SPECPRO.
RULE81-85
LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC. vs. PASTOR T.
QUEBRAR and FRANCISCO KILAYKO January 31, 1984
Facts:
1. Luzon Surety Company Inc. issued two administrator's bond
in the amount of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of the defendant-
appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, as administrator in Special
Proceedings Nos. 3075 and 3076 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, entitled " Re Testate Estate of
A. B. Chinsuy," and Re Testate Estate of Cresenciana Lipa,"
respectively.
2. In consideration of the suretyship wherein the plaintiff-
appellee Luzon Surety Company, Inc. was bound jointly and
severally with the defendant appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, the
latter, together with Francisco Kilayko, executed two
indemnity agreements, where among other things, they
agreed jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff-appellee "the
sum of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) in advance as
premium thereof for every 12 months or fraction thereof, this
... or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect" and to
indemnify plaintiff-appellee against any and all damages,
losses, costs, stamps taxes, penalties, charges and expenses,
whatsoever, including the 15% of the amount involved in any
litigation, for attomey's fees.
3. For the first year, from August 9, 1954 to August 9, 1955, the
defendants-appellants paid P304.50 under each indemnity
agreement or a total of P609.00 for premiums and
documentary stamps.
4. On June 6, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental approved the amended Project of Partition and
Accounts of defendant-appellant.
5. On May 8, 1962, the plaintiff-appellee demanded from the
defendants-appellants the payment of the premiums and
documentary stamps from August 9,1955.
6. On October 17, 1962, the defendants-appellants ordered a
motion for cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds
on the ground that "the heirs of these testate estates have
already received their respective shares".
7. On October 20, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental acting on the motions filed by the defendants-
appellants ordered the bonds cancelled.
8. Plaintiff-appellee's demand amounted to P2,436.00 in each
case, hence, a total of P4,872.00 for the period of August 9,
1955 to October 20, 1962. The defendants-appellants to pay
the said amount of P4,872.00.
9. On January 8, 1963, the plaintiff-appellee filed the case with
the Court of First Instance of Manila During the pre-trial the
parties presented their documentary evidences and agreed on
the ultimate issue - "whether or not the administrator's bonds
were in force and effect from and after the year that they
were filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they
were cancelled." The defendants-appellants offered P1,800.00
by way of amicable settlement which the plaintiff-appellee
refused.
10. The lower court allowed the plaintiff to recover from the
defendants-appellants. Defendants-appellants appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On March 20, 1975, the Court of Appeals in
a resolution certified the herein case to this Court after
finding that this case involves only errors or questions of law.
Issue: Whether or not Quberar et al are still liable to
pay plaintiff under the bond for the years after the
project of partition has been approved. YES.
Held: The proper determination of the liability of the surety
and of the principal on the bond must depend primarily upon
the language of the bond itself. The bonds herein were
required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. While
a bond is nonetheless a contract because it is required by
statute, said statutory bonds are construed in the light of the
statute creating the obligation secured and the purposes for
which the bond is required, as expressed in the statute. The
statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a part of
the bond and imparts into the bond any conditions prescribed
by the statute. The bonds in question herein contain
practically the very same conditions in Sec. 1, Rule 81 of the
Rules of Court. Pertinent provision of the administrator's
bonds is as follows:
Therefore, if the said Pastor T. Quebrar faithfully prepares
and presents to the Court, within three months from the date
of his appointment, a correct inventory of all the property of
the deceased which may have come into his possession or
into the possession of any other person representing him
according to law, if he administers all the property of the
deceased which at any time comes into his possession or into
the possession of any other person representing him;
faithfully pays all the debts, legacies, and bequests which
encumber said estate, pays whatever dividends which the
Court may decide should be paid, and renders a just and true
account of his administrations to the Court within a year or at
any other date that he may be required so to do, and
faithfully executes all orders and decrees of said Court, then
in this case this obligation shall be void, otherwise it shall
remain full force and effect .
Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the
administrator/executor to put up a bond for the
purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees
and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful
performance of the administrator's trust. Having in
mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is
then liable under the administrator's bond, for as long
as the administrator has duties to do as such
administrator/executor. Since the liability of the
sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator
and embraces the performance of every duty he is
called upon to perform in the course of administration
follows that the administrator is still duty bound to
respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him
in consideration of the suretyship
It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar,
still had something to do as an administrator/executor even
after the approval of the amended project of partition and
accounts on June 6, 1957.
The contention of the defendants-appellants that the
administrator's bond ceased to be of legal force and effect
with the approval of the project of partition and statement of
accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit. The defendant-
appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease as administrator
after June 6, 1957, for administration is for the purpose of
liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among
the heirs and legatees. And liquidation means the
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of
all the debts and expenses. It appears that there were still
debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957.
The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a
rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by the
bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire until
the administration has been closed and terminated in the
manner directed by law Thus, as long as the probate court
retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a
continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the
bond by the defendants-appellants.
It must be remembered that the probate court possesses an
all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and over

the administration proceedings and it cannot be devoid of
legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for
the every purpose for which it was filed.. It is the duty of the
courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estate of
the deceased persons by intervening in the administration
thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury that may be
done.
Valera vs. Inserto May 7, 1987
Conflicting claims over a fishpond asserted by the
administrators of the estate of deceased spouses, on the one
hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses and their
lessee, on the other, have given rise to the proceedings.
Facts:
1. Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had been
appointed administrators in the intestate estate of
Spouses Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa.
2. Teresa Garin, grandchild from the deceased
daughter, filed a motion asking that the
Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for
her failure to render an accounting of her
administration.
3. Cabado replied that no accounting could be
submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's husband and
the movant heirs' father, delivered to the
administrator an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras,
Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate and
she in turn moved for the return thereof to the
estate, so that it might be partitioned among the
decedents' heirs.
4. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return
to the estate, asserting that the property was owned
by his children and this was why it had never been
included in any inventory of the estate.
5. Lower court viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for
contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the
fishpond's return to the estate, as having given rise
to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate
within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court.
6. Court issued an Order commanding the Heirs of
Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond
in question * * to the intestate Estate of the Spouses
and it found that an implied trust had been created
in accordance with Art 1453 & 1455 of CC. (The
fishpond original belonged to the govt and been
leased to Rafael who in turn sold his leasehold rights
to his daughter Teresa, but the sale was fictitious,
because it was resorted merely to support the
schooling of the children of Teresa and to return
after the children finish schooling.)
7. The fishpond was leased by Garin Heirs to Fabiana,
who although willingly surrendered it to the sheriff,
later filed a complaint-in-intervention. This
was dismissed for the lease contract had not been
registered, hence not binding, so he instituted a
separate action for injunction and damages.
8. Court issued TRO enjoining administrators from
disturbing Fabiana in the possession of the fishpond.
9. Administrators filed a MTD averring that the action
was barred by the probate court’s prior judgement.
10. SC – special civil action for certiorari and mandamus
contending that CFI of Iloilo had no right to interfere
with the probate court in the legitimate exercise of
its jurisdiction in the settlement of the estate.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
11. CA – Fabiana filed an action for certiorari and
injuction alleging that a)the probate court had no
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership; b) the
title of Garen heirs is a stronger claim that rebuts the
presumption that the estate owns the fishpond; and
c) a separate action has to be filed.
Issue: WON the probate court had jurisdiction to resolve the
issue of title covering fishpond.
Held: NO.
1. Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court),
acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to
property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other
parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the
interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.
The reason for the exception being that the question
of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special
court is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence
of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which
may be waived.
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the
application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier
stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to
the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question
of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of
settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing
"finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for
determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to
determine whether it should or should not be included in the
inventory. 31 This function of resolving whether or not
property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be
sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence,
although the Court's determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
2.
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the
question of title to the fishpond was merely
provisional, not binding on the property with any
character of authority, definiteness or permanence,
having been made only for purposes of in. conclusion
in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the
hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be
subject of execution, as against its possessor who
has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely
to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not
been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate
action. These considerations assume greater cogency
where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is
not in the decedents' names but in others, a
situation on which this Court has already had
occasion to rule.
August 30, 1982 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE JULIANA REYES, PAULINA
SANTOS DE PARREÑO, special administratrix, v.
GREGORIA ARANZANSO, Appellant.

