CRITICAL AREALS IN POLITICAL LAW
from suit as when the reefs were destroyed he was acting
1. Rights in the Contiguous Zone and EEZ
UNCLOS III
SECTION 4. CONTIGUOUS ZONE
Article33: Contiguous zone
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as
the contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the
control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations
committed within its territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.
Article56: Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal
State in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources,
whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to
the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy
from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of
this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine
environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under
this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal
State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of
other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the
provisions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the
seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with
Part VI.
2. Precautionary Principle; Immunity from Suit
of Foreign States (Arigo vs Swift) : The state
may not be sued without its consent. When the
state is acting within its proprietary function (jure
gestionis), there is no immunity from suit.
However, when the state is in the exercise of its
official (jure imperi) it is immune from suit unless
expressly or impliedly waived.
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LEX AEQUITAS SORORITY
In the case of Arigo vs Swift, the commander was immune
in his official capacity.
precautionary principle requires that, if there is a strong
suspicion that a certain activity may have environmentally
harmful consequences, it is better to control that activity
now rather than to wait for incontrovertible scientific
evidence.
3. Principle of Postliminy (Co Kim Cham v Tan
Keh)
principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur. It is a legal maxim that, excepting that of a
political nature, "Law once established continues until
changed by some competent legislative power. It is not
changed merely by change of sovereignty." There can be no
break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes
into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a
primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of
human society.
4. Right to Privacy; Subjective and Objective
Test (Pollo v Constantino)
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US
Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner
in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to
privacy and constituted a "search and seizure". Because
the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such
area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it
was further noted that the existence of privacy right under
prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a
person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
Although the majority opinion in Katz v. United States
made no reference to this reasonable expectation of
privacy test, it instituted the doctrine that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
5. Search of a Moving Vehicle (Carrol Doctrine)
In Criminal law, Carroll doctrine refers to a principle that
permits a police officer to search an entire motor vehicle
and any containers inside it if there is probable cause to
believe the vehicle contains contraband or the fruits,
instrumentalities or evidence of criminal activity.
The reasoning of Carroll concerning the need to permit
warrantless search "where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant" suggested that a warrantless search of a car
would be permissible with respect to any type of object for
which a warrant to search could be obtained were there
time to secure a warrant. Subsequent cases discussed the
warrantless search in Carroll based on the mobility of the
vehicle; the "opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is
readily moveable."
The Court said that the "right to search and the validity of
the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest."
In Carroll, the police had probable cause that the auto
contained contraband but yet no lawful basis for taking
custody of the occupants of the vehicle so as to prevent its
leaving while a search warrant was sought
6. Due Process in Deportation Proceedings (Lao Gi v.
CA) - Thus, The provisions of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceedings.
In deportation cases, the Court cannot conceive of any
justification for a private party to have any right to
intervene. Even if such party can establish any damages
due him arising from the deportation charge against the
alien, such relief cannot be afforded him in the deportation
proceeding. His recourse if at all is in the ordinary courts.
Thus the Court rules that the intervention of a private
prosecutor should not be allowed in deportation cases. The
possibility of oppression, harassment and persecution
cannot be discounted. The deportation of an alien is the
sole concern of the State. This is the reason why there are
special prosecutors and fiscals tasked to prosecute such
cases.
8. Requisites of a Valid Warrant (Uy v. BIR)
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable
cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe
the place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized
Sec. 4 Examination of complainant; record. - The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.
Reliance on Prosecutor's Certification (Placer v. Villanueva)
There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the
fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, but does
such certification bind the judge to come out with the
warrant? The Court answers this query in the negative. The
issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it
calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the
issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following
provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the
judge be satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the
investigating officer that the offense
complained of has been committed and
that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused has committed it, he
must issue a warrant or order for his
arrest.
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LEX AEQUITAS SORORITY
9. Signing articles of the crime; booking sheets
(People v. Linsangan; People v. Ang Chun Kit)
Signing articles of the crime; booking sheets (People v.
