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TC Response To Aufheben 12: 1 Point
TC Response To Aufheben 12: 1 Point
TC Response To Aufheben 12: 1 Point
After reading your text on TC in Aufheben no. 12, and assuming a good
linguistic understanding on my part, it would seem that you raise four points on
which we diverge, or on which additional work is required by TC in order to
justify our analyses:
1) One of the three objections made by Dauvé and Nesic to the concept of
programmatism in their pamphlet “Une histoire d’amour…” (“Love of
labour lost…” ?? check title in English)
2) Doesn’t the proletariat have to recognise itself as a class before
abolishing itself?
3) The foundation of the possibility of a second phase of real subsumption
in the concepts of capital and real subsumption.
4) The concept of alienation.
I’ll happily leave the question of Althusser to one side. To approach this
question in its own right would, on both sides, only lead us up a blind alley.
However interesting it could be, on a number of questions, to examine and
criticise Althusser’s positions, to pose Althusser as the subject in his own right
would ensnare us in our discussions, as he would become the positive or negative
referent of the questions that we want to deal with. These questions would be
transformed by making Althusser the reference point.
1st point
Without ever saying it expressly, Dauvé and Nesic make three objections to the
concept of programmatism:
a) Workers don’t give their all for their boss. This objection would hardly
merit quotation if we didn’t find its inverse in the ideology of “social link”
and “adhesion” that they offer in their apologetic vision of the “post-war
boom” in the pamphlet “Whither the world?” (“Il va falloir attendre”).
Here they accept in the context of capitalism that which they deny in that
of the liberation of labour.
2nd point
3rd point
As regards the fourth point, I think that our divergences are not very great
and I don’t want to add any new ones between us on what seems to me to be, on
reading your text, more a question of vocabulary than a theoretical difference. My
critique of the concept of alienation is not a “war” on the utilisation of the term;
we in TC use the term ourselves, and in Critical Foundations… I use the concept
of alienated labour or the alienation of labour. My critique bears explicitly upon
the Hegelian or Feuerbachian usage of the concept which quickly pollutes it. I
explain myself below in the chapter on the S. I. and in the chapter on cooperation
in Critical Foundations… In my opinion, things appear clearest in the one on
cooperation where the critique of the speculative character of the concept is not
made for its own sake but appears through the analysis of the relation of
exploitation. We can come back to this if you want.
“Not only is history posited from the outset as a category of the human
essence (and not the inverse as history itself would have it), but, worse, it is the
nature of this history which is predefined as alienation. We start from an
identity, we return to an identity; as the original identity can be nothing other
than “unstable”, by the very definition of the human essence, between the two
there can only be a loss of this identity: subject and object are alien to each other.
But take note, this loss is itself only a form of the identity in itself in the process
of becoming for itself, and this is the very concept of alienation, and this is the
reason why Marx abandons it: the loss is only a form of the identity, its necessary
becoming in order to find itself once more, negative identity. History flows from
the true reality of man, which he regains at the end of alienation.
In alienation, the separation between labour and property or labour and
capital, the separation between men, is brought back to the movement of a
single/unique/unitary being (être unique) (the original phantasm), the
separation is never real. If I conceive of capital on the model of the “essential
powers of man transposed opposite and against him”, then I have “man” on both
sides: as labour and as capital. Then the splitting of society into classes has no
sense, no reality, it is just a form which already has within it its own supersession
as its resolution, because the schism is absurd; so the form already carries
something within itself that means that it has no sense in relation to itself since,
as schism, it is merely a moment of the existence of the identity. It becomes
“irrational” and has to leave the stage of history. This is completely different to
conceiving of this separation and this transposition as the movement of wage
labour and capital, for now we no longer have any single/unique/unitary being
(être unique) which is split, while continuing to determine (chapeauter) totality.
Each term/pole (terme) is given in its singular reality, whose reciprocal
implication we produce. The “transposition” doesn’t bring me back to a
single/unique/unitary being (être unique), but to a social relation of production,
in which capital is the transposition of the social powers of labour; because this
labour is wage labour, it is itself “transsubstantiation”. In the ideology of
alienation, its supersession is the “Truth” of man which, even defined as history,
makes the latter one of its predicates. Communism becomes the realisation of the
human essence; alienation can only be posited if we have already posited its
return to the subject. Alienation implies its own suppression in its own
conceptual structure and not as history, which is for it nothing but a detail and
about which it has, in fact, nothing to say. Just as the origin of religion is not
within man as abstraction, but within society itself, the separation that alienation
seeks to account for is not an “alienation of man”, nor is it given by the nature of
his “Activity” (the two intersect), but a contradiction in particular historical
societies setting particular classes against each other.” (Critical Foundations…,
pp. 512-513)
“The method of alienation with its complement, “human essence”, has the
particular quality of being able to be applied to anything and everything. One of
its favourite subjects is the State, where alienation is seen as the separation
between generic universal life contemplated in the State and personal life which
corresponds to immediate practical activities. All this is not “wrong”, it is the
method which is; this method, having been the spiritual complement to every
reformism, has become a lifejacket for all the theories swallowed up by the
disappearance of programmatism. The State, as we have said, is certainly the
“separation of universal life”, an abstraction of the individual engaged in class
relations; but it is not this, as the whole problematic in The Jewish Question
poses it, because man is separated into two. It is thus because it is society which
is divided in two (before this there is no State) because it is the State of the
dominant class and because this latter subsumes the whole of society under the
reproduction of its particular interests. The problem with the concept of
alienation is that it cannot function without reversing subject and predicate, and
this is true in every domain. History, as succession of particular social forms,
becomes the predicate of subject-man or, in a supposedly more concrete version,
these social forms become the predicate of activity or of labour (cf. above). In
fact, all this wisdom was already served up in 1932 by the “discoverers” of the
“young Marx”: Landsuth and Mayer. “In his work from 1840-1847 Marx opens up
little by little the entire horizon of historical conditions and pins down the
general human foundation without which the entire explanation of economic
relations remains the simple intellectual work of a shrewd economist.” This
human foundation is of course defined in the mode of alienation: “the liberation
of his existence in relation to conditions exterior to himself which falsify all the
true manifestations of the essential being of man, (…) all the manifestations of his
being will immediately be what they really are” (our emphasis); “After Marx
arrived at this result by separating himself from Hegel and Feuerbach, and put
this realisation in front of him, the efforts of the rest of his life would be directed
solely to denominating the forces of reality at work, which act to resolve the
contradictions between the idea and reality. But these forces are the forces of the
alienation of the self, of the power of conditions, the domination of political
economy: capital.” (Landshut and Mayer, “Avant-Propos” in the collection of
“Oeuvres de jeunesse” of Marx (“Works of the Young Marx”) – published under
the title: “Le Matérialisme historique” -; in French in “Avant-Propos” of vol. 4 of
“Oeuvres philosophiques”, Ed Costes).