SYNOPSIS
Juliana Reyes died intestate. Her surviving spouse, Simplicio
Santos, filed in the CFI of Manila a petition for the settlement
of her estate and asked for his appointment as administrator
thereof. Despite opposition from Gregoria Aranzanso. a first
cousin of the deceased, who asserted that Simplicio’s
marriage to the deceased was bigamous and void and that
the adoption of the two children, Paulina and Aurora was
likewise void at ab initio for want of the written consent of
their parents who were then living and had not abandoned
them, Simplicio Santos was appointed as special
administrator of the estate and acted as such until his death
on July 1, 1962.
The following month, Araceli Pilapil, Paulina Santos’ attorney-
in-fact, was appointed as special administratrix. In 1965, she
filed a motion for her appointment as the regular
administratrix. Oppositors proposed the appointment of
Gregoria Aranzanso as such, she being the nearest surviving
relative of the decedent who died without issue. Hearings
were held with the parties presenting their respective
evidence to support their contentions until the court issued its
order appointing Gregoria Aranzanso as the regular
administrator, as the movants were found to have adverse
interests against the intestate estate. Motions for
reconsideration proved futile. On June 20,1966 however, the
probate court, presided by a different judge, issued an order
revoking Gregoria Aranzanso’s appointment and in her stead
declared petitioner Paulina Santos de Parreno as the special
administratrix of her late mother’s intestate estate following
the ruling in a related case, G.R. No. L-23828, where the
Supreme Court declared Gregoria Aranzanso and others
without right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of the
estate in question. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
the probate court was not justified in revoking the
appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as she could only be
removed for a cause or causes provided by law. Her removal
on the ground that she is without right to intervene as heir in
the settlement of the estate in question is not one of the
grounds provided by Rule 82 of the Rules of Court. Her
intervention in the settlement proceedings is not in the
capacity of heir although she might be one if her direct attack
on the adoption of the two girls should succeed.
The order removing Gregoria Aranzanso as administrator was
set aside.
FACTS: Juliana Reyes died intestate. Her substantial estate is
still being settled in Special Proceedings No. 34354 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV. The settlement
has spawned a number of litigation which has reached this
Court and includes not only the instant case but also other
cases with the following docket numbers: 23828, 26940 and
27130.
The estate had only special administrators until Gregoria
Aranzanso who claims to be a first cousin of the decedent
asked that she be appointed regular administrator. Her
motion provoked counter motions, oppositions, replies,
rebuttal and rejoinder which take up 120 pages of the printed
record on appeal and which demonstrate the zeal of the
various counsel in espousing their clients claims to the estate
which as aforesaid is substantial.
The Court issued an order appointing Gregoria Aranzanso as
regular administrator and relieving Araceli A. Pilapil as special
administrator.
Motions for reconsideration of the order were filed but the
presiding judge held firm "considering that most of the
movants have adverse interests against this intestate estate.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
But the opposition was persistent; it refused to give in.
And so on June 20, 1966, the court which incidentally
was presided by a different judge issued an order
granting the omnibus motion filed by Paulina Santos de
Parreno.
("In view of the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court
rendered on February 28, 1966 in S.C. G.R. No. L-23828,
`Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos v. Gregoria
Aranzanso, et al’, which decision declared that the
oppositors Gregoria Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura,
Consuelo Pasion and Pacita Pasion are without right to
intervene as heirs in the settlement of the estate in
question and that said oppositors were enjoined
permanently from withdrawing any sum from the estate
in the concept of the heirs and from intervening in this
proceeding, and which judgment of the Supreme Court
has already become final and executory, the oppositors
aforementioned, more specially the administratrix
Gregoria Aranzanso, have lost their right to intervene in
this case and the latter to perform any act of
administration in the present proceeding. As a matter of
fact, if we have to construe strictly the mandate of the
aforementioned judgment of the appellate Court, it would
seem that the oppositors never had any right at all to
intervene in this case. Such being the case, the Court
after weighing carefully the circumstances surrounding
this case, has arrived at the conclusion that the
aforementioned decision of the appellate Court has
stripped off the oppositors of any semblance of
personality which they may have acquired in this instant
proceeding.)
Finding the omnibus motion filed by Paulina R. Santos de
Parreño on May 26, 1966 to be well-taken, the same is
hereby granted.
"The oppositors Gregorio Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura,
Consuelo Pasion and Pacita Pasion are declared to be without
any right to intervene in this intestate proceeding and,
henceforth, they should not be allowed to take part therein.
"GREGORIA ARANZANSO and Demetria Ventura are ordered
to return to the estate the sum of P14,000.00 which they
received by virtue of the order of this Court dated October 2,
1965.
"The appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as regular
administratrix pursuant to the order of this Court dated
January 29, 1966 is revoked and she is ordered to render a
final account of her administration within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
"Paulina R. Santos de Parreño is appointed special
administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Juliana Reyes
de Santos and upon her filing a bond in the amount of
P2,000.00 and the corresponding oath of office, letters of
special administration be issued to her.
A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied which
prompted Gregoria Aranzanso to appeal the order.
ISSUE: whether or not the lower court was justified in
revoking the appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as the
administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.
It stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed
regular administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes
may be removed from her office but only for a cause or
causes provided by law. What is the law on removal? It is
found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Court which reads
as follows:

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; INTESTATE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS;
ADMINISTRATORS, GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL. — The law on
removal of appointed regular administrators is found in Rule
82, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court which reads as follows; "Sec.
2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or
removal. If an executor or administrator neglects to render
his account and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may
permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies,
resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court
grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be
granted to any suitable person.
REGULAR ADMINISTRATOR MAY BE REMOVED ONLY FOR
CAUSE. — Appellant having been appointed regular
administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes may be
removed from her office but only for a cause or causes
provided by law. The decision of this Court, cited in the
appealed order that she, among other persons, is without
right to intervene as heir in the settlement of the estate in
question is not one of the grounds provided by the Rules of
Court.
ORDER REMOVING APPELLANT AS ADMINISTRATOR SET
ASIDE. — The decision denied to appellant the right to
intervene in the settlement proceedings as an heir of Juliana
Reyes. But an administrator does not have to be an heir. He
can be a stranger to the deceased. Her intervention in the
settlement proceedings is not in the capacity of heir although
she might be one if her direct attack on the adoptions of the
two girls should succeed. The order removing appellant as
administrator is set aside and she is reinstated as
administrator of the intestate estate in question.
Let it be recalled that in G.R. No. L-23828, Paulina Santos, Et.
Al. v. Gregoria Aranzanso, Et Al., 123 Phil. 160 (1966), a
collateral attack on the adoption of the two girls was not
allowed under the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
When Juliana Reyes died intestate, Simplicio Santos filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the
settlement of her estate. In said petition he stated among
other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he,
as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27
and 17 years of age, respectively. In the same petition, he
asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the
deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment
of administrator. For her grounds she asserted that Simplicio
Santos’ marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and
thus void; and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora
Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written
consent of their parents who were then living and had not
abandoned them.
The Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute, ruling
that the validity of the adoption in question could not be
assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings (Sp. Proc.
NO. 34354). The order was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the appealed order, finding
instead that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to
the absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of the
minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
open to collateral attack.
Stating that, "The principal issue on the merits in this appeal
is whether respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura,
could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption
decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos," this Court gave
a negative answer.
Thereafter, this Court rendered judgment which insofar as
relevant reads as follows:
"Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby
reversed and the order of the probate court a quo sustaining
the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is affirmed. Respondents
Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura as well as
Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are declared without right to
intervene as heirs in the settlement of the intestate estate of
Juliana Reyes . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The decision denied to Gregoria Aranzanso the right to
intervene in the settlement proceedings as an heir of Juliana
Reyes. But an administrator does not have to be an heir. He
can be a stranger to the deceased. In fact, in one of her
motions Paulina Santos de Parreño proposed the appointment
of the Philippine National Bank as special administrator.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 144-146.) We hold that the
intervention of Gregoria Aranzanso in the settlement
proceedings is not in the capacity of heir although she might
be one if her direct attack on the adoption of the two girls
should succeed. We have authorized such direct attack in G.R.
No. L-26940.
WHEREFORE, the order of June 20, 1966, removing Gregoria
Aranzanso as administrator is hereby set aside and she is
reinstated as administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana
Reyes. Cost against the appellee.
ANA LIM KALAW, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HONORABLE
RICARDO B. DIAZ and ROSA LIM KALAW, Respondents
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul and set aside
the decision dated December 27, 1985 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court 1 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 in Special
Proceeding No. 84520 removing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as
administratrix and appointing private respondent Rosa Lim
Kalaw in her stead as the administratrix of the estate of their
late father Carlos Lim Kalaw.
It appears on record that Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate,
Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an amended petition for the issuance
of Letters of Administration with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 84520 naming
Ana Lim Kalaw (63 years old), Victoria Lim Kalaw (57 years
old), Pura Lim Kalaw (53 years old) and Rosa Lim Kalaw (43
years old) as the surviving heirs of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw.
TC issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as
special administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a
preliminary inventory of all the properties which came into
her possession as special administratrix of the estate of her
late father.
The trial court issued another order appointing petitioner as
the judicial administratrix of said estate and a Letter of

Administration was issued to the petitioner after the latter
took her oath of office.
Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to
render an accounting of her administration of said estate
which was granted by respondent Judge Ricardo Diaz.
RES. judge issued another order requiring petitioner to
render an accounting of her administration with the express
instruction that said order be personally served upon the
petitioner since the order dated December 8, 1982 was
returned to the Court unserved. However, said order was also
not received by the petitioner.
PR Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and Pura
Lim Kalaw filed a motion to remove petitioner as
administratrix of their father’s estate and to appoint instead
private respondent on the ground of negligence on the part of
petitioner in her duties for failing to render an accounting of
her administration since her appointment as administratrix
more than six years ago in violation of Section 8 of Rule 85 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to
render an accounting within 30 days from receipt thereof. She
likewise filed on the same date, her Opposition to the motion
praying for her removal as administratrix alleging that the
delay in rendering said accounting was due to the fact that
Judge Carlos Sundiam, who was the judge where the
intestate proceeding was assigned, had then been promoted
to the Court of Appeals causing said sala to be vacated for a
considerable length of time, while newly-appointed Judge Joel
Tiongco died of cardiac arrest soon after his appointment to
said vacancy, so much so that she did not know to whom to
render an accounting report.
IAC GRANTED REMOVAL.Administratrix Ana Lim Kalaw is
hereby REMOVED as such Administratrix of the Estate of the
late Carlos Lim Kalaw."
Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the appellate court in sustaining respondent Judge
Diaz’ order removing her as judicial administratrix considering
that she had already submitted an accounting report covering
the period from December, 1977 to December, 1983 in
compliance with respondent’s Judge order.
ISSUE: W/N PETIONER’S REMOVAL AS
ADMINITRATRIX PROPER.
HELD: YAH. REMOVAL OF ADMINISTRATOR; JUSTIFIED, FOR
NEGLIGENCE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING OF HIS
ADMINISTRATION AS REQUIRED BY LAW. — subsequent
compliance in rendering an accounting report did not purge
her of her negligence in not rendering an accounting for more
than six years, which justifies petitioner’s removal as
administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in
her place as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court.
As correctly stated by the appellate court: "The settled rule is
that the removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule
82 lies within the discretion of the Court appointing him. As
aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Degala
v. Ceniza and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, ‘the sufficiency of any
ground for removal should thus be determined by said court,
whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act
or omission on the part of the administrator not comfortable
to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.’
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere
with the action taken by a probate court in the matter of the
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error
or gross abuse of discretion is shown. (Borromeo v.
Borromeo, 97 Phil. 549; Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA
768.) In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as
administratrix was on the ground of her failure for 6 years
and 3 months from the time she was appointed as
administratrix to render an accounting of her administration
as required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court."
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; ACCOUNTABILITY OF
ADMINISTRATOR, WHEN TO RENDER ACCOUNTS; RULE AND
EXCEPTION. — The rendering of an accounting by an
administrator of his administration within one year from his
appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word
"shall" in said rule. The only exception is when the Court
otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting
claims against the estate or for paying the debts or disposing
the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the case at bar.
"Petitioner’s contention that her removal was without due
process is certainly not borne out by the records. There has
been a hearing and, in fact, several pleadings had been filed
by the parties on the issue before the order of removal was
issued. Thus, the motion to remove petitioner as
administratrix was filed on January 3, 1984, which motion
was set for hearing on February 10, 1984. Petitioner filed an
opposition to the motion on March 22, 1984. This was
followed by a Rejoinder and Manifestation filed on April 6,
1984 by private Respondent. The order for petitioner’s
removal was issued on January 4, 1985, or after almost a
year from the time the motion to remove her was filed. Not
satisfied with this order, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 1985, to which motion private
respondent filed an opposition on January 25, 1985. Petitioner
filed a rejoinder to the opposition on February 18, 1985.
Respondent Judge issued his order denying the motion for
reconsideration on April 30, 1985. This recital of events
indubitably disproves petitioner’s allegation that she was not
afforded due process."
Gonzales vs. Hon. Aguinaldo September 28, 1990
FACTS: Special Proceedings No. 021, pending before the
court a quo, is an intestate proceeding involving the estate of
the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis. Doña
Ramona is survived by her four (4) children who are her only
heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F.
Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez.
Court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and
private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the
estate.
While petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the United States
accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving medical
treatment in that country, private respondent Teresa Olbes
filed a motion to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-
administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and
omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the
heirs.
Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo issued an order which required Beatriz
F. Gonzales and the other parties to file their opposition, if
any, thereto. Only Asterio Favis opposed the removal of
Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, as the latter was still
in the United States attending to her ailing husband.

Respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration
granted to Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as
the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona Gonzales.
Petitioner moved to reconsider but the respondent Judge
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent
Judge's order should be nullified on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown by
respondents to be anchored on any of the grounds provided
under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept
resignation of executor or administrator.
Proceedings upon death, resignation or
removal — If an executor or administrator
neglects to render his account and settle
the estate according to law, or to perform
an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or
absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or in its
discretion, may permit him to resign. . . .
ISSUE: WON there is sufficient cause to reverse the order of
the probate court removing petitioner as co-administratrix of
the estate.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
removal is not favored. Conflicts of opinion and judgment
naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons
with different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if
unresolved by the co-administrators, can be resolved by the
probate court to the best interest of the estate and its heirs.
We, like petitioner, find of material importance the fact that
the court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that the
conflict and disharmony between the two (2) co-
administratrices were unjustly caused by petitioner, or that
petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her
duties, or prevented the management of the estate according
to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission
showing that her continuance as co-administratrix of the
estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.
Petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales is as interested as respondent
Olbes and the other heirs in that the properties of the estate
be duly administered and conserved for the benefit of the
heirs; and there is as yet no ground to believe that she has
prejudiced or is out to prejudice said estate to warrant the
probate court into removing petitioner as co-administratrix.
Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as
co-administratrix of the estate also on the ground that she
had been absent from the country since October 1984 and
had not returned as of 15 January 1985, the date of the
questioned order, leaving respondent Olbes alone to
administer the estate.

The facts show that petitioner had never abandoned her role
HELD: YES. The rule is that if no executor is named in the
as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in
will, or the named executor or executors are incompetent,
the fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an
intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of the
administrator of the estate. Thus, as held in re Mc Knight's
estate of the deceased who shall act as representative not
Will, a temporary residence outside of the state, maintained
only of the court appointing him but also of the heirs and the
for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is not
creditors of the estate. In the exercise of its discretion, the
such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal
probate court may appoint one, two or more co-
as executor.
administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented.
Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact
that two (2) of the other three (3) heirs of the estate of the
Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their
deceased (Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis Gomez) have
trust as entitle them to protection from removal without just
opposed the retention or re-appointment of petitioner as co-
cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court
administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that the
provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the court to
removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims,
remove an administrator.
caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the
estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample orderly and efficient administration.
discretion in the removal of an administrator, it however must
have some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal.
As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was
There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of
valid, and no satisfactory cause for her removal was shown,
the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the
the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her.
rules or the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or
Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed
substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In
without just cause. Her removal was therefore improper.
making such a determination, the court must exercise good
judgment, guided by law and precedents.

In the present case, the court based the removal of the

petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the estate,
conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between
petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes which allegedly have
prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance that
petitioner had been absent from the country since October
1984, and up to 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned
order.
Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the
deceased's estate be marked with harmonious relations
between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements
between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's
SEBIAL vs. SEBIAL JUNE 27, 1975
FACTS: Gelacio Sebial died intestate in Pinamungajan Cebu.
According to the appellants, Gelacio Sebial, by his first wife
Leoncia Manikis, begot three children named Roberta, Balbina
and Juliano. By his second wife, Dolores Enad, whom he
allegedly married in 1927, he supposedly begot six children
named Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza
and Luciano.
On June 17, 1960 Benjamina Sebial filed in the CFI Cebu a
verified petition for the settlement of Gelacio Sebial's estate.

She prayed that she be appointed administratrix thereof
(Spec. Proc. No. 2049-R). Roberta Sebial opposed the petition
on the ground that the estate of Gelacio Sebial had already
been partitioned among his children and that, if an
administration proceeding was necessary, she, Roberta Sebial
should be the one appointed administratrix and not
Benjamina Sebial, a housemaid working at Talisay, Cebu
which is about seventy kilometers away from Pinamungajan.
In a supplemental opposition the children of the first marriage
contended that the remedy of Benjamina Sebial was an action
to rescind the partition.
Lower court appointed Benjamina Sebial as administratrix.
Letters of administration were issued to Benjamina Sebial and
a notice to creditors was issued. The oppositors moved for the
reconsideration of the order appointing Benjamina Sebial as
administratrix. They insisted that the decedent's estate had
been partitioned on August 29, 1945 and that the action to
rescind the partition had already prescribed. –denied.
The oppositors filed a motion to terminate the administration
proceeding on the grounds that the decedent's estate was
valued at less than six thousand pesos and that it had already
been partitioned and, therefore, there was no necessity for
the administration proceeding.
Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the
decedent's estate allegedly consisting of seven unregistered
parcels of land with a total value of nine thousand pesos, all
located at Barrio Guimbawian, Pinamungajan. The oppositors
registered their opposition to the inventory on the ground
that the seven parcels of land enumerated in the inventory no
longer formed part of the decedent's estate.
The probate court issued an order suspending action on the
pending incidents in view of the possibility of an amicable
settlement.
The oppositors, Roberta Sebial, Juliano Sebial and the heirs of
Balbina Sebial, submitted their own inventory of the conjugal
assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis.1äwphï1.ñët
Lower court inexplicably required the administratrix to submit
another inventory. In compliance with that order she
submitted an inventory wherein she reproduced her inventory
and added two other items - two houses allegedly valued at
P8,000 and the fruits of the properties amounting to P5,000
allegedly received by the children of the first marriage.
The lower court approved the second inventory because there
was allegedly a "prima facie evidence to show that" the seven
parcels of land and two houses listed therein belonged to the
decedent's estate. It also granted the motion of the
administratrix for the delivery to her of certain parcels of land
and it directed that the heirs of Gelacio Sebial, who are in
possession of the parcels of land should deliver those
properties to the administratrix and should not disturb her in
her possession and administration of the same. It denied the
oppositors' motion for "revision of partition".
CA certified the case to this Court because in its opinion the
appeal involves only the legal issues of (1) the construction to
be given to section 2, Rule 74 and section 1, Rule 84 (now
Rule 83) of the Rules of Court and (2) whether an ordinary
civil action for recovery of property and not an administration
proceeding is the proper remedy, considering oppositors'
allegation that the estate of Gelacio Sebial was partitioned in
1945 and that some of his heirs had already sold their
respective shares.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
ISSUE: WON the court lose jurisdiction to approve the
inventory which was made 6 months after the appointment?
CONTENTIONS: Oppositors' contention in their MR that the
probate court had no jurisdiction to approve the inventory
dated November 17, 1961 because the administratrix filed it
after three months from the date of her appointment is not
well-taken. The three-month period prescribed in section 1,
Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is not
mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration and the publication of the notice of
hearing, the proper CFI acquires jurisdiction over a decedent's
estate and retains that jurisdiction until the proceeding is
closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after the three-
month period would not deprive the probate court of
jurisdiction to approve it. However, an administrator's
unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for
his removal (Sec. 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court).
The other contention of the oppositors that inasmuch as the
value of the decedent's estate is less than five thousand
pesos and he had no debts, the estate could be settled
summarily under section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court or
that an administration proceeding was not necessary (the
limit of six thousand pesos was increased to ten thousand
pesos in section 2, Rule 74 effective on January 1, 1964)
rests on a controversial basis. While in the verified petition for
the issuance of letters of administration, it was alleged that
the gross value of the decedent's estate was "not more than
five thousand pesos", in the amended inventory the valuation
was P17,000.
HELD: NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court,
the prescribed three-month period is not mandatory. Once a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed
with the proper court and the publication of the notice of
hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over
the estate and retains such until the probate proceedings is
closed. Hence, even if the inventory was filed only after the
three-month period, this delay will not deprive the probate
court of its jurisdiction to approve it. However, under section
2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, such unexplained delay can
be a ground for an administrator's removal.
If the efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement prove
fruitless, then the probate court should ascertain what assets
constituted the estate of Gelacio Sebial, what happened to
those assets and whether the children of the second marriage
(the petitioner was a child of the second marriage and the
principal oppositor was a child of first marriage) could still
have a share, howsoever small, in the decedent's estate.
We hold that the said order is erroneous and should be set
aside because the probate court failed to receive evidence as
to the ownership of the said parcels of land. The general rule
is that questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in
a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties
are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to
submit to the probate court the question of title to property
and, when so submitted, the probate court may definitely
pass judgment thereon.
However, third persons to whom the decedent's assets had
been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in court
and be examined under oath as to how they came into the
possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 87, Rules of
Court) but a separate action would be necessary to recover
the said assets (Chanco vs. Madrilejos, 12 Phil. 543; Guanco
vs. Philippine National Bank, 54 Phil. 244).

