EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 1

Running Head: EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING

The Effect of Mood on Social and Analytic Problem-Solving: Exploring the Influence of

Cognitively-Orientated Individual Differences Constructs

Aoife De Brun, Kevin Thomas, and Kenneth McKenzie

School of Psychology, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland.

Word count: 3,991.

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Abstract

Whilst research shows that mood can influence problem-solving, the influence of

cognitively-oriented individual differences constructs has not been studied. Also, as efficient

problem-solving can influence one’s adaptive functioning in the social environment, it is

important to examine everyday social problem-solving as well as more abstract analytical

problem-solving. This exploratory study (N = 62) examined the influence of mood on these

dimensions of problem-solving, whilst controlling for pertinent cognitively-orientated

individual differences constructs. Two mood states (sadness and frustration) were induced

using a cued autobiographical life event recall technique, and analytical and social problem-

solving was assessed by graduate-entry to medicine test items and vignettes depicting social

dilemmas, respectively. The individual differences constructs assessed were impulsiveness,

mindfulness, and cognitive failures. Results revealed that mood best predicted analytical

problem-solving, whereas cognitive failures best predicted social problem-solving. The

findings are discussed in relation to the need to further examine the constructs of mindfulness

and cognitive failures and the need to develop an empirically useful analytical problem-

solving set.
 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 3

In recent years, the interplay between emotion and cognition has been the focus of

considerable research (e.g., Caruso & Shafir, 2006; Peters, Västfjäll, Gärling & Slovic, 2006;

Schwarz & Clore, 2003). A number of accounts for the function of affect and the ways in

which it can influence cognition have been proposed. For example, Schwarz and Clore’s

(1983) study regarding the informative functions of affect proposed that individuals employ a

‘How-Do-I-Feel-About-It?’ heuristic to guide decision-making. Their study demonstrated

that people tend to more highly rate their happiness and life satisfaction when in a good mood

than a bad mood. This study led to an increased interest in the role of affect in cognition.

A prevalent finding in such research is that people are inclined to attribute their

affective state to whatever stimulus is the current focus of attention (Pham, 2007). This

attribution is logical when the target stimulus is actually the source of feeling. However,

individuals tend to make this attribution even when the true source of feelings is unrelated to

the focal stimulus (Schwarz & Clore, 2003). The informative role of affect in value

judgements, attention guidance, information-processing, and as a motivator of behaviour has

been demonstrated (Peters et al., 2006).

The role of affect has been recognised within dual-process accounts of reasoning

(e.g., Evans, 2003), which distinguish between two cognitive systems: ‘System 1’ is typically

automatic, rapid, heuristic-like, and experiential; ‘System 2’ is evolutionarily recent, typically

controllable and conscious. ‘System 2’ is considered to involve rational and analytic

processes, whereas ‘System 1’ is thought to have evolved early and relies on prior knowledge

and beliefs. Thus, affect seems closely linked with ‘System 1’ only.

There is a growing body of evidence indicating that positive and negative mood states

elicit qualitatively different information-processing styles (e.g., Cahir & Thomas, 2010; Isen,

2001). It has been demonstrated that mood valence can have a broad influence on cognition
 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 4

and even a slight change in affective state can influence the style and content of information-

processing. For instance, happy moods promote a reliance on global knowledge structures

and a more heuristic, top-down processing style (Schwarz & Clore, 2003). However, positive

moods can also decrease the depth of information-processing and decrease performance in

analytical reasoning tasks (Pham, 2007). In contrast, sad moods appear to promote a bottom-

up, systematic processing style, with a focus on detail. Sad moods have been found to

increase the precision with which people process information and decrease the reliance on

general knowledge structures (Schwarz & Clore, 2003).

However, not all negative moods activate this systematic form of processing. While

some researchers argue that the valence of affect is important (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983;

Isen, 2001), others contend that positive and negative affective states do not necessarily have

contrasting effects on cognition (Caruso & Shafir, 2006). Caruso and Shafir argue that

making any mood valence salient results in a similar impact on decision-making and merely

attending to emotion influences cognition. This is also relevant for problem-solving as

research has indicated that moods can affect information-processing, decision-making and

problem-solving in similar ways. For instance, following an extensive research on positive

moods, Isen (2001) contends that affect can broadly affect cognition and influence how we

think and solve problems.

As pointed out by Raghunathan and Pham (1999), a limitation of research in this field

is that very few studies have addressed specific emotions, even of the same valence, and their

possible distinct effects on cognition. The ‘Appraisal Tendency Framework’ (Lerner &

Keltner, 2000) expands on the feelings-as-information approach (Schwarz & Clore, 1983),

proposing that cognition and thinking styles commonly reflect the appraisal-tendency

underpinning the emotion being experienced. Specifically, appraisal tendencies are goal-

directed processes through which emotions influence cognition. For instance, Lerner and
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Keltner (2001) demonstrated that discrete emotions of the same valence (anger and fear) can

influence cognition by exerting opposite effects on judgement and decision-making.

Likewise, Raghunathan and Pham (1999) found that sadness and anxiety resulted in distinct

effects on decision-making outcomes. Lerner and Keltner (2001) suggest that certain

emotions give rise to specific cognitive and motivational processes, which account for the

effects of each emotion upon problem-solving and judgement.

Social problem-solving has long been investigated as a measure of how we deal with

issues encountered in everyday life (Platt & Spivack, 1975). Social-problem solving refers to

the process of ‘real-world’ and everyday problem-solving and influences one’s adaptive

functioning in the social environment (D’Zurilla, Nezu, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2004). Social

problem-solving sets have been employed successfully to assess how mood affects

information-processing strategies and decision-making (e.g., Platt & Spivack, 1975).

Typically, such problem sets outline intrapersonal (emotional or health) problems and

interpersonal problems (e.g., interpersonal conflicts) to test an individual’s ability to work

through a series of steps to reach a specified goal (D'Zurilla et al., 2004). However, a concern

with such measures is the lack of ecologically-valid, modern social problem sets suitable for

young people. Recent practices of relying on the criterion group to generate and score

problems shows great promise (Gilhooly, Gilhooly, Phillips, Harvey, Brady, & Hanlon,

2007).

In contrast, analytical problems test an individual’s rational and deliberative

reasoning. Typically, analytical problems require effortful and thorough analysis to arrive at

the correct solution. Such problems are similar to syllogistic reasoning problems, which is a

form of deductive reasoning comprising a major statement and a minor statement and a

premise relating to the two previous statements (Evans, 2003). Typically, participants’ have

to indicate what conclusion, if any, can be drawn from the problem. For the present study, we
 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 6

were interested in deductive reasoning problems that were relevant to real-life and that had

one correct answer.

Clearly, there is considerable evidence of the influence of mood on cognition, but

research also suggests there may be substantial variation in people’s performance on

cognitive tasks (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000). Gasper and Clore (2000) contend that

individual variation in cognition and emotional attention is informative and should therefore

be studied. Variation in emotional processing and reactivity has been shown to influence

cognition and therefore may influence problem-solving (Peters & Slovic, 2000). Furthermore,

there are individual differences in the tendency toward cognitive slips, which have been

shown to be related to factors such as overload of short-term memory capacity and reduced

attention (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982). Stanovich and West (2000)

suggest that individual differences could have implications for performance on reasoning

tasks. Research has also indicated that impulsiveness is positively related to deficits in social

problem-solving (McMurran, Blair, & Egan, 2002).

Individual differences might also be evident in awareness and monitoring of feelings

(Pham, 2007). This ‘mindfulness’ may be broadly defined as bringing one’s attention to the

experiences occurring in the moment (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004). The assessment of

mindfulness may function as an appropriate control when examining the effect of mood on

cognition. For instance, Gasper and Clore (2000) found that individuals who regularly inspect

their emotions (i.e., those high in emotional attention) are more likely to rely on such feelings

when making a decision than those who are low in emotional attention. According to

Stanovich and West (1998), individual difference is one aspect of performance that has

largely been neglected within cognitive research of this nature. They argue there may be

important implications in aspects of performance that have been ignored in the controversy

about reasoning processes and is therefore something which must be studied.

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Despite a few exceptions, differences in problem-solving performance emerging from

affective states of the same valence, and the consideration of individual differences in

problem-solving, have been overlooked. Given this situation, this study sought to examine

the effect of mood and certain pertinent cognitively-orientated individual differences

constructs on two different types of problem-solving.

Sad moods have been found to elicit greater attention to detail and therefore promote

analytical reasoning (Spering, Wagener, & Funke, 2005). Conversely, individuals in a sad

mood typically do not perform as well on social problems (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-

Hoeksema, 1995). The affective state of frustration is often described as the blockage of goal

attainment and thus often identified as a component of, and a precursor to, anger (Berkowitz

& Harmon-Jones, 2004). According to Lerner and Tiedens (2006), anger can result in a

decrease in the depth of information-processing and an increase in the dependence on

heuristic information-processing strategies, seemingly because states of anger and frustration

create an impression of certainty. Therefore, anger seems to produce outcomes more similar

to a positive mood than a negative mood state. From such research, the following hypothesis

was formulated.

