
companion sumapi to me is unbelievable. xxxx
   
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually
some delusion? considered in the Philippines as part of a culture bound
  syndrome and it could also be an indication Basically the
xxxx phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of organic
  mental disorder. It is also common in culture bound
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of
distortion, your Honor. concentration in a particular settings or situations so that
  a person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose]
Q: No, Delusion. concentration and would not be able to follow up
  testimony of witnesses as well as arguments given by the
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes. counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution, so I
  would say that there is this difficulty in manners of
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse? attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a
  judge experience trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this
A: Both are on the same footing. trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he might not
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 94

be able to rationalize or to control expressions or as well
as physical when he is in a trance.
 
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a
proceeding, he was in a trance?  
himself admitted that in the course of his testimony in
these cases he was in a trance, would you still consider
him at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal
person?

  A: No.

A: No, I have not encountered any.  

  Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these

proceedings also and I will show to you the transcript of
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe
stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always
such claim you will call that person not a normal person.
had and still had a socalled counter part, his other side,
  other self, what can you say to that claim, would that be
the claim of a normal, mental sound person?
A: Maybe weird.
 
 
A: No.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the
proceedings in these cases held on October 10, 2000,  
afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not
Atty. Dizon. Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you tell us?
fit to sit as judge?
Are you in trance at this very precise moment?
JUDGE FLORO, JR.: Nakalakip sila. I call it a trance,  
but I distinguished not the trance that you see the
nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. Thats a trance that is xxxx
created by the so called Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao,
 
multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as
mind projection. He is correct in a sense that those A: Yes.[118]
nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind
projection or the hypnosis do come, and there is a
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
change in the psychological aspect of the person.
But in my case I never was changed physically or
mentally. Only the lights and heat will penetrate  
that person.  ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T.
very moment, Mr. witness, meron kayong kalakip
Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent
ngayon?  Ngayong  oras na ito? JUDGE FLORO: Yes,
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain
they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are
in office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
they? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: They cannot be seen
Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
but  ATTY. DIZON: No, can you see them? To point
to us where are they in this room?,  Now that you  
have read and seen this portion wherein Judge Floro
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 95

It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his

pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not finish his We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC
term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his
Judge because of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform
calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second
honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA
address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved
in a coup detat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is insane as, in fact,
alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to
the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case have never said so.
his court. It is improper and grandiose of him to express superiority
over other judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and
for him to say that he is very successful over many other applicants When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the
for the position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge
service due to insanity, he was apparently using the term in its loose sense.Insanity is
to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such
self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing, irresponsible and a general laymans term, a catchall word referring to various mental disorders.
abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit
to be one. So is he who gets into a trance while presiding at the Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term [120] as this is the one used by Drs.
hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a
Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and
psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a
person in such circumstances is mentally unfit or insane and should 2000 psychological evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.
not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions of
a judge. The life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and
presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative
that he is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition happiness of the people. [121] An honorable, competent and independent judiciary
to continue discharging the functions of his office.
exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of government, and the
 
well-being of the people.[122] Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of

administering justice are our front liners, the judges who preside over courts of law

and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it

has been said, courts will only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over
RECOMMENDATION
them are truly honorable men, competent and independent.[123]
 

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by  

reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform
the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73,
respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED
from such office.[119]
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable
man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not
found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of

psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross
deficiency in competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in psychic visions,
of foreseeing the future because of his power in psychic phenomenon. He believes
in duwendes and of a covenant with his dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel. He
believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several
people to have been in two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the
angel of death who can inflict pains on people, especially upon those he perceived as
corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court
sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge
Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his
psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers
during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court
Clinic about Judge Floros uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to
action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However,
such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the
critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial system .
 
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary
duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and
principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference to psychic
phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr.
[124]
  sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 96
testimony of the prosecutions principal witness by concluding that the testimony was
a fairytale or a fantastic story. [125] He then went to state that psychic phenomena was
destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the
witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floros decision is quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL witness
(sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is full
of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor points), ergo, the
court concludes that due to several indicia of fraud/perjury
(flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not
worthy of belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may
be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby declared a FAIRY
TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable
only for SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof
of the foregoing conclusion:
 
a.)                NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and
Raul Ineria were sinalubong by Lando/accused on June
21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas,
and that he saw the nagpambuno between Raul and
Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO
LONGER THERE, but he still saw the nagpambuno; MORE
IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the
ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
 
b.)                The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11 th HOUR
CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked to submit false
testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing
by accused when he NOTICED him the following day?
(TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo
that the TSN was incorrect due to typographical error, or
maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo
might have been SLEEPING during the testimony, so that
the word DAY should have been corrected to another
word SUITABLE to Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the Court
had synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but
the Court found no reason that the seeming error DAY
should be corrected; the Courts sole/remaining

conclusion is that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES
cooperated by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of
FOR SURE, in having BEEN DESTINED to be
FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS
FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.);[126] (Emphasis
supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro[127]  we held that
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An
independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve
specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and
explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits
include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive
and procedural rules of law.[128]
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in
pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the primordial
necessity of order in the social life.[129]
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his
competence for judicial tasks leaves much to be desired. As reported by the Supreme
Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he
has lapses in judgment and may have problems with decision-
making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and
seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic
phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may
cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in
dispensing justice. x x x[130]
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 97
Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he
served as RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of
government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and
identified himself with large components of the judges
role. Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is likely to
have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the fashion
of one who is said to have the judicial temperament. He is likely to
have displayed the kinds of behavior that the judges role
demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the bench
develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic
elements of investiture and of court procedure, the honorific forms
of address, and even the imposing appearance of some court
buildings serve to emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even
the most unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes his
position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization must conform
at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as a judge. [131]
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected
of other public officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law and they must thus
identify themselves with the law to an even greater degree than legislators or
executives.[132] 
As it has been said, [j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according
to some abstract ideas of right and justice, but according to the rules laid down by
society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The function of the judge is
primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art,
whether we call it legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity.
[133]
 We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States:

 
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve
sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-
discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own views are
incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But
these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They
are precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from those
entrusted with judicial power.
x x x x
 
The judicial judgment must move within the limits of
accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the
idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. [134]  that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it had previously used in
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental
requirements of competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus
be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious challenge to the
existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits
for a period of three (3) years.
 
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined
the judiciary as RTC judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed the history of
this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such major and
unfortunate faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application
for judgeship. He went through the entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was
nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic achievements. As to having
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 98
failed the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out
that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floros submission of psychiatric
evaluations conducted by mental health professionals from the private sector and
which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than
honorably in procuring these evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic
for a second opinion of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing its
functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution which prescribes
that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. [135] It was only on 18
October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-009, the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council,
ascertaining if one seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional
qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary.
[136]
 Rule 6 thereof states:
SECTION 1. Good health.  Good physical health and sound
mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant play
a critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate
task of administering justice. x x x
 
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests.  The applicant shall submit
to psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the Supreme
Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly
accredited by the Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the
evaluation of a private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus,
the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological evaluations of mental
health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as RTC judge is fait
accompli. What awaits us now is the seemingly overwhelming task of finding the

PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros almost seven years of
suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a
suspension of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.[137] The Constitution limits
this power through the admonition that such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.[138]
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in
administrative cases against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to
be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended pending investigation.
This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which
took effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its
power of administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. [139]This
power -- consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes
that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive
suspension resolved to:
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 99
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the
foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days from notice; (2)
REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant,
Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and
recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records
thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate
psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the proper
office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or
mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino
Floro, effective immediately under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for
the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges
against him.[140]
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floros suspension, albeit
indefinite, was for the duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him
which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the investigator of the
records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that (t)he investigating Justice
or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its
commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant [141] and,
(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the investigating
Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of
fact and recommendation.[142]
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not
only for the entire period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless
extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the
investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may
preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the
administrative case against him or her.[143] This is because
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who
are charged with a serious offense warranting preventive
suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the

ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may
preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the
administrative case especially where there is a strong likelihood of
his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure
is intended to shield the public from any further damage or
wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of
office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts
image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and
conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the
privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a
judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast
government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as
the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression.[144]
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present
because of the serious charge of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the
actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much longer period than 90
days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to
Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not only did Judge Floro
move for several re-settings of the hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his feet
with respect to the order to submit himself to the appropriate psychological/mental
examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him ballooned into 10
cases which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and law.
[145]
 All in all, Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had connived
to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he filed on  19 May
2003 against Justice Ramirez. [146]
 
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in
this case considering that the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 100
been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We have ruled
similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a
judge who was placed under preventive suspension pending
investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for the entire duration of
the preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied
to judges is clearly apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in
which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court
until further orders. 
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended
for 13 months, during which period he was not paid his salaries,
allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the
Court permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the
administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of
income. He thus incurred several loans to provide for his familys
basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his
back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire
period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said
in Gloria v. Court of Appeals , preventive suspension pending
investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to
enable the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal
investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time to
conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety
(90) days, the preventive suspension is no longer justified. Hence,
for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances
and other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his
preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum
period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals,  should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation
would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such may not be
entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a
situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other
economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive
suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case was
not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the
administrative charge, his preventive suspension exceeding the
ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and would

indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his
subsequent acquittal completely removed the cause for his
preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily, therefore, we
must rectify its effects on just and equitable grounds. [147]
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is
likewise entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic
benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find themselves
preventively suspended by the Court until further orders or, as this case, for the
duration of the investigation. Judge Iturraldes suspension of 13 months even pales in
comparison to Judge Floros suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire
excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his profession, thus
putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers largesse. And, though he was given
donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could not
compensate for his loss of income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period
of suspension exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of back
salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three of his
almost seven years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in Gloria  that any
suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated as we would be, in effect,
rewarding Judge Floros propensity to delay the resolution of his case through the
indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived connived to
oust him out of office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the investigation was not delayed
through any fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held
innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess
of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced
precisely because, being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 101
hand, and as already discussed, contributed to the delay in the investigation of his
cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent
of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro
beyond the reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand
that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and
do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity
regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form,
the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously
expressed by different courts.[148]
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the
delay in the resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to award him
back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to
three years. This is because Judge Floros separation from the service is not a
penalty as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is imposed
instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a medically disabling
condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at least at present, to
continue discharging the functions of his office.
 The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the
circumstances. As discussed, if we were to give him more than three years of back
salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying
the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only
dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to

peg the period at less than three years then the same would only be a pittance
compared to the seven years suspension he had to live through with Damocles sword
hanging over his head and with his hands bound as he could not practice his
profession.
Judge  Floros  separation from the service moots the case against him docketed
as  A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz  Arriego  v. Judge  Florentino  V.  Floro, Jr.), on
the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC  a.                   High intellectual assets as a result of self-discipline
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the service renders moot the
complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions
in this case will not cause a ripple on the Courts decision to separate Judge Floro
from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a replica of charge h in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and
considering that charge h is without basis, this particular complaint filed by
Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.
Judge  Floros  separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or
part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public
office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such
separation does not carry with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits
nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 102
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock
of the finding of mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify
him from re-entering government service for positions that do not require him to
dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floros favor that
the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They
mention Judge Floros assets and strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor
modification of work environment. Thus:
and self- organization.[149]
b.                  (I)mpressive academic achievements with no drastic
change in his personality and level of functioning as a
lawyer in private practice.[150]
c.                   (C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness,
pre-occupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena
not detrimental to his role as a lawyer.[151]
 
d.                  Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt
with in moderate proficiency . His concern for the details
that make up a total field represents his attempts at being
systematic and cautious.[152]
e. (E)quipped with analytical power.[153]
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge
because of the sensitive nature of said position, he may still be successful
in other areas of endeavor.
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge
Floros current administrative and medical problems are not totally of his making. He

was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now, appear to render
him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of
corruption and debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling
condition.
Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to genetics [154] and/or
adverse environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential information is not
available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse
environment factors they have no control over.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1)                 FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of
FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13
charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
2)                 RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and
consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge
the functions of his office, effective immediately;
3)                 As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.
back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits
corresponding to three (3) years;
4)                 DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v.
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 103
5)                 DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC ( Re: Resolution
Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for
MOOTNESS. 
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners, 
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and
RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re
Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine
Bar, respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent
in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually
focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on
himself and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition
for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada,
et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for
lack of merit.

Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively
necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification
in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by
respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his
wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica
(the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal
complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in
Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same
incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was
acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City
Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of
Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay
Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as
compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No.
R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada
but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was
then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M.
Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno
S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G.
Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the
preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that
positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have
come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court
concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five
hundred pesos as damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as
counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's
decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through
negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be
deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion
insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a
falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to
remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to
grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for
reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that
"with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 104
Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as
Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next
appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding
its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from
abusive language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court,
impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days
(and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of
court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he
said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any
threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow.
On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the
Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the
Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into
consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for
January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on December 8, 1972, respondent
sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded
them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages
in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and
justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We
pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind
whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to
be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not
accord with his views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court,
personally and individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws,
evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and
justice.
The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5,
1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of
respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering
its decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del
Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a
reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in
their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright
aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could
be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it
through ignorance.
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5,
1973):

A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true;
any man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will
succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed,
whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del
Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his
Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that
precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so
much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse,
worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil
liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding
even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in
the New.
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that
"counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00
and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139,
let certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We
upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension
from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial
Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the
Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices
Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar
sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R;
that the case for damages (R-13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after
Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court
of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in
favor of the defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del
Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually
carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their
minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial
discretion emanating from pure conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on
October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law
imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement
reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was
the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration,
turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25,
1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk
of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 105
resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his
motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of
merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated
July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time
reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of
the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed
against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the
Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed
by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for
the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government ,
so that they may well know them and work for their extermination" (Emphasis
supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the
Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of
retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R.
No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a
pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our
other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del
Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the
contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.
At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R.
No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might
have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which
drove him to make his contemptuous statements.
The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against
Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the
occasion in question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without
thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement
uttered was the former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be
liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the preponderance
thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the
negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was
"buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral
defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review
on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so
because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and
conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant
overturning its decision.