The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant
contentions of the parties as to the assets of decedent's
estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the
transferees of some of the assets. The issue of prescription
should also be considered (see p. 84, Record on Appeal).
Generally prescription does not run in favor of a coheir as
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership
(Art. 494, Civil Code). But from the moment that a coheir
claims absolute and exclusive ownership of the hereditary
properties and denies the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but that of
ownership (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857).
At the hearing of the petition for letters of administration
some evidence was already introduced on the assets
constituting the estate of Gelacio Sebial. The petitioner
testified and presented Exhibits A to J and X to Y-3. The
oppositor also testified and presented Exhibits 2 to 10-A. The
stenographic notes for the said hearing should be transcribed.
In addition to that evidence. The probate court should require
the parties to present further proofs on the ownership of the
seven parcels of land and the materials of the two houses
enumerated in the amended inventory of November 17, 1961,
on the alleged partition effected in 1945 and on the
allegations in oppositors' inventory dated November 7, 1961.
After receiving evidence, the probate court should decide
once and for all whether there are still any assets of the
estate that can be partitioned and, if so, to effect the
requisite partition and distribution. If the estate has no more
assets and if a partition had really been made or the action to
recover the lands transferred to third person had prescribed,
it should dismiss the intestate proceeding.
SC - (a) the probate court's order of December 11, 1961,
granting the administratrix's motion of May 4, 1961 for the
delivery to her of certain properties is set aside; (b) its other
order of December 11, 1961 approving the amended
inventory should not be considered as a final adjudication on
the ownership of the properties listed in the inventory and (c)
this case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with the guidelines laid down in
this decision.
FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR.,
FACTS: Catalina Bajacan died on February 3, 1977. On March
16, 1977, the petitioner filed a petition with the CFI of Nueva
Ecija, Gapan, for the probate of a will alleged to have been
executed by the deceased instituting the herein petitioner as
sole and universal heir and naming him as executor; and on
May 10, 1977, the private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss and/or opposition contending, among others, that all
the real properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by
them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Intervivos executed on
June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in
their favor; On September 23, 1977, a motion for the
appointment of a special administrator was filed by the
petitioner alleging that the unresolved motion to dismiss
would necessarily delay the probate of the will and the
appointment of an executor.
On December 23, 1977, the respondent judge issued an order
denying the motion. A subsequent MR was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: WON the petition for the appointment of a special
administrator shall be granted.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. It appears that the estate the
properties registered under the Torrens system in the name
of the deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty (80)
hectares of first class agricultural land. It is claimed that
these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each
harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an immediate need
for a special administrator to protect the interests of the
estate as regards the products.
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special
administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar. Rule
80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Section 1
— Appointment of Special Administrator — When there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by
any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of
the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed. Under the
above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a
will.
Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special
administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. This
discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or
Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO M.
MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao
FACTS: Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur,
died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-
seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr.,
and by their six legitimate children. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed
in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the
probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970
containing declarations of her ownership of the southern half
of their conjugal properties and that her properties be left
undivided during her husband's lifetime and the heirs'
legitimes be satisfied from the fruits of yhe properties. Feliz
Balanay, Sr., though initially opposed to the probate for he
was preterited, later on relented and reniunced his share in
her estate.
The CFI gave effect to the widower's conformitt and
appointed its clerk or court as special administrator. When a
purported lawyer for Felix Balanay, Jr. Came and filed a
motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will, the
CFI declared the will void and converted the testate
proceedings into testate proceedings into intestate
proceedings and ordered the issuance of notice to creditors.
Felix Balanay, Jr. Asked that the lower court reconsider
alleging that the purported lawyer was terminated hence the
withdrawal of the probate was unauthorized. When this was
denied, the recourse was to SC.
ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity, and in declaring it void.
HELD: NEGATIVE. SC held that in view of certain unusual
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal

validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs.
Nuguid) But the probate court erred in declaring that the will
was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order,
it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will
and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which
presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions
contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other
dispositions; unless it is to be presumed that the testator
would not have made such other dispositions if the first
invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code).
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on
collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein
may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and
impair the legitimes.
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving
spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover,
he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his
hereditary rights. Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in
favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention
on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be
avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail
that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the
purpose of giving it. As far as is legally possible, the
expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the
dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld.
MAURO P. MANANQUIL vs. ATTY. CRISOSTOMO C.
VILLEGAS, August 30, 1990
Short Summary: Disbarment case against the lawyer of the
administrator for entering into a lease agreement with the
estate he's working for, allegedly for a minimal fee and w/o
court approval. Court held that no court approval is necessary
for the administrator to enter into a lease agreement. But
there are still sufficient grounds for disciplinary sanction, as
he is prohibited under the civil code to enter into any
transaction regarding the property which he is supposed to
litigate.
FACTS:
 As early as 1961, Villegas was retained as counsel of
record for Felix Leong, one of the heirs of the late
Felomina Zerna, who was appointed as administrator
of the Testate Estate of the Felomina Zerna.
 A lease contract was executed between Felix Leong
and the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" involving sugar lands
of the estate.
 Felix Leong was designated therein as administrator
and "owner, by testamentary disposition, of 5/6 of
all said parcels of land.."
 Mananquil, appointed special administrator after
Felix Leong died, alleges that over a period of 20
years, Villegas allowed lease contracts to be
executed between his client Felix Leong and a
partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which
Villegas is a partner, under iniquitous terms and
conditions.
 Moreover, complainant charges that these contracts
were made without the approval of the probate court
and in violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new
Civil Code.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
ISSUE: WON Villegas committed acts of misconduct in failing
to secure the approval of the court in Special Proceedings No.
460 to the various lease contracts executed between Felix
Leong and respondent's family partnership.
HELD: No.
 Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules
of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the
right to the possession and management of the real
as well as the personal estate of the deceased so
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and the expenses of administration. He may,
therefore, exercise acts of administration without
special authority from the court having jurisdiction of
the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that
an administrator has the power to enter into lease
contracts involving the properties of the estate even
without prior judicial authority and approval.
 Thus, considering that administrator Felix Leong was
not required under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the
probate court in order to validly lease real properties
of the estate, respondent, as counsel of Felix Leong,
cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the
probate court of the various lease contracts involved
herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.
 Even if the parties designated as lessees in the
assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose
Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE
VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as an
agent of the latter, the Court rules that the lease
contracts are covered by the prohibition against any
acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties
involved in litigation in which he takes part. To rule
otherwise would be to lend a stamp of judicial
approval on an arrangement which, in effect,
circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law.
 For, piercing through the legal fiction of separate
juridical personality, the Court cannot ignore the
obvious implication that respondent as one of the
heirs of Jose Villegas and partner, later manager of,
in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit from
the contractual relationship created between his
client Felix Leong and his family partnership over
properties involved in the ongoing testate
proceedings.
Lindain v. Court of Appeals, August 20, 1992
Facts:
 While petitioners were still minors, they already
owned a parcel of land registered under their names.
 Their mother Dolores, acting as their guardian sold
the land for P2,000 to the respondents Spouses Ila.
 The respondents purchased the lot upon assurance
of their counsel that the property could be sold
without the written authority of the court since its
value was less than P2,000.
 Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the
sale of the registered land, contending that the sale
was null and void because it was made without
judicial authority or court approval.
 On the other hand, the respondents argued that
there was no need to obtain prior court approval
since the value of the property was less than P2,000
and that the right of the petitioners to rescind the
contract has already prescribed.

