G.R. No.
185663               June 20, 2012 additional payment of the necessary fees if the Honorable Court so
REMEDIOS ANTONINO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY and TAN TIAN
SU, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Nature of the Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1 dated May 26, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated
December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
89145.
Factual Antecedents
Since March 21, 1978, petitioner Remedios Antonino (Antonino) had
been leasing a residential property located at Makati City and owned
by private respondent Tan Tian Su (Su). Under the governing lease
contract, Antonino was accorded with the right of first refusal in the
event Su would decide to sell the subject property. 3
On July 7, 2004, the parties executed a document denominated as
Undertaking Agreement4 where Su agreed to sell to Antonino the
subject property for ₱39,500,000.00. However, in view of a
disagreement as to who between them would shoulder the payment of
the capital gains tax, the sale did not proceed as intended.5
On July 9, 2004, Antonino filed a complaint against Su with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, for the reimbursement of the
cost of repairs on the subject property and payment of damages. The
complaint was raffled to Branch 149 and docketed as Civil Case No.
04-802.6 Later that same day, Antonino filed an amended complaint to
enforce the Undertaking Agreement and compel Su to sell to her the
subject property.7
In an Order 8 dated December 8, 2004, the RTC dismissed Antonino’s
complaint on the grounds of improper venue and non-payment of the
appropriate docket fees. According to the RTC, Antonino’s complaint is
one for specific performance, damages and sum of money, which are
personal actions that should have been filed in the court of the place
where any of the parties resides. Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa
and Manila, respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue.
Specifically:
The instant case is an action for specific performance with damages, a
personal action, which may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides (Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules of
Court). Records show that plaintiff is a resident of 706 Acacia Avenue,
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City while defendant is a resident of
550 Sto. Cristo St., Binondo, Manila. Hence, the instant case should
have been filed in the place of residence of either the plaintiff or
defendant, at the election of the plaintiff. Contrary to the claim of
plaintiff, the alleged written agreements presented by the plaintiff in her
Amended Complaint do not contain any stipulation as to the venue of
actions. x x x9
The RTC also ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over Antonino’s
complaint in view of her failure to pay the correct amount of docket
fees. Citing Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,10 the RTC ruled that:
Anent the non-payment of filing fees on the Amended Complaint,
plaintiff alleges that no new assessment was made when the Amended
Complaint was filed since there [were] no additional damages prayed
for. The Manchester decision has been recently relaxed as to allow
orders an assessment thereof.
The Court is not persuaded.
The Amended Complaint, which the Court notes to have been filed at
4:00 o’clock in the afternoon or few hours after the initial complaint was
filed, further prays that judgment be rendered "ordering defendant to
sell his property located at 1623 Cypress, Dasmariñas Village, Makati
City covered by TCT No. 426900 to plaintiff in accordance with the
terms and conditions stipulated in their agreement dated July 7, 2004
and ordering defendant to desist from selling his property to any other
party other than plaintiff.", which makes the instant case also an action
for Specific Performance in addition to the claim for Damages.
However, the value of the described property was not stated in the
prayer and no docket fees were paid. Thus, following the ruling of the
Supreme Court in the case of Manchester Development Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, that the Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, the instant case is hereby dismissed.11
On December 23, 2004, Su filed an Omnibus Motion, 12 praying for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, which Antonino caused to be
annotated on the title covering the subject property and the issuance of
a summary judgment on his counterclaims. Su, among others, alleged
the propriety of cancelling the notice of lis pendens in view of the
dismissal of the complaint and Antonino’s failure to appeal therefrom.
On January 3, 2005, Antonino filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,13 claiming that her complaint is a real action and the
location of the subject property is determinative of its venue.
Alternatively, she submitted a certification issued by the Commission
on Elections, stating that she is a resident of Makati City. She then
prayed for the reinstatement of her complaint and issuance of an order
directing the clerk of court to assess the proper docket fees. This was
denied by the RTC in an Order 14 dated January 6, 2005, holding that
there was non-compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.
Antonino thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration 15 dated January 21,
2005, claiming that there was due observance of the rules on motions.
Antonino alleged that her motion for reconsideration from the RTC’s
December 8, 2004 was set for hearing on January 7, 2005 and Su
received a copy thereof on January 6, 2005. Antonino pleaded for a
liberal interpretation of the rules as Su was notified of her motion
before the hearing thereon and was not in any way prejudiced. She
also reiterated her arguments for the reinstatement of her complaint.
In a Joint Resolution16 dated February 24, 2005, the RTC denied Su’s
Omnibus Motion and Antonino’s January 21, 2005 Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC refused to cancel the notice of lis pendens,
holding that:
It is quite clear that the dismissal of the Amended Complaint was
anchored on two grounds, e.g. (1) for improper venue and (2) for non-
payment of docket fee. It is elementary that when a complaint was
dismissed based on these grounds[,] the court did not resolve the case
on the merits. Moreover, "a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case unless the docket fees are paid" x x x. Thus,
the cause of action laid down in the complaint remains unresolved for
proper re-filing before the proper court. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court said: "The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the
Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time." x x x17
The RTC maintained its earlier ruling that Antonino’s Motion for
Reconsideration from the December 8, 2004 Order is pro-forma and
did not suspend the running of the period to file an appeal. The RTC
also reiterated that Antonino’s complaint is a personal action such that
the proper venue therefore is either the City of Manila or Muntinlupa
City.
On April 1, 2005, Antonino filed with the CA a petition for annulment of
judgment.18 Antonino prayed for the nullification of the RTC’s Order
dated December 8, 2004 dismissing her complaint, Order dated
January 6, 2005 denying her motion for reconsideration and Joint
Resolution dated February 24, 2005 denying her motion for
reconsideration of the January 6, 2005 Order. According to Antonino,
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it ruled that her action for the enforcement of the
Undertaking Agreement is personal and when it deprived her of an
opportunity to pay the correct amount of docket fees. The RTC’s grave
abuse of discretion, Antonino posited, was likewise exhibited by its
strict application of the rules on motions and summary denial of her
motion for reconsideration.
19  remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain
In its Decision dated May 26, 2008, the CA dismissed Antonino’s
petition. While the CA recognized Antonino’s faulty choice of remedy, it
proceeded to resolve the issues she raised relative to the dismissal of
her complaint. Thus:
It should be stressed that in this case, there is neither allegation in the
