[A.C. No. 2343. July 30, 1982.

FACUNDO LUBIANO, Complainant, v. JOEL G.

GORDOLLA, Respondent.
Facts:
Gordolla is charged by Lubiano for his failure to observe the
standard expected to him as a member of the bar. On the motion for
reconsideration filed by Gordolla as a counsel for Robina Farm, Inc.,
Gordolla described the award of separation pay to the complainant as
“ill-gotten wealth”, the decision of the National Labor Relation
Commission as an “unknowing” one, and the sheriff office as “partner
in crime”. Respondent attributed the said statements to his zeal in the
performance of his duty to uphold the case of his client. He also said
that they are covered by the mantle of absolute privileged
communication, being relevant and pertinent to the subject of the
injury in the NLRC.

Issue:
WON Gordolla is subject for disbarment.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that, although the language used by
Gordolla does not constitute sufficient cause for disbarment, Section
20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canons of Professional
Ethics states that it is the duty of an attorney to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
Gordolla is ordered to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and warned that a repetition of a
similar act would be dealt with more severely.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla
is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P200.00, payable to the Clerk of
this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this decision, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is further warned
that a repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more severely.

1
 A.C. No. 3452, June 23, 2014
HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner, v. ATTY. GINES
ABELLANA, Respondent.
Facts:
On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this
administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. AbelJana
who had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-6970
entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson
Yu of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. In the administrative
complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional
misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:
1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear
that he had filed Civil Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988,
conformably with their agreement, although the complaint was
actually filed on June 14, 1988;
2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the
reply vis-à-vis the answer with counterclaim, with his omission
having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial court
beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a
scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for the plaintiff’s side an
unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as the plaintiff;
and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to
eventually submit it three months later;
3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled
hearings;
and
4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash
payment made by Samonte for his court appearances and his
acceptance of the case.
On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment
on the administrative complaint. In his comment dated April 6,
1990, Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of documents,
clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on
June 14, 1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte had
not given enough money to cover the filing fees and other charges
totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00,
contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00
as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing fees. He asserted that
the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed
the reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer with
counterclaim of the defendants on August 2, 1988, attaching as proof
the copies of the reply and that it was the RTC, not him, who had
scheduled the pre-trial on January 16, 1989.
He countered that it was Samonte who had been dishonest,
because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least
P2,000.00 in contravention of their agreement on the amount of
2
P10,000.00 being his acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees;
that the filing fees paid were covered by receipts issued by the Clerk
of Court; that no receipts were issued for the P200.00/appearance
fee conformably with the practice of most lawyers; and that Samonte
had not also demanded any receipts.
On May 30, 1990 and July 30, 1990, the Court referred the
administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation.
On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and
present their evidence at 10:00 am on November 18, 1994. However,
the parties sought postponements. And the hearing was reset several
times. On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash
dated January 7, 2005 from Atty. Abellana. Reacting to the motion to
quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed on
February 9, 2005, declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative
complaint against Atty. Abellana.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment
of Atty. Abellana, observing as follows:

x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil

case, said respondent has shown a facility for utilizing false and
deceitful practices as a means to cover-up his delay and lack of
diligence in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a
whole, the respondent’s acts are nothing short of deplorable.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended

that respondent Atty. Gines Abellana be disbarred from the
practice of law for resorting to false and/or deceitful practices,
and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits
a member of the bar.

On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting

the findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty.
Abellana from the practice of law for one year, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above- entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex “A”, and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for
resorting to falsehood and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to
exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits member of the Bar,
Atty. Gines N. Abellana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year.

3
 On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration
based on the following grounds:
A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the
undersigned from the practice of law for one (1) year is too stiff
in relation to the alleged unethical conduct committed by the
respondent;
B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully
supported with evidence;
C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by
testimonial evidence so that it is hearsay and self-serving.
The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellana’s motion for
reconsideration.
In his comment dated October 21, 2008, Samonte reiterated his
allegations against Atty. Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not
refute the charges against him; and noted that the reply that Atty.
Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not even annexed
either to his position paper and motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
WON the acts of Atty. Abellana is subject for disbarment.

Ruling:
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer
is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy.
These expectations, though high and demanding, are the
professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine
Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath
that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona
fide member of the Law Profession, thus:

I, __________________________, do solemnly swear that I

will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.

By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey

the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or

4
out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to
conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Every
lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the
rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by
others.42 It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty,
integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code
of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent

to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court

hearings.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the

status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
client’s request for information.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22,

2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
subject to the MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N. Abellana
is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF
LAW effective upon receipt of this decision, with the stern warning
that any repetition by him of the same or similar acts will be punished
more severely.

