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Organization.
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InternationalOrganization44, 1, Winter1990
C 1990bytheWorldPeace Foundation Institute
andtheMassachusetts ofTechnology
Detenteand SALT
Approachesto explainingdetente
tweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionbutwhichforbothsideswent
beyondthesimpletaskofavoidingnuclearwar.Whiletheiraccountsoffer
valuableinsightson how theobjectivesof thetwo countriesdiffered and
whydetentein thiscase failedto producea lastingmodification of the
superpower relationship,theylacka solidtietointernational relationstheory
and do notaddresstheissue of thestructural impactof nuclearweapons.
Historicalexplanations leavethedistinct impression thata setofuniqueand
probablyirreproducible "causes" coalescedin the1970sto producea tem-
porarychangein thecharacterof superpower relations.If theintersection
ofobjectivesinthe1970sis seenonlyas a coincidence orhistorical
accident,
to generalizeaboutfuture
itis difficult fordetente.To do this,
possibilities
we needa theoretical approachthatwilladdressseveralbasicpuzzlesabout
detente:Fromwhichsourcesand underwhatcircumstances didthesuper-
powers'objectivesarise,and in whatsensemighttheyactuallyhave been
"shared"?If ambiguousobjectivesled to incompatible behaviorin specific
areas, did the experienceshatterthe objectives?Alternatively, if shared
objectivesdo persist,mighttheexperienceofthe1970sserveas a stepin a
socializationorlearning process,theresiduesofwhichcouldbe calledforth
in anotherattempt to realizesimilarobjectivesin the 1990s?
The logicalplace to startthesearchfora theorythatwilladdressthese
questionsis withrealismand,in particular, thestructuralor neorealistper-
spectiveassociatedwiththeworkofKennethWaltz.Numerouscriticshave
foundthatWaltz'stheory is sometimes misleadingormoreofteninadequate
forspecificpurposesininternational relations.ButthepostwarU.S.-Soviet
relationship oughtto be a relatively easy testforneorealism;the theory
shouldbe able to capturethedynamicof an intensely bipolarrelationship
betweentwogreatpowersthathavea highlevelofconflicting interests
and
a low level of interdependence. Can it do so in a way thatallows us to
extrapolate fromthedetenteexperienceofthe 1970s?
Structural realismstartswiththeaxiomsthattheinternational systemis
anarchicand thatstatesare compelledby theharshimperative of self-help
to providefortheirown securityand well-being. It suggeststhattheself-
help principlewill be strongest in a conflict-ridden, high-stakessecurity
relationshipbetweenpowerful states,suchas thatbetweentheUnitedStates
and the SovietUnion. Althoughanarchydoes not makecooperationim-
possible,any cooperationthatdoes emergeundertheseconditionsis ex-
pectedto be tenuous,unstable,and limitedto issues of peripheral impor-
tance.4Whileproponents ofstructural realismcan thusclaimthata limited
superpower detenteis notinconsistent withtherealistviewofworldpolitics,
4. I discuss this problemat lengthin ExplainingCooperation in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control
(Princeton, N.J.:Princeton UniversityPress,forthcoming).Fora moregeneraldiscussion, see
Robert0. Keohane,"Theoryof WorldPolitics:Structural Realismand Beyond,"in Ada
Finifter,ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington,D.C.: AmericanPo-
liticalScienceAssociation,1983),pp. 503-40.
of formalbodiesassociatedwitharmscontrol(suchas theStandingCon-
sultativeCommission)to the development of less formalbut stillinstitu-
tionalizedforumsforthediscussionof regionalconflicts, nonproliferation,
and othersubjectsofjointinterest. Manyoftheseinstitutions survivedand
continuedto function (albeitat reducedlevels)duringthedarkestdays of
therelationship in theearly1980s.
Jointcustodianship also differssubstantiallyfromthetypeofmanagement
tasks thatWaltz believesthe moderngreatpowersare in a positionto
perform. 16 It is logicalto expectthatsuperpowers ina bipolarworldwilldo
moreto managethesystembecauseexternalities andproblems ofcollective
actionare reducedas the numberof greatpowersdecline.That-said,the
problemof relativegainsremainsunsolved.In a bipolarsystemwithout
nucleardeterrence, therewouldbe continuing or evenenhancedincentives
to pursuerelativegainsin thecompetition betweenthepoles. The factthat
thedistribution ofpoweris so severelyskewedinfavorofthesuperpowers
mayrelievetheirconcernsabouttherelativegainsmadebylesserstatesat
theirexpenseas theyperform management tasksand bearthecosts,butit
can hardlyrelievetheirworriesabout each other.This structural effect
shouldbe reinforced by thehostileideologicaltingein U.S.-Soviet com-
petition.
