Binamira Vs. Garrucho
 General Manager-Appointment and
In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira
seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to
have been removed without just cause in violation of his
security of tenure.
Facts:
In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the
Minister of Tourism, the petitioner assumed office on on
April 7, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval
from President Aquino of the composition of the Board of
Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-
Chairman in his capacity as General Manager, approved
by the President on the same date.
Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had
discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and
Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors.
On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by
respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism.
On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent
Garrucho a memorandum designating him concurrently
as General Manager, effective immediately, until the
President can appoint a person to serve in the said office
in a permanent capacity.
Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the
PTA in accordance with this memorandum, the petitioner
filed this action against him to question his title.
Subsequently, while his original petition was pending,
Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on
April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed
Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as
additional respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from
his designation.
Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to
the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority
Held:
Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine
Tourism Authority, provides as follows:
SECTION 23-A.
Tenure. — The General Manager shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a
term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for
cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he
shall serve as such until his successor shall have been
appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)
Where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office
only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will
by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation
is considered only an acting or temporary appointment,
which does not confer security of tenure on the person
named.
The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been
illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly
provides that the appointment of the General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the
President of the Philippines, not by any other officer.
Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which
because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally
speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to
assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of
the President.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot
delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was
chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to
exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the
power to substitute another in his place has been given
to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office
requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of
judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was
chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to
exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power
to substitute another in his place has been given to him,
he cannot delegate his duties to another. “
The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head
to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when
“performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business,” which was true of the designation made by
Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also
adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not
‘disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,” as
also happened in the case at bar.
With these rulings, the petitioner’s claim of security of
tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation
being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential
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prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to
the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it
could be and was authorized, the designation signified
merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be
legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for
a different reason).i•t•c-aüsl In either case, the
petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must be rejected.
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who
apparently believed in good faith that he was being
extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of
Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible
authority to do so at the time the designation was made.
This belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino
later approved the composition of the PTA Board of
Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-
Chairman because of his position as General Manager
of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of
the categorical appointment required to be made by the
President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under
Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.
The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner
never acquired valid title to the disputed position and so
has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
against the petitioner.
Pimentel, Jr. vs Ermita, 472 SCRA 587
(Public Officer, Difference Between Ad-Interim and
Acting Appointments)
Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned,
President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which
they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the
appointments, assert that “while Congress is in session,
there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting,
to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, without first having
obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session.
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s
power of appointment.  Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5,
Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:
SEC. 16.  Power of Appointment. — The President shall
exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided
for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17.  Power to Issue Temporary Designation. —
(1) The President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in
the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in
him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to
the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of
illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a
vacancy.
Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an
acting capacity to department secretaries while
Congress is in session.
Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature.  It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until
the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. 
In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter
ego of the President, such as the office of a department
secretary, the President must necessarily appoint
an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
The office of a department secretary may become
vacant while Congress is in session.  Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have
the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of
the office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while Congress is in session.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are
both effective upon acceptance.  But ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy.  Moreover ad-
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
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Appointments.  Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they
can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.
 
Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment
of the undersecretary? 
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the
President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. 
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,
and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of
this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations
on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly
against the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s
interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited
to the power to prescribe the qualifications to
an appointive office.  Congress cannot appoint a person
to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to
that office.  Neither may Congress impose on the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to an
office.  indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?
Monsanto vs Factoran
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of
the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify
the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC
affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she
was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon
which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that
clemency could be given even before conviction). By
reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former
post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still
vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance
who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position
without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier
than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. 
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon
bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies
that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement
should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire
period of her suspension; and that she should not be
required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of
P4,892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the
President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied
Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first
seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate
her former position. 
Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement
to her former position without need of a new
appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil
Held: 
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding
from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws,
which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the
executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for
whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated
officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting
out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as though he never committed
the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The
very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of
guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof.
It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves
forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
3

