RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY / CULTURE / INTEGRATION

Culture & religion

Nikhat SattarApril 05, 2019Facebook Count
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OFTENTIMES so many traditions and cultural practices get absorbed into religion that people tend to
replace the latter with the former. The lines between the two become blurred and over time, basic
tenets of faith are forgotten and replaced with customs and traditions.

Migration of peoples to other countries causes absorption of local values and customs and these can
seep into religion. During his lectures in Madras in the 1930s, the great Quran scholar, Mohammed
Marmaduke Pickthall, talking about the pathetic situation of Muslims and especially women in India,
claimed that the system of purdah came neither from Islam nor from Arabia. It was a cultural system
adopted from Zoroastrians, Persians and Christian Byzantines. Its implementation differed (and still
does), depending on the class and economic status of the women.

Pickthall goes on to say that Indian Muslims adopted the idea of women’s subjugation to the man in
marriage from other cultures. Marriage in Islam is a social contract with equal say by the partners.
Many scholars now argue that it is based on equality with equal rights, although the man had
financial responsibility, relevant for those times.

Women had the right to choose and sometimes even initiate proposals. Now, women’s choice is not
only disregarded but often punished with death. Although an issue of culture, in the minds of many
Muslims, this is religiously sanctioned — an erroneous concept.

Local traditions should not replace basic beliefs and be seen as part of faith.

Another cultural practice that has become accepted as part of religion is the declaration of pious
individuals as saints and the giving up of children to shrines.

There have been many pious Muslims who have spent their lives in search of the truth and praying
to God, but neither the Quran nor the Sunnah present any injunction for their treatment as saints.
The system of pirs and shrine-keepers is based on the cultures of converts in Iraq and Syria,
developed further through the influence and amalgamation of local cultures in India. Pious people
should be venerated and even emulated in some cases, but they should not be worshipped, as the
case appears to be in some countries.
Both religion and culture are closely related and influence each other. Many practices used by
Muslims in the subcontinent differ from those in the Middle East and elsewhere because of how
Muslims accepted traditions that existed in the region. There is no harm in this, as long as they do
not replace basic beliefs and get absorbed as essentials of religion. As an example, getting orphans
from a mosque to recite verses from the Holy Quran upon the demise of a person is deemed part of
religion. It has no such status.

Anything that is added as a part of Islam is called innovation or bidah. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) is
reported to have said: “The most evil matters are those that are newly invented (in the religion), for
every newly invented matter is an innovation. Every innovation is misguidance and every
misguidance is in the Hellfire” (Sunan Al Nasa 1578).

Consider the matter of women observing iddah when widowed or divorced. This period of 90 days-
plus was meant to determine pregnancy, during the times when no other means was possible.

Many families in the subcontinent adopted the practice of restraining the movement of women and
refusing visits of any man. No religious precedent exists for this. Such a practice also comes from the
cloistering of women in the old Hindu system.

An even stranger tradition is that in some families upon the death of a man his women relatives are
not allowed to see his face. The dead body becomes a na mehram. There are even cases when the
husband has not been allowed to view his dead wife’s face because the marriage stood annulled!

In case of marriage, culture has introduced a caste and biradari system which is abhorrent to Islam.
This is so prevalent that society in the subcontinent, in particular, relies on cousin marriages, even in
cases when the couples are completely unsuited, mostly to keep inheritance within the family. This
could be one of the reasons why societies in which such marriages abound rarely flourish in intellect
and creativity. Family planning is frowned upon as un-Islamic, but multiple marriages, a practice
allowed under certain conditions, are seen to be a man’s right.

Such distortions and regressive practices are hugely detrimental but have gained much acceptance
and legitimacy. Culture should develop with time, but once it gets amalgamated into religion, the
practices become fossilised. Sifting simple religious acts from traditions that should be given up
becomes impossible, with rational thought and debate being a major casualty. Instead of the Quran,
unverified ahadith and rote learners are adopted as religious guides.
Focus on NAP
EditorialApril 06, 2019Facebook Count
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IN the aftermath of the horrific 2014 APS, Peshawar, tragedy, political forces in the country, along
with the security establishment, pledged to take firm action against militancy of all sorts, as well as
those providing the support structure for hatred and violence.

While there has been progress on many points of the NAP agenda, it is key that there is no let up in
momentum and that the state maintains surveillance of the elements out to foment violence in the
country.

In this regard, Minister of State for Interior Shehryar Khan Afridi, while speaking at an event in
Islamabad on Thursday, said that actions against proscribed organisations were being taken not
under pressure of the Financial Action Task Force, but as envisioned under NAP.

“No one will be allowed to use our land against any country,” he said, while briefing diplomats in the
federal capital.

In a similar vein, the army’s top brass announced at the last corps commanders’ conference that the
military would support all stakeholders in implementing NAP.

It is a positive sign that all institutions of the state are on the same page regarding NAP.

Indeed, recent actions against militant outfits such as JeM and LeT, taken in the aftermath of the
Pulwama event, indicate that the PTI-led government realises it must crack down on violent actors.

However, it is important that the state does not rest on its laurels.

Considering the strength of the jihadi infrastructure nurtured since the Zia era, it will take some time
and considerable effort before it is dismantled.

The nation has paid with thousands of lives in the battle against militancy, so it is important that all
violent actors are put out of business, to ensure these lives have not been lost in vain.
Moreover, equal attention must be paid to all 20 points outlined under NAP.

For instance, many sectarian outfits and those responsible for promoting hate speech are still active,
though keeping a low profile.

As was reported, Maulvi Abdul Aziz of the Lal Masjid infamy recently led Friday prayers at the same
mosque in Islamabad.

The fact that such a controversial cleric was able to pull this off indicates that loopholes exist.

In order to root out militancy and push the country in a more tolerant direction, the process of
identifying and prosecuting hatemongers must be ongoing.

There must be zero tolerance for those promoting hatred of religions, sects, ethnicities and
nationalities.

While freedom of speech is inviolable and needs to be protected by the state, those promoting
violence against individuals or communities cannot be tolerated.

Moreover, choking the funds of hatemongers and violent entities is essential for Pakistan’s own
security.

Madressahs and religious institutions that are dedicated to religious studies are fine; but institutions
that promote jihadi thought and sectarianism cannot be allowed to function as usual.

The state must win the battle.

Unpacking deradicalisation

Arifa NoorApril 09, 2019Facebook Count

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ONCE again, as the state rolls up its sleeves to rid society of militancy, plans beyond the conventional
security operations are under the spotlight. And this includes figuring out how to deal with militants.

In this regard, words such as ‘deradicalisation’ are being bandied about; but it is hard to figure out
what the specific plans or strategies are. The information minister, Fawad Chaudhry, is one of the
few to provide any details — he has said that it is to be a three-step strategy. The first will be to
disarm the groups; the second to help them get jobs and interest-free loans; and the third will be to
integrate them into society.

Other news reports quote unnamed officials as saying the militants could be accommodated in the
paramilitary forces.

There has been criticism of this idea of integration, instead of punishment, as it is argued that
militants should be punished for crimes, instead of being facilitated into society. But while this has
its merits, punishment cannot be the only solution.

The problem in Pakistan is the absence of details about the government’s deradicalisation plans.

Simply put, not every militant will be found guilty of such crimes that he can be given the death
sentence or life imprisonment. There are many lower-level operatives who cannot be put away
forever, even if they can be convicted.

And this is why the state has to think more broadly. It is in this context that deradicalisation has to
be considered for those who are not beyond redemption. The ‘strategy’ has been adopted by a
number of states, even though its success is far from evident. But the debate over the efficacy is for
another time.

At the moment, the problem in Pakistan is the absence of details available about the government’s
deradicalisation plans.

If the deradicalisation programmes in other Muslim countries are to provide any hints of what the
stakeholders in Pakistan may be considering, then such projects tend to focus on inmates or
convicted criminals.

Be it Saudi Arabia or Indonesia, the programmes run by these governments aim to ‘reform’ or
deradicalise imprisoned militants. Clerics or former militants are brought in to talk to them, mentor
them in a bid to turn them away from extremist views and radical ideologies. At a later stage, they
can be facilitated economically by being offered employment to help them integrate into their
families and society.

For example, in Indonesia (which initiated such efforts after the Bali bombings), the programme is
based on the idea that radicals will only listen to other radicals. As a result, reformed extremists
were recruited to talk to and engage with convicted militants. And the second aspect was to offer
them financial assistance — paying the school fees of their children; providing their wives with
money to raise the family. Eventually, the released prisoners were provided with some money. (In
fact, there were some who argued that the programme’s ideological component was not too
effective and that militants opted for it only because of the financial incentives.)

Despite the Indonesian authorities touting this as a success, not everyone agrees. However, other
Southeast Asian states have implemented similar programmes.

Apart from Muslim countries, the European countries, too, have such programmes, though these
tend to be divided into counter-radicalisation (which are preventive in nature) and deradicalisation
categories.

An example of a deradicalisation programme was the Violence Prevention Network run in Germany
which targeted prisoners from the far right as well as religious extremists. The prisoners were
offered a programme in prison, followed by support for a year after being released. In addition, their
families were provided financial help. But instead of the engagement being based on religion, the
dialogue was more focused on delving into the perpetrators’ sense of anger, their crimes and re-
educating them about democracy and handling conflict.

On the other hand, the prevention programmes work entirely differently — they aim to identify
those at risk or those who may be involved or engaged with extremist organisations and working to
disengage them.

For instance, a programme in the Netherlands, which was run by the government in collaboration
with the local authorities, reached out to young people in right-wing groups. These youths were
offered support in withdrawing from groups; this support could be in the form of help in returning to
school or getting a job and accommodation.