Hypothesis I: Mood state will differentially influence problem-solving performance,

such that the sad mood condition will perform better on the analytic problems and the

frustrated mood condition will perform better on the social problems.

Two further hypotheses were formulated regarding the ability of social and analytical

problem-solving performance to be predicted by certain pertinent individual differences

constructs and mood state. As it is very difficult to account for every possible pertinent

individual difference construct, there will be a focus on three constructs that have been

recognised as potentially influential, namely, mindfulness, impulsiveness and the tendency to

 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 8

make cognitive failures (Gasper & Clore, 2000; McMurran et al., 2002; Stanovich & West,

2000).

Hypothesis II. Mood will explain the most variance in performance on both

dimensions of problem-solving.

Hypothesis III. Mindfulness, cognitive failures, and impulsiveness will influence

performance on both dimensions of problem-solving.

Method

Design

A 3 (mood: neutral, frustration, sadness) x 2 (problem-type: social, analytical)

between-groups design was employed. Performance on the social and analytical problems

was the main dependent measure, with the other measures being the individual differences

constructs (mindfulness, cognitive failures and impulsiveness).

Participants

Sixty-two students from a major university in Ireland (28 male, 34 female)

participated voluntarily in exchange for psychology course credit. Participants were aged 18

to 25 (M = 20.6) years.

Materials

Individual differences constructs

Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-15; Spinella, 2007)

This 15 item measure employs a 4-point Likert-type scale. The items form three

discrete scales (non-planning, motor impulsiveness, and attention impulsiveness) that

 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 9

demonstrate good reliability both previously (Spinella, 2007) and among the present sample

(Cronbach’s s = .82 and .78, respectively). A total score of impulsiveness was computed.

Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982)

This 25-item scale determines a person’s tendency toward failures in memory,

perception, and motor function. It has been found to be a reliable measure of everyday

cognitive performance with high reliability (Broadbent et al., 1982). The response format is

via a 5-point Likert-type scale. Only the ‘Distractibility’ subscale (9 items) was employed in

the current study as it was the only subscale of interest; it yielded Cronbach’s  of .74. A

total score of cognitive failures was computed.

Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness (KIMS; Baer et al., 2004)

This 39-item scale uses a 5-point Likert-type scale to determine the tendency to be

mindful in daily life. The items form four sub-scales; ‘Observe’, ‘Describe’, ‘Act With

Awareness’, and ‘Accept Without Judgment’. In this study, the sub-scale of ‘Act Without

Awareness’ was omitted to reduce the questionnaire to 29 items, as physical aspects of

mindfulness were not of interest. The KIMS has displayed good internal consistency

previously (Baer et al., 2004) and among the present sample (Cronbach’s s = .8 and .78,

respectively). A total score of mindfulness was computed.

Mood induction technique

Participants rated how they felt before and after the cued autobiographical recall

mood-induction technique. To avoid directly revealing moods of interest, a self-report scale

comprising six emotion terms (amusement, sadness, happiness, fear, surprise, frustration) was

used, although the only scales of interest were sadness and frustration. Participants rated each

emotion on a 9-point Likert scale.

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Analytical problem-solving task

BioMedical Admissions Test (BMAT; University of Cambridge, 2005)

This draws upon generic academic skills to discriminate effectively among applicants

for university medical training courses. Two analytical reasoning items from this test

assessing verbal and mathematical reasoning were employed1. There were five multiple

choice answers presented and participants were asked to provide an account of steps taken to

achieve the given answer or to provide an attempt at working the problem out. Responses and

‘rough work’ were coded using a three-point scale by one author and another researcher who

was ‘blind’ to the study. Inter-rater agreement was high between coders for both problems

and simple agreement ranged from between 93-97% (Cohen’s Κ = .89 and .94, respectively).

Social problem-solving task

A six-member student panel was assembled to generate a selection of typical

scenarios that university students in Ireland could relate to. Two short social problem

vignettes were developed through brainstorming with students from a comparable university

in Ireland. The vignettes outlined problems relating to interaction with a lecturer in university

and regarding balancing time between two groups of friends. Participants were asked to give

an account of steps they would take to achieve the stated goal. Each solution was rated for

quality and perceived efficacy on a 3-point scale by the panel. Inter-rater agreement between

the six coders varied and average pairwise agreement ranged from between 63-72% (Fleiss'

Κ = .56 and .42, respectively). The average of all scores was the dependent measure.