Linsangan)
Before Pat. Ruiz investigated the appellant, he prepared
the booking sheet and arrest report, the affidavit of arrest,
crime report, and referral letter to the Fiscal's Office. Just
when the appellant was being apprised of his constitutional
rights, his uncle, a neighbor, and the barangay chairman
arrived. According to Pat. Ruiz, Linsangan's uncle offered
P500 to Pat. Corpuz in the presence of Pat. Lahom, to let
the accused go. He was requested by the barangay
chairman, who is allegedly a compadre of Major
Yangquiling, commander of the arresting officers, not to
proceed with the case.
The alleged motive of the policemen for fabricating the
charge against him and planting marked money on his
person is not credible. The Court is unable to imagine that
a lowly tricycle driver would have the temerity to defy a
pair of armed policemen by refusing to give them a ride in
his tricycle to pursue a law violator.
The appellant was not denied due process during the
custodial investigation. Although he was not assisted by
counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police
found tucked in his waist, his right against self-
incrimination was not violated for his possession of the
marked bills did not constitute a crime; the subject of the
prosecution was his act of selling marijuana in cigarettes
(People vs. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47; People vs. Macuto, 176
SCRA 762; Mejia vs. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457). His
conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on
the P10-bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed
the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while
he was actually engaged in selling marijuana cigarettes to
a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more
credence to their categorical declarations than to the
appellant's denials (People vs. Tan, 145 SCRA 614). That is
as it should be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to
have performed their official duties in a regular manner
(People vs. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521; People vs. Ale, 145
SCRA 50). Their task of apprehending persons engaged in
the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and
procedural technicalities to make it doubly so.
People vs Ang Chun
With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we
already said in People v. Morico that "when an arrested
person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police
station he does not admit the commission of an offense nor
confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking
Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being booked
and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It
is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary
detention against the police themselves. It is not an extra-
judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of
conviction.
But as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, accused Ang
Chun Kit's conformity to the questioned documents has not
been a factor in his conviction since his guilt has been
adequately established by the detailed and unshaken
testimonies of the officers who apprehended him. Hence
even disregarding the questioned documents we still find
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
10. Suspicionless Drug Tests (SJS v. Dangerous Drugs
Board)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory
drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their
right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and
from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the
parental authority of school authorities. In the case of
private and public employees, the constitutional soundness
of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy
and requirement.
11. Specificity of Offense; General Pattern of Business
Exception (Stonehill v. Diokno; CB v. Morfe)
Stonehill v. Diokno
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.
The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of
our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications
involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as
alleged in the aforementioned applications — without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
12. John Doe Warrants (People v. Veloso)
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not
the rule. The police should particularly describe the place
to be searched and the person or things to be seized,
wherever and whenever it is feasible. The police should not
be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are
difficult enough of performance under the best of
conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far
fetched judicial interference.
13. Deliberative Process Privilege (In Re Production
of Court Records)
A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it
reflects the giveand- take of the consultative process.
The key question in determining whether the material is
deliberative in nature is whether disclosure of the
information would discourage candid discussion
within the agency. If the disclosure of the information
would expose the government’s decision making process in
a way that discourages candid discussion among the
decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts’ ability to
perform their functions), the information is deemed
privileged.
NOTE: When classified as this kind of privileged
information, it is not covered by the constitutional right to
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information and should be deemed excluded from the
public
14. Non-establishment Clause (Tilton v. Richardson)
Ruling in Tilton vs Richardson
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that only the 20-year
limitation portion of the Act violated the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-year
clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of
facilities used for non-secular purposes would have the
effect of advancing religion. The Court held that the
church-related institutions in question had not used their
federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that
the facilities were "indistinguishable from a typical state
university facility." The Court also held that the Act did not
excessively entangle the government with religion, noting
that college students were less susceptible to religious
indoctrination, that the aid was of "nonideological
character," and that one-time grants did not require
constant state surveillance.