On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became
final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why
he should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July
1, 1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that
"..., he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the
Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding
evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing correction. He would
have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human
efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire
from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human
deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).
This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his
contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents
reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny
del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals
in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to
appear personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On
September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court,
wherein he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant
in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all
human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in
my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a
life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down
justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous
contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is
utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly
rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous
statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances
that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice
in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the
corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete
loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding
condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal
profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or
warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his
views are absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 106
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial
Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals
suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a
motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said
directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he
had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to submit a
memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation
that there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance
with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for
decision.
In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del
Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered
him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his
reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that
for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked for forgiveness; he
reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and
that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of
the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error
in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to
make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic
standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the
undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the
practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme
Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his
clients as regards all his pending cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and
physical ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant
justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote:
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices
of the Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He
answered in the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge
Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an
American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited was
rendered during the American regime in the Philippines which was
still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the
Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code
still remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up
to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme Court
thereon
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time
pleading that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive

respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has
decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in
practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus
making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion
of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt
proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an
act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt
in defense of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974,
to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement
directly with his clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only
to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support
the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers
(Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to
emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always
remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in
the noble mission of administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude
(People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he
has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic
institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
(In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of
right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but
men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods,
perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the
issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 107
vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-
445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity
and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect
(17 C. J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing
to the latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with
a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a
supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of
the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but
to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification.
Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a
member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build  and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard
towards the court so essential to the proper administration of
justice(Emphasis supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p.
5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was
based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied
in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We
found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both
instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a
case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of
respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their
respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client
cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of
the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded
to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered
unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if
not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in
assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are
superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense
cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and
in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and
justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 108

seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept
of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or
just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may
appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of
another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without
considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a
state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount
qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance,
coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events
and circumstances. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at Manila
that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing EN BANC
to close the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with
honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the
A.M. No. L-363             July 31, 1962
practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We
wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds
that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.
fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated
March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as
implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court,
shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of
this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654,
Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)
The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico
del Mar from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it
on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of
Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former
municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to
the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was
affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua.  After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was
granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted
portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines."

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder
Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed
from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his
Fernando, J., took no part. answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in
defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43
Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral
turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it
means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham,  84
P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended
to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited.
Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was
convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a
subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to
strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground
for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction
and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon
has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making
it the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent
Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi  of the case, particularly in
the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State,
6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte  Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State  the
court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of
the felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding
provided for in article 226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met
with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to
afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all
its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act
of executive grace was received. Ex parte  Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v.
U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young,  61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte  Garland quoted with approval in the
Lontok case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the
guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment
and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted
before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 109
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights
it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself,
unlike that in Ex parte  Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense
by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the
United States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here.
Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder
without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by
treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage
of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the
use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra.  The degree of moral
turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain
rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the
bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither
dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to
them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte  Wall, 107
U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men
in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to
ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets
a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the
crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered
disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 110

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125766. October 19, 1998]

FELICIDAD L. ORONCE and ROSITA L. FLAMINIANO, petitioners, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and PRICILIANO B. GONZALES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

The issue of whether or not a Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court may resolve
the issue of ownership of the property involved in an unlawful detainer case has been
discussed by this Court in a number of cases, the more recent of which is that
of Hilario v. Court of Appeals. [1]  Jurisprudence on the matter has in fact been
reflected in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure under Rule 70, to wit:

SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of

ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. (4a)

These developments in the law notwithstanding, there remains some misconceptions

on the issue of jurisdiction of inferior courts in ejectment cases where ownership is
raised as a defense that the Court deems proper to clarify in this petition.

Private respondent Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation was the

registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 2,000 square meters. The land
with improvements, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-54556 (383917),
is situated at No. 52 Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City.

In June 1988, private respondent obtained a four million peso - (P4,000,000.00)

loan from the China Banking Corporation. To guarantee payment of the loan, private
respondent mortgaged the Gilmore property and all its improvements to said

bank. Due to irregular payment of amortization, interests and penalties on the loan
accumulated through the years.
On April 13, 1992, private respondent, through its president, Antonio B.
Gonzales, signed and executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering
the Gilmore property and its improvements, in favor of petitioners Rosita Flaminiano
and Felicidad L. Oronce.[2] The deed, which states that the sale was in consideration
of the sum of P5,400,000.00,[3] provided inter aliathat
x x x the VENDOR (PBGDC) also guarantees the right of the VENDEES (petitioners) to
the possession of the property subject of this contract without the need of judicial
action; and possession of said premises shall be delivered to the VENDEES by the
VENDOR at the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the signing and execution
of this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
On the other hand, petitioners bound themselves to pay private respondents
indebtedness with China Banking Corporation.
In fulfillment of the terms and conditions embodied in the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, petitioners paid private respondents indebtedness with the
bank. However, private respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver possession of
the premises to petitioners upon the expiration of the one-year period from April 13,
1992. Almost six months later since the execution of the instrument or on October 2,
1992, petitioners caused the registration of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage with the Register of Deeds. Simultaneously, they obtained a new title, TCT
No. 67990, consistent with the fact that they are the new owners of the property.
[4]
 Sometime in July 1993, they paid the real estate taxes on the property for which
they were issued Tax Declarations Nos. C-061-02815 and C-061-02816. [5]
On November 12, 1993, petitioners sent private respondent a demand letter
asking it to vacate the premises. Said letter, just like three other consecutive notices
sent through the Quezon City post office, was unclaimed. Hence, on April 11, 1994,
petitioners filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint for
unlawful detainer against private respondent. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 8638 was raffled to Branch 41. Petitioners alleged that by virtue of the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, they acquired from private respondent the
Gilmore property and its improvements, for which reason they were issued TCT No.
67990. However, they added, in violation of the terms of that document, specifically
Sec. 3 (c) thereof, private respondent refused to surrender possession of the
premises. Consequently, they demanded that private respondent vacate the premises
through notices sent by registered mail that were, however, returned to them
unclaimed.
In its answer to the complaint, private respondent raised the issue of ownership
over the property. It impugned petitioners right to eject, alleging that petitioners had
no cause of action against it because it was merely a mortgagee of the property. It
argued that when the parties executed the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 111
Mortgage, its real intention was to forge an equitable mortgage and not a sale. It
pointed out three circumstances indicative of an equitable mortgage, namely:
inadequacy of the purchase price, continued possession by private respondent of the
premises, and petitioners retention of a portion of the purchase price.
During the preliminary conference on the case, the parties agreed to stipulate
on the following: (a) the existence and due execution of the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, and (b) the issue of whether or not the premises in litis are
being unlawfully detained by private respondent. [6]
On March 24, 1995, the MTC[7] decided the case in favor of petitioners. It ruled
that petitioners are the owners of the Gilmore property on account of the following
pieces of evidence: (a) TCT No. 67990; (b) petitioners payment to the China Banking
Corporation of P8,500,000.00, the amount of the mortgage entered into between
private respondent and said bank; (c) payment of real estate taxes for 1993, and (d)
Tax Declaration No. 02816 in petitioners names. The MTC further held that private
respondents possession of the premises was merely tolerated by petitioners and
because it refused to vacate the premises despite demand to do so, then its
possession of the same premises had become illegal. Thus, the MTC decreed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant
and all persons claiming rights under it to vacate the premises-in-litis located at No.
52 Gilmore St., New Manila, Quezon City, and to peacefully surrender possession
thereof to the plaintiffs; to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 a month as
compensation for the unjust occupation of the same from April 11, 1994 (the date of
filing of this case) until defendant fully vacates the said premises; to pay plaintiffs the
amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus costs of suit.
Counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On April 25, 1995, private respondent interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 219, of Quezon City that docketed it as Civil Case No. Q-95-23697.
Private respondent stressed in its appeal that it was not unlawfully withholding
possession of the premises from petitioners because the latters basis for evicting it
was the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage that did not reflect the true
intention of the parties to enter into an equitable mortgage. Clearly in pursuance of
that allegation, private respondent filed a motion questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC to entertain its appeal. On the other hand, petitioners filed a motion for the
immediate execution of the appealed decision. The RTC granted the motion on
September 21, 1995 and the corresponding writ of execution was issued on
September 25, 1995. The following day, the sheriff served upon private respondent
the writ of execution and a notice to vacate the premises within five (5) days from
receipt thereof.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of its appeal, private respondent filed an action
for reformation of instrument with the RTC. It was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-
24927 and assigned to Branch 227.
In a resolution dated December 7, 1995, RTC Branch 219 asserted jurisdiction
over the appeal. It ruled that the issue of whether or not an action for reformation of
a deed of sale and an unlawful detainer case can proceed independently of each
other has been resolved by this Court in Judith v. Abragan.[9]  In said case, this Court
held that the fact that defendants had previously filed a separate action for the
reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable
mortgage in the same Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the
summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff.
On December 12, 1995, private respondent filed in the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners and RTC Branch 219. It assailed the
September 21, 1995 order granting the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal, the writ of execution and the notice to vacate served upon private respondent
(CA-G.R. SP-39227).
On December 13, 1995, RTC Branch 219 [10] rendered the decision affirming in
toto that of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Stating that in ejectment proceedings, the
only issue for resolution is who is entitled to physical or material possession of the
premises involved, RTC Branch 219 held that:
x x x the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) are vendees of the defendant (PBGDC) by
virtue of a deed of sale where the extent of its right to continue holding possession
was stipulated. In the agreement, the existence and due execution of which the
defendant had admitted (Order, December 16, 1994, Rollo, p. 111), it was clearly
stated that the defendant shall deliver the possession of the subject premises to the
plaintiffs at the expiration of one (1) year from the execution thereof, April 12, 1992.
The defendant failed to do so. From then on, it could be said that the defendant has
been unlawfully withholding possession of the premises from the plaintiffs.
In any case, this ruling on the matter of possession de facto is without prejudice to
the action for reformation. This is because `the judgment rendered in an action for
forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in
no wise bind the title or effect the ownership of the land or building nor shall it be
held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a
different cause of action not involving possession (Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court,
154 SCRA 153; Section 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). [11]
On that same date, December 13, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining RTC Branch 219 from enforcing the writ of
execution and the notice to vacate the premises and on January 15, 1996, the same
court granted private respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 112
enjoining the implementation of both the writ of execution pending appeal and the
decision of RTC Branch 219.
Around six months later or on July 2, 1996, RTC Branch 227 [12] issued an order
declaring private respondent non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial and,
therefore, dismissing the action for reformation of instrument in Civil Case No. Q-95-
24927. Private respondent, not having sought reconsideration of said order, the same
court issued a resolution on August 15, 1996 directing the entry of judgment in the
case.[13] The Clerk of Court accordingly issued the final entry of judgment thereon. [14]
In the meantime, on July 24, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein
questioned Decision.[15] It set aside the December 13, 1995 decision of RTC Branch
219 and declared as null and void for want of jurisdiction, the March 24, 1995
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 41. It made
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioners from implementing
the decision of RTC Branch 219, the writ of execution and the notice to vacate.  In so
holding, the Court of Appeals said:
It is quite evident that, upon the pleadings, the dispute between the parties extended
beyond the ordinary issues in ejectment cases. The resolution of the dispute hinged
on the question of ownership and for that reason was not cognizable by the MTC.
(See: General Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Castelo, 13 SCRA 652 [1965]).
Respondent judge was not unaware of the pendency of the action for reformation.
However, despite such knowledge, he proceeded to discuss the merits of the appeal
and rendered judgment in favor of respondents on the basis of the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage which was precisely the subject of the action for reformation
pending before another branch of the court.Prudence dictated that respondent judge
should have refused to be drawn into a discussion as to the merits of the respective
contentions of the parties and deferred to the action of the court before whom the
issue was directly raised for resolution.
On whether or not private respondent was in estoppel from questioning the
jurisdiction of the MTC since it voluntarily submitted thereto the question of the
validity of its title to the property, the Court of Appeals said:
This is not so. As earlier pointed out, petitioner (private respondent here) had, in its
answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer, promptly raised the issue of
jurisdiction by alleging that what was entered into by the parties was just an
equitable mortgage and not a sale. Assuming the truth of this allegation, it is fairly
evident that respondents would not have had a cause of action for ejectment. In
other words, petitioner, since the start of the case, presented a serious challenge to
the MTCs jurisdiction but, unfortunately, the court ignored such challenge and
proceeded to decide the case simply on the basis of possession.

