In principle, “Hunter Killer” protected the government officials and by

postponement, obviates geopolitical turmoil. Instead of plastering off against the

radicals, the menace to Pax Americana is a Russian coup that collapses the

country’s premier. This internal strife could not emanate at a worse time for the

Americans, who have a submarine unaccounted for in rival’s terrain. So the

supremacies in the states directed Captain Joe Glass for an undercover pursuit

operation. Between edgy relations shared by Rear Admiral John Fisk and Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Charles Donnegan, the two senior officials are at

probabilities with how to ensue with the operation. Glass’ ship may need to secure it,

with unvaryingly would twitch another Cold War. But except if someone does not

release the toppled Russian President shortly, the Cold War may already underway

by Russia’s scoundrel military leader.

Appended on to an already demanding subversion is the land module to the

sea rescue of the Russian President. Almost equidistant through the whole scheme

of scenario, the spectators are hosted to a group of dubious marines training up their

latest affiliate when they got the call for an unbearable duty to infiltrate on the enemy.

They are the one who reported back to Washington D.C. about the coup, and in a

last trench power to stave off an all-out war, Fisk probed them to step in and rescue

the president and bring him to the submarine where Glass is commanding his men

so all of them can escape from the arising terror. It sounds like a good plan for Glass

but that was not the case. It is not is easy to recapitulate the benefits of Glass’

decision hence, the decision sounds ironic and not good. Another anchor weighing

down the spectrum of events are the infrequent grim moments that deviate into
satire‒like when the senior officials hold covert discussions in the center of a hectic

government building, instead of a private office.

First, it is important to make an analysis on the Russian coup d’état. The

existence of the Russian coup d’état is in question here as well as the intervention of

America in the affairs of the government of Russia. The concept of realism can be

used as an argument in this aspect. Realism contends that, in an anarchic

international system, states main objective is for survival that obligates them to

maximize their relative power in order to preserve their territory and existence. Since

international cooperation is possible only in as much as it responds to the state’s

self-interest in maximizing their power and prospects for survival, states do not

pursue cooperation on the basis of normative commitments. According to some

Realist legal scholars, states adopt only to international legal norms that either

enhance their power, formalize the subordination of weaker states or that they intend

to violate deliberately to their own advantage.

In addition, international politics in modern times generally recognizes no

authority above the nation-state. Agreements among states are enforceable only by

the agreeing states themselves. This assumption of anarchy poses a paradox for

agreements to limit violence during wartime. Reciprocity, hence, serves as the main

tool to enforce agreements in international politics. This simply means that America

cannot meddle on Russia because these two states are sovereign and have no

agreement that can obligate one to the principle of pacta sunt servanda or the

principle which compels states to honor the agreement or treaty. Hence, the

intervention is illegal.
 Another concept significant to the Russian coup d’état is the principle of ‘Par

in parem non habet imperium’ which states that in public international law, the

principle that one sovereign power is the basis of the act of the state doctrine and

sovereign immunity (Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law, 2019). This legal

maxim emphasizes that a sovereign power cannot interfere with the affairs of

another sovereign power nor can one state be inferior or superior to another state.

More so, this debunked the interference of American in the affairs of Russia and

America cannot deny the intervention because the submarine is in the jurisdiction of

the Russia.

Another aspect that needs to be analysed on the scheme is the decision-

making process. It is easy to say that the decisions made by America are legitimate

especially the traumatizing condition of Russia. It is important to note here that both

in international relations and international law the fundamental rights of state are

essential. In this case, the right of existence and rights to self-defence against

imminent armed attack is important.

Military theory can provide a definition for war as well as methods and

systems for how to wage it in the most effective way. Implicate in each theory are the

qualities and abilities that create the most effective forms of leadership for those

methods and systems (Williams, 2007). Now, let us use the military theory of both

Sun Tzu and Niccolo Machiavelli in determining the importance of such in the

decision-making process of both parties.