In conclusion, what the non-establishment clause under the
constitution prohibits is the fact that no law shall be made
to prefer a specific religion. There must be benovelent
neutrality.
15. Hold Departure Order (Genuino v. De Lima)
La ter, in Genuino v. De Lima ,  doc keted as G.R.
No. 19 793 0, promul ga ted on 1 7 A pri l 20 18 , the
Supreme Court struc k down DO J Circula r No. 4 1
as uncon stitu ti onal as it viol ates one’s
con stitu ti onal righ t to travel , and that th ere is no
law wh ich au thori zes the S ec reta ry of Ju sti ce to
issue H DOs, WLO s, or all ow depa rture orders
(A DO ).
In sai d ruling, the Su prem e Court further
em pha si zed tha t th e power to issu e HDO is
“inherent to the cou rts” , an d it “does not requi re
legi slative conf erment or c onsti tutional
recogn iti on ”; it c o- exists with the gra nt of ju dici al
power.”
Consequent to sai d ruling, th e Su prem e Cou rt, on
07 Augu st 201 8, issued a Resolu ti on
in Administrative Matter No. 18 -0 7- 05 -S C, or th e
Rul e on Prec autiona ry Hol d Depa rture
Order,   whereby a responden t in a c rim inal
compl aint may now be legall y barred f rom l eaving
the c ountry upon applica ti on with , and issu ance of
a prec au tionary hold departu re order (PHDO) by
the c ourts.
As defi n ed under the rule, a PH DO is “an order in
writing issu ed by a c ourt, comman din g the Bureau
of Im migra ti on to preven t any attempt by a person
suspected of a cri me to depart from th e
Philippin es which shall be issued  ex- parte  in ca ses
involving c rim es wh ere the mini mum of th e
penal ty prescribed by law is a t least si x yea rs an d
one day or when the off en der is a f orei gn er
rega rdless of the imposable penal ty.”
Th e perti nent points of thi s n ew ru le are the
foll owing: (a) th e PHDO is a pplica bl e to cri mes
wh ere the minimum penal ty prescribed by la w
is a t le as t  six yea rs and on e day, or th e off ender
is a f orei gn er regardl ess of the im posa bl e pen alty;
(b) the PH DO ma y be issu ed  ex pa rte,   or with ou t
the kn owledge and parti cipati on of th e
respon dent(s); (c) the PH DO ma y be appli ed by a
prosec utor wi th an y regional tri al c ourt within
wh ose territoria l ju risdi cti on the alleged c rim e
wa s commi tted, or for compellin g rea sons, wi th
an y regional tria l cou rt within th e ju dic ial region
where th e c rim e wa s commi tted if the plac e of th e
c omm ission of the crime is kn own; (d) th e PH DO
ma y also be appli ed wi th the regi ona l tri al cou rts
in the Ci ty of M anila, Quezon City, Cebu City,
Il oilo Ci ty, Da va o Ci ty an d Ca ga yan de Oro City
based on complaints instituted by the Nati onal
Bu reau of Investi ga tion rega rdless where th e
all eged cri me wa s com mitted; (e) th e a pplica tion
by th e investi ga tin g prosec utor sha ll be upon
m otion of th e compl ainant and upon a prelim inary
determi na tion of probable cause based on the
c om plain t and atta chments th ereof; (f) the PHDO
sh all be issu ed upon person al determ in ation by
th e ju dge, in wh ose c ourt th e appli cation is fi l ed,
th at probable cau se exi sts, an d th ere is a high
proba bi lity that responden t wil l depa rt from the
Phili ppines to eva de a rrest and prosec ution of
c rim e again st him or her; (g) upon a fi nding of
proba bl e cause, the PH DO sh all issue, an d th e
ju dge sh all di rect the Bu reau of Immi gration to
hold and preven t th e departu re of the respon dent
a t any Philippin e airport or ports; (h) th e proba bl e
cau se for the purpose of i ssuin g th e PHDO shall
be withou t prej udic e to the resolution of the
in vestigatin g prosec utor of th e cri minal
c om plain t; (i ) th e dismissal of the criminal
c om plain t, however, may be used by the
responden t as a groun d for th e lif ting of the
PH DO ; an d (j ) th e respon dent ma y fi le a verifi ed
m otion bef ore the i ssuin g cou rt for the temporary
lif ting of the PHDO based on a m eritorious ground
an d upon posti ng of a bond.