The continuing problemofrelativegainsmeansthatsystemmanagement
in a bipolarworldis essentially a typeof balancingbehaviorin whichthe
underlying harshcompetition betweenthesuperpowers is themostimportant
factorpromoting theperformance oftheirrespectivemanagement tasks.In
the absence of nucleardeterrence, accordingto Waltz,each superpower
wouldbe primarily responsibleformanagingeventsin its own sphereof
influence, creating a geographically based "divisionofmanagerial labor."'17
It followsthattheprospectsforsignificant jointsuperpower action,either
to managethesystemtogether ortoaid theothersuperpower initsprincipal
efforts,wouldbe minimal. History, however,goesagainstthislogic.To the
extentthatthe detenteof the 1970sincludedat least some elementsof
superpowercooperationin positivemanagement tasks and thatthe new
detenteofthelate 1980sseemsto be expanding further in thisdirection, a
revisedrealistframework-one in whichnucleardeterrence is viewedas a
changeinorganizing principle andjointcustodianship is recognized as a new
superpower function-maybe a morepowerfulmeansof conceptualizing
thestructure oftheinternational system.
In subsequentsectionsof thisarticle,I interpret the 1970sdetenteas a
consequenceofstructural changein theinternational systemand thenpush
theinterpretation forward to generatepredictions forU.S.-Soviet detente
in the 1990s.
16. See Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, chap. 9.
17. Ibid.,p. 209.
According to thislogic,theSovietswouldhavehadlittlereasontoengage
in anythingmorethanextremely limitedcooperativeefforts to managethe
armsraceandwouldhavefavoredmoreextensiverestraints onlywhensuch
agreements offeredasymmetric benefitstoMoscow.Sovietleadersmayhave
made the assessmentaround1969thatan agreement to constrainABM
systemswouldallowthemto intensify thecontinuing strategicmilitarycom-
petitionwiththe UnitedStatesin areas in whichthe SovietUnionhad a
comparative advantage.This,in turn,wouldreinforce thetrendin thebal-
anceofmilitary powerthathadledtodetenteandwouldguarantee continued
Americanwillingness to view the Soviet Union as a moreor less equal
superpower.
Continuing theraceinABM systems might havehadprecisely theopposite
effect.The Sovietexperiencewithstrategic defensehad been largelydis-
appointing.In the 1950sand 1960s,Moscow had investedsignificant re-
sourcesin developingvariousmeansof defending the countryor limiting
damagein theeventof nuclearattack,butthetechnological advantageof
offenseoverdefensein nuclearsystemsremainedconvincing (and thein-
troductionof the multipleindependently targetedreentry vehicle[MIRV]
would soon make it even moreso). By the late 1960s,the Sovietswere
beginningto scale back on deployment oftheGaloshABM systemaround
Moscow,and theywerewillingto talkseriouslyabouta completeban on
ABMs thatwouldhave requiredthemto dismantle it.28
WhiletheAmericanshad also been dissappointed withtheperformance
oftheirvariousprototype defensesystems, theKremlin hada healthy respect
forU.S. technological prowess.The AmericanABM programs and partic-
ularlyNixon'ssafeguard systemposed no immediate threatto theSoviets'
assureddestruction buttherewas also no guaranteethatAmer-
capability,
icaneffortsmightnotin timeproducea technological breakthrough. If this
wereto happen,theSovietUnioncouldbe thrownback intoa positionof
nuclearinferiority,
strategic a positionfromwhichtheleadership hadworked
so hardto escape sincetheend of WorldWar 11.29 The essentialpointis
(itsostensiblefocus).
of theproblemratherthanforwhatit has to say aboutU.S. attitudes
For a detailed analysis, see JeremyR. Azrael, The Soviet CivilianLeadership and theMilitary
HighCommand,1976-1986(SantaMonica,Calif.:RandCorporation,1987),p. 13.
was haltedat sixty-four
28. In 1970,theGaloshdeployment arrayedinfourcom-
launchers
plexes. See JohnPrados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligenceand Soviet StrategicForces
University
N.J.:Princeton
(Princeton, Press,1986),pp. 155-56and 169.Thiswas a significant
hadestimated
fromwhatU.S. intelligence
reduction planneddeployment.
as theoriginally See
Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University oftheSovietleadership's
Press,1986),pp.87-90.Fora discussion interest
in a completeban on ABM deployments, see Smith,Doubletalk,pp. 116-25.
