TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision

promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves
Publication in the Official Gazette (Enforceability of a declared that they were to become effective immediately
Statute) upon their approval.

FACTS: ISSUES:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of
public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid general applicability and laws which are not as to their
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, publication;
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent 2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various publications of general circulation.
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations HELD:
and administrative orders.
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date,
ISSUE: without its previous publication.
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required
before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to
HELD: the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim All statutes, including those of local application and private
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
not even a constructive one.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word
“shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
public concern is to be given substance and validity. called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or
of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon
a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he as possible.
must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of J. Cruz:
general application which have not been published have no
force and effect. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint,
FACTS: parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 1

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI],
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870,
1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963,
1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145,
2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-
454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528,
531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-
568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677,
679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22,
25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122,
123.

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354,
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
issuances is sought: parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64,
103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal,
324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847. of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to
192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226- do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the
228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271- petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370,
382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the
488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149- show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
1178,1180-1278. course.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as
& 65. the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540- those cases where he has some private or particular
1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, protected, independent of that which he holds with the
1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively
1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, "when the question is one of public right and the object of

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 2

the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws then the date of publication is material for determining its
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431]. date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope when it goes into effect.
Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only
General to call a special election for the position of insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said: applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
to be enforced. If the general rule in America were
otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the Section 1. There shall be published in the Official
case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a
apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions
rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the
well lead to error' Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general documents or classes of documents as may be required so
rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes
circumstances which surround this case are different from of documents as the President of the Philippines shall
those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not determine from time to time to have general applicability
a proper party to these proceedings no other person could and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer published. ...
of the Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character. The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply Without such notice and publication, there would be no
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to one.
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent the Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
case. significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the access to the legislative records—no such publicity
presidential issuances in question contain special accompanies the law-making process of the President.
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
Civil Code: themselves of the specific contents and texts of such
decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares
unless it is otherwise provided, ... y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas
por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 3

 and may have consequences which cannot justly be
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
matters of public concern is to be given substance and status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to demand examination. These questions are among the most
what must be included or excluded from such publication. difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
circularized to all concerned. 6 decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially cannot be justified."
and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7: From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of
Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278,
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.
that the Official Gazette as the official government 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed
know where to obtain their official and specific contents. that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino,
general application, which have not been published, shall ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of
have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
of those presidential decrees which were published only respondent officials considering the manifestation in their
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question comment that "the government, as a matter of policy,
as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in
their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar some other publication, even though some criminal laws
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic provide that they shall take effect immediately.
and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act issuances which are of general application, and unless so
of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the SO ORDERED.
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 PHIL 635 (1940)
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements
as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality FACTS: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a National Labor Union Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the
statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 4

Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its
discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts subordinate;
of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions,
Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and reason for the decision rendered.
elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial
was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
opposing the said motion. entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and
ISSUE: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this
meritorious to be granted. case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it
reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be
RULING: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose requirements set forth. So ordered.
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO,
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere manager and propietor, and
receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction vs.
is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative
and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant
functions in the determination of disputes between Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial
employers and employees but its functions are far more Relations.
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and LAUREL, J.:
regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
substantial merits of the case, without regard to conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in 1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo,
such manner as it may deem just and equitable. sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una
determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado
that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely se termine la obra;
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of 2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han
an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell,
which must be respected even in proceedings of this sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus
character: tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica
en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present misma;
one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; 3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato
(3) The decision must have something to support itself; colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de
(4) The evidence must be substantial; duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como
at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de
disclosed to the parties affected; practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5
de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 5

a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to
determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National
dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato Labor Union, Inc.
en virtud del paro.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the
hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers: reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed
to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it
1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of
making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false nature, to make several observations regarding the nature
and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. emphasize certain guiding principles which should be
observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by examined the entire record of the proceedings had before
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army. laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity.
The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and
September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
from the States) was but a scheme to systematically conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his these statements and expressions of views of counsel have
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army. no evidentiary value.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is
a company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to
collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable.
(Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had
been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous
civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable
in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a
modern labor legislation of American origin where the
industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair
labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor
Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to
the respondents that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such
far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative
than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It
is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and
deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as
will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive
and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages,
shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or
farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty,
and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to
the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the
parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of
labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor
as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 6

sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before
hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle
the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section
4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all industries established in a
designated locality, with a view to determinating the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such
industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the
"inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5,
ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective
system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in
order to determine specific controversies between labor and
capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et
al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we
had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September
13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It
shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural
disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative
policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated
by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the
avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the
Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v.
U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the
liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.
CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 7
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy,
22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is
vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it
aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from
the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon
power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No.
45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington,
Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations
Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed.
965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations
Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations
Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15;
Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides
that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and
equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this
and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from
the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent
inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57
Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry.
Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of
a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not
go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or
rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185,
57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative
tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the
latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case
against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty
actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply
to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and
the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the
any given case, but their report and decision are only conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served
advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing
Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or the documents referred to in his motion and such other
agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a The legislation which created the Court of Industrial
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
and may delegate to such board or public official such attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the
Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
powers. (Section 10, ibid.) instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence
as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner,
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a vs. JUDGE FILOMENO PASCUAL, respondent.
decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is D E C I S I O N
literally Relations personally to decide all controversies
coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, Intimating as to what the ideals of a good judge should be,
with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our Sir Francis Bacon wants judges “to remember that their
case there is no such statutory authority. office is jus dicere and not jus dare, to interpret law, and not
to make law or give law.” They ought to be “more learned
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all than witty, more revered than plausible, and more advised
controversial questions, render its decision in such a 3than confident. Above all things, INTEGRITY is their
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the portion and proper virtue.[1]
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from The Constitution and the statutes, however, limit the legal
the authority conferred upon it. qualifications of judges to only three bare essentials:
citizenship, age and experience. The virtues of probity,
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is honesty, temperance, impartiality and integrity, most often
sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged used to measure an aspirant to the bench, lose their
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National meaning in individual perception.
Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren
and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which While people perceive judges to be above the ordinary run
to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. of men, they know that a perfect judge, like a perfect priest,
exists only in fantasy.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession
of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the integrity of
Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material respondent judge in this administrative case stands
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to challenged for committing acts of extortion or bribery.
systematically discharged all the members of the National
Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired The following antecedent facts appear on record:
to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote
dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions irregularities and corruption were being committed by the
of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his Angat, Bulacan.
substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National
they could not be expected to have obtained them and Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation on the
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may
and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such be conducted. Ordered[2] to conduct a “discreet
far reaching importance and effect that their admission investigation” by the then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 8

were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo,
HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano.
They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for
Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team
realized was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to
find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido
Cruz, an accused in respondent’s sala.
In his affidavit[3] executed on March 23, 1993 before SA
Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in
Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of
Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the
preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime
he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent
judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed
that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in
view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent
the sum of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be
a drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to
serve his vice.
In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the
case caused respondent judge to be entrapped, for which
reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in
flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed the
following report:
“On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon,
CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio
de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat,
Bulacan, where Subject is attending the graduation of his
daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he
already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is
asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the
money because according to him there were plenty of
people around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see
him (Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day.
At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March
1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge
PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan,
and thereat handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills
contained in a white mailing envelope previously marked
and glazed with fluorescent powder.
In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court
room and after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came
out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge
PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The
Undersigned immediately entered the room and informed
Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having
received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a
thorough search, the marked money was found inserted
between the pages of a blue book on top of his table.
Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila
wherein he was subjected to ultra violet light examination.
After finding Subject’s right hand for the presence of
fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and
fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating
Procedure (S.O.P.).
CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 9
On even date, the results of our investigation together with
the person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to
the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he
be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and
penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of
the Philippines.” (Rollo, pp. 47-48.)
On May 11, 1994, by resolution of the Third Division of this
Court, this case was referred to Executive Judge Natividad
G. Dizon for investigation, report and recommendation.[4]
In connection with this investigation, respondent filed a
Memorandum, dated July 28, 1995, wherein respondent
presented his version of the case:
“Sometime in February 1993, one Ceferino Tigas, a
fictitious person according to the NBI, wrote a letter to Court
Administrator Ernani Paño of the Supreme Court, alleging
irregularities committed by the accused. Deputy Court
Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez endorsed the letter to the
NBI Director requesting `discreet’ investigation of the Tigas
letter. An NBI tandem of Agents Edward Villarta and
Reynaldo Olazo proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, to
investigate. Said tandem’s assignment was merely to
conduct discreet investigation supposedly, but it led to
incriminatory machinations, planting evidence, unlawful
arrest, illegal search and seizure. They contacted Candido
Cruz who was mentioned in the letter. They, however,
discovered that Ceferino Tigas, the alleged letter writer,
was an inexistent person, fictitious as shown by the
synopsis report of the NBI agents (Exhibit 8). Having
contacted Candido Cruz, the NBI agents persuaded him to
participate in what they called `entrapment operation.’ The
NBI agents prepared an affidavit, then a supplementary
affidavit and had them signed by Candido Cruz. They also
went to the NBI Headquarters and had four (4) P500 bills
dusted with fluorescent powder which they used in
the‘operation’ against the accused.
In the afternoon of March 25, 1993, the NBI, along with
Candido Cruz, proceeded to the municipal building of
Angat, Bulacan, where the accused judge was holding
office. However, they learned that the accused judge was
not in his office but was then attending the graduation rites
of his son at the nearby Colegio de Sta. Monica, and so
they decided to move their ‘operation’ to the school
grounds. The ceremonies had not yet begun. Candido
Cruz saw the accused in one corner of the compound and
approached him. He tried to give the accused an envelope
allegedly containing money, but the judge refused to accept
it and angrily drove Candido Cruz away. Rebuffed, the NBI
agents decided to reset their ‘operation’ the following day.
At around 9:30 in the morning of March 26, 1993, the NBI
agents and Candido Cruz arrived at the municipal building
of Angat, Bulacan. Cruz, as planned, entered the accused
judge’s chambers and placed an envelope, allegedly
containing marked money, right on his (judge’s) desk. He
thought it was a pleading for filing and he told Candido Cruz
to file it with the office of the clerk of court at the adjacent
room. Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was
asking for. Upon hearing the reply, the accused suddenly
erupted in anger, he grabbed the envelope on the desk and
hurled it to Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor, the
accused picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of
Cruz’s polo shirt and drove him out of the chamber.
Just seconds thereafter, agents Villarta and Olazo entered
the door of the chamber which door was open at that time.
They introduced themselves and told the accused that the
money that Cruz gave him was marked. Accused told them
that he did not receive or accept money from Cruz. But
they proceeded to search the room, the table, its drawers,
and every nook and cranny of his room, including the
pockets of the accused’s pants. After scouring the place,
the agents failed to find the envelope with the marked
money. And so, one of the agents called for Candido Cruz
who was waiting outside at a waiting shed fronting the
municipal building, and asked him where the envelope was.
Cruz came back to the room and, together with agent
Olazo, approached the cabinet and said ‘heto pala.’
Then, the accused’s humiliating experience began.
Thereafter, despite the strident protestations of the
accused, the envelope, which came from the pocket of
Cruz’s polo shirt, was placed on top of the table of the
judge, pictures were taken, and the accused was arrested
by the NBI agents.”[5]
On August 11, 1995, Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon the appearance of impropriety in all activities and a judge
submitted the following report and recommendation:
“The Investigating Judge respectfully submits her findings
based on the evidence at hand.
placed the envelope inside a directory which was placed on
top of a cabinet.
x x x. Why was he not surprised that somebody barged into
his chamber or was he really accustomed with people
directly dealing or negotiating at his chamber, as what Cruz
did, instead of dealing with his staff. His ‘angry words’ and
his actuations, according to his testimony, were not
convincing at all to show that he was that fuming mad at
Candido Cruz’s offer. More so, his claim that NBI Agents
connived with Candido Cruz just for their own personal
glory was not even persuasive. His excuse of the presence
of fluorescent powder on his hand was flimsy and
incredible.
The act of the respondent shows that he can be influenced
by monetary considerations. This act of the respondent of
demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant before
his court constitutes serious misconduct in office. It is this
kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how
nominal the amount involved on the part of those who are
charged with the responsibility of administering the law that
will surely erode the people’s respect for law and lose faith
and trust in the courts which are expected to render fair and
equal justice to all.
Such act go against Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which state: A Judge should avoid impropriety and
should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality
and diligence.
xxx xxx xxx

As against the respondent judge’s denials, the undersigned With the above, the Investigating Judge respectfully
submits that the sworn affidavits of complainants and NBI recommends that appropriate penalty be imposed upon the
Agents and documentary proofs attached to the records are respondent.”
more convincing and nearer to the truth. They have no
motive for fabricating this charge, except to bring justice. We find that the evidence on record does not warrant
Credence should be given to the testimony of the NBI conviction.
Agents coming as it does from an unpolluted source.
These Agents had no reason to testify falsely against the We note that the only bases for the Report and
respondent judge. They were just doing their duty. On the Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad
other hand, the respondent judge had to protect himself G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the
against the testimonial and technical/scientific evidence thatMemorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of
he had received the envelope and to reject its implications stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of
of such evidence. respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent
was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein
Furthermore, his defense that he was just instigated to respondent can confront the witnesses against him and
commit a crime is likewise untenable. The principle evolved present evidence in his defense.
from the cases appears to be that in a prosecution for an
offense against the public welfare, such as accepting bribe, This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even
the defense of entrapment cannot be successfully in an administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent
interposed; x x x. judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any
graver offense, the evidence against him should be
One may well wonder over the manner the envelope competent and should be derived from direct knowledge.[6]
containing the money was proffered to the respondent The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no
judge as he narrated his story on how he got mad at less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should
Candido Cruz when he proffered the said envelope, how he be only after due investigation and after presentation of
threw, picked it up and placed it in the pocket of the latter competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in
and how he drove him away. He even testified that it was character.[7] The above-quoted Report and
just ‘planted’ by the NBI Agents when the latter allegedly

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 10

Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk
of the requirements of due process. of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers.
Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge
inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal witness, suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on
Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell
several material points. on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and
inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz’ polo shirt and drove
It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo
someone who must have had an ax to grind against the immediately entered the door of the judge’s chambers,
respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the
of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not come out in money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge
the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The told them that he did not receive or accept money from
letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI
specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room,
charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of
Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a respondent’s chambers, and the pockets of the pants of
valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers
vague accusations. of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope
containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz
While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being to respondent judge.
apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating
team to make a “discreet investigation” of respondent, the Candido Cruz, who had gone down to the waiting shed,
NBI team had instead caused an instigation or the was called for by one of the agents. Candido Cruz was
entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter- asked as to the whereabouts of the envelope containing
writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they money. Candido Cruz went back to the judge’s chambers
sought out an accused before respondent’s court who could and made the motions of conducting a search. Eventually,
possibly be respondent judge’s virtual victim. Approached he went straight to the top of a cabinet and, in the manner
by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had of a magician, produced the envelope with marked money,
been brought before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, saying, “heto pala”.
Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of
Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to Thereafter, photographs were taken of respondent judge
the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was who was humiliated no end by the fact that the envelope
that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he with marked money was placed on top of his desk with
had original jurisdiction to try the case. respondent judge in front of it.

