Special Proceedings Case Digests Further Digested Version Judge Palamos PDF

SAN BEDA ALABANG - School of Law
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
2nd Semester, AY 2019-2020
Judge Gina Bibat-Palamos
FINALS PERIOD - CASE LIST
Rules 72-90
1. Buot vs. Dujali (G.R. No. 199885; October 2, 2017)

2. Gilda Jardeleza (deceased) substituted by her heirs vs. Spouses Melecio and
Elizabeth Jardeleza, JMB Traders Inc and Teodoro Jardeleza (G.R. No. 167975;
June 17, 2015)
3. MIMCO and heirs of Edward Marcelo vs. Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. (G.R. No. 209651;
November 26, 2014)
4. Guevarra vs. Guevarra (74 Phil 749)
5. Uy vs. Lee (G.R. No. 176831; January 15, 2010)
6. Codoy vs. Calugay (G.R. No. 123486; August 12, 1999)
7. Pastor vs. CA (G.R. No. 56340; June 24, 1983
8. Nuguid vs. Nuguid (G.R. No. L-23445; June 23, 1966)
9. Nepomuceno vs. CA (G.R. No. L-62952; August 6, 1980)
10. Pizarro vs. CA (G.R. No. L-31979; August 6, 1980)
11. Bermudo vs. Tayag-Roxas (G.R. No. 172879; February 2, 2011)
12. Metrobank vs. Absolute Management Corp (G.R. No. 170498; January 9, 2013)
13. Alan Joseph Sheker vs. Estate of Alice Sheker (G.R. No. 157912; December 13,
2007)
14. Gabatan vs. CA (G.R. No. 150206; March 13, 2009)
15. Valarao vs. Pascual (G.R. No. 150164; November 26, 2002)
16. Union Bank vs. Santibanez (452 SCRA 220)
17. Jamero vs. Nelicor (G.R. No. 140929; May 26, 2005)
18. Lee vs. RTC of Quezon City (G.R. No. 146006; February 23, 2004)
19. Heirs of Hilano Ruiz vs. Edmond Ruiz (G.R. No. 119671)
20. San Luis vs. San Luis (G.R. No. 133743; February 6, 2007)
21. Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino Briones (G.R. No. 150175; February 5, 2007)
22. Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen (G.R. No. 189121, 2013)
Rule 91 - Escheat
23. Alvarico vs. Sola (G.R. No. 138953; June 6, 2002)

24. Caro vs. Sucaldito (G.R. No. 157536; May 16, 2005)
Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Disclaimer: (for yellow pad purposes only, not for reviewing) this is a further digested version of another case pool with the following:
Antonio | Añover | Castillo | Dela Cruz | Devaras | Gagajena | Laxamana | Martinez | Reyes | Sanchez | Soriano
Rules 92-97 - Guardians and Guardianship
25. Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo (G.R. No. 147148)

26. Abad vs. Biason (G.R. No. 191993; December 5, 2012)
27. Oropesa vs. Oropesa (G.R. No. 184528; April 25, 2012) 
Rules 99-100 - Adoption and Custody of Minors
28. Cang vs. CA (G.R. No. 105308; September 25, 1998)

29. Vda. De Jacob vs. CA (G.R. No. 135216; August 19, 1999)
30. Republic vs. Hon. Jose Hernandez (G.R. No. 117209; February 9, 1996)
31. Republic vs. CA (G.R. No. 103695; March 1996)
32. In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorgia-Garcia (G.R. No. 148311; March 31,
2005)
33. SSS vs. Aguas (G.R. No. 165546; February 27, 2006)
34. Landingin vs. Republic (G.R. No. 164948; June 27, 2006) 

Rules 72-90
1. Jesusa Dujali Buot vs. Roque Rasay Dujali (G.R. No. 199885; October 2, 2017)
FACTS:
Buot filed for administration of the estate of Gregorio Dujali who died intestate. Buot
alleged she was a surviving heir. Roque Dujali opposed, stating that Buot failed to prove
her filiation. Buot presented a copy of the amended extrajudicial settlement which
included Buot and Dujali as Gregorio's heirs. The RTC agreed with Dujali, stating there
are two exceptions to the requirement that the settlement of an estate should be
judicially administered: (1) extrajudicial settlement; and (2) summary settlement of an
estate of small value. Here, administration is barred as Gregorio's estate was already
settled extrajudicially.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC properly dismissed the petition on ground that there has
already been an extrajudicial settlement.
HELD:
Yes. When one dies intestate, their estate may be subject to judicial administration
proceedings. The exception is provided in Section 1 of Rule 74. The provision does not
prevent the heirs from instituting administration proceedings if they have good reason to
choose not to file an action for partition. Where partition is possible, the estate should
not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons which depends on the circumstances of each case. Buot’s reasons do not
qualify as good and compelling to submit Gregorio’s estate to administration
proceedings.