5
 Fernandez v. Vasquez
A.M No. RTJ-11-2261, July 26, 2011

Facts:
The attorney complainant was the counsel of Dr. Susan Raola
in several cases instituted for the recovery of properties she
conjugally owned with the latter’s late husband Roland Raola against
spouses Fernando and Maria Raola. These cases were raffled to the
court presided by the respondent judge. Complainant reported he
was ordered by respondent to file a motion for his inhibition in one
civil case on the ground that the judge was the counsel prior to
appointment as public prosecutor of the Raola family. No action was
taken by the judge on the motion. A year later, after complainant filed
a supplemental motion for inhibition, on ground of manifest bias for
the spouses Raola, partiality and inexcusable delay in the
proceedings, that respondent judge ruled and denied such motions.
An affidavit filed by Buenconsejo B. Quides narrated the respondent’s
transactional relationship with the spouses Raola which started when
he was still an assistant provincial prosecutor to his present position
as presiding judge. In exchange of favors, the respondent used
coercive power of his public office to serve the private interests of the
spouses. Respondent judge filed a disbarment case against
complainant, alleging that the allegations were lies, but the case was
dismissed. The complainant laments that the judge still refuse to
recuse himself upon a third motion for inhibition.
Another matter that complainant emphasized in his complaint
was the dishonesty allegedly committed by respondent when he
accomplished his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) for the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC). Complainant alleged that when respondent filed his
application to the Judiciary in 2005, he placed an x in the box
indicating a No answer to the question: Have you been charged with
or convicted of or otherwise imposed a sanction of any law, decree,
ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal, or any other
government office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or any
foreign country, or found guilty of an administrative offense or
imposed any administrative sanction? (Question No. 24), and Have
you ever been retired, dismissed or forced to resign from
employment? (Question No. 25).
Complainant submitted that respondent lied by answering No to
these questions since he had been criminally charged for indirect
bribery in the early 1970s.
Contrary to complainants’ assertions, respondent maintained
that he was not forced to resign as a clerk of court. He noted that the
indirect bribery case was filed on 11 December 1974 while he
resigned as a clerk of court on 30 April 1973 (more than one year
before the indirect bribery case was filed). He allegedly resigned out

6
of disgust and conviction that the government he was serving was not
protecting its own civil servants but was out to silence anyone so that
its stranglehold could be perpetrated. Respondent bemoans the
struggles his family had to go through because of the trumped-up
charge for indirect bribery. He alleged that in his resolute attempt to
forever bury the scandal from his memory, he was so successful that
he has absolutely forgotten the matter, only to be revived after a
lapse of 36 years, with the filing of the instant administrative case. He
was sort of enveloped by amnesia as far as the incident was
concerned, so much so that in answering Question No. 24 in his
PDS, he automatically and without a blink of an eye, checked the
word No.

Issue:
WON the respondent is guilty of dishonesty.

Ruling:
That respondent is guilty of dishonesty in accomplishing his
PDS is impossible to refute. It was not mere inadvertence on his part
when he answered No to that very simple question posed in the PDS.
He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant, and
that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it
anyway.
Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well
the consequences of making a false statement in his PDS. Being a
former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that
all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter. His being a
judge makes the act all the more unacceptable. Clearly, there was an
obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a
member of the judiciary. As visible representation of the law,
respondent judge should have conducted himself in a manner which
would merit the respect of the people to him in particular and to the
Judiciary in general. He should have acted with honesty in
accomplishing his PDS, instead of deliberately misleading the JBC in
his bid to be considered and eventually appointed to his present
position. Such lack of candor has blemished the image of the
judiciary. His contention that the indirect bribery case had been
dismissed is immaterial, he was duty bound to disclose such
information when he was applying for judicial position. Had it not
been for this administrative complaint, such matter would have
escaped the attention of this Court. In the case, however, of necessity
consider the compulsory retirement of respondent on 12 October
2010. The penalty of suspension can thus no longer be implemented.
In lieu thereof, the penalty of fine may still be imposed, the
determination of the amount of which is subject to the sound
discretion of the court.

7
 WHEREFORE, for gross inefficiency and dishonesty,
respondent Judge Angeles S. Vasquez, RTC, Branch 13, Ligao City,
is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00)
PESOS to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

8
 A. C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998
JULIETA B. NARAG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M.
NARAG, Respondent.
Facts:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of
every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the
exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may
withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an
administrative complaint 1 for disbarment against her husband, Atty.
Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons
1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers.
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of
Atty. Dominador M. Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college
instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in
the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a
first year college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty. Narag.
Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of
the legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her
resistance until the student acceded to his wishes.

They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various

circles in the community, but which they managed to from me. It
therefore came as a terrible embarrassment to me, with unspeakable
grief and pain when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live
with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous circumstances.

It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a

member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the
employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of Trade and Industry
Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for
this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her sense of
right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of the
Bar.