29. Sovietconcernson thisscorehavebeenandcontinue tobe a standard ofmilitary
feature
writers'commentaries. Duringthe early1980s,Chiefof theGeneralStaffMarshalNikolai
Ogarkovwrotethatthestrategic militarybalanceduring theearly1960swas an unacceptable
conditionwithextremely disadvantageousconsequences forSovietinterests.
Ogarkovbelieved
thatas lateas 1963,theUnitedStateswas capableoflaunching a disarming first
strikeagainst
istration,
vigorousmilitary competitionwas thought to be thebestrouteto
The Sovietsmighthave had it rightall
an acceptablepoliticalrelationship.
along:itdidmakesensetodiscussandmakeplansforfighting and"winning"
a nuclearwarin a moreconcretefashionthanAmericanstrategic doctrine
had done in the past decade. Reagan's strategicmodernization program,
withitsemphasison theimprovement ofcommandandcontrolfacilities and
therapiddeployment ofa newgeneration ofcounterforce-capableweapons,
was aimedat providing the UnitedStateswitha flexiblelimitednuclear
optioncapabilityto fightand prevailin a protractedwar of attrition.
The
StrategicDefenseInitiative(SDI), launchedon 23 March 1983,was fully
consistent withthisnew perspective on U.S. interests.If theABM treaty
lay at the centerof the old Americanconceptionof detente,its essential
repudiation meanttheend of a perceivedconjunction betweenmilitary re-
straintand thepoliticalaspectof superpower relations.Henceforth,U.S.
attempts to engagetheSovietUnionin politicalcooperation wouldreston
a foundation ofmilitarycompetitivenessand,ifpossible,outright strategic
superiority.
The U.S. leadership's"flirtation"withthisalternativeconceptionofin-
tereststurnsoutto havebeenremarkably brief.By 1985,thetwosideswere
once againengagedin seriousarmscontrolnegotiations, whichproduced
the Intermediate NuclearForces (INF) Treatyin 1987and considerable
progresstowarda Strategic ArmsReductionTalks(START) agreement that
wouldincludesignificant reductions in the numberof strategic
warheads.
SDI remained,butit was largelytransformed intoa programdesignedto
enhanceratherthantranscend thecondition ofmutualdeterrence.41
Whathappenedin theinterim? It seemsthatthe"power" ofa structural
constraintexerteditselfon otherwise reluctantAmericandecisionmakers,
who werethenforcedto revisetheirconceptionsofnationalinterest once
again.The Americansratherquicklyranup againsttheboundariesof uni-
lateralactionand soon recognizedthattheyhad littlechoicebutto engage
theSovietUnioninsomesortofcollaborative relationship
beyondthesimple
dictatesof avoidingnuclearwar.42The SovietUnion,forreasonspossibly
41. Therewere,ofcourse,individuals withinandoutsidetheadministrationwhocontinued
tobelievethatSDI couldandshouldfocusondeveloping systemsthatwerecapableofcomplete
area defenseandwouldfulfill President visionofrendering
Reagan'soriginal nuclearweapons
"impotent andobsolete."By 1986,however,theywerea distinct minority.Funding priorities
withintheresearchprogram had also beenprogressivelyreorientedawayfrom"visionary"
high-technology conceptsand towardmoremundanetechnologies thatcouldbe deployedin
theneartermforhardsitedefenseor limited ofcitiesagainstaccidentalattack.By
protection
theendofthedecade,fewAmericans or SovietsbelievedthatSDI wouldin theforeseeable
future pose a seriouschallengeto theconditionofmutualvulnerabilityanddeterrence.
42. PublicpressureintheUnitedStatesandinEurope-symbolized mostpoignantly bythe
growth of the"nuclearfreeze"movement in theUnitedStates-obviouslyplayeda consid-
erableroleinbringing an otherwisereluctantAmerican administration
backto thebargaining
tablewiththeSoviets.But thisdoes notweakenthepowerof a structural argument, since
structuralconstraintscan affectstatebehaviorbya varietyofmeans.Terminology aside,we
shouldexpectstructural variablesto expressthemselves in somefashionthrough domestic
Conclusion
pushingforward rapprochement.
an Israeli-Palestinian We wouldalso ex-
pectto see cooperativemanagement of regionalconflictsextending to less
vitalareas,wherelow-levelhostilities do notthreaten thecentralinterests
ofthesuperpowers or carrysubstantial riskofescalation.This,too,would
represent strongevidenceofa structural change.