2. Gilda Jardeleza (deceased) substituted by her heirs vs. Spouses Melecio and
Elizabeth Jardeleza, JMB Traders Inc., and Teodoro Jardeleza (G.R. No. 167975;
June 17, 2015)
FACTS:
Sps. Gilda and Ernesto Jardeleza filed a civil action against Sps. Melecio and Elizabeth
Jardeleza, JMB Traders and Teodoro Jardeleza. Ernesto died and special proceedings
were filed with Teodoro as administrator. Teodoro filed a motion to dismiss the civil
action, stating that Melecio was also an heir of Ernesto so the properties in the action
for reconveyance should be advanced in his inheritance and the action should be heard
in the special proceedings before the RTC. The motion to dismiss was granted. Gilda
sought reconsideration, stating that the RTC, as probate court, cannot determine
ownership of the property, so the motion to dismiss should not have been granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC, as a probate court, can resolve issues of ownership.
HELD:
Yes. The probate court may decide prima facie the ownership of the property, but such
determination is not final and is without prejudice to the right of interested parties to
ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action, in the following instances: (1.)
When the claimants to the property are all heirs of the deceased and they agree to
submit the question for determination by the probate court and the interests of third
parties are not prejudiced; or (2.) When the purpose is to determine whether or not
certain properties should be included in the inventory. The determination is provisional,
not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title by
a court of competent jurisdiction.

3. MIMCO and heirs of Edward Marcelo vs. Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. (G.R. No. 209651;
November 26, 2014)
FACTS:
Jose Sr., died intestate and was survived by four compulsory heirs: Edward, George,
Helen and Jose, Jr. MIMCO filed a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration
of the estate of Jose, Sr., in the RTC. The RTC appointed Helen and Jose, Jr., as
special administrators. Edward was appointed as regular administrator. RTC approved
the proposed partition. Edward died, Jose, Jr., moved to revive the intestate
proceedings, and moved for his appointment as new regular administrator, the RTC
approved. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and moved for appointment of
George as administrator.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appointment of a regular administrator is necessary at this
stage of the intestate proceedings; and
2. Whether or not Jose, Jr.’s previous non-appointment as regular administrator bars
his appointment even in lieu of Edward who died. 
HELD:
1. Yes. The settlement of the estate is not complete. It is at the liquidation, partition
and distribution stage, governed by Rule 90 which provides that no distribution is
allowed until payment of the obligations. The inheritance tax is an obligation of
the estate, indirectly the heirs.  
2. Yes. Jose, Jr., was declared unfit and unsuitable to administer his father’s estate.
Under Section 6, Rule 78, since George is the eldest son of Jose, Sr., and his
most immediate kin, he was chosen by the other heirs of Jose, Sr., to perform the
functions of an administrator. 

4. Ernesto M. Guevara vs. Rosario Guevara and her Husband Pedro Buison (G.R.
No. L-48840; December 29, 1943) (74 Phil 749)
FACTS:
Victorino Guevara died testate, his will was not presented to court for probate, nor was
there any administration proceeding for settlement of estate. His legitimate son,
Ernesto, possessed the land adjudicated to him and disposed of various portions to pay
debts left by Victorino. Rosario Guevara presented a will of Victorino to the court, not for
the purpose of probate, but to prove that Victorino acknowledged her as his natural
daughter. She claimed her share of the inheritance, assuming that he died intestate,
because the will had not been probated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not probate is necessary for Rosario to be able to claim her legitime as an
acknowledged natural daughter.
HELD:
Yes. Section 5, Rule 77 provides: (1.) No will shall pass real or personal estate, unless
probated by court; and (2.) The probate of a will, a proceeding in rem, cannot be
dispensed with or substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial without
offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of
his property by will and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will
through means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal
notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees.

5. Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee (G.R. No. 176831; January 15, 2010)
FACTS:
Nixon Lee’s father died and left a holographic will in custody of Lee’s mother, Uy Kiao
Eng. Lee filed a petition for mandamus in the RTC to compel his mother to produce the
will so that probate proceedings for its allowance could be instituted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy.
RULING:
No. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of as there is another plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Lee has a photocopy of the will and
seeks production of the original for purposes of probate. Under Rule 76, Section 1, he
may institute probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in
his possession or not. Another remedy is available under Rule 75, Sections 2-5, on
production of the original holographic will.

6. Eugina Ramonal Codoy, and Manuel Ramonal vs. Evangline R. Calugay,
Josephine Salcedo, and Eufemia Patigas (G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999)
FACTS:
Calugay, Salcedo and Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of Matilde
Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the RTC, a petition for probate of holographic will.
Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal opposed the petition, alleging that the
will was forged and illegible. Petitioners filed a demurrer, claiming respondents failed to
establish sufficient basis for probate, the RTC granted it. The CA allowed the will to
probate and disregarded the requirement of 3 witnesses in case of contested
holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson, where the requirement is
merely directory and not mandatory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are merely directory and
not mandatory.
HELD:
No. Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. Article 811 provides, as a requirement for
the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least 3 witnesses explicitly declare
that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator. The word “shall”
connotes a mandatory order. We cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document
being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is
contested, that law requires 3 witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of
the deceased.

7. Pastor vs. CA (G.R. No. 56340; June 24, 1983)
FACTS:
Sps. Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio died. Their children were Pastor Jr., Sofia Pastor, and
Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of the holographic
will of Pastor Sr., with the CFI. It contained only one testamentary disposition, a legacy
to Quemada of Pastor Sr.’s shares in ATLAS. Quemada was appointed as special
administrator of the entire estate whether or not covered by the will. Quemada filed
against Sps. Pastor an action for reconveyance of properties of the estate. The probate
court allowed the will to probate. The CA affirmed. The SC remanded the petition to the
probate court. During pendency of the reconveyance suit in another court, the probate
court issued an order of execution and garnishment, resolving the question of
ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling the legacy to Quemada as not
inofficious.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity.
HELD:
No. In probate proceedings, the issue is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. The
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality. To determine whether or not certain property should be included in
inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.

8. Nuguid vs. Nuguid (G.R. No. L-23445; June 23, 1966)
FACTS:
Rosario died. She was survived by her parents, Felix and Paz Salonga, and her siblings
Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto. Remedios filed in the CFI
a petition to admit to probate a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario, 11 years
before her death. Felix and Paz Salonga opposed the probate of her will on ground that
by instituting Remedios as the universal heir, the compulsory heirs in the direct
ascending line were illegally preterited and thus the institution is void. The CFI held that
the will is void and thus would create intestacy of the estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will should be allowed probate.
HELD:
Yes. The court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the
extrinsic validity of the will. The court at this stage is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity of the will. In this case however, the question of whether or not the will
should be allowed probate must be answered. Here, the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will are practical considerations that induce the court to believe that we might as well
meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will. After all, there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.

9. Nepomuceno vs. CA (G.R. No. L-62952; August 6, 1980)
FACTS:
Jugo died testate, with Nepomuceno as executor. Nepomuceno filed a petition for the
probate of Jugo’s will. The legal wife of Jugo, Gomez, opposed and alleged that the
execution of the will was procured by undue and improper influence by Nepomuceno,
Jugo was very sick and Nepomuceno lived in concubinage with him. The CFI denied
probate of the will on ground that Jugo admitted in his will of cohabitation with
Nepomuceno. The CA declared the will as valid except the devise in favor of
Nepomuceno is null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court validly ruled on the intrinsic validity of the will.
HELD:
Yes. The general rule in probate proceedings is that the court's area of inquiry is limited
to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. An exception is that
the probate court is not powerless to pass upon certain provisions of the will. Applying
the ruling in Nuguid v. Nuguid, a will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, is null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic
validity is unnecessary.