But, respondent’s action in this regard was perpetrated In his testimony before the Sandiganbayan, NBI Agent SI
some time before Candido Cruz was “persuaded to Reynaldo Olazo stated that the marked money used in their
participate in what they (the NBI agents) called ‘entrapment entrapment operation actually came from Candido Cruz and
operation.’” The opportune time to bribe the respondent not from the NBI;[9] and he was not able to see what
should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz’ actually transpired between Candido Cruz and respondent
criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. judge inside the chambers of the judge. He was outside the
No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent judge’s chambers and entered it only after Candido Cruz
would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, gave the signal that the money was already delivered by
1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already. him to the respondent.[10] Candido Cruz, on the other
hand, testified that the marked money used in the alleged
It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] entrapment operation was given to him by the NBI[11] and,
that, despite the fact that he “scoured” the table of the when he went out of the judge’s chambers after giving the
respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money money, he signaled to one, Col. Javier, who was then
in it, no envelope was found and so he had to call Candido positioned immediately outside the chambers.[12]
Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the
envelope. In view of the foregoing facts, it is easy to conclude that the
acts of the NBI agents which triggered the incident that
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably transpired inside respondent judge’s chambers constituted
consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense instigation and not entrapment as claimed by the
that, at around 9:30 o’clock in the morning of March 26, prosecution. It is evident that Candido Cruz was induced to
1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the act as he did in order to place respondent judge in a
Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, compromising situation, a situation which was not brought
went inside respondent judge’s chambers, located thereat, about by any request of respondent judge. It is surprisingly
and placed before respondent judge an envelope strange that an accused in a case would simply barge into
containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that the judge’s chambers without rhyme or reason, place bribe
what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and money on top of the judge’s desk without so much as

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 11

explaining what the money was for. Respondent judge’s
action on Candido Cruz’s case which favored Cruz was
effected long before. We can believe the fact that, under
the circumstances, respondent judge did react in anger and
threw the envelope at the accused Candido Cruz. The
judge must have given back the money to Candido Cruz
and literally drove Cruz out of his chambers bringing the
money with him. This explains the reason why the NBI
Agents notwithstanding a relentless search did not find the
money inside the chambers. Four (4) NBI Agents made the
search and they were unable to find the envelope with the
marked money in it. This fact NBI Agent Olazo in effect
admitted because he had to call back Candido Cruz in
order to make Cruz divulge as to where the bribe money
was placed. When, after all, Candido Cruz produced the
money when he went back to the judge’s chambers, it
became obvious that the money when offered to
respondent judge was not received by the latter.
The foregoing set of facts smacks of unlawful prosecution
and planting of evidence amounting to persecution. It is
reprehensible to say the least that NBI agents should
entrap the respondent judge by illegal means, besmirch his
reputation by the planting of evidence against him and
make public the foregoing charges of bribery against him in
the face of the unjustified and illegal incriminatory
machinations perpetrated by the NBI agents in connivance
with Candido Cruz.
We, thus, hold respondent Judge Filomeno Pascual
blameless of the charge of bribery against him.
It should be noted that Candido Cruz insisted that he had
participated in the alleged entrapment operation only
because of the fact that the NBI agents made him believe
that there was an order therefor from the Supreme Court.
[13] Considering that he is illiterate and is already more
than 70 years of age, it is understandable why he was
easily persuaded by the NBI agents to cooperate without
need of any threat whatsoever. Inconsistencies in his
testimony is likewise attributed to his aforesaid personal
circumstances for it does not jibe with practical experience
that a person telling the truth will still have to struggle to
remember everything that transpired, he having been a
participant in the operation. Gross mistakes on very
important points not easily forgotten are very strong indicia
of the falsity of the story given by a witness.[14]
We reiterate the ruling in the case of Raquiza v. Castaneda,
Jr.,[15] that:
“The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule
where the charges on which the removal is sought is
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption,
incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.”
Reasonable doubt is the inability to let the judicial mind rest excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
easy upon the certainty of guilt after a thorough amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
investigation of the whole evidence.[16] The principle of procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before
reasonable doubt being applicable in the instant case, issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 12
therefore, we find that the alleged act of bribery committed
by respondent has not been sufficiently and convincingly
proven to warrant the imposition of any penalty against
respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge
is hereby exonerated and the administrative case against
him is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan
GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.
Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of
Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition
Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty
FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon.
Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr.
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within
which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on
motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it
reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18,
2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the
Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order
for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in
order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC
could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After
the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez
submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an
alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court
ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing
bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order
for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for
his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems
best to take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.
ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting thetime summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
prayer for bail scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of proceedings.
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings
before it. ii. Yes.

i. YES. The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys
that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the
knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima
facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest
warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its
supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist,
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to
punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to
persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for
their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date
would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute
an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended.
of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
when a person has been arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of
innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution
stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended” finds application “only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.”
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be
extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition
proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail
before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not
before the extradition court.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule
invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar
probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as
Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath
an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight
produce. risk or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
In Extradition Cases cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein
supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether Since this exception has no express or specific statutory
a) they are sufficient in form and substance basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the
Law burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
c) the person sought is extraditable clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible,
the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran
for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already
of public knowledge that the United States was requesting
his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition
case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 13

election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to
grant him bail. An extradition proceeding is sui generis:
a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the
circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of the
giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradition proceedings even more. Extradition extradited.
proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while
to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a
avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities criminal case requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt” for
that may negate that purpose. conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon
showing of the existence of a prima facie case”
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition
within reach of our government if and when it matters; that proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition. extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him.
iii. NO.
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due assistance through which a person charged with or
process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the
to due process and fundamental fairness does not always best claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of
call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full whether the extradition request complies with the
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available extraditable.
during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full
chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that 4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good
It is also worth noting that before the US government faith with our obligations
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be
already been conducted in that country. He already had ready and in a position to deliver the
that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of accused, should it be found proper
taking it, he ran away.
5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Other Doctrines:
Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only
Five Postulates of Extradition the accused were
1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts
Crime of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion
In this era of globalization, easier and faster international of his indictment proceedings there; and
travel, and an expanding ring of b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be the requesting state is seeking his return and that the
an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other crimes he is charged with are bailable
states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime
in our own country. Extradition is Essentially Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial,
2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
Accused conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus,
the Executive Department of government has broad
By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial
system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused represented by the Philippine Department of Justice,
in the pending criminal case therein. petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN,
Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 14

Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
BATACAN CRESPO, respondents. Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.: Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez
sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.[7] The TRO
entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with
arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the
to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition
extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the
answer to these two novel questions is “No.” The Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ
explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision. extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant
the latter a reasonable period within which to file a
The Case comment and supporting evidence.[8]

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders
dated May 23, 2001[1] and July 3, 2001[2] issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.[3] The
first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application
for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ,
this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution.[9] By an
identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their
votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It
held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. This Resolution has become final and executory.

The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the
the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail United States of America, represented by the Philippine
to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate
follows: Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition
Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the
finds probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. United States District Court for the Southern District of
Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in
be issued. Consequently and taking into consideration connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal 00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United
Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18
for respondent’s temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title
(Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash. 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of
Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
“Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001
surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of
Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title
the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List.”[4] 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Section 6 of PD No.
the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into 1069.
legal custody.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent
The Facts Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion,”[10] which prayed that petitioner’s application for an
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled arrest warrant be set for hearing.
Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.[5]
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,[6] the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5,
United States Government, through diplomatic channels, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations
sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the
dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated issuance of a warrant of arrest.
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez,
also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 15

should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of ‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are
P100,000. ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines
with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing
on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its ‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May
questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a 10, 2001 in the case entitled ‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al.
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila,’
at one million pesos in cash.[11] After he had surrendered CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public
his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the
was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order issuance of the subject bail orders.’”[14]
dated July 4, 2001.[12]
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will
Hence, this Petition.[13] address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and
hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and
Issues (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending.
Petitioner presents the following issues for the Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the
consideration of this Court: Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure to file a
Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in
I. the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court.[15] We
shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates
“The public respondent acted without or in excess of that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first The Court’s Ruling
hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest
warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069. The Petition is meritorious.

II. Preliminary Matters

“The public respondent acted without or in excess of Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a
and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: “(1) the
because: issues were fully considered by such court after requiring
the parties to submit their respective memoranda and
‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a
the absence of any law that provides for such power. reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2)
the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and
‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely
Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give
Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition;
cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition and (4) the issues raised are purely of law.”[16]
proceedings.
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA,
‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition petitioner submits the following reasons: “(1) even if the
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition. petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such
appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides
‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition them, the parties would still bring the matter to this
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for
not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts
showing by the applicant of the existence of special ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in
circumstances. one case[17] ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the
court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial
‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same
proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail
‘special circumstances’ which may justify release on bail. both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals,
which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable
‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in
circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded belief favor of the potential extraditees and would give them
that he will not flee. opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the
ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under
existing extradition treaties.”[18]

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 16


As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher
court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been
given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to
correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has
certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of
law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of
urgency.[19] As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before
availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non,
when the questions raised are the same as those that have
already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed
upon by the lower court.[20] Aside from being of this nature,
the issues in the present case also involve pure questions
of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are courts.
special and important reasons therefor.[21] In Fortich v.
Corona[22]we stated:
should have been taken by the parties involved and
proceed directly to the merits of the case.’
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] we held as
follows:
“This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of
Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto
and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in
cases where special and important reasons or exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify the same.”
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the
important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem
it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such
proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over
Five Postulates of Extradition

“[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to The substantive issues raised in this case require an
take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty
issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent.[25]
be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the
cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, implementation of extradition treaties to which the
Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. Philippines is a signatory,[26] understanding certain
As we have further stated in Cuaresma: postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the
issues raised here.
‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only 1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of
when there are special and important reasons therefor, Crime.
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. x x x.’ First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of
suppressing crime[27] by facilitating the arrest and the
“Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary custodial transfer[28] of a fugitive[29] from one state to the
jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of other.
speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to
promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as With the advent of easier and faster means of international
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to
interest because of the magnitude of the problem created another for the purpose of committing crime and evading
by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly,
requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with
Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and criminals and crimes that transcend international
money. boundaries.

“That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in Today, “a majority of nations in the world community have
the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our come to look upon extradition as the major effective
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. instrument of international co-operation in the suppression
Court of Appeals:[23] of crime.”[30] It is the only regular system that has been
devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court
‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere competent to try them in accordance with municipal and
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their international law.[31]
strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote “An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction
again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted competent to try and punish them is that the number of
a particular case from their operation whenever the higher criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the
interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 17

within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional
effective extradition arrangements and the consequent rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in extraditee x x x.
order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an
absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the xxx xxx xxx
ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus
indirectly does the commission of crime itself.”[32] “There are other differences between an extradition
proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
In Secretary v. Lantion[33] we explained: proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings
involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal
“The Philippines also has a national interest to help in proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition
suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the proceeding allow admission of evidence under less
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to
by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a
purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy prima facie case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal case where
refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in
progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in individual extraditable but the President has the final
light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a
crimes.” similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises
wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster demands of the nation’s foreign relations before making the
international travel, and an expanding ring of international ultimate decision to extradite.”
crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist
state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the
country. person sought to be extradited.[37] Such determination
during the extradition proceedings will only result in
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a
Accused measure of international judicial assistance through which a
person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not
thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into
each other’s legal system and judicial process.[34] More questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.[38]
pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s signature on The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is
an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity only to determine whether the extradition request complies
and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought
rights of the person sought to be extradited.[35] That is extraditable.[39]
signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be
given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant 4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take
place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily
signed, or would have been directly attacked for its entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative
unconstitutionality. branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the
presumption that its implementation will serve the national
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis interest.

Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[36] Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty
extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In promotes comity[40]with the requesting state. On the other
criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad
accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- inimage of our country before the world community. Such
a class by itself -- they are not. failure would discourage other states from entering into
treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges
“An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a on reciprocity.[41]
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the
rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in
begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.[42] This
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His principle requires that we deliver the accused to the
guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition,

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 18

as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, “SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest;
“[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt
treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the deliveryof the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as
of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to
other government is under obligation to make the answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
surrender.”[43] Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the
and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found accused which may be served any where within the
proper. Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the
answer, or should the accused after having received the
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding
risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing
the experience[44] of the executive branch: nothing short of thereof.
confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their “(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant
extradition to the requesting state. of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the
accused and the attorney having charge of the case.”
The present extradition case further validates the premise (Emphasis ours)
that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to
flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of
only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of
requesting country.[45] Prior acts of herein respondent -- arrest? We rule in the negative.
(1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion
of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in 1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
the requested state despite learning that the requesting
state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our
charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the
aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered
his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and parties,[46] receiving facts and arguments[47] from them,
the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, [48] and giving them time to prepare and present such facts
given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time? and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no
longer be considered “immediate.” The law could not have
First Substantive Issue: intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole,
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest? in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued.
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC
--informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys
Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early
petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape stage. The trial court is not expected to make an
and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual
such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From
those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass the knowledge and the material then available to it, the
murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a
extradition cases. prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he accused.
should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his
constitutional right to liberty without due process. He Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of
further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex
setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael
of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task
court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of
discretion of the presiding judge. Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of
various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly
arguments. It states: authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the
crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit
I “Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 19

the Affidavit of Angela Byers” and enclosed Statements in
two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J “Table of
Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix” with
enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the
Exhibit L “Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward” and enclosed
Statements in two volumes.[49]
It is evident that respondent judge could have already
gotten an impression from these records adequate for him
to make an initial determination of whether the accused was
someone who should immediately be arrested in order to
“best serve the ends of justice.” He could have determined
whether such facts and circumstances existed as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In
point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting
documents that “probable cause” did exist. In the second
questioned Order, he stated:
been defeated by the escape of the accused from the
requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is
invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.”

“In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
Government in support of [its] request for extradition of warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants
existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
against the extraditee.”[50] requirement to notify and hear the accused before the
issuance of warrants of arrest.
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause
for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never
warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a
supporting documents. Hence, after having already hearing just for the purpose of personally determining
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he we required was that the “judge must have sufficient
set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.[51] supporting documents upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to cause.”[55]
answer after receiving the summons. In connection with
the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word “hearing” In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Court categorically stated that
is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before
holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law issuing a warrant of arrest:
could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at
this point that extradition proceedings are summary[52]in “Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest,
nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans judges merely determine personally the probability, not the
to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of
entire proceedings. probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to
“It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend see if it is supported by substantial evidence.”
something reasonable and something not inconsistent with
generally recognized principles of International Law, nor At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on
with previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, record, judges merely further examine complainants and
therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the their witnesses.[57] In the present case, validating the act of
reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the
the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x .”[53] accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be
discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to
to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and present evidence during the prima facie determination for
setting it for hearing at some future date would give them the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him
ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage
Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie
consequence, for the very purpose of both would have finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination
of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 20

proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no
superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to
summary nature of extraditions. bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request
and arrest warrant.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not
a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a
different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the
one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted
respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee. above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
restate the proper procedure: apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the
as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter
with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may beyond reasonable doubt.”[60] It follows that the
require the submission of further documentation or may constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no issue.
prima facie finding[58] is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge. The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is of habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the
determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension
time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”[61] Hence,
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail
given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings
proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
“best serve the ends of justice” in extradition cases. mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail? That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be
extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,
follows: extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the
trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should
“Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence against him, not before the extradition court.
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may No Violation of Due Process
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti[62] in
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.” arguing that, constitutionally, “[n]o one shall be deprived
of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law.”
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this
constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the
persons, including those sought to be extradited. conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount
Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the
evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to opportunity to be heard[63] but, at the same time, point out
the present case of Section 4[59] of Rule 114 of the Rules that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity
of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with to be heard.[64] Where the circumstances -- such as those
the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent
apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069. opportunity to be heard is enough.[65] In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 21

subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to disposition.
due process and fundamental fairness.
Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in
liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion[68] and
the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect
documents after a determination that the extradition request and enforce constitutional rights.[69] Furthermore, we
meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; believe that the right to due process is broad enough to
(2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed,
determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of the right to due process extends to the “life, liberty or
justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and property” of every person. It is “dynamic and resilient,
(3) his opportunity, once he is under the court’s custody, to adaptable to every situation calling for its application.”[70]
apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we
It is also worth noting that before the US government believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail
already been conducted in that country. But because he may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon
left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail,
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian
laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become and compelling circumstances[71] including, as a matter of
hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away. requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government
to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order Since this exception has no express or specific statutory
to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the
Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
without the due process that he had previously shunned clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court
pales against the government’s interest in fulfilling its realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a
Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to
world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes
“[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is
process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by
balanced against exigent and palpable government the courts into the exercise of this power should be
interests.”[66] characterized by caution, so that the vital international and
bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the protective of “the sporting idea of fair play,” it also
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need
Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of to fulfill international obligations.
violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or
excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special
extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to
custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have
Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing carefully examined these circumstances and shall now
the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the discuss them.
practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would
be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the 1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases was elected as a member of the House of Representatives.
falls into place with and gives life to Article 14[67] of the On that basis, he claims that his detention will
Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We
voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos,[72] the Court has
their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it
resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place ruled thus:
with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 22

“When the voters of his district elected the accused- law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
results which he could accomplish within the confines of germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a belonging to the same class.”[73]
person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for
may no longer serve his full term in office. and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of
public knowledge that the United States was requesting his
“In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have
question of constitutional equal protection. been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending
“The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person the final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in
be denied the equal protection of laws.’ This simply means line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his
that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both claim that his election to public office is by itself a
in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs compelling reason to grant him bail.
of government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall 2. Anticipated Delay
be displayed.
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the
“Does being an elective official result in a substantial extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases
the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to
all persons validly confined under law? determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes
conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or
“The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the
validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate accused in a criminal action.
of the people’ are multifarious. The accused-appellant
asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite
one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further
to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and
duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in academic.
the physical absence of one or a few of its members.
Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it
of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself.
under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the It would also encourage him to stretch out and
duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more.
elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A This we cannot allow.
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has
the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different 3. Not a Flight Risk?
classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law. Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To
support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the
“A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the
or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of country. True, he has not actually fled during the
or against groups or types of individuals. preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet,
this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the
“The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and
of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be
disregarded. within reach of our government if and when it matters; that
is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
“We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 23

In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of
granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has potential extraditees.
been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after
bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the Summation
extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the
application for bail, which may be granted in accordance As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and
with the guidelines in this Decision. stress these ten points:

Brief Refutation of Dissents 1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to

determine whether the request expressed in the petition,
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be
we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with
The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person
been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended
court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the
respondent’s claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back
for hearing not only petitioner’s application for an arrest to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed
warrant, but also private respondent’s prayer for temporary therein.
liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda
on the arrest, then position papers on the application for 2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is
bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties. deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or
soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the
Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending
Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently criminal case therein.
heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally
observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. 3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not
Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is
-- particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one
this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled in which the constitutional rights of the accused are
“Manifestations” by both parties and “Counter- necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s
Manifestation” by private respondent -- in which the main request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused
topic was Mr. Jimenez’s plea for bail. who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail.
Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the
be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear person would escape again if given the opportunity.
factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that,
in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, 4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition
private respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima
even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and
factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty
factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to
utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning. submit further documentation, or to personally examine the
affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest
spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
written by the learned justices themselves -- has answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the
exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all petition.
relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not
serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these 5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may
already very delayed proceedings,[74] which our Extradition apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of
Law requires to be summary in character. What we need absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there
now is prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b)
convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the there exist special, humanitarian or compelling
merits, not a circuitous cop-out. circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in
the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
allegedly “disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of
of extradition.” We believe that this charge is not only right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the
baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length peculiar facts of each case.
and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 24

6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due “accepting an advantage as an agent”, conspiracy to
process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does defraud, was penalized by a common law of Hongkong. A
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A warrant of arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face
subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk jail terms.
involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the
petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained.
enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the
summary nature of extradition. On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for his
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human extradition.
rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the
conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge
limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the Felixberto Olalia granted.
prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent
organs of government. Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to
vacate such order, but it was denied by the same judge.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not
a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power ISSUE:
to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties.
Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post
discretion in its duty and power of implementation. bail when there is nothing in the Constitution or Statutory
law providing a potential extradite a right to bail.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight
functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise HELD:
grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow
contortions, delays and “over-due process” every little step The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental
of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
become not only inutile but also sources of international person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the obligation
embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith to make available to every person under detention such
with a treaty partner’s simple request to return a fugitive. remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious
haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must
delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation. Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision
and technicalities that may negate that purpose. prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, aright to
due process under the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda
and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong Special
Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats
directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, the purpose of extradition.
with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter
of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL
our Extradition Law. No costs. ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
SO ORDERED. vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUÑOZ, Respondents.
Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs.
Hon. Felixberto Olalia DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under
Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 25

seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision
(RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity
Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and
(2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner
vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled
petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr.
by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee. After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr.
issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
The facts are: there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases
and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and
the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then
Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail.
Administrative Region. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong bail, thus:
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s
(1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is
Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense granted subject to the following conditions:
of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of
Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, 1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all
charge. times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of
this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor
Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional of the government;
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the
request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, 2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an
application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That
same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. 4. Accused is required to report to the government
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all
mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees
validity of the Order of Arrest. from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its noted therein accordingly.
Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
SO ORDERED.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent
be reversed. judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 26

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18,
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the
to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right
law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned
the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is
available even in extradition proceedings that are not
In his comment on the petition, private respondent criminal in nature.
maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
deprivation of one’s liberty. following trends in international law: (1) the growing
importance of the individual person in public international
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global
right to bail shall not be impaired, thus: recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses of countries to observe these universal human rights in
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition,
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even on the other.
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this individual person may properly be a subject of international
Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the
prospective extraditee may be granted bail. subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of
Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of
Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle,
that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and
extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal crimes against humanity committed in the former
proceedings," thus: Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the
individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as On a more positive note, also after World War II, both
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only international organizations and states gave recognition and
when a person has been arrested and detained for violation importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948,
of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
proceedings because extradition courts do not render Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to
judgments of conviction or acquittal. life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who customarily binding upon the members of the international
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this
he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that
beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 under the Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that
SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN
CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant
not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed
of innocence is not at issue. and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined
therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to process.
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the The Philippines, along with the other members of the family
rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 27

II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the all, both are administrative proceedings where the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty
to make available to every person under detention such of every individual is not impaired.
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object
various international treaties giving recognition and of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is connection with any criminal investigation directed against
in order. him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the
penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to government."
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited
to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender
likewise been detained. of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal
close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal,
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it
to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail is not punishment for a crime, even though such
persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis,
fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
detention during the pendency of administrative different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown
Philippines under international conventions to uphold civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
human rights. character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the punishment.14
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail
pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
"To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the
committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also
while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6
machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of
proceedings. the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice."
We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the
Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and
nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-
been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in extradition is received subsequently."
Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail. Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 28

 flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of
Records show that private respondent was arrested on the extradition court.
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of court to determine whether private respondent may be
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty evidence."
which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to
convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
due process under the Constitution. cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention;
and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
The applicable standard of due process, however, should dispatch.
not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the SO ORDERED.
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan
correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU,
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA. REMEDIOS
premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC, JOHN CARMONA,
"temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the ANNA SHEILA DINOSO, RAFAEL ENCARNACION,
potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that ANNALIZA EVIDENTE, FRANCIS FERNANDO, ZENNY
such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the GUDITO, EDGAR LIBERATO, JULIET LIPORADA,
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus GABRIEL MONDRAGON, JOSE MARIA PACKING,
probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and DOMINIC PETILLA, MA. SHALINA PITOY, SEVERINO
should be granted bail. RAMOS, VICTOR SANTIAGO, CAROLINA SARMIENTO,
FERDINAND TORRES, RICARDO VENTIGAN and other
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda students of the PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the ADMINISTRATION (Q.C.) similarly situated, petitioners,
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong vs.
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats Quezon City Branch (PSBA), DR. JUAN D. LIM, in his
the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Trustees of PSBA, ATTY. BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, in
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to his capacity as Vice- President for Admission and
life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights Registration, MR. RUBEN ESTRELLA, in his capacity as
are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by Officer-in-Charge, MR. RAMON AGAPAY, in his
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a capacity as Director of the Office of Student Affairs and
party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his MR. ROMEO RAFER, in his capacity as Chief Security
right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for of PSBA, respondents.
the grant is satisfactorily met.
RESOLUTION
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of
proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the PARAS, J.:
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil On May 2, 1988, this Court through its Second Division
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of rendered a Decision in the instant case which prodded the
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot Intervenor Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union) to
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to file a motion for reconsideration. Its argument hinges on the
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our pronouncement that —
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, x x x. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and contracts" required for college teachers are for one
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in semester. It is thus evident that after the close of the first
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than contract either with the students or with intervening
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must teachers. Such being the case, charge of denial of due
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a process is untenable. It is time-honored principle that

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 29

contracts are respected as the law between the contracting and their right to assemble, still such rallies,
parties. x x x (p. 12, Decision, italics supplied).(p. 874-875, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted
Rollo) peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or
violence. Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the
with the allegedly inevitable consequence of extenuating full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to
the pernicious practice of management to arbitrarily and subvert freedom into degenerate license.
wantonly terminate teachers simply because their contracts
of employment have already lapsed. SO ORDERED.