As to Sun Tzu, a nation will only have control over method and discipline and

their choice of commander. As one of the few constant factors of war that people
have control over, the choice and training of leaders is critical for success in war and,

as war is of vital importance to the state, critical for the well-being of the nation and

its people. Without a strong leader there can be no victory. There are three

characteristics of a military leader that show up repeatedly throughout Sūn Zi Bīng

Fă: independence of command, the use of deception and perhaps most important,

wisdom (zhi). One of the ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army is

by “attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom” Sun

Tzu frequently makes reference to the need for military command that is

independent of the government of the state. A commander must always keep his

enemy unsure of what he will do next. When about to strike he must seem inactive.

When close by, he must seem far away. To unsure surprise and success he should

always “devise unfathomable plans”. To further facilitate this ability to deceive and

surprise the enemy he must also be able to ensure secrecy amongst his own officers

and troops. “He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and

appearances, and thus keep them in total ignorance. By altering his arrangements

and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. By shifting

his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his

purpose.” (Sun Tzu, Giles 54) Secrecy and deception is the cornerstone of military

success and should be well practiced by any strong leader, both with his friends as

well as his enemies. In other words, his military tactic teaches us how to win a war.

Machiavelli, on the other hand, guarantees two most important ideas for

Machiavelli with respect to leadership are closely related to how a leader comes to

obtain power. He opens the first chapter of Il princip with a description of the kinds of
principalities and discusses the means by which they are acquired, and “they are

acquired either by fortune (Fortuna) or by ability (virtù). Later, in chapter seven of Il

princip, Machiavelli tells us about his two paragons of leadership. Machiavelli’s

approach to ethics and how a leader should act. While Machiavelli is often thought of

as an amoral proponent of expedience, a careful reading shows that he did in fact

have a strong ethical system. Machiavelli was well aware of the difference between

how people ought to live and how they really do live. Because there are so many

people who are willing to do evil, “it is necessary that a prince who is interested in his

survival learn to be other than good, making use of this capacity or refraining from it

according to need”.

Hence, a prince is not to perform cruel actions whenever his wishes, or to

support his personal wealth. Machiavelli describes particular limits for when a prince

should and should not use cruelty and its justification: “A prince, therefore, must be

indifferent to the charge of cruelty if he is to keep his subjects loyal and united.

Having set an example once or twice, he may thereafter act far more mercifully than

the princes who, through excessive kindness, allow disorders to arise from which

murder and rapine ensue. Disorders harm the entire citizenry, while the executions

ordered by a prince harm only a few individuals”. Therefore, Machiavelli’s ‘Art of War’

teach us how to prepare for a war.

In both military theories mentioned, one can connote that either one of the

two is significant in warfare. The Russian coup specialized themselves in the former

but the American military are specialized in the latter.

 The sequence of events in Hunter Killer and the subsequent military response

by the United States and its allies raise some difficult issues in international law.

Does an attack by another non-state group give rise to the right of self-defence as

understood under international law? Under what circumstances was the Russian

government itself a legitimate target for military action under the self-defence

doctrine? To what extent was the United States entitled to dictate the terms by which

the Russia should act before the military action would cease against it and to protect

the Russian President.

Only the first issue can be answered—yes—with any degree of confidence.

The others are clouded with uncertainty. To some extent this uncertainty reflects the

shift of international law away from an emphasis on regulating relations between

sovereign states (countries) towards having to incorporate the actions of other state

groups within the legal framework. As part of this shift, the responsibility of

governments for the actions of these state groups is receiving increasing attention.

The periodic use of military force by the United States against such organizations

and so-called ‘coup de teat' appears to be forcing a change in accepted state

practice and hence (arguably) influencing the boundaries of international customary

law. However, given that the United States is likely to be motivated primarily by

national interests, it would be useful for the United Nations General Assembly to

authorise the International Law Commission to codify exactly what are the principles

applying to the doctrine of self-defence under international law.

 As to International Committee of the Red Cross or ICRC (2019), armed attack

is defined by international law principle as the use of military force across borders to

commit armed attacks, which justifies the use of collective self-defence.

As to Marlyn (2002), the legal use of force in international law is important.

The Charter of the United Nations is one of the world’s most important treaties.