But Muslim states have tended to mostly focus on deradicalisation. The Saudi and Yemeni
programmes and the deradicalisation centres in Swat — like the Indonesian efforts (and to some
extent the German example) — have been aimed at convicted extremists.
To return now to Pakistan, one can assume, in the absence of details, that the deradicalisation the
government is now promising will be akin to the Indonesian model discussed here; especially as this
is what the Swat centres also did.

If so, this means that only convicted prisoners will be targeted.

But this raises a few questions. How successful will this be in settled areas where without reforms
the capacity of our judicial system to ensure convictions may remain rather limited?

Second, how will this work in the case of militants linked to organisations that so far have not carried
out attacks on Pakistani soil? How will they be convicted or imprisoned and then made part of such
programmes?

Third, will the deradicalisation programme, like the Indonesian model, aim to use former militants to
engage with these convicted militants, or will it use traditional ulema (which the Indonesians did not
use as they felt they were too discredited in the eyes of the militants)?

Fourth, is the government planning to set aside funds for the financial rehabilitation of these
militants once they have served their sentence?

Raising these questions is not about questioning the government’s sincerity. Instead, it is to highlight
the absence of a debate on the various aspects of a policy before it is given final shape and
implemented. Indeed, the government needs to hold a more open dialogue on the issue, which the
opposition must also engage in, if the state is serious about putting an end to the militancy that
plagues Pakistan and consequently also endangers its place in the international community.

‘’ SC and minority rights

I.A. RehmanApril 11, 2019Facebook Count

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THE conferment of the International Justice Excellence Award on former chief justice of Pakistan
Tassaduq Hussain Jillani at The Hague is an honour for Pakistan; Mr Jillani deserves to be felicitated
by the nation.
The award was given by the International Institute for Justice of the Netherlands to Mr Jillani for
promoting justice at home and around the world. The institute had taken special notice of his
judgement of June 2014 on minority communities’ right to protection.

Before we look back on that judgement, it may not be out of place to acknowledge the high place
former chief justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani occupies in the history of the Pakistan judiciary. He
became a judge of the Lahore High Court in 1994 and served on its bench for a decade, during which
period he established his reputation as a fair-minded judge who interpreted the law without any
biases.

Elevated to the Supreme Court in July 2004, he was a member of the bench that upheld Justice
Iftikhar Chaudhry’s challenge to his ouster by Gen Musharraf and restored him to the office of the
country’s top judge. Justice Jillani became chief justice of Pakistan in 2013, on the retirement of
Iftikhar Chaudhry. At that time, the Supreme Court was inviting much criticism for giving preference
to the exercise of its suo motu jurisdiction at the cost of its normal functions. Mr Chaudhry received
handsome tributes from his supporters, but quite a few critical voices were also raised.

Nearly five years down the line, the Supreme Court judgement remains largely unimplemented.

Even before taking over as chief justice, Mr Jillani tried to end the suo motu controversy. The
outgoing chief justice defended his extensive use of suo motu powers as a means of safeguarding
the people’s fundamental rights. Justice Jillani promised to honour the court’s traditions but said it
was necessary to review reliance on suo motu power and to use it within constitutional limits.
During his seven-month tenure, the court took suo motu notice of only a couple of cases in 2013 and
one case in 2014.

The first decision chief justice Jillani and his brother judges took was to forego their winter vacations
and push on with the disposal of pending cases. Within a week, a press reporter noted a number of
changes and stated that “bench number one had taken up every single case, unlike the past when
the hearing of suo motu or other high-profile cases used to consume the whole day. The pending
petitions filed under Article 184 (1) and suo motu are taken up after regular cases”.

A full court meeting of the Supreme Court, on the eve of chief justice Jillani’s retirement, reviewed
the disposal of cases by the apex court. The court was told that 3,533 cases out of the 3,862
instituted between April 5 and June 30, 2014, had been decided. Justice Asif Saeed Khosa said 2,000
of the 3,700 criminal cases had been decided over the preceding six months.

Since the Chaudhry court’s deviation from judicial propriety under the banner of activism or
populism was not the last instance of its kind, the need to acknowledge any efforts to restore judicial
propriety cannot be exaggerated.
It is an ironical turn of events that the judgement for which former chief justice Jillani has won
accolades at home and abroad is yet to be properly implemented. Chief justice Jillani took suo motu
notice of a letter complaining of lack of proper action in the case of the terrorist attack on a
Peshawar church in September 2013 in which 81 people were killed. He also took notice of petitions
on attacks on Hindu temples and shrines and the threats to the Kalashas as well as Ismailis in Chitral.
The three-member bench headed by the chief justice made some recommendations:

1) “The federal government should constitute a task force tasked with developing a strategy of
religious tolerance.”

2) Improve the curricula for schools and colleges to promote religious tolerance.

3) “The federal government should take appropriate steps to ensure that hate speeches in social
media are discouraged and the delinquents are brought to justice....”

4) The government should constitute a “national council for minorities’ rights. The functions of the ...
council should inter alia be to monitor the practical realisation of the rights and safeguards provided
to the minorities under the Constitution and law. The council should also be mandated to frame
policy recommendations for safeguarding and protecting minorities’ rights by the provincial and
federal governments.

5) “A special police force be established with special training to protect the places of worship of
minorities.”

6) The federal government and all provincial governments “should ensure the enforcement of the
relevant policy directives regarding the reservation of quota for minorities in all services.

7) “In all cases of violation of any of the rights guaranteed under the law or desecration of the places
of worship of minorities the concerned law-enforcing agencies should promptly take action,
including the registration of criminal cases against the delinquents.”

Finally the court passed an order to ensure compliance with its directives in these words: “The office
shall open a separate file to be placed before a three-member bench to ensure this judgement is
given effect to ... the said bench may also entertain complaints/ petitions relatable to violations of
fundamental rights of minorities in the country.”
Nearly five years down the line, the Supreme Court judgement remains largely unimplemented. The
importance of the court’s directives cannot be contested. Moreover, the minorities have accepted
the judgement as a charter of their demands. Recently, two civil society organisations moved the
Supreme Court for directing expeditious implementation of the verdict. The court created a one-man
commission to present a compliance report, but nothing is known about its labours. This
arrangement, it may be submitted, amounts to disregarding the points in the judgment.

The minorities find it difficult to keep the hope of justice alive.

Quetta: This photo shows family members of the blast victims comforting each other outside a
mortuary and (right) security officials inspect the site of the bombing at a fruit market in the city.—
Agencies

QUETTA: At least 20 people, including security personnel and children, were killed and 60 others
injured in a suicide attack at the Hazarganji fruit and vegetable market of Quetta and a motorcycle
bomb blast in the border town of Chaman on Friday.

At least eight people from the Hazara community and two children were among 19 victims of the
suicide attack that was later claimed by a faction of the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The
group said it collaborated with the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ), though there was no confirmation from the
latter.

In Chaman, the target of the motorbike blast was a vehicle of security forces carrying personnel of
the Frontier Corps (FC), officials said. They said it left one dead and 12 others, including two FC
personnel, wounded.

• Eight Shia community members among 20 dead in Quetta, Chaman blasts • Taliban faction claims
it collaborated with Lashkar-i-Jhangvi over attack

About the Quetta attack, official sources said the suicide bomber blew himself up when Hazara
community members, after purchasing vegetable and fruit, were loading their vehicles. The
community members had earlier arrived at the market under the security cover of FC.

“As result of the suicide attack, 19 people lost their lives and 48 were injured,” Home Minister
Ziaullah Langove told a press conference while confirming that it was a suicide blast.

Earlier, Deputy Inspector General of Police in Quetta Abdul Razzaq Cheema had put the death toll at
18 with 30 injured. He said it emerged during initial investigations that an explosive device, planted
in a potato sack, had been detonated by remote control.
However, police investigators later confirmed that it was a suicide attack, explaining that the head
and other parts of the suicide bomber were found in the area.

Soon after the blast security forces, including FC and police, rushed to the explosion site and
cordoned off the entrance. They started rescue operation and shifted the bodies and the injured to
Civil Hospital, where a state of emergency was declared.

“We received 19 bodies and 48 injured at civil hospital,” said Saleem Abro, medical superintendent
of the hospital.

Hospital sources said the death toll could rise as condition of at least 10 injured people was serious.

Later, heavy contingents of FC and police took the Hazara community members in their protection
and shifted them to Hazara Town. Meanwhile, a bomb disposal squad rushed to the explosion site
and collected evidences.

Home Minister Zia Langove said for the past many years, the people of Hazara community running
vegetable and fruit business came to Hazar Ganji every morning in FC and police protection in a
convoy from Hazara Town and Marriabad areas of the city.

The minister, however, believed that the Hazara community was not the specific target, because
people from other communities, too, lost their lives in the attack.

DIG Cheema told reporters that heavy contingent had been deployed at all important places after
receiving a security alert a few days ago about the threat of such attack. However, he said, they were
not expecting the attack in the Hazar Ganji area.

Hours after the explosion in Quetta, another blast took place in Chaman, a town at Pak-Afghan
border, leaving nearly a dozen people injured.

In the Chaman blast, 13 people were injured who were rushed to district hospital where one of them
died.

Police said the bomb was planted in a motorcycle parked outside a shop at the Mall Road
roundabout. They said it was detonated when a vehicle of security personnel was passing through
the area.
One man was killed and 12 others were injured in the explosion.

“The target of the blast was the vehicle of security forces, which was carrying FC personnel,” officials
said, adding that the vehicle remained safe.

However, an official later confirmed that two FC personnel were among the injured.

TTP faction claims responsibility

Meanwhile, the Qari Hussain faction of the banned TTP claimed responsibility of the Quetta attack.

The group said it collaborated with the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) for the joint action. “We targeted
Hazara community in the joint attack,” stated a message sent to the media in Quetta.

Expressing his grave concern and deep sorrow with the families of victims, Balochistan Chief Minister
Jam Kamal Khan Alyani strongly condemned the attack and ordered the law enforcement agencies to
submit a detailed report to him.