10. Pizarro vs. CA (G.R. No. L-31979; August 6, 1980)
FACTS:
Pizzaro Sr. died. The court appointed Corias as administrator. Corias filed a motion for
authority to sell properties to settle the debts of the estate, this was approved. The heirs
filed a motion for cancellation or rescission of conditional contract of sale, which was
denied. The heirs contended: (1.) Corias took advantage of the name and influence of
the Judge and induced Angliongto to purchase the lot at a much higher price; (2.) The
sale contained an impossible condition which was the ejectment of the tenants before a
certain date; (3.) There was connivance between Corias and the Angliongto with the
knowledge of the Judge and Atty. Salvador; and (4.) They suffered actual and moral
damages because of the sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred when it refused to order the rescission of the sale.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners sought to rescind the sale for failure of the buyers to pay the full
amount, a valid ground for rescission. That cause of action was within the judicial
competence and authority of the trial court with exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
cases the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was beyond
the jurisdictional bounds of the probate court whose main province is the settlement of
the estate. The trial court has to take cognizance of and hear the rescission case. It was
a reversible error for the CA to have upheld its dismissal.

11. Bermudo vs. Tayag-Roxas (G.R. No. 172879; February 2, 2011)
FACTS:
Atty. Bermudo, as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of the
estate of Hilario and for the allowance and probate of the latter's will. The RTC allowed
the will and recognized Roxas as Hilario's sole heir. Atty. Bermudo also served as
counsel for Roxas in the actions concerning her inheritance and filed a motion to fix his
legal fees and to constitute a charging lien against the estate for the legal services he
rendered. RTC granted him fees of 20% of the estate and constituted the same as lien
on the estate's property. Roxas opposed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorney's fees.
HELD:
Yes. Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorney's fees but only to
compensation as administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of
Court. But Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also
served as Roxas' counsel in the suit that assailed her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo
brought the contest all the way up to this Court to defend her rights to her uncle's estate
and succeeded. Acting as counsel in the suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as
administrator of the estate.

12. Metrobank vs. Absolute Management Corporation (G.R. No. 170498; January
9, 2013)
FACTS:
SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made advance payments to AMC which was given
to Chua, AMC’s General Manager. Chua died and a special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was commenced. SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s
death, for allegedly undelivered items. In its answer AMC averred that it had no
knowledge of Chua’s transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any money from the
latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case
it is adjudged liable to SHCI. The RTC categorized Metrobank’s allegation in the fourth-
party complaint as a kind of quasi-contract that mandates recovery of what has been
improperly paid. As such a claim, it should have been filed in a Special Proceeding not
before the RTC as a fourth-party complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed pursuant to
Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that a claim for necessary expenses spent as previous possessor
of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. According to the CA, Metrobank’s fourth-party
complaint embodies the concept "solutio indebiti" which arises when something is
delivered through mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates the
latter to return what has been received through mistake. In sum, Metrobank's claim in its
fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate is based on quasi-contract. It is also a
contingent claim that depends on another event. Both belong to the category of claims
against a deceased person that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court and, as such, should have been so filed in Special Proceedings.

13. Alan Joseph Sheker vs. Estate of Alice Sheker (G.R. No. 157912; December 13,
2007)
FACTS:
The RTC admitted to probate Alice Sheker’s holographic will and ordered all creditors to
file their claims against the estate. Alan Sheker filed a contingent claim for agent's
commission due him in the event of the sale of parcels of land of the estate, and
reimbursement for expenses for negotiating the sales. The executrix moved to dismiss
the money claim on the grounds that (1) the docket fee under Section 7(a), Rule 141
had not been paid; (2) Alan did not attach certification against non-forum shopping; and
(3) Alan did not attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and
served personally. The RTC dismissed the claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal
filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim.
HELD:
Yes. Certification against non-forum shopping is required for initiatory pleadings. Here,
the probate proceeding was initiated upon filing of a petition for allowance of the
decedent's will. A money claim is an incidental matter in the main action for settlement
of an estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a
separate action for a mere contingent claim. Alan's contingent money claim, not being
an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping. The
RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement
of a written explanation for non-personal service in the interest of substantial justice.