Ratification of the Charter is a prerequisite to membership of the United Nations. The

Charter sets out the obligations of members and amongst other matters, establishes

the Security Council. Article 2(4) of the Charter states that “All members shall refrain

in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial

integrity or political independence of any state, or in other manner inconsistent with

the purposes if the United Nations.

Essentially, the preceding paragraph eliminates the concept of ‘just war. The

use of force or the threat of it, by a state is no longer a legitimate means of dealing

with a dispute with another state. However Article 2 (4) does not prevent a country

from defending itself in response to acts of aggression. Article 51 states that

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or

collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of United

Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain

international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this

right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall

not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under

the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to

maintain or restore international peace and security..

 The decision of the cabinet must be in conformity of the limits of the right of

self-defence because the mentioned right is not an open-ended right. In order to

make it as a valid act under international customary law, as set down by the classic

formulation by the United Nations, it is generally required to conform with three

elements: “was the response necessary?”; “was the response proportionate?”; and

“was the response immediate?”. The last point, the question of immediacy, seems to

be of lesser importance in contemporary practice. State practice suggests that a

reasonably delayed response is acceptable where there is a need to gather evidence

of the attackers’ identity and or collect the intelligence and military force in order to

strike back in a targeted manner.

Meanwhile Gesellschaftzur (2001), notes that self-defence and collective

security represent antagonistic strains of thought on international relations. The right

to self-defence, as the remainder of the more encompassing right to self-

preservation, reflects the idea of an international order based on the power struggle

of states that can ensure survival only by their own strength. Collective security on

the other hand, expresses a belief in the possibility of a peaceful international order

and the capability of institutions to bring this order about. Put simplistically, self-

defence represents a realist, whilst collective security represents an idealist view of

international politics,

Now, is the doctrine of self-defence applicable to address the arising conflict?

As to the United Nation Security Council, the right of self-defence is not an open-

ended right. To be a valid act under international customary law, as set down by the

classic formulation by the United States in the 1837 Caroline incident, it is generally
required to conform with these three elements: “was the response necessary?”; “was

the response proportionate?”; and “was the response immediate?”. The last point,

the question of immediacy, seems to be of lesser importance in contemporary

practice. State practice suggests that a reasonably delayed response is acceptable

where there is a need to gather evidence of the attackers’ identity and or collect the

intelligence and military force in order to strike back in a targeted manner.

Consequently, was the military response necessary? It is safe to say that the

goal of the Americans in meddling on Russia is to help rescue the President. And, in

order to complete the mission, the only solution that they have is to have a military

attack. The intervention of America is in the first place illegitimate, but since the

urgency of an action is needed, they compromise the so-called “intervention”. If the

United States objective was to protect itself from the possibility of further attacks of

the Russian coup and to safeguard the Russian President in the immediate future,

was their 'no negotiation' position the only way of likely achieving this? Ultimately this

must be subjective question. If only the Russian coup eliminates the threat at least in

the absence of any useful guidance on what are the limits of international law in this

area. However, a more difficult question is whether the United States was justified

under the self-defence doctrine in pursuing a policy aimed at assisting the Russian

President forces to completely eradicate the Russian coup.

Finally, was the military response proportional? There are two main aspects

to this. Firstly, was the scope of the response proportional to the first attack?

Secondly, as the humanitarian laws of war apply, have non-combatants been

properly protected? The first issue is mainly bound up in the discussion above about
necessity in that it is questionable whether the purpose of military campaign against

the Russian coup was proportional because the Russian coup did not represent a

direct threat to the United States. If the coup's acquiescence to the presence of

Russia was a threat to international peace and security, it is properly the role of the

Security Council to deal with this, including through the mandating of the use of force

under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter. The possibility that the international

politics of the Security Council may not have allowed the United States as broad-

ranging a mandate to deal with the Russian coup is it might wish for does not change

the position in international law.

In relation to the second issue, there are no strict limits as to when non-

combatant deaths through so-called collateral damage become excessive.

International customary law forbids the use of weapons that are incapable of

distinguishing between civilian and military targets. A question may arise whether, in

targeting the Russian coup, all persons present can be classified as combatants.

However, the author has no information on this.