The motion likewise points out the fact that two of the
faculty members, namely Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo, and
Mr. Rene Encarnacion, supposedly found guilty by the
Investigating Committee headed by Mr. Antonio M.
Magtalas (p. 342, Rollo), had been issued permanent
appointments (not mere temporary contracts) by no less
than the President of the School himself. The appointment
of Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo dated August 9, 1986 (p. 887,
Rollo) can attest to this claim.
It is on the basis of the foregoing that We hereby amend
Our previous statements on the matter.
In a recent Decision, 1 this Court had the opportunity to
quite emphatically enunciate the precept that full-time
teachers who have rendered three (3) years of satisfactory
service shall be considered permanent (par. 75 of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). Thus, having
attained a permanent status, they cannot be removed from
office except for just cause and after due process.
Now applying the same principle in the case at bar, Mr.
Asser (Bong) Tamayo having stayed in the Philippine
School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch
(PSBA, for brevity) for three and one-half (3 1/2) years (in a
full-time capacity) may be deemed a permanent faculty
member provided, of course, the services rendered have
been satisfactory to the school. However, because the
investigation showed that Mr. Tamayo had participated in
the unlawful demonstration, his services cannot be deemed
satisfactory.
In the case of Mr. Rene Encarnacion, and Mr. Severino
Cortes, Jr. who taught in PSBA for two and one-half (2 1/2)
years and one and one-half (1 1/2) years respectively, to
them a permanent status cannot be accorded for failure to
meet the minimum requirement of three (3) years set by the
aforementioned Manual of Regulations. Of equal
importance, at this point, is the fact that the letter of
appointment had been extended only to Mr. Tamayo and
not to Mr. Encarnacion, neither to Mr. Cortes, Jr.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons adverted to hereinabove,
the motion for reconsideration, except insofar as We have
made the aforementioned clarificatory statements about the
tenure of full-time teachers and professors, is hereby
DENIED.
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the Secretary of the Board, petitioners,
right of students to complete their education in the school or vs.
university of their choice, and while We fully respect their HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding
right to resort to rallies and demonstrations for the redress Judge of Branch 87, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
of their grievances and as a part of their freedom of speech City and RAMON P. NADAL, respondents.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS TELAN
FACTS: THE UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the
penalties of suspension for one year, non-issuance of any
certificate of good moral character during the suspension
and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP
benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum and
non issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled
his financial obligations with the university. The disciplinary
action is meted after finally rendering a guilty verdict on
Nadal’s alleged willfull withholding of the following
information in his application for scholarship tantamount to
acts of dishonesty, viz: (1) that he has and maintains a car
and (2) the income of his mother in the USA in support of
the studies of his brothers. Nadal complained that he was
not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on
his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of
“NOT GUILTY” in his favor, the Chairman of the UP Board
of Regents, without notice to the petitioner, called another
meeting the following day to deliberate on the Chairman’s
Motion for Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a
decision of “GUILTY.” Upon petition, Nadal was granted his
action for mandamus with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON Nadal was denied due process.
HELD: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the
instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29,
1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the
attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases
are included as items on the agenda of the Board. At no
time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him
to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings
where his case was up for deliberation. Let it not be
forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of
professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that
justice may prevail. Nadal has sufficiently proven to have
violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed
when he applied for the benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in
criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable
doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-
judiciall proceedings, only substantial evidence is required,
that which means a reasonable mind might accept a
relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF
REGENTS and DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her capacity as

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 30

 will give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also
U.P. Office of Legal Services for petitioners. understand that my refusal to cooperate with the fact-
finding team may mean suspension of withdrawal of STFAP
Bonifacio A. Alentajon for private respondent. benefits and privileges.

ROMERO, J.: ———————

In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.)
truly the university of the people, the U.P. administration
conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of
tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and
Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the
"Iskolar ng Bayan" program. Spawned by the public clamor
to overcome what was perceived as the sharpening elitist
profile of the U.P studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand
the coverage of government educational subsidies so as to
include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-
economic ladder.
Student's Signature
Statement of the Applicant's Parent or Guardian
I hereby certify to the truthfulness and completeness of the
information which my son/daughter/dependent has
furnished in this application together with all the documents
attached. I further recognize that in signing this application
form, I share with my son/daughter/dependent the
responsibility for the truthfulness and completeness of the
information supplied herein. (Emphasis supplied for
emphasis)

After broad consultations with the various university
constituencies by U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P.
Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution
establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official
recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated
a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of
the program.
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-
finding team to visit my home/residence to verify the
information provided in this application and I will give my
utmost cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my
refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding team may mean
suspension or withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges
of my son/daughter/dependent.

In the interest of democratizing admission to the State —————————————————

University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP Parent's/Legal Guardian's/Spouse's Signature 1
benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book
subsidies and student assistantships which give From the early stages of its implementation, measures were
undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per adopted to safeguard the integrity of the program. One such
hour by working for the University. precautionary measure was the inclusion as one of the
punishable acts under Section 2 (a) of the Rules and
Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the
where, among others, they state the amount and source of University the deliberate falsification or
the annual income of the family, their real and personal suppression/withholding of any material information
properties and special circumstances from which the required in the application form.
University may evaluate their financial status and need on
the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. At the To further insure the integrity of the program, a random
end the application form, the student applicant, as well as sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a
his parent, signs a sworn statement, as follows: student's application form is undertaken. Among those who
applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was
Statement of the Student Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law.

I hereby certify, upon my honor, that all the data and On March 14, 1991, a team composed of Arsenio L. Dona
information which I have furnished are accurate and and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at
complete. I understand that any willful misinformation the residence of Nadal at 31 Twinpeaks Drive, Blue Ridge,
and/or withholding of information will automatically Quezon City.
disqualify me from receiving any financial assistance or
subsidy, and may serve as ground for my expulsion from Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the
the University. Furthermore, is such misinformation and/or team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino,
withholding of information on my part is discovered after I Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between
have been awarded tuition scholarship or any form of the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and
financial assistance, I will be required to reimburse all Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and
financial benefits plus the legal rate of interest prevailing at Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman
the time of the reimbursement without prejudice to the filing Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. 2
of charges against me. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis)
In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact- Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation
finding team to visit my home/residence to verify the showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that
veracity of the information provided in this application and I he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 31

owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies in violation of
was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal paragraph [a], Section 2 of the Rules [now covered by
was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had paragraph (i), Section 2 of the Rules, as amended 25 June
reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to 1992]." As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty
June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." of expulsion from the University and required him to
Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he
full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be
rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the "effected by the University thru outside legal action." 8
suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding
of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to
that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review
Tribunal for further investigation. 3 pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct
and Discipline. On November 26, 1992, the Executive
On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, Committee, voting 13:4, affirmed the decision of the SDT;
among other things, that his mother migrated to the United whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents
States in 1981 but because her residency status had not (BOR). The appeal was included in the agenda of the BOR
yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, meeting on January 25, 1993. 9
regular, well-paying employment." He also stated that his
mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio, was shouldering the On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the
expenses of the college education of his two younger Chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Education,
brothers. 4 thereby making her automatically a member of the BOR,
Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani wrote the BOR a letter
Noting further discrepancies between Nadal's application expressing her view that, after a close review of Nadal s
form and the certification, the U.P. charged Nadal before case by her legal staff, "it is only fair and just to find Mr.
the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) on August 23, 1991 Nadal's appeal meritorious and his arguments worthy of
with the following: belief. Consequently, he should be allowed to graduate and
take the bar examinations this year." 10
That respondent RAMON P. NADAL (UP Student No. 83-
11640), a student of the College of Law, UP System, At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the
Diliman, Quezon City, and STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) decision of the SDT but because "the Board was willing to
recipient (Bracket 4 for SY 1989-1990; Bracket 5 for SY grant a degree of compassion to the appellant in view of the
1990-1991) in his applications for STFAP (ISKOLAR NG alleged status and predicament of the mother as an
BAYAN) benefits which he filed for schoolyear 1989-1990, immigrant 'TNT' in the United States," the penalty was
and schoolyear 1990-1991, with the Office of Scholarship modified "from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension,
and Student Services (formerly Scholarship and Financial effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits
Assistance Service) voluntarily and willfully withheld and did received from the STFAP, with legal interest." The BOR
not declare the following: also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good
moral character. 11
(a) That he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla,
Model 1977); and Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the
BOR decision, allegedly against the advice of his counsel.
(b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing 12 The motion was placed on the agenda of the February
Nadal) in the U.S.A., in support of the studies of his 25, 1993 meeting of the BOR. A day before said date,
brothers Antonio and Federico, Senator Shahani wrote the BOR another letter requesting
that deliberation on Nadal's case be deferred until such time
which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount as she could attend a BOR meeting.
to acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation of
paragraph (a), Section 2, of the Rules and Regulations on On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's
Student Conduct and Discipline, as amended. (Approved by motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR held a
the B.O.R. at its 876th meeting on 02 September 1976, special meeting to accommodate the request of Regent
amended at the 923rd B.O.R. meeting on 31 January 1980, Shahani with Nadal's case as the sole item on its agenda.
and further amended at its 1017th B.O.R. meeting on 08 Again, Nadal's motion for reconsideration was included in
December 1988). 5 the March 23, 1993 agenda but in view of the absence of
Senator Shahani, the decision thereon was deferred.
On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT 6 rendered a
decision in SDT Case No. 91-026 exculpating Nadal of the At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the
charge of deliberately withholding in his STFAP application Board Room of the Manila Polo Club in Forbes Park,
form information that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla Makati, Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material
car, but finding him guilty of "wilfully and deliberately importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's claim that
withholding information about the income of his mother, earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial
who is living abroad, in support of the studies of his aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU).
brothers Antonio and Federico, 7 which is tantamount to Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 32

had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student
there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio The Chairman himself did not vote. 13
declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the
records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a
it should be disclosed that Nadal Falsely stated that he certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient
received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the
gross and material misrepresentation that would even BOR met again at a special meeting at the Westin
warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a Philippine Plaza Hotel. According to Regent Carpio, in
conditional vote that would depend on the verification of executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty" as the
Nadal's claim on the matter. members voted as follows: six members — guilty, three
members — not guilty, and three members abstained. 14
U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva Consequently, the BOR imposed on Nadal the penalties of
countered by stating that "a decision should not be suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-
anchored solely on one piece of information which he issuance of any certificate of good moral character during
considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed
pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per
1989 which had been established in the investigation and annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his
the reviews." He added that "the respondent's eligibility for transcript of records until he has settled his financial
his AdeMU high school scholarship and financial assistance obligations with the university. 15
from 1979 to 1983 does not in any way establish that he is
'not guilty as charged' before the SDT," since the formalOn March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a
charges against him do not include withholding of handwritten letter stating that "after learning of the latest
information regarding scholarship grants received from decision" of the BOR, he had been "intensely concentrating
other schools. on (his) job so that (he) can earn enough to pay for (his)
financial obligations to the University." Alleging that he was
At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board "now letting nature take its course," Nadal begged
decided to go into executive session where the following President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding
transpired: the case. 16

The Chairman of the Board, together with the President, However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional
directed the Secretary to reflect in the minutes of the Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with
meeting the following decisions of the Board in executive preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining
session, with only the Board members present. order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M.
Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and
A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Olivia C. Caoili. The petition prayed:
Nadal was guilty or not guilty as charged of willful
withholding of information in relation to his application for After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:
Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance Program
(STFAP) benefits which he filed for Schoolyears 1989-1990 a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;
and 1990-1991 which is tantamount to act of dishonesty in
relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and implement
2 of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and their decision rendered on 28 March 1993, exonerating
Discipline, as amended. petitioner from all the charges against him, and accordingly
dismissing SDT No. 91-026;
The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action
during the Executive Session: four (4) voted guilty; three (3) c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay
voted not guilty; and three (3) gave conditional votes, petitioner litigation expenses of at least P150,000.00.
pending verification with Father Raymond Holscher of
Ateneo de Manila University of Ramon P. Nadal's statement Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 17
in his STFAP application that he was granted scholarship
while he was in high school. Should Ateneo confirm that The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining
Nadal had not received financial assistance, then the order and the writ of preliminary injunction was immediately
conditional votes would be considered as guilty, and if set for hearing. At the May 10, 1993 hearing, the lower
otherwise, then not guilty. The Chairman requested the court declared that the only issue to be resolved was
President to make the verification as soon as possible the "whether or not the respondents in Civil Case No. 93-15665
next day. In answer to a query, the Chairman clarified that violated (Nadal's) right to due process when it rendered a
once the information was received from Ateneo, there decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him"
would be no need for another meeting to validate the during the March 29, 1993 meeting. After the respondents
decision. had presented their first witness, Dr. Olivia C. Caoili, the
lower court asked respondents' counsel whether they were
The President reiterated his objections to the casting of amenable to maintaining the status quo. Said counsel
conditional votes. replied in the negative, asserting the University's