14. Heirs of Gabatan vs. CA and Lourdes Evero Pacana (G.R. No. 150206; March
13, 2009)
FACTS:
Lourdes alleged in her complaint that she is the sole owner of the property, having
inherited it from her mother, Hermogena, who she claimed was the only child of Juan
and Laureana. In their answer, Gabatan denied Lourdes' claim. He alleged that Juan
Gabatan died single and Juan was survived by three siblings, namely: Teofilo, Macaria
and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs inherited land from Juan Gabatan and have
been in possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue on Lourdes’ heirship can be resolved in the same civil action
for recovery of ownership and possession of property.
HELD:
Yes. The only property in the estate is the Caloocan parcel of land. To subject it to a
special proceeding would be against expediency. To establish the status of petitioners
as heirs is impractical and burdensome to the estate with costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. There is no compelling reason to subject the estate to
administration proceedings as a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners. The trial court should proceed to evaluate
the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.

15. Valarao vs. Pascual (G.R. No. 150164; November 26, 2002)
FACTS:
Felicidad Pascual died. Her holographic will was submitted for probate and was denied.
Intestate settlement proceeded. Valarao moved for her appointment as special
administratrix which was approved. Diaz also asked for his appointment as special co-
administrator, but was denied. Respondents opposed Valarao’s appointment on ground
that she was not authorized to dispossess the heirs of their rightful custody of properties
without proof that the properties were being dissipated by them, and the possessory
right of Valarao had already been exercised by her "constructively" when the heirs on
her side took possession of the estate supposedly in her behalf.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Valarao was proper.
RULING:
Yes. There is no requirement for a special administrator to take possession of the estate
only upon a prior finding that the heirs have been wasting properties of the estate which
are in their possession. The law authorizes him to take possession of the properties in
whatever state they are, provided he does so to preserve them for the regular
administrator appointed afterwards. Clearly, the special administrator enjoys not merely
subsidiary possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but the
primary and independent discretion of keeping them so they may be preserved for
regular administration.

16. Union Bank vs. Santibanez (452 SCRA 220)
FACTS:
First Countryside Credit Corporation and Efraim Santibañez entered into 2 loans to buy
tractors, evidenced by a promissory note executed by Efraim with his son, Edmund.
Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Edmund was appointed as special administrator
of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the heirs agreed to divide
and possess the 3 tractors. Two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) for Florence. Each
would assume the debts of Efraim to FCCC, corresponding to each tractor taken by
them. FCCC then assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
ISSUE:
Whether the partition in the agreement executed by the heirs is valid.
RULING:
No. In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated. Unless a will is probated and notice is given to the whole world,
the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be void. The authentication of
a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator
and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for
the validity of a will. The agreement between Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors among themselves, is invalid, especially since at the time of its execution, there
was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will
covering the said tractors.

17. Margarito Jamero vs. Achilles Melicor (G.R. No. 140929; May 26, 2005)
FACTS:
Margarito Jamero filed for the administration and settlement of the estate of his mother,
Consuelo. Margarito’s brother, Ernesto, opposed the petition for appointment as regular
administrator of the estate. The court appointed Atty. Bautista as special administrator
pending the appointment of a regular administrator. The RTC denied Margarito’s motion
for reconsideration. The petition for certiorari was denied and the motion for
reconsideration was denied. The CA stated that the appointment of a special
administrator is discretionary to the appointing court. Being an interlocutory order, it is
not appealable nor subject to certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of a special administrator is discretionary to the
appointing court and being an interlocutory order, it is not appealable nor subject to
certiorari.
RULING:
Yes. The appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the
part of the RTC and non-appealable. However, it may be subject to certiorari if it can be
shown that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction. The Court held in Pefianco vs. Moral, even as the trial court's order may
merely be interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the
same when it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

18. Lee vs. RTC of Quezon City (G.R. No. 146006; February 23, 2004)
FACTS:
An MOA for the Extrajudicial Settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez was filed. Mrs.
Ortañez claimed that she owned shares of stock of Philinterlife. The intestate court
declared the MOA as partially void ab initio insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of
the Philinterlife shares of stocks. The decision was affirmed by the CA and SC. The
decision became final, but was not executed as the sheriff was repeatedly barred by the
security guards upon the instruction of Mrs. Ortañez. The intestate court granted
reinstate the name of Dr. Ortañez in the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife and to
issue the corresponding stock certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not extrajudicially settling a property under administration by virtue of the
MOA without the approval of the intestate court was proper.
HELD:
No. The Court ruled that an heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the
property under administration. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the
estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate
court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid. Mrs. Ortañez
invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the
intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs
or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court.