petition, nor sufficient proof adduced showing highly exceptional
circumstance to justify the failure of petitioner to avail of the remedies
of appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy through no
fault attributable to [her] before filing this petition for annulment of
judgment. In Manipor v. Ricafort, the Supreme Court held, thus:
If the petitioner failed to avail of such remedies without sufficient
justification, he cannot avail of an action for annulment because,
otherwise, he would benefit from his own inaction or negligence.
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural infirmity, and in the interest
of justice, we shall look into the issues raised and decide the case on
the merit.
xxxx
A perusal of the allegations of the complaint unambiguously shows that
petitioner seeks to enforce the commitment of private respondent to
sell his property in accordance with the terms and conditions of their
purported agreement dated July 7, 2004. By implication, petitioner
does not question the ownership of private respondent over the
property nor does she claim, by any color of title, right to possess the
property or to its recovery. The action is simply for the enforcement of
a supposed contract, and thus, unmistakably a personal action.
xxxx
Guided by the above rule (Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Court),
petitioner should have filed the case either in Muntinlupa City, where
she resides, or in Manila, where private respondent maintains his
residence. Other than filing the complaint in any of these places,
petitioner proceeds with the risk of a possible dismissal of her case.
Unfortunately for petitioner, private respondent forthwith raised
improper venue as an affirmative defense and his stand was sustained
by trial court, thus, resulting to the dismissal of the case.
Further, it is important to note that in a petition for annulment of
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not
merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction. The concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a
judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion. Petitioner, by claiming
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, actually
concedes and presupposes the jurisdiction of the court to take
cognizance of the case. She only assails the manner in which the trial
court formulated its judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It follows
that petitioner cannot use lack of jurisdiction as ground to annul the
judgment by claiming grave abuse of discretion. In this case where the
court refused to exercise jurisdiction due to improper venue, neither
lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion is available to
challenge the assailed order of dismissal of the trial court. 20 (Citations
omitted)
Antonino filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA in its Resolution dated December 5, 2008. 21
Issue
The sole issue for the resolution of this Court is the propriety of
Antonino’s use of the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment
as against the final and executory orders of the RTC.
Our Ruling
In Ramos v. Judge Combong, Jr., 22 this Court expounded that the
exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of
immutability of final judgments:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed
only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other
adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders
and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two
grounds for annulment of judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that
annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment.
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment
has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to
rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that at the
risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-
judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by
law.23 (Citations omitted)
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, 24 this Court emphasized that only void
judgments, by reason of "extrinsic fraud" or the court’s lack of
jurisdiction, are susceptible to being annulled.
The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though
final, are ultimately void. Annulment of judgment is an equitable
principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to
reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it
enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a
judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.25
Apart from the requirement that the existence of "extrinsic fraud" or
"lack of jurisdiction" should be amply demonstrated, one who desires
to avail this remedy must convince that the ordinary and other
appropriate remedies, such as an appeal, are no longer available for
causes not attributable to him. This is clearly provided under Section 1,
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Antonino’s recourse to annulment of judgment is seriously flawed and
the reasons are patent. There is therefore no reason to disturb the
questioned issuances of the RTC that are already final and executory.
A petition for annulment of judgment cannot serve as a substitute for
the lost remedy of an appeal.
First, Antonino cannot pursue the annulment of the various issuances
of the RTC, primary of which is the Order dated December 8, 2004, in
order to avoid the adverse consequences of their becoming final and
executory because of her neglect in utilizing the ordinary remedies
available. Antonino did not proffer any explanation for her failure to
appeal the RTC’s Order dated December 8, 2004 and, thereafter, the
Order dated January 6, 2005, denying her Motion for Reconsideration
dated January 3, 2005. Knowledge of rudimentary remedial rules
immediately indicates that an appeal was already available from the
Order dated December 8, 2004, as this is a final order as contemplated
under Sections 2, 3 and 5 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and there
was no legal compulsion for Antonino to move for reconsideration.
Nonetheless, since there is no bar for her to file a motion for
reconsideration so as to give the RTC opportunity to reverse itself
before elevating the matter for the appellate courts’ review, appeal is
the prescribed remedy from the denial of such motion and not another
motion for reconsideration. While Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court includes "an order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration" in the enumeration of unappealable matters, this
Court clarified in Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. 26 that such refers to
a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order and the denial of
a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal is a final order,
therefore, appealable. Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration
from a final judgment or order is prohibited, hence, can never interrupt
the period to perfect an appeal.
The RTC may have been overly strict in the observance of the three-
day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court contrary
to liberal stance taken by this Court in cases when the purpose of such
rule can be achieved by giving the opposing party sufficient time to
study and controvert the motion. 27 Justice and equity would thus
suggest that the fifteen-day period within which Antonino can appeal
should be counted from her receipt on January 7, 2005 28 of the Order
dated January 6, 2005 denying her Motion for Reconsideration dated
January 3, 2005. Unfortunately, even liberality proved to be inadequate
to neutralize the adverse consequences of Antonino’s negligence as
she allowed such period to lapse without filing an appeal, erroneously
believing that a second motion for reconsideration is the proper
remedy. While a second motion for reconsideration is not prohibited
insofar as interlocutory orders are concerned, 29 the Orders dated
December 8, 2004 and January 6, 2005 are final orders.
In fact, even if the period to appeal would be counted from Antonino’s
receipt of the Order dated February 24, 2005 denying her second
motion for reconsideration, she interposed no appeal and filed a
petition for annulment of judgment on April 1, 2005 instead. This, for
sure, constitutes a categorical admission that the assailed issuances of