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 33

prerogative to discipline students found guilty of violating its exists a threat to the petitioner (respondent in SDT Case
rules of discipline. 18 No, 91-026) that the decision of the Board of Regents finally
finding him guilty of willfully withholding information material
On the same day, the lower court 19 issued the following to his application for Socialized Tuition and Financial
Order: Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits, will be implemented
at any time, especially during the enrollment period, and
The parties were heard on their respective positions on the this implementation would work injustice to the petitioner as
incident (application for preliminary injunction and prayer for it would delay him in finishing his course, and,
temporary restraining order and opposition thereto). For consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job. The
lack of material time set this for continuation on May 17 and injury thus caused would be irreparable.
18, 1993 both at 2:30 p.m.
"Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule
In the meantime, in order that the proceedings of this case where there is no standard by which their amount can be
may not be rendered moot and academic, the respondents measured with reasonable accuracy. Where the damage is
herein, namely: Jose V. Abueva, President of the University susceptible of mathematical computation, it is not
of the Philippines and Vice-Chairman of the U.P. Board of irreparable." (Social Security Commission v. Bayona, et al.,
Regents, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura and G.R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962).
Armand V. Fabella, members of the U.P. Board of Regents,
Olivia C. Caoili, the officers, agents, representatives, and all IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to render
persons acting in their behalf, are hereby temporarily moot the issues in the instant proceedings, let a writ of
restrained from implementing their decision rendered on preliminary injunction be issued restraining the
March 29, 1993 in Administrative SDT Case No. 91-026 respondents, their officers, agent(s), representatives, and
entitled University of the Philippines vs. Ramon P. Nadal, all persons acting in their behalf, from further proceeding
as reflected in the Minutes of the 1062nd meeting of the with SDT Case No. 91-026, and from suspending petitioner,
Board of Regents, U.P. held at the Romblon Room, Westin upon the latter's filing a bond in the amount of P3,000.00.
Phil. Plaza, Manila, until further order from this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 20
SO ORDERED.
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Emerenciana Y. Arcellana, Ariel P. Tanangonan, Leticia R. prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or
Shahani and Antonio T. Carpio. The University, on the other temporary restraining order, raising the following issues:
hand, presented Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal himself as a whether or not Nadal was denied due process in the
hostile witness. On May 29, 1993, the lower court issued administrative disciplinary proceedings against him, and,
the following Order: whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her
discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary
The petitioner complains that he was not afforded due injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing
process when, after the Board Meeting on SDT Case No. the suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal.
91-026 on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of
"NOT GUILTY" in his favor, the Chairman of the U.P. Board Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the
of Regents, without notice to the herein petitioner, called instant petition, we shall confront a threshold issue raised
another meeting the following day to deliberate on his (the by private respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not having
Chairman's) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, which been authorized by the Board of Regents as a collegial
this time resulted in a decision of "GUILTY." While he main body to file the instant petition, and Dr. Abueva, who
issue of violation of due process raised in the petition pends verified the petition, not being the "Board of Regents" nor
trial and resolution, the petitioner prays for the issuance of a "the University of the Philippines," they are not real parties
writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the respondents in interest who should file the same. 21
from further proceeding with SDT Case No. 21-026 and
from suspending the petitioner for one year. A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of
It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means
injunctive writ that there must be a right to be protected. As material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the issue in the case at bar is due process in the March 29 the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
Board meeting, there is, indeed, a right to be protected for, question involved, or a mere incidental interest." 22
in administrative proceedings, a respondent's right to due Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to
process exists not only at the early stages but also at the protect inasmuch as what is in issue here is its power to
final stage thereof. impose disciplinary action against a student who violated
the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and
With the circulation to the members of the Board of Discipline by withholding information in connection with his
Regents, as well as to other UP personnel, of the Minutes application for STFAP benefits, which information, if
of the March 29, 1993 meeting, even after this case had disclosed, would have sufficed to disqualify him from
already been filed, the Court is convinced that there now receiving the financial assistance he sought. Such

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 34

dishonesty, if left unpunished, would have the effect of
subverting a commendable program into which the
University officials had devoted much time and expended
precious resources, from the conceptualization to the
implementation stage, to rationalize the socialized scheme
of tuition fee payments in order that more students may
benefit from the public funds allocated to the State
University.
suspended for having breached the University's disciplinary
rules. In the Non case, the Court ruled that the students
were not afforded due process for even the refusal to re-
enroll them appeared to have been a mere afterthought on
part of the school administrators. Here, Nadal does not
dispute the fact that his right to due process was held
inviolate until the BOR decided to meet on March 29, 1993
with his case as the sole item on the agenda.

Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as In any event it is gross error to equate due process in the
respondents in the petition for mandamus that he filed instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29,
below, Nadal is now estopped from questioning their 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not
personality to file the instant petition. 23 Moreover, under require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals
Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of the whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the
University Code "all process" against the BOR shall be Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary
served on "the president or secretary thereof'." It is in cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the
accordance with these legal provisions that Dr. Caoili is final review body. At no time did respondent complain of
named as a petitioner. Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and
University President and member of the BOR, has to verify special BOR meetings where his case was up for
the petition. It is not mandatory, however, that each and deliberation. He would make an exception of the March 29,
every member of the BOR be named petitioners. As the 1993 meeting for it was "supposed to reconsider the
Court has time and again held, an action may be decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating respondent
entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include an Nadal from all administrative charges against him." 29
indispensable party where it appears that the naming of the
party would be but a formality. 24 Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower
court on May 25, 1993 admitted that there was no final
No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is verdict at the March 28, 1993 meeting in view of the
the issue on the right of an academic institution to refuse conditional votes resulting from his assertion that he was
admission to a student arising from the imposition upon him "not morally convinced that there was sufficient evidence to
of an administrative disciplinary sanction. In our recent make a finding of guilty against Nadal because there was
decision in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. no direct evidence that his mother received income from the
Capulong, 25 wherein certain law students were dismissed United States and this income was sent to the Philippines to
for hazing resulting in the death of another, we held that the support the studies of the children." 30 Two regents shared
matter of admission of students is within the ambit of the view of Regent Carpio, with the following result: four
academic freedom and therefore, beyond the province of voted guilty, three, not guilty, and three cast conditional
the courts to decide. Certain fundamental principles bear votes. The BOR agreed that, upon the suggestion of
stressing. Regent Carpio, they would still verify from the AdeMU about
Nadal's alleged scholarship as a student in said institution.
One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus Consequently, no definitive decision was arrived at by the
below was that he was denied due process. To clarify, the BOR on March 28, 1993, Much less was a verdict of
so-called lack of due process referred only to the March 29, exoneration handed down as averred by respondent.
1993 meeting of the BOR. As stated by respondent's
counsel: "What was conceded by undersigned counsel was Regent Carpio testified, with respect to the March 29, 1993
that Nadal was afforded due process from the start of the meeting where all twelve members of the BOR were
administrative proceeding up to the meeting of the Board of present, that all of them participated in the voting held to
Regents on March 28, 1993." 26 reconsider the previous day's decision. He stated "I
remember Regent Arcellana questioning the voting again
With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent on the ground that there was already a final decision, but
considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due there was a vote taken on whether a motion for
process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said reconsideration can be decided by the board, and a
meeting. Counsel cites the ruling in Non v. Dames II 27 that majority of the board ruled that the matter can be
imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of reconsidered again upon motion of the chairman." 31
procedural due process," 28 the phrase obviously referring
to the sending of notice of the meeting. At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent
guilty, three (3) voted that he was not guilty and three (3)
Attention is drawn to the disparate factual environments abstained. As succinctly announced by Regent Carpio, the
obtaining in Non v. Dames II and in the instant case. In the final decision was that which was rendered on March 29,
former case, the students were refused admission for 1993 as "no other decision was made by the Board with
having led or participated in student mass actions against respect to the same issue." 32
the school, thereby posing a collision between
constitutionally cherished rights — freedom of expression Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his
and academic freedom. In the case at bar, Nadal was client was "not given due process in the March 29 meeting

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 35

because the ground upon which he was again convicted
was not the same as the original charge." 33 Obviously, he
was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March
28, i.e., whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he
claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the
AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the
charge considered was "exactly the same charge" of
withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. 34
It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio
requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a
scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not
"morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other
words, he sought additional insights into the character of
Nadal through the information that would be obtained from
the AdeMU.
In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and
a mere superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification
aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently,
that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable,
regular, well-paying employment" but that she was
supporting the education of his brothers with the help of
another son. To our mind, this constitutes sufficient
admission that Nadal withheld information on the income,
however measly and irregular, of his mother. Unlike in
criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable
doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-
judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required,
that which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. 35 In light of
the foregoing circumstances, we find that Nadal has been
sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to
divulge all information needed when he applied for the
benefits of the STFAP.
Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the
ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all
costs so that justice may prevail. The sentinels who stand
guard at the portals leading to the hallowed Temples of
Justice cannot be overzealous in admitting only those who
are intellectually and morally fit. In those who exhibit
duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady
character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the
practice of his profession.
Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably
aware that the bedrock axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Further on, Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar." (Emphasis
supplied for emphasis)
Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble
profession of law that honesty and integrity are
requirements no less weighty than hurdling the Bar
examinations. This is the reason why a certification of good
moral character is one of the documents that must be
CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 36
submitted in applying to take said examination. In fact, a
charge of immoral or deceitful conduct on the part of an
applicant, when proved, is a ground for disqualifying him.
To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been
shown sufficiently that respondent has committed an act of
dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection
with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant
violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct
and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent
power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be
invoked and rightfully exercised.
As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline
is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the
mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right
to survive and continue operating. In more relevant terms,
through its power to impose disciplinary sanctions, an
educational institution is able to exercise its academic
freedom which is, in the case at bar, the right to suspend
and refuse admission to a student who has subverted its
authority in the implementation of the critically important
STFAP.
At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a
University is encompassed by the right of academic
freedom. In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology 36 the Court stated that a school
or college which is possessed of the right of academic
freedom "decides for itself its aims and objectives and how
best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students."
Elucidating, in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio
M. Capulong, 37 the Court further expounded:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have
consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission
to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a
school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student
rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982,
students have a right "to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights
are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards
laid down by the academic institution.
For private schools have the right to establish reasonable
rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and
promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to
parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not
legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and
cooperate with the schools.
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation
and indispensable to the successful management of the
college. The rules may include those governing student
discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules
governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, if
not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the incidentally, has not ceased refining and modifying it's
institution, but to its very survival. operations.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of
militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the
students demanded and plucked for themselves from the
panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized
under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in
Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, that is,
their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.
(Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the
lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for
mandamus.
SO ORDERED.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218; GR NO
84818 18 DEC 1989 CASE DIGEST

On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside
finds that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower
court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services
sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain
the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, specified lines that were reduced by order of herein
and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National
Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered
without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive
own making, which led him into such a predicament. More Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix
importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and
issue of academic freedom which provides more than hearing.
ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary
sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was
learning. exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
court should have restrained itself from assuming petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and
jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is regulation of respondent NTC
never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and
certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. 38
It is of no avail against an official or government agency Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.
39
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-
lower court dared to tread upon legally forbidden grounds. making power and even the power to fix rates- when such
For, by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
academic freedom was peremptorily curtailed. Moreover, given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a
the door was flung wide open for Nadal to do exactly what legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains
the decision of the BOR prohibited him from doing and that all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is
is, to violate the suspension order by enrolling for the first the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and
semester of 1993-1994. It must have been with to no other
consternation that the University officials helplessly
watching him complete his academic requirements for The respondent admits that the questioned order was
taking the Bar. 40 In the event that he be allowed to issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however,
continue with his studies he would, in effect render moot insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the
and academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings
legally imposed upon him by the BOR's final decision of and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court
March 29, 1993. What is to prevent other aspirants for said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate
STFAP scholarships from misleading the University pending final determination of the application of petitioner,
authorities by misrepresenting certain facts or as in instant such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
case, withholding vital information and stating downright exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice
falsehoods, in their application forms with impunity? Not and hearing
only would this undermine the authority of the U.P. to
discipline its students who violated the rules and regulations The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to
of the institution but, more importantly, subvert the very rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
concept and lofty intent to give financial assistance to poor without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order
but deserving students through the STFAP which, be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 37

didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the 3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A"
petitioner. antenna(Pinugay III) was established. Pinugay II provided
links with the Indian Ocean Region (major cities in Europe,
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE Middle East, Africa, and other Asia Pacific countries
CORPORATION, petitioner, operating within the region) thru the Indian Ocean
vs. INTELSAT satellite.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" antenna
respondents. (Pinugay III) was established to temporarily assume the
functions of Pinugay I and then Pinugay II while they were
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner. being refurbished. Pinugay III now serves as spare or
reserved antenna for possible contingencies.
Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz.
5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed a
standard "B" antenna at Clark Air Field, Pampanga as a
television receive-only earth station which provides the U.S.
REGALADO, J.: Military bases with a 24-hour television service.

This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense
that it involves the public utility services of the petitioner
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the only one rendering
such services in the Philippines.
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an
Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
(hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs
the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged
by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by
fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further
reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power
and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due
process of law.
The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner 2 are
not in dispute. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514,
PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish,
construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such
places as the grantee may select, station or stations and
associated equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise
granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services
from the communications satellite system and ground
terminal or terminals."
6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation of a third
standard "A" earth station (Pinugay IV) to take over the links
in Pinugay I due to obsolescence. 3
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the
petitioner is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the
Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the
Convention and the Operating Agreement of the
International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)
of 53 member nations, which two global commercial
telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively
established by various states in line with the principles set
forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of
the United Nations.
Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite
circuits to:
1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;
2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;
3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;
4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and
5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.

Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus
undertook the following activities and established the provided by petitioner enable said international carriers to
following installations: serve the public with indispensable communication
services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile,
1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional earth telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and
station in Pinugay, Rizal. television standard conversion from European to American
or vice versa.
2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna (Pinugay I)
was established. Pinugay I provided direct satellite Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was
communication links with the Pacific Ocean Region (the exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
United States, Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
Thailand, China [PROC], New Zealand and Brunei) thru the Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite. petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 38

services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said
Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to
apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders,
as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates
therefor.
Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner
filed with respondent NTC an application 4 for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has
been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to
continue providing the international satellite
communications services it has likewise been providing
since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in
rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for
a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and
maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the
services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein
applied for.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a
provisional authority to continue operating its existing
facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to
charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was
valid for six (6) months from the date of said order. 5 When
said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was
extended for another six (6) months, or up to September
16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the
provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6)
months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed
the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a
reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized
rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on
the following ground:
The Commission in its on-going review of present service
rates takes note that after an initial evaluation by the Rates
Regulation Division of the Common Carriers Authorization
Department of the financial statements of applicant, there is
merit in a REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject
to further reductions, should the Commission finds (sic) in
its further evaluation that more reduction should be effected It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the
either on the basis of a provisional authorization or in the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner
final consideration of the case. 6 required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.
hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust,
unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a
violation of substantive due process.
I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of
Executive Order No. 546, providing for the creation of
respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of
Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under the
jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that
respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise
of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While petitioner in
its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue delegation of
legislative power, it subsequently clarified its said
submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of
certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of
quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of
which allegedly requires an express conferment by the
legislative body.
Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect
questioning the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos.
546 and 196 on the ground that the same do not fix a
standard for the exercise of the power therein conferred.
We hold otherwise.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power
may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard
for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making
the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of
the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative
agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case,
establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory
and must have been established in the manner prescribed
by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
power, the only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is
that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been
held that even in the absence of an express requirement as
to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 7

PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196,
following reasons: respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to
determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of
1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of public service communications which necessarily include
respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection
communications does not provide the necessary standards therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No.
constitutionally required, hence there is an undue 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the
delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory requirements of public safety, public interest and
powers of NTC; reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of
private entities in communications and broadcasting
2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides
properly and constitutionally conferred, the same was for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and
exercised in an unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra Communications with control and supervision over
vires, in that (a) the questioned order violates procedural respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national
due process for having been issued without prior notice and economic viability of the entire network or components of

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 39

the communications systems contemplated therein should
be maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an
in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in
order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of
its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable
rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements
of a valid delegation of legislative power.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned
order violates procedural due process because it was
issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without
the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order
was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a
unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an
opportunity to present its side before the order in question
was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction
and the consequent deterioration of the public service could
have been shown and demonstrated to respondents.
Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate
fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-
judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are
necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of
due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the
fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is
quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the
function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice
and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to
a named person, as in the instant case, the function
involved is adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they insist that
under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be
preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant
to respondent NTC's legislative function but because the
assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in
the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application for a
certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not
the only primary source of data or information since
respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of
the rates charged.
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Commission, 9 we made a categorical classification as to
when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-
judicial and when it is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the
power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant
to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is
not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same
applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is
predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report
submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is
making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital,
which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled
to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce
evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or
complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion
CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 40
drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in
making said finding of fact, respondent performed a
function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid
exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of
The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. 10 to
wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of
the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is
not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer,
Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is
said: 'If the nature of the administrative agency is
essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and
hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future
action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
property are not involved, is not determined according to
the same rules which apply in the case of the direct
application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in
73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec.
130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity
of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding
depends on the character of the proceeding and the
circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is
possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice
and hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the administrative body acts in
the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative
functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a
judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular
and immediate rather than general and prospective, the
person whose rights or property may be affected by the
action is entitled to notice and hearing. 11
The order in question which was issued by respondent
Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is
premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial,
that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates
charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's
financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit
of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of
the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate
reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the
attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%)
rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner
could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis
the viability of its business requirements. The rates it
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it
conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a
public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude.
We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to
petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of
its service to the public considering the maintenance
requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the
financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector
who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on
questioned order. knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which
is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made was given no opportunity to controvert.
by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made
that notice and hearing are not necessary since the effective on a specified date. It becomes a final legislative
assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings act as to the period during which it has to remain in force
and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft pending the final determination of the case. 13 An order of
of merit. respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a
temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low,
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate- since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during
fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final
the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, insofar as the revenue during the period covered by the
as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming order is concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the
that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will
same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its
such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce property, a declaration of its nullity becomes inductible,
entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory which brings us to the issue on substantive due process.
procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other
order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is
applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result
provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of
provides: business. On the other hand, respondents assert that since
petitioner is operating its communications satellite facilities
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no
notice and hearing the Commission shall have power, upon vested right therein. What it has is merely a privilege or
proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and license which may be revoked at will by the State at any
provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and time without necessarily violating any vested property right
exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the of herein petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of
contrary: respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of such privilege
should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor arbitrary, but
xxx xxx xxx it must be fair and reasonable.

(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a
which shall be imposed, observed and followed thereafter legislative franchise which is subject to amendment,
by any public service; ... alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good
so requires. 14 Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination
does not apply to respondent NTC, there being no limiting, of the operation of said utility is required by the common
excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive good.
Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the
has no authority to make such order without first giving consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the
petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or utility, or clothed with the general power of management
permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the
commission's own motion as in the present case. That such regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to
a hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to
September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due
PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then
its existing facilities, to render the services it presently of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore,
offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under which operates as an effective confiscation of private
the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
consideration of the merit of this application, the infringement of property rights is void, because it is
Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12 repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process
and equal protection of the laws. 15
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing
respondents may have other sources of information or data, Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its
still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by public

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 41

utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the There projected undertakings were formulated on the
rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission premise that rates are maintained at their present or at
has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof may
regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of practically lead to a cessation of its business. While we
reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not concede the primacy of the public interest in an adequate
be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be and efficient service, the same is not necessarily to be
oppressive. 16 equated with reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates
assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and
What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of the consumer.
formula but of sound business judgment based upon the
evidence 17 it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of Consequently, we hold that the challenged order,
discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being
independent judgment. 18 In determining whether a rate is violative of the due process clause is void and should be
confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should
situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. A heretofore have done, with the hearing and determination of
method often employed in determining reasonableness is petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public
the fair return upon the value of the property to the public convenience and necessity and in which proceeding the
utility. Competition is also a very important factor in subject of rates involved in the present controversy, as well
determining the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is as other matter involved in said application, be duly
allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due
competition. 19 observance of our pronouncements herein.

A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate
reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial
evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner,
contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several
other sources of information without, however, divulging
such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an
attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed
rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the
financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction
without any elucidation on what implications and
conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from said
statements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data
reflected in the financial statements influenced its decision
to impose a rate reduction.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the
order of respondents, dated September 2, 1988, in NTC
Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order issued under our resolution of September
13, 1988, as specifically directed against the aforesaid
order of respondents on the matter of existing rates on
petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED
Agabon vs. NLRC / Riviera Home - GR No. 158693 Case
Digest

On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe FACTS:

drawback, with the consequent detriment to the public
service, should the order of respondent NTC turn out to be
unreasonable and improvident. The business in which
petitioner is engaged is unique in that its machinery and
equipment have always to be taken in relation to the
equipment on the other end of the transmission
arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition, rehabilitation, or
refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily
entails a major adjustment or innovation on the business of
petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any change in the
sending end abroad has to be matched with the
corresponding change in the receiving end in the
Philippines. Conversely, any in the receiving end abroad
has to be matched with the corresponding change in the
sending end in the Philippines. An inability on the part of
petitioner to meet the variegations demanded be
technology could result in a deterioration or total failure of
the service of satellite communications.
At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed
at refurbishing, rehabilitating, and renewing its machinery
and equipment in order to keep up with the continuing
charges of the times and to maintain its facilities at a
competitive level with the technological advances abroad.
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum
board and cornice installers from January 1992 to February
23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of
work. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
was decided in their favor by the Labor Arbiter. Riviera
appealed to the NLRC contending just cause for the
dismissal because of petitioner’s abandonment of work.
NLRC ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not
entitled to backwages and separation pay. The CA in turn
ruled that the dismissal was not illegal because they have
abandoned their work but ordered the payment of money
claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the
existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the right to be heard and to
defend himself. Abandonment is the deliberate and

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 42

unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his and, in lieu of reinstatement to pay them their separation
employment. For a valid finding or abandonment, two pay of one (1) month for every year of service from date of
factors are considered: failure to report for work without a hiring up to November 29, 1999.
valid reason; and, a clear intention to sever employer-
employee relationship with the second as the more Respondent is further ordered to pay the
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from complainants their holiday pay and service incentive leave
which it may be deduced that the employees has no more pay for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998 as well as their
intention to work. premium pay for holidays and rest days and Virgilio
Agabon’s 13th month pay differential amounting to TWO
Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (P2,150.00) Pesos, or
employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the aggregate amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE
the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT & 93/100
penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This (P121,678.93) Pesos for Jenny Agabon, and ONE
became known as the Wenphil Doctrine of the Belated Due HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND EIGHT
process Rule. HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT & 93/100 (P123,828.93)
Pesos for Virgilio Agabon, as per attached computation of
Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not forJulieta C. Nicolas, OIC, Research and Computation Unit,
any of the justifiable or authorized by law. Where the NCR.
dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal but the employer SO ORDERED.[4]
should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to
discourage the abhorrent practice of “dismiss now, pay On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter
later” which we sought to deter in Serrano ruling. The because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their
violation of employees’ rights warrants the payment of work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation
nominal damages. pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter
were also denied for lack of evidence.[5]
AGABON V NLRC
Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals.
This petition for review seeks to reverse the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2003, The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal
in CA-G.R. SP No. 63017, modifying the decision of of the petitioners was not illegal because they had
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC- abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of
NCR Case No. 023442-00. money claims. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc.
is engaged in the business of selling and installing WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor
ornamental and construction materials. It employed Relations Commission is REVERSED only insofar as it
petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum dismissed petitioner’s money claims. Private respondents
board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992[2] until are ordered to pay petitioners holiday pay for four (4)
February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for regular holidays in 1996, 1997, and 1998, as well as their
abandonment of work. service incentive leave pay for said years, and to pay the
balance of petitioner Virgilio Agabon’s 13th month pay for
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and 1998 in the amount of P2,150.00.
payment of money claims[3] and on December 28, 1999,
the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the SO ORDERED.[6]
dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the
monetary claims. The dispositive portion of the decision Hence, this petition for review on the sole issue of
states: whether petitioners were illegally dismissed.[7]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find the Petitioners assert that they were dismissed because the
termination of the complainants illegal. Accordingly, private respondent refused to give them assignments
respondent is hereby ordered to pay them their backwages unless they agreed to work on a “pakyaw” basis when they
up to November 29, 1999 in the sum of: reported for duty on February 23, 1999. They did not agree
on this arrangement because it would mean losing benefits
1. Jenny M. Agabon - P56, 231.93 as Social Security System (SSS) members. Petitioners
2. Virgilio C. Agabon - 56, 231.93 also claim that private respondent did not comply with the
twin requirements of notice and hearing.[8]

