Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 94951 April 22, 1991

APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA CANDIDO, respondents.

Bernabe B. Alabastro for petitioner.

Angel Fernandez for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular employee
of the said firm? This is the novel issue raised in this petition.

Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18,
1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the
beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a
monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.

On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry,
she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate
supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she
was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa
offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to
quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return
to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.

On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and
Employment. After the parties submitted their position papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned to
the case on August 24, 1988 the latter rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, Conformably With The Foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondent, Apex Mining Company, Inc., Masara, Davao del Norte, to pay the complainant, to
wit:

1 Salary

Differential –– P16,289.20

2. Emergency Living

Allowance –– 12,430.00
 3. 13th Month Pay

Differential –– 1,322.32

4. Separation Pay

(One-month for

every year of

service [1973-19881) –– 25,119.30

or in the total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND 42/100
(P55,161.42).

SO ORDERED.1

Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), wherein in due course a decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof on July
20, 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed decision. A motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.

Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, which appopriately should be a special civil action
for certiorari, and which in the interest of justice, is hereby treated as such.2 The main thrust of the petition
is that private respondent should be treated as a mere househelper or domestic servant and not as a
regular employee of petitioner.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms "househelper" or
"domestic servant" are defined as follows:

The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall
refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's
home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment
thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family.3

The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in
the employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners,
houseboys and other similar househelps.

The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a

company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing of
said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be considered to extend to then driver, houseboy, or gardener
exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as
within the meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined by law.

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said
employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or
laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their
circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case,
whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other
agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the
business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.

Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain
aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered
as such as employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The mere fact that the
househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in
relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and
employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic
servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.

Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and maintains that respondent abandoned
her work.1âwphi1 This argument notwithstanding, there is enough evidence to show that because of an
accident which took place while private respondent was performing her laundry services, she was not
able to work and was ultimately separated from the service. She is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief
as a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be interested in
returning to her work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public respondent
NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 87210 July 16, 1990

FILOMENA BARCENAS, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), Rev. SIM DEE the present Head Monk
of the Manila Buddha Temple, MANUEL CHUA, in his capacity as the President and Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc., and in his
private capacity, respondents.

L.B. Camins for petitioner.

Lino M. Patajo and Jose J. Torrefranca for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari (which We treat as a special civil action for certiorari) seeks to annul
the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated November 29, 1988, which reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter dated February 10, 1988 in NLRC NCR Case No. 12-4861-86 (Filomena
Barcenas v. Rev. Sim See, etc., et al.) on the ground that no employer-employee relationship exists
between the parties.

Petitioner alleged in her position paper the following facts:

In 1978, Chua Se Su (Su for short) in his capacity as the Head Monk of the Buddhist Temple of Manila
and Baguio City and as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist
Association of the Phils. Inc. hired the petitioner who speaks the Chinese language as secretary and
interpreter. Petitioner's position required her to receive and assist Chinese visitors to the temple, act as
tourist guide for foreign Chinese visitors, attend to the callers of the Head Monk as well as to the food for
the temple visitors, run errands for the Head Monk such as paying the Meralco, PLDT, MWSS bills and
act as liaison in some government offices. Aside from her pay and allowances under the law, she
received an amount of P500.00 per month plus free board and lodging in the temple. In December, 1979,
Su assumed the responsibility of paying for the education of petitioner's nephew. In 1981, Su and
petitioner had amorous relations. In May, 1982, of five months before giving birth to the alleged son of Su
on October 12, 1982, petitioner was sent home to Bicol. Upon the death of Su in July, 1983, complainant
remained and continued in her job. In 1985, respondent Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected
President and Chairman of the Board of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc. and
Rev. Sim Dee for short) was elected Head Buddhist Priest. Thereafter, Chua and Dee discontinued
payment of her monthly allowance and the additional P500.00 effective 1983. In addition, petitioner and
her son were evicted forcibly from their quarters in the temple by six police officers. She was brought first
to the Police precinct in Tondo and then brought to Aloha Hotel where she was compelled to sign a
written undertaking not to return to the Buddhist temple in consideration of the sum of P10,000.00.
Petitioner refused and Chua shouted threats against her and her son. Her personal belongings including
assorted jewelries were never returned by respondent Chua.
Chua and DEE on the other hand, claimed that petitioner was never an employee of the Poh Toh Temple
but a servant who confined herself to the temple and to the personal needs of the late Chua Se Su and
thus, her position is coterminous with that of her master.

On February 10, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

complainant Filomena Barcenas, and the respondent corporation is hereby ordered to
pay her the following:

1. P26,575.00 backwages from August 9, 1986 up to date hereof.,

2. P14,650.00 as separation pay;

3. P18,000.00 as unpaid wages from August, 1983 up to August 8, 1986; and

4. P10,000.00 moral damages.

Complainant's charge of unfair labor practice is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 1

Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which, as earlier stated, reversed the
above decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this instant petition.

A painstaking review of the records compels Us to dismiss the petition.

At the outset, however, We agree with the petitioner's claim that she was a regular employee of the
Manila Buddhist Temple as secretary and interpreter of its Head Monk, Su As Head Monk, President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Su was
empowered to hire the petitioner under Article V of the By-laws of the Association which states:

. . . (T)he President or in his absence, the Vice President shall represent the Association
in all its dealings with the public, subject to the Board, shall have the power to enter into
any contract or agreement in the name of the Association, shall manage the active
business operation of the Association, shall deal with the bank or banks . . . 2

Respondent NLRC represented by its Legal Offices 3 argues that since petitioner was hired without the
approval of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc., she was
not an employee of respondents. This argument is specious. The required Board approval would appear
to relate to the acts of the President in representing the association "in all its dealings with the public."
And, even granting that prior Board approval is required to confirm the hiring of the petitioner, the same
was already granted, albeit, tacitly. It must be noted that petitioner was hired in 1978 and no whimper of
protest was raised until this present controversy.

Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be categorized as mere domestic
work. Thus, We find that petitioner, being proficient in the Chinese language, attended to the visitors,
mostly Chinese, who came to pray or seek advice before Buddha for personal or business problems;
arranged meetings between these visitors and Su and supervised the preparation of the food for the
temple visitors; acted as tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as liaison with some goverment offices;
and made the payment for the temple's Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not be
deemed activities of a household helper. They were essential and important to the operation and religious
functions of the temple.
In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return to Bicol in May, 1982 to
await the birth of her love-child allegedly by Su The records do not show that petitioner filed any leave
from work or that a leave was granted her. Neither did she return to work after the birth of her child on
October 12, 1982, whom she named Robert Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The NLRC found that it was
only in July, 1983 after Su died that she went back to the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioner's pleadings
failed to rebut this finding. Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her old position
which she had already abandoned. Petitioner herself supplied the reason for her return. She stated:

. . . (I)t was the death-bed instruction to her by Chua Se Su to stay at the temple and to
take care of the two boys and to see to it that they finish their studies to become monks
and when they are monks to eventually take over the two temples as their inheritance
from their father Chua Se Su. 4

Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Su's mistress who is bent on
protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her son and nephew. In her pleadings, the petitioner
claims that they were forcefully evicted from the temple, harassed and threatened by respondents and
that the Poh Toh Buddhist Association is a trustee corporation with the children as cestui que trust. These
claims are not proper in this labor case. They should be appropriately threshed out in the complaints
already filed by the petitioner before the civil courts. Due to these claims, We view the respondents' offer
of P10,000.00 as indicative more of their desire to evict the petitioner and her son from the temple rather
than an admission of an employer-employee relations.

Anent the petitioner's claim for unpaid wages since May, 1982 which she filed only in 1986, We hold that
the same has already prescribed. Under Article 292 of the Labor Code, all money claims arising from
employer-employee relations must be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued,
otherwise they shall forever be barred.

Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to work in the temple after Su died, there is,
however, no proof that she was re-hired by the new Head Monk. In fact, she herself manifested that
respondents made it clear to her in no uncertain terms that her services as well as her presence and that
of her son were no longer needed. 5 However, she persisted and continued to work in the temple without
receiving her salary because she expected Chua and Dee to relent and permit the studies of the two
boys. 6 Consequently, under these circumstances, no employer-employee relationship could have arisen.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated November 29, 1988 is
hereby AFFIRMED for the reasons aforestated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.