`The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not, if it had no
jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for
the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel (5 C.J.S., 861-863). (La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 236 SCRA 78 [1994]).
Contrary to respondents pretense, the filing by petitioner of an action for the
reformation of contract may not really be an afterthought. As we understand it,
petitioner, to support its allegation that the contract was a mere equitable mortgage,
cites the fact that the price was inadequate; it remained in possession of the
premises; it has retained a part of the purchase price; and, in any case, the real
intention of the parties was that the transaction shall secure the payment by
petitioner of its loan, adverting to Article 1602 of the Civil Code. Under Article 1604 of
the same code, it is provided that the presence of only one circumstance defined in
Article 1602, such as those cited above, is sufficient for a contract of sale with right to
repurchase to be presumed an equitable mortgage. Without in any way preempting
the decision of the court in the action for reformation, it is our considered view that,
under the factual milieu, the action was initiated for the proper determination of the
rights of the parties under the contract, and not just an afterthought.
No derogatory inference can arise from petitioners admission of the existence of the
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. The admission does not necessarily dilute
its claim that the same does not express the true intent of the parties.
Verily, since the case at bench involves a controverted right, the parties are required
to preserve the status quo and await the decision of the proper court on the true
nature of the contract. It is but just that the person who has first acquired possession
should remain in possession pending decision on said case, and the parties cannot be
permitted meanwhile to engage in petty warfare over possession of property which is
the subject of dispute. To permit this will be highly dangerous to individual security
and disturbing to the social order. (Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 795
[1990]).[16]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari where petitioners raise the
following assigned errors allegedly committed by respondent Court of Appeals:
I.
THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO THE
PROVISIONS OF SEC. 33 (2) OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980
CONFERRING EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ON THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT IN EJECTMENT CASES AND VESTING IT WITH AUTHORITY, INDEED
MANDATORILY, TO RESOLVE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP TO DETERMINE ISSUES OF
POSSESSION.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 113
II.
THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IS CONTRARY TO CURRENT AND
PREVAILING DOCTRINE AS ENUNCIATED IN WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORP. VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 208 SCRA 108; SY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 200 SCRA 117;
AND ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 229 SCRA 627.
III.
THE FILING OF THE REFORMATION CASE CONFIRMS THE JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OVER THE EJECTMENT CASE; THE DISMISSAL OF
THE REFORMATION CASE CONFIRMS THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED MERELY AS A
PLOY TO DELAY DISPOSITION OF EJECTMENT PROCEEDINGS, AND BARES NOT
JUST THE ERROR BUT THE UTTER INEQUITY OF THE RESPONDENT COURTS
DECISION ANNULLING THE EJECTMENT DECREE AND SETTING ASIDE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DECISION OF AFFIRMANCE.
Petitioners argue that the precedent laid down in Ching v. Malaya[17] relied upon
by the Court of Appeals, was based on the old law, Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary
Act of 1948), as amended, which vested in the city courts original jurisdiction over
forcible entry and unlawful detainer proceedings and the corresponding power to
receive evidence upon the question of ownership for the only purpose of determining
the character and extent of possession. [18] They claim that since the original complaint
for unlawful detainer was filed on April 13, 1992, then the applicable law should have
been Section 33 (2) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg.
129). That law vests in the city courts exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases and the corresponding power to receive evidence upon
questions of ownership and to resolve the issue of ownership to determine the issue
of possession.[19]
The history of the law vesting Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts with
jurisdiction over ejectment cases has invariably revolved upon the assumption that
the question of ownership may be considered only if necessary for the determination
of the issue as to who of the parties shall have the right to possess the property in
litigation.[20] Thus, under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, Section 88 vested
municipal and city courts with authority to receive evidence upon the question of title
therein, whatever may be the value of the property, solely for the purpose of
determining the character and extent of possession and damages for detention.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 that was enacted on June 21, 1969, provided that
city courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance over
ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings
and that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in conjunction with the issue of
possession. Expounding on that provision of law, in Pelaez v. Reyes,[21] this Court
said:

x x x We are of the considered opinion that the evident import of Section 3 above is
to precisely grant to the city courts concurrent original jurisdiction with the courts of
first instance over the cases enumerated therein, which include `ejection cases where
the question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. To sustain petitioners
contention about the meaning of the last phrase of paragraph (c) of said section
regarding the resolution of the issue of ownership `in conjunction with the issue of
possession is to disregard the very language of the main part of the section which
denotes unmistakably a conferment upon the city courts of concurrent jurisdiction
with the courts of first instance over ejection cases in which ownership is brought in
issue in the pleadings. It is to Us quite clear that the fact that the issue of ownership
is to be resolved `in conjunction with the issue of possession simply means that both
the issues of possession and ownership are to be resolved by the city courts. And the
jurisdiction is concurrent with the Courts of First Instance precisely because usually
questions of title are supposed to be resolved by superior courts. In other words, this
grant of special jurisdiction to city courts is to be distinguished from the power
ordinarily accorded to municipal courts to receive evidence of title only for the
purpose of determining the extent of the possession in dispute.
Upon the approval on August 14, 1981 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, however, the power of inferior courts, including
city courts, to resolve the issue of ownership in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases was modified. Resolution of the issue of ownership became subject to the
qualification that it shall be only for the purpose of determining the issue of
possession. In effect, therefore, the city courts lost the jurisdiction to determine the
issue of ownership per se  that was theretofore concurrent with the then Courts of
First Instance. Thus, Section 33 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession.
Accordingly, the Interim Rules and Guidelines in the implementation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 provides as follows:
10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. Metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts,
and municipal circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try cases of forcible entry
and detainer even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings and the
question of possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
but the question of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 114
Explaining these provisions of law, in Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals, [22] the
Court said:
These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No. 296 which merely
allowed inferior courts to receive evidence upon the question of title solely for the
purpose of determining the extent and character of possession and damages for
detention, which thereby resulted in previous rulings of this Court to the effect that if
it appears during the trial that the principal issue relates to the ownership of the
property in dispute and any question of possession which may be involved necessarily
depends upon the result of the inquiry into the title, then the jurisdiction of the
municipal or city courts is lost and the action should be dismissed. With the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction
over an ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without
passing upon the issue of ownership, with the express qualification that such issue of
ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of determining the issue of
possession. In other words, the fact that the issues of ownership and possession de
facto are intricately interwoven will not cause the dismissal of the case for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer on jurisdictional grounds.
Another development in the law has emphasized the fact that inferior courts
shall not lose jurisdiction over ejectment cases solely because the issue of ownership
is interwoven with the issue of possession. Under the 1983 Rules on Summary
Procedure, as amended by a resolution of this Court that took effect on November
15, 1991, all forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases shall be tried pursuant to the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, regardless of whether or not the issue of
ownership of the subject property is alleged by a party. [23] In other words, even if
there is a need to resolve the issue of ownership, such fact will not deprive the
inferior courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases [24] that shall be tried summarily.
When the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded, thereby amending Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, by virtue of Republic Act No. 7691 that took effect on April 15, 1994, the
jurisdiction of said courts over ejectment cases was retained. Thus, in Hilario v. Court
of Appeals  this Court said:
x x x. As the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases
even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue
of ownership; but this is subject to the same caveat that the issue posed as to
ownership could be resolved by the court for the sole purpose of determining the
issue of possession.
Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be
regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a
necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases

where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real
property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
In other words, inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory
power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit.
[25]
 These courts shall resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an
ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete
adjudication of the issue of possession. Considering the difficulties that are usually
encountered by inferior courts as regards the extent of their power in determining the
issue of ownership, in Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals,  the Court set out guidelines
to be observed in the implementation of the law which, as stated at the outset, has
recently been restated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The guidelines pertinent
to this case state:
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that
ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may be
resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, x x x,
the legal provision under consideration applies only where the inferior court believes
and the preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of possession
is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the
plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently,
where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly
establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery
of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of material
possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for ownership, or where the
issue of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, the action is not one for
forcible entry but one for title to real property.
x x x x x x x x x,
5. Where the question of who has the prior possession hinges on the question of who
the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of
ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real
owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a
determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other
contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise
pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded
merely as provisional,  hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.[26] (Emphasis supplied.)
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 115
In the case at bar, petitioners clearly intended recovery of possession over the
Gilmore property. They alleged in their complaint for unlawful detainer that their
claim for possession is buttressed by the execution of the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, a copy of which was attached as Annex A to the complaint
and by the issuance of TCT No. 67990 that evidenced the transfer of ownership over
the property.[27] Because metropolitan trial courts are authorized to look into the
ownership of the property in controversy in ejectment cases, it behooved MTC Branch
41 to examine the bases for petitioners claim of ownership that entailed
interpretation of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
However, while it quoted paragraph (c) of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage that embodies the agreement of the parties that possession of the Gilmore
property and its improvements shall remain with the vendor that was obliged to
transfer possession only after the expiration of one year, [28] MTC Branch 41
apparently did not examine the terms of the deed of sale. Instead, it erroneously held
that the issue of whether or not the document was in fact an equitable mortgage
should not be properly raised in this case. Had it examined the terms of the deed of
sale, which, after all is considered part of the allegations of the complaint having
been annexed thereto, that court would have found that, even on its face, the
document was actually one of equitable mortgage and not of sale. The inferior court
appears to have forgotten that all documents attached to a complaint, the due
execution and genuineness of which are not denied under oath by the defendant,
must be considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing evidence
thereon.[29]
Article 1602 of the Civil Code provides that a contract shall be presumed to be
an equitable mortgage by the presence of any of the following:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the
parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance
of any other obligation.
Article 1604 of the same Code provides that the provisions of Article 1602 shall
also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale. The presence of even one

of the circumstances in Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract as one of
equitable mortgage.[30] The explicit provision of Article 1602 that any of those
circumstances would suffice to construe a contract of sale to be one of equitable
mortgage is in consonance with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of
property rights.
The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering the 2,000-square-
meter lot located at No. 52 Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City provides as
follows:
3. That the total consideration for the sale of the above-described property by the
VENDOR to the VENDEES is FOURTEEN MILLION (P14,000,000.00) PESOS, in
Philippine currency, payable as follows:
a) The VENDOR shall be paid by the VENDEE the sum of FIVE MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P5,400,000.00) PESOS upon the signing and execution of this
Deed of Sale With Assumption of Mortgage after computation of the mortgage
obligation of the VENDOR with CHINA BANKING CORPORATION in the amount of
______________________ which the VENDEES agree to assume as part of the
consideration of this sale. The VENDEES hereby assume the mortgage obligation of
the VENDOR with the CHINA BANKING CORPORATION in the total amount of
___________________.
b) The VENDOR hereby undertakes and agrees with the VENDEES that the first-
named party shall warrant and defend the title of said real property hereby conveyed
in favor of the VENDEES, their heirs, successors or assigns, against all just claims of
all persons or entities; that the VENDOR also guarantees the right of the VENDEES to
the possession of the property subject of this contract without the need of judicial
action; and furthermore, the VENDOR binds itself to execute any additional
documents to complete the title of the VENDEES to the above-described property so
that it may be registered in the name of the VENDEES in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act.
c) It is hereby expressly agreed and understood by and between the VENDOR and
the VENDEES that the house and other improvements found in the premises are
included in this sale and thatpossession of said premises shall be delivered to the
VENDEES by the VENDOR at the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the
signing and execution of this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
d) It is furthermore expressly provided and agreed by and between the VENDOR and
the VENDEES that the capital gains tax shall be paid by the VENDOR while any and all
fees and expenses incident to the registration and transfer of the title to the
aforementioned property shall be defrayed and borne by the VENDEES.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 116
e) Attached to this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage as Annex `A thereof is
the Certificate of ROSANA FLORES, Corporate Secretary of PRICILIANO B.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine Laws who certified that at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of
said corporation held on December 3, 1991 at which meeting a quorum was present,
the following resolution was adopted and passed, to wit:
`RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the company, PRICILIANO B.
GONZALES DEVELOPMENT is (sic) hereby authorized the President, Mr. Antonio B.
Gonzales to enter into and/or negotiate for the sale of a property described as
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383917 with an area of TWO THOUSAND (2,000)
SQUARE METERS under the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;
`RESOLVED FURTHER, that Mr. ANTONIO B. GONZALES, is hereby authorized to
sign, execute any and all documents relative thereto.
That aforesaid resolution is in full force and effect.
(sgd.)
ROSANA
FLORES
Corporate
Secretary
(SG
D.)
f) Full title and possession over the above-described property shall vest upon the
VENDEES upon the full compliance by them with all the terms and conditions herein
set forth.[31] (Underscoring supplied.)
That under the agreement the private respondent as vendor shall remain in
possession of the property for only one year, did not detract from the fact that
possession of the property, an indicium of ownership, was retained by private
respondent as the alleged vendor. That period of time may be deemed as actually the
time allotted to private respondent for fulfilling its part of the agreement by paying its
indebtedness to petitioners. This may be gleaned from paragraph (f) that states that
full title and possession of the property shall vest upon the VENDEES upon the full
compliance by them with all the terms and conditions herein set forth.
Paragraph (f) of the contract also evidences the fact that the agreed purchase
price of fourteen million pesos (P14,000,000.00) was not handed over by petitioners
to private respondent upon the execution of the agreement. Only P5,400,000.00 was
given by petitioners to private respondent, as the balance thereof was to be
dependent upon the private respondents satisfaction of its mortgage obligation to
China Banking Corporation. Notably, the MTC found that petitioners gave private

