CHAPTER-IV

JURISDICTION, OFFENCES RELATING TO FIR AND ROLE OF

MAGISTRATE

A. INTRODUCTION
A Police officer has to: write the case relating to the cognizable offence
irrespective to the place of occurrence, if an informant comes to him ask the officer-in-
charge of the Police station to register the case. He must register the case and send it to
the concerned Police Station. Members of the public are frequently advised by the police
to give information to the nearest police station. Unfortunately we often heard of
complaints of informants being directed by officers in the ‘nearest’ police station to go to
‘proper’ police station to give his/her information.1 This problem arises from the
! i
territorial jurisdiction of the police station in relation to the case concerned.

B. Police Officer can not refuse to record the FIR on the ground that he has no
territorial jurisdiction over place of offence

The Supreme Court in its recent judgment imposed fine on the Non-Registration
of the cognizable offence. The Officer-in-charge of a police station cannot refuse to
record on the FIR on the ground that concerned police station has no territorial
jurisdiction over place of offence. It amounts to dereliction of duty on the part of the
Police Officer.
Section 154 Cr.P.C. reads as follows:-
(1) “Every information relating to the commission of cognizable offence, if given
orally to an officer-in-charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or
under his direction, and be read over to the informant and every such information,
whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person
giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in
such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.

FIRST INFORMATION REPORT, by DSP Goh Boon Keng, Journal of the Royal Malaysia
Police Senior Officers’ College, 2003, p.61.
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(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given
forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. Three copies are to be prepared with the help of
carbon papers and one of the copies is received immediately in the court of Judicial
Magistrate of the Police Station concerned.2
i
(3) Any person aggrieved -by a refusal on the part of an officer - in-charge of a
police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the
substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police
concerned, who if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to
be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code,
and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer-in-charge of the police station in
relation to that offence.”

C. Information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases

Section 155 Cr. P.C. (1) When information is given to an officer-in-charge of a
police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable
offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to
be kept by such officer, in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this
behalf, and refer the informant to the Magistrate.
(2) No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a
Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial.
(3) Any police officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in
respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer-in-
charge of a police station may exercise in a cognizable case.
(4) Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is
cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the
other offences are non-cognizable.

2
Ways to get bail avoid police harassment and Jail by S.M. Ashari, Ashri Law Publication, 1994, p.
27.
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When we go through the Section 154 and S. 155 Cr.P.C. we can find out that th<
territorial jurisdiction over a place of crime is not necessary when the offence relates to i
commission of cognizable offence.
In Section 154 of the Code, no where it is said that the offence should take place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned police station, whereas in Section 155
it is clear that the information relating to commission of non-cognizable offence shoula
be within the limits ofsuch station. From the above it is clear that the officer-in-charge of
a police station is not supposed to refuse the investigation when he receives the
information relating to commission of a cognizable offence on the ground that the
concerned police station has no territorial jurisdiction over the place of crime. But he can
refuse to record the information if it relates to commission of a non-cognizable offence, if
offence is committed beyond territorial jurisdiction of the Police Station.3

D. The proper course to be followed is to record the FIR and forward the
information to the concerned police station having jurisdiction
In the case State of A.P. v. Punati Ramulu and others,4 it was held that: “The
case as put forward by the prosecution was that PW-1 went to Narasaraopet from the
scene of the occurrence. He contacted PW-13 to draft the report addressed to the Circle
Inspector of Police. PW-1 was projected by the prosecution as an eye witness who is the
i
nephew of the deceased and had accompanied the deceased when the latter went to
realize debts from the villagers. On reaching the police station at Narasaraopet he was
informed by the constable on duty that the Circle Inspector, PW-22, had already received
information about the occurrence and had left for the village. The police constable at the
police station refused to record the complaint presented by PW-1 on the ground that the
said police station had no territorial jurisdiction over the place of offence. It was certainly
a dereliction of duty on the part of the constable because any lack of territorial
jurisdiction could not have prevented the constable from recording information about the
cognizable offence and forwarding the same to the police station having jurisdiction over
the area in which the crime was said to have been committed.

3 First Information Report (F.I.R.) by Rajender Mangari, Asia Law House, Hyderabad, 2nd Edition
2005-2006, Page-62.
4 1993 Cri.J. 3684 SC.
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According to the evidence of PW-22 Circle Inspector he had received information

of the incident from police constable No. 1278, who was on bandobast duty. On receiving
the information of the occurrence, PW-22 left for the village of occurrence and started the
investigation of the case. Before proceeding to the village to up the investigation, it is
conceded by PW-22 in his evidence, that he made no entry in the daily diary or record in
the general diary about the information that had been given to him by constable 1278,
who was the first person to give information to him on the basis of which he had
proceeded to the spot and took up the investigation in hand. It was only when PW-1
returned from the police station along with the written complaint to the village that the
same was registered by the Circle Inspector PW-22, during the investigation of the case
at about 12-30 noon, as the FIR Ex. P-1. In our opinion, the complaint, Ex. P-1, could not
be treated as the FIR in the case as it certainly would be a statement made during the
investigation of a case and hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. As a matter of fact that High Court
recorded a categorical finding to the effect that Ex. P-1 had not been prepared at
Narasaraopet and that it had “been brought into existence at Pamidipadu itself, after due
deliberation”. Once we find that the investigating officer has deliberately failed to record
the first information report on receipt of the information of a cognizable offence of the
i

nature, as in this case, and had prepared the first information report after reaching the
spot after due deliberations, consultations and discussion, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the investigation is tainted and it would, therefore be unsafe to rely upon
such a tainted investigation, as one would not know where the police officer would have
stopped to fabricate evidence and create false clues. Though we agree that mere
relationship of the witnesses PW-3 and PW-4, the children of the deceased or of PW-1
and PW-2 who are also related to the deceased, by itself is not enough to discard their
testimony and that the relationship or the partisan nature of the evidence only puts the
court on its guard to scrutinize the evidence more carefully, we find that in his case when
the bonafides of the investigation has been successfully assailed, it would not be safe to
rely upon the testimony of these witnesses either in the absence of strong corroborative
evidence of a clinching nature, which is found wanting in this case.”
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E. When there is dispute regarding territorial jurisdiction

In Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt, of NCT of Delhi),5 it was held that
“1. At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482,
Cr.P.C., on the ground that Investigating Officer has no territorial jurisdiction.
2. S.H.O., has statutory authority U/S. 156, Cr.P.C., to investigate any Cognizable
offence for which a FIR is lodged.
3. After investigation is over, if Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that cause
of action for lodging FIR has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is
required to submit a report U/S. 170 Cr.P.C. and to forward the case to the Magistrate
empowered to take cognizance of offence.”

i
F. Offences committed outside India
In the offences committed outside India, the Officer-in-charge of a Police Station
receives information of a commission of cognizable offence, he has to register a case on
the basis of such information. Section 188 Cr.P.C. (Proviso), which prohibits “enquiry or
trial” except with sanction of central government in regard an offence, committed by an
Indian citizen or one bound by the Indian Law in a foreign country need no application at
the stage of registration of an FIR or investigation by the police. Rather, joint operation
of Sections .3 & 4 of I.P.C. & Section 154 of Cr. P.C. make it mandatory to register and
investigate into such a case.6 7

G. Police Officer has power to investigate in a foreign country

In the case of Union ofIndia v. W.N. Chadda1 (popularly known as Bofors case)
honorable court decided that in regard to investigation of such case in a foreign country,
help can be sought under Section 166(A) of Cr.P.C. by having “letter regotory” issued by
an Indian country to appropriate court or authority in the concerned foreign country
through the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. At the stage of issuance
of letter regotary, the accused has no right to be heard as the doctrine of Audi Aultrem
Partem does not apply in such a stage.

5 1999 (4) RCR (Crl.) 503 (SC).