the RTC had already become final and executory in view of her
omission to perfect an appeal within the mandated period. By no
means can her petition for annulment of judgment prosper as that
would, in effect, sanction her blatant negligence or sheer obliviousness
to proper procedure.
Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the
reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of judgments, final
orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must
have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for
relief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies
thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of
those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to
the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would
benefit from his own inaction or negligence.30 (Citation omitted)
"Grave abuse of discretion" is not a ground to annul a final and
executory judgment.
Second, a petition for annulment of judgment can only be based on
"extrinsic fraud" and "lack of jurisdiction" and cannot prosper on the
basis of "grave abuse of discretion". By anchoring her petition on the
alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the dismissal of her
complaint and the denial of her two (2) motions for reconsideration,
Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the concept of "lack of jurisdiction". As
this Court previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. "G"
Holdings, Inc.,31 "lack of jurisdiction" as a ground for the annulment of
judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. It does not
contemplate "grave abuse of discretion" considering that "jurisdiction"
is different from the exercise thereof. As ruled in Tolentino v. Judge
Leviste:32
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.
Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.33 (Citation omitted)
In fact, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in dismissing
Antonino’s complaint. The RTC was correct in classifying Antonino’s
cause of action as personal and in holding that it was instituted in the
wrong venue. Personal action is one that is founded on privity of
contracts between the parties; and in which the plaintiff usually seeks
the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or
recovery of damages. Real action, on the other hand, is one anchored
on the privity of real estate, where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
ownership or possession of real property or interest in it.34 Antonino’s
following allegations in her amended complaint show that one of her
causes of action is one for the enforcement or consummation of a
contract, hence, a personal action:
XII
On July 7, 2004, plaintiff and defendant executed a document entitled
"Undertaking Agreement" (copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
H) wherein defendant agreed to sell said property to plaintiff "who has
leased said property since March 21, 1978 up to the present" with the
plaintiff paying a downpayment of $50,000.00 US dollars the following
day, July 8, 2004.
xxxx
XIV
Defendant also refused to accept the $50,000.00 US Dollars and was
about to tear up the document they previously signed the day before
when plaintiff prevented him from doing so.
XV
Consequently, plaintiff discovered that defendant was already
negotiating to sell the said property to another Chinese national who
incidentally is also one of plaintiff’s buyers.
xxxx
Premises considered, in the interest of substantial justice, it is most
respectfully prayed that after due hearing that judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to sell his property located at 1623 Cypress,
Dasmariñas Village, Makati City covered by TCT No. 426900 to
plaintiff in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in their
agreement dated July 7, 2004.
x x x x35
Antonino’s cause of action is premised on her claim that there has
already been a perfected contract of sale by virtue of their execution of
the Undertaking Agreement and Su had refused to comply with his
obligations as seller. However, by claiming the existence of a perfected
contract of sale, it does not mean that Antonino acquired title to the
subject property. She does not allege otherwise and tacitly
acknowledges Su’s title to the subject property by asking for the
consummation of the sale.
That there is a private document supposedly evidencing the alleged
sale does not confer to Antonino title to the subject
property.1âwphi1 Ownership is transferred when there is actual or
constructive delivery and the thing is considered delivered when it is
placed in the control or possession of the buyer or when the sale is
made through a public instrument and the contrary does not appear or
cannot be clearly inferred. 36 In other words, Antonino’s complaint is not
in the nature of a real action as ownership of the subject property is not
at issue.
Moreover, that the object of the alleged sale is a real property does not
make Antonino’s complaint real in nature in the absence of a contrary
claim of title. After a contract of sale is perfected, the right of the
parties to reciprocally demand performance, thus consummation, WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
arises – the vendee may require the vendor to compel the transfer the rendered as follows:
title to the object of the sale 37 and the vendor may require the payment
of the purchase price.38 The action to cause the consummation of a
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42948
sale does not involve an adverse claim of ownership as the vendor’s
title is recognized and the vendor is simply being asked to perform an
act, specifically, the transfer of such title by any of the recognized 1. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render
modes of delivery. full accounting of the amounts he received as profits from
the sale and resale of the Lemery property in the amount of
₱ 4,524,000.00;
Considering that the filing of the complaint in a wrong venue sufficed
for the dismissal thereof, it would be superfluous to discuss if
Antonino’s non-payment of the correct docket fees likewise warranted 2. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to
it. the law firm the said amount of ₱ 4,524,000.00 plus interest
of 12% per annum from the time he received the same and
converted the same to his own personal use or from
At any rate, even if the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal of her
September 1997 until fully paid; and
complaint, such had already become final and executory and will not
be disturbed as it had jurisdiction and it was not alleged, much less,
proved that there was extrinsic fraud. Moreover, annulment of the 3. To pay the costs of suit.
assailed orders of the RTC will not issue if ordinary remedies, such as
an appeal, were lost and were not availed of because of Antonino’s
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42959
fault. Litigation should end and terminate sometime and somewhere. It
is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party should not be 1. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render a full
deprived of the fruits of the verdict.39 accounting of the amounts he received under the retainer
agreement between the law firm and Atlanta Industries Inc.
and Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount of ₱
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of
320,000.00.
merit and the Decision dated May 26, 2008 and Resolution dated
December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145
are hereby AFFIRMED. 2. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm
the amount received by him under the Retainer Agreement
with Atlanta Industries, Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in
SO ORDERED.
the amount of ₱ 320,000.00 plus interests of 12% per annum
from June 1998 until fully paid;
G.R. No. 180572               June 18, 2012
3. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to pay the law firm his
SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA and JOENA B. balance on his cash advance in the amount of ₱ 25,000.00
ABRENICA Petitioners, with interest of 12% per annum from the date this decision
vs. becomes final; and
LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and TIBAYAN, ATTYS.
ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN and DANILO N. TUNGOL, Respondents.
4. To pay the costs of suit.