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 43

 Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained
that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned their
work.[9] In fact, private respondent sent two letters to the
last known addresses of the petitioners advising them to
report for work. Private respondent’s manager even talked
to petitioner Virgilio Agabon by telephone sometime in June
1999 to tell him about the new assignment at Pacific Plaza
Towers involving 40,000 square meters of cornice
installation work. However, petitioners did not report for
work because they had subcontracted to perform
installation work for another company. Petitioners also
demanded for an increase in their wage to P280.00 per
day. When this was not granted, petitioners stopped
reporting for work and filed the illegal dismissal case.[10]
It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies like the NLRC are accorded not only respect but
even finality if the findings are supported by substantial
evidence. This is especially so when such findings were
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[11] However, if the
factual findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are
conflicting, as in this case, the reviewing court may delve
into the records and examine for itself the questioned
findings.[12]
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of
the facts, ruled that petitioners’ dismissal was for a just
cause. They had abandoned their employment and were
already working for another employer.
To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only
the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself.[13] Article 282 of the Labor Code
enumerates the just causes for termination by the
employer: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by
the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the
latter’s representative in connection with the employee’s
work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal
of an employee to resume his employment.[14] It is a form
of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of
employment by the employer.[15] For a valid finding of
abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the
failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship, with the second as the
more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts
from which it may be deduced that the employees has no
more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the
employment must be shown by clear proof that it was
deliberate and unjustified.[16]
CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 44
In February 1999, petitioners were frequently absent
having subcontracted for an installation work for another
company. Subcontracting for another company clearly
showed the intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship with private respondent. This was not the first
time they did this. In January 1996, they did not report for
work because they were working for another company.
Private respondent at that time warned petitioners that they
would be dismissed if this happened again. Petitioners
disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention to
sever their employer-employee relationship. The record of
an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the
penalty that should be meted out to him.[17]
In Sandoval Shipyard v. Clave,[18] we held that an
employee who deliberately absented from work without
leave or permission from his employer, for the purpose of
looking for a job elsewhere, is considered to have
abandoned his job. We should apply that rule with more
reason here where petitioners were absent because they
were already working in another company.
The law imposes many obligations on the employer
such as providing just compensation to workers,
observance of the procedural requirements of notice and
hearing in the termination of employment. On the other
hand, the law also recognizes the right of the employer to
expect from its workers not only good performance,
adequate work and diligence, but also good conduct[19]
and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to
continue to employ such persons whose continuance in the
service will patently be inimical to his interests.[20]
After establishing that the terminations were for a just
and valid cause, we now determine if the procedures for
dismissal were observed.
The procedure for terminating an employee is found in
Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code:
Standards of due process: requirements of notice. – In all
cases of termination of employment, the following
standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
I. For termination of employment based on just
causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying
the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said
employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain
his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee
so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his that sending notices to the last known addresses would
termination. have been useless because they did not reside there
anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin
served on the employee’s last known address. notice requirements to the employee’s last known address.
[21] Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with
Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or the procedural requirements of due process.
omissions attributable to the employee while dismissals
based on authorized causes involve grounds under the A review and re-examination of the relevant legal
Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate principles is appropriate and timely to clarify the various
employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires rulings on employment termination in the light of Serrano v.
payment of separation pay. When the termination of National Labor Relations Commission.[22]
employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full
backwages are mandated under Article 279. If Prior to 1989, the rule was that a dismissal or
reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal termination is illegal if the employee was not given any
was unjust, separation pay may be granted. notice. In the 1989 case of Wenphil Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[23] we reversed this long-standing
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause rule and held that the dismissed employee, although not
under Article 282, the employer must give the employee given any notice and hearing, was not entitled to
two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard reinstatement and backwages because the dismissal was
if requested by the employee before terminating the for grave misconduct and insubordination, a just ground for
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which termination under Article 282. The employee had a violent
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard temper and caused trouble during office hours, defying
and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the superiors who tried to pacify him. We concluded that
decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on reinstating the employee and awarding backwages “may
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery
employer must give the employee and the Department of of the rules of discipline that employees are required to
Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the observe.”[24] We further held that:
effectivity of his separation.
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the private
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may respondent for just cause should be maintained. He has no
be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article right to return to his former employment.
282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under
Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to
process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or account for failure to extend to private respondent his right
authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the to an investigation before causing his dismissal. The rule is
dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was explicit as above discussed. The dismissal of an employee
no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or must be for just or authorized cause and after due process.
authorized cause but due process was not observed. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second
requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its
In the first situation, the dismissal is undoubtedly failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation
valid and the employer will not suffer any liability. as required by law before dismissing petitioner from
employment. Considering the circumstances of this case
In the second and third situations where the dismissals are petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the
illegal, Article 279 mandates that the employee is entitled to amount of P1,000.00. The measure of this award depends
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission
privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and committed by the employer.[25]
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid
actual reinstatement. reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due
process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the
In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the
upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it employee. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated
should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer Due Process Rule.
should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process. On January 27, 2000, in Serrano, the rule on the extent of
the sanction was changed. We held that the violation by
The present case squarely falls under the fourth the employer of the notice requirement in termination for
situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was just or authorized causes was not a denial of due process
established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to that will nullify the termination. However, the dismissal is
work for another company. Private respondent, however, ineffectual and the employer must pay full backwages from
did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 45

the time of termination until it is judicially declared that the due process should be differentiated from failure to comply
dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. with constitutional due process.

The rationale for the re-examination of the Wenphil doctrine Constitutional due process protects the individual from the
in Serrano was the significant number of cases involving government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or
dismissals without requisite notices. We concluded that the administrative proceedings; while statutory due process
imposition of penalty by way of damages for violation of the found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects
notice requirement was not serving as a deterrent. Hence, employees from being unjustly terminated without just
we now required payment of full backwages from the time cause after notice and hearing.
of dismissal until the time the Court finds the dismissal was
for a just or authorized cause. In Sebuguero v. National Labor Relations Commission,[28]
the dismissal was for a just and valid cause but the
Serrano was confronting the practice of employers to employee was not accorded due process. The dismissal
“dismiss now and pay later” by imposing full backwages. was upheld by the Court but the employer was sanctioned.
The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or
We believe, however, that the ruling in Serrano did not penalty, and depends on the facts of each case and the
consider the full meaning of Article 279 of the Labor Code gravity of the omission committed by the employer.
which states:
In Nath v. National Labor Relations Commission,[29] it was
ART. 279. Security of Tenure. – In cases of regular ruled that even if the employee was not given due process,
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services the failure did not operate to eradicate the just causes for
of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized dismissal. The dismissal being for just cause, albeit without
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from due process, did not entitle the employee to reinstatement,
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of backwages, damages and attorney’s fees.
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, in his separate opinion in MGG
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time Commission,[30] which opinion he reiterated in Serrano,
of his actual reinstatement. stated:

C. Where there is just cause for dismissal but due

This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not for process has not been properly observed by an employer, it
any of the justified or authorized causes provided by law. would not be right to order either the reinstatement of the
Payment of backwages and other benefits, including dismissed employee or the payment of backwages to him.
reinstatement, is justified only if the employee was unjustly In failing, however, to comply with the procedure prescribed
dismissed. by law in terminating the services of the employee, the
employer must be deemed to have opted or, in any case,
The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness and should be made liable, for the payment of separation pay. It
injustice which elicited strong dissent has prompted us to might be pointed out that the notice to be given and the
revisit the doctrine. hearing to be conducted generally constitute the two-part
due process requirement of law to be accorded to the
To be sure, the Due Process Clause in Article III, employee by the employer. Nevertheless, peculiar
Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights circumstances might obtain in certain situations where to
based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the undertake the above steps would be no more than a
traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed useless formality and where, accordingly, it would not be
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our imprudent to apply the res ipsa loquitur rule and award, in
entire history. Due process is that which comports with the lieu of separation pay, nominal damages to the employee. x
deepest notions of what is fair and right and just.[26] It is a x x.[31]
constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on the
executive and judicial powers of the government provided After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent
by the Bill of Rights. doctrines in the law on employment termination, we believe
that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing,
process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to
authorized causes of employment termination under the follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just
Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such
Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in
found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines in a fair result by dispensing justice not just to employees, but
Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department Order to employers as well.
Nos. 9 and 10.[27] Breaches of these due process
requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore statutory

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 46

 The unfairness of declaring illegal or ineffectual We have repeatedly stressed that social justice – or
dismissals for valid or authorized causes but not complying any justice for that matter – is for the deserving, whether he
with statutory due process may have far-reaching be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is
consequences. true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the
balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution
This would encourage frivolous suits, where even the fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is
most notorious violators of company policy are rewarded by it justified to give preference to the poor simply because
invoking due process. This also creates absurd situations they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are
where there is a just or authorized cause for dismissal but a rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and the
procedural infirmity invalidates the termination. Let us take rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.[35]
for example a case where the employee is caught stealing
or threatens the lives of his co-employees or has become a Justice in every case should only be for the
criminal, who has fled and cannot be found, or where deserving party. It should not be presumed that every case
serious business losses demand that operations be ceased of illegal dismissal would automatically be decided in favor
in less than a month. Invalidating the dismissal would not of labor, as management has rights that should be fully
serve public interest. It could also discourage investments respected and enforced by this Court. As interdependent
that can generate employment in the local economy. and indispensable partners in nation-building, labor and
management need each other to foster productivity and
The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is economic growth; hence, the need to weigh and balance
not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The the rights and welfare of both the employee and employer.
commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not
prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant
right, as in this case.[32] Certainly, an employer should not case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
be compelled to pay employees for work not actually dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
performed and in fact abandoned. employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of
his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor
The employer should not be compelled to continue Relations Commission.[36] The indemnity to be imposed
employing a person who is admittedly guilty of misfeasance should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of
or malfeasance and whose continued employment is “dismiss now, pay later,” which we sought to deter in the
patently inimical to the employer. The law protecting the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature of
rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self- indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts
destruction of the employer.[33] of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of
the due process violation of the employer.
It must be stressed that in the present case, the
petitioners committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment, Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is
which, if the requirements of due process were complied adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal. been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[37]
violative of Article 282 should not be protected by the Social
Justice Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the As enunciated by this Court in Viernes v. National
term suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice. Labor Relations Commissions,[38] an employer is liable to
As the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel observed, social pay indemnity in the form of nominal damages to an
justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity employee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such
of interdependence among diverse units of a society and of dismissal, the employer fails to comply with the
the protection that should be equally and evenly extended requirements of due process. The Court, after considering
to all groups as a combined force in our social and the circumstances therein, fixed the indemnity at P2,590.50,
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and which was equivalent to the employee’s one month salary.
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, This indemnity is intended not to penalize the employer but
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the to vindicate or recognize the employee’s right to statutory
greatest good to the greatest number.”[34] due process which was violated by the employer.[39]

This is not to say that the Court was wrong when it The violation of the petitioners’ right to statutory due
ruled the way it did in Wenphil, Serrano and related cases. process by the private respondent warrants the payment of
Social justice is not based on rigid formulas set in stone. It indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of
has to allow for changing times and circumstances. such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.[40]
Justice Isagani Cruz strongly asserts the need to apply a Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar,
balanced approach to labor-management relations and we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this
dispense justice with an even hand in every case: form of damages would serve to deter employers from
future violations of the statutory due process rights of
employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 47

recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter
under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. from which an employer is prohibited under Article 113[45]
of the same Code from making any deductions without the
Private respondent claims that the Court of employee’s knowledge and consent. In the instant case,
Appeals erred in holding that it failed to pay petitioners’ private respondent failed to show that the deduction of the
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month SSS loan and the value of the shoes from petitioner Virgilio
pay. Agabon’s 13th month pay was authorized by the latter. The
lack of authority to deduct is further bolstered by the fact
We are not persuaded. that petitioner Virgilio Agabon included the same as one of
his money claims against private respondent.
We affirm the ruling of the appellate court on petitioners’
money claims. Private respondent is liable for petitioners’ The Court of Appeals properly reinstated the monetary
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter ordering the private
pay without deductions. respondent to pay each of the petitioners holiday pay for
four regular holidays from 1996 to 1998, in the amount of
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the P6,520.00, service incentive leave pay for the same period
burden of proving it. Even where the employee must allege in the amount of P3,255.00 and the balance of Virgilio
non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on Agabon’s thirteenth month pay for 1998 in the amount of
the employer to prove payment, rather than on the P2,150.00.
employee to prove non-payment. The reason for the rule is
that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
remittances and other similar documents – which will show is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and January 23, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 63017, finding that
other claims of workers have been paid – are not in the petitioners’ Jenny and Virgilio Agabon abandoned their
possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute work, and ordering private respondent to pay each of the
control of the employer.[41] petitioners holiday pay for four regular holidays from 1996
to 1998, in the amount of P6,520.00, service incentive leave
In the case at bar, if private respondent indeed paid pay for the same period in the amount of P3,255.00 and the
petitioners’ holiday pay and service incentive leave pay, it balance of Virgilio Agabon’s thirteenth month pay for 1998
could have easily presented documentary proofs of such in the amount of P2,150.00 is AFFIRMED with the
monetary benefits to disprove the claims of the petitioners. MODIFICATION that private respondent Riviera Home
But it did not, except with respect to the 13th month pay Improvements, Inc. is further ORDERED to pay each of the
wherein it presented cash vouchers showing payments of petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages
the benefit in the years disputed.[42] Allegations by private for non-compliance with statutory due process.
respondent that it does not operate during holidays and that
it allows its employees 10 days leave with pay, other than No costs.
being self-serving, do not constitute proof of payment.
Consequently, it failed to discharge the onus probandi SO ORDERED.
thereby making it liable for such claims to the petitioners.
JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, vs.
Anent the deduction of SSS loan and the value of the DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID
shoes from petitioner Virgilio Agabon’s 13th month pay, we BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO and
find the same to be unauthorized. The evident intention of JONATHAN CAGABCAB.
Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005
income in the form of the 13th month pay to employees not
already receiving the same[43] so as “to further protect the Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA
level of real wages from the ravages of world-wide Foods Processing Corporation until the latter terminated
inflation.”[44] Clearly, as additional income, the 13th month their employment because the corporation was “in dire
pay is included in the definition of wage under Article 97(f) financial straits”. It is not disputed, however, that the
of the Labor Code, to wit: termination was effected without JAKA complying with the
requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding
(f) “Wage” paid to any employee shall mean the the service of a written notice upon the employees and the
remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or month before the intended date of termination.
ascertained on a time, task, piece , or commission basis, or Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal,
other method of calculating the same, which is payable by underpayment of wages and nonpayment of service
an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten incentive leave and 13th month pay against JAKA. The
contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the termination
services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair illegal and ordering JAKA to reinstate respondents with full
and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is not
Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily possible. The Court of Appeals reversed said decision and
furnished by the employer to the employee…” ordered respondent JAKA to pay petitioners separation pay

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 48

equivalent to one (1) month salary, the proportionate 13th Joy Remarca, Erick Tac-An, and Jenne Carlos.
month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time Respondents performed jobs such as slicer, laboratory
their employment was terminated. crew packers, recorders/encoders, loiners, vinyl bag
openers/receivers or storage persons, and who were
Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where necessary and desirable to the main business of petitioner.
an employee is dismissed for cause but such dismissal was
effected without the employer’s compliance with the notice On November 7, 2000, respondents were refused entrance
requirement under the Labor Code? by the guards manning the gate of the Davao Fish Port
Complex, as they were already terminated from work
Held: It was established that there was ground for effective November 1, 2000 based on a memorandum3
respondents’ dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one of dated November 7, 2000 issued by Romero, petitioner's
the authorized causes enumerated under Article 283 of the office manager. The memorandum was posted in the
Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to guardhouse.
comply with the notice requirement under the same Article.
Considering the factual circumstances in the instant case, On November 16, 2000, respondents filed with the Labor
the Court deem it proper to fix the indemnity at P50, 000.00. Arbiter (LA), Davao City, a Complaint for illegal dismissal
The Court of Appeals have been in error when it ordered with money claims for holiday pay, service incentive, leave
JAKA to pay respondents separation pay equivalent to one pay, allowances, unpaid salaries, damages and attorney's
(1) month salary for every year of service. “In all cases of fees against petitioner and Penta Manpower, alleging that
business closure or cessation of operation or undertaking of they were dismissed without just and valid cause and due
the employer, the affected employee is entitled to process. Petitioner was served a summons and a
separation pay. This is consistent with the state policy of complaint.
treating labor as a primary social economic force, affording
full protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The On December 11, 2000, a mandatory conference was
exception is when the closure of business or cessation of ordered but the amicable settlement failed. The LA then
operations is due to serious business losses or financial ordered all the parties to file their respective position
reverses; duly proved, in which case, the right of affected papers. Respondents and Penta Manpower filed their
employees to separation pay is lost for obvious reasons.” position papers, while petitioner did not file any despite
receipt of notice.