respondent the amount of P8,500,000.00 that should be paid to the bank to cover the
latters obligation, thereby leaving the amount of P100,000.00 (P5,400,000.00
+ P8,500,000.00 = P13,900,000.00) of the purchase price still unpaid and in the
hands of petitioners, the alleged vendees.
Hence, two of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 are manifest in the
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, namely: (a) the vendor would remain in
possession of the property (no. 2), and (b) the vendees retained a part of the
purchase price (no. 4). On its face, therefore, the document subject of controversy, is
actually a contract of equitable mortgage.
The denomination of the contract as a deed of sale is not binding as to its
nature. The decisive factor in evaluating such an agreement is the intention of the
parties, as shown, not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract, but by
their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after
executing the agreement. [32] Private respondents possession over the property was
not denied by petitioners as in fact it was the basis for their complaint for unlawful
detainer.
Neither does the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in petitioners favor
import conclusive evidence of ownership or that the agreement between the parties
was one of sale.[33] In Macapinlac v. Gutierrez Repide,  this Court said:
x x x it must be borne in mind that the equitable doctrine x x x to the effect that any
conveyance intended as security for a debt will be held in effect to be a mortgage,
whether so actually expressed in the instrument or not, operates regardless of the
form of the agreement chosen by the contracting parties as the repository of their
will. Equity looks through the form and considers the substance; and no kind of
engagement can be adopted which will enable the parties to escape from the
equitable doctrine to which reference is made. In other words, a conveyance of land,
accompanied by registration in the name of the transferee and the issuance of a new
certificate, is no more secured from the operation of the equitable doctrine than the
most informal conveyance that could be devised.[34]
A closer look into the allegations of the complaint would therefore show that
petitioners failed to make out a case for unlawful detainer. By the allegations in the
complaint, private respondent as a mortgagor had the right to posses the property. A
mortgage is a real right constituted to secure an obligation upon real property or
rights therein to satisfy with the proceeds of the sale thereof such obligation when
the same becomes due and has not been paid or fulfilled. [35] The mortgagor generally
retains possession of the mortgaged property [36] because by mortgaging a piece of
property, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien but ownership thereof is not parted
with.[37] In case of the debtors nonpayment of the debt secured by the mortgage, the
only right of the mortgagee is to foreclose the mortgage and have the encumbered
property sold to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness. The mortgagors default does
not operate to vest in the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property, for
any such effect is against public policy.[38] Even if the property is sold at a foreclosure
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 117
sale, only upon expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor
having made use of his right of redemption, does ownership of the land sold become
consolidated in the purchaser.[39]
Petitioners tenuous claim for possession of the Gilmore property was
emasculated further by private respondents answer to their complaint. The latter
claimed ownership of the property, alleging that the agreement was one of mortgage
and not of sale. Private respondent alleged therein that in March 1993 (sic), it
borrowed money from petitioner Felicidad Oronce alone to redeem the subject
property from China Banking Corporation. She agreed to lend it the amount on
condition that the Gilmore property should be mortgaged to her to guarantee
payment of the loan.However, petitioner Flaminiano took the money from petitioner
Oronce and paid the mortgage obligation of private respondent to the China Banking
Corporation while claiming that 50% of the amount was hers. Petitioner Flaminianos
husband, Atty. Eduardo Flaminiano, forthwith prepared the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage and, without private respondents knowledge, had it
registered for which reason a new certificate of title was issued to petitioners.  In
claiming that the agreement was one of mortgage, private respondent alleged in its
answer, inter alia, that the actual total value of the property was thirty million pesos
(P30,000,000.00); that while it had possession of the property, petitioners did not
then attempt to repossess the same, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the
execution of the document; that petitioners did not pay the real estate taxes even
after the transfer of title in their favor, and that petitioners did not deliver to private
respondent the alleged purchase price.
Considering these claims of private respondent, MTC Branch 41 should have
passed upon the issues raised on the ownership of the Gilmore property for the
purpose of determining who had the right to possess the same. As it turned out, it
simply accepted the allegations of petitioners without examining the supporting
documents. Had it closely analyzed the documents, it would have concluded that
petitioners could not have validly ousted private respondent from the property since
the basis for its claim of ownership, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage,
was actually a document evidencing an equitable mortgage. It would have
accordingly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
In fine, had the MTC exercised its bounden duty to study the complaint, it would
have dismissed the same for lack of cause of action upon a provisional ruling on the
issue of ownership based on the allegations and annexes of the complaint. Or,
exercising caution in handling the case, considering petitioners bare allegations of
ownership, it should have required the filing of an answer to the complaint and,
having been alerted by the adverse claim of ownership over the same property,
summarily looked into the issue of ownership over the property. As this Court
declared in Hilario v. Court of Appeals:
It is underscored, however, that the allegations in the complaint for ejectment should
sufficiently make out a case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as the case may
be; otherwise, jurisdiction would not vest in the inferior court. Jurisdiction over the

subject matter is, after all, determined by the nature of the action as alleged or
pleaded in the complaint. Thus, even where the defendant alleges ownership or title
to the property in his or her answer, the inferior court will not be divested of its
jurisdiction. A contrary rule would pave the way for the defendant to trifle with the
ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, as he could easily defeat the same
through the simple expedient of asserting ownership. [40]
As discussed above, even a perusal of the complaint without going over the
claims of private respondent in his answer would have sufficed to arrive at a
provisional determination of the issue of ownership. The importance of such
provisional ruling on the issue of ownership is demanded by the fact that, in the
event that the claim of the plaintiff in an ejectment case is controverted as in this
case, any ruling on the right of possession would be shaky, meaningless and fraught
with unsettling consequences on the property rights of the parties. After all, the right
of possession must stand on a firm claim of ownership. Had the MTC made a
provisional ruling on the issue of ownership, the parties would have availed of other
remedies in law early on to thresh out their conflicting claims.
Private respondents action for reformation of instrument was in fact a step in
the right direction. However, its failure to pursue that action [41] did not imply that
private respondent had no other remedy under the law as regards the issue of
ownership over the Gilmore property. There are other legal remedies that either party
could have availed of. Some of these remedies, such as an action for quieting of title,
have been held to coexist with actions for unlawful detainer. [42] There is a policy
against multiplicity of suits but under the circumstances, only the institution of proper
proceedings could settle the controversy between the parties in a definitive manner.
Hence, although the Court of Appeals resolved the appeal under the
misconception that the action for reformation of instrument was still viable, it
correctly held that the controversy between the parties was beyond the ordinary
issues in an ejectment case. Because of the opposing claims of the parties as to the
true agreement between them, the issue of ownership was in a sense a prejudicial
question that needed determination before the ejectment case should have been
filed. To reiterate, a decision reached in the ejectment case in favor of any of the
parties would have nonetheless spawned litigation on the issue of ownership. At any
rate, proceedings would have been facilitated had the inferior courts made even a
provisional ruling on such issue.
The contentious circumstances surrounding the case were demonstrated by an
occurrence during the pendency of this petition that cries out for the resolution of the
issue of ownership over the Gilmore property.
After the parties had filed their respective memoranda before this Court, private
respondent filed an urgent motion to cite petitioner Rosita L. Flaminiano and her
husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, in contempt of court. [43] The motion was
founded on an affidavit of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales who resided at the contested property,
deriving his right to do so from private respondent corporation that is owned by his
family. Gonzales alleged that on September 20, 1997, petitioner Flaminiano and her
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 118
husband entered the property through craftiness and intimidation. At around 5:30
p.m. on that day, two (2) men knocked at the gate. When the houseboy, Luis R.
Fernandez, opened the gate for pedestrians tentatively, the two men told him that
they would like to visit Gonzales mother who was ailing.
Once inside, the two men identified themselves as policemen and opened the
gate for twenty (20) men, two (2) trucks and an L-300 van to enter.  When Gonzales
went outside the house, he saw thirty (30) to forty (40) men and two (2) trucks
entering the driveway. The person he asked regarding the presence of those people
inside the property turned out to be the brother of petitioner Flaminiano.  That person
said, Kami ang may-ari dito. Matagal na kaming nagtitiis, kayo ang dapat sa
labas.  After Gonzales had told him that the property was still under litigation before
this Court, the man said, Walang Supreme Court Supreme Court.  When Gonzales
asked petitioner Flaminiano, who was inside the premises, to order the people to
leave, she said, Papapasukin naminito dahil sa amin ito. Maglalagay ako ng tao diyan
sa loob, sa harap, sa likod. Wala ng pakiusap.  When a power generator was brought
inside the property and Gonzales pleaded that it be taken out because the noise it
would create would disturb his ailing mother, Emiliana Gonzales, petitioner
Flaminiano said, Walang awa-awa sa akin. Atty. Flaminiano butted in and, referring to
Gonzales mother, said, Ialis mo na, matanda na pala. When Gonzales prevented the
switching on of some lights in the house due to faulty wiring, Atty. Flaminiano
suggested, Bakit hindi mo ipasunog ito? May insurance pa kayo 5 million, madali lang
yan. Short circuit. Since the Flaminianos and their crew were not about to leave the
property, Gonzales called up his brother, Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and informed him of
what happened. However, instead of confining themselves in the driveway, the
Flaminianos and their group entered the terrace, bringing in food.
Gonzales was all the while concerned about his 81-year-old mother who had
just been discharged from the hospital. However, the Flaminianos stayed until the
next day, September 22, 1997, using the kitchen, furniture and other fixtures in the
house. Gonzales took pictures of Flaminiano and his companions. When Atty.
Flaminiano arrived, he confronted Gonzales and told him, Hindi ako natatakot kahit
kanino ka pa mag-report, kahit pa sa Supreme Court, gusto ko nga mag-reklamo
kayo para matapos ang kaso. Sa September 25, may shooting dito, gagawin ko ang
gusto ko dito.[44]
The affidavits of Renato C. Mola, driver of Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and that of
Luis R. Fernandez, houseboy of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales, as well as the xerox copy of the
sworn statement dated September 21, 1997 of Pria B. Gonzales before the Philippine
National Police in Camp Crame where she filed a complaint against Atty. Flaminiano
for the illegal entry into their house, support the affidavit of Dr. Gonzales.
In its supplemental motion[45] to cite petitioner Flaminiano and her husband,
Atty. Flaminiano, in contempt of court, private respondent alleged that the
Flaminianos committed additional contumacious acts in preventing another member
of the family, Mrs. Cipriana Gonzales, from entering the property. In her affidavit,
Mrs. Gonzales said that the Flaminianos and their people used the whole house,
except the bedrooms, for their filming activities. [46]

Thereafter, private respondent filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with this Court to
enjoin petitioners, Atty. Flaminiano and their representatives and agents from
preventing private respondent, its agents and representatives from entering the
property and to cease and desist from occupying the property or from committing
further acts of dispossession of the property. [47] On October 13, 1997, this Court
issued the temporary restraining order prayed for. [48] In the motion it filed on October
21, 1997,[49] private respondent informed the Court that the TRO could not be served
upon petitioners immediately because, Atty. Flaminiano, their counsel of record, had
changed address without informing the Court. It was served upon said counsel only
on October 15, 1997. However, instead of complying with this Courts order,
petitioners continued occupying the property. On October 16, 1997, after receiving a
copy of the TRO, petitioners put up a huge billboard in front of the property stating
that it is the national headquarters of the Peoples Alliance for National Reconciliation
and Unity for Peace and Progress (PANRUPP).
In their comment on the motion for contempt, petitioners noticeably did not
controvert the facts set forth by private respondent in said motion. Instead, it
reasserted its claim of ownership over the property as evidenced by TCT No. 67990.
They alleged that they had mortgaged the property to the Far East Bank and Trust
Company in the amount of thirty million pesos (P30,000,000.00) for which they are
paying a monthly interest of around P675,000.00 without enjoying the material
possession of the subject property which has been unlawfully and unjustly detained
by private respondent for the last four (4) years as it was used as the residence of
the members of the family of its President ANTONIO B. GONZALES without the said
private respondent paying rentals thereon for the period from January 1995 up to
October 5, 1997 when the said property was voluntarily vacated by the members of
the President (sic) of respondent corporation, ANTONIO B. GONZALES, who has since
then been a fugitive from justice having been convicted by final judgment of the
crime of estafa through falsification of public document and has succeeded in evading
his sentence.
They averred that Tadeo Gonzales erroneously claimed that the rights of
ownership and possession over the property are still under litigation because the
issue of ownership is no longer involved in this litigation when the complaint for
reformation of instrument with annulment of sale and title filed by private respondent
was dismissed with finality by reason of non-suit. Hence, they claimed that they now
stand to be the unquestionable registered and lawful owners of the property subject
of controversy and that the July 24, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals has
already lost its virtuality and legal efficacy with the occurrence of a supervening event
which is a superior cause superseding the basis of the judgment in CA-G.R. No.
39227 of respondent court.
They informed the Court that they are now leasing the property to PANRUPP
from October 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998. They alleged, however, that the
property is in a deplorable state of decay and deterioration that they saw the need to
act swiftly and decisively to prevent further destruction of the property where they
invested millions of pesos of their life-time savings to acquire the same. Hence, they
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 119
sought the assistance of barangay officials in Barangay Mariana, New Manila who
helped them effect the peaceful entry into the property of the petitioners without the
use of strategy, force and intimidation contrary to what was alleged in the motion for
contempt. They peacefully took over possession of the property on September 20,
1997 but allowed the immediate members of the family of private respondents
president to stay on. The family finally agreed to vacate the premises on October 5,
1997 upon the offer of the petitioners to shoulder partially the expenses for the
hospitalization of the ailing mother at the St. Luke General Hospital where she was
brought by an ambulance accompanied by a doctor at petitioners expense.
Petitioners questioned the issuance by this Court of the TRO on October 13,
1997, asserting that when it was issued, there were no more acts to restrain the
illegal occupants of the subject property (as they) had already peacefully vacated the
premises on October 5, 1997 or more than a week after the said TRO was issued by
the Third Division of this Court. They prayed that the motion for contempt be denied
for lack of merit and that the TRO issued be lifted and set aside for the act or acts
sought to be restrained have already been done and have become a fait
accomplibefore the issuance of the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER on October
13, 1997.[50]
As earlier discussed, petitioners claim that the dismissal of the action for
reformation of instrument for non-suit had written finis to the issue of ownership over
the Gilmore property is totally unfounded in law. Petitioners should be reminded that
the instant petition stemmed from an unlawful detainer case, the issue of which is
merely possession of the property in question. The issue of ownership has not been
definitively resolved for the provisional determination of that issue that should have
been done by the MTC at the earliest possible time, would only be for the purpose of
determining who has the superior right to possess the property. Inasmuch as this
Court has resolved that the rightful possessor should have been private respondent
and its representatives and agents, the TRO issued by this Court on October 13, 1997
should not be lifted. That the TRO was issued days before private respondent left the
property is immaterial. What is in question here is lawful possession of the property,
not possession on the basis of self-proclaimed ownership of the property . For their
part, petitioners should cease and desist from further exercising possession of the
same property which possession, in the first place, does not legally belong to them.
The conduct of petitioner Flaminiano in taking possession over the property as
alleged by private respondent through Tadeo Gonzales is deplorably high-handed. On
an erroneous assumption that she had been legally vested with ownership of the
property, she took steps prior to the present proceedings by illegally taking control
and possession of the same property in litigation. Her act of entering the property in
defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals
constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court that
should be dealt with accordingly.
Be that as it may, what is disturbing to the Court is the conduct of her husband,
Eduardo Flaminiano, a lawyer[51] whose actuations as an officer of the court should be
beyond reproach. His contumacious acts of entering the Gilmore property without the
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 120

consent of its occupants and in contravention of the existing writ or preliminary

injunction issued by the Court of Appeals and making utterances showing disrespect
for the law and this Court, are certainly unbecoming of a member of the Philippine
Bar. To be sure, he asserted in his comment on the motion for contempt that
petitioners peacefully took over the property. Nonetheless, such peaceful take-over
cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in
force. Notably, he did not comment on nor categorically deny that he committed the
contumacious acts alleged by private respondent. Through his acts, Atty. Flaminiano
has flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or abetting activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. [52]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED

and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED without prejudice to
the filing by either party of an action regarding the ownership of the property
involved. The temporary restraining order issued on October 13, 1997 is hereby made
permanent. Petitioners and their agents are directed to turn over possession of the
property to private respondent.