DECISION
SO ORDERED.

SERENO, J.:
The present case is a continuation of G.R. No. 169420 1 decided by this
Court on 22 September 2006. For brevity, we quote the relevant facts
narrated in that case:
Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual
respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the
Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan ("the firm").
In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner. The first was SEC
Case No. 05-98-5959, for Accounting and Return and Transfer of
Partnership Funds With Damages and Application for Issuance of
Preliminary Attachment, where they alleged that petitioner refused to
return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel
of land in Lemery, Batangas. The second was SEC Case No. 10-98-
6123, also for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership
Funds where respondents sought to recover from petitioner retainer
fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the
cash advance that he obtained in 1997.
The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City pursuant to Republic Act No.
8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies
from the SEC to the courts. In a Consolidated Decision dated
November 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
226, held that:
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 17, 2004. On
December 21, 2004, he filed a notice of appeal under Rule 41 and paid
the required appeal fees.
Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution pursuant to A.M. 01-2-04-SC, which provides that decisions
in intra-corporate disputes are immediately executory and not subject
to appeal unless stayed by an appellate court.
On January 7, 2005, respondents filed an Opposition (To Defendant's
Notice of Appeal) on the ground that it violated A.M. No. 04-9-07-
SC2 prescribing appeal by certiorari under Rule 43 as the correct mode
of appeal from the trial court’s decisions on intra-corporate disputes.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition
to Defendant's Notice of Appeal) and an Opposition to respondents’
motion for execution.
On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring petitioner to
show cause why it should take cognizance of the notice of appeal in
view of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC. Petitioner did not comply with the said
Order. Instead, on June 10, 2005, he filed with the Court of Appeals a
Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Attached Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondents opposed the
motion.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion in its assailed
Resolution dated June 29, 2005 x x x.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The Court of Appeals also denied petitioner's motion
reconsideration in its August 23, 2005 Resolution.
Given the foregoing facts, we dismissed the Petition in G.R. No.
169420 on the ground that the appeal filed by petitioner was the wrong
remedy. For that reason, we held as follows:3
VIII. The lower court not only erred in the exercise of its
jurisdiction but more importantly it acted without jurisdiction
or with lack of jurisdiction. 5
for
We note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998
and 15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner Erlando only. It was
with the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena
joined Erlando as a co-petitioner.