It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty.

Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-
year-old woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level.
Atty. Narag professed his love for his wife and his children and
denied abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he
described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed, and said:
What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an
incurably jealous and possessive woman, and every time the
streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or
9
 complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all
without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the
consuming demands of her "loving" jealousy. Then, as is her
nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off,
she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the
Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of November 11,
1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy.

Issue:
WON Atty. Narag did an immoral act and is subject for
disbarment.

Ruling:
Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute
the testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions
were of public knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to his
wife and children.
WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

10
 PATRICIA FIGUEROA v. SIMEON BARRANCO,
SBC Case No. 519, 1997-07-31
Facts:
1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession.
Respondent took 3 unsuccessful attempts in bar examination in 1966,
1967 and 1968 before passing in 1970 bar examination and before
he could take his oath, the complainant filed an instant petition and
said that the respondent and she are sweethearts and has a child but
the respondent did not fulfill his promises to marry her.
Upon the motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies
of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974,
respondent filed a manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case
citing failures to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello.
Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable
reasons in failing to file a comment earlier. The Court denied the
motion to dismiss by the respondent.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to
dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by the respondent on
September 17, 1979. The third motion to dismiss by the respondent
was noted in the Court’s Resolution dated September 15, 1982.
Respondent’s hopes were again dashed on November 17,
1988 when the Court, in response to complainant’s opposition,
resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the
dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath.

Issue:
WON Simeon Barranco, Jr. should be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath and continue the admission to the legal profession.

Ruling:
The Court find that these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from
the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same... does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a
lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.

11
 Overgaard v. Valdez
A.C. No. 7902, March 31, 2009
Facts:
The respondent, Atty, Godwin R. Valdez, is the legal counsel of
the complainant Torben B. Overgaard in two cases filed by him and
two cases filed against him. Even if the complainant gave the full
amount of legal fees for his service, the respondent refused to
perform any of his obligations under their contract for legal services,
ignored the complainant’s request for a report of the status of the
cases entrusted to his care, and rejected the complainant’s demands
for return of the money paid to him. The respondent didn’t submit a
position paper or attend the hearing.

Issue:
WON Atty, Godwin R. Valdez’s abandonment of his client
constitutes a violation of his oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

Ruling:
Yes, the court find that respondent’s disbarment should be
upheld. From the facts of the case, and based on his own
admissions, it is evident that he has committed multiple violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. He is ORDERED to immediately return to Torben B.
Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its equivalent in Philippine
Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of extra-
judicial demand. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu of
six percent (6%), shall be imposed on such amount from the date of
promulgation of this decision until the payment thereof. He is further
ORDERED to immediately return all papers and documents received
from the complainant.

12
 Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa
A.C. No. 7360 July 24, 2012
Facts:
Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same
case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor hence violating
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Catalan
also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the
accused are relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa
displayed manifest bias in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa bribed
his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros. Toribio) for
₱30,000 to uphold the charge of frustrated murder and not less
serious physical injuries in a case where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a
respondent. The Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa for direct
bribery for having demanded ₱15,000 from for the dismissal of a
homicide case and for the release of said accused Arsenio Cadinas
despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance of the complainant
in said case.

In his defense, respondent claimed that his appearing as a

defense counsel for the accused was in compliance with the mandate
to render legal services to the needy and to the oppressed. On the
second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismissed Pros. Toribio’s
allegations as self-serving. On the third cause of action, while Atty.
Silvosa admitted his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and is under
probation, he asserted that conviction under the 2nd paragraph of
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code does not involve moral
turpitude since the act involved does not amount to a crime.

Issue:
WON the acts of Atty. Silvosa constitute valid grounds so as to
warrant his disbarment.

Ruling:
Yes. First, when he entered his appearance on the Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule
15.03 which provides that “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts. Indeed, the prohibition against representation of
conflicting interests applies although he attorney’s intentions were
honest and he acted in good faith.

Second, the records showed that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt

to bribe Pros. Toribio. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June
1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by
Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter.
13
There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies
against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied
the accusation and dismissed it as persecution.

Third, Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a

ground for disbarment. Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of
direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence
of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime.

Respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED

and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

14
 PEDRO L. LINSANGAN v. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
AC. No. 6672, 2009-09-04
Facts:
Complainant alleged that respondent, Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
client to transfer legal representation. Atty. Tolentino promised the
complainant financial assistance and collection on their claims to
induce them to hire him, he also calls them and sent them text
messages.

To support his allegations, Mr. Linsangan presented the sworn

affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon
him to sever his lawyer-client relationship with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.00.

Respondent, in defense denied knowing the paralegal, Fe

Marie Labiano, and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card.