 The Regional Trial Court declared the sale null and
void but the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court decision.
Issue: Whether or not a parent, acting as administrator of
the property of his/her minor children can dispose of the
children’s property without any judicial approval.
Held: No
 Court approval is necessary because the Rules of
Court provide that the parent, acting as legal
administrator of his/her minor children’s property
only has powers of possession and management.
Prior to any sale, mortgage, encumbrance or other
disposition of property, court authority and approval
are necessary regardless of the amount involved.
 The private respondents' allegation that they are
purchasers in good faith is not credible for they knew
from the very beginning that their vendor, the
petitioners' mother, without court approval could not
validly convey to them the property of her minor
children. Knowing her lack of judicial authority to
enter into the transaction, the private respondents
acted in bad faith when they went ahead and bought
the land from her anyway.
 One who acquires or purchases real property with
knowledge of a defect in the title of his vendor
cannot claim that he acquired title thereto in good
faith as against the owner of the property or for an
interest therein (Gatioan vs. Gaffud, 27 SCRA 706).
 The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet
prescribed for "real actions over immovables
prescribe after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code).
Since the sale took place in 1966, the action to
recover the property had not yet prescribed when
the petitioners sued in 1987.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals is set aside and that of the
Regional Trial Court.
September 30, 1982 FLORA DE GRACIA REGNER VDA.
DE DAYRIT vs. HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
III, ATTY. CASIMIRO R. MADARANG, JR., and ATTY.
VICENTE JAYME
FACTS: Petitioner married Norberto L. Dayrit in 1934. She
alleged that Norberto did not bring any property into the
marriage but that she brought a vast estate of paraphernal
properties inherited from her parents. Her husband managed
said properties by tolerance and that out of the fruits thereof
they acquired some conjugal assets. Norberto abandoned her
in 1972.
After 6 years of separation in fact, Norberto returned in 1978
and filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebu a "Complaint for Recovery of Administration of Conjugal
Properties", which, according to petitioner included
paraphernal properties administered by her during their
separation. In a Compromise Agreement submitted and
approved in that case, Norberto was to administer the
properties in Iligan City in addition to specified conjugal
properties in Cebu City, while petitioner was to exercise full
administration over her paraphernal and some conjugal
properties in Cebu City except those turned over to Norberto.
There was to be no accounting between the spouses.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
Norberto died leaving a Will naming herein respondent, Atty.
Vicente Jayme, as executor. The latter then filed Special
Proceedings No. 4004-R for probate of the Will and praying
that he be appointed Executor, and before admission of the
Will to probate, as Special Administrator. Petitioner and their
adopted daughter, Lydia Dayrit, opposed respondent Jayme's
appointment alleging that petitioner was better qualified to
manage the estate. Petitioner likewise prayed for the
disallowance of the Will and that the proceedings be
converted to intestacy.
Petitioner was appointed by the Probate Court presided by
respondent Judge, as Special Administrator, without bond.
Petitioner submitted an Inventory of Properties and prayed for
its approval. Respondent Jayme opposed it principally on the
ground that petitioner had merely submitted a token list of
properties.
Petitioner prayed the Court for authority to assign 10 shares
of Club Filipino, Inc., Cebu, to Atty. Casimiro Madarang, Jr.,
her nephew and counsel, to act not only as her proxy but to
sit in the Board of Directors. The Probate Court allowed the
assignment.
Atty. Jayme presented a Petition for Change of Special
Administratrix praying that Atty. Madarang, Jr., be appointed
as substitute Special Administrator on the ground that
petitioner had filed an inadequate inventory; that she had
transferred and placed in the name of third parties certain
properties worth approximately P4 million; that she had not
rendered any accounting; and that she was no longer capable
to discharge her duties as Special Administratrix.
Atty. Madarang filed a Petition for Guardianship before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu praying that
he be appointed guardian over the property of petitioner, who
was already 73 years old, and that Dr. Domingo Veloso be
appointed as guardian over her person. It was claimed that
petitioner was afflicted with chronic diabetes causing mental
lapses, forgetfulness, and diabetic coma, and that she was
becoming the target of deceit and exploitation, Respondent
Atty. Jayme, and two of petitioner's nearest relatives
intervened in that proceeding and joined Atty. Madarang's
petition for guardianship.
Court directed petitioner to deposit with the Philippine
National Bank in the name of the Estate all her cash receipts
from conjugal properties. Petitioner prayed for
reconsideration of that Order. Probate Court granted an ex
parte Motion of respondent Atty. Jayme ordering that the
Bank of America and the City Bank, both in the United States,
be informed that the deposits in said banks being in custodia
legis, no withdrawals should be allowed without Court
approval.
Probate Court issued the disputed Order, principally
challenged herein, revoking petitioner's Letters of Special
Administration on the grounds that petitioner had shown
interest adverse to many valuable properties of the Estate,
the compelling need to preserve the estate properties from
further unauthorized disbursements and other dispositions,
and for the protection of creditors. Respondent Atty.
Madarang was appointed in her stead, with a bond of
P10,000.00.
Court authorized Atty. Madarang, as Special Administrator, to
withdraw from the deposit in the Philippine National Bank for
payment of workers' salaries, and ordered petitioner to turn
over the sum of money representing management fee

