Unrecorded Valor: Eastern Roman Dukes and

Their Limitanei Legions During the Roman-Persian

War of 337-363
By
John S. Harrel

1
 The study of military history has a much wider scope than acknowledged by
contemporary scholars. It is more than the story of campaigns and battles. It is a
story of how societies form institutions for their collective security and how those
institutions operate in peace and war. It is a story of soldiers and their subculture.
It includes the entire range of economic, social, legal, political, technological, and
cultural issues that arise from a state’s need to organize violence to preserve its
existence and achieve its collective goals.i This study examines the Late Roman
Limitanei (Frontier Army) and seeks to explain why it was effective at providing border
security and defense during the Roman-Persian War of 337-363, while the Western
Limitanei collapsed.
Scholars debate whether the Late Roman emperors, and specially Emperors
Diocletian and Constantine, had a grand strategy for the defense of the Roman Empire.ii
The Roman Limes (border or frontier) stretched over six thousand kilometers from the
North Sea along the Rhine and Danube Rivers to the Black Sea; along the Tigris River,
along the edge of the Arabian Desert, to the Red Sea and then along the edge of the
Sahara Desert to the Atlantic Ocean. The historian Whittaker is of the opinion that there
could not have been a grand strategy due to the length of the limes and the diverse threats
along its length.iii There are no documents that prove Emperors Diocletian and
Constantine formulated a grand strategy. However, the massive resources they expended
in developing similar fortified zones along the entire length of the limes and reorganizing
and expanding the army with new regiments1 in order to defend the empire, proves their
obvious strategic defensive intent.iv The fact that emperors, counts and dukes were taking
the offensive, crossing the limes, winning battles and burning barbarian villages or
sacking Persian cities does not negate the fact that the empire was on the strategic

1
Ninetieth and Twentieth Century historians and translators refer to Late Roman
military units with the generic modern term “regiment”. That practice is adopted in
this paper.

2
defense.v
The defensive system first implemented by the Emperor Diocletian contained a
three-tiered military force. The Limitanei regiments formed the frontier armies,
descendants of the original Roman Army of Principate, they were tasked with the
strategic mission of defending the limes from fortified cities, fortresses and forts. The
Comitatensei regiments formed field armies. They were originally created from
detachments from the old Roman Army and newly created infantry and cavalry units.
The Comitatensei regiments were stationed in the provincial interiors with the strategic
mission to intercept border incursions or invasions that the Limitanei could not defeat or
control. The Palatinai regiments were elite units originally assigned to the emperor’s
personnel army. They accompanied the emperor on campaigns. They were often
assigned to regional field armies.vi The Emperor Theodosius later formalized the
Emperor’s army by creating two Praesental armies attached to his court during the late
Fourth Century.vii
There were three other types of units referred to in historical sources. The
Pseudocomitatensei regiments, which were Limitanei units attached to a field army.
The term first appears after Roman fortresses were ceded to Persia by the 363 Treaty.
The Scholae regiments were created by Emperor Constantine I, after the Praetorian
Guard was disbanded. They were the personnel guard of the emperor. Finally, there
was the Protectors Domestici, a special regiment that was part officer candidate
school and staff college that provided staff officers for the various armies.
The term “Limitanei” was first recorded in 363 in a text used to describe all troops
assigned to specific border regions under the command of duces or dux (hereafter duke).
Ripenses is a sub-division of limitanei used for regiments based along river frontiers.
When fully developed the Eastern Roman Empire had nine limitanei armies commanded
by dukes deployed in duchies along the Danube and Euphrates Rivers, the mountains of
Armenia Minor and Arabic and Egypt Deserts.2
The Arabian Limes provide a base line for the study of the eastern frontier defense.
Unlike the Rhine-Danube Limes, the Arabian Limes never collapsed during the Fourth
2
Limitanei regiments kept the old names of legions, auxilia, cohorts for infantry
regiments and ala and equites and new terms cuni and vexillations for cavalry.

3
and Fifth Centuries. Unlike the old re-built forts along the Rhine-Danube limes,
Emperors Diocletian and Constantine established new forts east of the Jordan River and
Dead Sea along the military road, via Nova Traiana. The Limitanei armies of the
duchiesviii of Arabia and Palestine were organized much like the other duchies of the
Middle East.ix The official strength of the armies varied depending upon which theory of
Late Roman regiments strength is accepted. Using the Notitia Dignitatum, Dr. A.H.M.
Jones (writing in 1964) estimated that the Duchy of Arabia was garrisoned by a Limitanei
army of 13,500 to 19,500 (consisting of two legion regiments, twelve cavalry equites and
alas regiments, and five infantry cohorts regiments).x Dr. Parker (writing in 2006) and
his team that excavated the Arabic Limes place the effective strength of the Arabian
Limitanei Army at between 6, 0503 and 8,050.xi While Jones and Parker agree on the
number of regiments, Parker bases his reduced regiment size upon the small size of the
fortresses and Roman military records found in Egypt. These records and excavated
barracks suggest that Limitanei cavalry regiments were comprised of 120 horsemen and
160 footmen in the cohorts rather than Jones’ theorized strength of 500.xii
Historian Hugh Elton asserts that the Limitanei provided three functions on the
border: policing, intelligence gathering, deterring raids. xiii In the east they had the
additional mission of defending cities, fortresses and forts against determined assault and
siege. Surviving military records indicate they were also assigned responsibilities for
recruitment, tax collection and administration of justice in the communities around the
forts.xiv The police function included preventing deserters from leaving and spies from
entering the empire. They were not always successful. In 359, Antoninus, a Roman staff
officer on the Duke of Mesopotamia’s staff, deserted to avoid debt collection. Antoninus,
the debtor, utilizing his knowledge of Roman deployments and patrols became King
Shapor’s primary advisor and guided the Persian advance guard during the 359
invasion.xv
The second function was intelligence gathering. Simply by interacting with the
tribes along the border the Limitanei become aware of the activities and military strength
of the Persians. In 359 Eastern Limitanei scouts reported the Persian Army build up and

3
The variance is dependant whether the two Limitanei legions tertiae Cyrenaicae
and quartae Martiae had 1,000 or 2000 men.

4
initial movement before the Persian cavalry screen crossed the Tigris River and continued
to report until the Persians drove back the Roman scouts and border cavalry patrolsxvi
The third mission was to deter enemy raids.xvii Their effectiveness at skirmishing
with small bands of raiders is uncertain. Roman literary sources of the time did not
record non-events.xviii Ammianus admits that he failed to record battles that were
indecisive or insignificant. xix An estimate as to the effectiveness of the Western
Limitanei can be deduced by the size of the raiding war bands that broke through and
were recorded by Roman historians. During the winter of 357 a war band of 600 Franks
broke into the Empire and occupied a deserted fort on the River Meuse. In 457 a war
band of 900 Alamanni was defeated attempting to cross the Alps.xx In the east, Saracen
raids targeted isolated travelers and small groups but left cities unmolested. In Palestine,
the main roads and pilgrimage routes were patrolled and protected by small fortlets.
Important pilgrims were provided military escorts.xxi It can therefore be assumed that
Western Germanic war bands and Eastern Persian and Saracen (Arab) raiders under
1,000, were intercepted by the Limitanei patrols and regiments. Bloody skirmishes were
never recorded since they were unimportant by the standards of contemporary historians.
The constabulary mission of the Limitanei was to take care of road security in the
frontier districts as well as other police functions.xxii The constabulary mission of a
Limitanei unit included recruiting for the army, collection of the military tax (annona)
and the administration of justice in and around the fort it garrisoned. The Prefect
(colonel) Flavius Abinnaeus (286-351) commanded the cavalry regiment Ala Quinta
Praelectorum stationed at the fort in Dionysia, Upper Egypt from 344 - 351.xxiii The
Abinnaeus Archive, containing Flavius’ personal record on papyrus survived to the
present day thanks to the dry climate of Egypt. This archival treasure deals with the
administrative details of military command and quality of life on the Egyptian Limes.
The letters indicate that the ala was used to suppress smuggling,xxiv escort and protect
dignitariesxxv and provide escort and muscle for tax collectors.xxvi Local civilians looked to
the local commander to punish soldiers who stole or vandalized property.xxvii Historians
David Breeze and Brian Dobson note that while we have been able to discover the
function and activities of the border regiments, the details of individual daily activity still
elude us.xxviii Despite other assigned duties, the defense of forts and fortresses was of

5
prime importance.
The impetus for the improvement of fortifications during the Fourth Century was
the failure to prevent Persian incursions into Roman Syria during the Third Century.xxix
Emperors Diocletian and Constantine turned the Provence of Mesopotamia into a
defensive zone of fortified cities to protect the rich Provence of Syria and City of
Antioch.xxx During the First-Third Centuries Roman military construction built towers
flush with a fort’s wall. Fighting was expected to take place outside the walls not upon
them. In the middle of the Third Century forts were built with towers projecting out from
the fort wall. This change in military construction signified a change in tactics and the
forts were now intended as fighting platforms.xxxi These towers allowed defenders to
protect vulnerable walls and gates from assaulting troops with enfilading fire from siege
engines, archers and slingers.xxxii
Forts can be divided into four categories based upon their functions. Garrison forts
were large instillations designed to accommodate a regiment of 1,000 to 2,000 men, often
only twenty percent as large as Principate legionary forts designed for 6,000 men. They
often served as headquarters for a district with sub-units assigned to detachment forts and
watchtowers. Most Limitanei legionary regiments listed on the Notitia Dignitatum were
headquartered in such forts.xxxiii Detachment forts were usually new construction and not
listed on the Notitia Dignitatum. They were very small, some only 31 x 32 meters.xxxiv
Small unattached watchtowers supported detachment forts and garrison forts. These were
fortified three story blockhouses often located on high ground over looking the border.
xxxv
Finally, along river limes, fortified landings allowed the Roman Army access when
crossing the river.xxxvi Forts were built with the expectation that the defenders would be
attacked and this caused a major reorganization and rearmament of the army that
occupied them.
The regiments that made up the Limitanei and defended the limes forts often
traced their linage to legions of Julius Caesar. Despite this long history and the
increased importance of cavalry, the Roman soldier remained a swordsman. The spear,
whether pila or lanceara, was only a primary weapon when fighting cavalry, otherwise it
was thrown, with darts and javelins before entering into hand-to-hand combat. Both
Vegetius in Epitoma Rei Militaris (395-410) and the Emperor Maurice’s Field Manuel

6
Strategikon (582-602) agree that training with sword and shield was critical for the
infantry.xxxvii A new recruit sent directly into battle with his regiment was a liability to his
regiment and often a danger to his comrades. Basic training during the First –Third
Centuries was conducted in a permanent camp, fort, xxxviiior winter quarters. An argument
can be made that it was simpler in the Fourth Century for the Limitanei to train its new
recruits than the Comitatenses regiments which did not have a fixed base.
While the emperors of the Fourth Century spent lavishly on fortifications, they did
pinch pennies when it came to armor, helmets and shields. The plywood shield, complex
helmet and articulated plate armor (lorica segmentata) of the Principate was replaced by
simple and cheap chain mail armor, simple helmets and plank shields.xxxix The three-foot
sword (spatha) replaced the two-foot sword (gladius) but both were designed for
thrusting.xl The primary throwing spear, the pila, was replaced with the lanceara for
throwing or thrusting. The Roman shield, despite it cheap manufacture, was designed to
have an offensive role, allowing Roman soldiers to bash into and unbalance their
opponents.xli The replacement of the pila with the lanceara made the spear more
versatile, especially against cavalry but it could still be thrown before coming to grips
with enemy infantry. Most Limitanei cavalry regiments were equiped with helmets,
shields, swords, javelins and darts or armed as horse archers.xlii Maurice’s Strategikon
recommends that when body armor was in short supply it should be issued to the
first two ranks of a heavy infantry. Vegetius blames abandonment of armor and
helmets on the relaxation of discipline. He contends that soldiers seldom trained fully
equipped for battle and that is why they petitioned the emperor to lay aside these heavy
burdens.xliii Vegetius was either being very naive or very tactful; for equipping the army
and enforcing discipline was the responsibility of the emperor and his appointed officers.
No group of soldiers, going into battle then or today would turn down body armor and a
helmet if offered, regardless of the great weight.
Vegegtius, writing at the end of the Fourth Century recommended that 25-30% of
the youngest and fittest recruits receive training as archers and slingers making them
extremely useful in defending cities and forts. He also argues for the use of weighted
darts (martiobarbuli); five of which should be attached to the inside of a shield.xliv The
Strategikon recommends that infantry regiments deployed for a field battle be mixed with