He also ordered the relevant authorities to provide best possible medical facilities to the injured and
announced that the provincial government would bear the medical expenses.

Mr Alyani said such kind of timid attacks could never undermine their commitment against
extremism and terrorism. The culprits were enemies of humanity, he remarked.

Funeral, burial

On Friday evening, hundreds of people offered funeral prayers for the Hazara community victims
who were later laid to rest in the Hazara Town graveyard. Home Minister Ziaullah Langove, Health
Minister Mir Nasibullah Marri and security officials were also present.

Burial of other victims was also held in other areas of Quetta, while the bodies of some victims who
belonged to other cities were shifted to their native towns.
Hazara community protest killings

Later, men, women and children from the Hazara community staged a protest rally on the main road
and later converged at the Quetta Press Club where they chanted slogans against the government.
They condemned the ongoing ‘genocide’ of Hazara community, demanded proper implementation
of the National Action Plan (NAP) without any discrimination and arrest of elements involved in this
inhuman act. They said it was responsibility of the state to provide security to its people.

Support for Hazaras?

EditorialApril 16, 2019Facebook Count
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NOT too long ago, the government of Pakistan and many of its citizens appeared enamoured of New
Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, whose actions in the wake of an attack on Muslims in her
country turned many here into admirers of her compassionate and determined style of leadership.
But while our leaders heaped praise on her humanity, their response to the deadly attack on the
Hazara community in Quetta on Friday, and its subsequent sit-in, has been inadequate. There
appears to be a lacklustre effort by the government to reach out to and pacify the protesting
members of the minority Shia group who continued their sit-in even amid heavy showers and cold
weather before ending it on Monday night. The response from the government has included a visit
by the maritime minister to Quetta, where he condoled with the families of the victims and gave
assurances about investigating the incident. On the fourth day, other PTI leaders visited Quetta and
gave similar assurances. The protesters, who set up their camps to condemn last week’s blast at the
Hazarganji vegetable and fruit market, rightly demanded that elements involved in the suicide attack
be arrested, steps be taken to ensure their protection and the implementation of NAP take place
“without any discrimination”. Above all, their fresh demand was that the prime minister himself visit
and engage with them to chalk out a future for a vulnerable community battered by violence and
hate.

It is a pity that governments past and present have fallen short when it comes to standing by
Pakistan’s minorities — especially the Hazara community, whose plight reflects an existential
struggle. Token condemnations through tweets are a far cry from Ms Ardern’s gestures, which
politicians here gushed about in the aftermath of the Christchurch attacks. Instead of simply praising
Ms Ardern, the government should strive to embody her qualities of empathy and courage. More
leaders should aspire to be like her across the world — especially in Pakistan where she is hailed as a
champion.

Human nature
Amin Valliani April 19, 2019Facebook Count
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IN order to make this world a citadel of peace and tranquillity, the first vital step is to understand
each other’s nature. In other words, perhaps there is no subject in the world more important than
the understanding of human nature. According to the Quran, we are created from a single soul (4:1).
Yet we are different from each other — physically and psychologically. Some of us bear a rigid
mindset, while others hold a more flexible outlook. Therefore, the need of the hour is to better
understand those whom we interact with, as many of our interpersonal conflicts are the result of
misunderstandings.

Generally, it is said that human nature is fundamentally good as it is created according to the divine
nature (30:30), but the material environment of the world alters humankind. Similarly, every nation
or community around the world is different from the other because of their physical or material
environment. People living in mountainous valleys are different in nature from those who live in
tropical or coastal regions.

The formation of human nature is subject to many elements and it seems to run in a variety of ways.
Sometimes we see a human being predicated upon an angelic character, suffused with the love of
humanity, sacrificing his life in the service of others. At the same time, we see another human being
of a satanic character, becoming a monster in human form and inflicting harm upon his fellow
beings.

There is a vast body of literature dealing with human nature. Many are of the opinion that human
nature consists of ingrained characteristics that impact interpersonal relations. The Holy Quran
abounds in verses discussing human nature with clear-cut messages about what makes humans
angelic or devilish.

Everyone carries within them a spark from the divine flame.

The majority of Quranic injunctions address humans in general. They pinpoint the innate nature of
general humanity such as verse 4:28 which says that humans have been created weak. At another
place, the holy book says humans have been created impatient (70:19). Yet another verse says
humans are very miserly (17:100). In short, one needs to keep these characteristics in mind while
dealing with humans in general.

Though every human being is thought to be an animal biologically, he or she carries the seed within
them of spirituality — a spark from the divine flame. They have been bestowed with intellect to
think, learn and seek guidance to mould themselves into higher beings.
Right thinking at the individual level is one of the fundamental requirements in developing the right
type of nature. In our daily interactions, we come across thousands of people. Each person leaves an
imprint of his/her thoughts on our minds. We need to monitor and evaluate these incoming
thoughts before we turn them into actions. The negative thoughts need to be rejected, while the
positive need to be promoted.

When these thoughts are turned into actions, and actions are then repeated over time, they become
part of our nature. Thus human nature is a composite of characteristics acquired as a result of this
thought process.

Another important element that plays a role in forming human nature relates to our daily intake of
food. Food not only fills our stomach, satiates our hunger, makes our bodies strong and healthy, but
also contributes in shaping our nature. The Holy Quran says “O ye people! Eat of what is on earth,
lawful and good. And do not follow the footsteps of the evil one [Satan] for he is to you an avowed
enemy” (2:168).

Islam emphasises upon believers to eat rightfully earned food. If one eats wrongfully earned food
(haram) through corruption, dishonesty, fraud or other illegal means, it will definitely affect his
nature. Though the unlawfully earned food fills the stomach, it generates undesirable thoughts and
beastly tendencies. Therefore, Islam is very emphatic about lawful earning.

Besides the above, there are other elements which play a significant role in forming human nature.
These include genes, upbringing, environment, socialisation and education.

Recently, a scientific study was conducted on identical twins, who share the same set of genes. It
was believed that studying identical twins could effectively answer several questions related to
human nature, including the influence of genes, upbringing, environment and socialisation.

The scientists employed these studies to understand the nature of identical twins that were adopted
by different families and thus grew up in significantly different environments. This scientific study
later proved that all these elements have a role in shaping the nature of individuals.

Humans are complex beings; their nature is a product of many kinds of influences. Understanding
human nature will result in making this world a more peaceful place.
Terror & citizenship
EditorialJuly 01, 2019Facebook Count
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WITH the emergence of transnational jihadi networks and global militant outfits like Al Qaeda and
the self-styled Islamic State group, questions of dealing with captured terrorists and their
dependents have arisen, especially when they hold nationalities of Western states. To put it bluntly,
these individuals are unwanted by their countries of origin, and due to their involvement in militant
activities other states are unwilling to take them in. While some fighters are hardcore militants and
need to be prosecuted, the question of underage fighters, ‘jihadi wives’ and children of militants is
far trickier. One method that some Western states have adopted to get rid of unwanted citizens
involved in militancy is to strip them of their citizenship; in a high-profile case, the UK recently
revoked the citizenship of Shamima Begum, a woman who left Britain to join IS when she was 15. In
fact, as a conference held recently in The Hague was told, the UK has revoked the nationality of 100
individuals in 2017. But stripping people of their citizenship is hardly a viable way of countering
terrorism and extremism; in fact, it may add to the problem by increasing feelings of alienation. As a
former Bahraini lawmaker who was stripped of his citizenship by the sheikhdom told the conclave,
states can use the revocation of citizenship as a political tool to punish opponents and critics.

Indeed, hardcore militants who indulge in violence and terrorism need to be punished. However, for
underage recruits of jihadi groups and others who may have been swept away by emotions, along
with punitive measures rehabilitation is also important. Simply revoking the nationality of such
individuals is akin to passing the buck. The fact is that many of those drawn to extremist groups from
Europe and elsewhere have failed to integrate in their home societies, or have been ignored by the
state. So instead of tackling the issue of integration and helping ‘mainstream’ individuals, states
pretend that the problem does not exist by wresting people’s citizenship from them. Once
individuals have been deprived of their nationality, their resentment towards society will only grow,
and they may return to extremism and militancy. Instead of simply cancelling their citizenship, a
combination of punitive measures and reformative efforts should be implemented by Western states
whose denizens have gone abroad to participate in ‘jihad’. Leaving such individuals stateless will only
add to global security concerns.

Role of religion
Amin VallianiJuly 12, 2019
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NOT too long ago, the events at Christchurch (New Zealand) mosques and Sri Lankan churches once
again highlighted the crucial need for interfaith harmony. This means that followers of all religions,
though they belong to different parts of the world, speak different languages, and profess different
interpretations of their faiths, should live together peacefully as good neighbours.

The world is a family of religions. Like in a family, its members contribute and strengthen to make
the family unit stronger. Similarly, all religions provide inspiration to build a better world.

In order to create interfaith harmony at the global level, it is also necessary that the contribution of
all religions to the development of a common humanity must be recognised, highlighted and be
made part of the school curriculum internationally. All religions have made notable contributions in
the areas of spiritual enlightenment, moral inspiration and social cohesion.

All religions provide inspirations to build a better world.

Religion has been with us since time immemorial and most people spontaneously adhere to the
religion of their forefathers. Every religion has changed the course of history and uplifted societies. It
has demonstrated its relevance and usefulness throughout history, and the modern age is no
exception.

There are certain areas where the contribution of religion is above board. The first such area is that
it has instilled faith in a Higher Power. Every individual is regarded as a manifestation of divine will.
We are born for a purpose and achieving the same gives us a sense of fulfilment. Religion connects
individuals and communities to their Creator informing them about the purpose and meaning of life.