16 Penn Central v. New York:  If the restriction is
reasonably related to a legitimate public interest, then it
does not result in a taking. Diminution in property value
alone does not establish a taking
17. City of Manila vs Estrada: The court is empowered
to make such final order and judgment as shall secure to
the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his
rights under the law, and to the defendant just
compensation for the land so taken. The final order and
judgment are reviewable by this court by means of a bill of
exceptions in the same way as any ordinary action.
18. People vs Domantay: Miranda rights and the rules
regarding confession, admission provided for under the
1987 constitution are applicable during a custodial
investigation, that is, when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus
on a particular person
19 US v. Tan Tent: The prohibition contained in section 5
of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled
to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the defendant's own
lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main
purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit
compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or
upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling
confessions or declarations implicating them in the
commission of a crime. The accused was not compelled to
make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere
fact that an object found upon his body was examined
seems no more to infringe the rule invoked than would the
introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a
thief
20 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
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LEX AEQUITAS SORORITY
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may
be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not
there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.
Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the
rule and its non-delegation the exception.
Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence
to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say,
specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields.
Power of Subordinate Legislation
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This
is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the
broad policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the details
which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one
such administrative regulation..
21. Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals (Reyes v HRET)
Rules 15 and 17 of the 2015 HRET Rules provide:
Rule 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the Members of the House of Representatives.
To be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper
oath; and (3) assumption of office.
Rule 17. Election Protest. - A verified election protest
contesting the election or returns of any Member of the
House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate
who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office, within fifteen (15) days from June
30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption of
office, whichever is later.
22. Guidelines for Party-lists (Atong Paglaum
Doctrine)
The Party-List System
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions
registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar
bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll
watchers in accordance with law.
Guidelines:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition
must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it
must show – through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and
track record – that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily,
majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. And it must
demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or
is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in
the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be
elected to the House of Representatives." In other words,
while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that
they are political parties, they must show, however, that
they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented.
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LEX AEQUITAS SORORITY
Third, by an express constitutional provision, the religious
sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x
x
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds
for disqualification.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of,
or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by,
the government. By the very nature of the party-list system,
the party or organization must be a group of citizens,
organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be
independent of the government. x x x
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the
requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 contains the qualifications of party-
list nominees, with special age-related terms for youth
sector candidates.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. x x x Under Section 2 of RA 7941,
the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties." x x x
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.20 (italics
and emphases ours)
23. Privilege from arrest of legislators (Trillanes v.
Pimentel): The crime charged in this case was coup d’eat
which is punishable by more than six years, is NOT covered
by the parliamentary immunity from arrest. Thus:
Privilege from Arrest
One of the privileges that a member of Congress enjoys is
the privilege from arrest. In this regard, Section 11, Article
VI, of the Constitution provides as follows:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in Congress or in any committee thereof.
This privilege is intended to insure representation of the
constituents by the members of Congress. In Vera vs.
Avelino, the Supreme Court, quoting a decision of the
United States Supreme Court, explained for whose benefit
the right to parliamentary immunity is secured:
These privileges are thus secured not with the intention of
protecting the members against prosecutors for their own
benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling
their representatives to execute the function of their office
without fear of prosecution, civil or criminal.
24. Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (Balag v. Senate)
The Court finds that the period of imprisonment
under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate
during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last
until the termination of the legislative inquiry under
which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it was
stated that obedience to its process may be enforced by the
Senate Committee if the subject of investigation before it
was within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and
the proposed testimony called relates to that subject.
Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative
inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate
may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said
legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent
power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine
necessity to penalize the detained witness.
25. Organization of the House of Representatives and
Senate (Baguilat v. Speaker Alvarez)
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of
all its respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its
entire membership. Said provision also states that the
House of Representatives may decide to have officers other
than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to
how these officers are chosen is something within its sole
control.23 In the case of Defensor-Santiago v.
Guingona,24 which involved a dispute on the rightful Senate
Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001),
this Court observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit
on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of
Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner
of selecting the other officers [of the Lower House]. All that
the Charter says is that ' [e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.' [As such], the
method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the [House
of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court. "25
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI 26 of the
Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole
authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its
proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory
laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters
of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the
courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority
[of the House of Representatives]. "27 Hence, as a general
rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound
to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings
of the [House of Representatives]." 28
26. Journals and Records; Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Caso Philippines Commercial Co. vs Gimenez
(Feb. 1963)
“Enrolled bill doctrine or the Journal entry, is
the signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
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and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of
such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a
declaration by the two houses, through their presiding
officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch
of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
Enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the
respect due to coequal and independent departments,"
which requires the judicial department "to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases
that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort
to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of
its due enactment
The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires
it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and
is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, this
Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same
text passed by both Houses of Congress. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate (caso
phil. Commercial vs Gimenez)
27. PDAF AND DAP
BELGICA AND ARAULLO vs Pres. Benigno
Aquino (consolidated case)
The budget preparation phase is commenced
through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM.
Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various
departments and agencies submit their respective Agency
Budget Proposals to the DBM. The DBM next consolidates
the recommended agency budgets into the National
Expenditure Program (NEP) and is submitted in the form of
a proposed GAA. The NEP thereafter is presented by the
DBM to the President and the Cabinet for further
refinements or reprioritization. Once the NEP is approved
by the President and the Cabinet, the DBM prepares the
budget documents for submission to Congress
The DAP was a government policy or strategy
designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated
spending. In the context of the DAP’s adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining
Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution
Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute
the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to
legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
"As pointed out in Gonzales v. Raquiza: "In a
strict sense, appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing
more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the
Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury,’
while appropriation made by law refers to ‘the act of the
legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a
certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from
the State to its creditors.’
On the other hand, the President, in keeping with
his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the
budget to changes in the country’s economic situation. He
could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. The
pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP,
identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did
not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the
money had been already set apart from the public treasury
by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the
Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
28. Taxation of Educational Institutions
DLSU VS CIR
Non-stock, non-profit educations
(NSNPEI)
Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxes and duties.
- a plain reading of the Constitution would show
that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require that the
revenues and income must have also been sourced from
educational activities or activities related to the purposes
of an educational institution. The phrase all revenues is
unqualified by any reference to the source of revenues.
Thus, so long as the revenues and income are used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes,
then said revenues and income shall be exempt from taxes
and duties.
“as long as all incomes are being used
actually, directly and exclusively for
purpose, such incomes are exempted
regardless where it is sourced”
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Proprietary Educational Institution (PEI)
to the
“Section 27 (B) of the NIRC”
Proprietary educational institutions and hospitals
which are nonprofit shall pay a tax of ten percent (10%) on
their taxable income except those covered by Subsection
(D) hereof: Provided, that if the gross income from
unrelated trade, business or other activity exceeds fifty
percent (50%) of the total gross income derived by such
educational institutions or hospitals from all sources, the
tax prescribed in Subsection (A) (15%) thereof shall be
imposed on the entire taxable income.
29. Succession of the President
The constitution provides for a line of succession in the
event that the elected President of the Philippines is not
able to discharge the duties of his office due to death,
disability, or resignation. The following is the line of
succession:
1. Vice President —  in cases of the death, disability,
or resignation of the President
and the
2. Senate President — in cases of the death,
disability, or resignation of the President and Vice
President
3. Speaker of the House of Representatives — in
cases of the death, disability, or resignation of the
President, Vice President, and Senate President
Contrary to popular belief, the constitution doesn’t include
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the President’s
line of succession.