CELEBES JAPAN FOODS CORPORATION, represented
by KANEMITSU YAMAOKA and CESAR ROMERO,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YERMO, ORSON MAMALIS, BAI ANNIE ALANO,
MICHIE ALFANTA, GINALYN PANILAGAO, ANNALIE
AYAG, JOCELYN AGTON, JOSE JURIE SURIGAO,
GILDA SERRANO, JOY REMARGA, ERICK TAC-AN and
JENNE CARLOS, Respondents.
DECISION
On July 2, 2001, the LA rendered a decision4 in favor of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the dismissal of complainants as illegal; and
2. Ordering respondents Celebes Japan Foods Corp., Kenji
Fuji, Kanemitsu Yamaoka and Cesar B. Romero to pay to
complainants the award above set forth in the total amount
of P838,642.90 only.

DEL CASTILLO, J.: SO ORDERED.5

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the The LA found that there was an employer-employee
Decision1 dated June 27, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated relationship between respondents and petitioner; that
September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals, Mindanao respondents' works were necessary to petitioner's business
Station, Cagayan de Oro City, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73093. of processing tuna fish; that as regular employees,
respondents were entitled to security of tenure; that Penta
Petitioner Celebes Japan Foods Corporation is engaged in Manpower was a labor-only contractor, since it did not have
the business of buying, processing and exporting of tuna substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
fish, with buying station and plant located at the Davao Fishequipment and machineries, which were necessary for the
Port Complex, Daliao, Toril, Davao City. Kanemitsu performance of the required services; and that it was
Yamaoka, Cesar Romero and Kenji Fuji were the petitioner that actually managed, supervised and controlled
Chairman, Office Manager and Plant Supervisor, respondents' employment. The LA found respondents'
respectively, of petitioner Celebes. Petitioner contracted dismissal to be illegal, i.e., without cause and due process,
with Penta Manpower and Allied Resources to provide and proceeded to compute respondents' money claims.
manpower services for the former's business, with the latter
recruiting people to work for the former, people who Petitioner filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations
included respondents Susan Yermo, Orson Mamalis, Bai Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro City, on the ground
Annie Alano, Michie Alfanta, Ginalyn Panilagao, Annalie that the former was deprived of its right to due process, and
Ayag, Jocelyn Agton, Jose Jurie Surigao, Gilda Serrano,

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 49

that the LA rendered its decision contrary to law and operation as a consequence of prolonged lack of adequate
applicable jurisprudence. supply for high-quality fresh tuna. Although respondents
were dismissed for an authorized cause, the CA found that
On April 16, 2002, the NLRC rendered its Resolution,6 the petitioner did not comply with the statutory requirement of
dispositive portion of which reads: due process; thus, it ordered petitioner to pay each of the
respondents nominal damages in the amount of
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is VACATED P50,000.00.
and SET ASIDE in favor of REMANDING the entire records
to the arbitration branch of origin. The Labor Arbiter below Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, praying for the
is hereby directed to accord respondent Celebes Japan reduction of the nominal damages awarded from
Foods Corporation and the other respondents their right to P50,000.00 to P5,000.00 for each respondent, claiming that
due process by allowing them to submit their position the financial condition of the employer must be considered
paper, copy furnished the complainants and other in fixing the amount of nominal damages. It then submitted
respondent (PENTA), and after all the parties are heard, for an audited financial statement for the period ending
the Labor Arbiter to render its decision accordingly. December 31, 2004, comparative financial statements from
the years 2000 to 2004, and its annual income tax returns
SO ORDERED.7 for the same period, which all showed that the company
incurred capital deficits.
Respondents filed their motion for reconsideration, which
the NLRC denied in a Resolution8 dated June 18, 2002. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated September 22, 2006.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA, alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in Petitioner is before us raising a lone assignment of error,
finding that petitioner was denied due process and in thus:
remanding the case to the LA for further reception of
evidence. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
GROSSLY ERRED AND/OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
On June 27, 2005, the CA, Mindanao Station, Cagayan de DISCRETION IN MISAPPLYING THE DOCTRINES IN
Oro City, issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive AGABON v. NLRC, JAKA v. PACOT AND VIERNES v.
portion of which reads: NLRC BY REFUSING TO MODIFY AND/OR REDUCE
THE AWARD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES FROM P50,000.00
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is TO P5,000.00 PER EMPLOYEE TERMINATED AND IN
GRANTED in part. This Court hereby DECLARES the THE ABSENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC FACTUAL FINDING
legality of the dismissal but ORDERS Celebes Japan Foods THAT THIS IS A CASE OF "DISMISS NOW, PAY LATER"
Corporation to PAY each petitioner herein P50,000.00 as TERMINATION.10
NOMINAL DAMAGES for violation of statutory due process.
Further, this Court FINDS no cogent reason to remand the The petition has no merit.
case to the Labor Arbiter. 9
The CA ruled that respondents, who were petitioner's
The CA found that petitioner was not denied due process, employees, were terminated from work due to an
since the latter was duly informed that it was a party to the authorized cause; and this finding was never assailed by
illegal dismissal case filed by respondents, as shown by its them, thus, already attained finality. In fact, respondents in
receipt of the summons, together with the complaint, as well their Comment filed before us, accept such finding by
as the LA Orders directing the submission of position stating that there is no question that they have been
papers and informing the parties that the case was severed from their employment due to an authorized cause.
considered submitted for decision; that petitioner was given The CA also found that procedural due process was not
ample opportunities to defend its interest, but it chose not to observed in the termination of respondents, since the latter
participate, which constrained the LA to resolve the case was not served by petitioner the required notice as provided
based on available evidence; and that it was only after an under Article 283 of the Labor Code; i.e., a written notice
adverse decision by the LA that petitioner came out and must be served on the worker and the Department of Labor
claimed denial of due process. The CA further found that and Employment at least one month before the intended
the NLRC erred in remanding the case to the LA for further date of termination. This finding was not disputed at all by
proceeding, since the NLRC was in a position to resolve the petitioner. Thus, it is settled that respondents were
dispute based on the records before it. terminated due to an authorized cause without petitioner
complying with procedural due process.
The CA then proceeded to decide the case by agreeing
with the LA’s finding that respondents were petitioner's Where an employee was terminated for cause, but the
employees and not of Penta Manpower, as the latter was employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the
merely engaged in labor-only contracting. However, the CA employee is entitled to the payment of nominal damages
found that respondents' dismissal was for an authorized pursuant to our ruling in Agabon v. National Labor Relations
cause, as petitioner asserted that the absence or Commission11 and Jaka Food Processing Corporation v.
termination of their work was caused by a cessation of its Pacot.12

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 50

 failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to
In Agabon, we found the dismissal of the employees therein be imposed upon him should be tempered because the
to be valid and for a just cause, since abandonment was dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act
duly established. However, we held the employer liable, imputable to the employee; and (2) if the dismissal is based
because procedural due process was not observed. We on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the employer
ordered the employer to pay, in lieu of backwages, failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction
indemnity in the form of nominal damages, and we said: should be stiffer because the dismissal process was
initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management
The violation of the petitioners’ right to statutory due prerogative.14
process by the private respondent warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of In Agabon, the nominal damages awarded to the
such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the employees for a dismissal based on a just cause without
court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. x x x the notice requirement was P30,000.00; while in Jaka,
We believe this form of damages would serve to deter where the dismissal of the employees was based on an
employers from future violations of the statutory due authorized cause under Article 283, but without the required
process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a notice under the same rule, we fixed the amount at
vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted P50,000.00.
to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing
Rules.13 Petitioner claims that in the above-mentioned cases, the
relevant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly
The Agabon ruling was qualified in Jaka which declared the the financial condition of the employer, were taken into
dismissal of the employees valid as it was due to an consideration in fixing the amount of nominal damages; that
authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code, i.e., the amount of P50,000.00 for nominal damages awarded to
retrenchment, as it was proven that Jaka was suffering from the 12 employees in this case is not reasonable, since
serious business losses at the time it terminated petitioner has been having a capital deficit of
respondents’ employment. However, Jaka failed to comply P43,629,974.46 for the last three years, with a
with the notice requirement under the same rule. We then stockholders’ equity of only P2,750,000.00 or a capital
distinguished the case from Agabon stating: impairment equivalent to more than 15 times its
stockholders’ equity. This impairment differs from that of
The difference between Agabon and the instant case is that Jaka, since the latter has a P200 million equity and only a
in the former, the dismissal was based on a just cause 47% impairment of capital, with six employees terminated.
under Article 282 of the Labor Code while in the present
case, respondents were dismissed due to retrenchment, Petitioner's argument fails to persuade.
which is one of the authorized causes under Article 283 of
the same Code. Jaka has presented its audited financial statement to show
that it was in such serious financial distress as to justify the
At this point, we note that there are divergent implications of retrenchment of the employees concerned. As its
dismissal for just cause under Article 282, on one hand, and retrenchment program was undertaken in 1997, its deficit
a dismissal for authorized cause under Article 283, on the had ballooned to 123.61% of the stockholders’ equity; thus,
other. a capital deficiency or impairment of equity ensued; in
1998, the deficit grew to P355,794,897.00 or 177% of the
A dismissal for just cause under Article 282 implies that the stockholder's equity. The deficit was shown to prove the
employee concerned has committed, or is guilty of, some ground for the employees' dismissal, but it was not the sole
violation against the employer, i.e. the employee has basis of the court in fixing the nominal damages in the
committed some serious misconduct, is guilty of some fraud amount of P50,000.00 for each employee for Jaka's failure
against the employer, or, as in Agabon, he has neglected to comply with the notice requirement. In the same manner,
his duties. Thus, it can be said that the employee himself while petitioner in this case incurred a capital impairment
initiated the dismissal process. which was much higher than its stockholders' equity, the
same should not be the only basis for determining the
On another breath, a dismissal for an authorized cause amount of nominal damages that should be awarded. The
under Article 283 does not necessarily imply delinquency or gravity of the due-process violation should be taken into
culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the special consideration;15 and, just like in Jaka, the sanction
dismissal process is initiated by the employer’s exercise of should be stiffer, because the dismissal process was
his management prerogative, i.e., when the employer opts initiated by the employer’s exercise of its management
to install labor-saving devices, when he decides to cease prerogative.
business operations or when, as in this case, he undertakes
to implement a retrenchment program. Significantly, there was no bona fide attempt on the part of
petitioner to comply with the notice requirements under
xxxx Article 283 of the Labor Code. Records show that on
November 7, 2000, respondents were refused entrance by
Accordingly, it is wise to hold that: (1) if the dismissal is the guards manning the gate of the Davao Fish Port
based on a just cause under Article 282 but the employer Complex, based on a memorandum of even date issued by

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 51

Romero, petitioner's Office Manager, stating that
respondents had been terminated effective November 1,
2000. Respondents learned of the existence of such
memorandum, which was posted only in the guardhouse on
the day they were refused entrance to the gate. There was
indeed no notice at all to respondents. Notably, there was
not even any reason stated in the memorandum why they
were being terminated. We cannot overemphasize the
importance of the requirement of the notice of termination,
for we have ruled in a number of cases that non-compliance
therewith is tantamount to deprivation of the employee’s
right to due process.16

Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of

the plaintiff that has been violated or invaded by the
defendant may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.17 Considering the circumstances in this case, we find
no error committed by the CA in fixing the award of nominal
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each respondent
as indemnity for the violation of the latter’s statutory rights.

Petitioner's reliance on Viernes v. National Labor Relations

Commission18 to support its claim for the reduction of the
award of nominal damages is misplaced. The factual
circumstances are different. Viernes is an illegal dismissal
case, since there was no authorized cause for the dismissal
of the employees; and the employer was ordered to pay
backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits,
computed from the time the compensation was withheld up
to the actual reinstatement. In addition, since the dismissal
was done without due process, the nominal damages
awarded was only P2,590.00 equivalent to one-month
salary of the employee. In this case, the dismissal was
valid, as it was due to an authorized cause, but without the
observance of procedural due process, and the only award
given was nominal damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

June 27, 2005 and the Resolution dated September 22,
2006 of the Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station, Cagayan
de Oro City, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73093 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSTI 2 DUE PROCESS |Aila Marie Quinto 52