There are countless different faiths, religions and schools of thought; all of them provide an answer
for how we got here, where we go when we die and why we are here. Islam, in particular, says that
humans have been created with a mission of ibadat [worship]. Allah says “I created not the jinn and
humans except they should perform [ibadat] (51:56)”. The word ‘ibadat’ is literally translated in
English as worship but in Islamic parlance it means submission to the will of Allah. This implies
acceptance of conditions in which humans are born.

The second area where religions’ contribution is noteworthy is highlighting the transitory nature of
physical life. The latter is limited in time but religion encourages human beings to become immortal
by contributing to their societies. Some are lucky enough that they make contributions in uplifting
their societies. In this way, they live in the hearts and minds of people even after their physical
death. When a person dies, his actions come to an end. But religion gives him an opportunity to earn
a reward even after death for the actions done during earthly life. Islam calls it ‘sadaqah jariyah’
which means continuous reward for an action that someone does in his or her life.
Similarly, life and death are major topics of all religions. No human is born through his own volition
or at his own behest but his life is gifted by the Divine to perform righteous actions. All religions
encourage their adherents to do good deeds in this field of action for onward transmission to
eternity; good actions are the only ‘assets’ to be sent forth for eternal bliss. This helps change the
course of peoples’ lives by changing the shape of their character.

This life involves ups and downs and religion provides consolation and relief to individuals who pass
through these ups and downs. It encourages and inculcates values of patience, tolerance and striving
for self-improvement.

Most religions reject self-aggrandisement and warn humanity against over-involvement in material
pursuits. In other words, humans should not be living in a world of increasing material plenty by
forgetting or forsaking the spiritual side of their existence. They have an obligation to uplift their
spirit by devoting themselves more to the cause of spirituality.

Normally, all religions state that life on earth is noble; therefore, it should not be wasted in
meaningless wrangling. Religion points out that there is an inflated personal ego everywhere — in
politics and art, in economics and business — which needs to be subdued. Religion encourages
people to strive for peace within and peace across the earth.

These are the basics inherent in the teachings of most religions. Diversity in all aspects of life is a
natural phenomenon, therefore, it is incumbent upon all of us to be broadminded and open-
hearted. Governments should accord equal status and protection to all people no matter what faith
they belong to. In this way we would make our world a citadel of peace and tranquillity.

Sufi’s death
EditorialJuly 13, 2019
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OVER the past four decades — particularly from the Zia era onwards — this country has seen a wide
variety of charismatic jihadi and sectarian leaders that have created movements and lashkars that
have challenged the writ of the state and imperilled its security. Amongst these ‘stars’ of the jihadi
firmament was Sufi Mohammad, a cleric and militant who passed away in Peshawar on Thursday.
Founder of the Tehreek Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammadi, Sufi Mohammad campaigned for decades for
enforcement of his version of Sharia in the country, violently confronting the state in pursuance of
this objective on several occasions. Amongst his grimmer exploits was the caravan of zealous fighters
he led to Afghanistan to take on the Americans and support the Afghan Taliban following the US
invasion of that country in 2001. Hundreds of his fighters reportedly died in the massacre that
followed this expedition. Moreover, his son-in-law Mullah Fazlullah led the TTP, one of the deadliest
terrorist groups in this country’s history. While this is not a history to be proud of, there are lessons
that the state can learn from the life of Sufi Mohammad, especially his quest to violently take over
and enforce ‘Sharia’ in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The reason Sufi Mohammad and later Fazlullah were successful in creating havoc in the Malakand
region was arguably due to the absence of the state in the area, particularly its civilian arm. Because
the area’s residents were deprived of the full benefits of citizenship due to the state’s lack of
presence, charismatic rabble-rousers were able to fill the void. And while the military was able to
restore order in the area through security operations, the civilian authorities are still found to be
lacking where service delivery is concerned. The lesson from Malakand, and indeed all other areas
affected by militancy in Pakistan, is that if the state fails to do its job, other actors will step in, and
there is no guarantee that they would be benign elements, working within the confines of the
Constitution. To prevent the emergence of militant groups with extremist agendas, both the civilian
and military arms of the state must prevent vacuums from being created. While the security
establishment must maintain peace, it is the civil administration that has to work to ensure that
citizens, even in the remotest and most underdeveloped parts of the country, are assured of their
fundamental rights.

The counterterrorism challenge

Muhammad Amir RanaUpdated July 14, 2019

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PAKISTAN has stepped up its anti-militant campaign, apparently to steer clear of being blacklisted by
the Financial Action Task Force. Pakistan had already narrowly escaped that listing, with the support
of China, Malaysia and Turkey, during the last FATF review meeting held in Orlando, Florida.

Read: FATF compliance will require all-out effort

Yet the country remains under immense pressure to take action against all militant groups that are
proscribed by the UN Security Council. Pakistan has also been viewed as employing a selective
approach towards different militant groups. The FATF meeting held in Paris last February had
rejected Pakistan’s assessment based on a classification of militant groups into different categories,
and had demanded uniform action against all shades of militants. Pakistan has considerably
reviewed its action plan to check terror financing after these critical observations, among others,
were made by the FATF.

More than once, Pakistan has urged for the depoliticisation of critical transnational forums such as
FATF, as it believes that India, the US, UK and a few other European countries are using the forum to
put undue pressure on it. Pakistan’s friends have supported its concerns, though in a softer tone, but
have avoided bailing out the country over the issue of terror financing. Over the last two decades,
Pakistan has dealt with the international pressure for it to do more against a few Kashmir- and
Afghanistan-focused militant groups, but the FATF has apparently proved instrumental in radically
changing the country’s perception of the militant threat.

Pakistan’s renewed anti-militant campaign is hindered by several factors.

The Punjab Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) has recently registered cases against the
leadership of the banned Jamaatud Dawa (JuD), including its founding members Hafiz Saeed, Abdul
Rehman Makki and Zafar Iqbal. It is believed that Pakistan has taken this initiative in compliance with
commitments it has made to the FATF. On the other hand, it also reflects Pakistan’s seriousness in
dealing with militant groups. In practice, however, this renewed anti-militant campaign is hindered
by several factors including capacity gaps among counterterrorism departments, which are also
struggling to find some solid legal ground against the leadership of the militant groups.

Read: Hafiz Saeed, 12 other JuD leaders booked for terror financing

It would be an enormous challenge for the CTD to prove the cases of terror financing against the JuD
leadership in local courts; though these cases could be used to restrict their movement.
Interestingly, this is the second time that such cases have been registered against JuD head Hafiz
Saeed. In 2009, a similar case was registered against him when he appealed for donations to his
organisations while addressing a public gathering in Faisalabad. The case was dismissed by the
Lahore High Court and, later, the interior ministry’s appeal against the decision in Supreme Court
was also rejected.

However, the situation could be different this time, as the JuD, its affiliated charities and militant
groups have been notified as proscribed by the ministry.

Read: JuD, FIF facilities taken over in Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan after listing by federal govt

The recently registered cases of terror financing against militant leaders may contribute towards
easing the pressure being applied by the FATF. But these measures alone will not suffice to deal with
the issues of militancy and extremism in Pakistan. The state will have to take more concrete
measures over a longer period of time. These groups have thousands of workers in their ranks who
remain uncertain about their future. They include both trained and untrained militants,
administrative staff and affiliated charities.

While the chains of schools and other educational institutions run by these militant groups have
been put under the supervision of the provincial education departments, the Auqaf departments will
apparently manage their affiliated madressahs. The JuD alone was running more than 700 schools
and over 200 madressahs. The banned Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) also owned dozens of madressahs
and schools across the country. The staffs of these schools and madressahs have been
accommodated by the corresponding controlling government departments, without a proper
scrutiny process and without a deradicalisation programme.

However, workers of the charity wings and administrative staff have not been accommodated yet,
with the exception of around 50 persons who have been recruited by the Punjab rescue operations.
The rescue department had taken more than 250 ambulances of the JuD into its custody.

Frustration among these workers is increasing, including towards their own leaders. This is a
dangerous development. A somewhat similar frustration was observed among the cadres of militant
groups after the first crackdown against them in 2001. This had caused serious rifts among them and
made many turn against the state and join international terrorist groups. Some among these
frustrated members of the JuD and JeM can now also join the militant Islamic State group and Al
Qaeda or form their own small terrorist cells. The JeM cadre is more critical because hundreds of its
militants have a background of having worked along with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, Al Qaeda
and sectarian terrorist organisations.

Pakistan will have to evolve a comprehensive rehabilitation programme for former members of
these banned organisations. Such a programme could help boost the international community’s
confidence in Pakistan’s efforts to counter extremism and terrorism. The world is receptive to such
initiatives, which are also endorsed by UNSC Resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017). For one, the
‘Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism’ presented by the UNSC to the UN General Assembly
entailed more than 70 recommendations including a call to introduce disengagement and
rehabilitation programmes. An absence of such a programme in Pakistan would not only continue to
raise doubts about the future of these organisations’ combatant and non-combatant members, but
also about Pakistan’s intentions.

The National Counter Terrorism Authority has the mandate for suggesting and developing such
rehabilitation programmes but, so far, it has proved an impotent body. Apparently, Nacta has no will
— or perhaps power — to take initiative on its own, for it always looks towards the powerful security
institutions and endorses what comes from them. The challenge of countering terrorism is huge,
requiring not only broad-based consultation but also a visible and serious action plan being
implemented on the ground.
Crackdown on militants

EditorialMay 19, 2019Facebook Count

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IT is a predictable pattern: violence by militants followed by the state unleashing its might to
eliminate them. So it is once again in Balochistan. In the wake of a blood-soaked few weeks in the
troubled province, security forces on Thursday launched an operation in the Mastung area, killing
nine suspected militants who are said to have belonged to a banned organisation. Four security
personnel also sustained injuries in the exchange of gunfire. Balochistan has been the staging ground
for several deadly attacks within the space of a month. Most were claimed by either banned Baloch
militant organisations or the (also proscribed) TTP. On April 18, around a dozen gunmen belonging to
an alliance of Baloch separatist groups murdered 14 bus passengers in Gwadar district; 11 of them
were personnel belonging to the navy, air force and Coast Guards. On May 12, armed assailants
stormed Pearl Continental in the heavily secured Gwadar city; five people — including four hotel
security guards and a navy official — lost their lives while the militants themselves were killed. BLA
claimed responsibility. Two attacks during this period targeted the FC; at least five died in the line of
duty. On April 12, 10 were killed and 48 injured in a bombing attack against the long-suffering
Hazaras in Quetta.

Even for Balochistan, sadly no stranger to violence, this is a particularly gruesome tally. It seems that
militants of all stripe, religious extremists as well as separatists, are determined to continue their
battle against the state and prove they have the wherewithal to do so. The remote, inhospitable
reaches of Balochistan are ideal for outlaws to retreat and recoup, and remain under the radar while
planning their next move. Using force to deal with them, while staying within the bounds of the law,
is no doubt necessary. However, where the Baloch separatists are concerned, believing that a
militarised approach alone will neutralise them once and for all betrays a fundamental lack of
understanding about the ‘Baloch problem’ — even a lack of imagination. It ignores the fact that at its
core this is a political issue that needs a political solution to be durable. Unfortunately, no serious
and sincere attempt has yet been made by the state to engage with the disgruntled elements among
the Baloch, even through intermediaries. In the absence of such moves, the disaffection among the
local population will continue to grow and fuel the insurgency.

Moderate Muslims’ dilemma

Rafiullah KakarMay 20, 2019Facebook Count

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THE Easter bombings in Sri Lanka once again turned a spotlight on the challenge of global jihad,
terrorism and Islamophobia. Muslim scholars and community leaders from across the world have
condemned the attack, dissociated themselves from the perpetrators and defended Islam as a
religion of peace.

Many Muslims are constantly feeling like they need to apologise. Still, they continue to face a
backlash and stereotyping of their community. The fear of reprisals combined with growing
Islamophobia compels Muslims to insist that these acts have nothing to do with their faith. This urge
to separate religion from the violence committed in its name is well intentioned and
understandable, yet counterproductive.

It is true that these terrorists do not represent the overwhelming majority of Muslims, who oppose
terrorist groups like the militant Islamic State (IS), the Taliban, and Al Qaeda. However, it does not
necessarily mean that they have nothing to do with religion. They may not represent the Islam that
moderate Muslims know and follow, but their actions are inspired by their own version or
interpretation of it.

Here, it is worth emphasising that, as a Muslim, I strongly believe that the Muslim belief is no more
‘violent’ than those of other religions. Neither is religion the only cause of such violence. Instead,
violent extremism is a complex phenomenon with multiple driving factors including injustice,
identity crisis, extremist ideologies, and socioeconomic reasons. Their salience varies across time and
space. There is no clear profile or single causal pathway that can define the process of radicalisation.

There is no clear profile or single causal pathway that can define the process of radicalisation.

Similarly, there is also no denying that colonialism, Western military interventions in Muslim
countries and support to authoritarian Muslim rulers have played a role in the rise of Islamic
extremists and militants in the Muslim world. To summarise, it is often a combination of politics and
extremist interpretations of Islam that produces the vitriolic narrative and rampage that most
Muslim countries face today.

The problem is that while Muslims almost always talk about the politics that creates terrorism, and
rightly so, they are reluctant to discuss the role of radicalised interpretations in inspiring terrorist
violence. Interventionist Western foreign policies alone do not explain the origin and sustenance of
terrorist groups like Taliban, Al Qaeda and IS. These groups derive their sustenance mainly from
obscurantist ideology that views the modern nation-state as a system of kufr and affirms the
inherent right of Muslims to rule. The desire and motivation to kill and be killed comes from a
sincere belief in the notion of achieving paradise through ‘martyrdom’.

In Muslim-majority countries, a small segment of Muslims do recognise the challenge posed by

radical interpretations of religion and disputes a literalist reading advocated by fundamentalists.
Quranic verses, they argue, are often misinterpreted and quoted out of context. There are, however,
two points which must be considered in the debate.

First, these debates are restricted to the drawing rooms and private gatherings of a tiny liberal,
secular and left-leaning class that is often insulated from the rest of society which is generally
conservative. Publicly, most Muslims are reluctant to openly engage in a debate regarding religion.
Those who do so often pay a huge price.

Second, the lack of an authoritative hierarchy in doctrinal interpretation means that any Muslim can
interpret religion the way he or she likes. While making Islam more egalitarian and democratic, this
also makes it easier for extremists to promulgate their literal interpretations despite opposition by a
large majority of Muslim clerics and scholars.

Moderate Muslims cannot be blamed for not engaging in open public debate because most Muslim
countries lack the environment required for discussing sensitive issues. The countries where there is
space for critical debates are the relatively advanced democracies of the developed world. However,
in almost all such countries, Muslims are also a minority and often the victims of hatred and
prejudice inspired by Islamophobia. Consequently, conscious of their minority status, moderate and
liberal Muslims in these countries hold back their views on religion for fear of being seen as abettors
of Islamophobia.

The rise of right-wing nationalism in Europe and America has only reinforced their concerns.
Diaspora Muslims fear that even pointing out that militancy might have something to do with a
certain interpretation will feed into Islamophobia. The nuance about particular interpretations, the
argument goes on, would gradually disappear in the public debate and Islam as a religion and
Muslims as a group would be criticised. These are legitimate concerns and it is, therefore, not
surprising that diaspora Muslims scholars and intellectuals are at the forefront of the ‘IS-has-
nothing-to-do-with-religion’ school of thought.

The real challenge for Muslims is to be able to have these difficult conversations in a way that does
not lead to more Islamophobia or buttress the West’s Orientalist and stereotypical view of Islam and
the Muslim world. Media, scholars, journalists and governments in the Muslim and Western world
have a responsibility to assuage these fears and ensure a safe space where such conversations can
be held. Moreover, they should also not mistake this as an acceptance that an extremist version of
Islam is the only or main source of terrorist violence.

Instead, the discussion about addressing other important drivers of violent extremism should
continue. Defeating violent extremism requires a holistic strategy that should simultaneously
address its social, economic and political causes. Reclaiming control of theological interpretations
should be just one bit of the wider strategy.
Moderate Muslims must understand, deconstruct and delegitimise the extremists’ version of Islam
rather than denying the existence of their interpretation. By denying any link between faith and the
violence carried out in its name, Muslims foreclose all public debate on different interpretations and
help extremist Muslims get away with their context-less versions.

This denial has given right-wing nationalists in Europe and America an opportunity to cash in on the
growing public unease about Muslims and their faith. They need to realise that the extremists’
interpretation can only be countered and discredited publicly if its existence is first admitted and
then actively contested and challenged. This may sound like a daunting task, but it is the only way
moderate Muslims can ensure that their vision of a more tolerant and inclusive Islam prevails.

Stability and identity

Muhammad Amir RanaJune 30, 2019
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The writer is a security analyst.

WHILE its effects are palpably visible in political and economic ambits,
instability also adds to confusion and insecurities, and causes behavioural
changes among individuals. It can even trigger crises of personal and social
identities, which Pakistani power elites tend to confuse with external factors
threatening our national security.

The current atmosphere of political and economic chaos is not new. Yet it presents
the country’s renewed challenge to come out of its chronic instability. Apparently,
the current political regime is also failing to bring some fresh approaches and new
perspectives to cure our economic malaise. On the other hand, it is miserably
struggling to sell an impression of stability to the people, who are enormously
agonised by the ongoing economic adjustments and corrections.

Anxiety kills the potential for productivity and creativity, so essential for the
growth and development of state and society. The recent Quetta Literary Festival
(QLF) reflected this growing anxiety among the intelligentsia and educated youth
of Pakistan. For one, most discussions on the future of our state and society linked
it to the prospective direction of Pakistan’s stability and identity.

Stability has always been the top priority of any state, because it also indicates that
the state is functioning well. However, stability cannot be imposed; it comes as a
natural outcome of coherent policies and actions of state institutions and cordial
relations between state and society. Instability, nonetheless, triggers various types
of insecurities among the state organs and segments of society. A sense of
discrimination and humiliation not only compounds this problem but also
aggravates identity crises among communities, particular those with problematic
group histories.

Dignity and empowerment may be more important than

economics or security.
The common Pakistani faces multiple levels of discrimination at the hands of
multiple actors and due to many factors. Some believe they are being discriminated
against on the basis of their race, language, culture, facial appearance, faith or sect.
Ethnic, religious and sectarian-based profiling is common and often used by the
state as well as majority ethnic, religious and sectarian groups. A study by an
Islamabad-based think tank, titled Who Am I? A Study on Identity and Co-
Existence in Pakistan, is reflective of debates at the QLF, indicating that while
people of small federating units and/or ethno-religious minorities feel
discrimination when interacting with public departments or state institutions, two
factors in particular aggravate them. The first is linked with human dignity and the
second with empowerment.

A significant majority of the study’s participants believed in human dignity more

than economics or security, and asserted that it is one’s sense of dignity or lack
thereof that develops identity. The dignity factor is relatively new, but has been
developing along with securitisation over the last two decades, in the form of
security check posts on highways, in urban areas, on campuses and in government
departments.

The study also noted that most of the respondents from Balochistan, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and the latter’s tribal districts had experienced some sort of
humiliation at check posts, which they interpret as profiling. One can understand
that these two provinces have suffered greatly from terrorism and insurgencies,
which have added to their insecurity and sensitivity. Perhaps this is why security
institutions have also worked on improving their social skills in recent years, to
respect local sensitivities. However, it remains a major factor in the people’s
increasing sense of insecurity and humiliation.

It was also noted that educated youth (especially in Balochistan, Sindh, KP’s tribal
districts and Gilgit-Baltistan) feel less empowered in society. A big segment of
youth, regardless of religious or education backgrounds, joined militant groups, not
necessarily by falling for extremist or separatist ideologies, but because they were
awed by the militants’ stature, and wanted to be seen the same way. The desire for
power and prestige in their areas is so pronounced that these youngsters were
suffering from a crisis of identity.

Similar factors can be identified in Pakistan’s identity politics, which is centred on

group identities. Nationalist political and social movements want a broader sense
of belonging and ownership in the system, which the power elites only share with a
select group of cronies.

It is interesting that, in the majoritarian Punjab, a sense of cultural marginalisation

is resurfacing. The Punjabi intelligentsia complains that, for the sake of national
unity, it has sacrificed its cultural and ethnic identity. However, voices from other
provinces feel that the Punjabi power elites should have adopted a federalist
approach rather than emphasising a strong centre and creating uniformity. The
federalist approach would have provided a better coherence among the federating
units, and Punjab should also have not compromised its cultural background.

The debate on identity and stability cannot be complete without discussing the role
of religion. The state and power elites still strongly believe that religion is the only
factor that can glue the nation and, in this attempt, promote religiously inspired
actors who follow their design. A variety of such actors are at the elites’ service;
the latter choose and abandon them as needed. According to the study, using
religion for national coherence is not only an inclination in Punjab; such voices’
power is gradually increasing in Sindh and Balochistan too.

One interesting finding of the study was about local-level problems and how
people relate these with broader sociopolitical issues. The majority of respondents
highlighted civic issues such as access to clean water, education, health, population
management, traffic, etc. This was followed by issues related to personal liberties
such as freedom of expression and physical security. Strikingly, many talked about
local-level disputes in the shape of class differences or local mafias. However, the
majority believed that even if the solutions to these day-to-day issues would not
help resolve big issues such as an identity crisis, they support more freedom and
sociopolitical securities for a better and healthier society and stable state.

Dashed dreams
Irfan HusainSeptember 07, 2019
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irfan.husain@gmail.com
RECENT events in our region have served to puncture the myth of the
Muslim ummah. When Raza Rabbani, the PPP senator, suggested we should
leave the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), he was just stating the
obvious.

Far from being part of a vast, united brotherhood, Muslims have proved to be their
own worst enemies. Over the centuries, they have spilled each other’s blood with a
ferocity unmatched by any of their non-Muslim enemies.
And as the last few years show us, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and Yemen are
continuing the murderous pattern established in the Islamic world since several
hundred years. Pakistan, too, has contributed its share of killers and victims.

Despite this continuous mayhem in the Islamic world, we remain convinced —

blind to the mountain of evidence before us — that Muslims around the world are
part of a brotherhood, and that they will come to each other’s help when the need
arises.

Tell that to the Palestinians or the Kashmiris of IHK. Both are more isolated than
ever as nobody wants to antagonise either Israel or India. The fact is that all nations
act in their own self-interest. So when the ruler of the UAE gives Modi his
country’s highest civilian award, he is indifferent to the fate of Kashmir. All he
wants is better relations with India, the regional giant.

The OIC has emerged as a toothless tiger.

Similarly, sympathy for the Palestinians among Muslims has evaporated over the
years. Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in the ’70s, and is now actively
engaged in imprisoning the people of Gaza by shutting access to the Sinai desert.
The Saudis are in de facto alliance with Israel and the United States. Their agenda
rests on their visceral hatred for Iran. And if an Indian firm has recently entered
into a multi-billion dollar agreement with Aramco, the Saudi oil company, we
should not be surprised.

Granted, many of the recent conflicts in the Muslim world have been triggered by
Western interventions. But the jihadists who have carried out numerous attacks
have all been Muslims, and they have mostly been radicalised by Wahhabism’s
interpretation of Islam. In many verified cases, they have been armed and paid by
Saudi individuals and organisations.

Tens of thousands of men, women and children in Yemen have been killed by
incompetent Saudi and Emirati pilots, and the poorest country in the region has
been reduced to starvation by the Saudi naval blockade. So much for Islamic
brotherhood.

Tiny Qatar has been subjected to a pointless boycott; aircraft and ships are forced
to take long detours to approach the country, avoiding Saudi and UAE waters and
airspace. Its crime? Normal neighbourly relations with Iran, and playing host to Al
Jazeera, the international TV channel that has been critical of many Muslim
governments.

In all these conflicts, the OIC has emerged as a toothless tiger. In conflicts from
Kashmir to Kosovo, it has been totally ineffectual. Its role over the brutal Israeli
occupation of the West Bank has been especially pathetic. So leaving the
organisation, as Raza Rabbani has suggested, would be no great loss.
Given the many conflicts in Islamic history, what is the allure of the ummah and
the caliphate? Why do so many Muslims keep harping about these ancient
constructs? When Arabs were the only Muslims around, I suppose it made a kind
of sense to appeal to tribesmen who shared culture, language and traditions to serve
under the flag of a caliph.

However, as the faith spread across much of the world, different Muslim countries
evolved along diverse paths. Their identities were shaped by cultures, languages
and histories far removed from the Middle East. The thought of Indonesians going
to war to defend Iraq, for example, made no sense. And nor were they going to be
led by a caliph they played no part in selecting.

The caliphate is another moribund institution that has no role in the modern world.
Who will accept a leader other than one with local credentials? After the
murderous chief of the militant Islamic State group, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi,
declared himself caliph, there was no rush to join his cause. True, several thousand
Muslims did make the journey to Syria, but once the IS began to crumble, they
were disillusioned and are now dead, or in jail.

Ultimately, this craving for the caliphate harks back to a period when Muslims
ruled much of the world. There is a notion that once the caliphate is restored and
unity among Muslims miraculously forged, they will regain their place in the sun.
The ummah thus reborn will defeat the West, and the long decline of the Muslim
world will be reversed.

Dream on. It takes more than faith and petrodollars to become a strong, modern
nation capable of standing up for itself. Education and hard work are needed, not
slogans and empty threats.

Ignoring the seeds of extremism

Muhammad Amir RanaUpdated September 22, 2019
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The writer is a security analyst.

THE way Hindu temples were vandalised and private properties destroyed
recently in Sindh’s Ghotki district is yet another reminder that the challenge
of religiously inspired violent extremism is bigger than we thought. Moving
beyond a shallow condemnation, the government will certainly have to act to
increase the cost of committing such violence, that too on spurious grounds.

Apart from the specific measure related to the Ghotki incident, two things must be
done to protect all religious minorities in the country from violence. First, the
groups and individuals using faith to gain political and religious influence should
be strictly dealt with under the law. Secondly, the state should demonstrate zero
tolerance towards hate narratives being disseminated online and in other ways by
extremist religious groups, individuals and their supporters.

A clear, unequivocal message should be sent that the state alone is the custodian of
the constitutional rights of all citizens, irrespective of their faith. The fear
expressed by the majoritarian mindset that religious minorities could harm the
sovereignty of Pakistan is simply baseless. For one, patriotism cannot be reduced
to religion alone without declaring non-Muslims in Pakistan as non-citizens.

A general argument can be made that Pakistan’s power elites have been patronising
religious, ethnic, cultural and racial disagreements to further their regime, instead
of looking at the diversity of religious, cultural and societal opinion in Pakistan as
a sign of inclusiveness and plurality. That has significantly damaged the country’s
social fabric, mainly its humanistic values such as empathy and compassion, which
safeguard individuals and societies from hate and aggression. Empathy is defined
as one’s ability to feel other people’s emotions, mainly those stimulated by
suffering, and to have a genuine desire to relieve that suffering.

Power elites are neither empathetic nor do they promote

peace narratives to curb divisiveness.
Irrespective of its geographical location and its religious or secular tendencies, if a
society possesses a sense of majoritarian supremacy or is hyper nationalistic or
harbours a collective sense of hatred and aggression, then it lacks empathy and
compassion. The absence of these two attributes could push society towards chaos
and anarchy. Sympathy is not the alternative to these two values. Sympathy is a
stream of emotions which provides relief from stress through ‘recognising’ the
sufferings of others, but it does not incorporate ‘understanding’.

Unfortunately, often power elites are neither empathetic towards the people nor do
they promote such a narrative. A dearth of narratives of empathy and compassion
in the formal and informal systems of education can inflict even greater damage. In
this regard, the work of an American scholar, Gregory H. Stanton, on the
Srebrenica Genocide of 1995 is insightful. It describes 10 stages of genocide. He
theorised that genocide is not committed by a small group of individuals, rather a
large number of people and the state contribute to mass killings in one way or
another. The first stage is classification, where society is divided on ethnic or
religious lines. The next three stages nurture the conception of ‘otherness’, with
symbolisation, discrimination and dehumanisation. At the fifth stage, plans for the
extermination of the ‘other’, seen as the enemy, are drawn up.

The next stage is of polarisation through propaganda via the media and other
forums to further dehumanise the ‘other’. The persecution of intellectuals and
influential opponents follows. After that, extermination becomes easy and denial is
used as a strategy to cover up criminal violence. Stanton includes triumphalism as
the 11th stage where criminals involved in violence are respected as heroes. This
may not appear in the same chronological order but the processes are similar.

There are symptoms of this in many places and South Asia is not immune. India
might have reached an alarming stage but Pakistan too has the seeds as witnessed
in the hate narratives being spouted, while the role of the state in denying criminal
violence is often worrisome. The prime minister’s statement about the Ghotki
incident, in which he smelled a conspiracy against his visit to the US and his
forthcoming speech at the UN General Assembly reflects a state of denial.
Vandalism against the Hindu community in Pakistan may not be as common as
violent incidents in which other religious minorities are targeted, but such
statements still provide refuge to the culprits.