Procedure

The study was administered via an online survey, which was constructed so that

participants were assigned randomly to one of three mood conditions; frustration (n = 22),
 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 11

sadness (n = 20), or control/neutral (n = 20) and to one of the six (mood*problem) groups.

Participants were informed that they would be taking part in a study which examined the

manner in which people’s feelings influence their ability to solve problems. The survey items

were presented in the same order to each condition; the only difference being the phrasing of

the ‘personal story’ cue to induce mood. Order of item presentation was held constant as the

various measures administered were deemed dissimilar enough for carry-over effects not to

be an issue. The mood induction technique comprised an autobiographical event concerning a

neutral/control (‘briefly describe your day yesterday’), sad (‘event or moment that made you

very sad or feel very depressed’), or frustrated mood (‘something you had planned that did

not work out’). A mood manipulation check was administered before and after the mood

induction technique was administered. All participants then solved two social then two

analytical problems. Scales measuring the individual differences constructs were

administered to all participants in the following order: mindfulness, cognitive failures, and

impulsiveness.

Results

Mood Manipulation Check

The difference between ratings on the sadness and frustration emotion scales before

and after the mood induction technique was calculated. Ratings before were subtracted from

the ratings after so that positive scores indicated more intense emotions after the mood

induction technique. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on sadness difference scores

produced a main effect, F (2,59) = 6.03, MSE = 1.51, p < .01, η2 = .17, which revealed that

scores were positive in the sadness and frustration groups (Ms = 1.2 and .55, respectively) but

negative in the control group (M = -.15). Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed a

difference between the sadness and control groups only (p < .05). Given that scores were
 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 12

highest (furthest from zero) in the sadness group, it seems that the mood induction technique

was successful for this group. An ANOVA on frustration difference scores produced no main

effect, F (2,59) = 1.64, MSE = 1.61, p > .10, η2 = .03, with scores being highest in the

frustration group (M = .50) followed by the control group (M = .15) and the sadness group

(M = -.05). Although self-reported frustration was highest in frustration group, inter-group

differences were not reliable.

Effect of Mood on Problem-Solving

This was examined using linear trend analyses. The linear trend analysis for social

problem-solving did not prove significant, F(1,59) = .05, p > .1 , η 2 = .001. Although, as

predicted, the sadness group achieved the lowest overall score (M = 1.05), which was lower

than both the control group (M = 1.21) and the frustration group (M = 1.17). The linear trend

analysis for analytical problem-solving was not significant, F(1,59) = 1.72, p > .1 η 2 = .03.

However, again the expected trend was observed, as the sadness group (M = 1.28) achieved a

score higher than the control group (M = 1.05) yet the frustration group achieved the highest

overall score (M = 1.34).

Predictive Ability of Mood and Individual Differences on Problem-Solving

This was assessed using a hierarchical multiple regression2. The mood factor was

entered in the first block, followed by CFQ score, KIMS score, and BIS-15 score. For the

analytical problems, the results were as follows. After Step 1, with the predictor of mood in

the equation, R2 = .03, F (2,59) = .93, p > .05. After Step 2, with cognitive failures,

mindfulness, and impulsiveness added to the prediction of analytical problem-solving score

by mood, R2 = .06 (Adjusted R2 = .02), F (5,56) = .72, p > .05. Predictors in the model failed

to reliably explain the variance in analytical problem-solving scores. Although the mood
 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 13

predictors achieved the largest standardised regression coefficients, their magnitudes were

not large enough to contribute reliably to the model.

Another hierarchical multiple regression was carried out to assess the predictive

ability of mood, impulsiveness, mindfulness, and the tendency to make cognitive failures to

predict social problem-solving. Mood was entered in the first block, followed by CFQ score,

KIMS score, and BIS-15 score. The results were as follows. After Step 1, with the predictor

of mood in the equation, R2 = .02, F (2,59) = .55, p > .05. After Step 2, with cognitive

failures, mindfulness, and impulsiveness added to the prediction of social problem-solving

score by mood, R2 = .07 (Adjusted R2 = -.01), F (5,56) = .87, p > .05. The best predictor in the

model was score on the CFQ, β = -.22. Although the CFQ predictor achieved the largest

standardised regression coefficient, it did not contribute to the model reliably.