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar

Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The complaint is rooted on an alleged intrusion by respondent

into complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of
the CPR. Complainant presented substantial evidences consisting of
the sworn statements to prove that the respondent indeed solicited
legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.

Although the respondent denied that he knows Labiano, he

later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Issue:
WON the respondent violates CPR and ROC.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

15
16
 Koppel, Inc. v. Makati Rotary Club Foundation, Inc.
G.R. No. 198075
Facts:
Fedders Koppel, Incorporated (FKI), an air-conditioning
manufacturer, owned a parcel of land located in Parañaque City
which housed buildings and improvements dedicated to the business
of FKI. In 1975, FKI left the land to Makati Rotary Club Foundation
(MRCF) by way of a conditional donation; MRCF accepted all
conditions and both FKI and MRCF executed a deed of donation
evidencing their consensus.
Conditions of the Donation:
Respondent would lease the land back to FKI under the
terms of the donation (1) Period of lease is for 25 years or until
May 25, 2000; renewable for another 25 years upon mutual
agreement, (2) Rent paid by FKI for 1st 25 years is P45,126.00
per annum, (3) Rental for the 2nd 25 years shall be subject of a
mutual agreement; if cannot agree, then it be submitted to a
panel of 3 arbitrators in accordance of arbitration law in the
Philippines.
Fair Market value should not exceed beyond 25% of
the original value and Rental for the 2nd 25 years shall not
be exceeding 3% of the fair market value of the land.

On October 1976, FKI and MRCF executed an amended deed

of donation that reiterated the provisions of the deed of donation and
by the virtue of the lease agreement as stipulated in the deed of
donation and the amended one, FKI continued to possess and use
the land.

On 2000, 2 days prior the expiration of the deed, FKI and

MRCF executed another contract of lease which agreed with the
condition of a new 5-year contract. In 2005, after the expiration of the
2000 lease contract, another agreement is made and governed by
the laws of the Philippines. FKI complied with the agreement made
and paid rentals and the donation for 3 years in thee 2005 lease
contract but in June 2008, FKI sold its rights and properties to
Koppel, Inc. FKI and MRCF executed an assignment and assumption
of lease and donation where KFI formally assigned all its interests
and obligation in favor of Koppel. The following year, Koppel refused
to pay the rent and donation because it violated the material
conditions of the donation of the land in the donation and amended
deed of donation.
June 1, 2009, MRCF sent the 1st demand letter notifying the
petitioner of its default. September 22, 2009, Koppel sent a reply

17
expressing disagreement over the rental stipulation. September 25,
2009, MCRF sent the 2nd demand letter which reiterated the demand
to pay obligations. September 30, 2009, Koppel refused to comply.

Issue:
WON the 2005 lease contract is arbitrable.

Ruling:
Yes, all of the arguments are bereft of merit for they have erred
in overlooking the significance of thee arbitration clause incorporated
in the 2005 lease contract.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED, REFERRING the petitioner and the respondent to
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract, repeatedly included in the 2000 Lease Contract and in the
1976 Amended Deed of Donation.

18
 A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 March 31, 2006
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
Facts:
1995, Atty. Florentino V. Floro applied for judgeship but in the
pre-requisite psychological evaluation by the SC Clinic, it is revealed
that Atty. Floro had “evidence of ego disintegration” and “developing
psychotic process”. Atty. Floro later voluntarily withdrew his
application. In June 1998, when he applied a new, the evaluation
exposed problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion,
social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and
perceptual distortions. It is obvious that in his 1995 and 1998
application, Atty. Floro was unfit for being a judge. But since Atty.
Floro has an impressive academic standing, the JBC allowed Atty.
Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second
opinion appeared favorable thus making a way for Atty. Floro to be a
RTC judge.

Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo filed an administrative

complaint against him then he recommended as well that Judge Floro
be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of
investigation against him. On July 20, 1999, a Resolution was made
and stated that the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of
the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460.

One of those reported is for his alleged partiality in criminal

cases where he declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to
Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct or Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Judge Floro denies the allegations, he claims that what he did

impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy
his predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded
accused whose cases could not be tried due to lack of a permanent
prosecutor assigned to his sala.

Issue:
WON Judge Floro violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

Ruling:
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that
Judge Floro’s current administrative and medical problems are not
19
totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his
mental problems, for now, appear to render him unfit with the delicate
task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and
debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling
condition.

Finally, if Judge Floro’s mental impairment is secondary to

genetics 154 and/or adverse environmental factors (and,
unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we cannot
condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse environment –
factors they have no control over.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY

THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges
against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;

2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge

of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and consider
him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling
condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions
of his office, effective immediately;

3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back

salaries, allowances and other economic benefits corresponding to
three (3) years;

4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v.

Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and

5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution

Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for
MOOTNESS.