Lastly, it is important to know also the essentiality of the extraction of the

international law as regards to this crisis. The role of international law, is vital since

concepts and ruling are used throughout this paper but the researcher would want to

point out other concepts relevant to the crisis. And one of these is the role of the

Security Council in the operation.

Under Article 51, the right of self-defence ceases once the Security Council

has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. In

theory, the question arises whether the measures taken would have to be
demonstratively effective before the right of self-defence ceases (Commonwealth of

Australia, 2002). However, given the United States is a permanent member of the

Security Council, it could veto any measures it deems contrary to its national

interests. Thus it is unlikely a situation would arise where the Security Council was at

odds with the United States on whether a right of self-defence continued to exist or

whether that right was being exercised within the limits set down under international

law. Once the right of self-defence arises, the only legal obligation the United States

has is to report to the Security Council on what measures it has taken in self-

defence. It has no obligation to seek authorisation under Article 42 for the use of

force so long as the force it is using is consistent with the right of self-defence as

previously outlined.

The international law relating to self-defence is too ill–defined to provide any

detailed guidance on the legality of the totality of the United States' military

operations against the Russian coup. The various uncertainties highlighted by this

paper suggests there is real need for the International Law Commission to codify

exactly what are the principles applying to the doctrine of self-defence. This need is

underscored by the fact that the main check on the exercise of the right of self-

defence, the United Nations Security Council, is unlikely to function if one of its

permanent members considers that the continuation of military action is in its

national interest. However, this issue is bound up in the question of whether the

Security Council permanent members should continue to have veto powers, and is

therefore beyond the scope of this paper.

 Another extraction of international law that can be relevant to the issue is the

basic rules of International Humanitarian Law in armed conflicts. As to the

International Committee of the Red Cross (1988), international humanitarian law is

also important subject of war. The following are the basic rules especially in an

armed attack:

1. Persons hors de combat and those who do not take a direct part in

hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives and their moral and

physical integrity. They shall in all circumstances be protected and

treated humanely without any adverse distinction.

2. It is forbidden to kill or injure an enemy who surrenders or who is hors

de combat.

3. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for by the party to

the conflict which has them in its power. Protection also covers medical

personnel, establishments, transports and equipment. The emblem of

the Red Cross or the Red Crescent is the sign of such protection and

must be respected.

4. Captured combatants and civilians under the authority of an adverse

party are entitled to respect for their lives, dignity, personal rights and

convictions. They shall be protected against all acts of violence and

reprisals. They shall have the right to correspond with their families and

to receive relief.

5. Everyone shall be entitled to benefit from fundamental judicial

guarantees. No one shall be held responsible for an act he has not

 committed. No one shall be subjected to physical or mental torture,

corporal punishment or cruel or degrading treatment.

6. Parties to a conflict and members of their armed forces do not have

an unlimited choice of methods and means of warfare. It is prohibited to

employ weapons or methods of warfare of a nature to cause

unnecessary losses or excessive suffering.

7. Parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian

population and combatants in order to spare civilian population and

property. Neither the civilian population as such nor civilian persons

shall be the object of attack. Attacks shall be directed solely against

military objectives.

In addition, the International Committee of Red Cross or ICRC (2016) are a

set of international rules that set out what can and cannot be done during an armed

conflict. The main purpose is to maintain some humanity in armed conflicts, saving

lives and reducing suffering. To do that, IHL regulates how wars are fought,

balancing two aspects: weakening the enemy and limiting suffering. The rules of war

are universal. The Geneva Conventions (which are the core element of IHL) have

been ratified by all 196 states. More so, IHL is an important extraction to the crisis for

there are consequences that will arise especially when it is broken, Not only the

combatants who will lose their lives but also other individuals. Also, without the rules

of war, all are considered losers.

To sum it up, it is much better for both countries to engage first in bilateral

agreements because that will require them to have amicable settlements over the
issue. Such treaties can help resolve the crisis and prevent similar crisis into

happening again. Since sovereign states cannot intervene with other sovereign

states, it is the role now of the international community to govern what must be done

to eradicate or to mitigate the casualties or to completely settle the disputes. The

United Nations Security Council has the prime duty to unravel these kinds of crisis in

order not to further intensify its degree.