7
close combat infantry (armed with shield, darts, sword and spear) and archers (armed
with bows, shields and darts) in a ratio as high as four to one.xlv The reliance on missile
weapons is supported by battle descriptions by Ammianus and the Emperor Julian. The
inclusion of missile troops in infantry regiments was not a new development of the late
Fourth Century. A papyrus that survived from Panopolis, now in the Chester Beatty
Library Dublin, Ireland, with donatives records of the Limitanei infantry regiment Legio
secunda Traianainxlvi (Egypt ca. 300) reports that 45% of the men on the roll are
lanciarii (a type of skirmishing light infantry)4.xlvii The biggest change in the tactical
battle of the Roman infantry regiment was that archers and skirmishers were now organic
within the regiment. These skirmishers and archers could have been new young recruits
within the first five years of being conscripted. While the increased missile use caused
minor tactical changes in field battle, the evolution of equipment appears to be directly
linked to the function and mission of the Limitanei in defending fortifications and small
skirmishes with raiders.
It has been argued that the Limitanei were inferior soldiers because the standards
for being admitted were lower and they received lower rates of pay and less benefits than
the Comitatenses regiments. These arguments are not support by modern historians.xlviii
In so far as the Late Roman statues, regulations and laws were concerned, a soldier’s life,
no matter which army he served in, was superior to the life of a peasant. Throughout the
history of the late Roman Republic and Empire, enlistment in the army, despite the risks
involved, provided an avenue for a common man to acquire position and status above his
class.xlix For most of the Fourth Century soldiers were paid in kind receiving clothing,
rations and cash installments at intervals. As they rose though the ranks they were
authorized family allowances and tax exemptions for their families. The more
prestigious a soldier’s regiment, the more of his family members received tax
exemptions.l However, due to the corruption of the age some of their benefits, pay and
allowances were misdirected to their officers and non-commissioned officers. Conditions
of life would vary greatly based upon the leadership and integrity of a soldier’s tribune or
prefect (regimental commander).li
The Late Roman Army needed between 15,000-30,000 new recruits yearly,

4
These lanciarii should not be confused with the elite infantry regiment.

8
depending whether its total strength was 300,000 or 600,000. The two main sources of
recruits from inside the empire came from volunteers and conscripts.lii Vegetius reported
that traditionally, peasants made better recruits than city dwellers because they were
accustomed to hard labor. Recruits were to be of good heath and not fully enrolled
(branded) in the army until they were found fit for military service.liii Recruits and
conscripts had to be at least 5’7”liv reduced from 5’10” in 367.lv
Veterans' sons were required to serve but not necessarily in the same unit as their
father.lvi A law in 375 directed conscripts with better physiques to be enrolled in the
Comitatense, while the Limitanei in theory, received inferior specimens.lvii Yet, the
Abinnaeus Archive infers that a Limitanei prefect may have had the discretion to take
his pick of the new conscripts before escorting them to the field army.lviii This raises the
inference that the sons of serving soldiers or discharged veterans living in the local area
would join their fathers’ regiment. Other letters form the Abinnaeus Archive support the
argument that the regiment’s commander had a patron-client relationship with the
soldiers of his regiment along with discharged veterans and their dependents in his
vicinity. It is not reasonable to conclude that all superior Roman conscripts, and
veterans’ sons within the frontier duchies, entered the Comitatenses regiments in the
interior, unless they were not acceptable to local Limitanei prefect. For the same reason
it is not realistic that all inferior conscripts from the interior were assigned to the
Limitanei. Sons of cavalry veterans, if they enlisted with a horse, would be allowed to
join the cavalry.lix Soldiers and small units were transferred between the Comitatenses,
Limitanei and Palatini armies and regiments by arrangement between the counts and
dukes. Assumedly, money changed hands. These transfers became such a problem in the
West that on March 19, 400, Emperor Honorius enacted an edict prohibiting the
practice.lx The evidence indicates that Limitanei Roman recruits and conscripts were not
necessarily inferior to those incorporated into the Comitatenses regiments.
Men from outside the empire could join the army as individual volunteers, be
conscripted as part of a treaty, or recruited from prisoners of war. While the majority of
barbarians serving in the Roman Army were Germanic, all barbarian groups provided
recruits. The majority of the barbarian volunteers were attracted to the life style of a
Roman soldier, which would have been luxurious compared to their tribal home. These

9
individual volunteers would have been absorbed into the society of their regiment
learning Latin and becoming completely assimilated, often forgetting their native
tongue.lxi Barbarians settled within the empire in accordance with treaties. Prisoners of
war were also incorporated into all elements of the army.
A series of laws indicates that service in the army, outside the border duchies of
Gaul was not popular. There were severe penalties for cutting off one’s thumb to evade
service. Desertion by conscripts was a constant problem in the first years of service.
Many peasants were afraid of leaving home and went to great length to evade call up.
Yet, once they got over their initial panic and homesickness the majority seemed to have
served contentedly.lxii Laws against military service evasion and prohibitions against
pacifist churchmen speaking out against conscription should not be used to support the
conclusion that most of the population was against military service. During the 360 siege
of Bezabde Zabdiceni tribal militia helped the Roman Army defend the city. Like Israel
today, populations living in the duchies, under constant threat of raids and invasion, most
likely looked at military service in a more positive light.
The Roman Limitanei, like all armies, would have formed a sub-culture within
Roman society. Their wives and families lived in villages outside their forts. Regardless
of their origin, single men would eventually marry and establish families with local
women. Modern observers of men in combat have long noted the development of special
importance attached to small group relationships when faced with combat situations.
These relationships determine whether men fight or run.lxiii Many Limitanei regiments had
unit histories and battle honors dating back hundreds of years. In healthy regiments new
recruits would have been inducted into the regimental fraternity. Long service soldiers
accepted new officers as their own and they became one of their fraternity, though a
special member.lxiv
There was a theory, mostly discredited today, that Limitanei were a peasant militia,
working the land and fighting when needed. Despite evidence to the contrary, this theory
continues to appear in popular publications.lxv The first source that indicates Limitanei
worked their own land, assigned to them by the authorities, dates to 443. There is no
evidence that this affected their military ability, and it is consequently misleading to
speak of a peasant militia as necessarily implying negative qualitative performance in