20
 JORGE MONTECILLO v. FRANCISCO M. GICA
G.R. No. L-36800. October 21, 1974
Facts:
Montecillo was accused of slander by Gica. Atty. Del Mar.
represented Mortecillo in lower court and successfully won the case.
When the case went to Court of Appeals, the Court reversed the
same. Upon the decision, Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for
reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of
Appeals’ Judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices “knowingly
rendered and unjust decision” and “Judgement has been rendered
through negligence” and that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be
deceived.

But the Court did not reverse its judgement and denied the
motion. Atty. Del Mar insisted another motion for reconsideration and
made another threat by stating that “with almost all penal violations
placed under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, particularly Article
171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in
Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of Martial Law, the
next appeal that will be interposed, will be to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines.”

The Appellate Court impelled to assert its authority, ordered

respondent Atty. Del Mar why he should not be punished for
contempt of court. Respondent made a written explanation wherein
he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was
not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the
course of action he would follow.

Respondent Atty. Del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and

forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to
convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in
their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled... threats, even
casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating
that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for
knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance.

Appellate Court concluded that "Counsel Atty. del Mar is found

guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and
ordered suspended from the practice of law. Atty. Del Mar himself
moved for the dismissal of his complaint, apologized to the Court of
Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal
moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices.

21
 This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did
not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he
actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making
them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with
the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction
respondent Atty. Del Mar had the temerity to file his motion asking
that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of
Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached.

Issue:
WON Counsel Atty. Del Mar should be held liable.

Ruling:
Yes. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold
the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity,
according to the oath he has taken.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del
Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of
November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed. Respondent Atty. Quirico del
Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this
Court, such suspension to take effect immediately.

22
 Re: Diosdado Q. Gutierrez 115 Phil. 647

Facts:
Atty. Diosdado Gutierrez, a member of the bar, was convicted
of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of
Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators, was sentence to the
penalty of death. The court, upon review, reduced the penalty to
Reclusion Perpetua. After servicing a portion of the sentence, he was
granted a conditional pardon by the President on August1958 on the
condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. The widow of the deceased Samaco filed a verified
complaint before the Court praying that Atty. Gutierrez be disbarred
pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Atty. Gutierrez admitted the facts but
pleaded the conditional pardon in defense.

Under section 5 of Rule 127 a member of the bar may be

removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude"
includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man.

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but

conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term.

Issue:
WON Atty. Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that
he was granted pardon.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and
considering the nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q.
Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name
stricken from the roll of lawyers.

23
 Felicidad L. Oronce, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.
298 SCRA 133
Facts:
Private respondent Priciliano B. Gonzales Development
Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land at No. 52
Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City.

In June 1988, it obtained a four million peso loan from the China
Banking Corporation.  To guarantee payment of the loan, private
respondent mortgaged the Gilmore property and all its improvements
to said bank.  Due to irregular payment of amortization, interests and
penalties on the loan accumulated through the years.

On April 13, 1992, private respondent, through its president,

Antonio B. Gonzales, signed and executed a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage covering the Gilmore property and its
improvements, in favor of petitioners Rosita Flaminiano and Felicidad
L. Oronce. The deed, states that the sale was in consideration of the
sum of P5,400,000.00 and that private respondent will deliver said
property after expiration of 1 year from date of sale.

On the other hand, petitioners bound themselves to pay private

respondent’s indebtedness with China Banking Corporation.

In fulfillment of the terms and conditions embodied in the Deed of

Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, petitioners paid private
respondent’s indebtedness with the bank. However, private
respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver possession of the
premises to petitioners upon the expiration of the one-year period
from April 13, 1992.  Almost six months later since the execution of
the instrument or on October 2, 1992, petitioners caused the
registration of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with the
Register of Deeds.  Simultaneously, they obtained a new title,
consistent with the fact that they are the new owners of the property.
Sometime in July 1993, they paid the real estate taxes.

On November 12, 1993, petitioners sent private respondent a

demand letter asking it to vacate the premises.  Said letter, just like
three other consecutive notices sent through the Quezon City post
office, was unclaimed.  Hence, on April 11, 1994, petitioners filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint for
unlawful detainer against private respondent.  

24
 MTC ruled in favor of petitioners Flaminiano and Oronce. On
appeal to the RTC, it affirmed the decision of MTC. On Dec 02 1995
private respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with TRO
and preliminary injunction. CA ruled in favor of private respondents
and granted the TRO and Preliminary Injunction enjoining the
implementation of the writ of execution and the decision of the RTC
which is the basis of this petition.

However, pending litigation in this Court, private respondent filed

an urgent motion to cite petitioner Rosita L. Flaminiano and her
husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, in contempt of court. The
motion was founded on an affidavit of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales who
resided at the contested property, deriving his right to do so from
private respondent corporation that is owned by his family. Gonzales
alleged that on September 20, 1997, petitioner Flaminiano and her
husband entered the property through craftiness and intimidation.  At
around 5:30 p.m. on that day, two (2) men knocked at the
gate.  When the houseboy, Luis R. Fernandez, opened the gate for
pedestrians tentatively, the two men told him that they would like to
visit Gonzales’ mother who was ailing.

Issue:
WON Atty. Flaminiano should be held liable.

Ruling:
 Atty. Flaminiano’s acts of entering the property without the
consent of its occupants & in contravention of the existing writ or
preliminary injunction & making utterances showing disrespect for the
law & this Court, are unbecoming of a member of the Bar. Although
he says that they “peacefully” took over the property, such “peaceful”
take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction
that he knew was still in force. Through his acts, he has flouted his
duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or
abetting “activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.”
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED without prejudice to the filing by either party of an action
regarding the ownership of the property involved. The temporary
restraining order issued on October 13, 1997 is hereby made
permanent. Petitioners and their agents are directed to turn over
possession of the property to private respondent.

25
 G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, 
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH
DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions. He underwent fistulectomy,
was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private

respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner
continued to receive compensation. However, without due notice,
private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made
oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted
upon.

Petitioner then filed an action with the NLRC for illegal

dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay, consequential,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Said
complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, holding
that petitioner abandoned his work. On appeal, said decision was
affirmed in toto.

Issue:
WON petitioner De Ysasi III abandoned his work.

Ruling:
In order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made
there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2)
a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with
the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Such intent the court find dismally
wanting in this case.

Private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's

plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work was

26
not without valid causes of which private respondent had full
knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner
was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains
nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a
conclusion.

Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be

given credence as even when private respondent supposedly
"became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the farm,
the latter continued to perform services directly required by his
position as farm administrator.

Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation

regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, as well as
correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back
to work, and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor

Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is
ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding
three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, and in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every
year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one
(1) whole year.

27
 November 29, 1969 G.R. No. L-29543
GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL COURT OF
MANILA and UDHARAM BAZAR CO., respondents-appellees.
Facts:
Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares for recovery of a
certain sum of money. The case was eventually assigned to the sala
of respondent Judge Abad Santos.

In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred that the
defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff qualities of ready made
goods and delivered to her in good condition and same were already
sold, but did not make the full payment up to the present time and
That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85,
representing the balance of her account as the value of the said
goods, which is already overdue and payable.

Instead of answering the complaint against her, Pajares, moved

for a bill of particulars to require Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the
kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said
company.

The inferior court denied the motion of Pajares. Pajares filed a

motion for reconsideration but the motion has been likewise denied.
She then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging respondent Judge Abad Santos acted in grave
abuse of discretion.

The company filed a motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of

certiorari and was granted. A motion for reconsideration was once
again filed but also been denied. The petition went up to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
WON the counsel of Pajares failed in his duty to encourage
amicable settlement or a confession of judgment to accord respect to
the other party’s claim, saving his client additional expenses and help
prevent the clogging of court dockets.

Ruling:
The circumstances obviously show that the appeals are just
tricks of the counsel to delay payment and prolong litigation

28
unnecessarily. It just wasted the time of the court and keeps clogging
the court docket.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and

petitioner-appellant’s counsel shall pay treble costs in all instances.
This decision shall be noted in the personal record of the attorney for
petitioner-appellant in this Court for future reference. So ordered.

29
 [G.R. No. L-36138. January 31, 1974.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

ANTONIO ROSQUETA, JR., EUGENIO ROSQUETA and CITONG
BRINGAS, defendants-appellants; ATTY. GREGORIO B.
ESTACIO, Respondent.

Facts:
On May 25, 1973, the Court required the respondent Atty.
Gregorio B. Estacio, the counsel de parte for appellants to show
cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his
failure to file the brief for the appellants within the period which
expired on March 30, 1973. He failed to show cause as thus required,
and on September 7, 1973, the court issued a resolution which
suspends the respondent from the practice of law except for the
purpose of filing the brief which should be done within thirty days from
receipt of notice. Then on October 22, 1973, he filed a motion to
reconsideration wherein it appeared that he did seek to explain his
failure to file the said brief on time but he left it to be mailed on June
9, 1973 with Antonio Rosqueta, Sr., the father of the appellants, who,
however, was unable to do so as on June 10, his house caught fire.
He said that he is not informed of such occurrence until the
preparation of the motion for reconsideration. On November 5, the
Court required the appellants to comment on a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent concerning specifically their
alleged desire to withdraw their appeal.

Then on December 27, 1973, the respondent submitted two

affidavits, one from Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and from Eusebio
Rosqueta wherein stated that they gave their consent and approval to
respondent’s motion to withdraw the appeal and they gave their
consent and approval voluntarily, without force, threat of fraud.

Respondent’s liability is thus mitigated but he cannot be

absolved from the irresponsible conduct of which he is guilty.

Issue:
WON Atty. Estacio’s suspension should continue.

Ruling:
No, his liability is mitigated. But the Supreme Court noted that
Atty. Estacio has been irresponsible, has been negligent and
inattentive to his duty to his clients. Difficulty in the amount necessary

30
to pursue the appeal, does not necessarily conclude his connection
with the case.
WHEREFORE, the suspension of Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is
lifted. The requirement to file the brief is dispensed with but Atty.
Gregorio B. Estacio is censured for negligence and inattention to
duty. Likewise, as prayed for by appellants themselves, their appeal
is dismissed.

31
 G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL,
LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR.,
respondents.
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by the petitioner
collapsed and destroyed the nearby tailoring shop occupied by the
family of the private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of their daughter, Marissa Bernal. Private
respondents had been warned by the petitioner to vacate their shop
because the wall is already week but the respondents failed to do so.

Base on the facts, the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial

Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
rendered judgement finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was
received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987,
the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed
a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution
of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the
Resolution of October 27, 1987.

The Court finds that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,
1985,138 SCRA 461.

Petitioner contend that the ruling in the Habaluyas case should

not be made to apply to the case since the Habaluyas decision is not
yet publicated in the Official Gazette as of the time that subject
decision of the CA was promulagated.

32
Issue:
WON Supreme Court decisions must be published in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding.

Ruling:
Contrary to the petitioner’s view, there is no law requiring the
publication of the SC in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed

no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible
for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should
be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to

DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

33
 GR No. L-38581, Mar 31, 1976
LORENZO JOSE v. CA
Facts:
On February 8, 1968, at the poblacion of Florida blanca,
Pampanga, petitioner Jose was arrested by the local police leading to
the filing with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III of
several criminal cases against him to wit: illegal discharge of firearm
(Crim. Case 6235), robbery (Crim. Case 6236) and illegal possession
of explosives (Crim. Case 6237). These three cases were jointly tried
after which the trial judge, Hon. Honorio Romero, in a decision dated
December 15, 1969, and promulgated on January 15, 1970 acquitted
accused Lorenzo Jose of illegal discharge of firearm and robbery, but
convicted him for illegal possession of the hand grenade that was
found on his person at the time of his arrest.

After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day

filed his notice of appeal. Nine days thereafter or more particularly on
January 24, 1970, petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be
reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he had
made in the course of the trial, a permit to possess the hand grenade
in question. The trial court in its order of January 30, 1970 denied the
motion mainly on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case
in view of the perfection of the appeal by the accused on the very
date the decision was promulgated.

The record elevated to the CA and Lorenzo prayed for his

acquittal or in alternative for the remand of the case back to the trial
court for a new trial. The second motion for reconsideration is denied.
The appellant Lorenzo filed a petition for Review in the SC which
denied outright.

The Solicitor General opposed the granting of the foregoing

motion for reconsideration claiming that there was neither a denial of
"substantial justice nor error of any sort on the part of respondent
Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of conviction," and that it
being admitted by petitioner that the evidence sought to be
introduced by him at the new trial is not newly discovered evidence,
the denial of the new trial "visibly papers as correct". This Opposition
drew a lengthy reply from petitioner's counsel.

It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted

on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that
(a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not

34
merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to
the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted.

However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new
trial on newly discovered evidence, but rather on broader grounds of
substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

Power of appellate court on appeal. — Upon appeal from a

judgement of the Court of First Instance, the appellate court may
affirm or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty
imposed by the trial court, remand the case into the Court of First
Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.

Issue:
WON there can be new trial.

Ruling:
Yes. This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of
procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice — to
render justice where justice is due to secure to every individual all
possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is
charged. That a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a
sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the
solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt shall not
escape, innocence shall not suffer.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby set aside the

judgment of conviction of the herein petitioner, Lorenzo Jose, and
remand the case to the court a quo for a new trial only for purpose of
allowing said accused to present additional evidence in his defense.
The trial court shall inform this Court of the final outcome of the case
within a reasonable time. Without pronouncement as to costs.

35
 [G.R. No. L-26222. July 21, 1967.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE
JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte; and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO, and
RUFINO BORRES, Respondents.
Dominador L. Padilla for Petitioner.
Narbasa, Tambac Alindo & Borres for Respondents.
Facts:
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the
spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in
Puga-an. City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle,
caliber 22) and pali-untod (home-made gun) were fired in rapid
succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead.
Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house,
entered therein and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza,
Epifania Mendoza and Marcelo Mendoza — all minor children of the
couple — and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.

Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases

heretofore listed — Tomas Narbasa and Tambac Alindo — moved for
a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that
"said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one
impulse."

On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to

reconsider. He took the position that the acts complained of
"stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the
accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one
impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime to the series of
shots killed more than one victim" ; and that only one information for
multiple murder should be filed, to "obviate the necessity of trying five
cases instead of one."

Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of

crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other (delito complejo).

Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot
from a gun results in the death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence
teaches that, in this factual setting, the complex crime defined in the
first part of Article 48 finds application. A similar rule obtains where
one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter's body
through and wounded another. The first died instantaneously; the
36
second, seven days later. This Court convicted the assailant of
double murder. So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and
the bomb explodes, with the result that a number of persons are
killed, that single act again produces a complex crime.

Issue:
WON the fiscal should insist the five criminal cases.

Ruling:
NO. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under
no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or
that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is
hereby granted; the orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and
May 31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void, and, in
consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders;
and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby
directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and
1250 as they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final
determination thereof.
Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo
and Rutino Borres. So ordered.

37
 [G.R. No. L-35133. May 31, 1974.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMUNDO

MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy",
GENEROSO ANDRES @ "Ross", Defendants-Appellants.

Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera.

Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, Et.

Al.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor

General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta
for Appellee.
Facts:
About 2:00 o’clock in the early morning of April 20, 1970, three
men barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino Bana in
Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman,
standing on the first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley of
shots from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on
the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot wounds were
inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on the
abdominal region. Elino Bana did not die immediately. He stood up
and told his wife to call for his brother Conrado who lives not far away
from their house. The victim’s wife fetched Conrado; but when they
returned, the wounded man was no longer at home for he was
already brought to the Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was
carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of
some people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to the
Nueva Ecija General Hospital, but he died on the way that same day,
April 20, 1970.

We affirm the lower court’s finding that the prosecution has

proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo Madera
was the one who fired the shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of
which was the fatal shot, and that appellants Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres were with Madera at the time. Juanito Bana, a son
of the victim, testified that saw the appellant Raymundo Madera
standing on the first step of their stairs holding a .45 caliber firearm.
Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw Raymundo
Madera as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm,
and appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then
with Madera.

In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the

prosecution presented the dying declaration of the victim Elino Bana.

38
The trip from the house of Elino Bana to the Municipal Building took
only about thirty minutes. It was then 3:00 o’clock in the morning. In
said dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and the answer
was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he could not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the
testimony of Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on their way to
the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him that he could not identify
the persons who shot him. Said policeman has been an investigator
in the police force since 1964.
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal
right away the identities of the appellants to the victim himself and to
their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not militate
against their credibility. There is no evidence on record that they were
asked by their relatives about the identity of the appellants. Had they
been asked, they would have readily revealed appellants’ identities
as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon
only a few hours after the fateful incident, during a formal
investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of Police when and
where they executed their respective sworn statements.
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres because the
Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And We agree.
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind
appellant Madera when the latter fired shots at Elino Bana, did not
make them liable for what Madera did, there being no proof
whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three appellants. They were
not armed. They did nothing to help Madera. Their mere passive
presence at the scene of the crime did not make them liable either as
co-principals or accomplices.

Issue:
WON the Solicitor General can recommend acquittel of
Marianito and Generoso.

Ruling:
YES. insofar as Marianito and Generoso is concerned –
Madera’s guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. But Marianito’s
and Generoso’s guilt were not established.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed
with respect to the appellant Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with
1/3 of the cost charged against him; and it is hereby reversed as
regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso
Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby acquitted of the crime charged
with proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release from
confinement is hereby ordered unless they are held for another legal
cause.
39
 A.C. No. 1418. August 31, 1976.

JOSE MISAMIN, Complainant, v. ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN

JUAN, Respondent.
Facts:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila
Police force and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San
Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain
establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and,
what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose
Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his
employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar’s Bakery, for the violation of
the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of
Respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the
part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the
non-appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled
hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor-General to get at the bottom of
things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the
outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law is rather
exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate
proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the
recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed. This is
one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any
choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account
respondent’s practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a
police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the
suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent’s appearance
at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent
police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately he referred to
the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have
been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of
Manila and the National Police Commission." 3 As for the charges
that respondent conspired with complainant’s counsel to mislead
complainant to admitting having received his separation pay and for
giving illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why the Report
of the Solicitor General recommended that they be dismissed for lack
of evidence.

40
Issue:
WON respondent should be held administratively liable.

Ruling:
No. There can only be suspicion that he used his public office,
despite being a public trust, and not his legal knowledge, it shall not
pass being unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a
member of the bar, should refrain from laying himself open to such
doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position
occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy
of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take
care that his honor remains unsullied.
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against
respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having been duly
proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.

41