19. Heirs of Hilano Ruiz vs. Edmond Ruiz (G.R. No. 119671)
FACTS:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters. Hilario Ruiz
died. Four years later, Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes filed in the RTC, a petition for the
probate and approval of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment
of the estate’s debts and obligations, has authority to: (1) grant an allowance from the
funds of the estate to support the testator’s grandchildren; (2) order release of titles to
certain heirs; and (3) grant possession of all properties to the executor of the will.
RULING:
1. No. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from funds of the decedent’s
estate. The law limits allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend to
grandchildren, regardless of minority or incapacity.
2. No. There can be no distribution until payment of the obligations, unless distributees,
or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within the time that the court directs.
3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to possess and manage real and
personal property of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised if it is
necessary to pay debts and expenses of administration. He cannot unilaterally assign to
himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all properties of the deceased, with a true account of his
administration, expenses of administration, and amount of the obligations and estate
tax, all of which are subject to the court’s determination as to their propriety.

20. Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis (G.R. No. 133743; February 6, 2007)
FACTS:
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. He married Felicidad, they had no children, but
lived together for 18 years until his death. Felicidad sought for dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a
petition for letters of administration in the RTC of Makati. Rodolfo, one of Felicisimo’s
children by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. He claimed that the proper venue was the RTC of
the province of Laguna since it was Felicisimo’s residence before his death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue was proper.
HELD:
Yes. Although under Section 1, Rule 73, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the RTC of the province where he resided at the
time of his death. "Reside" must be understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purpose of the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the petition for letters of administration was
validly filed in the RTC which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.

21. Erlinda Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones (G.R. No. 150175; March 10,
2006)
FACTS:
Maximino died. His wife, Donata, instituted intestate proceedings and was appointed as
administratrix. She was awarded ownership of real properties. Donata died. Erlinda and
Gregorio were appointed as administrators of Donata’s estate. Respondent was
awarded administration of Maximino’s estate. Gregorio opposed. Respondents filed a
complaint against Donata’s heirs for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of
real property. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino,
unlawfully registered in her name the real properties belonging to the Maximino’s estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Maximino may still assail the intestate proceedings.
HELD:
No. Maximino’s heirs did not prove their claim with clear and convincing evidence. In the
absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and Maximino’s
heirs. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or
mistake, but pursuant to an order issued by the CFI in special proceedings. The CFI
order is presumed to be regularly issued, it declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and
exclusive heir of Maximino, making Donata the single owner of Maximino’s estate,
including real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs.

22. Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen (G.R. No. 189121, 2013)
FACTS:
Elise, aided by her mother Lourdes, filed a “petition for letters of administration” as she
claimed to be the natural child of decedent, born at a time her parents were capacitated
to marry each other. Elise claimed Eliseo and Amelia’s marriage is void and bigamous
as Amelia was still married to Sandico. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss claiming that
the residence of the decedent was in Tarlac as shown by the death certificate, thus filed
in the wrong venue, and that there is no factual or legal basis for Elise to be appointed
as administratrix of the Estate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the decedent resided in Las Piñas.
2. Whether or not Elise had standing. 
HELD:
1. Yes. “Resides" means personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. The death certificate is proof of residence of the
deceased at the time of his death but is not binding upon the court. Eliseo filed an
action for judicial partition against Amelia on ground that their marriage was void
for being bigamous, negating the contention that Eliseo spent the last days of his
life with Amelia in Tarlac.
2. Yes. Rule 78, Section 6, allows the next of kin to file a petition for letters of
administration. Elise is a compulsory heir who stands to benefit from the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate and is deemed to be an interested party.
 

Escheat
23. Alvarico vs. Sola (G.R. No. 138953; June 6, 2002)
FACTS:
Alvarico is Sola’s natural father. Lopez is Alvarico’s aunt and Sola’s adoptive mother.
Lopez transferred a parcel of land to Sola. Alvarico filed a civil case for reconveyance
against Sola. He claims that Lopez donated the bond to him and took possession of it,
he contends it had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Sola. Sola contends
that the donation is void as it was made when Lopez was no longer the owner and that
said donation lacked the approval of the bureau.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner has a better claim to the land.
HELD:
No. Donations of the same thing to 2 or more persons is governed by the law on double
sales which provides that in case of double sale of immovable property, ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of
property. The affidavit of adjudication, as a public document, is entitled to the
presumption of regularity.