The Congress of the Philippines is mandated enact a law
calling for a special election three days after the vacancy in
the Office of the President and Vice President. The special
election should occur 40 days after the enactment of the
law, but not later than 60 days after the enactment of the
institution law.
30. Midnight Appointments : The prohibition on midnight
appointments only extend to appointments in the
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. The judiciary is NOT covered
by such prohibition.
31. Appointments; Types; CA Confirmation
PIMENTEL VS ERMITA (2005)
Appointments (Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution)
The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
educational
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
from tax,
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.
- It is readily apparent that under the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These
four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time
to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President
authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
FLORES VS DRILON
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
the controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Hence, incumbent elective official, Gordon is
ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and
CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be
sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City,
and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void; he may be considered a de facto officer.
This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It
seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official
will work for his appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(Flores vs Drilon)
33. Power to Discipline (Joson v. Torres)
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to
investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has
may be the power derived from the Constitution itself to
investigate complaints against local government officials.
A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to
rank whose the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue
delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The
President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is
delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to
discipline. 54

The first group of officers only is clearly appointed with

Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency. Thus:

and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of
Appointments, the President appoints. a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief
appointments are extended only during a recess of Executive are performed by and through the executive
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
appointments are submitted to the Commission on by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. 55
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of President. 56 The power of control is provided in the
Constitution, thus:
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can
also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the
by the Commission on Appointments. (Pimentel vs Ermita) executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.  57

32. Appointment of elective officials to other government Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the
posts presidency. 58 As head of the Executive Department, the
President, however, may delegate some of his powers to
the Cabinet members except when he is required by the

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Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally.  59 The members
of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in
certain matters because the President cannot be expected
to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally
all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be,
the President's alter ego in the matters of that department
where the President is required by law to exercise
authority
34. Commander-in-chief Powers (Lagman v.
Medialdea)
The military power enables the president to
(1) command all the armed forces of the Philippines
(2) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
(3) declare martial law
Note: The president is made the commander-in-chief of all
the armed forces of the Philippines is there are armed
forces to command. These forces will be raised by congress
in the exercise of its general legislative power
35. Pardon and Amnesty (Monsanto v. Factoran)
- amnesty is usually addressed to crimes
against the sovereignty of the state, to
political offenses, forgiveness being deemed
more expedient for the public welfare than
prosecution and punishment pardon condones
infractions of the peace of the state
- amnesty is usually generally addressed to
classes or even communities of persons;
pardon is usually addressed to one individual
- in amnesty, there may or may not be distinct
acts or acceptance, so that if other rights are
dependent upon it and are asserted, there is
affirmative evidence of acceptance; in pardon,
there must be distinct acts of acceptance
- pardon does not require the concurrence of
the congress, amnesty requires the
concurrence
- pardon is a private act of the president which
must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned because the courts do not take
judicial notice of it; amnesty is a public act of
which the courts take judicial notice
- pardon looks forward and relieved the
offender from the consequences of the offense
while amnesty looks backward and absolves
and puts into oblivion the offense itself
36. Foreign Loans
"The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board
shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of
the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete
report of its decision on applications for loans to be
contracted or guaranteed by the Government or
government-owned and controlled corporations which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and
containing other matters as may be provided by law."
(Article VII, Section 20).
37. Treaties; the President as the Sole Organ of
Foreign Relations (Vinuya v. Romulo)
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
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authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of
foreign relations. It is well-established that “the conduct of
the foreign relations of our government is committed by
the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the
political’–departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken
only by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil.
38. Administrative Supervision by the SC over Courts
(Maceda v. Vasquez)
Administrative Power
o Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987
Constitution exclusively vests in the SC
administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to
the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
o By virtue of the Court’s administrative
power, it is only the SC that can oversee
the judges' and court personnel's
compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them
if they commit any violation.