In the Manuscripts, Marx considers private property and all the notions
developed by political economy as being, for political economy, “facts without
necessity”. The critique of political economy consists of searching for their
necessity elsewhere, in philosophy. The conceptions of the economists and the
realities that they mask are considered to be a whole; it is true that he is not yet “a
shrewd economist” - in reality there isn’t in the Manuscripts a critique of political
economy (cf. the whole first third of the book is dedicated mostly to “profits and
losses”). In order to find “necessity”, political economy is filtered through the
subject-object relation of the philosophy of alienation: the product of my labour
which is a manifestation of myself becomes a commodity, therefore it becomes
alien to me, so labour ceases to be a human manifestation. The necessity of
political economy is thus founded in the nature of man: “political economy has
failed to recognise alienation in labour” and the latter as “the becoming for
himself of man in alienation”. And we fall back on the aporias (apories) and the
teleology of the essence of man: a human phenomenon, private property has its
origin in man but it becomes the negation of human activity, and so a non-sense,
therefore it has to be suppressed.
“The shrewd economist”, showing himself to be a better philosopher, is
“satisfied” with understanding the fundamental form of capital, production
oriented to the appropriation of the labour of others, as a historical form. “Our
conception fundamentally diverges from that of the economists who, tangled up
in the capitalist system, certainly see how production occurs in the capitalist
system (that’s not all! author’s note), but not how this relation itself is produced
and creates at the same time the material conditions of its own dissolution,
undermining at the same time its historical justification as a necessary form of
economic development and of the production of social wealth” (Marx, Missing 6th
Chapter, Ed 10/18, p264). “Necessity”, “historical justification”, “production of
its supersession”, the terms are still there, but no longer any trace of “facts
without necessity” to be transcended by Work or Man. Here we have a completely
different problematic. Capital suppresses its own historical meaning: all the
difference is there. And when, in the new cycle of struggles, this movement is the
structure and content of the very contradiction between the proletariat and
capital, it is all the ideologies which could still form the basis for understanding
this movement as alienation which must necessarily collapse, including Marx’s
objectivism. (Critical Foundations…, p.515-516)
‘It is thus absurd to ask oneself if capital is productive or not. Labour itself is
only productive if it is absorbed by capital, which constitutes the basis of
production commanded by the capitalist. The productivity of labour becomes the
productive powers of capital, just as the exchange value of commodities is
crystallised in money. Labour is not productive if it exists for the worker himself
in opposition to capital, if it has an immediate existence exterior to capital. It is
not productive as the direct activity of the worker because it merely ends up in
simple circulation where transformations have a purely formal character. Certain
people claim that the productive force attributed to capital is a simple
transposition of the productive force of labour; but they forget that capital is
precisely this transposition, and that wage labour implies capital in such a way
that it too is transubstantiation, that is to say an activity which seems alien to the
worker.’ (Marx, Grundrisse, Ed Anthropos, vol. 1, p 256).
The social character of labour and the social worker (travailleur social) only
exist in objectifying themselves in capital and as process of this objectification;
this social character is not even a latent quality in the individual worker which
capital appropriates, it is produced and only exists in its objectification as an
element, a power of capital. This social character can therefore never be a quality
inherent in the individual worker nor even in the sum of individual workers, for
when it exists, workers no longer belong to themselves.” (Critical Foundations…,
p.92)
I’m aware that it is not worthy of a gentleman to quote himself, I hope you’ll
excuse me, but I think that these extracts will shed light on the sense of our
critique of the concept of alienation.
These four points don’t exhaust all the discussions that we could have, but I
hope that I’m not wrong in thinking that they were the most important ones.
In friendship,
for Théorie Communiste
R.S.
It goes without saying that you can do what you like with this letter, if you
envisage publishing it and you consider it too long, then you are at liberty to
make the cuts that you consider necessary and that your conscience permits.