6 Mia v. S.I. of Police Tanur, 1993 Cr. LJ 1098, (Kerala).
7 1993 Cr. L.J. 859.
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H. FIR by Accused
First Information Report may be lodged by an accused person himself. FIR may
be lodged by the accused for two reasons:
1) Accused after committing gruesome murder would himself come to the police
station and confess the offence; or
2) Accused may lodge false information about the offence with a view to save his
skin.
Whenever police officer receives information of the commission of cognizable
offence, he is bound to issue FIR on the information received by him, from any person
including the accused.
Officer-in-charge of the police station cannot refuse to register the case when he
gets information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence.

I. Whether such FIR is admissible

The question that naturally arises is whether such first information report filed by
the accused is at all admissible in evidence, in view of provisions of Sec. 25 of Evidence
Act and Sec. 162 of Criminal Procedure Code reads as qunder
162. Statements to police not to be signed : Use of statements in evidence:-
(1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation
under this chapter shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it, nor shall
any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any
part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at
any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such
statement was made:
Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or
trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his
statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the
Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by Section
145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872); and when any part of such statement is
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so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but foi
the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination.
(2) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling
within the provisions of clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 ol
1872), or to affect the provisions of Section 27 of that Act.
Explanation An omission to state a fact or circumstance in the statement referred to in
sub-section (1) may amount to contradiction if the same appears to be significant and
otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which such omission occurs and
whether any omission amounts to a contradiction in the particular context shall be a
question of fact.
In H.M. Rishbud v. State of Delhi,8 honorable court decided that Sec. 162
Cr.P.C. does not. come into play unless the statement is recorded in course of
investigation by a police officer. The investigation starts U/S. 157 Cr.P.C. as soon as a
I

police officer proceeds to enquire into a cognizable offence on receipt of first

information. It is thus, next step following the first information report. So it is obvious
that provisions of S. 162 Cr.P.C. do not bar the admissibility of such first information
report.
Sec. 25 of Indian Evidence Act
Section 25 of Evidence Act reads as follows:-
!

25. Confession to police officer not to be proved:- No confession made to a

police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
As soon as the accused discloses the offence to the police officer and implicates
himself, he stands automatically charged with the offence within the meaning of word
‘accused’ occurring in Sec. 25 of Evidence Act. In the first information report itself also
there is column to show “the name and residence of accused” Thus, as soon as the
accused implicates himself before a police officer, he stands, ‘accused of the offence’ and
consequently that part of his statement which amounts to an acknowledgement of guilt,
comes within the ambit of Section 25 of Evidence Act, and as such becomes totally
inadmissible in the evidence against the accused. Section 25 of Evidence Act however
does not prevent its use by the accused or by co-accused. If it goes in favour of either of

1955 Cr.L.J. 526 (531)S.C.

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hem, for example to reduce an offence of murder U/S. 302 IPC to an offence of culpable
tomicide not amounting to murder U/S. 304 IPC in view of grave and sudden
irovocation to which the accused might have alluded to, in his confession.

r. Confessional first information report can not be taken as a whole

A confessional FIR can not be taken as a whole in some case earlier it had been
leld that even if an FIR consisted of some confessional and non-confessional parts, the
ion-confessional parts would be separated from confessional part and exhibited on behalf
}f the prosecution,9 The above position was reviewed by the Supreme Court at length In
Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar,10 ( confessional FIR) and it was held that a
confessional statement may consist of several parts and may reveal not only the actual
commission of the offence, but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity, the
provocation, the weapon used, the intention, the concealment of the weapon and
subsequent conduct of the accused. When confession is tainted, the taint attaches to each
part of it. It is not permissible in law to separate one part and to admit it in evidence as an
non-confessional statement.

K. Law laid down by Apex Court in Aghnoo Nagesia case

In the case Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar,11 BACHAWAT, J. “the appellant
was charged under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for murdering his aunt, Rani, her
daughter, Chamin, her son-in-law, Somra and Dilu, son of Somra. He was convicted and
sentenced to death by the Judicial Commissioner of Chotanagpur. The High Court of
Patna accepted the death reference, confirmed the' conviction and sentence and dismissed
the appeal preferred by the appellant. The appellant now appeals to this Court by special
leave.
(2) The prosecution case is that on August 11, 1963 between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. the
appellant murdered Somra in a forest known as Dungijharan Hills and later Chamin in
Kesari Garha field and then murdered Rani and Dilu in the hosue of Rani at village
Jamtoli.

9
Lachhu Munda v. State of Bihar, 1964(1) Crl. LJ 528 Patna.
10
1966 Cr. LJ 100 (SC).
II
AIR 1966 SC 119.
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(3) The First information of the offences was lodged by the appellant himself at
Police Station Palkot on August 11, 1963 at 3-15 p.m. The information was reduced to
writing by the officer-in-charge, Sub-Inspector H.P. Choudhury, and the appellant affixed
his left thumb impression on the report. The Sub-Inspector immediately took cognisance
of the offence, and arrested the appellant. The next day, the Sub-Inspector in the
company of the appellant went to the house of Rani, where the appellant pointed out the
dead bodies of Rani and Dilu and also a place in the orchard of Rani covered with bushes
and grass, where he had concealed a tangi. The appellant then took the Sub-Inspector and
witnesses to Kasiari garha khet and pointed out the dead body of Chamin lying in a ditch
covered with Ghunghu. The appellant then took the Sub-Inspector and the witnesses to
Dungijharan Hills, where he pointed out the dead body of Somra lying in the slope of the
hills to the north. The Sub-Inspector also recovered the appellant’s house a chadar stained
with human blood. The evidence of P.W. 6 shows that the appellant had gone to the
i ;
forest on the morning of August 11,1963.
(4) The medical evidence discloses incised wounds on the all the dead bodies. The
injuries were caused by a sharp-cutting weapon such as a tangi. All the four persons were
brutally murdered.
(5) There is no eye-witness to the murders. The principal evidence against the
appellant consists of the first information report, which contains a full confession of guilt
by the appellant. If this report is excluded, the other evidence on the record is insufficient
to convict the appellant. The principal question in the appeal is whether the statement or
any portion of it is admissible in evidence.
(6) The first information report reads as follows
“My name is Aghnu Nagesia. (1) My father’s name is Lodhi Nagesia. I am a
resident of Lotwa, Tola Jamtoli, Thana Palkot, District Ranchi. Today, Sunday, date not
j
known, at about 3 p.m. I having come to the P.S. make statement before you the S.I. of
Police.
(2) That on account of my Barima (aunt) Mussammat having given away her
property to her daughter and son-in-law quarrels and troubles have been occurring among
us. My Barima has no son and she is a widow. Hence on her death we shall be owners of
her lands and properties and daughter and son-in-law of Barima shall have no right to
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hem. She lives separate from us, and lives in her house with her daughter and son-in-law
ind I live with my brother separately in my house. Our lands are separate from the time
)f our father.
(3) Today in the morning at about 7-8 a.m. I had gone with a tangi to Duni Jharan
3ahar to cut shrubs for fencing. I found Somra sitting alone there who was grazing cattle
here.
(4) Seeing him I got enraged and dealt him a tangi blow on the filli (calf) of right
leg, whereby he toppled down on the ground. Thereupon I dealt with several chheo
(blows) on the head and the face, with the result that he became speechless and died. At
that time there was none near about on that Pahar.
(5) Thereafter I came to the Kesari Garu field where Somra’s wife Chamin was
weeding out grass in the field.
(6) I struck her also all of a sudden on the head with the said tangi whereby she
dropped down on the ground and died then and there.
(7) Thereafter I dragged her to an adjoining field and laid her in a ditch to the
i