The phenomenon of religious intolerance has its own dynamics but in recent years
it has increased through its connectivity with larger extremist discourses fanned in
cyberspaces. Social media platforms have increased the exposure and vulnerability
of the youth to divisive and extremist ideologies. This exposure is making people
sensitive about their identities. Such an identity crisis is beneficial to the radical
groups. An individual needs emotional healing and anxiety caused by such
exposure and tries to connect with the nearest group of like-minded people.

The small groups look towards bigger and better organised groups not only for
ideological and political inspiration but also to learn organisational skills. Mian
Mithu, a radical cleric from Ghotki, could be an example. He may act
independently but is said to have been inspired by the Tehreek-i-Labbaik and
encouraged by banned militant groups like Al Rehmat Trust, Jamaatud Dawa and
charities associated with hard-line madressahs in Karachi.

These groups succeeded in building pressure on non-Muslim communities but the

cleric has better cultural, religious and ethnic credentials to influence local
communities. With his influence, he is regarded as capable of triggering vandalism.
The problem is that our state institutions do not consider the tendencies of non-
violent extremism as a potent threat.

There is a need to adopt a framework or narrative, that treats all citizens,

irrespective of their ethnicity, creed and geography, with equality. Introducing
courses on citizenship in education curricula, extracted from the Constitution, are
greatly needed.

To be precise, non-Muslims in Pakistan should be owned as an integral part of the

country. Bracketing non-Muslims with India or Western countries is to contradict
history; they are indigenous to the soil and their valuable contribution to this region
is a chapter of Pakistan’s history.
Perspective

How best to tackle violent extremism in Pakistan

Ihsan Ghani

Updated Apr 22, 2019 03:17pm

8 COMMENTS EMAIL PRINT

Illustration by Leea contractor

Violence is not unique to Islam. Almost all religions have violent strands though there are no recent
historical parallels to the violence being perpetrated in the name of Islam. Similar is the case with
seminaries which are part of all religions but, since 9/11, only Islamic madrasas have been branded
as nurseries of terrorists.

There are several reasons for the current prevalence of violence in Islam. These include the actual or
perceived historical injustices in places like Kashmir and Palestine, and even the fall of the Ottoman
Caliphate a hundred years ago. These developments have generated a sense of marginalisation and
frustration – and consequently extremist tendencies – among Muslims.

Yet, we must acknowledge that the rise of violent Islam is a relatively recent phenomenon. None of
the many militant organisations that sprang up in Europe after World War II were Islamic. Even in
the 1980s, only two out of 64 militant groups operating in different parts of the world had religious
motivations. This changed only in the 1990s when 26 out of 56 militant organisations operating
worldwide were religiously motivated. A majority of them claimed Islam to be their guiding force.

Rise of Islamic militancy can be attributed to the flourishing of the Persian Gulf’s Sunni economies,
particularly that in Saudi Arabia, in the 1970s and an Islamic revolution in Shia Iran in 1979.
Together, the two developments resulted in proxy sectarian wars in places such as Pakistan. The
taking over of government in Islamabad by a religious zealot and military dictator, General Ziaul Haq,
in 1977, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 only added to the mêlée.

Military rulers and right wing politicians in Pakistan have continued to patronise militant activities of
extremist Islamic organisations since then. Even liberal political parties looked the other way as
foreign powers and Pakistan’s security establishment used these militants as proxies in regional and
global conflicts. In due course, nationalist and subnationalist militant organisations also emerged in
the country owing, partly if not entirely, to the deteriorating security situation.

In recent times, Pakistan has proscribed some militant organisations and their members under
pressure from global powers and international regulatory authorities. Proscription, though, has had
little impact on the activities of these organisations. This is mainly because the laws enacted –
including the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997 – and the initiatives taken – such as the National Action
Plan formulated in December 2014 – for curbing their activities have never been implemented in
letter and spirit.

Over the last few years, though, there has been a growing realisation among the ruling class that the
policy of nurturing, patronising and appeasing religious militant organisations was flawed and would
not work any longer. But reversing these decades-long covert and, at times, overt policies overnight
is neither feasible nor desirable.

There are always apprehensions that militant organisations could react with violence if and when a
strict action is taken against them. These misgivings are certainly not misplaced though recent
history has proved that these could be exaggerated in Pakistan’s case. Recent crackdowns against
the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, an anti-blasphemy extremist organisation, and the lack of any
reaction from its supposedly ‘huge support base’ is a case in point.

Considered an uncontrollable monster at one point, its cadres have simply withered away even
though its leaders have now spent months in detention. Recent proscription of Jamaat-ud-Dawa and
Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation and the crackdown on Jaish-e-Muhammad have been, similarly, met
with a whimper.

While the state must guard against disproportionate actions against militant and proscribed
organisations, legal instruments – such as the provisions of ATA – must be implemented as a first
step to curtail their presence and activities. A careful reading of ATA would reveal that it is a very
comprehensive piece of legislation. Problem, though, is the huge gap between the intent of the law
and its application on the ground — something that the Financial Action Task Force, a global
watchdog on money laundering and terrorism financing, has all along been lamenting about. ATA
has always been used in crimes of usual nature.

Often, it has been also deployed for the victimisation of political opponents but it has never been
invoked against militant organisations because, for most of our recent past, we needed these
entities for political purposes — for utilising their vote bank or for deploying them as proxies.
Sympathisers of these organisations, including some members of the state apparatus, have been
giving them the benefit of doubt for these very reasons. Many people rather have eulogised their
social, charitable and welfare activities but, in the process, have missed the bigger picture
altogether.

We must bear in mind that we need to take action against militant organisations not just under
global pressures or for meeting requirements of the international regulatory authorities but for the
sake of Pakistan’s own survival. It must also be clear to all of us that the problems created by
militant entities can only be resolved through legal means.
Attempts at deradicalising the members of these organisations, being carried out or sponsored by
the security establishment, are certainly being done in good faith but they remain half-baked in their
conception and fruitless in their implementation. Opening and running occasional deradicalisation
centres will not prevent or counter radicalisation in the society.

Evidence from other parts of the world suggests that the tendency to use shortcuts never allows
deradicalisation efforts to be significantly successful. This is as true in places such as Egypt – which
has a long history of violent Islamic extremism – as it is in states like the United Kingdom which, in
recent years, has run many deradicalisation programmes to little avail.

As a starting point, we must identify the nature and causes of radicalisation in Pakistan. To do that,
we need research carried out by genuine researchers and think tanks, and not by security or
intelligence agencies. Research teams specifically selected for the purpose should be given free
access to all stakeholders, particularly to terrorists and militants. Once their findings are received,
we could start plugging the holes identified by them.

Mainstreaming militant organisations should be the next step. It is not a novel idea. A number of
countries have mainstreamed militant organisations of various ideologies. The most successful
example in this regard is the Irish Republican Army, a separatist group once fighting against the
British rule over Northern Ireland. It has transformed itself into a political party over the last decade
and a half.

Nepal’s former Maoist guerilla fighters are also now a part of the government after having won
votes to reach the country’s parliament. Many warring factions in Cambodia’s civil war, similarly,
have become electoral contenders. Most recently, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – or
FARC – have forsworn violence and decided to take part in democratic politics.

We, however, must understand that mainstreaming is the process of reorienting a terrorist or
militant organisation through negotiations and talks. The process involves convincing them to
change their behavioural patterns and organisational outlook. Such convincing only works if it is
followed by a formal peace accord or some kind of a charter of reconciliation involving all
stakeholders.

This accord or charter should include terms and conditions for decommissioning the members of
militant organisations, and provide for a legal and judicial amnesty for their past activists in
exchange for a commitment to stay away from all types of violence.

This process also requires the state to allow militant organisations some space to operate before
they could transform themselves. They will definitely take time before reorienting themselves into
welfare/social entities or political parties. Throughout this time, though, the state must remain
conscious of the formation of splinter groups that could likely continue as militant entities.

Most importantly, the process of mainstreaming must not start without Parliament’s involvement.
Parliament, in fact, must take ownership of it. After an open debate, the legislature should devise a
consensus strategy applicable to all militant organisations. Political environment will be further
damaged if the process is carried out selectively and without a parliamentary oversight.

If the state clearly defines its policy, it has multiple instruments of power at its disposal – including
different law enforcing agencies, legal and judicial institutions, and constitutional authority – to
enforce that policy. And if it spells out its goals publicly, majority of the population will back its
efforts. In the ongoing counterterrorism efforts, the state has already proved that there is nothing
that it cannot achieve if it uses its powers judiciously.

We must not forget that extremism and radicalisation cannot be countered through kinetic – read
security – measures alone. The process also requires soft interventions in the form of legislation and
policies. Most importantly, there has to be sustained implementation of laws and policies that
inform the state’s actions which, in turn, should not only be transparent and fair under the law of
the land but also must be verifiable and sustainable. Certain state institutions may encounter
capacity issues in implementing and sustaining counter militancy policies but their capacity could be
enhanced easily through training, and by seeking help and support of international partners.

Time certainly is right for initiating measures to rid Pakistan of religious militancy and violent
extremism. People are highly weary of terrorism in the country. We, therefore, must embark on a
comprehensive deradicalisation and mainstreaming programme — not because the world wants us
to start one but because it is a necessary condition for our country’s survival as a place at peace with
itself and others.

A secular dream entombed

Jawed NaqviAugust 06, 2019
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The writer is Dawn’s correspondent in Delhi.

IT was Hari Singh, the erstwhile ruler of Kashmir, who originally granted the
special status to Kashmiris in their homeland in 1927. He did so at the behest
of Kashmiri Pandits, the Hindu elite at the time in the Muslim-majority state.
Subsequently, with the arrival of adult franchise and progressive land
reforms, Kashmiri Muslims also began to reap the benefits of their special
status. The Pandits had opposed the influx of people from neighbouring
Punjab into the administrative structures and other public areas of the
erstwhile princely state.

Following a controversial accession by Hari Singh to India, a claim Pakistan

regards as fictitious, Pandit Nehru retained the special status for Kashmiris through
constitutional procedures in the Indian parliament in 1954. His emotional
attachment to Kashmir may have been a factor, but Nehru also saw that the special
ties shored up India’s secular image at a time of all-round religious strife. Kashmir
to him turned into a beacon of India’s secular reality, as Pakistan saw in it a
completeness of its Muslim basis.

In an interview with American journalist Arnold Michaelis a year before his death,
Nehru also hinted that a further religious partition of Kashmir could work
negatively for Muslims in different parts of India who had chosen not to migrate to
Pakistan.

Prime Minister Modi’s revivalist government was emboldened by a rare majority it

got in elections in May, and with the numbers on its side, it has successfully
entombed Nehru’s dream of a secular, inclusive republic. With the Valley in
lockdown, and most communications snapped and the streets crammed with the
tens of thousands of urgently imported troops, Home Minister Amit Shah
announced the revocation of the special status in the Rajya Sabha. He overrode
opposition protests in doing so. However, Modi has found strange allies in his
stealthy and swift move. Opposition leaders Arvind Kejriwal and Mayawati have
backed his Kashmir move.

Monday marks the beginning of a long nightmare for the

Kashmiri people.
It was hard to make out what Amit Shah exactly said in the din, and the
notification was not circulated to MPs ahead of the tabling, as is otherwise the
norm. Yet, from what one could glean through the commotion, Shah cleverly
refrained from trying to abrogate the entire Article 370, but picked only clauses
that gave Kashmir special rights.

This should help in dealing with the diplomatic fallout — though even here Modi
is well armed. Vladimir Putin has accorded him the highest civilian honour. Xi
Jinping is pursuing closer ties to get him to support China’s global trading plans.
And Donald Trump has devised effusive epithets for him. Modi’s star ally in the
Middle East, Benjamin Netanyahu is due to pay a day-long visit to Delhi next
month, which should give his host useful insights into strengthening the
stranglehold on an occupied people.
President Kovind signed the controversial proclamation on Monday by citing the
powers bestowed to him by Article 370 Clause (1). Such changes ordinarily can
only be made with the consent of the government of Jammu and Kashmir, but the
state is under presidential rule. This is where the proclamation could face a legal
challenge.

The clause also refers to the instrument of accession that binds India to Kashmir,
and which Pakistan rejects. Implicitly, the retained clause does therefore offer
room for a resumption of bilateral discussions, scope for which remains in sight,
assuming President Trump did not mishear Modi.

In other words, the fig leaf for international explanations has been retained. It
would not be far-fetched to imagine that Modi’s dramatic manoeuvres are
communally motivated, but do not substantially alter the basis of negotiations that
were pursued between Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf. The key plank in
their talks was the loosening of trade ties and boosting people’s contact across the
Line of Control, which they saw as the future de facto border. That discussion is
still possible, it is tempting to believe.

Because Pakistan disputes the instrument of accession, its criticism of how India
arranges the political furniture in the disputed area it controls is cosmetic from a
diplomatic perspective. What is of far greater significance is the intent behind the
proposed bifurcation. Under this scheme, Ladakh would break away and become a
Union Territory without an elected assembly, say, like Chandigarh. This should
enable Modi to keep the large Muslim population of Kargil from acquiring a
political platform, which will be also denied to Ladakh’s Buddhist people.

The newly delineated Jammu and Kashmir territory, minus Ladakh, would have an
elected assembly, like Kejriwal’s semi-toothless rule in Delhi. Significantly, it
could produce Kashmir’s first Hindu chief minister. That is at least one clear
purpose of keeping the option of election in the predominantly Hindu Jammu.

Importantly, Pakistan will have to negotiate the feared demographic changes,

replete with militarily protected and therefore segregated regions on the model of
Israeli settlements. Monday marks the beginning of a long nightmare for the
Kashmiri people. It also marks the first steps towards the completion of a long-
promised Hindutva project, and it became possible with brute power of the
military.

The strategy included the marginalisation of the two main political claimants to
Indian-backed power grid, the Abdullahs and the Muftis, who had both flirted with
the BJP in the past. They are currently under house arrest. Separatist leaders were
picked up earlier. Yasin Malik was rumoured to be unwell in Delhi’s Tihar Jail, but
the prison authorities said he was in good health.
There was a time when Kashmiris ignored the lurking political disputes and
offered the best locales for Indian cinema, whose heroes and heroines were loved
in every home. Then came the surge of Muslim puritans, though they failed to alter
Kashmir’s Sufi heritage. Now the hapless people must face the full force of
Hindutva bigotry, a malaise that has already spread to far corners of Nehru’s India,
trampling his eclectic offerings.

Hate and its shadow

Rafia ZakariaAugust 07, 2019
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The writer is an attorney teaching constitutional law and political philosophy.

BY the time the weekend ended, it was the deadliest the United States had
ever seen. Around 10am on Saturday morning, as parents took excited
children to Walmart ready to buy school supplies (the official school year in
the US begins in late August or early September), a gunman opened fire, first
in the parking lot and then inside Walmart itself. As his manifesto, uploaded
before the attack, revealed, he knew how to strike a ‘soft target’ (Walmart
stores are cavernous, large and without any real security or police presence)
and he was rebelling against the Hispanic ‘invasion’ of the US.

Nor was that enough during America’s weekend of terror. Across the country in
Dayton, Ohio, hundreds of people milled around a bar in a district known for its
nightlife. After one in the morning, a white man in his early 20s, armed with
hundreds of rounds of explosives, opened fire on people on the street before trying
to get into the bar itself. In about 30 dreadful seconds, he shot nine people and
injured 15. After 30 seconds, police in the area responded and shot him. One of the
dead was his own sister, a fact that has particularly baffled those who have been
investigating the matter.

It is odd to see Americans go through what Pakistanis have already endured. The
memory of the dark winter day when the Army Public School was attacked,
leaving young bodies and exercise books littered all over the place, is one that
continues to haunt the country. Then there were the losses of so many valiant
leaders, from Benazir Bhutto and Salmaan Taseer to many more who had to
contend with the same sort of extremism, albeit presented in a religious garb. Many
weekends of mourning and of certainty, of blocked mobile phone signals and
banned YouTube, postponed wedding celebrations, cancelled exams and so much
more, came with the fight against the Pakistani Taliban.
 Like the young men attracted to extremist ideology in
Pakistan, America’s terrorists are young white men who seem
unsure of their direction in life.
Another less discussed consequence also accompanied Pakistan’s ‘war on terror’.
‘Pakhtun’ became conflated with ‘terrorist’, freedom of speech began to be
considered pointless, and religion was elevated as not simply the central but the
only aspect of meaning in life. In fighting the Taliban, Pakistanis — as if to
reclaim their beliefs from the Taliban’s barbarism — became more ‘pious’, began
to enact stricter judgements on neighbours and family members who did not pray
or did not fast, or did not in their view make sufficient shows of piety. Even as the
Taliban began to be relegated to the peripheries.

If the Taliban objected to men and women studying together at university, vigilante
student groups operating on Pakistani campuses today carry forward their legacy.
If they wanted women to be completely covered in public places, it has become the
rule in most of the country, save the tony areas of Karachi and Lahore.

The central point of drawing these comparisons is simply to illustrate that in

fighting militancy, some terror, some of its language, some of its techniques, its
penchant for dogma, for a lack of tolerance, for the flagrant showing off of piety,
has all stuck with Pakistan. This shadow of terror is harder to fight, to isolate and
to condemn.

Countries like Pakistan, post-colonial countries, are continually (and incorrectly)

often seen as inhabiting the Western past. This is of course a colonial frame, where
the West is always ahead and the rest are always gasping to catch up. In this case,
however, Pakistan has something useful to say to the Americans. In the American
fight against white supremacy, the language of race and the tribalism of cliques
based on skin colour are both going to make their home within a generation’s
imagination. The inanity of mass violence, the sheer inhumanity of it, will seep
into their bones and harden then in ways that only those stricken with grief — the
large inchoate sadness of a collective rather than individual sadness — can
understand.

It is clear that the US is on the cusp of a race war. The ‘war on terror’ that it
imposed on others, that it used to justify the killing of hundreds of thousands of
people, has now turned inwards and is greedily claiming American lives. So deep
is the division that the two sides have become calcified in their positions; the white
supremacists see everyone who is not white and even those whites who are not
white supremacists, as a threat, as unpatriotic and (at least for a murderous few)
worthy of being killed. Those committed to tolerance and racial harmony watch
aghast, unable to react in time, unable to accept that people they have known can
transform so suddenly, so unexpectedly, into racist monsters.
Like the young men attracted to extremist religious ideology in Pakistan,
America’s terrorists are young white men who seem unsure of their direction in
life, left out of the artificial intelligence and automation-led economy in which
immigrants and others seem to thrive. They have support from the top: President
Donald Trump has been lauded by white supremacists that celebrate his every
racist remark, and feel that he is entirely in step with their project of making
America a white country.

Their zeal, their inability to feel any compassion for their victims, their failure to
see through their own ragged logic, are reminiscent of the characteristics of the
extremist mindset that Pakistanis know well. The Trump administration’s inability
to act, its shadow support for those known to have racist and white supremacist
views, are like Pakistani administrations past that seemed not quite sure, or were
wilfully blind to the danger posed by extremists.

This week Pakistan is mired in its own crisis and is hardly in a position to offer up
advice. In its own moment of uncertainty, as it confronts the evil imposed on
innocent Kashmiris by an overreaching Indian state, it can take some comfort in
the knowledge that those who perpetuate evil eventually become tainted with it
themselves.