charged to the Cebu Coliseum in 1981 and disbursed without
Court authority.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner-wife shall have the right in the
administration of the estate of the deceased.
HELD: YES. It is our considered opinion that inasmuch as
petitioner-wife owns onehalf of the conjugal properties and
that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive
her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to
the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary
interests. Justice and equity also demand that opposing sides
in a probate proceeding be adequately represented in the
administration of the decedent's estate. 1
And this, despite the distrust and animosity allegedly
pervading the relationship between petitioner and respondent
Atty. Madarang, for it is expected that the Probate Court will
be on hand to resolve conflicts that may arise, the paramount
consideration always being the best interests of the estate.
As in the case of Corona vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-
59821, promulgated on August 30, 1982, the Special
Administrators are reminded that while they may have
respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court
subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court
and are expected to work in the best interests of the entire
estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement,
and that whatever differences there may be between them
shall be ironed out fairly and objectively for the attainment of
that end.
SC - CFI of Cebu is hereby ordered, in Special Proceedings
No. 4004R pending before it, to appoint petitioner Flora de
Gracia Regner Vda. de Dayrit as co-Special Administrator,
without bond, who shall act as such jointly with Atty. Casimiro
R. Madarang, Jr., the other Special Administrator, on all
matters affecting the estate.
May 18, 1978 Testate Estate of the Late Felix J. de
Guzman. VICTORINO G. DE GUZMAN,
vs.
CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO, ARSENIO DE GUZMAN
and HONORATA DE GUZMAN-MENDIOLA,
Facts: The deceased testator was survived by eight children
named Victorino, Librada, Severino, Margarita, Josefina,
Honorata, Arsenio and Crispina. His will was duly probated.
Letters of administration were issued to his son, Doctor
Victorino G. de Guzman, pursuant to the order of the CFI of
Nueva Ecija.
One of the properties left was a residential house. In
conformity with his last will, that house and the lot on which it
stands were adjudicated to his eight children, each being
given a one-eighth pro indiviso share in the project of
partition, which was signed by the eight heirs and which was
approved by the lower court.
The administrator submitted four accounting reports for the
period from June 1964 to September 1967. Three heirs
Crispina de Guzmans-Carillo Honorata de Guzman-Mendiola
and Arsenio de Guzman interposed objections to the
administrator's disbursements in the total sum of P13,610.48.
It should be noted that the probate court directed the
administrator "to refrain from spending the assets of the
estate for reconstructing and remodeling the house of the
deceased and to stop spending any asset of the estate
without first securing authority of the court.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
The lower court allowed the items as legitimate expenses of
administration. Hence, respondents appealed to this Court.
Issue: WON the probate court erred in approving the
utilization of the income of the estate (from rice harvests) to
defray those expenditures which allegedly are not allowable
under the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary
expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the
estate. He is entitled to possess and manage the decedent's
real and personal estate as long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He
is accountable for the whole decedent's estate which has
come into his possession, with all the interest, profit, and
income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such
estate as is sold by him, at the price at which it was sold
(Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court).
One of the Conditions of the administrator's bond is that he
should render a true and just account of his administration to
the court. The court may examine him upon oath With
respect to every matter relating to his accounting 't and shall
so examine him as to the correctness of his account before
the same is allowed, except when no objection is made to the
allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily
established by competent proof. The heirs, legatees,
distributes, and creditors of the estate shall have the same
privilege as the executor or administrator of being examined
on oath on any matter relating to an administration account."
(Sec. 1[c] Rule 81 and secs. 8 and 9, Rule 85, Rules of
Court).
A hearing is usually held before an administrator's account is
approved, especially if an interested Party raises objections to
certain items in the accounting report (Sec. 10, Rule 85).
At that hearing, the practice is for the administrator to take
the witness stand, testify under oath on his accounts and
Identify the receipts, vouchers and documents evidencing his
disbursements which are offered as exhibits. He may be
interrogated by the court and crossed by the oppositors's
counsel. The oppositors may present proofs to rebut the
administrator's evidence in support of his accounts.
Administration expenses should be those which are necessary
for the management of the estate, for protecting it against
destruction or deterioration, and, possibly, for the production
of fruits. They are expenses entailed for the preservation and
productivity of the estate and its management for purposes of
liquidation, payment of debts, and distribution of the residue
among the persons entitled thereto.
I. Expenses for the renovation and improvement of the family
residence — P10,399.59. — As already shown above, these
expenses consisted of disbursements for the repair of the
terrace and interior of the family home, the renovation of the
bathroom, and the construction of a fence.
It is obvious that the expenses in question were incurred to
preserve the family home and to maintain the family's social
standing in the community.
Obviously, those expenses redounded to the benefit of an the
co- owners. They were necessary for the preservation and use
of the family residence. As a result of those expenses, the co-
owners, including the three oppositors, would be able to use
the family home in comfort, convenience and security.
We hold that the probate court did not err in approving the
use of the income of the estate to defray those expenses.
II. Expenses incurred by Librada de Guzman as occupant of
the family residence without paying rent — P1 603.11—
Those expenses consist of the salaries of the house helper,

light and water bills, and the cost of gas, oil floor wax and
switch nail
Those expenses were personal expenses of Librada de
Guzman, inuring to her benefit. Those expenses, not being
reasonable administration expenses incurred by the
administrator, should not be charged against the income of
the estate.
Librada de Guzman, as an heir, is entitled to share in the net
income of the estate. She occupied the house without paying
rent. She should use her income for her living expenses while
occupying the family residence.
III. Other expenses — P558.20. — Among these expenses is
the sum of P100 for stenographic notes which, as admitted by
the administrator should be disallowed. Another item,
"representation expenses", was not explained. it should
likewise be disallowed.
The probate court erred in allowing as expenses of ad.
administration the sum of P268.65 which was incurred during
the celebration of the first death anniversary of the deceased.
Those expenses are disallowed because they have no
connection with the care, management and settlement of the
decedent's estate.
The other expenses for the lawyer's subsistence and the cost
of the gift to the physician who attended to the testator are
allowable expenses.
IV. Irrigation fee — P1,049.58. represented the "allotments"
for irrigation fees to eight tenants who cultivated the Intan
crop, which allotments were treated as "assumed expenses"
deducted as farming expenses from the value of the net
harvests.
The fact is that the said sum was paid by the administrator to
the Penaranda Irrigation System as shown in the Official
Receipt. It was included in his accounting as part of the
farming expenses. The amount was properly allowed as a
legitimate expense of administration.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of April 29, 1968 is
affirmed with the modifications that the sum of (a) P1,603.11
as the living expenses of Librada de Guzman. (b) P100 for
stenographic notes, (c) P26.25 as representation expenses,
and (d) P268.65 as expenses for the celebration of the first
anniversary of the decedent's death are disallowed in the
administrator's accounts. No costs.
February 26, 1990 ALBERTO F. LACSON, EDITHA F.
LACSON, ROMEO F. LACSON and ZENA F. VELASCO
vs.
HON. LUIS R. REYES, in his capacity as presiding judge
of Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 22, and/or Multiple Sala, Imus, Cavite, and
EPHRAIM J. SERQUINA,
Facts: Private respondent Serquina, petitioned the RTC
Cavite for the probate of the last will and testament of
Carmelita Farlin. He also petitioned the court in his capacity
as counsel for the heirs, the herein petitioners, and as
executor under the will.
The petition was not opposed and hence, the respondent
court issued a "certificate of allowance.
Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for attorney's fees"
against the petitioners, alleging that the heirs had agreed to
pay, as and for his legal services rendered, the sum of
P68,000.00.
The heirs denied the claim alleging that the sum agreed upon
was only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already paid.
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
Respondent court granted the petition for attorney's fees,
directing the respondent heirs to pay their lawyer the sum of
P65,000.00 as true and reasonable attorney's fees which shall
be a lien on the subject properties.
Thereafter, Atty. Serquina moved for execution which was
granted by the respondent court.
The petitioners submit that the decisions are null and void on
the groubd that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction
over the "motion for attorney's fees" for failure on the part of
Serquina, to pay docket fees; and the respondent court also
gravely abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees
contrary to the provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUEs: WON the resp court acquired jurisdiction on the
awarding of attorney's fees in favor of private respondent
despite the non-payment of docket fees No!
WON an attorney who is concurrently an executor of
a will is barred from recovering attorney's fees from the
estate. Yes!
Ruling:
I. As a general rule, the court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee, and if
there be a clear showing that the party had intended to evade
payment and to cheat the courts, it does not excuse him from
paying docket fees as soon as it becomes apparent that
docket fees are indeed payable.
In the case at bar, the "motion for attorney's fees" was clearly
in the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer against his
clients for attorney's fees.
In that event, the parties should have known, the respondent
court in particular, that docket fees should have been priorly
paid before the court could lawfully act on the case, and
decide it.
It may be true that the claim for attorney's fees was but an
incident in the main case, still, it is not an escape valve from
the payment of docket fees because as in all actions, whether
separate or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding, the
payment of docket fees is mandatory.
Assuming, therefore, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty.
Serquina's demand for attorney's fees in the sum of
P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina, should have paid the
fees in question before the respondent court could validly try
his "motion".
II.
It is pointed out that an attorney who is concurrently an
executor of a will is barred from recovering attorney's fees
from the estate.
The rule is therefore clear that an administrator or executor
may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has
incurred as such, but he may not recover attorney's fees from
the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a
compensation is in the nature of executor's or administrator's
commissions, and never as attorney's fees. It is also left to
the sound discretion of the court.
With respect to attorney's fees, the rule disallows them.
Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court set aside the
sum of P65,000.00 as and for Mr. Serquina's attorney's fees,
to operate as a "lien on the subject properties," the trial judge
must be said to have gravely abused its discretion.
The next question is quite obvious: Who shoulders
attorney's fees? It was held that a lawyer of an
administrator or executor may not charge the estate for his
fees, but rather, his client. Mutatis mutandis, where the

administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it is the
latter who must pay therefor.
In that connection, attorney's fees are in the nature of actual
damages, which must be duly proved. 23 They are also
subject to certain standards, to wit: (1) they must be
reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the
importance of the subject matter in controversy; (2) the
extent of the services rendered; and (3) the professional
standing of the lawyer. 24 In all cases, they must be
addressed in a full-blown trial and not on the bare word of the
parties. 25 And always, they are subject to the moderating
hand of the courts.
The Court is not persuaded from the facts above that Atty.
Serquina is entitled to the sum claimed. The Court observes
that these are acts performed routinely since they form part
of what any lawyer worth his salt is expected to do. The will
was furthermore not contested. They are not, a case [where]
the administrator was able to stop what appeared to be an
improvident disbursement of a substantial amount without
having to employ outside legal help at an additional expense
to the estate," 27 to entitle him to a bigger compensation. He
did not exactly achieve anything out of the ordinary.
The records also reveal that Atty. Serquina has already been
paid the sum of P6,000.00. 28 It is our considered opinion
that he should be entitled to P15,000.00 for his efforts on
a quantum meruit basis. Hence, we hold the heirs liable for
P9,000.00 more.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered: (1) GRANTING the petition and making the
temporary restraining order issued on January 16, 1989
PERMANENT; and (2) ORDERING the petitioners to PAY the
private respondent, Atty. Ephraim Serquina, attorney's fees in
the sum of P9,000.00. The said fees shall not be recovered
from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.
ANA LIM KALAW, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, THE HONORABLE RICARDO B. DIAZ and ROSA
LIM KALAW
Facts: Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate on July 8, 1970. On
1972, Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an amended petition for the
issuance of Letters of Administration with the CFI of Manila
naming Ana Lim Kalaw, Victoria Lim Kalaw, Pura Lim Kalaw
and Rosa Lim Kalaw as the surviving heirs of the late Carlos
Lim Kalaw.
RTC issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as
special administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a
preliminary inventory of all the properties which came into
her possession as special administratrix of the estate of her
late father.
RTC issued another order appointing petitioner as the judicial
administratrix of said estate and a Letter of Administration
was issued to petitioner.
Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to
render an accounting of her administration of said estate
which was granted by respondent Judge Diaz. es
law library
Respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to
render an accounting of her administration. However, said
order was also not received by the petitioner.
Private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters
SPECPRO.RULE81-85
Victoria and Pura Lim Kalaw filed a motion to remove
petitioner as administratrix of their father’s estate and to
appoint instead private respondent on the ground of
negligence on the part of petitioner for failing to render an
accounting of her administration in violation of Section 8 of
Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion alleging that the
delay in rendering said accounting was due to the fact that
Judge Sundiam, who was the judge where the intestate
proceeding was assigned, had then been promoted to the
Court of Appeals causing said sala to be vacated for a
considerable length of time, while newly-appointed Judge
Tiongco died of cardiac arrest, that she did not know to whom
to render an accounting report.
RTC ruled that Ana Lim Kalaw violated the provisions of
Section 8, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court for not rendering an
account of her administration within one (1) year from date of
receipt of the letters of administration and this constitutes
negligence on her part to perform her duty as Administratrix.
CA rendered a decision directing respondent Judge to require
private respondent Rosa Kalaw to post the appropriate
administrator’s bond within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the appellate court in sustaining respondent Judge
Diaz’ order removing her as judicial administratrix considering
that she had already submitted an accounting report covering
the period from December, 1977 to December, 1983 in
compliance with respondent’s Judge order.
Issue: WON the removal of petitoineras administratrix of her
father's estate is justified
Ruling: Yes!
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS;
ACCOUNTABILITY OF ADMINISTRATOR, WHEN TO RENDER
ACCOUNTS; RULE AND EXCEPTION. — The rendering of an
accounting by an administrator of his administration within
one year from his appointment is mandatory, as shown by
the use of the word "shall" in said rule. The only exception
is when the Court otherwise directs because of extensions of
time for presenting claims against the estate or for paying the
debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist
in the case at bar.
2. REMOVAL OF ADMINISTRATOR; JUSTIFIED, FOR
NEGLIGENCE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING OF HIS
ADMINISTRATION AS REQUIRED BY LAW. — subsequent
compliance in rendering an accounting report did not purge
her of her negligence in not rendering an accounting for more
than six years, which justifies petitioner’s removal as
administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in
her place as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court.
As correctly stated by the appellate court: "The settled
rule is that the removal of an administrator under Section 2 of
Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the Court appointing him.
As aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Degala v. Ceniza and Umipig, ‘the sufficiency of any ground
for removal should thus be determined by said court, whose
sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or
omission on the part of the administrator not comfortable to
or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.’
 SPECPRO.RULE81-85
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to
interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the
matter of the removal of an executor or administrator unless
positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.

In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as

administratrix was on the ground of her failure for 6 years
and 3 months from the time she was appointed as
administratrix to render an accounting of her administration
as required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court."

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, the
same is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner.