ACOON, ABDUL RAHIM G.

Admin. and Election Laws

Topic: Judicial Review

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DALAUTA

G.R. No. 190004
Topic: This is an action for determination of just compensation.

Statement of Facts: 

Respondent was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Butuan City with an
area of 25.2160 hectares and which was placed by DAR under compulsory acquisition
of CARP as reflected in the Notice of Coverage. Petitioner LBP offered ₱192,782.59 as
compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low.

The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Butuan City, who affirmed the valuation made
by LBP, after a summary administrative proceeding was conducted.

Respondent filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting
as SAC. He alleged that LBP’s valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules and
regulations prescribed in DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 06, series of 1992, for
determining the just compensation of lands covered by CARP’s compulsory acquisition
scheme.

The Board of Commissioners constituted by SAC inspected the land and recommended

that the value of the land be pegged at ₱100,000.00 per hectarei  in which both parties
objected.
DAR Admin. Order  No. 06 (1992) – II (A)
There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or CA
regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the claim:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where:  LV = Land Value; CNI = Capitalized Net Income; CS = Comparable Sales; MV
= Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant, and
applicable.
A.1             When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be: LV=(CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2             When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be: LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3             When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be: LV = MV x 2
A.4        In all the above, the computed value using the applicable formula or the
Declared Value by Landowner (DV), whichever is lower, shall be adopted as the Land
Value.
xxx
Dalauta claimed that he had a net income of Php350,000.00 in 1993 from sales of trees
to one person, Fonacier, thus the formula of  LV = CNI x 0.9 + MV x 0.1 should be
used, which yields a total value of ₱2,639,557.oo.
LBP alleged that the land had no income and the corn production found during the
ocular inspection in 1994 was only for family consumption. Thus they used the
formula LV= MVx 2 which yielded a total value of ₱192,782.59.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is considered the trial court correctly computed the just
compensation of the subject property.
Ruling/Doctrine:

Upon an assiduous assessment of the different valuations arrived at by the DAR, the
SAC and the CA, the Court agrees with the position of Justice Francis Jardeleza that just
compensation for respondent Dalauta’s land should be computed based on the formula
provided under DAR-LBP Joint Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 2003 (JMC No.
11 (2003)). This Memorandum Circular, which provides for the specific guidelines for
properties with standing commercial trees, explains:

The Capitalized Net Income  (CNI) approach to land valuation assumes that there would
be uniform streams of future income that would be realized in perpetuity from the
seasonal/permanent crops planted to the land. In the case of commercial trees
(hardwood and soft wood species), however, only a one-time income  is realized when
the trees are due for harvest. The regular CNI approach in the valuation of lands
planted to commercial trees would therefore not apply.  (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

Dalauta’s sale of falcata trees indeed appears to be a one-time transaction. He did not
claim to have derived any other income from the property prior to receiving the Notice
of Coverage from the DAR in February 1994. For this reason, his property would be
more appropriately covered by the formula provided under JMC No. 11 (2003).

Dalauta alleges to have sold all the falcata trees in the property to Fonacier in
1993. After Fonacier finished harvesting in January 1994, he claims that, per advice of
his lawyer, he immediately caused the date of effectivity of this Joint Memorandum
Circular x x x.” It is submitted, however, that applying the above formula to compute
just compensation for respondent’s land would be the most equitable course of
action under the circumstances. Without JMC No. 11 (2003), Dalauta’s property would
have to be valued using the formula for idle lands, the CNI and CS factors not being
applicable. Following this formula, just compensation for Dalauta’s property would only
amount to ₱225,300.00, computed as follows:
LV = MVx2
Where: LV = Land Value;  MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration*
For the area planted to corn, ₱7,740.00/hectare
For idle/pasture land, ₱3,890/hectare

Thus:
For the 4 hectares planted to corn:  LV = (P7, 7 40/hectare x 4 hectares) x 2 =
₱61,920.00
For the 21 hectares of idle/pasture land:  LV = (₱3,890/hectare x 21) x 2 = ₱163,380.00
Total Land Value = P61,920.00 + Pl63,380.00 = P225,300.00
ACOON, ABDUL RAHIM G.
Admin. and Election Laws
Topic: Judicial Review

MONTOYA vs. POLICE DIRECTOR REYNALDO P. VARILLA

Statement of Facts:

National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special Order No. 1044 on 9

September 1998 dropping Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
from the rolls, effective 15 August 1998, for failure to attend the Law Enforcement and
Enhancement Course (LEEC). He had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a
period of 67 days, from 23 January 1998 to 31 March 1998.

Four months after he was dropped from the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof addressed to the PNP Regional Director for the National Capital
Region (NCR), explaining that on 22 January 1998, he went to the Baler Police
Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick Leave Form approved by the station
commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his name had already been forwarded to the
NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not approved. Montoya averred that his
failure to attend the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was suffering from arthritis
with on and off symptoms of severe body pain. Montoya attached to his Motion a
certification simply dated 1998, issued by a certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and
authenticated by Police Chief Inspector (P/CINSP.) Ethel Y. Tesoro, Chief, Medical
Service, CPD. The Special Order 990 was cancelled.

Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by Hearing Officer

Police Superintendent, and based on his findings, the NCR Regional Director rendered a
Decision on 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya from the police service for Serious
Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective immediately. Montoya received a copy of said
Decision on 20 July 2000.

Montoya filed a motion. Montoya’s Petition/Motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction,
since a disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from service imposed by a
PNP regional director may only be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB).

Montoya next filed before the RAB of the National Capital Region (RAB-NCR), alleging
lack of due process considering that he was not even notified of any hearing by the
Summary Hearing Officer and was thus deprived of the opportunity to present evidence
in his defense. The Summary Hearing Officer in the Summary Dismissal Proceedings
against him recommended his dismissal from police service based on his failure to
report for the LEEC, without even looking into his side of the controversy.

On 11 December 2002, the RAB-NCR rendered its Decision granting Montoya’s appeal
and ordering his reinstatement. The NCR Regional Director assailed the RAB-NCR
decision reinstating Montoya in the police service.

On 8 August 2003, Montoya, together with the other police personnel reinstated in the
service by RAB-NCR (hereinafter collectively referred to as Montoya, et al.), filed before
the DILG an Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Appeal of the NCR
Regional Director. On 10 November 2003, DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. issued an
Order denying the appeal of the NCR Regional Director. The NCR Regional Director,
represented by Manere, appealed the Order dated 10 November 2003 of DILG
Secretary Lina to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On 23 March 2004, the NCR
Regional Director issued Special Order No. 611 reinstating Montoya, et al., without
prejudice to the pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director before the CSC.

Issues:

WON the right to due process of petitioner was violated.

Ruling/Doctrine:

Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated, strips down administrative due process to its most
fundamental nature and sufficiently justifies freeing administrative proceedings from the
rigidity of procedural requirements. In particular, however, due process in
administrative proceedings has also been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect
a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend
one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.

Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly
bound by procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to observe
the fundamental requirements of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be
heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative or judicial proceedings. In the application of the principle of due process,
what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the
opportunity to be heard.

In the instant case, the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were flawed
from the very beginning when these were conducted without due notice to him. The
NCR Regional Director, through Manere, never contested the fact that the Hearing
Officer proceeded with his investigation without giving notice to Montoya. Without
notice, Montoya was unable to attend the hearings, present written or oral arguments,
and submit evidence in his favor; he was completely deprived of the opportunity to be
heard on the administrative charges against him and was irrefragably denied due
process.

Consequently, the Decision dated 23 June 2000 of the NCR Regional Director dismissing
Montoya from service is void for having been rendered in violation of the latter’s due
process.
ACOON, ABDUL RAHIM G.
Admin. and Election Laws
Topic: Judicial Review

CABUNGCAL VS. LORENZO

G.R. No. 160367. December 18, 2009.

Statement of Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, issued and approved Resolutions
declaring the reorganization of all offices of the municipal government and adopting the
proposed new staffing pattern of the municipal government. The Municipal Mayor of
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, Sonia R. Lorenzo, issued a memorandum informing all
employees of the municipal government that, pursuant to the reorganization, all
positions were deemed vacant and that all employees must file their respective
applications for the newly created positions listed in the approved staffing, otherwise,
they would not be considered for any of the newly created positions.

Instead of submitting their respective applications, petitioners, filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with application for issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. They alleged that they were permanent
employees of the Rural Health Unit. They sought to prohibit the implementation of the
reorganization and nullification of said Resolutions.

While the case was pending, Mayor Sonia R. Lorenzo issued a letter terminating the
services of those who did not re-apply as well as those who were not selected for the
new positions.

The CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit citing that the
assailed acts of respondents are clearly authorized under Section 76 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Likewise, it ruled that the reorganization is justified for it
creates budgetary savings.

Petitioners contend that the Decision and Resolution of the CA were not in accordance
with Republic Act (RA) No. 6656, otherwise known as "An Act to Protect the Security of
Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization", specifically Section 2 thereof and RA 7305, otherwise known as the
"Magna Carta of Health Workers".

Respondents, for their part, argue that petitioners' separation from service was a result
of a valid reorganization done in accordance with law and in good faith.

Issues:

Whether or not petitioners' automatic resort to the Court of Appeals is proper.

Whether the case falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

Ruling/Doctrine:

NO. Petitioners' recourse should have been with the Civil Service Commission and not
with the CA. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has
jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of
government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the
sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.

In this case, petitioners are former local government employees whose services were
terminated due to the reorganization of the municipal government of the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Considering that they belong to the civil service, the
CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office.

Even the laws upon which petitioners anchor their claim vest jurisdiction upon the CSC.
Under RA 6656 and RA 7305, it is the CSC which determines whether an employee's
dismissal or separation from office was carried out in violation of the law or without due
process. Accordingly, it is also the CSC which has the power to reinstate or reappoint an
unlawfully dismissed or terminated employee.
Consequently, petitioners' resort to the CA was premature. The jurisdiction lies with the
CSC and not with the appellate court.
NO, The case does not fall under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust
all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide
the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. This,
however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions: (1) when there is a violation
of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when
there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the
subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners' filing of a
petition for mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing
that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of
extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief.

As a rule, judicial intervention is allowed only after exhaustion of administrative

remedies. This principle goes hand-in-hand with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which precludes courts from resolving, in the first instance, controversies falling under
the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Courts recognize that administrative
agencies are better equipped to settle factual issues within their specific field of
expertise because of their special skills and technical knowledge. For this reason, a
premature invocation of the court's judicial power is often struck down, unless it can be
shown that the case falls under any of the applicable exceptions.

Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should have first
brought the matter to the CSC which has primary jurisdiction over the case.
ACOON, ABDUL RAHIM G.
Admin. and Election Laws
Topic: Judicial Review

IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON A.

DATUMANONG
G.R. No. 150274, August 4, 2006
Statement of Facts:

Tel- Equen, District Engineer of Mountain Province, DPWH was charged with an
administrative complaint by the Office of the Ombudsman for dishonesty, falsification of
official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules and
regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the service
the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found him
guilty. After his MR was denied, Tel-Equen appealed to the CA. It was also denied
hence they appealed to the SC.

While the appeal was pending with the SC, DPWH Sec Datumanong issued a
memorandum order dismissing Tel Equen from the service.

Tel-Equen, filed this present case to cite the former DPWH Secretary Datumanong in
contempt for issuing the said memorandum order.

Issue:

W/N Datumanong should be cited in contempt.

Ruling/Doctrine:

No

The contempt power must be exercised with utmost self-restraint. The issuance of the
Memorandum Order by Datumanong was not a contumacious conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.

At most, it could have been only an error in judgment or a result of confusion with
regard to the following rules:

Admin Code of 1987: decisions of the CSC commission are immediately executory even
pending appeal, versus: the rules of procedure under the Ombudsman Act (which is the
one which should be applied to Tel-Equen in this case) which state that decisions of the
Office of the OMB is not executory at once.

However, this issue can be considered cured as a supervening event occurred; the said
rule of procedure under the Ombudsman has been amended to the effect that
decisions of the office of the Ombudsman are executory even if pending appeal.

Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial
agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so
provides.