39. Career and Non-career positions; Power to
Discipline; Security of Tenure (CSC v. Salas; Gloria v.
CA)
In CSC vs Salas: The nature of the position, as may be
ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy-determining or highly technical
 Confidentiality may also be determined upon the
recommendation of the president with
concurrence of CSC
In Gloria vs CA: Preventive suspension pending appeal
is actually punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if
the respondent is exonerated and the administrative
decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be
reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension.
Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the
respondent “shall be considered as under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event
he wins.” On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the
period of his suspension becomes part of the
final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar
the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period
of suspension pending their appeal would be considered as
part of the preventive suspension, entitling them to full pay
because they were eventually exonerated and their
suspension was unjustified.
Security of tenure: No officer or employee of the CSC shall
be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by
law
Career service vs Non-Career service
- Career service: characterized by entrance
based on merit and fitness to be determined
as far as practicable by competitive
 examination or based on highly technical
qualifications, opportunity for security if
tenure
- Non-career service: entrance based on other
that the usual test of merit and fitness, tenure
is limited to a period specified by law or which
is coterminous with an appointing authority
40. Power of the COMELEC over interparty issues
(Atienza v. COMELEC)
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party
disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority
to resolve any and all controversies involving political
parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct
their activities without interference from the state.
The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a
party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions.
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party
leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court.
The Court ruled in Kalaw vs. Commission on Elections that
the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section
2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party
and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts."
The Court also declared in another case  that the
COMELEC’s power to register political parties
necessarily involved the determination of the persons
who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it, as an incident of its power to
register political parties.
41. Automatic release of IRA (Pimentel v. Aguirre):
The withholding of the President of 10% internal revenue
allotments are NOT valid exercise of the president’s
powers. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further
that the release shall be made directly to the LGU
concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the
year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that
may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command
that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is,
therefore, imperative.  (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
42. Initiation of Impeachment Proceedings (Gutierrez
v. HOR) : In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the
judiciary cannot inquire into whether or not an offense is
an impeachable offense as such is a political question
which is within the sound discretion of the legislature.
43. Ancestral Land v. Domain (Cruz v. Sec. DENR):
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private and belong to the ICCs/IPs
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs
held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously until the present, except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth
or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private
individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise
lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein and includes ancestral lands,
forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other
lands individually owned whether alienable or not,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
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bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources. They also include lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the
same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are
limited to lands and that these lands are not merely
occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the
ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership. These lands include but are not limited to
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots.
44. Public Utilities (Roy v. Herbosa)
Under Sec 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, all the
executive and managing officers of a public utility company
must be Filipinos. Thus, the all-filipino management team
must first be convinced that any of the 8 corporate actions
in section 6 of the corporation code will be in the interest
of the company
NOTE: The determining factor is the “beneficial use” of the
stock owned. Hence, if the stock is named under a Filipino
but the Filipino cannot/does not have the power to dispose
of it freely, it is not within in the ambit of Filipino
ownership and cannot be included in the 60% requirement
45. Due Process in Student Disciplinary Proceedings
(ADMU v. Capulong)
NOTE: Thus, so long as these minimum standards are
complied with there is no violation of
procedural/substantive due process
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as
petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; 
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: 
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them 
own behalf; and 
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
46. Amendments to the Constitution (Lambino v.
COMELEC)
In Lambino vs COMELEC:
Amendment refers to isolated or piecemeal change only, as
distinguished from revision which is a revamp of rewriting
the whole instrument
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks & balances,
there is also revision is the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution
 Generally affects many provisions of the
constitution
Amendment broadly refers to change which does not alter
the main principle involved.
 Usually affects only one
TWO TESTS TO DETEMINE

 Quantitative test – how many provisions of the

constitution are being amended?
 Qualitative test – will there be substantial changes
to the basic governmental plan?

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