north of it and covered her body with Gongu (Pala ke chhata) so that people might not
see her. There was no person then at that place also.
(8) Thereafter I armed with that tangi and went to the house of my barima to kill
her. When I reached there, I found that she was sitting near the hearth which was burning.
(9) Reaching there all of a sudden I began to strike her on the head with tangi
I
whereupon she dropped down dead at that very place.
(10) Near her was Somra’s son aged about 3-4 years.
(11) I also struck him with the tangi. He also fell down and died.
(12) I finished the life of my Barima so that no one could take share in her
properties.
(13) I hid the tangi in the jhari of my Barima’s house.
(14) Later on I narrated the occurrence to my chacha (father’s brother) Lerha that
I killed my aforesaid four persons with tangi. After some time:
(15) I started for the P.S. to lodge information and reaching the P.S. I make this
statement before you.
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(16) My Barima had all along been quarrelling like a Murukh (foolish woman
and being vexed, I did so.
(17) All the dead bodies and the tangi would be lying on those places. I can point
them out.
(18) This is my statement. I got it read over to me and finding it correct, I affixed
my left thumb impression.
(7) We have divided the statement into 18 parts. Parts 1,15 and 18 show that the
appellant went to the police station to make the report. Parts 2 and 16 show his motive for
the murders. Parts 3, 5, 8 and 10 disclose the movements and opportunities of the
appellant before the murders. Part 8 also discloses his intention. Parts 4, 6, 9 and 11
disclose that the appellant killed the four persons. Part 12 discloses the killing and the
motive. Parts 7,13 and 17 disclose concealment of a dead body and a tangi and his ability
to point out places where the dead bodies and the tangi were lying. Part 14 discloses the
previous confession by the appellant. Broadly speaking the High Court admitted in
evidence parts 1,2, 3, 5, 7, 8,10,13,15,16,17 and 18.
(8) On behalf of the appellant, it is contended that the entire statement is a
confession made to a police officer and is not provable against the appellant, having
regard to S. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. On behalf of the respondent, it is
contended that S. 25 protects only those portions of the statement which disclose the
killings by the appellant and the rest of the statement is not protected by S. 25.
(9) Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with
confessions made by an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be found generally
in Ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Ss. 162 and 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading
“Admissions”. Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt with in Ss. 24 to 30. A
confession or an admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is
excluded by some provision of law. Sec. 24 excludes confessions caused by certain
inducements, threats and promises. Section 25 provides: “No confession made to a police
officer shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence”.
The terms of S. 25 are imperative. A confession made to a police officer under
any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a
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confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made
lefore any investigation has begun. The expression ‘accused of any offence’ covers a
person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence
when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a
confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the
immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a
confession made to a person other than a police officer. Section 26 does not qualify the
absolute ban imposed by S. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in
the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 & 26. It provides
that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such
information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
forbids the use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an
investigation for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the offence under
investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under sub-s. (2), and it
specifically provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of
i
the Evidence Act. The words of S. 162 are wide enough to include a confession made to
a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the
course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate under S. 164 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except as
provided by S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an accused to a police officer is
absolutely protected under S. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of an
investigation it is also protected by S. 162 Cr.P.C. and a confession to any other person
made by him while in the custody of a police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is
made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions seem to proceed upon
the view that confessions made by an accused to a police officer or made by him while he
i
is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used in
evidence against him. They are based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest
effect should be given to them.
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(10) Section 154 of Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the recording of the
first information. The information report as such is not substantive evidence. It may be
used to corroborate the informant under S. 157 .of the Evidence Act or to contradict him
under S. 145 of the Act if the informant is called as a witness. If the first information is
given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against
him as evidence of his conduct under s. 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a
non-confessional statement, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under S.
21 of the Evidence Act and is relevant. Similarly in the case of Faddi v. State of
Madhya. Pradesh,12 explaining Nisar Ali v. State of U.P.13 and Dal Singh vs. King
Emperor14 the same view was given but a confessional first information report to a
police officer cannot be used against the accused in view of S. 25 of the Evidence Act.
(11) The Indian Evidence Act does not define ‘confession’. For a long time, the
Courts in India adopted the definition of ‘confession’ given in Art. 22 of Stephen’s
Digest of the Law of Evidence. According to that definition, a confession is an admission
made at any time by a person charged with crime, stating or suggesting the inference that
he committed that crime. This definition was discarded by the Judicial Committee in
Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor,15 Lord Atkin observed that “.......no statement
I

that contains self exculpatory matter can amount to confession, if the exculpatory
i
statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be
confessed. Moreover, a confession must either admit in terms of the offence, or at any
rate substantially all . the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely
incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession,
e.g. an admission that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession of the
knife or revolver which caused a death with no explanation of any other man’s
possession.”

AIR 1964 SC 1850. .

AIR 1957 SC 366. i
44 Ind App 137 : (AIR 1917 PC 25)
66 Ind App 66 at p. 81 : AIR 1939 PC 47 at p. 52.
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These observations received the approval of this Court in Palvinder Kaur v.

itate of Punjab,16 Shah J. referred to a confession as a statement made by a person
tating or suggesting the inference;that he has committed a crime.
(12) Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an admission of the offence by a
terson charged with the offence. A statement which contains self-exculpatory matter
annot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which, if true,
vould negative the offence alleged to be confessed. If an admission of an accused is to be
ised against him, the whole of it should be tendered in evidence, and if part of the
tdmission is exculpatory and part inculpatory, the prosecution is not at liberty to use in
;vidence the inculpatory part only. And same was given in Hanumant Govind v. State
>f M.P. the accused is entitled to insist that the entire admission including the
:xculpatory part must be tendered in evidence. But this principle is of no assistance to the
tccused where no part of his statement is self-exculpatory and the prosecution intends to
ise the whole of the statement against the accused.
(13) Now, a confession may consist of several parts and may reveal not only the
ictual commission of the crime but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity, the
provocation, the weapons used, the intention, the concealment of the weapon and the
subsequent conduct of the accused. If the confession is tainted, the taint attaches to each
Dart of it. It is not permissible in law to separate one part and to admit it in evidence as a
ion-confessional statement. Each part discloses some incriminating fact, i.e., some fact
which by itself or along with other admitted or proved facts suggests the inference that
the accused committed the crime, and though each part taken singly may not amount to a
confession, each of them being part of a confessional statement partakes of the character
af a confession. If a statement contains an admission of an offence, not only that
admission but also, every other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the
statement is part of the confession.
(14) If proof of the confession is excluded by any provision of law such as S. 24,
S. 25 and S. 26 of the Evidence Act, the entire confessional statement in all its parts
including the admissions of minor incriminating facts must also be excluded, unless proof

AIR 1952 SC 354 at p. 357; In State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, (1961)1 SCR 14 at p. 21 :
AIR 1960 SC 1125 at pp. 1128-1129.
1952 SCR 1091 at p. 1111; AIR 1952 SC 343 atp. 350 and 1953 SCR 94; AIR 1952 SC 354.
 182

of it is permitted by some other section , such as S. 27 of the Evidence Act. Little

substance and content would be left in Ss. 24, 25 and 26 if proof of admissions of
incriminating facts in a confessional statement is permitted.
(15) Sometimes, a single sentence in a statement may not amount to a confession
at all. Take a case of person charged under S. 304-A of Indian Penal Code and a
statement made by him to a police officer that “I was drunk; I was driving a car at a speed
of 80 miles per hour; I could see A on the road at a distance of 80 yards; I did not blow
the horn; I made no attempt to stop the car; the car knocked down A”. No single sentence
in this statement amounts to a confession, but the statement read as a whole amounts to
confession of an offence under S. 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, and it would not be
permissible to admit in evidence each sentence separately as a non-confessional
i
statement. Again, take a case where a single sentence in a statement amounts to an
admission of an offence. A states; “I struck ‘B’ with a tangi and hurt him.” In
consequence of the injury ‘B’ died. A committed an offence and is chargeable under
various sections of the Indian Penal Code. Unless he brings his case within one of the
recognized exceptions, his statement amounts to an admission of an offence, but the other
parts of the statement such as the motive, the preparation, the absence of provocation,
concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct, all throw light upon the gravity
of the offence and the intention and knowledge of the accused, and negatives the right of
private defence, accident and other possible defences. Each and every admission of an
incriminating fact contained in the confessional statement is part of the confession.
(16) If the confession is caused by an inducement, threat or promise as
contemplated by S. 24 of the Evidence Act, the whole of the confession is excluded by S.
24. Proof of not only the admission of the offence but also the admission of every other
incriminating fact such as the motive, the preparation and the subsequent conduct is
excluded by S. 24. To hold that the proof of the admission of other incriminating facts is
not barred by S. 24 is to rob the section of its practical utility and content. It may be
suggested that the bar of S. 24 does not apply to the other admissions, but though
receivable in evidence, they are of no weight, as they were caused by inducement,, threat
j

or promise. According to this suggestion, the other admissions are relevant, but are of no
value. But we .think that on a plain construction of S. 24 proof of all the admissions of
 183

lcriminating facts contained in a confessional statement is excluded by the section,

similarly, Ss. 25 and 26 bar not only proof of admissions of an offence by an accused to a
olice officer or made by him while in the custody of a police officer but also admissions
ontained in the confessional statement of all incriminating facts related to the offence.
(17) A little reflection will show that the expression “confession” in Ss. 24 to 30
efers to the confessional statement as a whole including not only the admissions of the
>ffence but also all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence. Section
'7 partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26 in respect of so much of the
nformation whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact
liscovered in consequence of the information, if the other conditions of the section are
satisfied. Section 27 distinctly contemplates that an information leading to a discovery
nay be a part of the confession of the accused and thus fall in the purview of Ss. 24,25,26
i
md Section 27 thus show that a confessional statement admitting the offence may contain
idditional information as part of the confession. Again, S. 30 permits the Court to take
i
nto consideration against a co-accused a confession of another accused affecting not only
limself but the other co-accused. Section 30 thus shows that matters affecting other
versons may form part of the confession.
(18) If the first information report is given by the accused to a police officer and
amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by S. 25. The
confession includes not only the admission of the offence but all other admissions of
incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement. No part
of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of
S. 25 is lifted by S. 27.
(19) Our attention is not drawn to any decision of this Court or of the Privy
Council on the question whether apart from S. 27, a confessional first information report
given by an accused is receivable in evidence against him. Decisions of the High Courts
on this point are hopelessly conflicting. They contain all shades of opinion ranging from
total exclusion of the confession to total inclusion of all admissions of incriminating facts
except the actual commission of the crime. In Harji v. Emperor,18 the Lahore High Court
held that the entire confessional first information report was inadmissible in evidence. In

18
AIR 1918 Lah. 69 and Nur Muhammad v. Emperor, 90 Ind Cas 148 (Lah.)
 184

Emperor v. Harman Kisha,19 the Bombay High Court held that the entire confessional
report dealing with events on the night of the offence was hit by S. 25, and it could not be
said that portions of it dealing with the motive and the opportunity were not parts of the
confession. In Emperor v. Kommoju Brahman,20 the Patna High Court held that no
part of the confessional first information report was receivable in evidence, the entire
report formed a single connected story and no part of it had any meaning or significance
except in relation to the whole, and it would be wrong to extract parts of the statement
and treat them as relevant. This case followed in Adi Moola Padayachi v. State,21 and
the Court admitted only the portion of the confessional first information report which
showed it was given by the accused and investigation had started thereon. In State of
Rajasthan v. Shiva Singh,22 the Court admitted in evidence the last part of the report
dealing with the movements of the accused after the commission of the offence, but
I
excluded , the other parts of the statement including those relating to motive and
opportunity. In Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy,23 the Calcutta High
1
Court admitted in evidence the narrative of the events prior to the night of occurrence
disclosing the motive of the offence. This case was followed by the Nagpur Court in
Bharosa Ramdayal v. Emperor, 24 the Court admitted in evidence the introductory part
and the portion narrating the motive and the opportunity. In Ram Singh v. The State,25
the Rajasthan High Court held that where it is possible to separate parts of the first
information report by an accused from that in which he had made a confession, that part
which can be so separated should be admitted in evidence, and on this view, admitted a
part of the report relating to motive and subsequent conduct including the statement that
the accused had left the deceased lying wounded and breathing in the tibari and there was
no hope of her surviving and he had come having covered her with a cloth. In Lachhman
Munda v. The State of Bihar,26 the Patna High Court admitted in evidence portions of
the first information report relating to the motive the opportunity and the entire narrative

19 ILR 59 Bom. 120; AIR 1935 Bom. 26.

20 ILR 1940-19 Pat. 301, at pp. 308, 314; AIR 1940 Pat. 163atpp. 165, 167.
21 1960 Mad. WN 528.
22 AIR 1962 Raj. 3. I
23 ILR 49 Cal. 167; AIR 1922 Cal. 342.
24 AIR 1941 Nag. 86, in Kartar Singh v. State, AIR 1952 Pepsu 98.
25 ILR (1952) 2 Raj. 93.
26 AIR 1964 Pat. 210.
 185

f events before and after the crime. This case was followed in the judgment under
ppeal. Some of the decided cases took the view that if a part of the report is properly
everable from the strict confessional part, then the severable part could be tendered in
vidence. We think that the separability test is misleading and the entire confessional
tatement is hit by S. 25 and save and except as provided by S. 27 and save and except
he formal part identifying the accused as the maker of the report, ho part of it could be
endered in evidence.
(20) We (Judges in Aghnoo Nagesia case) think, therefore, that save and except
jarts 1,15 and 18 identifying the appellant as the maker of the First Information Report
md save and except the portions coming within the purview of Section 27, the entire First
Information Report must be excluded from evidence.
(21) Section 27 applies only to information received from a person accused of an
affence in the custody of a police officer. Now, the Sub-Inspector stated he arrested the
appellant after he gave the first information report leading to the discovery. Prima facie,
therefore, the appellant was not in the custody of a police officer when he gave the report,
unless it can be said that he was then in constructive custody. On the question whether a
person directly giving to police officer information which may be used as evidence
against him may be deemed to have submitted himself to the custody of the police officer
within the meaning of S. 27 there is conflict of opinion. See the observations of Shah, J.
on
and Subba Rao, J. For the purposes of the case, we shall assume that the appellant was
I

contructively in police custody and, therefore, the information contained in the first
information report leading to the discovery of the dead bodies and the tangi is admissible
in evidence. The entire evidence against the appellant then consists of the fact that the
appellant gave information as to the place where the dead bodies were lying and as to the
place where he concealed the tangi, the discovery of the dead bodies and the tangi in
consequence of the information the discovery of a blood-stained chadar from the
appellant’s house and the fact that he had gone to Dungi Jharan Hills on the morning of
August 11, 1963. This evidence is not sufficient to convict the appellant of the offences
under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

27
1961 (1) SCR 14 : AIR 1960 SC 1125.
 186

(22) In the result, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence passed by the
Courts below are set aside, and the appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.

L. Statement made by one accused in FIR can be used against other accused
In Bandla Muddi Atchutha Ramaiah and others v. State of A.P.28 (Deceased)
Srinivasa Rao was the brother-in-law of PW1 (Suryanarayana Rao) who was residing
with his wife and children in a house situated adjacent to the house where his brothers-in-
law and mother-in-law were resisting in Thummadipudi village. All the accused belonged
to a different village. But for sometime they were residing in a house situated about 200
feet away from the house of the deceased. On 1-7-88, while second accused (Samba Siva
Rao) was returning home he was confronted by a dog which emerged from PWl’s house.
When the animal barked at the second accused he pelted stones at it, PW1 came out of his
house and told the accused not to harm the mongrel. This was followed by an altercation
between the two which was soon aggravated into a brawl and PWl’s wife and brother-in-
I

law (deceased) joined in it. Second accused left the scene giving a warming that he would
avenge for the insult meted out to him.
On the next day (2-7-88) second accused accompanied by his father (A-l) and
their relative (A3) reached the same place by about 11-30 P.M. Second accused called
!

PW1 to come out and in response to it PW 1 came out accompanied by his wife and
children. Then all the three assailants attacked PW1 by beating him. When his wife
(PW2) intervened she too was assaulted by the assailants. Hearing the hue and cry some
others from the household of PW1 including deceased Srinivasa Rao and PW3
Raghavulu rushed to the scene. When the deceased was held up by the other two accused,
A2 inflicted a stab injury on the chest of the deceased. By then, a few of the neighbours
arrived at the scene and they caught hold of A2 and A3. Achyuta Ramaiah (Al), by the
time escaped from the scene but he was chased and was caught from his house and he
was brought back to the scene. All the three assailants were beaten up by the furious
neighbours and finally they were trussed up at the same place. Police reached the scene
i
and removed all the injured, including the assailants, to the hospital, but the deceased
succumbed to his injuries on the way.

28
1997 SCC (Crl.) 128; 1996 Cr: LJ 4463.
 187

On the strength of a statement recorded from PW1 a Crime Case (No. 60 of 1988
>f Duggirala, P.S.) was registered. Another FIR was registered as Crime Case No. 61/88
>ased on a statement recorded from the first accused. The latter was referred by the police
is “mistake of law” within a couple of days and the former was charge sheeted after
completion of investigation.
“It is necessary to point out that the statement attributed to the first accused
'Achyuta Ramaiah) in Ex. P-24 was completely disowned by him when he was
questioned by the learned sessions Judge under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Even assuming
that this was truly recorded by the police, its utility in evidence is very much reflected by
law. A statement in an FIR can normally be used only to contradict its maker as provided
in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872 or to corroborate his evidence as envisaged in
Section 157 of the Act. Neither is possible in a Criminal trial as long as its maker is an
accused in the case, unless he offers himself to be examined as witness (vide Nisar Ali v.
1
State of U.P., Kappor, J. speaking for the three Judge Bench in that decision has
observed:
“A first information report is not substantive piece of evidence and can only be
used to corroborate the statement of the maker under Section 157 of Evidence Act or to
contradict it under Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as Evidence against maker
at the trial if he himself becomes an accused nor to corroborate or contradict other
witness. In this case, therefore, it is not evidence”.
However, another Bench of two Judges in Faddi v. State of M.P., has stated
that if the FIR given by the accused contains any admission as defined in Section 17 of
Evidence act there is no bar in using of such an admission against the maker thereof as
permitted under Section 21 of the Act provided such admission is not inculpatory in
character. In the judgment their Lordships distinguished Nisar Ali case in the following
lines “But it appears to us that in the context in which the observation is made and in the
circumstances, which we have verified from the record of that case, that the Sessions
Judge had definitely held the first information report lodged by the co-accused who was
acquitted to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali and that the High Court did not refer to it at

AIR 1957 SC 366.

1964(6) SCR 312.
 188

all in its judgment. This observation really refers to a first information report which is in
the nature of a confession by the maker thereof. Of course, a confessional first
information report cannot be used against the maker when he be an accused and
necessarily cannot be used against a co-accused”.
However, a caution has been struck by this Court (Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal
'-It
and Bachawat, JJ) in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, that when the statement in the
FIR given by an accused contains incriminating material and it is difficult to shift the
exculpatory portion therefrom, the whole of it must be excluded from evidence.
The legal position, therefore is this: A statement contained in the FIR furnished by
one of the accused in the case cannot in any manner be used against another accused.
Even as against the accused who made it, the statement cannot be used if it is inculpatory
in nature nor it can be used for the purpose of corroboration or contradiction unless its
maker offers himself as a witness in the trial. The very limited use of it is as an admission
under Section 21 of the Evidence act against its maker alone unless the admission does
not amount to confession.
In this case, Ex. P-24 cannot undoubtedly, be used against the second accused or
third accused. As the first accused is not alive now, it is unnecessary for us to exercise
our mind as to the extent to which it could have been used against the first accused
himself. However, in this context, we may observe that none of the prosecution witnesses
had a case that any cash or even any property of the accused had been taken away by
PW1 or his party on the previous night. The High Court therefore, went wrong in relying
|

on the aforesaid statement contained in Ex. P-24 to reach the finding that the accused had
a strong motive to launch an attack on PW-1 and is made on the night of the occurrence.
i i

M. Accused is entitled to certified copy of FIR

Allahabad High Court in Shindey v. U.P.,32 held that the first information report
is a public document and the accused is entitled to have its certified copy either from the
police authorities or from in court where it is lying, if the accused files an application and
i
is prepared to pay the proper court fee. Further, the accused is entitled to know what was

1966(1) SCR 134.

1998 Crl. L.J. 2879.
 189

aid in the FIR to connect him with the offence, so that he may be in a position to protect
is interest, is therefore, entitled to a copy thereof.
IE CAN HAVE IT FROM:
(1) Police station; or
- (2) Office of Superintendent of Police; or
(3) C.J.M./Magistrate/Special Judge, as the case maybe.
It was further held by Full Bench of Madras High Court reported in 1998 Madras,
Crl.) 503, Law Weekly, that the accused is not entitled to certified copy of the FIR,
before forwarding a final report, and Division Bench of Allahabad High Court held that
:hey are handicapped to appreciate the reasons for holding so, due to their non­
mentioning in any view of matter for the reasons recorded by them, they are unable to
agree with that view.
!

N. Hearing of accused at the time of recording of FIR:-

At the stage of recording of FIR or even during the investigation, the accused has
I
no right to be heard and therefore notice need not be issued to him at this stage.
In the case of Union of India v. W.N. Chanda honorable court decided that the
doctrine of Audi Alteram partem cannot be invoked at the stage of recording of FIR or
even during the investigation.

O. IN DOWRY DEATH CASES - MOTIVE IS IMPLICIT:

In Dowry deaths motive for murder exists and what is required of courts is to
examine as to who translated it into action as motive viz., whether individual or family.34
First Information Report is definite in regard to cruelty and harassment meted out to
deceased for and in connection with the dowry demand soon before her death and mere
specific omission in relation to definite sum of money etc would not make prosecution
case doubtful.35

1993 Cr. LJ. 859 (SC). Bofors Cases.

Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 1991(1) Crimes 116(117) S.C.
2005 Cri L J 2062 ( Utr) (DB).
 190

In Rameshwar Dayal v. Col. Ram Singh,36 it was held that FIR and complaint
case on the same facts section 190 Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance
of an offence upon receiving a complaint of facts constituting such offence independently
of a Police Report before him of such facts.
The motive is inherent in dowry-death cases.37Section 54 and 195(1) Cr. P.C., the
mandatory provisions of Section 195(1) Criminal Procedure Code do not effect the right
of police to investigate a cognizable offence. From a plain reading of Section 195 Cr.
P.C. it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the Court intends to take
cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1), Cr. P.C. and it has nothing to do with the
statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable
offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have
been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in Court. In other words, the
statutory power of the Police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or
circumscribed by Section 195, Cr. P.C. It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet
(challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court
would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section
195(1) (b), Cr. P.C. but nothing therein deters the Court from filing a complaint for
offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and materials
. i
i

collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the
■JO

procedure laid down in Section 340, Cr. P.C.

P. FIR filed against the accused can be falsified

i

Ram Kumar and another were convicted U/S. 304-B & 498-A of I.P.C. Ram
!

Kumar is the husband and second appellant is mother-in-law of the deceased. The
deceased, Rajdulari married to the first appellant on 20-6-1984. The case of the
prosecution is that the appellant demanded dowry ever since the marriage. The deceased
informed the same whenever she visited her parents.

36 1998(2) RCR(Criminal) 803(P&H).

37 Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 1991(1) Crimes 116 (117) S.C.; Laxman Kumar v. State,
A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 25; Smt. Medha Bai v. State of M.P., 1993(2) Crimes 813; Rajammal v. State,
1993 Cri. L.J. 3029 (Mad.).
38
1998 Cri. L.J. 1104 (1104-1105) SC: 1998 (1) Crimes 122 (S.C.).
 191

The sister of deceased by name Bhimla was married to the 1st appellant brother on
re same day of the marriage of the deceased. The case of the prosecution is that on 7th
ipril, 1988. three persons came to the house of PW7 and told that Raj Dulari (deceased)
/as having severe pain in the stomach and that they should go to see her. On getting this
iformation, she went to the appellant house, but none of them was found. Her daughter
Laj Dulari was also not in the house. They found that their second daughter Bhimla was
Dcked up in a room on the first floor. She said that the appellant had given beating to Raj
)ulari during day and when she tried to intervene, she was detained in the locked room,
’hen, the dead body of Raj Dulari was found lying near a well outside the house.
The Court of Session considered the entire evidence and came to the conclusion
bat the charges were proved. On appeal, the High Court affirmed that judgment. Learned
i
ounsel appearing for the appellants argued before us that the following circumstances
lisprove the case of the prosecution.
The ‘Muklawa’ ceremony of the younger sister was performed about a month and
. half before the occurrence and that shows, according to learned counsel, that there was
to demand of dowry or harassment by the appellants for Raj Dulari. According to learned
counsel, if it had been so, the ‘muklawa’ ceremony of the younger sister would not have
>een performed. There is no substance in this contention. The marriage of both the sisters
ook place on the same day. There was no purpose in stopping the ‘muklawa’ of the
rounger sister. As spoken to by the witnesses, the parents were hoping that if both the
isters started living together the situation would improve and they would be happy. The
jerformance of ‘muklawa’ of the younger sister does not belie the evidence of
larassment.
The second contention placed before us by the learned counsel for appellants is
hat the younger sister had filed a divorce petition later and in that petition, she had
mproved the story. According to the learned counsel, in the First Information Report, the
ippellants’ names were mentioned while in the petition for divorce, the younger sister
lad implicated her husband also and that shows that the story was not true. There is no
nerit in the contention. The First Information Report could not be falsified by the
illegations made in the divorce petition. The latter is not relevant for considering the
ruth of the prosecution.
 192

The learned counsel next: contended that the deceased had written five or six
letters to her parents but none of them has been produced. We have to see whether the
evidence placed before court is sufficient to prove the charges. The absence of the said
letters does not disprove the case of the prosecution. The next argument is that there is no
mark on the dead body to evidence the alleged beating. There is ample evidence to prove
that there was harassment by the appellants. The same has been believed by the courts
below. We see no infirmity in the discussion or appreciation of evidence by the Courts
below.
In the case of Ramkumar and another v. State of Haryana39 honorable court
decided that the circumstances, we do not find any justification to interfere with the
concurrent findings of the Courts below. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

Q. Accepting final report without issuing notice is illegal

It was held by A. P. High Court in Injamuri Jayamma v. Director General of
Police (CID) Hyderabad and another.40 It was held having regard to the principles laid
down as to the mandatory requirements of sec. 173 Cr. P.C. in the instant case, glaringly,
the learned Magistrate did not give any reasons much less any opportunity of hearing
either to the said V. John to whom the notice was alleged to have been served or to the
petitioner. The order passed by the Magistrate also is a one line order whereas the final
report runs into pages and there is absolutely no consideration either way for accepting or
rejecting the same and the reasons therefore (para 25) of the case mentioned above.

R. OFFENCES RELATING TO THE REGISTRATION OF FIR

i). Signature on the FIR
The FIR must be signed by the Informant.
i
(a) Informant right to refuse to sing the FIR
Informant should not sign the FIR if the information written by the Police Officer
is not narrated by him, or if it is wrong. The informant may refuse to sign the FIR if the
information recorded by the police officer is not correct.

1999 Cr. L.J. 462 SC.

2002 (1) ALD (Criminal) 290 (AP).
 193

b) When it will be an offence

After giving the information, after recording the information as stated by the
iformant, if the informant refused to sign the report of the FIR made by him to the police
fficer he may be prosecuted for the offence under Section 180IPC.

i) . Section 180 of Indian Penal Code

Section 180 of IPC reads as follows:-
Refusing to sign statement:- “Whoever refuses to sign any statement made by
dm, when required to sign that statement by a public servant legally competent to require
hat he shall sign that statement, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
vhich may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 500/- or with
ioth.”
To punish the informant it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that:
(a) the accused informant (if he refuses to sign) made a particular statement.
(b) That he shall be required to sign that statement by a public servant.
(c) That such public servant was legally competent to require him to sign such
statement.
(d) That the accused refused to sign such statement.

i
ii) . Police has no power to refuse to record FIR
The Police Officer has no power to refuse to enter the received information in
i
'irst Information Report for adequate action about the commission of cognizable offence
s given to him, but he can refuse to record the FIR if the information is given as vague
ind not adequate enough to enable him to commence an investigation. Refusal to record
he FIR by the police officer is punishable departmentally and legally i.e. under Section
117 of I.P.C.

v) Section 217 Indian Penal Code

’ublic servant disobeying direction by law with intent to save person from punishment or
iroperty from forfeiture Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any
 194

direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as such public
servant, intending thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save,
any person from legal punishment or subject him to a less punishment than that to which
he is liable, or with intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save, any
property from forfeiture or any charge to which it is liable by law, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with
fine, or with both.

Nature of the offence

Section 217 of IPC is cognizable offence, bailable offence triable by any
Magistrate.

v). Lodging a False Report

People may lodge false report:
(i) for taking vengeance;
(ii) for getting insurance money, illegally by cooked-up stories of death or
fire;
(iii) for grabbing other’s ornaments by narrating false stories of theft; and
(iv) for misleading the police.
It is the duty of the police officers in such cases to make an enquiry into the matter so that
innocent persons are not charged on false information. The story of the informant must be
scrutinized carefully and evidence must be collected to establish that the case is false.
Once it is established that the case is false, the FIR is to be sent to the Court for
cancellation. A final report as required u/s. 173(2) Cr.P.C. is to be drafted by the police
officer-in-charge of the Police Station emphasizing the following points
1. The brief facts given by the informant in the FIR.
i

2. The observation of the Investigating Officer who investigated the case of the
Informant by inspection of the spot or material exhibits relied by the informant.
3. Direct and indirect evidence and its details which lead to the definite conclusion
of the witnesses and the nature of the evidence given by them.
4. In support of information and scientific evidence on which he relies.
 195

5. How the facts given by the complainant are not reconcilable.

6. How the evidence relied upon by the informant is worthy of rejection.
7. Why the informant was motivated to move to the police.
8. In the concluding para there should be a prayer that the case be closed:
(1) if any accused is arrested that he be discharged,
(2) if anything has been taken into possession and how it should be disposed of.
(3) That the informant should; be proceeded against under Section 182 or S. 211 of
Cr. P.C.

d) Filing of a case against an informant

A final report should be submitted to the Competent Magistrate for his order that
he case is closed. After the final disposal of the original case, the informant may be
i

>rosecuted for lodging a false FIR for the offence under Section 182 of I.P.C. or S. 211 of
.P.C.

di). Section 182 Indian Penal Code

False information, with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the
njury of another person
“Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or
relieves to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will
hereby cause, such public servant: -
i
a) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true
state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him, or
b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any
oerson, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
nay extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with
I

Doth.

Nature of the Offence

I
It is a non-cognizable offence, bailable, triable by Magistrate of First Class.
 196

Section 211 Indian Penal Code

False charge of Offence made with intent to injury:-
“Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or causes to be
instituted any Criminal Proceeding against that person, or falsely charges any person with
having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such
proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and if
such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with
death imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be
punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Nature of offence- This offence is Non-Cognizable, Bailable and triable by Magistrate of
the first class.

viii) . Recording untrue statements in FIR by the Police Officer

Recording of untrue statements in the FIR is a serious offence. The police officer
is responsible for inserting anything false in the FIR and is liable to be punished under
Section 177 and S. 218 of I.P.C.

ix) . Section 177 of Indian Penal Code

Sec. 177 of IPC reads as follows:-
Fumishing false information: -Whoever, being legally bound to furnish
information on any subject to any public servant, as such, furnishes, as true, information
on the subject which he knows or has reason to believe to be false, shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees or with both;
or, if the information which he is legally bound to give respects the commission
of an offence, or is required for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence,
or in order to the apprehension of an offender, with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

!
 197

Mature of the Offence- This offence is Non-Cognizable, Bailable and triable by any
Magistrate
Section 218 Indian Penal Code
Section 218 of IPC reads as follows
Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save person
rom punishment or property from forfeiture Whoever being a public servant, and
>eing as such public servant, charged with the preparation of any record or other writing,
fames that record or writing in a manner which he knows to be incorrect, with intent to
;ause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, loss or injury to the public or
o any person, or with intent thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will
hereby save, any person from legal punishment, or with intent to save, or knowing that
te is likely thereby to save, any property from forfeiture or other charge to which it is
iable by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
nay extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”

Mature of offence- This offence is cognizable, Bailable and triable by any Magistrate.