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It
makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense
has been established by judicial proceedings, that which
has been done or suffered while they were in force is
presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot
be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and
benefits.  appointment to public office which was forfeited by
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply
and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the
Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service
of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served
by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt,
merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation
and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran,  G.R. No.
78239,  February 9, 1989)
GARCIA v. COA
September 14, 1993 (G.R. No. 75025)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: VICENTE GARCIA
Respondents: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE
MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV
FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV
Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena
City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against
him. The president grated him an executive clemency.
The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of salaries.
The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12
March 1984 but the records do not show whether
petitioner’s reinstatement was to the same position of
Supervising Lineman.
ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of
back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the
grant of executive clemency.
HELD:
The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for
reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon
does not generally result in automatic reinstatement
because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he
is not entitled to back wages.
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual,
it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and
as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the
offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon
because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his
criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name,
good reputation and unstained character prior to the
finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial
court was founded not on lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not
commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding
him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public
servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary
reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him,
bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his
reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no
longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment;
he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance
of the clemency.
Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government
service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to
afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start
and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a
result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right
to back wages is afforded to those with have been
illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to
those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from
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April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to
March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.
Cuyegkeng vs. Cruz G.R. No. L-16263
Facts: Among the 12 nominees for the Board of Medical
Examiners, only 6 were shortlisted by the President,
which includes Dr. Pedro Cruz, a government physician.
The petitioners, who are among the nominees cut by
the president, prayed for two causes of action. The first,
being that anyone of them is qualified for the position
and that Dr. Cruz’s appointment be rendered illegal, thus
null and void. While the second, prays for a writ of
preliminary injunction, ceasing, desisting and refraining
the respondent from assuming and performing the role of
Board Medical Examiner, and for the respondent to pay
for the costs of this suit. The petition for preliminary
injunction was dismissed. The Council of Philippine
Medical Association, and incorporated association
intervened enjoining the petitioners in their prayer for
relief.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ have valid causes of action.
Held: No. The Court Ruled that Respondent has a good
and valid right to his title on the grounds that one who
does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another
cannot question his title by quo warranto. This suggests
that petitioners have no cause of action against the
respondent. While the intervenors have no right to
question the title of respondent. Hence, the petition for
quo warranto has no merit.
Requisites of a De Facto Officership
CSC v. JOSON
DOCTRINE: The submission of the appointment
beyond the prescribed period is not an
impediment to its validity. An appointment remains
valid despite the non-compliance of the proper
officials with the pertinent CSC rules.
FACTS:
 July 1, 1995, Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr., then
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) appointed Priscilla Ong as
Executive Assistant
IV in his office under a contractual status.
 The appointment was made after the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) thru
Director Miguel B. Doctor approved his request for the
creation of a contractual position of Executive
Assistant IV at the Office of the POEA
Administrator, effective not earlier than July 1, 1995.
 Subsequently, respondent Joson wrote the CSC
requesting exemption from the rule requiring
appointees to confidential staff positions to meet
the prescribed
educational qualification.
The educational requirement for the position of
Executive
Assistant is a “Bachelor’s degree relevant to the job” and
Priscilla Ong was not a college degree holder.
 Acting upon this request, the petitioner CSC
issued a resolution, approving the appointment of
Ong under a Coterminous Temporary status:
 In this case, it is clear that Ong does not meet the
educational qualification for the position of Executive
Assistant IV. However, considering that Ong has to her
credit 65 units leading to a Bachelor’s degree and that
the said position is coterminous with the appointing
authority and belongs to his confidential/personal
staff, the proposed appointment of Ong may be
allowed under Coterminous Temporary status.
ISSUE:
Should Ong be considered a de jure or de facto public
officer?
HELD: SC held that Ong is a de jure public offier. The
inaction of certain officials led to the non-compliance with
the CSC requirement that appointments should be
included in the monthly report of personnel action
(ROPA), which must be submitted in turn to the CSC.
The Court held that legitimate justifications excused the
delayed observance of or the non-compliance with the
requirement.
A de facto officer is:
 One who is in possession of the office and
discharging its duties under color of authority.
By color of authority is meant that derived from an
election or appointment, however irregular or informal,
so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
 The difference between the basis of the authority of a
de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one
rests on right, the other on reputation. It may be likened
5
to the difference between character and reputation. One seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election
is the truth of a man, the other is what is thought of him.” or appointment can restore the ousted official.
It is the color of authority, not the color of title that
distinguishes
an officer de facto from a usurper.

DISPOSITIVE:
Petition DENIED. Being a de jure officer, Ong is
entitled to receive all the salaries and
emoluments appertaining to the position

Monroy v. CA
G.R. No. L-23258 July 1, 1967
Bengzon, J.P., J.

FACTS:
Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas,
Rizal, when on September
15,1 9 6 1 ,   h i s   c e r t i f i c a t e   o f   c a n d i d a c y   a s   r e p
resentative of the first district of Rizal in t
h e forthcoming elections was filed with the
Comelec. Three days later, or on September
18,1961, Monroy filed a letter withdrawing said
certificate of candidacy. The Comelec approved the
withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, Felipe
del Rosario, then the vice-mayor
of N a v o t a s ,   t o o k   h i s oath of office
as municipal mayor on the
t h e o r y   t h a t   p e t i t i o n e r   h a d forfeited the said
office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in
question.
Did Monroy
cease to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, 
after his certificate of candidacy was 
f i l e d   o n September 15, 1961?

HELD:
 Yes. The withdrawal of his certificate of
candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former
position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code
(which reads “Any elective provincial,
municipal or city official running for
an office, other then the
o n e   w h i c h   h e   i s   a c t u a l l y holding, shall be
considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy”)
makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective
upon t h e f i l i n g o f t h e c e r t i f i c a t e o f f o r
another office. Only the moment and act of
f i l i n g a r e considered. Once the certificate is filed, the
6