Time and again, this Court has upheld dismissals of incorrect appeals,
On 26 April 2007, the CA issued a Resolution 6 dismissing the Petition.
even if these were timely filed. In Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and
First, it reasoned that the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule
General Services, Inc., this Court affirmed the dismissal by the Court of
47 of the Rules of Court is available only when the ordinary remedies
Appeals of a petition for review under Rule 43 to question a decision
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
because the proper mode of appeal should have been a petition for
no longer available through no fault of petitioners. 7 Considering that the
certiorari under Rule 65. x x x.
dismissal of the appeal was directly attributable to them, the remedy
under Rule 47 was no longer available.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Second, the CA stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition delved
Indeed, litigations should, and do, come to an end. "Public interest on the merits of the case and the appreciation by the trial court of the
demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a evidence presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the grounds for
case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than annulment are limited only to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
to delay the administration of justice." In the instant case, the trial
court's decision became final and executory on January 3, 2005.
Lastly, the CA held that the fact that the trial court was not designated
Respondents had already acquired a vested right in the effects of the
as a special commercial court did not mean that the latter had no
finality of the decision, which should not be disturbed any longer.
jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court stated that, in any event,
petitioners could have raised this matter on appeal or through a
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but they did not do so.
Resolutions dated June 29, 2005 and August 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90076 denying admission of petitioner’s Petition for Review are
Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated
AFFIRMED.
2 May 2007, but the CA had by then already issued the 26 April 2007
Resolution dismissing the Petition.
Thus, respondents sought the execution of the judgment. On 11 April
2007, G.R. No. 169420 became final and executory.4
On 24 May 2007, the 26 April 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
98679 became final and executory.8
Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Court’s Decision in G.R.
No. 169420, petitioners Erlando and Joena subsequently filed with the
Petitioners did not give up. They once again filed a 105-page Petition
Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
for Annulment of Judgment with the CA dated 25 May 2007 9 docketed
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
as CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. This time, they injected the ground of
temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The
extrinsic fraud into what appeared to be substantially the same issues
Petition for Annulment of Judgment assailed the merits of the RTC’s
raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The following were the grounds
Decision in Civil Case Nos. Q-01-42948 and Q-01-42959, subject of
raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719:
G.R. No. 169420. In that Petition for Annulment, Petitioners raised the
following grounds:
A. Extrinsic fraud and/or collusion attended the rendition of the
Consolidated Decision x x x based on the following badges of fraud
I. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners
and/or glaring errors deliberately committed, to wit:
and respondents did not present direct documentary
evidence to substantiate [their] respective claims.
I. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both
petitioners and respondents did not present direct
II. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners
documentary evidence to substantiate their respective
and respondents relied mainly on testimonial evidence to
claims, as it relied purely on the gist of what its personnel did
prove their respective position[s].
as regards the transcript of stenographic notes the latter
[sic] in collusion with the respondents.
III. The lower court erred in not ruling that the real estate
transaction entered into by said petitioners and spouses
II. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both
Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and
petitioners and respondents relied mainly on testimonial
not a law partnership transaction.
evidence to prove their respective positions by relying totally
on what was presented to it by its personnel who drafted the
IV. The lower court erred in ruling that the testimonies of the Consolidated Decision in collusion with the respondents.
respondents are credible.
III. The lower court deliberately erred in not ruling that the
V. The lower court erred in ruling that the purchase price for real estate transaction entered into by said petitioners and
the lot involved was ₱ 3 million and not ₱ 8 million. spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal
transaction and not a law partnership transaction for the
same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
VI. The lower court erred in ruling that petitioner’s retainer
agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a law partnership
transaction. IV. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the
testimonies of the respondents are credible as against the
petitioner Erlando Abrenica and his witnesses for the same
VII. The lower court erred when it failed to rule on said reasons as stated in Nos. I and II above.
petitioners’ permissive counterclaim relative to the various
personal loans secured by respondents.
 V. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the
purchase price for the lot involved was ₱ 3 million and not ₱
8 million for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II
above.
VI. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that
petitioner’s retainer agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc.
was a law partnership transaction for the same reasons as
stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
VII. The lower court deliberately erred when it failed to rule
on said petitioners’ permissive counterclaim relative to the
various personal loans secured by respondents also for the
same reasons as the above.
B. As an incident of the extrinsic fraud[,] the lower court[,] despite full
knowledge of its incapacity[,] rendered/promulgated the assailed
Consolidated Decision x x x without jurisdiction or with lack of
jurisdiction.10 (Underscoring in the original.)
On 2 August 2007, the CA issued the first assailed
Resolution11 dismissing the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719, which
held the Petition to be insufficient in form and substance. It noted the
following:
x x x. Readily noticeable is that CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 practically
contained the prayer for the annulment of the subject consolidated
Decision premised on the very same allegations, grounds or issues as
the present annulment of judgment case.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed
only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other
adequate remedy (Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA
96[2004]). Under Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the only grounds for an annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167 [2004]).
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
x x x           x x x          x x x
x x x. In the case at bar, not only has the court a quo jurisdiction over
the subject matter and over the persons of the parties, what petitioner
is truly complaining [of] here is only a possible error in the exercise of
jurisdiction, not on the issue of jurisdiction itself. Where there is
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter (as in this case), the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal (Republic vs. "G" Holdings, supra, citing
Tolentino vs. Leviste, supra). (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Humble Motion for
Reconsideration12 on 28 August 2007.
While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September
2007, petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion 13 with Branch
226, alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his
children and petitioner Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial
court still had to determine the manner of distribution of the firm’s
assets and the value of the levied properties. Lastly, he insisted that
the RTC still had to determine the issue of whether the Rule 41 appeal
was the correct remedy.
On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim 14 also
with Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that she 15 and her
stepchildren16 owned a number of the personal properties sought to be
levied. She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor
vehicles as well as the house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of the absolute community
of property. She likewise alleged that the real property, being a family
home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping
having a depreciated combined value of one hundred thousand pesos
(₱ 100,000) were exempt from execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section
13 of the Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and release
and likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if
any.
Accordingly, the RTC scheduled17 a hearing on the motion. On 17
October 2007, however, petitioner Erlando moved to withdraw his
motion on account of ongoing negotiations with respondents.18
Thereafter, petitioner Erlando and respondent Abelardo Tibayan,
witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC
of Quezon City, executed an agreement to postpone the auction sale
of the property covered by TCT No. 216818 in anticipation of an
amicable settlement of the money judgment.19
Finally, on 30 October 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 issued
the second assailed Resolution20 denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration for having been filed out of time, as the last day for
filing was on 27 August 2007. Moreover, the CA found that the grounds
stated in the motion were merely recycled and rehashed propositions,
which had already been dispensed with.
Petitioners are now assailing the CA Resolutions dated 2 August 2007
and 30 October 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. They
insist that there is still a pending issue that has not been resolved by
the RTC. That issue arose from the Order 21 given by the trial court to
petitioner Erlando to explain why it should take cognizance of the
Notice of Appeal when the proper remedy was a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Further, petitioners blame the trial and the appellate courts for the
dismissal of their appeal despite this Court’s explanation in G.R. No.
169420 that the appeal was the wrong remedy and was thus correctly
dismissed by the CA. Instead of complying with the show-cause Order
issued by the RTC, petitioners went directly to the CA and insisted that
the remedy they had undertaken was correct.
Petitioners also contend that there was extrinsic fraud in the
appreciation of the merits of the case. They raise in the present
Petition the grounds they cited in the three (3) Petitions for Annulment
of Judgment (including the Amended Petition) quoted above.
Next, they assert that petitioner Joena’s right to due process was also
violated when she was not made a party-in-interest to the proceedings
in the lower courts, even if her half of the absolute community of
property was included in the execution of the judgment rendered by
Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City.
Finally, they insist that their Humble Motion for Reconsideration was
filed on time, since 27 August 2007 was a holiday. Therefore, they had
until 28 August 2007 to file their motion.
Since then, it appears that a Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued on
3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the sum of ₱ 5 million for the
property covered by TCT No. 216818.
On 18 March 2009, while the case was pending with this Court,
petitioners filed a Complaint 22 with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Marikina City against herein
respondents and Sheriff Nardo I. de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the
RTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-
1323-MK and was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina
City.23 Petitioners sought the nullification of the sheriff’s sale on
execution of the Decision in the consolidated cases rendered by
Branch 226, as well as the payment of damages. They alleged that the
process of the execution sale was conducted irregularly, unlawfully,
and in violation of their right to due process.
On 2 July 2009, Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City issued a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondents and/or their agents,
and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City from consolidating TCT No.
216818.24
The filing of the Complaint with the RTC of Marikina City prompted
respondents to file a Motion25 before us to cite for contempt petitioner
spouses and their counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista. This Motion was
on the ground that petitioners committed forum shopping when they
filed the Complaint pending with Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina
City, while the present case was also still pending.
Meanwhile, on 22 September 2009, respondents filed before Branch
226 an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. 26 That
Motion was granted by Branch 226 through a Resolution 27 issued on 10
November 2011. This Resolution then became the subject of a Petition
for Certiorari28 under Rule 65 filed by petitioners before the CA
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
Soon after, on 6 March 2012, petitioners filed with the CA an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (T.R.O.) 29 after
Sheriff De Guzman, Jr. served on them a Notice to Vacate within five
days from receipt or until 11 March 2012. As of the writing of this
Decision, the CA has not resolved the issue raised in the Petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April 1985), Maria
Monica Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on
12 April 1990).
After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got
married on 28 May 1998. 31 In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she
represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties – in
particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer
table – were owned by the latter. We note that two of these
stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit.
As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents.
Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent
Erlando’s children, her claim cannot be sustained.
Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles
purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot covered by
TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community
regime.1âwphi1 However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes
from the community property the property acquired before the marriage
of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and
the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Neither these two
vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
We now proceed to discuss the Motion for contempt filed by
respondents.

Our Ruling Respondents claim that petitioners and their present counsel, Atty.
Antonio R. Bautista, were guilty of forum shopping when the latter filed
Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK with the RTC of Marikina City while the
Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were
case was still pending before us. In Executive Secretary v.
allegedly denied due process when the CA rejected their second
Gordon,32 we explained forum shopping in this wise:
attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble
Motion for Reconsideration.
Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
We DENY petitioners’ claims.
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus,
it has been held that there is forum-shopping —
The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice,
not to thwart them. Petitioners may not defy the pronouncement of this
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one
Court in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing remedies that are no longer
forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by
available to them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of
appeal or certiorari) in another, or
annulment of judgment was no longer available to them, because they
had already filed an appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions,
that appeal was dismissed. (2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court,
a party files another before the Court of Appeals since in
such case he deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that
It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and
even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is
executory through the fault of petitioners themselves when petitioner
dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would
Erlando (1) filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule 43; and (2)
still be open," or
filed a Petition for Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the
resolution by the RTC of the issues still pending before the trial court.
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction
30  in another court after failing to obtain the same from the
In Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, we said:
original court.

It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants

Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed to question the proceedings
ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible
undertaken by the sheriff in executing the judgment in Civil Case Nos.
denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be
Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. On the other hand, the present case
avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory
questions the merits of the Decision itself in Civil Case Nos. Q01-
right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
42948 and Q01-42959. These cases have different causes of action.
down in the Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners were clearly guilty of forum
the right to appeal must play by the rules. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
shopping when they filed the Complaint before the RTC of Marikina
City.
With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due
process was violated, it must be recalled that after she filed her
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby
Affidavit of Third Party Claim on 13 September 2007 and petitioner
DENIED. The Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007
Erlando filed his Urgent Omnibus Motion raising the same issues
issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 are
contained in that third-party claim, he subsequently filed two Motions
AFFIRMED.
withdrawing his Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioner Joena, meanwhile,
no longer pursued her third-party claim or any other remedy available
to her. Her failure to act gives this Court the impression that she was SO ORDERED.
no longer interested in her case. Thus, it was through her own fault
that she was not able to ventilate her claim.
G.R. No. 163602               September 7, 2011