24. Caro vs. Sucaldito (G.R. No. 157536; May 16, 2005)
FACTS:
Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land from Ruperto Gepilano. Caro sold a portion of the
said lot to his son Melchor Caro. Melchor Caro applied for a free patent for the area of
the property. It was opposed so the application was cancelled. Susana Sucaldito, as the
buyer of the lot, filed an application for a free patent which was issued. Caro filed a
complaint against Sucaldito, alleging that he was the owner of the lot and that since the
issuance of the free patent in favor of Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had
no right over it. Hence, as a "trustee of a constructive trust," she was obliged to return
the same to him as the lawful owner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caro has the legal personality to file for the reconveyance of the subject
land.
HELD:
No. Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. A suit
filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. Here, Caro is not the
owner of the property but a mere applicant for a free patent, thus he cannot be
considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.

Guardianship
25. Pilar Y. Goyena vs. Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo (G.R. No. 147148) (395 SCRA
117)
FACTS:
Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo filed a petition for letters of guardianship over her sister,
Julieta due to the latter’s old age, weakness, and recovery from a mini-stroke, requiring
the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in various enterprises. Pilar
Goyena, Julieta‘s close friend for over six decades, opposed the petition. She claims
that Julieta is competent enough to manage her person and property. Julieta was
declared incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property and
Gustilo was appointed as her guardian. The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in finding Julieta to be incompetent and incapable of
taking care of herself.
HELD:
No. When it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the
guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action
which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is
made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error. Here, Goyena has not shown that
the lower courts committed any error.

26. Abad vs. Biason (G.R. No. 191993; December 5, 2012)
FACTS:
Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura.
He alleged that he is Maura’s nephew. He averred that Maura is over 90 years old and
is in dire need of a guardian to look after her and her business affairs. Abad was
allowed to present evidence ex parte. Biason filed a Motion for leave to file opposition,
alleging that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was not notified of the pendency
of the petition. Abad’s petition was denied and Biason was held as Maura’s guardian.
Abad filed a petition for review on certiorari. Pending the resolution of the instant
petition, Biason died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed due to the death of Biason.
HELD:
Yes. Abad prayed to nullify the CA’s decision which dismissed his appeal from the RTC
and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. He was challenging Biason’s
qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as guardian for
Maura. With Biason’s death, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with
resolving the merits of the petition. The relationship of guardian and ward is terminated
by the death of either. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or
anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.

27. Oropesa vs. Oropesa (G.R. No. 184528; April 25, 2012)
FACTS:
Nilo filed a petition to be appointed as guardian to the property of his father, Oropesa.
The petition alleged that Oropesa has been afflicted with several maladies, that his
judgment and memory were impaired. Cirilo filed his Opposition to the petition for
guardianship. According to him, Nilo did not present any relevant documentary or
testimonial evidence that would attest that Oropesa is incompetent. In fact, the only
medical document presented was the Report of Neuropsychological Screening which
although had negative findings regarding memory lapses of Oropesa, it also contained
findings that Oropesa was indeed competent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is considered as an incompetent person under the Rules of
Court.
RULING:
No. Where the sanity of a person is in issue, expert opinion is not necessary, the
observations of the trial judge will suffice. A finding that a person is incompetent should
be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence. Nilo’s failure to formally offer his
documentary evidence, the proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of
testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers
real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be
acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert
medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of Nilo’s cause of action.

Adoption
28. Cang vs. CA (G.R. No. 105308; September 25, 1998)
FACTS:
Cang and Ana Marie were married and had three children. Cang left for the United
States where he sought a divorce from Ana Marie. He was issued a divorce decree and
granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all
reasonable times and places. Ronald and Maria Clara, who were the brother and sister-
in-law of Ana Marie, filed a petition for adoption of the three minor children. The trial
court granted the petition for adoption. Ana Marie was the only parent who gives
consent to the adoption of their children. The CA affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cang’s consent to the adoption necessary.
HELD:
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a
valid reason. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of
adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because
the findings of the lower courts on the issue of abandonment of facts on record. The
petition for adoption must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their
father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.