10
battle.lxvi In isolated locations there is evidence that the land around the forts was farmed,
but no evidence has been uncovered that the soldiers, instead of their families, slaves or
local civilians cultivated the land or managed the flocks.lxvii Papers discovered in Egypt
record that in 508 a Comitatensei soldier from the Transtigritani Regiment leased a
bakery from a soldier from the Leones Clibanarii Regiment. John Moschus, in the same
year, recorded that a soldier sat every day weaving baskets and then at 3:00 p.m. (9th
hour) reported for duty with his regiment.lxviii Evidently, enterprising soldiers with free
time, found avenues to profit, regardless of their regiment. Least we forget the Roman
peasant militia created the Roman Empire between 300 BCE-100 BCE, defeating the
Carthaginian and Hellenic professional armies.
In the Late Roman Army, only men in the staff corps, regimental commanders and
higher would be commissioned on the emperor’s authority. Today this rank is referred to
as “field grade”; officers in the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, colonel and general.
Roman non-commissioned officers performed the function of modern junior officers.
Ducenarius’ and centurions were the equivalent of modern company commanders. They
were given independent commands, such as escorting foreign dignitaries to the court of
the emperor. In the Fourth Century officers could be appointed from the ranks, or
through patronage, into a staff corps (protectores domesticus) in service to the emperor.
In these corps the potential regimental commanders were trained and tested to determine
whether they were fit to command. Regimental commanders were called tribuni
(tribunes), prefects or praetositi. Tribune was also used for army staff officers (tribuni
vacates). Many tribuni vacates, like Ammianus, were attached to generals like Ursicinus
to serve in the field as staff officers. The Emperor Valentinianus I (321-375) was
promoted from the staff regiment to command a Comitatenses cavalry regiment at age 36
in 357. Flavius Abinnaeus, spent 33 years in Limitanei cavalry regiments rising to the
rank of ducenarius when posted to the staff corps at 51.lxix After serving twenty-eight
years in the Palatinai Legion Ioviani Flavius Memorius was elevated to Protector
Domesticus, where he served for six years, before he was appointed Prefect of the
Comitatenses Legion Lanciarii Seniores. He must have been 55 when appointed Prefect.
After three years as Prefect he served five years as a count, first as comes ripae and then
comes Mauretania.lxx The evidence indicates that successful, experienced soldiers could

11
achieve appointment to regimental command, regardless of the status of their regiment.
This historical data supports the conclusion that the emperors of the Fourth Century
expended the empire’s wealth by creating a defensive system of improved border forts
and city fortifications. They pinched pennies by subdividing the army and creating a
border army, the Limitanei, that had lower status, lower pay and fewer benefits than the
more prestigious Comitatenses and Palatini field army regiments. All regiments were
provided cheaper equipment. The emperors compensated for their tightfistedness by
providing regiments with experienced commanders and dukes, many being long service
professionals, instead of court appointed favorites. Battlefield performance often had
more to do with training and leadership than regimental status. The new defense system
was tested in 337, while the Emperor Constantine laid dying on his deathbed.
Warfare in Late Antiquity between Rome and Persia was attrition warfare;
consisting of skirmishes, small battles, sieges and very few major battles.lxxiArrayed
against the Eastern border defenses were two external threats. The Parthian and later the
Sassanid Persian Empire threatened the limes of Eastern Anatolia, Syria and
Mesopotamia with raids and conquest. The limes of Arabia, Egypt and Africa were
mostly defended against tribal raids, until the Vandal and Islamic invasions. The
Persians were particularly dangerous because they were culturally and militarily as
advanced as the Romans. Defensive stone walls were not an obstacle to Persian
engineers, as they were to barbarian war bands of the West.
During the Persian War of 337-363, skirmishes and sieges were the norm,
with Emperor Julian’s ill-fated invasion of Persia in 363, (where his timely death and
Jovian’s unpopular peace saved the invading Roman Field Army from destruction) as the
exception.lxxii Persian King Shapor II (309-379) started the war in an attempted to regain
territories that Emperor Diocletian captured at the end of the Third Century. Both
Armenia and Mesopotamia were vital to the strategic interest of both Persia and Rome.
Armenia, though mountainous, provided an excellent east-west invasion route along the
Araxes River. On the western end of this axis lay the rich Roman provinces of Anatolia
and Cappadocia. On the east end this axis led into the heart of Persia. Just south of the
mountains of Anatolia is located the east-west axis along the Mesopotamia steppes. On
the Roman side were the rich Province of Syria and the City of Antioch. On the Persian

12
side were located the rich cities of the Tigris and Euphrates Valley. After the Persian
defeat in 297, the Persian-Roman border was moved from the Euphrates to the Tigris
River.
King Shapur II attempted, with varying success to conquer the great fortresses of
Roman Mesopotamia, Singara, Nisibis and Amida. Unlike his predecessor, Emperor
Constanius II (337-361) stood primarily on the defense and the war degenerated into a
series of skirmishes and sieges. He relied on the Limitanei armies to attrite the Persian
Army, forcing them to expend their strength and campaign seasons against the walls of
Roman forts and garrison cities. Throughout the war the City of Nisibis was of
fundamental importance to the strategic defense of the entire Roman East and dominated
the Mesopotamian axis. Until its surrender, as part of the treaty in 363, Nisibis was not
only the headquarters of the duke of Mesopotamia but also often served as the forward
mustering-point for the mobile forces of the general of the Army of the Orient (magister
militum per Orientem). The city valiantly resisted three Persian sieges (338, 346 and
350) and became an obsession for the King Shapor II.
The years between 336-349 saw heavy fighting.lxxiii The Persians unsuccessfully
besieged the City of Nisibis in 338 and 346. The City of Singara was the scene of heavy
fighting in 344 and 348. The City of Amida was destroyed by the Persians in 336 and
rebuilt and refortified. During the second siege of Singara in 348, the future count but
still a tribuni vacates in the Emperor’s Protector staff regiment, Aelianus, conducted his
daring nocturnal raid at the head of an ad hoc regiment of raw recruits5 cutting his way
through the Persian siege lines.lxxiv For this action he was promoted, most likely to
regimental commander (tribuni or prefect) before he was appointed count and
commander of the defense of Amida in 359.lxxv
The year 350 marked a point of crisis in the reign of Emperor Constantius II. The
third siege of Nisibis started in the spring of 350 and coincided with a major threat to the
internal stability of the Empire and to Constantius’ rule. In January 350 Constantius'
younger brother and co-emperor, Constans, was murdered and Flavius Magnus
Magnentius (303- 353) was then proclaimed emperor by the Gallic Army at Trier. These