Discussion

It was predicted that sad and frustrated mood states would differentially influence

social and analytical problem-solving. Specifically, the sadness mood group would score

higher on analytical problems (Spering, Wagener, & Funke, 2005) and lower on social

problems (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), whereas the reverse would occur for the

frustration mood group (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). The mood induction technique was

successful for the sadness group, not the frustration group. However, although the frustration

group reported the highest level of frustration, the inter-group difference was not reliable.

Although the expected trend in scores was observed among the mood groups for the

social problems, the difference was not reliable. This (albeit non-significant) trend concurs

with the predictions of the appraisal tendency framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000) and the

affect-as-information hypothesis (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2005). For the analytical

problems, although there was no effect of mood, the sadness group achieved a higher score
 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 14

than the control group, as predicted. The lack of an effect of mood was contrary to our

prediction.

Mood, impulsiveness, mindfulness, and cognitive failures did not predict social and

analytical problem-solving. However as hypothesised, mood was the best predictor of

problem-solving performance, which concurs with previous research (e.g., Lyubomirsky, &

Nolen-Hoeksema; Spering et al., 2005). Despite the present finding, it is interesting to note

that the CFQ achieved the largest standardised regression coefficient in relation to social

problem-solving, indicating a link between cognitive failures and social problem-solving.

While no conclusions can be drawn about the impact of cognitive failures on social problem-

solving, its potential influence is worthy of further investigation.

The regression analyses yielded different results from previous research (e.g. Lerner

& Tiedens, 2006). The failure of mood to explain the variance in both types of problem-

solving is puzzling given the well-established effect of mood on cognition (e.g., Pham, 2007).

One possible reason for the present finding is that the mood induction technique was not

powerful enough. While a reliable sadness mood effect was observed for the sadness group,

no such effect occurred for the frustration group. Arguably, the autobiographical memory cue

was not as explicit for the frustration group and thus did not have the same power as the cue

for the sadness group.

A possible reason for the failure to detect the highest frustration scores in the

frustration group is participants’ mindfulness and emotional awareness. Data from the KIMS

revealed that the frustration group scored lower and displayed more variation (M = 89.18, SD

= 13.7) than the control group (M = 97.8, SD = 11.62). This may account for the failure to

induce the desired mood state, as people who have higher emotional awareness tend to rely

more heavily on feelings when thinking than people who are lower in emotional awareness
 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 15

(Gasper & Clore, 2000). Although the autobiographical memory mood-induction technique

we used had been shown to be effective (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996), the

inclusion of an instruction to visualise the event or memory in the ‘personal story’ prompt

may have been more effective to induce frustration.

A potential limitation of the study was the provision of multiple-choice answers for

the analytical problems. Presumably, some participants randomly guessed correct answers.

Regrettably, there appears to be no analytical reasoning problem set that has been established

and widely-used in studies of mood and cognition. The development of such a problem set

would be beneficial to future research and its use could effectively differentiate the influence

of discrete moods on problem-solving. Regarding social problem tasks, a number exist,

although some have proven more popular than others (D’Zurilla et al., 2004). However,

Gilhooly et al.’s (2007) attempt to use a sample from the target population to generate and

score social problems is a technique with considerable promise. Arguably, it provides the best

assessment of problem-solving ability in target populations.

The key strength of the study was to begin to address a gap in the literature.

Specifically, although researchers agree that trying to clarify the impact of individual

differences on problem-solving is worthy of empirical investigation (Gasper & Clore, 2000;

Stanovich & West, 1998), studies into the role of cognitively-orientated individual

differences and different dimensions of problem-solving are scarce. The few studies that exist

show great promise in increasing our understanding of these factors (e.g., Gasper & Clore,

2000). However, the extent to which pertinent individual differences constructs can

contribute to and influence problem-solving remains unclear. Future research must account

for these factors to fully comprehend the interplay between mood and cognition. Constructs

that may well prove important in future research include mindfulness and cognitive slips.
 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 16

The study found that mood best predicted analytical problem-solving, whereas

cognitive failures best predicted social problem-solving. This study highlights the need to

consider individual differences within mood and cognition research. For instance, future

research is required to further examine the constructs of mindfulness and cognitive failures

and there is a need to develop an empirically-useful analytical problem-solving set for use in

studies of this nature.

 EFFECT OF MOOD ON PROBLEM SOLVING 17

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Footnotes
1
All experimental items employed are available upon request from the first author.

2
Mood group was coded for suitability in regression analyses using dummy variables, with the sadness

and frustration groups being contrasted with the control group.