29. Vda. De Jacob vs. CA (G.R. No. 135216; August 19, 1999)
FACTS:
Tomasa, surviving spouse of Dr. Alfredo, was appointed special administratix for various
of his estates. Pedro Pilapil claimed to be Alfredo’s legally-adopted son, he sought to
intervene to claim his share of the estate as sole surviving heir. He presented an order
issued by the CFI, granting the petition for adoption filed by Alfredo. The trial court ruled
in favor of Pilapil as the legally adopted child and sole heir of Alfredo. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.
HELD:
No. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged
adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts thereafter. No proof
was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Both the Bureau of
Records Management and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar issued certifications
that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. The
evidence presented by Pilapil shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

30. Republic vs. Hon. Jose Hernandez (G.R. No. 117209; February 9, 1996)
FACTS:
Spouses Van and Regina Munson, filed a petition to adopt Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran.
In the same petition, the spouses prayed for the change of the first name of adoptee to
Aaron Joseph. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the
same petition for adoption. Petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition
for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that
these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. The
trial court ruled in favor of respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in granting the decree for change of name embodied
in a petition for adoption.
HELD:
Yes. The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or
proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as
it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship
does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian
or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus
granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.

31. Republic vs. CA (G.R. No. 103695; March 1996)
FACTS:
The petition was filed by private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P.
Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, a minor. With prayer for the correction of
the minor's first name "Midael" to "Michael." According to the Republic, the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because the notice by publication
did not state the true name of the minor child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents’ petition for
adoption.
HELD:
Yes. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted.
In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the
letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even
the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. The purpose of the
publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the
adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication
of notice in this case.

32. In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorgia-Garcia (G.R. No. 148311; March 31,
2005)
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He alleged her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia, Stephanie has been
using her mother's middle name and surname, and he is now a widower and qualified to
be her adopting parent. He prayed Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to
"Garcia," and her surname “Garcia” be changed to "Catindig". The trial court denied on
ground that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name. The Republic agreed with
Catindig that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname
of her natural mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an adoptee can use the surname of her mother as her middle name.
HELD:
Yes. There is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. Being a legitimate
child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. Republic
Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998," secures these
rights and privileges for the adopted.

33. SSS vs. Aguas (G.R. No. 165546; February 27, 2006)
FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, a member of the SSS and a pensioner, died. Pablo’s surviving spouse,
Rosanna Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. Rosanna indicated in her
claim that Pablo was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn. Janet Aguas, who also claimed
to be the child of Pablo and Rosanna, joined them as claimant. According to a witness,
Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna; she was just taken in by them
because they could not have children. There were no legal papers on Janet’s adoption
ISSUE:
Whether Janet is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.
HELD:
No. In this case, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real
child but merely adopted. Leticia also testified that Janet’s adoption did not undergo any
legal proceedings and there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic
Act No. 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted" children are considered dependent
children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot
consider her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.

34. Landingin vs. Republic (G.R. No. 164948; June 27, 2006)
FACTS:
Landingin filed to adopt minors Elaine, Elma, and Eugene Dizon Ramos. They are the
natural children of Manuel Ramos, Landingin’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. When
Manuel died, the children were left to their grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos. Their
biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married, had two children there, and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel. Maria died. The children gave their
written consent for adoption. Landingin failed to present evidence of the consent of
Amelia Ramos and to prove Amelia’s consent. The trial court granted the petition. The
CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Landingin is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of
their biological mother, Amelia Ramos Pablo.
HELD:
No. The written consent of biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree
of adoption. The requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is to protect
the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the
proposed adoption.


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SAN BEDA ALABANG - School of Law

FINALS PERIOD - CASE LIST

1. Buot vs. Dujali (G.R. No. 199885; October 2, 2017)

23. Alvarico vs. Sola (G.R. No. 138953; June 6, 2002)

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

25. Goyena vs. Ledesma-Gustilo (G.R. No. 147148)

Rules 99-100 - Adoption and Custody of Minors

28. Cang vs. CA (G.R. No. 105308; September 25, 1998)

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

23. Alvarico vs. Sola (G.R. No. 138953; June 6, 2002)

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

28. Cang vs. CA (G.R. No. 105308; September 25, 1998)

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

Abesamis, Maraya - Escudero, Michelle - Garcia, Lisa

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