!. In the absence of name of witness, Evidence can not be doubted

Non-mention of name of witness is not a ground to doubt his evidence, there is no

equirements of mentioning of the names of all witnesses in the first information report,
mt the details and description of witnesses, who saw the commencement of offence is
.dvisable, to mention in the FIR. The High Court has noted that the names of witnesses
lo not appear in the first information report. That by itself cannot be a ground of doubt
heir evidence as noted by this Court in Bhagwan Singh and others v. State of M.P.41
rhere is no requirement of mentioning the names of all witnesses in the first information
leport.

JT 2002(3) SC 387, Chittar Lai v. State of Rajasthan, 2003 AIR SCW 3466. (2003); State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Man Singh and others, 2003(6) Supreme 202.
 198

T. Omission of minor thing is no ground to disbelieve the witness

Non-mentioning of torch in the FIR is not a ground to disbelieve the witnesses.

The non-mentioning of Torch is not a ground to disbelieve the witnesses who deposed
that there is a torch burning. The Apex Court in Shakti Patra and others v. The State of
West Bengal,42 held that where prosecution witness testified that he had identified the
accused in the light of the torch held by him, the presence of torch would not be said to
be not proved on the ground that there was no mention of the torch in the FIR or in the
Statement of the witness before the police, when there was testimony of the other
witnesses that when they reached the spot they found the torch burning. Following the
above decisions the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. V. Babu and others,43 held that :
Where prosecution witness testified that he had identified the accused in the light of the
torch held by him, the presence of torch would not be said to be not proved on the ground
that there was no mention of the torch in the FIR or in the statement of the witness before
the Police, when there was testimony of the other witnesses that when they reached the
spot they found the torch burning. This omission of word is not fatal to the prosecution
case.

U. FIR AND THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATE

In Shashikant V. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors.44 The Apex
Court held that in the instant case, an anonymous complaint alleging corrupt practice by
member of Special Police Force was received. Authorities on basis of said complaint
initiated preliminary enquiry against him. Such course is permissible. Although ordinarily
in terms of S. 154 of the Code, when a report is received relating to the cognizable
offence, a First Information Report should be lodged, to carry out a preliminary inquiry
even under the Code is not unknown. When an anonymous complaint is received, no
investigating officer would initiate investigative process immediately thereupon. It may
for good reasons carry out a preliminary enquiry to find out the truth or otherwise of the

AIR 1981 SC 1217.

2004(1) ALD (Criminal) 15 (SC) Para 5.
AIR 2007 SUPREME COURT 351.
 199

illegations contained therein. Only when a F.I.R. is lodged, the officer in charge of the
>olice station statutorily liable to report there about to a Magistrate who is empowered
o take cognizance in terms ofproviso to S. 157(1) of the Code. Proviso (b) appended
hereto empowers the Investigating Officer not to investigate where it appears to him that
here is no sufficient groundfor entering into an investigation. The question, therefore, as
:o whether an empowered officer who had made investigation or caused the same to be
made in a cognizable offence within the meaning of S. 157 of the Code or had not
initiated an investigation on the basis of an information which would not come within the
meaning of S. 154 of the Code is essentially required to be determined in the fact
situation in each case.
(1) As and when Magistrate and Judges who are receiving the F.I.R. shall initial
sach page and put the date and time of receipt the name or number of messenger shall
also be noted. If F.I.R. is received by post, the envelope also be initialled and preserved.
(2) Whenever the Magistrate receives F.I.R. it shall be his duty to verify whether
police have taken up the investigation or not. According to recently printed F.I.R, in Col.
No. 13 the police have to mention whether they have taken up the investigation or
directed the investigation or refused to investigate or transferred to any other police
station on the point of jurisdiction.
According to Sec. 154 Cr. P.C. whenever police officer receives information of
commission of a cognizable offence, he has no option except to register the case. But,
according to Sec. 157(1) (b) Cr. P.C. if it appears to the officer-in-charge of a Police
Station that there is no sufficient ground for. entering on an investigation, he shall not
investigate the case. That means police officer cannot refuse to register F.I.R., but he can
refuse to investigate if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground for entering on
i
an investigation. This fact has to be mentioned by him in the printed F.I.R. in Col. No.
i
13. The power of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the
Magistrate and it is only in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case that
I
the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation, or in the alternative
himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the
case. Sec. 159 Cr. P.C. Such Magistrate, on receiving such report may direct an
investigation or, if he thinks fit, at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to
 200

him to proceed to hold a preliminary inquiry into or otherwise to dispose of the case in
manner provided in the Code.
(1) It is the duty of the officer-in-charge of a police station to record information
of commission of a cognizable offence.
(2) After issuing of F.I.R. it is the duty of the police officer that he shall forthwith
send a report of the same to Magistrate empower to take cognizable of such offence upon
the police report; and
(3) He shall proceed in person, or depute one of his subordinate officers to
proceed, to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and if
necessary to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender.
According to 157, Clause (b) Cr. P.C. a Police Officer can refuse to investigate if
it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he
shall not investigate the case.
On such report, according to Sec. 159 Cr. P.C. the Magistrate may direct an
investigation subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary inquiry into, or
otherwise to dispose of the case in the manner provided in this Code.
In S. N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari,45 it was held that The High Court has
held that U/S 159, the only power which the Magistrate can exercise on receiving a report
from the Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station, is to make an order in those cases which
are covered by the provision to sub-section (1) of Sec. 157 viz cases in which the Officer-
in-Charge of the Police Station does not proceed to investigate the case. The High Court
has further held that this Section 159 does not empower a Magistrate to stop the
investigation by the police in exercise of the power conferred on it by Section 156. It is
the correctness of this decision which has been challenged by the appellant and the
ground taken is that Section 159 should be interpreted as being wide enough to permit the
Magistrate to proceed or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed, to hold a
preliminary inquiry into or otherwise to dispose of the case in the manner provided in this
Code, even if the report from the police, submitted under Sec. 157, states that the police
are proceeding with the investigation of the offence. It was urged by counsel for the
appellant that the narrow interpretation of Section 159 accepted by the High Court will

45
A.I.R. 1970 SC 786.
 201

eave persons at the mercy of the police who can harass any one by having a false report
odged and starting investigation on the basis of such a report without any control by the
udiciary. He has particularly emphasized the case of the appellant who was himself a
udicial officer working as additional District Magistrate and who moved the Magistrate
)n the ground that the police had engineered the case against him.
It may also be further noticed that even in sub-section (3) of Section 156, the only
lower given to the Magistrate who can take cognizance of an offence under Sec. 190, is
o order an investigation; there is no mention of any power to stop an investigation by the
police. The scheme of these sections thus, clearly is that the power of the police to
nvestigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate and it is only in
:ases where the police decide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene
md either direct an investigation or in the alternative himself proceed or depute a
Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case. The power of the
>olice to investigate has been made independent of any control by the Magistrate”.
The object of Section 159 of Cr. P.C. was interpreted by the Supreme Court in the
udgment cited supra that Sec. 159 of the Code, which defines the power of a Magistrate
vhich he can exercise on receiving a report from the police of the cognizable offence
I

mder Section 157 of the Code.

In our opinion, Section 159 was really intended to give a limited power to the
!
i

Magistrate to ensure that the police investigate all cognizable offences and do not refuse
o do so by abusing the right granted for certain limited cases of not proceeding with the
i
investigation of the offence.

7. Magistrate has no power to Stop the Investigation by Exercising his Powers U/S
lection 159 Cr. P.C.
In N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari,46 it was held “Section 156(1) of the Code
>f Criminal Procedure empowers an officer-in-charge of a Police Station to investigate
i
my cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate. Sub-section (2) of Section 156
ays down that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be
ailed in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not

A.I.R. 1970 SC 786.