5
Recruits for the regiments of Superventores (scouts) and Praventores
(Skirmishers).

13
events in the West distracted Constantius' attention from the eastern frontier, which he
had personally guarded throughout the 340s.
Unable to contemplate sharing control of the Empire with a usurper, Constantius
made ready to march west in the spring of 350 to oppose Magnentius, with most of the
Field Army of the Orient, while King Shapor made ready to lead his army across the
Tigris River into Roman territory. Constantius left the defense of Mesopotamia and the
city of Nisibis in the hands of Duke or possibly Count Lucillianus, a competent and well-
respected officer. The sources do not identify the garrison, but it most likely included the
Limitanei Legion I Parthicae Nisibenae6 and other Limitanei units of the Duchy of
Mesopotamia. There is no indication that Constantius sent Duke Lucillianus any
reinforcements from the field army.
It is assumed that King Shapor, as was his custom in 359 and 360, upon his arrival
before the walls of Nisibis tried to persuade the garrison to capitulate. After the rejection
of his offer, the Persians besieged the city between 100-160 days. The Persian engineers
used every siege tactic, which Duke Lucillianus defeated. Finally the Persian engineers
brought down a section of the wall by a novel, and unclear use of a nearby river. As the
walls fell the Persian assault troops immediately entered the breach and were meet by the
desperate garrison fighting to force them back. Hand-to-hand combat, support by arrows
and bolts from the walls and towers checked the Persian assault, while a sortie from a
gate forced the Persian to withdraw. Shortly after this failed assault, the Persian Army
lifted the siege and retreated after suffering heavy casualties from combat and disease.
The lifting of the siege represented a humiliating defeat for the Persians. They had taken
advantage of a favorable opportunity when the Limitanei Army of Mesopotamia was
unsupported to attack the fortress and they employed novel methods of siege warfare.
The garrison showed a remarkable degree of resistance, both physical and psychological,
to the Persian onslaught. The garrison’s determination and loyalty to the Emperor,
despite being abandoned to their fate, brought them victory.lxxvi
In the spring and summer of 350, as Duce Lucillianus defended Nisibis, Emperor
Constantius marched west with the Army of the Orient. Upon crossing over into Europe
Ventrano, Commander of the Pannonian Army joined the Emperor. By September 28,

6
Nisbenae, probably a battle honor for the siege of 350.

14
350 the Emperor had mustered an army of 80,000 against the Usurper Magnentius’ Army
of Gaul numbering 36,000 men. The battle was a victory for Constantius but a disaster
for Rome and especially to the Western Roman Empire’s longevity. At the Battle of
Mursa, the Army of Gaul was nearly destroyed by Constantius. It is reported that the
Army of Gaul lost 20,000 of its 36,000 men engaged.lxxvii While most likely an
exaggeration, it is reported that Constantius lost 30,000 men.lxxviii Magngentius was
finally defeated and killed on August 11, 353. The loss of up to 50,000 trained Roman
soldiers in the middle of a two front war (Gaul and Persia) greatly limited Emperor
Constantius’ options. He eventually attempted to stabilize the west with an economy of
force by appointing Julian Caesar, and giving him command of the greatly reduced Army
of Gaul.
After failing in his third attempt to capture Nisibis, King Shapor appears to have
abandoned all hope of capturing it by direct assault. The war continued, but King Shapor
spent most of the 350s fighting off nomad attacks on Persia's northern frontier.
Making peace with the tribes in 358, he was able to focus again on Rome.
The Persians targeted the city of Amida during the invasion of 359. With the aide
of the deserter, Antonius, King Shapor developed a novel campaign plan using Roman
roads to his advantage, bypassing the border fortress such as Nisibis and marching
straight into Syria to plunder its rich cities. Historian R.C. Bockely convincingly argues
that King Shapor crossed the Tigress at Nineveh, followed Roman roads west, taking the
fortress of Singara and paused in the vicinity of the City of Bebase. His scouts reported
that the Euphrates was in flood so he shifted his advance north and marched 150
kilometers, bypassing Nisibis heading toward the city of Amida, a key Roman military
supply city and armory for artillery.lxxix The Persian advance guard of 20,000 men, under
Tamsapor and Nohodares, marched up the road from Nisibis to Amida. The Persian
cavalry screen appears to have ambushed and defeated Ammianus’ General Unricinus, as
they were leaving Amida, with Amminaus barely making it back into Amida.lxxx After
isolating Amida, Tamsapor and Nohodares pushed north, and in modern terms
established a cordon around the city of Amida, to protect Shapor and his main army while
plundering the countryside.
The Roman command appears to have been split between General Sabinianus,

15
Commander of the Army of the Orient located at Edessa and Ursicinus, Commander of
the forward line of fortresses and a forward cavalry corps of at least three regiments.
Sabinianus sat tight at Edessa with an army of 19,000 men.lxxxi In the absence of the
Emperor’s Praesentalis army and its Palatini regiments, the Army of the Orient was too
small to successfully force a field battle on Shapor’s Persians.lxxxii
Contrary to what Amminaus claims, the Romans prepared for the invasion
throughout the winter. The six reinforcing regiments at Amida were not thrown into
Amida at the last minute. The Legion X Fortenses was over five hundred kilometers
from its base at Aila in Palestina Salutaris. The Illyrian cavalry regiments, part of
Ursicinus’ cavalry corps that disgraced themselves, were from the Balkans. Two Gallic
legions could only move 20 miles a day, so they were camped near the city or had been
ordered to the city weeks before the Persian invasion. These movements, like the recall
of Ursicinus himself, were probably part of a military build up by Emperor Constantius,
which Shapor’s attack forestalled.lxxxiii
The normal garrison of Amida consisted of the Limitanei Legion V Parthica
supported by an unnamed cavalry regiment. The small garrison was reinforced with
detachments of the Limitanei Legions; XXX Ulpia, X Fortenses, Superventores and
Praventores; two down graded former Western Comitatenses legions from the Army of
Gaul, the Magnentius and Decentius,lxxxiv and a regiment of household horse archers.lxxxv
In total there were 4,0007 soldiers and 16,000 civilians arrayed against the initial Persian
advance guard of 20,000,lxxxvi which was eventually (allegedly) reinforced with a main
army of up to 80,000 men.
The siege began when a Roman ballista bolt, shot during a reconnaissance, missed
the allied King Grumbates and killed his son. Honor dictated King Shapor conduct a
siege to avenge the death of his ally’s son. The siege lasted 73 days. Repeated assaults
by the Persian Army were skillfully repulsed and the garrison made repeated sallies. On
the seventy-third, day a mound the Roman’s built behind their wall to counter the Persian
siege ramp suddenly collapsed.8 The collapsed mound filled the gap between the city wall
and the Persian ramp and presented the Persians an unhindered bridge into the city. The
7
Most put this garrison at between 7-10,000 based upon theoretical strength of the
regiments. Here I follow Park’s estimates of actual strength.
8
Most likely caused by a mine.