Whathave we seen recentlyto differentiate betweenthesetwo sets of
predictions? At a generallevel,thesharpdeterioration in U.S.-Soviet re-
lationsofthelate 1970sand early1980sturnsoutto have beenremarkably
brief,giventhedepthof hostility generatedduringthedeclineof detente.
Many of the institutions thatdevelopedaroundsuperpowercooperation
duringtheearly1970s(notably,nucleararmscontrolon theSALT model)
survivedthemaelstrom in a conditionresembling suspendedanimation and
were ratherquicklyrejuvenatedas relationsimprovedduringthe second
Reaganterm.Cooperationaimedat sharedaversionsis indeedexpanding
intonewandmoredifficult realms,includingjointeffortstocombatterrorism
and the spreadof ballisticmissiles,whichmayinvolvesharingsensitive
intelligencedata.45Strategicarmscontrolhas notyetyieldedcooperative
agreements thatexpandinfundamental waysbeyondthemodelofthe1970s,
butthepotential forsuchagreements seemsripe.46
The mostinteresting developments to datelie injointsuperpower action
in ThirdWorldconflicts. The Reaganadministration beganto seriouslyex-
plorethepossibilities forU.S.-Soviet cooperationon regionalconflicts as
earlyas September1984,whenthePresidentcalledfora regularseriesof
meetings at theministerialandexpertlevel.TheAmerican approachtothese
discussionsmanifests substantiallearningfromthe miscuesof the 1970s
detente:effortsto definegeneralguidelines havebeeneschewedin favorof
specificattempts to grapplewiththeparticulars ofeach individual conflict,
andtheentireconceptoflinkagetoothersuperpower issueshasbeenalmost
entirelydropped.47
ofStateJamesBaker'sproposals,see "US MayTell Soviets:
45. For a reportofSecretary
Let's ShareSecrets,"TheNew YorkTimes,21 April1989,p. 8.
46. The 1987INF agreement verification
was notableforitsintrusive procedures thatgo far
beyondanything envisionedbytheoriginalSALT model.Still,thesuperpowers havenotyet
agreement
concludeda substantial forcesorarrived
onstrategic acceptableformula
ata mutually
forthinking aboutmodernstrategicdefensivesystems.Yet mutualdeterrence is as robustat
presentas ithas everbeen,and theprobabilityofnuclearwarremainsinfinitesimally low. If
a "grandcompromise" offensive
on strategic and defensivesystemswerenegotiated in the
nearfuture, evidenceofcooperation
further
thiswouldconstitute beyondtheboundsofshared
aversion.
47. DiscussingtheAmerican positionon negotiations Undersecretary
in regionalconflicts,
MichaelH. Armacostsaid that"our approachhas beento work
of StateforPoliticalAffairs
on all theissuesacrosstheboard,makeprogress wherever we can,andconcludeagreements
whenin theirownterms,theymeetUS goalsandinterests." Thiscomesclose to an explicit
repudiation oflinkage.See his addressbeforetheGeneralFederation ofWomen'sClubs,22
June1988,reportedin Bureauof PublicAffairs, U.S. Department of State,Current
Policy
1089: Regional Issues and US-Soviet Relations (Washington,D.C.: GovernmentPrintingOf-
fice,July1988).
A traditional structural
argument mightexplainmanyof theseefforts as
simplyrepresenting moreefficient tacticsof negativecooperation,but at
least somejointactionhas been aimedat areas of secondaryor even pe-
ripheralimportance wheresharedaversionsare an extremely weak incen-
tive.In Waltz'sworld,thereis no compelling reasonforthe superpowers
to cooperatein brokering a "solution"of sortsforthesituation in Angola
andNamibia;albeitlocallyviolent,thisconflict is unlikelytoriskescalation.
Detailsare sketchy,butit seemsthatleadersin Washington and Moscow
devotedconsiderableenergyto a quiet,cooperativeeffort to developa
framework forresolvingthisconflict. A prominent Reaganadministration
officialcharacterized theagreement as theproductof "an intensedialogue
withtheSoviets-involving discussionsatthesummit, ministerialandexpert
levels,aimedat seekingwaysto promotea politicalsettlement.' '48 It is also