 202

empowered under this section to investigate, while Sub-Section (3) gives power to any
Magistrate empowered under Section 190 of the Code to order such an investigation in
any case as mentioned in Sub-section (1).
Section 157 requires that whenever such information is received by an officer-in­
charge of a police station that he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence
which he is empowered to investigate under Section 156, he must forthwith send a report
of it to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such an offence upon a police
report and, at the same time, he must either proceed in person, or depute one of his
subordinate officers to proceed, to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of
the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for discovery and arrest of the offender. This
provision is qualified by a proviso which is in two parts. The first clause of the proviso
enables an Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station not to proceed to make an investigation
i
on the spot or to depute a subordinate officer for that purpose if the information received
is given against a person by name and the case is not of a serious nature. The second
clause of the proviso permits the officer-in-charge of a police station not to investigate
the case if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an
investigation. The report to be sent to the Magistrate under sub-section (1) of Section 157
requires that in each of the case where the officer-in-charge of the police station decides
to act under the two clauses of the proviso, he must state in his report his reasons for not
fully complying with the requirements of sub-section (1) and, in addition, in cases where
he decides not to investigate on the ground mentioned in the second clause of the proviso,
he is required to notify to the informant the fact that he will not investigate the case or
cause it to be investigated.

W. Power in respect to hold investigation and preliminary inquiry

Such Magistrate, on receiving such report, may direct an investigation or, if he
thinks fit, at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to
hold a preliminary inquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of, the case in the manner
provided in this Code.”
 203

“The High Court of Lahore in Crown v. Mohammad Sadiq Niaz,47 and the High
3ourt of Patna in Pancham Singh v. State,48 interpreted Sec. 159 to the same effect as
leld by us above. The reasons given were different. Both the Courts based their decisions
jrimarily on the view expressed by the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja
'iaziar Ahmed.49 That case, however, was not quite to the point that has come up for
tecision before us. The Privy Council was concerned with the question whether the High
3ourt had power under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash
>roeeedings being taken by the police in pursuance of first information reports made to
he police. However, the Privy Council made some remarks which have been relied upon
>y the High Courts and are to the following effect.
“In India, as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to
nvestigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any
luthority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an
mfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by
m exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The functions of the judiciary and the
lolice are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty
vith due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise
ts own function, always, of course, subject to the right, of the court to intervene in an
ppropriate case when moved under Sec. 491 of the Cr. P.C. to give directions in the
lature of habeas corpus.
This interpretation, to some extent, supports the view that the scheme of the
Criminal Procedure Code is that the power of the police to investigate a cognizable
'ffence is not to be interfered with by the judiciary. Their Lordships of the Privy Council
vere, of course, concerned only with the powers of the High Court under Sec. 561A Cr.
’.C. while we have to interpret Sec. 159 of the Code which defines the power of a
Magistrate which he can exercise on receiving a report from the police of the cognizable
iffence U/S. 157 of the Code. In our opinion, Sec. 159 was really intended to give a
imited power to the Magistrate to ensure that the police investigate all cognizable

AIR 1949 Lah. 204.

AIR 1967 Pat. 416.
AIR 1945 PC 18.
 204

offences and do not refuse to do so by abusing the right granted for certain limited cases
of not proceeding with the investigation of the offence.
“Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant urged that such an interpretation is
likely to be very prejudicial particularly to officers of the judiciary who have to deal with
cases brought up by the police and frequently give decisions which the police dislike. In
such cases the police may engineer a false report of a cognizable offence against the
Judicial Officer and may then harass him by carrying on a prolonged investigation of the
offence made out by the report. It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal
Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect
that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person
can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution under which if the High Court could be convinced that the power of
investigation has been exercised by a Police Officer mala fide, the High Court can always
issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers.
The fact that the Code does not contain any other provision giving power to a Magistrate
to stop investigation by the police cannot be a ground for holding that such a power must
be read in Section 159 of the Code.

X. Magistrate cannot interfere with the investigation but he can direct the
investigation when police failed to do so
In Peral Bewereage Ltd., New Delhi v. State of A.P.,50 it was held that “There is
a clear cut distinction between the information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence given orally or in writing to an officer-in-charge of a police station and
cognizance of offence by a Magistrate, upon receiving a complaint of facts which
constitutes offence. Such taking of cognizance may be upon a police report of such facts
i

or upon information received from any person other than a police officer. The
information relating to commission of a cognizable offence is bound to be entered by an
officer-in-charge of police station in the prescribed book. Such reports are called first
information reports. Person lodging such information relating to commission of a
cognizable offence is an informant, whereas the complaint is the one constituting facts

50
2000(2) ALD 32 A.P.
 205

revealing commission of an offence. In the later case, it is called the complaint and if it is
filed by an individual other than a police officer, it will be known as private complaint.
“Every officer-in-charge of a police station is empowered to investigate any
cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate and the proceedings in any such case
shall not, at any stage, be called in question on the ground that the case was one which
such officer was not empowered to investigate.”
“An officer-in-charge of a police station, upon satisfying himself that there is
reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Sec. 156 of
:he Code to investigate he shall forthwith proceed to investigate the facts and
circumstances of the case, if necessary, to make measures for discovery and arrest of the
offender.”
“The power conferred upon the police officer is coupled with duties. Discretion is,
rowever, given to the police officer not to investigate the case, if it appears to the officer
hat there is no sufficient ground for entering on investigation, but that statutory power
md discretion is to be exercised fairly and reasonably and in accordance with law. In
cither case he is bound to submit a report to the Magistrate under Sec. 158 of the Code.
The Magistrate upon receiving the said report may direct an investigation or hold a
ireliminary inquiry into the report or otherwise dispose of the same in the manner
provided in the Code. It is clear that the jurisdiction is conferred upon the Magistrate to
lirect the investigation even in cases where the police officer came to the conclusion that
here is no sufficient ground for entering on investigation. This is a limited power
inferred upon a Magistrate to compel the Police Officer to proceed with the
nvestigation. There is no power as such conferred under the Code upon any Court to
>therwise interfere with the processes of investigation. The investigating agency is
ilothed with jurisdiction and freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to
each a conclusion of its own. The jurisdiction of an investigating agency cannot be
nterdicted by any Court, as no such power is conferred upon any Court by the Code,
nvestigation of an offence is the area exclusively reserved for an officer-in-charge of a
>olice station and once that is completed and the officer submits the report before the
Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence under Sec. 190 of the Code, the duty of the
’olice Officer comes to an end. Thereafter, it is within the exclusive domain of the
Magistrate for further proceeding. It is thus clear that no court under the Code have any
:ontrol and power to stifle or impinge upon the proceedings in the investigation and it is
 206

only in a case wherein the police officer decides not to investigate the offence, the
concerned Magistrate may intervene and either direct an investigation or in the
alternative, he himself can proceed or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to
proceed to hold preliminary inquiry or otherwise dispose of the case in the manner
provided in the Code.

Y. Powers of Magistrate to stop investigation (Secs. 167(5) & (6) of Cr. P.C.)
Sectionl67(5)- If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation
is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was
arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the
offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies, the Magistrate that for
special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond
the period of six months is necessary.

Section 167(6)- Where any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been
made under sub-section (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application
made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to be made,
vacate the order made under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made
into the offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he may
specify.

Z. REVIEW
In this chapter, this has been discussed that FIR is to be written by the Police
Station In charge irrespective of paving local jurisdiction and sent it to the concerned
Police Station. FIR must be registered in a Cognizable offence as the Police has bounden
duty to take cognizance of matters of serious nature and to assist the victim at a time
when he is in jeopardy. Based on jurisdiction a Police Officer cannot escape from his
essential duty of taking in Cognizance, a cognizable offence. In next Chapter, i.e.
Chapter-V it has been discussed that FIR is not an encyclopedia and there is no need to
mention each details therein.