16
Persians assault troops crossed over the wall before the Romans could stop them and the
garrison was over -whelmed. Aelianus’ skill at defending the city caused the Persian
Army to waste the campaign season and sustain high losses (allegedly 30,000). After
sacking and destroying the city, the Persian campaign culminated. Count Aelianus and
his senior officers were executed and the survivors were lead across the Tigris River into
slavery.lxxxvii Cappadocia and Syria were saved at the cost of 4,000 soldiers and the City of
Amida.
The siege of Amida provides a rare opportunity to compare the combat capabilities
of the Comitatensei and Limitanei units. The cavalry skirmishes, before and after the
Siege of Amida, reveal no difference in combat performance. General Ursicinus cavalry
corps was defeated and scattered by the Persian advance guard as they were leaving
Amida.lxxxviii Two of Ursicinus’ Comitatensei regiments of Illyrian cavalry, failed to
maintain their watch on the main road between Nisibis and Amida and missed 20,000
Persians heading toward Amida.lxxxix While attempting to cross the flooded Euphrates
River after escaping from Amida, Ammiaus observed a Roman cavalry patrol being
pursued by a superior force of Persian cavalry.xc The successful 348 nocturnal raid by an
ad hoc Limitanei cavalry regiment of raw recruits, led by Aelianus must also be
considered.xci Based upon the limited observations of both Comitatensei and Limitanei
cavalry units it can fairly be concluded that there is no difference in their combat
performance.
A review of battlefield performance however supports a different conclusion
regarding the abilities of the Comitatensei and Limitanei infantry. Eastern Limitanei
infantry regiments were superior to Western Comitatenses regiments in defending
fortified positions. The combat performance of the two western Comitatensei Legions
Magnentius and Decentius indicates that they were veterans, most likely raised by the
Usurper Magnentius from Comitatensei and Limitanei units in Gaul.xcii Ammianus
observed that these soldiers were useless in siege operations, being better suited to open
warfare. Toward the end of the siege these Gallic legions conducted a nocturnal raid
against the Persian camp, which threw the camp into disorder, but after hard fighting
caused no lasting damage. At daybreak, with support from soldiers on the walls the
Gallic legions re-entered the city with 400 dead. In honor of this raid, the Emperor raised

17
a statute to the campiductoribusxciii (drill instructor and third in command of a legion) in
the city of Edessa.xciv
In 360, while Emperor Constantius was still in the Balkans, and despite his heavy
losses in 359, Shapor stuck the Cities of Singara and Bezabde. Singara was defended by
the Limitanei regiments I Flavian and I Parthian and cavalry which was chased into the
city by the swiftness of the Persian attack. The siege was relatively short. The Persian
engineers had learned their lesson from the year before. They brought up a monster ram,
which breached a newly repaired tower. When the tower clasped the Persians stormed
the city. The city was spared a complete sack but the garrison was lead east in chains.
No help could be sent due to the lack of water along the road to Singara. xcv
After taking Singara, Shapor marched 150 kilometers north, ignoring Nisibis and
attacked Bezabde. The Limitanei regiments II Flavian, II Armenian, and II Parthian with
archers and the Zabdiceni militia defended Bezabde. As the Persian engineers pushed
rams against the wall, the defenders fought desperately to stop them. The monster ram
was employed again, collapsing a tower, and the Persian Army stormed the city sacked it.
Emperor Constantius marched from Constantinople and in the fall lead a counter –attack,
but failed to recapture Bezade due to the onset of winter.
In 361 Emperor Constantius was once again on the horns of a dilemma. King
Shapor continued to constitute a threat. Julian had been declared Emperor and he
marched east against Constantius. When King Shapor failed to cross the Tigris (due to
“bad omens”), the Persian front stabilized and Constantius marched west to confront
Julian. Constantius did not, as was the western custom, strip the duchies of their
limitanei regiments. Constantius’ untimely death averted a civil war and brought Julian
into power. Julian’s campaign of 363, while interesting in its own right provides no
insight into the combat capabilities of the Limitanei.xcvi Julian demonstrated that he was a
general with the capabilities of Marcus Licinius Crassus (115 BCE – 53 BCE) but failed
to achieve the results of his hero; Alexander the Great. Julian was successful against
unsophisticated barbarian war bands, but was no match against the sophisticated Persian
Army of King Shapor.
King Shapor, utilized Roman defensive strategy to defeat Julian’s Roman Army.
He maintained his field army behind the Tigris River while drawing supplies from his

18
fortified cities. He chose to use the Parthian and Persian traditional tactics of engaging
the invading Roman armies in skirmishes instead of a single pitched battle; allowing heat
and lack of supplies to defeat the Romans. Julian was killed in one of these skirmishes,
most likely by a Roman spear. What King Shapor could not win with the lance and bow
he won by treaty. In order to save the army from destruction Jovian (Julian’s short lived
successor) made an ignominious peace, by which districts on the Tigris and the City of
Nisibis were ceded to the Persians. Thus ended the first major test of the Roman
defensive strategy.
When comparing the combat performance of Comitatensei and Limitanei infantry
regiments, it is clear that they were trained differently. Limitanei infantry regiments were
trained to use artillery, siege equipment and the bow. Limited information on the cavalry
regiments indicate, that generally, Limitanei regiments were skirmishers and horse
archers, while Comitatensei regiments included light regiments and heavier battle
cavalry.xcvii In the mid-Fourth Century, western Comitatensei regiments fought battles in
the field against the western barbarians and may not have incorporated archers or trained
their soldiers in the use of the bow as latter recommended by Vegetius and the
Strategikon. The Comitatensei were trained for open warfare not to defend fortifications.
The primary sources show that the Eastern Roman Limitanei was effective during
the Fourth Century at providing border security and defense of the Eastern Roman
Empire. The primary difference between the Eastern and Western Limitanei was that
eastern regiments were normally not required to provide drafts to the field armies to fight
in the civil wars. The constant war with Persia prevented Emperor Constantius from
drafting soldiers from eastern Limitanei duchies to fight in the west. In 351, at the Battle
of Mursa, the Army of Gaul lost 20,000 of its 36,000 men engaged, many of who were
Limitanei. Reduced by drafts for the Army of Gaul, it is not surprising that the Rhine
Frontier collapsed in 355.
A Roman staff officer upon viewing the ruins of Amida in 360 rendered the final
verdict on the Limitanei’s effectiveness:

"Look with what spirit the cities are defended by the soldiers, for whose generous
pay the wealth of the Empire is inadequate."xcviii