Furthermore, it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was

first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13 October 1983.
SPOUSES EULOGIA MANILA and RAMON MANILA, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES EDERLINDA GALLARDO-MANZO and DANIEL
MANZO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
Decision1 dated February 27, 2004 and Resolution 2 dated May 14,
2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49998 which
granted the petition for annulment of judgment filed by the
respondents.
The controversy stemmed from an action for ejectment 3 filed by the
respondents, spouses Ederlinda Gallardo-Manzo and Daniel Manzo,
against the petitioners, spouses Ramon and Eulogia Manila, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 79 (Civil
Case No. 3537). The facts as summarized by the said court are as
follows:
On June 30, 1982, Ederlinda Gallardo leased two (2) parcels of land
situated along Real St., Manuyo, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, to Eulogia
Manila for a period of ten (10) years at a monthly rental(s) of P2,000.00
for the first two years, and thereafter an increase of ten (10) percent
every after two years. They also agreed that the lessee shall have the
option to buy the property within two (2) years from the date of
execution of the contract of lease at a fair market value of One
Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00)
The contract of lease expired on July 1, 1992 but the lessee continued
in possession of the property despite a formal demand letter dated
August 8, 1992, to vacate the same and pay the rental arrearages. In a
letter reply dated August 12, 1992, herein defendant claimed that no
rental fee is due because she allegedly became the owner of the
property at the time she communicated to the plaintiff her desire to
exercise the option to buy the said property.
Their disagreement was later brought to the Barangay for conciliation
but the parties failed to reach a compromise, hence the present
action.4
On July 14, 1993, the MeTC rendered its decision, 5 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, a judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
ordering the defendants:
1) To vacate the subject parcels of land and surrender
possession thereof upon the payment by the plaintiff of one-
half of the value of the building constructed by the lessee.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse the aforesaid amount,
the lessee shall have the option to exercise her right under
Article 1678 of the New Civil Code;
2) To pay rental arrearages up to July 1, 1992 in the amount
of Two Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand and Forty Four
80/100 Pesos (P228,044.80);
3) To pay, as reasonable compensation for their continued
withholding of possession of the subject lots, the sum of
Three Thousand Two Hundred and Twenty One Pesos
(P3,221.00) every month, commencing July 2, 1992 up to
such time that they finally yield possession thereof to the
plaintiffs, subject to an increase of ten percent (10%) after
every two (2) years from said date; and
4) To pay plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the sum of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 63 (Civil Case No. 93-3733) which reversed the MeTC. The
RTC found that petitioners have in fact exercised their option to buy
the leased property but the respondents refused to honor the same. It
noted that respondents even informed the petitioners about foreclosure
proceedings on their property, whereupon the petitioners tried to
intervene by tendering rental payments but the respondents advised
them to withhold such payments until the appeal of respondents in the
case they filed against the Rural Bank of Bombon (Camarines Sur),
Inc. (Civil Case No. 6062) is resolved. It further noted that respondents’
intention to sell the lot to petitioners is confirmed by the fact that the
former allowed the latter to construct a building of strong materials on
the premises. The RTC thus decreed:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
reversing the decision of the lower court dated July 14, 1993 and
ordering as follows:
1) That plaintiffs execute a deed of absolute sale over that
parcel of land subject of the Contract of Lease dated June
30, 1982 after full payment of defendants of the purchase
price of P150,000.00;
2) That plaintiffs pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.7
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on December 23, 1994.
In its Order dated March 24, 1995, the RTC denied the motion for
having been filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period considering that
respondents received a copy of the decision on December 7,
1994.8 Consequently, the November 18, 1994 decision of the RTC
became final and executory.9
On December 22, 1998, respondents filed a petition for annulment of
the RTC decision in the CA. Respondents assailed the RTC for
ordering them to sell their property to petitioners arguing that said
court’s appellate jurisdiction in ejectment cases is limited to the
determination of who is entitled to the physical possession of real
property and the only judgment it can render in favor of the defendant
is to recover his costs, which judgment is conclusive only on the issue
of possession and does not affect the ownership of the land. They
contended that the sale of real property by one party to another may
be ordered by the RTC only in a case for specific performance falling
under its original exclusive jurisdiction, not in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction in an ejectment case. Respondents also alleged
that the petition for annulment is the only remedy available to them
because the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault on
their part.
By Decision dated February 27, 2004, the CA granted the petition,
annulled the November 18, 1994 RTC decision and reinstated the July
14, 1993 MeTC decision. On the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised by
the respondents, the CA ruled as follows:
It must be stressed that the main action before the Metropolitan Trial
Court is one for ejectment grounded on the expiration of the parties’
contract of lease. And said court, finding that petitioners have a valid
right to ask for the ejectment of private respondents, ordered the latter
to vacate the premises and to pay their rentals in arrears. To Our mind,
what the respondent court should have done in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, was to confine itself to the issue of whether or
not petitioners have a valid cause of action for ejectment against the
private respondents.
Unfortunately, in the decision herein sought to be annulled, the
respondent court went further than what is required of it as an
appellate court when it ordered the petitioners to sell their properties to
the private respondents. In a very real sense, the respondent court
materially changed the nature of petitioners’ cause of action by
deciding the question of ownership even as the appealed case
involves only the issue of prior physical possession which, in every
ejectment suit, is the only question to be resolved. As it were, the
respondent court converted the issue to one for specific performance
which falls under its original, not appellate jurisdiction. Sad to say, this
cannot be done by the respondent court in an appealed ejectment
case because the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it
revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted and
does not create that cause (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S.), 137,
172, 2 L. edition 60, cited in 15 Corpus Juris 727).
It follows that the respondent Regional Trial Court clearly acted without
jurisdiction when it ordered the petitioners to sell their properties to the
private respondents. The order to sell can be made only by the
respondent court in an action for specific performance under its
exclusive original jurisdiction, and not in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction in an appealed ejectment suit, as in this case. Worse, the
relief granted by the same court was not even prayed for by the private
respondents in their Answer and position paper before the MTC,
whereat they only asked for the dismissal of the complaint filed against
them.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the
present petition raising the following issues:
A
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR IN ANNULLING THE JUDGMENT BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING THAT THE
ORDINARY REMEDIES OF NEW TRIAL, APPEAL,
PETITION FOR RELIEF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE
REMEDIES WERE LOST THROUGH THE FAULT OF THE
RESPONDENTS
B remedies of appeal, new trial and petition for review was not due to the
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR IN ANNULLING THE JUDGMENT BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY ON THE
GROUND OF "LACK OF JURISDICTION" WHEN IT HAS
NOT BEEN SHOWN THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MAKATI CITY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE RESPONDENTS OR THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CLAIM11
The petition is meritorious.
A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial
Court in civil actions can only be availed of where "the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner." 12 It
is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances and such
action is never resorted to as a substitute for a party’s own neglect in
not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate
remedies.13 The only grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, respondents alleged that the loss of remedies against the
RTC decision was attributable to their former counsel’s late filing of
their motion for reconsideration and failure to file any proper petition to
set aside the said decision. They claimed that they had been
constantly following up the status of the case with their counsel, Atty.
Jose Atienza, who repeatedly assured them he was on top of the
situation and would even get angry if repeatedly asked about the case.
Out of their long and close relationship with Atty. Atienza and due
regard for his poor health due to his numerous and chronic illnesses
which required frequent prolonged confinement at the hospital,
respondents likewise desisted from hiring the services of another
lawyer to assist Atty. Atienza, until the latter’s death on September 10,
1998. Thus, it was only on November 1998 that respondents engaged
the services of their new counsel who filed the petition for annulment of
judgment in the CA.
We are not persuaded by respondents’ asseveration. They could have
directly followed up the status of their case with the RTC especially
during the period of Atty. Atienza’s hospital confinement. As party
litigants, they should have constantly monitored the progress of their
case. Having completely entrusted their case to their former counsel
and believing his word that everything is alright, they have no one to
blame but themselves when it turned out that their opportunity to
appeal and other remedies from the adverse ruling of the RTC could
no longer be availed of due to their counsel’s neglect. That
respondents continued to rely on the services of their counsel
notwithstanding his chronic ailments that had him confined for long
periods at the hospital is unthinkable. Such negligence of counsel is
binding on the client, especially when the latter offered no plausible
explanation for his own inaction. The Court has held that when a party
retains the services of a lawyer, he is bound by his counsel’s actions
and decisions regarding the conduct of the case. This is true especially
where he does not complain against the manner his counsel handles
the suit.14 The oft-repeated principle is that an action for annulment of
judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.15
In any event, the petition for annulment was based not on fraudulent
assurances or negligent acts of their counsel, but on lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioners assail the CA in holding that the RTC decision is void
because it granted a relief inconsistent with the nature of an ejectment
suit and not even prayed for by the respondents in their answer. They
contend that whatever maybe questionable in the decision is a ground
for assignment of errors on appeal – or in certain cases, as ground for
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 – and not as ground
for its annulment. On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA,
being a higher court, has the power to adopt, reverse or modify the
findings of the RTC in this case. They point out that the CA in the
exercise of its sound discretion found the RTC’s findings unsupported
by the evidence on record which also indicated that the loss of ordinary
fault of the respondents.
We agree with the petitioners.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to
either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over
the subject matter of the claim.16 In a petition for annulment of
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely
an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the
court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law
does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction
over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law.17
There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate jurisdiction
over ejectment cases decided by the MeTC, MTC or MCTC. We note
that petitioners’ attack on the validity of the RTC decision pertains to a
relief erroneously granted on appeal, and beyond the scope of
judgment provided in Section 6 (now Section 17) of Rule 70. 18 While
the court in an ejectment case may delve on the issue of ownership or
possession de jure solely for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession de facto, it has no jurisdiction to settle with finality the issue
of ownership19 and any pronouncement made by it on the question of
ownership is provisional in nature. 20 A judgment in a forcible entry or
detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and
establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means
constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or
title of ownership. 21 We have held that although it was proper for the
RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of
ownership and receive evidence on possession de jure, it cannot
adjudicate with semblance of finality the ownership of the property to
either party by ordering the cancellation of the TCT.22
In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the petitioners. Clearly, respondents’ petition to annul the final RTC
appeal of respondents when, instead of simply dismissing the decision is barred under the equitable doctrine of laches.
complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the
defendants (petitioners), it ordered the respondents-lessors to execute
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners-lessees, on the basis
Decision dated February 27, 2004 and Resolution dated May 14, 2004
of its own interpretation of the Contract of Lease which granted
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49998 are SET ASIDE. The
petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within a certain
petition for annulment of judgment filed by herein respondents is
period (two years from date of execution) and for a fixed price
DISMISSED.
(₱150,000.00).23 This cannot be done in an ejectment case where the
only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to the
physical possession of the property. No costs.

Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is

but an exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same
as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein.24 The ground for annulment of the decision
is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have
taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.25

Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision,

they failed to show that the RTC did not have the authority to decide
the case on appeal. As we held in Ybañez v. Court of Appeals:26

On the first issue, we feel that respondent court acted inadvertently

when it set aside the RTC ruling relative to the validity of the
substituted service of summons over the persons of the petitioners in
the MTC level. We must not lose sight of the fact that what was filed
before respondent court is an action to annul the RTC judgment and
not a petition for review. Annulment of judgment may either be based
on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the
judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. There is nothing in the
records that could cogently show that the RTC lacked jurisdiction.
Chiefly, Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, vests upon the RTC the exercise of an
"appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
their respective territorial jurisdictions." Clearly then, when the RTC
took cognizance of petitioners’ appeal from the adverse decision of the
MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its
appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law. Perforce, its decision may
not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as it has, beyond
cavil, jurisdiction to decide the appeal. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)

The CA therefore erred in annulling the November 18, 1994 RTC

decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as said court had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners’ appeal.1avvphi1

On the timeliness of the petition for annulment of judgment filed with

the CA, Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that a
petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be
filed within four years from its discovery; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The principle of
laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier—
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.28 There is no absolute rule as to
what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.29

Here, respondents’ failure to assail the RTC ruling in a petition for

review or certiorari before the CA, rendered the same final and
executory. Having lost these remedies due to their lethargy for three
and a half years, they cannot now be permitted to assail anew the said
ruling rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Their inaction and neglect to pursue available remedies to set aside
the RTC decision for such length of time, without any acceptable
explanation other than the word of a former counsel who already
passed away, constitutes unreasonable delay warranting the
presumption that they have declined to assert their right over the
leased premises which continued to be in the possession of the