Petitioner Rosita Flaminiano is hereby held guilty of contempt of court for

disobeying the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals and accordingly
fined P20,000.00 therefor. Her counsel and husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, is
ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00 for committing contumacious acts unbecoming of
a member of the Philippine Bar with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
acts shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his
record at the Office of the Bar Confidant.

This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan,  and Purisima, JJ.,  concur.

SECOND DIVISION
Pardo, J.,  no part.

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, 

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU
CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.

F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.

Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.


REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would
indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent
had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and
with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial
intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with
distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same
reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein
private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager
of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on
a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone,
gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities
and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding,
fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to
the hacienda  and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private
respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the
house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his
wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized
on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he
underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer.
During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr.
Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter,
for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in
April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary.
Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor
and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however,
were not acted upon.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 121
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC,
for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984,
docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment
of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the
NLRC,1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner
the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination
of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of
the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1)
whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled
to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits;
and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as
the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the
character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent,
that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or
not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which
reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In
compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its
comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the
findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter
is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact
that because of the special relationship of the parties and the
nature of the action involved, this case could very well go down (in)
the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For
this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake,
the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father. 9

Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2)
observations were noted that may justify why this labor case
deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints that
petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were
personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And
secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow
their personal relationship to come in the way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of
want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process.
He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings
of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings
thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of
his functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground
to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is
wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and
the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court.
Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults
herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of
stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be
Section 16[c] and [d],  The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of
page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling, and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively
ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of
law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who
conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge
who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that
he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they
truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts
of and evidence submitted in the case.12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11,
1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 122
eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering
that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's
functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due
process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must
be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge
private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his
arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural
niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and
after due process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which
an employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit: 
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d)
commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e)
other causes analogous to the foregoing.
of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for
the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law. 15Suffering from a disease by
reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his
services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it is
well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer
to effect the former's dismissal from employment.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent
gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that
petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such
employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or 
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to
the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent
NLRC,18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law
are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19

The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from
October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as
abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr.
Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn,
Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by
medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in
Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to
recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the
hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged
to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special
circumstances involved and basic human experience, petitioner's
illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II
may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi
III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to
December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant
outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an
employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention
to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson
Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social
Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute
abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC  (191 SCRA 328),
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 123
the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from
which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to
work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. NLRC  (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid
cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . .
Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt
acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does
not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no
abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave
his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness
and strained family relations. Second he has some medical
certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work,
petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent
of his intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not the
least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he
realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that
petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment. 20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's
confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical
treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of
petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical
and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to
work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so
serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is
beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of
which were amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and as the records are
bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable
cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and
unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to
constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably
may be classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of
discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I
assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he
could do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not
strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times,
or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work.
What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible
and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard

he proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased
production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years
1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating
from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable
by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying
that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm
administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was
no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to
begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that
any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That
petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is
undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence  per
se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his
son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept
petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee of the haciendafor social
security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions
therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he
became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered
the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an
employee. According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to
petitioner from that time until  even after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced"
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles
from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were
made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely
stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard
petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, " (h)e quemado los
(p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive
of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister
motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning
the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel
position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the
administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied
voluntary resignation.25
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 124
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew
about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The
assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from
May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant
and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued
since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and
capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September
14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly
pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or
without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as
farm administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may
justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as
the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent
we find dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's
plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982,
prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that
petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as
that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and
correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm
machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for
additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash
advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities,
Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through 
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the
normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to
request or even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case,
however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values
and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the
matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone
who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with

the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If
indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by
private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige
petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect
to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine
what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to
compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed  of withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident
of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL,
am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited
planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with
BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am
entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these
presents  As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and
lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME
and in my name, place and stead, my check/checks
aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the
power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and
stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot
cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my
proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my  rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the
receipts therefor.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 125
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a
"CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests
for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance
readiness to go back to work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for
private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the
latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of
such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private
respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby
foreclosing his opportunity to 
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on
the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative
Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both
parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's
entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as
farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay
slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be
determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances
above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given
by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts
therefor37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business
expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we
have determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums
received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services
character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and
solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly
converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the
employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of

resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does
not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice
and hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases
where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the
grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation
obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any
ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. 40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set
out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this
wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a
worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts
or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases
of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last
known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the
allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a
reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately
notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly
the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint
with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a
monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the
place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month,
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 126
specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons
for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of
employment, the positions last held by them and such other
information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance
and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that
petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice
about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be
heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin
requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits
that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the
certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of
the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of
petitioner was submitted thereto.41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed,
as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly
requires service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial
compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an
employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due
process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise
of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the
fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the
respondent as to his defense of implied
resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the
Department of 
Labor and Employment for his sons'
(sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as
required by BP 130. And for this failure, the other
requisite for a valid termination by an employer
was not complied with. This however, would not
work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of
a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the
cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be

imposed on the respondent for his failure to
observe the notice on due process requirement.
(Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587).
(Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C"
Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation
v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is:
once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be
rewarded  his fair and just share of what the law accords him.48
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to
observe procedural due process. The public policy behind this is
that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render
a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed.
However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due
process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner
dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is without just
cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has
a justifiable excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the
mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally
dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the
imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due
process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error
in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the
employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required
under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the
failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of
every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its
denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment,
the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 127
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in
the absence of just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions
has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing
that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the
practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where
there are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of
back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more
particularly when managerial employees are concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement
is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to
wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and to his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement.
(Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement
Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held
that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be made
between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court
concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers
cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The
NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary
workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of
managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file
workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may
not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism
between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be
reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present
relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained
that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is
hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his
dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted
oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further
prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust
dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate
one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded

feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act
or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary
damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide
whether or not they should be adjudicated.51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing
recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by
bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the
dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not
feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be
proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the
aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were
awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were
undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally
be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and
the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted
in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other.
For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be
awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be
modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case
because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such
absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and
hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal.
He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding
three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement,
petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months
being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent
jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for
damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at
fault.54
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 128
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records,
sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded
that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with 
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is
just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable
efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients.
Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct
litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit.
He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in
every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. 56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a)
lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit
of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what
was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The
records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have
found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case
has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a
labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the
copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of
the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged
to make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family
leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful
and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced
that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may
have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as
parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly
contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine,
neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest
hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their
respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an
ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for
a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 129

lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-29543. November 29, 1969.]

GLORIA PAJARES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS,

MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA and UDHARAM BAZAR CO., Respondents-
Appellees.

Moises C. Nicomedes for Petitioner-Appellant.

Tomas Lopez Valencia for Respondents-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROCEDURE; BILL OF PARTICULARS; DENIAL OF MOTION
THEREFOR IN INSTANT CASE NOT ERROR OF LAW. — It is plain and clear that no
error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was committed by respondent
judge in denying appellant’s motion for a bill of particulars in the collection case
instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by respondent-appellee for the recovery of
her indebtedness of P354.85 representing the overdue balance of her account for
ready-made goods ordered by and delivered to her in 1961. Appellee’s complaint
precisely and concisely informed appellant of the ultimate or essential facts
constituting the cause of action against her, in accordance with the requirements of
the Rules of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENTIARY MATTERS NOT SUBJECT TO BILL OF PARTICULARS.
— Where the particulars sought all concerned evidentiary matters, the same do not
come within the scope of Rule 12, Section I of the Rules of Court which permits a
party to move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which
is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him to prepare his
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTICULARS INVOLVED IN INSTANT CASE WITHIN KNOWLEDGE
OF ADVERSE PARTY. — Since appellant was engaged in the business of buying and
selling merchandise and appellee was one of her creditors from whom she used to
buy on credit ready-made goods for resale, appellant had no need of the evidentiary
particulars sought by her to enable her to prepare her answer to the complaint or to
prepare for trial. These particulars were just as much within her knowledge as
appellee’s. She could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, for all she had
to do was to check and verify her own records of her outstanding account with
appellee and state in her answer whether the outstanding balance of her
indebtedness was in the sum claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount.
Furthermore, a month before appellee filed its collection case, it had written appellant
a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding account of P354.85 within one
week and appellant, through her counsel, wrote appellee acknowledging her said
indebtedness.
4. COURTS; CLOGGING OF COURT DOCKETS- COLLECTION CASE INVOLVED IN
INSTANT CASE NEEDLESSLY CLOGGED COURT DOCKETS. — In this case, the simple
collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven years. Had
appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask
from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful
indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred would have been much
more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she still remains
saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after having spent
uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this worthless cause.
5. ID.; ID.; REMINDER TO LITIGANTS AND ATTORNEYS AGAINST FILING OF
UNMERITORIOUS CASES. — The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is
needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may
be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 130
of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay"
and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action."
DECISION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant’s appeal from the lower Court’s Order of
dismissal of her petition for a writ of certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
against respondent judge’s order denying her motion for a bill of particulars as the
defendant in a simple collection case.
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated August
16, 1968 certifying the appeal to this Court as involving purely questions of
law:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria Pajares from the order dated July
21, 1962 issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Estrella Abad
Santos of the Municipal Court of Manila and respondent Udharam Bazar & Co.
"There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria
Pajares before the Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain sum of money.
The lawsuit was docketed in the inferior court as Civil Case No. 97309 and was
eventually assigned to the sala of the respondent Judge Abad Santos.
"In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of ready made
goods and delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but did not
make the full payment up to the present time;
"‘3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85,
representing the balance of her account as the value of the said goods, which is
already overdue and payable.’
"Instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares, however, moved for
a bill of particulars praying the inferior court to require the Udharam Bazar & Co. to
itemize the kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said company,

the respective dates they were taken and by whom they were received as well as
their purchase prices, alleging that without this bill she would not be able to meet the
issues raised in the complaint.
"After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria Pajares for a bill of
particulars. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by the said court,
she then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Manila,
alleging in support of her petition that in denying her motion for a bill of particulars,
the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion.
"But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the petition for a writ of
Preliminary injunction, for the reasons: (1) that the allegations of the complaint filed
by the said company in the inferior court, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, are
clear, specific and sufficiently appraise the defendant, now herein petitioner Gloria
Pajares, of the nature of the cause of action against her so as to enable her to
prepare for her defenses; and (2) that the things asked for in the motion for a bill of
particulars are evidentiary matters, which are beyond the pale of such bill. Convinced
that the said motion of the company is well founded, the lower court accordingly
dismissed the petition on April 21, 1962.
"Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by the court
below, Gloria Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court, contending under
her lone assignment of error to maintain her such appeal that the lower court erred in
dismissing her petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, in its order dated July
21, 1962, as amended by its order dated August 18, 1962.
"The only genuine issues involved in the case at bar are (1) whether the allegations
of the complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of
action against her; and (2) whether the items asked for by the said Gloria Pajares in
her motion for a bill of particulars constitute evidentiary matters. To our mind these
are purely legal questions. A perusal of the brief of the parties has shown that no
genuine factual questions are at all involved in this appeal."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was
committed by respondent judge in denying appellant’s motion for a bill of particulars
in the collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by private
respondent-appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness of P354.85 representing the
overdue balance of her account for ready-made goods ordered by and delivered to
her in 1961. Appellee’s complaint precisely and concisely informed appellant of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action against her, in accordance
with the requirements of the Rules of Court. 1  docket fees, printing of her appellant’s brief, and attorney’s fees would have been
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her motion
that appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the
goods represented by the alleged amount of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice
numbers on which they were delivered to the defendant, the amount due on each
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 131
such invoice and by whom they were received." These particulars sought all
concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of Rule 12, section
1 of the Rules of Court which permits a party "to move for a definite statement or for
a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularly to enable him to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for
trial."cralaw virtua1aw library
Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of buying and selling
merchandise at her stall at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City, and appellee was one
of her creditors from whom she used to buy on credit ready-made goods for resale,
appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars sought by her to enable her to
prepare her answer to the complaint or to prepare for trial. These particulars were
just as much within her knowledge as appellee’s. She could not logically pretend
ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check and verify her own
records of her outstanding account with appellee and state in her answer whether
from her records the outstanding balance of her indebtedness was in the sum of
P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount.
The record shows, furthermore, that a month before appellee filed its collection case,
it had written appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding account
in the said sum of P354.85 within one week. Appellant, through her counsel, wrote
appellee under date of March 23, 1962, acknowledging her said indebtedness but
stating that "Due to losses she has sustained in the operation of her stall, she would
not be able to meet your request for payment of the full amount of P354.85 at once.
I would therefore request you to be kind enough to allow her to continue paying you
P10.00 every 15th and end of the month as heretofore."cralaw virtua1aw library
No error was therefore committed by the lower court in summarily dismissing
appellant’s petition for certiorari against respondent judge’s order denying her motion
for a bill of particulars, as pretended by appellant in her lone assignment of error.
Well may we apply to this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in an
analogous case, 2 that "the circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove
that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that
the courts could well devote to meritorious cases."cralaw virtua1aw library
Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over
seven years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess
judgment and ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her
lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of filing
fees in the Court of First Instance, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court
much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she still
remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after
having spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this worthless
cause.
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 132

As we recently said in another case, 3 the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys
is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases
may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the
Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is
not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this
rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-appellant’s counsel

shall pay treble costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in the personal
record of the attorney for petitioner-appellant in this Court for future reference. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,

Fernando and Barredo, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-36138. January 31, 1974.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO

ROSQUETA, JR., EUGENIO ROSQUETA and CITONG BRINGAS, defendants-
appellants; ATTY. GREGORIO B. ESTACIO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

Every now and then, although there seems to be more of such cases of late, a
member of the bar is proceeded against for failure to live up to the responsibility
owed to a client as well as to this Court. This is another such instance. In our
resolution of May 25, 1973, we required respondent Gregorio B. Estacio, counsel de
parte for appellants to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him for failure to file the brief for appellants within the period which expired
on March 30, 1973. He failed to show cause as thus required, and on September 7,
1973, we issued a resolution suspending him from the practice of law except for the
purpose of filing the brief which should be done within thirty days from receipt of
notice. Then on October 22, 1973, he filed a motion for reconsideration wherein it
appeared that he did seek to explain his failure to file the brief on time, but he left it
to be mailed on June 9, 1973 with Antonio Rosqueta, Sr., father of appellants Antonio
Rosqueta, Jr. and Eusebio Rosqueta, who, however, was unable to do so as on the
10th of June, his house caught fire. He would impress on this Court that he was not
informed of such occurrence until the preparation of his motion for reconsideration.
At any rate, he would stress that both Antonio Rosqueta, Sr. and Salvador Labariento,
father-in-law of the third appellant, Citong Bringas, informed him they would
withdraw the appeal as they could not raise the money needed for pursuing it. He
had a supplement to such motion for reconsideration filed on October 25, 1973
wherein he stated that he could not secure the affidavits of appellants themselves as
two of them were in the Penal Colony in Davao and the third in the Iwahig Penal
Colony in Palawan. On November 5, 1973, this Court required appellants to comment
on a motion for reconsideration of respondent concerning specifically their alleged
desire to withdraw appeal.
Then on December 27, 1973, there was a motion of respondent submitting two
affidavits, one from Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and the aforesaid Citong Bringas and the
other from Eusebio Rosqueta wherein they indicated their consent and approval to
respondent’s motion to withdraw appeal. The joint affidavit of the first two appellants
reads as follows: "1. That we are the same persons named above who have been
charged in Criminal Case No. L-36138 entitled People v. Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., Et. Al.
pending on appeal before the Supreme Court of the Philippines; 2. That we hereby
consent and approve the motion to withdraw the appeal filed by our counsel, Atty.
Gregorio B. Estacio before the Supreme Court of the Philippines on that Criminal Case
No. L-36138 then pending in said Court; 3. That we have given our consent and
approval of our own will voluntarily, without duress, force, threat or fraud or deceit;
[In witness whereof], we have hereunto set our signatures this 4th day of December
1973 in the Municipality of Panabo, Davao." 1 The affidavit of Eusebio Rosqueta
follows: "1. That I am one of the accused in that case entitled People v. Antonio
Rosqueta, Jr., Et. Al. under No. G.R. L-36138 now pending before the Supreme Court
of the Philippines; 2. That I hereby give my consent and approval to the Motion to
Withdraw the Appeal which has been filed by our counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio
before the Supreme Court on the above-stated case; 3. That I have reached this
conclusion after I have conferred with our counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio and this
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 133
statement hereby revokes and nullifies the statement signed by me on December 5,
1973 at the Central Sub-Colony, Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan before witnesses,
namely, Mr. Abencio B. Gabayan and Miss Merle J. Jopida; 4. That I have executed
this affidavit of my own free will, without intimidation, threat, fraud, deceit, duress or
force; [In witness whereof], I have hereunto set my hand this 13th day of December,
1973 in the City of Puerto Princesa." 2 
Respondent’s liability is thus mitigated but he cannot be absolved from the
irresponsible conduct of which he is guilty. Respondent should be aware that even in
those cases where counsel de parte is unable to secure from appellants or from their
near relatives the amount necessary to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily
conclude his connection with the case. It has been a commendable practice of some
members of the bar under such circumstances, to be designated as counsel de oficio.
That way the interest of justice is best served. Appellants will then continue to
receive the benefits of advocacy from one who is familiar with the facts of the case.
What is more, there is no undue delay in the administration of justice. Lawyers of
such category are entitled to commendation. They manifest fidelity to the concept
that law is a profession and not a mere trade with those engaged in it being
motivated solely by the desire to make money. Respondent’s conduct yields a
different impression. What has earned a reproof however is his irresponsibility. He
should be aware that in the pursuance of the duty owed this Court as well as to a
client, he cannot be too casual and unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is
not enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly mailed. Such
inattention as shown in this case is inexcusable. At any rate, the suspension meted
on him under the circumstances is more than justified. It seems, however, that well-
nigh five months had elapsed. That would suffice to atone for his misdeed.
WHEREFORE, the suspension of Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is lifted. The requirement to
file the brief is dispensed with but Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is censured for negligence
and inattention to duty. Likewise, as prayed for by appellants themselves, their
appeal is dismissed.
Zaldivar, Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-80718. January 29, 1988.]
FELISA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and
LUIS BERNAL, SR., Respondents.
SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; PERIOD FOR APPEALING OR FOR
FILING A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, NON-EXTENDIBLE. — The rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138
SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GROSS PERIOD IN BOCAVA CASE, INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR. — The one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the
Court’s Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration may still be allowed cannot be invoked by the petitioners as their
motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after
the grace period on June 30, 1986.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions
of the Special Division of the Court of Appeals in the Luis Bernal, Sr., Et. Al. v. Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, Et Al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had
become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified
as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant
petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive
grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burnedout building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of
private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed
to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment
finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 134
received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of
the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion
for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for
reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc.
v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In
its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on May 30, 1986
(142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
[G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went
further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 16, 1985, 144 SCRA
161], stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of
the grace period, to wit:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In other words, there is one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30,
1986 of the Court’s Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is
still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be
allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R.
No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].
In the instant case, however, petitioners’ motion for extension of time was filed on
September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June
30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 135

the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge
in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary period.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of
Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court’s decision holding petitioner liable under Article
2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs."cralaw virtua1aw library

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had
the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to
vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be
disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant
petition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-38581. March 31, 1976.]

LORENZO JOSE, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Carreon & Carreon and Zosimo D. de Mesa for Petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio

Raquel-Santos and Solicitor Teodoro G. Bonifacio for Respondents.

SYNOPSIS
Petitioner was convicted of illegal possession of explosives (handgrenade) that was
found on his person at the time of his notice of appeal and thereafter, a motion for
the reopening of the case to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he
made in the course of the trial, permit to possess the handgrenade in question. The
trial court denied the motion on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case
elevated to the Court of Appeals where petitioner prayed for his acquittal or, in the
alternative, for the remand of the case back to the trial court for new trial. The
appealed decision was affirmed. Motions for reconsideration and/or new trial were
filed but were denied, hence, this petition for review which the Supreme Court at first
denied but later reconsidered and treated as a special civil action.
The Supreme Court ruled that in the interest of justice and in view of the
circumstance of the case, petitioner should be afforded the opportunity of producing
exculpating evidence.
Judgment of conviction set aside and case remanded to the court a quo for new trial.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; NEW TRIAL; GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE. — It is an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence
is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go
to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted.
2. ID.; ID.; GROUNDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. — Petitioner does not justify his
motion for a new trial on newly discovered evidence, but rather on broader grounds
of substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. Correctly so, the
authority of appellate court over an appealed case is broad and ample enough to
embrace situations where the court may grant a new trial for reasons other than that
provided in Sec. 13 of the same Rule, or Sec. 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. While
Sec. 13, rule 124, and Sec. 2, Rule 121 provide for specific grounds for a new trial, i.
e., newly discovered evidence and errors of law or irregularities committed during the
trial, Sec. 11, Rule 124 does not so specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of
the court the determination, on a case to case basis, of what would constitute
meritorious circumstances warranting a new trial or retrial.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES ORDERED ON GROUNDS NOT
SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR BY LAW. — Admittedly, courts may suspend its own
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 136
rules or except a case, from them for the purposes of justice or, in a proper case,
disregard them. In this jurisdiction, in not a few instances, this Court ordered a new
trial in criminal case on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of
witness (People v. Oscar Castelo, Et Al., Phil. 54), negligence or incompetency of
counsel (U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74), improvident plea of guilty (People v. Solacito,
L-29209, August 25, 1969), disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the
accused in the trial (U.S. v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500), and where a judgment was
rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the presection and the defense
(U.S. v. Pobre,11 Phil. 51).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW TRIAL WARRANTED IN CASE AT BAR. — The circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar justify a reopening of petitioner’s case to afford him the
opportunity of producing exculpating evidence. This is a situation where a rigid
application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goals of courts of justice
— to render justice where justice is due — to secure to every individual all possible
legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. The failure of
the Court of Appeals to appreciate the merits of the situation, involving as it does the
liberty of an individual, thereby closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice
be averted, constitute a grave abuse of discretion which calls for relief from this
Court.
DECISION
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of explosives
(handgrenade) and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of five years, seeks a new trial
which was denied him by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and by
respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioner thus poses one legal issue for the court to resolve, viz: did respondent
appellate court commit an error of law and gravely abuse its discretion when it
denied petitioner’s motion for new trial "for the reception of (1) the written permit of
petitioner to possess and use handgrenade, and (2) the written appointment of
petitioner as PC agent with Code No. P-36-68 and Code Name ‘Safari’ (both
documents are dated 31 January 1968)" ? 1 
The following incidents are not in dispute:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On February 8, 1968, at the poblacion of Floridablanca, Pampanga, petitioner Jose
was arrested by the local police leading to the filing with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch III of several criminal cases against him to wit: illegal discharge of
firearm (Crim. Case 6235), robbery (Crim. Case 6236) and illegal possession of

explosives (Crim. Case 6237). These three cases were jointly tried after which the
trial judge, Hon. Honorio Romero, in a decision dated December 15, 1969, and
promulgated on January 15, 1970 2 acquitted accused Lorenzo Jose of illegal
discharge of firearm and robbery, but convicted him for illegal possession of the
handgrenade that was found on his person at the time of his arrest.
After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day, filed his notice of
appeal. Nine days thereafter or more particularly on January 24, 1970, petitioner filed
a motion praying that the case be reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a
reservation he had made in the course of the trial, a permit to possess the
handgrenade in question. The trial court in its order of January 30, 1970 denied the
motion mainly on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the
perfection of the appeal by the accused on the very date the decision was
promulgated. 3  "3. the denial of a new trial in the circumstances mentioned in his above-quoted
The records of Criminal Case 6237 were then elevated to the Court of Appeals where
petitioner as accused-appellant raised the issues of (1) an erroneous conviction for
illegal possession of explosives when there was no proof of an essential element of
the crime, and (2) erroneous denial of his motion to reopen the case for the reception
of his permit to possess the handgrenade. 4 In his brief, Lorenzo Jose prayed for his
acquittal or in the alternative for the remand of the case back to the trial court for a
new trial.
Resolving the appeal, respondent Appellate Court, 5 rendered its decision of March 8,
1974, affirming the findings of fact and the judgment of conviction of the court a quo,
and declaring that no. reversible error was committed by the latter when it denied the
reopening of the case as the court had lost its "power to change, modify, or alter its
decision." 6  introduced by him at the new trial is not newly discovered evidence, the denial of the
A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed with a plea that "assuming
arguendo that the court a quo lacked jurisdiction to act upon appellant’s motion for
new trial because of the perfection of the appeal, this Honorable Court — before
which said motion was reiterated and which has competence to act thereon — should
have granted the same if for no other reason than to prevent a miscarriage of justice
which is the inevitable result of its denial." 7 This motion for reconsideration was
denied in respondent court’s resolution of April 3, 1974. 8  in the interest of justice, he was constrained to make pertinent inquiries from the PC
A second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed by Lorenzo Jose 9 but
this was also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution promulgated on July 24,
1974. 10 
Forthwith, appellant Lorenzo Jose assisted by counsel, Atty. Francisco Carreon, filed
with Us this petition for review which We denied outright on September 6, 1974, "the
question raised being factual and for insufficient showing that the findings of facts by
respondent court are unsupported by substantial evidence, and for lack of
merit."cralaw virtua1aw library
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 137
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner stressing that the following
grounds should justify this Court to review the ruling of respondent appellate court,
to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. petitioner’s plight is of compelling human and legal interest, and his being
imprisoned for five (5) years when there is indubitable exculpatory evidence on hand
is a result — so harsh that the Honorable Court may well undertake a review of the
case just to satisfy itself of the justice and inevitability of such a result;
"2. a question of substance not heretofore determined by the Honorable Court is
involved, as the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial is, technically, not
newly discovered; and
statement of the main legal issue, is contrary to the decisions of this Honorable Court
because under these decisions, the new trial should have been granted since there is
a ‘strong, compelling reason’ in this case for granting the relief prayed for, such
strong compelling reason being the very strong probability of petitioner’s acquittal if a
new trial were granted. (Workmen’s Insurance Co. v. Augusto, 40 SCRA 123; Sison v.
Gatchalian, 51 SCRA 262; Rubio v. Mariano 52 SCRA 338; Montecines v. Court of
Appeals, 53 SCRA 14; Posadas v. Court of Appeals, L-38071, April 25, 1974; please
see Annotation: 52 SCRA 346. . . ." (pp. 157-158, rollo).
The Solicitor General opposed the granting of the foregoing motion for
reconsideration claiming that there was neither a denial of "substantial justice nor
error of any sort on the part of respondent Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment
of conviction," and that it being admitted by petitioner that the evidence sought to be
new trial "visibly appears as correct." This Opposition drew a lengthy reply from
petitioner’s counsel.
On February 13, 1975, a Manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor General
informing the Court that in view of the "persistence of accused petitioner Lorenzo
Jose both before this Honorable Court and respondent Court of Appeals as to his
alleged existing appointment as PC Agent and/or authority to possess handgrenade,"
Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in reply sent his letter dated December 27, 1974 with
enclosures, xerox copies of which are being attached to the manifestation as Annexes
A, B, C, C-1 and D. 11 
Annex A of the above-mentioned Manifestation of the Solicitor General
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza Padre Faura, Manila.
Dear Solicitor General Mendoza:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"With reference to your letter of December 5, 1974, please be informed that Colonel
Pedrito C. de Guzman, who is now Provincial Commander of Sorsogon Constabulary
Command, confirmed that he executed an affidavit on May 4, 1974 at Sorsogon,
Sorsogon stating that he appointed Mr. Lorenzo Jose of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga as
PC Agent on January 31, 1968.
"The incumbent Provincial Commander of Pampanga Constabulary Command also
confirmed the appointment of Lorenzo Jose as PC agent during the year 1968.
"Attached herewith are the pertinent papers related to the said appointment.
"Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
FIDEL V. RAMOS  guilt shall not escape, innocence shall not suffer. (69 Phil. 556, 564-565, quoting
Major General, AFP
Chief of Constabulary" 
(p. 191, rollo)
Inclosure:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Appointment paper  discovered only thereafter.
of subject person dtd
Jan. 31, 1968 with  after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
Personal History  merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to the merits as
Statement
Annex B is the appointment dated January 31, 1968 of petitioner Lorenzo Jose as a
PC Agent of the Pampanga Constabulary Command with Code Number P-36-68 and
Code Name "Safari" with expiration on December 31, 1968, the pertinent portion of
which We quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This Headquarters will, from time to time, provide you firearms and such other
equipment which it may deem necessary for your personal protection on the need
basis which will be covered by separate written authority." (p. 192, rollo).
In a Resolution of February 21, 1975, the Court resolved to set aside the denial of
this petition for review, to give due course and consider the Petition as a special civil
action. In another Resolution of April 4, 1975, the parties were given time to submit
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 138
their respective memorandum.
This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the
overriding goal of courts of justice — to render justice where justice is due — to
secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime
of which he is charged. The failure of the Court of Appeals to appreciate the merits of
the situation, involving as it does the liberty of an individual, thereby closing its ear to
a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion
which calls for relief from this Court.
At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for upholding
the time-honored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this Court in Suarez v.
Platon, Et Al., that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose
obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that
justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while
Justice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme Court in 69 U.S. Law Review, June, 1935, No.
6, p. 309) The Solicitor General now concedes that the interests of justice will best be
served by remanding this case to the court of origin for a new trial.
We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals that the
evidence sought to be presented by the petitioner do not fall under the category of
newly-discovered evidence because the same — his alleged appointment as an agent
of the Philippine Constabulary and a permit to possess a handgrenade — were
supposed to be known to petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not
It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not
ought to produce a different result if admitted. 12 
However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new trial on newly
discovered evidence, but rather on broader grounds of substantial justice under Sec.
11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Power of appellate court on appeal. — Upon appeal from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance, the appellate court may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and
increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the
Court of First Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent appellate court
over an appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace situations as the
instant case where the court may grant a new trial or a retrial for reasons other than
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 139

that provided in Section 13 of the same Rule, or Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of
Court. 13 While Section 13, Rule 124, and Section 2, Rule 121, provide for specific
grounds for a new trial, i.e. newly discovered evidence, and errors of law or
irregularities committed during the trial, Section 11, Rule 124 quoted above does not
so specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the court the determination, on
a case to case basis, of what would constitute meritorious circumstances warranting a
new trial or retrial.
Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to aid and not to obstruct
the proper administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of
justice but not to bind and chain the hands that dispense justice, for otherwise,
courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for
the purposes of justice 14 or, in a proper case, disregard them. 15 In this jurisdiction,
in not a few instances, 15 this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds
not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, 16 negligence or
incompetency of counsel, 17 improvident plea of guilty, 18 disqualification of an
attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial court, 19 and where a
judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution
and the defense. 20 
the meantime the accused had perfected his appeal.
We find and hold that the above circumstances justify a reopening of petitioner’s case
to afford him the opportunity of producing exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal
from this Court which petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not proper. As
correctly stressed by the Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance of
examining the documentary evidence sought to be produced, and of cross-examining
the persons who executed the same, as well as the accused himself, now petitioner,
on his explanation for the non-production of the evidence during the trial.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby set aside the judgment of conviction of the
herein petitioner, Lorenzo Jose, and remand the case to the court a quo for a new
trial only for the purpose of allowing said accused to present additional evidence in
his defense. The trial court shall inform this Court of the final outcome of the case
within a reasonable time. Without pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Martin, JJ., concur.

Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the
severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. 21 

Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case now before Us
which may be classified as exceptional enough to warrant a new trial if only to afford
human opportunity to establish his innocence of the crime charged.

Thus — petitioner was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a

handgrenade in the court below. He claimed to be an agent of the Philippine
Constabulary with a permit to possess explosives such as the handgrenade in
question. However, he found himself in a situation where he had to make a choice —
reveal his identity as an undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to
perform intelligence work on subversive activities and face possible reprisals or even
liquidation at the hands of the dissidents considering that Floridablanca, the site of
the incident, was in the heart of "Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a possible EN BANC
exoneration or acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution.
Without revealing his identity as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary, he claimed [G.R. No. L-26222. July 21, 1967.]
before the trial judge that he had a permit to possess the handgrenade and prayed
for time to present the same. The permit however could not be produced because it THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JUDGE
would reveal his intelligence work activities. Came the judgment of conviction and HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte; and
with it the staggering impact of a five-year imprisonment. The competent authorities TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO, and RUFINO BORRES, Respondents.
then realized that it was unjust for this man to go to jail for a crime he had not
committed, hence, came the desired evidence concerning petitioner’s appointment as Dominador L. Padilla for Petitioner.
a Philippine Constabulary agent and his authority to possess a handgrenade for the
protection of his person, but, it was too late according to the trial court because in Narbasa, Tambac Alindo & Borres for Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MURDER; SEPARATE SHOTS KILLING
VARIOUS VICTIMS GIVE RISE TO SEPARATE CRIMES; SEPARATE INFORMATIONS
SHOULD BE FILED. — Where the facts alleged are that defendants fired guns in rapid
succession from outside the house of a family, killing the father, and that defendants
then forcibly entered the house, letting loose several shots, killing all the three minor
children and wounding the mother, the City Fiscal correctly presented five separate
informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder. When various victims
expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
2. ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; SINGLE ACT, NOT SINGLE IMPULSE, IS DECISIVE. — To
apply the first half of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes as a
complex crime a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies,
there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written
into the law.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CASES OF RELATED OFFENSES MAY BE TRIED JOINTLY.
— To obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one is a laudable purpose
but cannot, by itself, justify a trial judge to order the fiscal to file only one information
for multiple murder. Section 15, Rule 119, Rules of Court, confers upon the judge the
power to try these cases jointly.
4. PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; FISCAL NOT COMPELLED TO FILE A PARTICULAR
CHARGE; REASONS THEREFORE. — A prosecuting attorney is under no compulsion to
file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence
to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion, notwithstanding the possibility of abuses on his part, because he should
not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction and, in case of doubt, should
be given the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in courts being unnecessarily
swamped with unmeritorious cases and, worse still, a criminal suspect’s right to due
process may be transgressed.
5. ID.; FISCAL’S OPINION ON WHAT CRIME IS TO BE CHARGED NORMALLY
PREVAILS. — As the question of instituting a criminal charge is addressed to the
sound discretion of the investigating fiscal, in a clash of views as what crime is to be
charged, between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal’s
should normally prevail.
DECISION
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 140
SANCHEZ, J.:
Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before
the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate
cases, four for murder and one for frustrated murder, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza; and
Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza.
The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney
from his investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the
crucible of a full-dress trial on the merits.
The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo
Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Puga-an. City of Iligan, were asleep.
It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and pali-untod (home-made gun) were fired
in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter,
defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein and let loose
several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, Epifania Mendoza and Marcelo Mendoza — all
minor children of the couple — and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.
Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas
Narbasa and Tambac Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1)
criminal case." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and
motivated by one impulse."cralaw virtua1aw library
Giving the nod to defendant’s claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13,
1966, directed the City Fiscal to unity all the five criminal cases, and to file one single
information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247,
1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."cralaw virtua1aw library
The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon

the ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and
more than one victim was killed." The defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the
position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on
the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one
impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime to the series of shots killed
more than one victim" ; and that only one information for multiple murder should be
filed, to "obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Primarily to annul respondent Judge’s orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as
having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion, the People came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.
This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.
The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either
for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of
robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five
indictments remain as they are?
1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period."cralaw virtua1aw library
Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single
penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other (delito complejo). 1  11
Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in
the death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting,
the complex crime defined in the first part of Article 48 finds application. 2 A similar
rule obtains where one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter’s body
through and through and wounded another. The first died instantaneously; the
second, seven days later, This Court convicted the assailant of double murder. 3 So
where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes with the result
that a number of persons are killed, that single act again produces a complex crime.
4  murder.
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed.
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 141
Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 5 Thus, where the six defendants,
with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also a submachine gun and Grand
rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several others, each of
the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths
(eleven)." 6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for quadruple murder — with the
use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo — of a man, his
common-law wife, and their two children in cold blood. The accused were found
guilty by the trial court of such offense. This Court, in reversing this ruling below,
held that" [t]he four victims were not killed by a single act but by various acts
committed on different occasions and by different parties" ; that such acts "may not
be regarded as constituting one single crime" ; and that" [t]hey should be held as
separate and distinct crimes." 7 And a third. At the commencement exercises of an
elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots" — from
a pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also
died. This Court there ruled that there were "three distinct and separate murders"
committed by appellant Juan Mones. 8 And finally, in People v. Gatbunton, L-2435,
May 10, 1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule — who were
asleep — were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst of
machinegun fire, two of the couple’s children — also asleep — were killed. The
accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder.
On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of four
murders." 9 
The present case is to be differentiated from People v. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30,
1955. There, on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of
home guards. It was held that there was only one complex crime. In that case,
however, there was no conspiracy to perpetrate the killing. In the case at bar,
defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge conspiracy amongst
them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all. 10 Not material here,
therefore, is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the individual
death caused by each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this
point, that to apply the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be
singularity of criminal act, singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.
 
The respondent judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of
the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of
trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the
statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the
fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied. 12 
Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly
presented the five separate informations — four for murder and one for frustrated
2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 142

of one of the witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to
commit robbery, and that the acts constituting murders and frustrated murder
complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. If true, this would bring the
case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48, which treats as a
complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.
A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly
performed. 13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it
is alleged that certain personal properties (transistor radio and money) were taken
away by the culprits after the shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor’s
opinion thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is
the grave problem of proving the elements of that offense — robbery. For another,
the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to
be noted here is that all the informations charged evident premeditation. With
ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons
for the Fiscal’s action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has
abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he
has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points
to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of
abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a
prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction.
In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result
in our court being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a
criminal suspect’s right to due process — the sporting idea of fair play — may be
transgressed. So it is, that in People v. Sope, 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made the
pronouncement that" [i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one
charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be
filed and cannot be controlled by the offended party. 14 
recited.
And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we
are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing
separate cases for murder and frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the
complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide under the provisions
of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for multiple murder
and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal’s discretion should not be
controlled.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the
orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set aside
and declared null and void, and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said
orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to
reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were commenced,
and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.
Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres. So
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., did not take part.

3. The impact of respondent Judge’s orders is that his judgment is to be substituted

for that of the prosecutor’s on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The
question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of
the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be
supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason
then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and
the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant,
those of the Fiscal’s should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be
subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution SECOND DIVISION
may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop
a purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974
administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RAYMUNDO MADERA @
adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO ANDRES @
statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was ‘held invalid.’" 15 Nothing in the record "Ross", Defendants-Appellants.
would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just

Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera.
Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for appellee.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of the
Circuit Criminal Court 1 finding them guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost
proportionately.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 20, 1970,
three men barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag,
Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first rung of the
stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who
was then sleeping on the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot wounds
were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on the
abdominal region. Elino Bana did not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife
to call for his brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The victim's
wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the wounded man was no longer at
home for he was already brought to the Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was
carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of some people. From
the Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva Ecija General Hospital, but he
died on the way that same day, April 20,1970.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired the shots
at the victim Elino Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and that appellants
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at the
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire and
saw the appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of their stairs holding
a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2 meters from the
stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw Raymundo Madem as
the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and appellants Marianito
Andres and Generoso Andres were then with
Madera.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 143
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented the
dying, declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino Bana to
the Municipal Building took only about thirty minutes. On the way, they were met by
policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by
Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look into the shooting incident. Upon
reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana that he would
have to take down his written statement regarding the shooting incident, and the
latter agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00 o'clock in the morning.
In said dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and the answer was: Mundo
Madera and two others whom he could not
recognize.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of
Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on their way to the Municipal Building, Elino
Bana told him that he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said policeman
has been an investigator in the police force since 1964. He should have asked Elino
Bana while he was giving his dying declaration in the Municipal Building why he said
earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman Feliciano did not do this. It
must be noted that not only Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a witness
to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful
execution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the
identities of the appellants to the Victim himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana
and Francisco Viloria, does not militate against their credibility. There is no evidence
on record that they were asked by their relatives about the identity of the appellants.
Had they been asked, they would have readily revealed appellants' identities as they
did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a few hours after the
fateful incident, during a formal investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of
Police when and where they executed their respective sworn
statements.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and sworn
on the same date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana
categorically stated that Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while
Ross and Totoy Andres were downstairs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with their house.
He testified on direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their house. On
cross examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That does not show any
inconsistency in his testimony, because on further questioning, he said that the
balcony referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that after he heard
the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back portion of their house. The
falsity of this statement has not been shown by the defense. The pictures presented
by it which apparently show that there was no such opening, can be explained by the

fact that the tall grasses could obscure the back portion of the house where the
kitchen door was located.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of
gunfire. But that would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.
An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he would otherwise
have observed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the attention to a keen
edge. In some other cases, it has been observed, in effect, that the emotion incident
to the impending peril may not be the kind of excitement which confuses, but that
which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize. the circumstance of the threatened danger
in order to avoid it.2chanrobles virtual law library
The appellants asserted in their briefs 3 that "the evidence on record does not show
that there was a moon shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio
Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a moonless night;" hence, Juanito
Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized the appellants. This position is
untenable. Why? chanrobles virtual law library
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature"  4 and, under this rule, of the
time when the moon rises or sets on a particular day. 5 This not withstanding and for
certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get a certification from the Weather
Bureau 6 which shows that the moon was bright at the time of the shooting incident.
It reads:
To whom It May Concern: chanrobles virtual law library
This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the following
astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and correct: chanrobles virtual
law library
1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day, April
20, at 4:27 A.M.; chanrobles virtual law library
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34 degrees
above the western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees West; chanrobles virtual
law library
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full moon
having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22,1970.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 144
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao Fernandez, Associate
Justice, Supreme Court, Manila.
For the Administrator:
(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong 
SIMEON V. INCIONG Chief, Astronomical Division
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the appellants
for there is no doubt as to their identities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI,
appellant Raymundo Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra himself
admitted that, the paraffin test having been conducted fourteen days after the
incident, the test could have given a negative result even if the appellant had fired a
gun fourteen days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on his hands could have been
washed off by washing or could have been removed by
perspiration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of
appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the victim
Elino Bana.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres
and Generoso Andres because the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And
We agree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the
latter fired shots at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did, there
being no proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three appellants. They were
not armed. They did nothing to help Madera. Their mere passive presence at the
scene of the crime did not make them liable either as co-principals or accomplices. In
one of the latest decisions of this Court, penned by Justice Felix Q. Antonio, We held:
It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a
preconceived plan or agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a
circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or connected
with the same be present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be
established a logical relationship between the commission of the crime and the
supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate connection between and
among the latter, such as by their overt acts committed in pursuance of a common
design. Considering the far-reaching consequences, of criminal conspiracy, the same
degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of
its presence that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 145

commission of the offense itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law

library

The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the other
hand, as an accomplice, it must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal
intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous
acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether
physical or moral. As aptly stated in People v. Tamayo: "It is an essential condition to
the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it
is further necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should
cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the
crime in an efficacious way." ... From our view of the evidence it has not been
convincingly established that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense,
either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through
external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the
crime in an efficacious way. Such circumstances being absent, his mere passive
presence at the scene of the crime certainly does not make him either a co-principal
or an accomplice in the commission of the offense.  7

This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the prosecution of
criminal cases that the prosecutor's finest hour is not when he wins a case with the
conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocate's
natural obsession for victory, he stands up before the Court and pleads not for the
conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to
prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and
Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly recommended the acquittal of the
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the SECOND DIVISION
appellant Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against him;
and it is hereby reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and [G.R. No. L-41213-14. October 5, 1976.]
Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby acquitted of the crime charged with
proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release from confinement is hereby JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE, TEOFANIS BONJOC,
ordered unless they are held for another legal cause. OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and MARIANO BARTIDO, Petitioners, v. JUDGE
PEDRO GALLARDO , in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit Criminal
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur. Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Adriano for petitioner Jorge P. Tan, Jr.

K. V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner Cesar Tan.

Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. for petitioner Teofanis Bondoc.


Amadeo Seno, Artemio Derecho & Manuel Quiambao for petitioners Librado
Isode, Osmundo, Tolentino and Mariano Bartido.
Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia
Simpio-Diy and Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko for Respondents.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private
prosecutors.
DECISION
ANTONIO, J.:
In this Special Civil Action for Certorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek the
annulment of respondent Judge’s Orders in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-XIII-
50-L-S’72 and CCC-XIII-51-L-S’72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21, 1975,
denying petitioners’ y motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to inhibit
himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order of July
23, 1975, denying petitioners’ Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration
and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of July 25, 1975,
ordering the transfer of the accused (petitioners herein) from Camp
Bumpus, PC headquarters, Tacloban City, to the National Penitentiary, New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought, by way of prohibition,
to compel respondent Judge to desist from further proceeding with the
afore-mentioned criminal cases.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge
was required to file his answer within ten (10) days from notice, and in
connection therewith, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the
respondent from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal
cases. The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of the
Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the
petition. The Solicitor General informed this Court, thus: that they are
"persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent
Judge’s decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free
from suspicion of bias and prejudice. . .. Considering the circumstances of
the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and
the nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that
respondent Judge ‘appeared to have been heedless of the oft-reiterated
admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 146
guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or
prejudgment’" and, therefore, it was the submission of said official "that the
case should be remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new
decision and with instruction to receive additional evidence proffered by the
accused with the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as
may be warranted" and, therefore, they interpose no objection to the
remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition of a new
decision by another trial judge, after the parties shall have adduced such
additional evidence as they may wish to make, under such terms and
conditions as this Honorable Court may deem fit to impose." 2 
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in
justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected
to the remand of this case. On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to
strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of
the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no
standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence,
without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal
. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before
this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in
contravention to that of the Solicitor General.
The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the right
to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand
inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings.
There are important reasons which support the view that in the present
proceedings, the private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and
take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General.
To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private
prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution
of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the
preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this
Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor
General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a
stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the
Solicitor General. There is no question that since a criminal offense is an
outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the
representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution, As
stressed in Suarez v. Platon, Et Al., 3 the prosecuting officer "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As

such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is
as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one." Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, Et Al., 4 that there is
an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court the
pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence,
to the end that the court’s mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the
innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to
all, this is the prosecution’s prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to
the state." It is for the purpose of realizing the afore-mentioned objectives
that the prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and
responsibility of the prosecuting officer.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the
offended party with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil
liability arising from the offense. This civil action is deemed instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the
civil action or reserves to institute it separately. 5 Thus, "an offended party
may intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in
case of offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the
offended party. 6 The only exception to this is when the offended party
waives his right to civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it
after the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right to intervene
upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its
prosecution. 7 And in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in
the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject
to the direction and control of the prosecuting official.’ 8 As explained in
Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the "intervention of the offended party or his
attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal
actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene,
they are not in control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to
those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. 9 The right
which the procedural law reserves to the injured party is that of intervening
in the prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the
criminal action and not of demanding punishment of the accused. 10 As
explained in People v. Orais: 11  the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and
"‘. . . the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 147
the promotor fiscal because, as the promotor fiscal alone is authorized to
represent the public prosecution, or the People of the Philippine Islands, in
the prosecution of offenders, and to control the proceeding, and as it is
discretionary with him to institute and prosecute a criminal proceeding,
being at liberty to commence it or not or to refrain from prosecuting it or
not, depending upon whether or not there is, in his opinion, sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt,
except when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the
continuation of the offended party’s intervention depends upon the
continuation of the proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists
from pressing the charge or asks the competent Court of First Instance in
which the case is pending for the dismissal thereof, and said court grants
the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the commission of the
offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the
principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not entitled to represent
the People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or
to control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his right to
intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal’s right of control, it cannot
be stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petition of the promotor
fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an
order overruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively
to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General
Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an offense
to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First
Instance upon petition of the promotor fiscal, would be tantamount to giving
said offended party of the direction and control of a criminal proceeding in
violation of the provisions of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders,
No. 58.’" 
Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law
defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an
indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the
offense. 12 
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the
Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court
of Appeals or in this Court. Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478,
"Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General",
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) the Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. . . . The office of
as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall
have the following specific powers and functions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw

library
(a) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals In all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party.
x       x       x
(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body
or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion, affects the
welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.
x       x       x
It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to
represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private
prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot he allowed to take a
stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to
giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the
provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.chanrobles law library
Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the remand of
the case to the trial court is not without any plausible justification. Thus, in support of
his contention that the rendition of the decision and the resolution on the subsequent
motions by the respondent Judge were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice,
the Solicitor General stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of respondent judge, petitioners
assert that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was illegally influenced by the
Larrazabals in connection with the decision of the two cases against petitioners
herein;
(b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in progress,
respondent judge received, through one of his court stenographers, two bottles of
whisky from Mayor Iñaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle of the deceased victims
Feliciano and Francisco Larrazabal;
(c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk with respondent judge, after
which the latter received from one of the private prosecutors a bottle of wine
wrapped in a newspaper which was ‘thick’ and ‘bulky’ and which allegedly contained
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 148
‘something else inside’;
(d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases based on the
memorandum of the prosecution which was literally copied in said decision although
with some corrections; and
(e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Iñaki Larrazabal, respondent judge amended
his already prepared decision in the two criminal cases involved herein by changing
the penalty of double-life sentence for the double murder charge against the
petitioners to the death penalty.
"The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported by an affidavit executed on
June 26, 1975 by Gerardo A. Makinano, Jr., court stenographer of the Circuit Criminal
Court, Tacloban City (Annex ‘E’, Petition). The truth of the charges made in such
affidavit are denied by respondent judge (in his answer to the instant petition dated
October 11, 1975), who in turn claims that it was petitioners who tried to bribe him
into acquitting them in the aforesaid criminal cases, after they were illegally furnished
a copy of the draft of his decision of conviction by the same court stenographer
Gerardo A. Makinano, Jr. (please see Answer of respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike
in the cases of Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 191 (1973), and Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA
124 (1974) relied upon mainly by herein petitioners, the facts alleged as constituting
the grounds for disqualifying the respondent judge in the instant petition are
disputed.
"Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this Court in support or in denial
of the alleged bribery of respondent judge, we have been informed of evidence
obtained by the National Bureau of Investigation when it cannot appropriate for us at
this time, however, and we are unable to do so, to submit to this Court definite
conclusions on the charges and counter-charges. An exhaustive inquiry and open
hearing should perhaps precede the making of categorical conclusions. But we are
persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge’s
decision and his resolutions on the motions for new trial were not free from suspicion
of bias and prejudice (See Martinez v. Gironella, 65 SCRA 245 [July 22, 1975]).
"Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges
and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we
feel that respondent Judge ‘appeared to have been heedless to the oft-reiterated
admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or
innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment
(Fernando, J., Concurring opinion, Martinez v. Gironella, supra, at 252 . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws
uniformly and impartially without regard to persons or their circumstances or the
opinions of men. A judge, according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court,
should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 149

tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing
it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity." 13 Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should not only be
impartial but should also appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a technical
conception. It is a state of mind" 14 and, consequently, the "appearance of
impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality." 15 It must be obvious,
therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act
and behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in
their impartiality.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, hence,
the question as to whether or not he should be disqualified from further proceeding
with the aforementioned criminal cases has already become moot.

WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby remands the case to the trial
court in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners’ motion for new trial and
to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence. No special
pronouncement as to costs.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976
JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,  counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant
vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a
member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the
legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese
descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin,
to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of
New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial
on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-
General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem
there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the
explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled
hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus
set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be
expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent
and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the
recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed, This is one of those
instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be
found guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared
as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he
held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that
the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He
contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not
among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of
L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 150
attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant
Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into
signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the
respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in
Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the
resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set
the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant
failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter
date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said
to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on
October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The
complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an
affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he was willing to
proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared,
apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He
explained that he brought the present action in an outburst of anger believing that
the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with
the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his case, he believed the
respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of
his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for
the suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor
proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of
Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil
Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have
been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the
National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with
complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his
separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why the
Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper
is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922,
the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the
attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer
of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been
subsequently adhered to. 6
 L e g a l E t h i c s N o . 2 P a g e | 151

This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there
might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his
profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That
is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be
dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to
avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public  
trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but
the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to
frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also
to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter
that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of
the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to
his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the
bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even
take care that his honor remains unsullied

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is

dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on
his record.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.