19
20
i
Richard W. Stewart. American Military History Volume 1, The United States Army and the Forging
of a Nation, 1775-1917. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2005, 1.
ii
Edward N. Luttwak. Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century A.D. to the Third.
Baltimore Md: John Hopkins University Press, 1976; Everett L. Wheeler. “Methodological Limits
and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part I.” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Jan.,
1993), 7-41. http://www.jstor.org/stable2944221; Evertt L. Wheeler. “Methodological Limtis
and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part II.” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Apr.,
1993), 215-240. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944057 ; Kimberly Kagan. “Redefining Roman
Grand Strategy.” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Apr., 2006), 333-362.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137956.
iii
C.R. Whittaker. Frontiers of the Roman Empire, A Social and Economic
Study. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994, 132-133.
iv
Stephen Johnson. Late Roman Fortifications. Towtowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books, 1983, 253.
v
Robin Seager. “Perceptions of Eastern Frontier Policy in Ammianus, Libanius, and Julian (337-
363).” The Classic Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1997), 253-268.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/639612; and see generally Harry G. Summers, Jr. On Strategy: The
Vietnam War in Context. Carlisle Penn: Strategic Institute Studies, 1982.
vi
Richard S. Cromwell. The Rise and Decline of the Late Roman Field Army. Sheppensburg, PA: The
White Mane Publishing Co. Inc., 1998, 5-12.
vii
Cromwell, 31-33.
viii
I use the term “duchy” to mean a military defensive zone in command of a duke.
ix
S. Thomas Parker. The Frontier in Central Jordan, Final Report on the Limes Arabicus Project,
Volume I. Washinton D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2006, 544-545;
Luke Ueda-Sarson. “Late Roman Shield Designs Taken from the Notitia Dignitatum.” Luke Ueda-
Sarson’s Wargame Pages, 2006. http://www.ne.jp/asahi/luke/ueda-sarson/NotitiaPatterns.html.
x
A.H.M. Jones. The Late Roman Empire 284-602, A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey
Voume I and II. Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, (1964), 679-686. Jones
estimates that Comitatenses legions had an authorized strength of 1,000 and Limitanei legions at
between 1,000 to 3,000. Auxila Palatine infantry regiments were authorized 600 to 700 and most
other cavalry and infantry units at about 500.
xi
Parker, 544-545.
xii
Ibid., 136-137.
xiii
Hugh Elton. Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350-425. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 1997, 207-
208.
xiv
H.I. Bell, V. Martin, E.G. Turner, D. van Berchem. ed and trans. The Abinnaeus Archive: The
Papers of A Roman Officer in the Reign of Constantius II. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
1962. 13-15.
xv
T.E. Page, E. Capps, E. and L.A. Post, Ed. Ammianus Marcellinus:The Late Roman Empire (AD 354-
378) Volumes I, II, and III. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library,
1935, Vol. I, 18, 4.7, 515-521
xvi
Ammianus Marcellinus, Vol. I, 439.
xvii
Elton, 207-208.
xviii
Ibid., 200-201.
xix
Ammianus Marcellinus, Vol. III, 13.
xx
Elton, 206.
xxi
Benjamin Isaac. “Bandits in Judaea and Arabia.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philogy, Vol. 88
(1984), 171-203, 200. http://www.jstor.org/stable/311452. ,
xxii
Isaac, 147-148.
xxiii
Abinnaeus, 13-15.
xxiv
Ibid., 51.
xxv
Ibid., 53-54.
xxvi
Ibid., 39-40.
xxvii
Ibid., 105-106.
xxviii
David J. Breeze and Brian Dobson. Roman Officers and Frontiers. Stuttgart GE: Franz Steiner
Verlag, 1993, 292-297.
xxix
Michael H. Dodgeon and Samuel N.C. Lieu. The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars
AD 226-363. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, 9-139.
xxx
Dodegeon, 136-154.
xxxi
Jerome H. Farnum. The Positioning of the Roman Legions. Oxford, UK: BAR International Series
1458, 2005. 9.
xxxii
Elton, 163.
xxxiii
Ibid., 157-158.
xxxiv
Ibid., 159, 160.
xxxv
Ibid., 160.
xxxvi
Ibid., 162.
xxxvii
Gareth Simon, ed. Ancient Strategists: Sun Tzu’s On The Art of War and Vegetius’ Epitoma Rei
Militaris. UK: Society of Ancients, 1994, 24-25; George T. Dennis. Maurice’s Strategikon, Handbook
of Byzantine Military Strategy. Philadelphia, Penn: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984, 138.
xxxviii
Jerome H. Farnum. The Postioning of the Roman Imperial Legions. Oxford UK: The
Basingtingstoke Press, 2005, 11.
xxxix
Pat Southern, Pat and Karen R. Dixon. The Late Roman Army. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1996, 89-126.
xl
Ross Cowan. Imperial Roman Army AD 161-284. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publising, 2003, 60.
xli
Phillip Sabin. “ The Face of Roman Battle.” The Journal of Roman Studies,” Vol. 90, (2000), 1-17,
8. http://www.jstor.org/stable/300198.
xlii
Maurice’s Strategikon, 127-132, 138-139, 143-144.
xliii
Vegetius, 26.
xliv
Vegetius, 24-25.
xlv
George T. Dennis. Maurice’s Strategikon, Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy. Philadelphia,
Penn: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1984, 127-132, 138-139, 143-144.
xlvi
Ueda-Sarson, Dux Thebaidos. http://www.ne.jp/asahi/luke/ueda-sarson/DuxThebaidos.html.
xlvii
Terence Coello. Unit Sizes in the Late Roman Army. Oxford UK:BAR International Series 645,
1996, Chp 4, 2.-10.
xlviii
Peter Heather. The Fall of the Roman Empire, A New History of Rome and the Barbarians.
Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. 2006, 62; Adrian Goldsworthy. How Rome Fell. New Haven
Con: Yale University Press. 2009, 206-211.
xlix
Brian Campbell. “ The Marrage of Soldiers under the Empire.” The Journal of Roman Studies. Vol.
68 (1978), 153-166. 165-166. http://www.jstor.org/stable/299633
l
Theodosian Code, Book VII, Title 13, 170-173, 180-181.
li
Jones, 646-649.
lii
Elton, 128-134.
liii
Vegetius, 23-24.
liv
Clyde Pharr, Trns. The Theodosian Code and Novels and Sirmondian Constitutions. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1952, 170.
lv
Jones, 616.
lvi
Isaac, 145.
lvii
Jones, 617.
lviii
Abinnaeus, 16-17, 61-65
lix
Theodosian Code, 183.
lx
Ibid., 157.
lxi
Jones, 620-623.
lxii
Ibid., 618-619.
lxiii
Ramsay MacMullen. “The Legion as a Society.” Historia: Zietschrift fur Alte Geschichte, Vol. 33,
No. 4 (4th Qtr., 1984), 440-456, 441. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4435901
lxiv
MacMullen, 441.
lxv
Simon MacDowall. Late Roman Infantryman AD 236-565.Oxford UK: Osprey Publishing, 1994,
4-9.
lxvi
Isaac, Benjamin. “ The Meaning of the Terms Limes and Limitanei.” The Journal of Roman
Studies, Vol. 78 (1988), 125-147. http://www.jstor.org/stable/301454.
lxvii
Parker.552-558.
lxviii
Jones, 663.
lxix
Ibid., 637-639.
lxx
Ibid., 639.
lxxi
Adrian Goldsworthy. How Rome Fell. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 2009,
255-263.
lxxii
Goldsworthy, 223-235.
lxxiii
Dodgeon, 154-210.
lxxiv
Ariel S. Lewin and Pietrina Pellegrinin, Eds. The Late Roman Army in the Near East from
Diocletian to the Arab Conquest. Proceedings of a colloquium held at Potenza, Acerenza and
Matera, Italy (May 2005). Oxford UK: BAR International Series 1717, 2007, 226.
lxxv
Ammianus seems to have missed some details. From other sources Aelianus would have been
promoted to regimental commander before being promoted to duke or count.
lxxvi
C.S. Lightfoot. “Fact and Fiction: The Third Siege of Nisibis (A.D. 350).” Historica: Zeitschrift
fur Alte Geshichte, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1st Quarter., 1988), 105-125.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436041
lxxvii
Magnentius and his Army of Gaul were enticed out of the Alpine passes leading into Gaul and onto
the plain of Paeonia where Constantius’ numerical superior army and cavalry would have the
advantage. On September 28, 351 the Army of Gaul deployed with its left flank against a river in
traditional fashion with infantry in the center and cavalry on the wings. Constantius’ army deployed in
similar order, but his line being longer and out flanked Magnentius’s unprotected and open right wing.
As the armies engaged, Constantius’ cataphractarii (heavily-armored cavalry) supported by horse
archers and lighter cavalry immediately routed Magnentius and his right wing and they fled the field.
Then disaster stuck, the Army of Gaul instead or routing or surrendering fought on. They were slowly
pushed back at an angle against the river. Since they were on a flat plain they could not brake contact.
Horse archers kept up a steady fire. The cataphractarii charged when a regiment attempted to move.
The battle lines broke up as the regiments locked shields and rallied on their standards. The left wing
cavalry, trapped against the river dismounted and fought with the infantry. After fighting all day, as
night fell the regiments finally broke. Pinned against the river the Army of Gaul was destroyed. Of the
36,000 engaged, 20,000 are reported killed. While most likely an exaggeration it is reported that
Constantius lost 30,000 men. Magngentius was finally defeated and killed on August 11, 353. Wilmer
Cave Wright, Ph.D. Trans. The Works of the Emperor Julian, In Three Volumes, Volume I, Oration II.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, The Loeb Classical Library, 1954, 149-157.
 Thomas M. Banchich and Eugene N. Lane, trns. The History of Zonaras: From Alexander Severus to
the death of Theodosius the Great. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
2009, 164-165.
lxxviii
Zonaras, 165.
lxxix
Ammianus Marcellinus, Vol. I, 456.
lxxx
R.C. Blockley. “Ammianus Millinus on the Persian Invasion of A.D. 359.” Phoenix, Vol. 42, No. 3
(Autumn, 1988), 244-260, 253-255. http://www.jstor.org/10888346.
lxxxi
Based upon the ND’s snap shot of 395 and Parker’s 21 st Century strength estimates.
lxxxii
Blockely, 259.
lxxxiii
Ibid., 255.
lxxxiv
Legions of the usurpers Magnentius and Decentius. These two legions had been post to the east
after the civil war for disloyalty and ill discipline. Ammianus Marcellinus, Vol. I 643-467.
lxxxv
Ammianus is unclear whether the regiments Superventores (scouts) and Praventores
(Skirmishers) were infantry or cavalry. The term superventores is used repeatedly by Ammianus
for soldier conducting reconnaissance as scouts. To be effective they would have to be mounted
and I would argue they are both mounted light cavalry regiments. Neither regiment is recorded
on the Nottitia Dignitatum. See Dodgeon for an alternate view. Dodgeon, 193, 340-347.
lxxxvi
The numbers of Late Roman Army are normally based upon the assumption that legions
averaged 1,000 men and other unites number 500. As a result most historians give the garrison
strength of 7-10,000 men. See R.C. Blockely. “Ammianus on the Persian Invasion of A.D. 359.”
Phoenix, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn, 1988), 244-260, 258. http://www.jstor.org/stable. However
they ignore keep facts. The two western legions probably took part in the bloodiest battle of the
period, the Battle of Mursa where a large part of the Army of Gaul was slaughtered. (See FN 75).
These legions would have been hollow shells. The two cavalry units would have been mauled,
after the skirmishes with the Persian Cavalry Screen.
lxxxvii
Ammianus Marcellinus, Vol. I, 471-515.
lxxxviii
Ibid., Vol. I, 457-461
lxxxix
Ibid., Vol. I, 558.
xc
Ibid., Vol. I, 513.
xci
Ariel S. Lewin and Pietrina Pellegrinin, Eds. The Late Roman Army in the Near East from
Diocletian to the Arab Conquest. Proceedings of a colloquium held at Potenza, Acerenza and
Matera, Italy (May 2005). Oxford UK: BAR International Series 1717, 2007, 226.
xcii
The Rhine River garrison consisted of the Limitanei Legions I Minerva, XXX Ulpia, XXII
Peimigenia and VIII Augusta with supporting cavalry alas and infantry cohorts. Constantine, his sons
and the Usurper Magnentius levied numerous comitatensian legions from these four Limitanei legions.
A detachment of XXX Ulpia was at the Siege of Amida in 359. The parent legion XXX Ulpia was
destroyed in Gaul in 355. Richard S. Cromwell. The Rise and Decline of the Late Roman Field Army.
Shippenburg PA: The White Mane Publishing Company, Inc. 1998, 14-15.
xciii
Ariel S. Lewin and Pietrina Pellegrini, Eds. The Late Roman Army in the Near East from
Diocletian to the Arab Conquest. Oxford UK: BAR International Series 1717, 2007, Article by P.
Rance. “ Campidoctores Vicarii, Tribuni: The Senior Regimental Officers of the Late Roman
Army”, 395-408.
xciv
Ammianus Marcellinus, Vol. I, 495-503.
xcv
Ibid., Vol. II, 35-41.
xcvi
See R.T. Ridley. “Notes on Julian’s Persian Expedition (363).” Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte
Geschichte, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1973), 317-330. http: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4435340.
xcvii
In 19th Century terms, generally limitanei cavalry would be similar to light dragoons, uhlans,
Cossacks and hussars used for scouting, raids, patrolling and pursuit after battle. Comitatenses
cavalry were like heavy dragoons, cuirassiers designed for field battles but would also include
lighter cavalry regiments.
xcviii
Ammianus Marcellinus, Vol. II, 73.