G.R. No.
L-13678             November 12, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRUDENCIO SALAVERIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose R. Varela for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The municipal council of Orion, Bataan, enacted, on February 28, 1917, an ordinance which,
among other things, prohibited the playing of panguingue on days not Sundays or legal
holidays, and penalized the violation thereof by a casero [housekeeper] by a fine of not less than
P10 nor more than P200, and by jugadores [gamblers] by a fine of not less than P5 nor more
than P200. The justice of the peace of Orion, when this ordinance went into effect, was
Prudencio Salaveria, now the defendant and appellant. Notwithstanding his official station, on
the evening of March 8, 1917, not a Sunday or legal holiday, seven persons including the justice
of the peace an his wife were surprised by the police while indulging in a game of panguingue in
the house of the justice of the peace. The chief of police took possession of the cards, the
counters (sigayes), a tray, an P2.07 in money, used in the game.
These are facts fully proven by the evince and by the admissions of the accused. Convicted in
the justice of the peace court of Orion, and again in the Court of First Instance of Bataan,
Salaveria appeals to this court, making five assignments of error. The three assignments, of a
technical nature, are without merit, and a fourth, relating to the evidence, is not sustained by the
proof. The remaining assignment of error, questioning the validity of the ordinance under which
the accused was convicted, requires serious consideration and final resolution. This ordinance in
part reads:
RESOLUTION NO. 28
xxx     xxx     xxx
Whereas, this Council is vested with certain powers by sections 2184 and 2185 of the
Administrative Code;
Whereas, it is the moral duty of this body to safeguard the tranquillity and stability of
the Government and to foster the welfare and prosperity of each an all of the
inhabitants of this municipality; therefore,
Be it resolved to enact, as it hereby is enacted, the following ordinance:
Ordinance No. 3
xxx     xxx     xxx
Third. — The games known as "Panguingue" "Manilla," "Jung-kiang," "Paris-Paris,"
"Poker," "Tute," "Burro," and "Treinta-y-uno" shall be allowed only on Sundays an
official holidays.
xxx     xxx     xxx
The following penalties shall be imposed upon those who play the above games on
days other than Sundays and official holidays:
For the owner of the house: A fine of from Ten to Two hundred pesos, or subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of one peso a day.
For the gamblers: A fine of from Five to Two hundred pesos each or subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of one peso a day.
The Philippine Legislature has granted to municipalities legislative powers of a dual character,
one class mandatory an the other discretionary. Of the first class is the provision of the
Administrative Code which makes it the duty of the municipal council, conformably with law, "to
prohibit and penalize . . . gambling." (Sec. 2188 [i], Adm. Code of 1916; sec. 2242 [i], Adm. Code
of 1917.) This is a more restricted power than that found in the original Municipal Code which
authorized a municipal council to "provide against the evils of gambling, gambling houses, and
disorderly houses of whatsoever sort." (Act No. 82, sec. 39 [u].) The present municipal law, since
making use of the word "gambling," must be construed with reference to the Insular Law, Act No.
1757, relating to the same subject. Act No. 1757 in section 1 defines "gambling" as "the paying
of any game for money or any representative of value or valuable consideration or thing, the
result of which game depends wholly or chiefly upon chance or hazard, or the use of any
mechanical inventions or contrivance to determine by chance the loser or winner of money or of
any representative of value or of any valuable consideration or thing." In the United
States vs. Hilario ([1913], 24 Phil., 392), the Supreme Court went into the subject of the meaning
of "gambling" in this jurisdiction, and found that it includes those games the result of which
depend wholly or chiefly upon chance or hazard, and excludes those games the result of which
depend wholly or chiefly upon skill, with the result that sections 621 to 625 of the Revise
Ordinances of the city of Manila (734-738 of the Revised Ordinances of 1917) were found to
prohibit only games of chance or hazard.
The ordinance of Orion, Bataan, merely prohibits the playing of panguingue on certain days,
without describing it. Further, although this court has considered the method by which many
other games are played, it has never as yet authoritatively decided whether panguingue was a
game of skill or hazard. Nor was any evidence on this point introduced in the present case.
However, a reading of the decision of the trial court and of official opinions of two Attorneys-
General, of which we can take judicial cognizance, warrants the deduction that panguingue is
not a game of chance or hazard and is not prohibited by Act No. 1757. (See Opinions of the
Attorney-General of July 11, 1904; July 25, 1904; October 10, 1905; and September 7, 1911;
also Berriz, Diccionario de la Administracion, p. 35.) If, therefore, we were to restrict our
investigation to those portions of the Administrative Code which authorize a municipal council to
prohibit and penalize gambling, there would exist grave doubt, to say the least, of the validity of
ordinance No. 3 of the municipality of Orion, Bataan.
There remains for consideration a different approach to the question.
While Philippine law gives to gambling a restricted meaning, it is to be noted that, in its broader
signification, gambling relates to play by certain rules at cards, dice, or other contrivance, so that
one shall be the loser an the other the winner. (20 Cyc., 878; Bouvier's Law Dictionary;
People vs. Todd [1889], 51 Hun [N. Y.], 446 451; 4 N. Y. Supp., 25.) As one example the
Charter of the town of Ruston, State of Louisiana, authorized it "to restrain, prohibit, an suppress
. . . games and gambling houses and rooms . . ., and to provide for the punishment of the
persons engaged in the same." Under this power the town passed an ordinance prohibiting "all
games of chance, lottery, banking games, raffling, and all other species of gambling," indicating
that there were other species of gambling in addition to games of chance. (See Town of
Ruston vs. Perkins [1905], 114 La., 851.) The common law notion of gambling, which only made
it an indictable offense when the play was attended by such circumstances as would in
themselves amount to a riot or a nuisance or to an actual breach of the peace, has given way to
statutes and ordinances designed to restrain, suppress, or control gambling.
Authority for the State or a municipality to take action to control gambling in this larger sense can
be found in an analysis of what is calle the police power.
Any attempt to define the police power with circumstantial precision would savor of pedantry.
The United States Supreme Court tritely describes it as "the most essential of all powers, at
times the most insistent, an always one of least limitable of the powers of government." (District
of Columbia vs. Brooks [1909], 214 U.S., 138.) The police power is based on the maxim "salus
populi est suprema lex" — the welfare of the people is the first law. The United States Supreme
Court has said that it extends "to the protection of the lives, health and property of the citizens,
and to the preservation of good order and the public morals." (Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts
[1878] , 97 U.S., 25; Barbier vs. Connolly [1885], 113 U.S., 27.) The Supreme Court of these
Islands has said that it extends "the police power of the state includes not only the public health
safety, but also the public welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the public's best
interest." (U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.) Recent judicial decisions incline to give a
more extensive scope to the police power that the older cases. The public welfare is rightfully
made the basis of construction.
Not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the
municipality does also. Like the State, the police power of a municipal corporation extends to all
matters affecting the peace, order, health, morals, convenience, comfort, and safety of its
citizens — the security of social order — the best and highest interests of the municipality.
(Case vs. Board of Health of Manila and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250.) The best considered
decisions have tended to broaden the scope of action of the municipality in dealing with police
offenses. Within the general police powers of a municipal corporation is the suppression of
gambling. Ordinances aimed in a reasonable way at the accomplishment of this purpose are
undoubtedly valid. (See U.S. vs. Pacis [1915], 31 Phil., 524; 39 L. R. A., 523, Note; Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 6th edition, pp. 138, 226, 742; Greenville vs. Kemmis [1900], 58 S. C.,
427 [holding that under the general welfare clause a city may pass an ordinance prohibiting
gambling in any private house].)
The Philippine Legislature, as before intimated, delegated to municipalities certain legislative
powers are named specifically. But in addition, and preceding both the specific powers of a
mandatory and discretionary character, is the general power of a municipal council to enact
ordinances and make regulations. It is this grant that the preamble of the ordinance of Orion
assigns as authority for its enactment. Said section 2184 of the Administrative Code of 1916
(sec. 2238, Adm. Code of 1917) reads:
The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
an duties conferred upon it by law an such as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
This section, known as the general welfare clause, delegates in statutory form the police power
to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal
authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally
construed by the courts. Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive view of Philippine
jurisprudence.
The general welfare clause has two branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by
law. With this class we are not here directly concerned. The second branch of the clause is
much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It
authorizes such ordinances "as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein."
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
The ordinance of the municipality of Orion does not seem in itself to be pernicious, or
unreasonable or discriminatory. Its purposes evidently are to improve the morals and stimulate
the industry of the people. A person is to be compelled to refrain from private acts injurious both
to himself an his neighbors. These objects, to be attained by limiting the pastime to definite days,
do not infringe any law of the general government.
The constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law
is not violated by this ordinance. Liberty of action by the individual is not unduly circumscribed;
that is, it is not unduly circumscribed if we have in mind the correct notion of this "the greatest of
all rights." That gravest of sociological questions — How far, consistently with freedom, may the
liberties of the individual member of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? —
has been debated for centuries, in vain, if we can not now discount the time worn objection to
any and all interference with private rights in order to effectuate the public purpose. (See
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905], 197 U. S., 11; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 58 L. R. A.,
748.) Almost countless are the governmental restrictions on the citizen.
The presumption is all favor of validity. The inhabitants of a municipality are in themselves
miniature states. The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality an with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject, and
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject, and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the
people. Who is in a better position to say whether the playing of panguingue is deleterious to
social order and the public interest in a certain municipality — the municipal council, or the
courts? The answer is self-evident. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation. (See U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.)
President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission still remain undisturbed by subsequent Acts
of Congress dealing with Philippine affairs and yet constitute a portion of our constitutional law,
as to the inviolable rule that "municipal governments . . . shall be afforded the opportunity to
manage their own affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable." Again the same organic
law says, "In the distribution of powers among the governments organized by the Commission,
the presumption is always to be in favor of the smaller subdivision, so that all the powers which
can properly be exercised by the municipal government shall be vested in that government . . . ."
Let us never forget these principles so highly protective of local self-government.
for unusual circumstances, a prison sentence should be imposed, if permitted by the law or
ordinance. We further suggest that, where the defendant has been found guilty and is a man of
station, he be given the maximum penalty.lawphil.net
Applying the foregoing in this instance, it results that the defendant and appellant must be found
guilty of a violation of ordinance No. 3 of the municipality of Orion, Bataan; and, in accordance
therewith, shall be sentenced to the maximum penalty of the payment of a fine of P200, or to
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with the costs of all three instances against him.
So ordered.

The judiciary can very well take notice of the fact that municipalities are accustomed to enacting
ordinances aimed at the regulation of gambling. The executive authorities an the Attorney-
General have usually upheld the validity of such ordinances, especially those intended to restrict
the playing of panguingue. (Opinions of the Attorney-General, supra; Opinion of the Executive
Secretary, July 6, 1909; Indorsement of the Governor-General, July 21, 1904.) This general
municipal practice, indicative of a social cancer to be eradicated, should not be discouraged by
strict judicial construction.

More important still, the courts cannot but realize that gambling, in its larger sense as well as in
its restricted sense, is an act beyond the pale of good morals, which, for the welfare of the
Filipino people, should be exterminated. The suppression of the evil does not interfere with any
of the inherent rights of citizenship. The pernicious practice is rightfully regarded as the offspring
of idleness and the prolific parent of vice and immorality, demoralizing in its association and
tendencies, detrimental to the best interests of society, and encouraging wastefulness,
thriftlessness, and a belief that a livelihood may be earned by other means than honest industry.
To be condemned in itself, it has the further effect of causing poverty, dishonesty, fraud, and
deceit. Many a man has neglected his business and mortgaged his integrity to follow the fickle
Goddess of the cards. Many a woman has wasted her hours and squandered her substance at
the gambling board while home and children were forgotten. It is highly proper that this pastime
should be subject to the control of restraints imposed by the ordinances of local governments
peculiarly afflicted by the evil. (See In re Voss [1903], 11 N. D., 540; Ex parte Tuttle [1891], 91,
Cal., 589; Greenwood vs. State [1873], 6 Baxt., 567; 32 Am. Rep., 539; 12 R. C. L., 709-715.)

For the suppression of such an evil, coordinate and harmonious action must concur between the
three departments of Government. A law or ordinance enacted by the legislative body must
exist. Such an ordinance is before us. Vigorous executive enforcement must take place to make
the law or ordinance a reality. Such activity by the police has brought this case to the courts. And
finally the Judiciary, having full respect for the legislative action of the municipal council and for
the prosecution by the executive officials, must, by judicial construction, equally as progressive
and constructive, give effect to the action of the other two powers. Wherefore,
although panguingue is not entirely a game of chance, since it is a proper subject for regulation
by municipal authorities acting under their delegated police power, whose laudable intention is to
improve the public morals and promote the prosperity of their people, their action should be
upheld by the courts. Ordinance No. 3 of Orion, Bataan, is found to be valid.

The culprit in this case is himself a member of the Judiciary. Instead of enforcing the law, he has
scorned it. His example to the people of Orion has been pernicious in its influence. If gambling is
to be suppressed, not only the weak and ignorant must be punished, but those with full
knowledge of the law and the consequences of violation. We would accordingly suggest to
Courts of First Instance that in all cases arising under the Gambling Law or ordinances, except
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any
persons, partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or
portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
other gambling activities.
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, respondents. Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business permit as
defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit:
Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.
a) Suspension of the business
permit for sixty (60) days for the
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
first offense and a fine of
P1,000.00/day

b) Suspension of the business

CRUZ, J.: permit for Six (6) months for the
second offense, and a fine of
P3,000.00/day
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the
objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor c) Permanent revocation of the
and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to business permit and imprisonment
the welfare of the city. of One (1) year, for the third and
subsequent offenses.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR
decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, thereof.
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the
Christmas season.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as
follows:
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

ORDINANCE NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND
PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT
AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY
WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against
ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS
CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;
PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.

WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another

BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan
Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of
de Oro, in session assembled that:
CASINO;

Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No.
casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to
3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing
any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the
Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used
city limits.
its premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO;
 WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4),
Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the
City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any
activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or
regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment
in order to protect social and moral welfare of the community;
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:
Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de
Oro is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following
penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor,
partnership or corporation undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance
of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year
or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court
against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the
establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO.
Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication
in a local newspaper of general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:
1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan
de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment
and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial
limits.
2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in
Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) — (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal
gambling."
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore
invalid on that point.
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to
cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the
general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v.
PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the
issues presented in this present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court sustained
the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national
economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the
Bureau of Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances
for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police
power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as
follows:
Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:
Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The
Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code
and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and
effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
 x x x           x x x          x x x It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government
Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with
the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units.
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for
Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:
habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and
maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent
devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of
pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic this Code, the following rules shall apply:
materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the
inhabitants of the city;
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government
within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5 unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may
prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental xxx xxx xxx
to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The
legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted
gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the
to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic
operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted
community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
to it by the Local Government Code.

Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated
the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official
in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions
disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper
therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government units the
upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v.
power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the Local Government Code
Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The
has recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best
petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which
expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State.
they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate
casinos "on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units
to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat,
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit,
nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of
their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is
casinos. left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making
charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is
such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to
deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the
review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not
conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the
follows:
judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355
and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on
the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be
valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government
units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited
games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited
but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code
could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the
section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should
be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated.
Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited
games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like
the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will
not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City,
and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public
policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred
on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to
this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance
admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by
the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority.
In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro
tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local
government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is
permissible because one law can change or repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has
only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and
useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to
centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited
by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by
Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning.
Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the
petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will
have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the
local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this
situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant
and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue
through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently
discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts
thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of
them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the
omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987),
and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees,
orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the
barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939
regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447
regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree
No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464,
477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force
and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs
locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as
they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and
29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No.
87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court
explained:
 The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the
assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the
part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be
given effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention,
and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the
intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it
appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the
question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private
respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments
of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for
the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648,
providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by
these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the
Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more
responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an
inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate
branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the
proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing
them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at
hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed
must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those
allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal
and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old
as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes
them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of
gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this
theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the
San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us
by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the
ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the
public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite
the prohibition of gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress,
from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the
mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life,
without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may
destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from
existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation
could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere
tenants at will of the legislature. 11
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not
been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains
control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under
our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to
grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in
the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to
tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify
or violate it.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their
constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be
endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy
gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual
gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social
scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the
limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the
father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its
own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly
affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it
contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such
contravention here.
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired.
P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local
government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot
be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of
casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the
public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
 People vs. Kottinger
G.R. no. L-20569 (October 29, 1923)
Malcolm, J.
Application of perjury
FACTS: On November 24, 1922 detective Juan Tolentino raided Camera Supply Co. located at
110 Escolta, Manila where he found and confiscated postcards depicting non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines in their native attire and in poses showing how they live.
Exhibit A carries the legend "Philippines, Bontoc Woman.
Exhibit A-1 is a picture of five young boys and carries the legend "Greetings from the
Philippines."
Exhibit A-2 has the legend "Ifugao Belle, Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines."
Exhibit A-3 has the legend "Igorot Girl, Rice Field Costume."
Exhibit A-4 has the legend "Kalinga Girls, Philippines.
Exhibit A-5 has the legend "Moros Philippines."
The herein defendant, J.J. Kottinger, was the manager of the company, he was charged of
having kept for sale in the store, obscene and indecent pictures in violation of section 12 of Act.
No. 277 (The Philippine Libel Law).
The prosecution produced no evidence proving the obscenity and indecency of the postcards as
they believed the postcards themselves are the best evidence of that. Dr. H. Otley Beyer, a UP
professor, and corroborated by other witnesses, testified that none of the pictures showed
anything that he did not see on various occasions in his studies. The defendant interposed a
demurrer based upon the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense and
were not contrary to law.
The trial court overruled the demurrer. The defendant was found guilty of the offense.
ISSUE/s: 1. WON PICTURES PORTRAYING THE INHABITANTS OF THE COUNTRY IN
NATIVE DRESS & AS THEY APPEAR & CAN BE SEEN IN THE REGIONS
IN WHICH THEY LIVE ARE NOT OBSCENE OR INDECENT WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE LIBEL LAW?
HELD: NO. The word “Obscenity” is defined as something offensive to chastity, decency or
delicacy. “Indecency” is an act against good behavior and a just delicacy. The test for obscenity
is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave or corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall. Another test is whether or not it shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency.
The Libel Law does not define what constitutes obscene or indecent writings, pictures, etc. but
the words “obscenity” and “indecency” are themselves descriptive, words in common use and
every person of average intelligence understands their meaning. Whether a picture is
obscene/indecent must depend on the circumstances of the case.
The Court turned to Federal Laws prohibiting the use and importation of obscene materials into
the Philippines in order to shed light on what constitutes as obscene or indecent. “Obscene” as
used in the Federal statutes makes it a criminal offense to place in the mail any obscene, lewd,
or lascivious publication, signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity,
has the same meaning given at common law in prosecutions for obscene libel.
The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted
presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine
community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by
photographs of this type.
Final Ruling: The SC reversed the judgement of the lower court. The Information was
dismissed. Defendant-appellant acquitted with all costs de oficio.
People vs. Aparici
52 OG 249 (1953)
the test whether a particular act is obscene is its tendency “to deprave or corrupt those whose
minds are open to such influences”, be they cultured or not.
FACTS: On February 3, 1953 Detectives Nibungco and Jose accompanied by photographers
Fajardo and Domingo of the Manila Chronicle, went to Azcarraga Theatre, in order to observe
what was being exhibited by the accused Virginia Aparici in the said theatre. She was in a dimly
lit stage dancing with her hips swaying with nothing on except nylon patches over her breasts
and a too abbreviated pair of nylon panties to interrupt her stark nakedness and around her
waist was a furry white girdle with a middle piece punctuating attention on the thing she was
supposed to hide.
In the said theatre, there were more than 100 customers and all of them were men. Most of them
have been howling and shouting in tagalog: “sigue muna, sigue nakakalibog”. Detectives
Nibungco and Jose stopped the show and asked the accused to put on her dress and to
surrender to them her brassiere and panties.
In her defense, she claimed that her performance (hula hula dance) was her portrayal of the life
of a widow whose guerrilla husband was killed by the Japanese; depicting the different emotions
of the widow such as sadness, anger and happiness.
Virginia Aparici was prosecuted for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code which
penalizes:
“3. Those who in theatres, fairs, cinematographs or any other place open to public
view, shall exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts and shows.”1
ISSUE: WON APARICI’S PERFORMANCE WAS CONSIDERED INDECENT OR IMMORAL,
THUS, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 201 OF THE RPC.
HELD: YES. The Court of Appeals held that the accused had exhibited indecent and immoral
acts. The gauge whether her dancing was immoral or indecent was the reaction of the public.
Evidently, the spectators had given their unequivocal verdict when they were howling and
shouting: “Sigue muna, sigue, nakakalibog”. Counsel for defense also advances the argument
that the reaction of the low class and uncultured audience is an unreliable gauge in determining
the objective indecency and decency of a performance. The court clarified that the test whether
a particular act is obscene is its tendency “to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to
such influences”, be they cultured or not.
Final Ruling: Accused is guilty.
1 Before amended by PD Nos. 960 and 969.
 People vs. Pandan
G.R. no. L-7295 (June 28, 1957)
Montemayor, J.
an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no
redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art.
FACTS: Defendants Marina Padan, Jose Fajardo, Cosme Espinosa, and Ernesto Reyes were
charged with a violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, said to have been committed
as follows: That on or about the 13th day of September, 1953, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously exhibit or cause to be exhibited inside a building in Tondo, Manila, immoral
scenes and acts, to wit: the said accused Jose Fajad, being then the manager and Ernesto
Reyes, as ticket collector and or exhibitor, willfully ,unlawfully and feloniously hired their co-
accused Marina Palan and Cosme Espinosa to act as performers or exhibitionists who
performed sexual intercourse (Live Sex Show) in the presence of many spectators, thereby
exhibiting or performing highly immoral and indecent acts or shows thereat.
2. On the appeal of Fajardo, he claimed that he was an innocent bystander but that because of
his popularity in the neighborhood, he was requested by the spectators to select the man and
the woman to engage or indulge in the actual act of coitus before the spectators. After making
the selection, he did not even care to witness the act but left the scene and returned to it only
when he heard a commotion produced by the raid conducted by the police.
The evidence on his active participation and that he was the manager and one in charge of the
show is however ample, even conclusive. In 1953, the place used for ping-pong was used for an
exhibition of human "fighting fish", the actual act of coitus or copulation. Tickets were sold at P3
each, and the show was supposed to begin at 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
The Manila Police Department must have gotten wind of the affair; it bought tickets and provided
several of its members who later attended the show, but in plain clothes, and after the show
conducted a raid and made arrests. At the trial, said policemen testified as to what actually took
place inside the building. About two civilians who attended the affair gave testimony as to what
they saw.

All of the accused, except for Marina Pandan pleaded guilty. At the trial, the three remaining
accused, were all found guilty of th crime charged. Only Jose Fajardo was able to file his appeal
on time, as appellants Espinosa and Reyes failed to file their briefs within the period prescribed
by law and their appeal was dismissed.
Fajardo contends that he was not the manager or the person incharge of the show or
proceedings on that night. His participation, was to play the role of an innocent bystander, but
that because of his popularity in the neighborhood, he was requested by the spectators to select
the man and the woman to engage or indulge in the actual act of coitus before the spectators;
that after making the selection, he did not even care to witness the act but left the scene and
returned to it only when he heard a commotion produced by the raid conducted by the police.
ISSUE/s: 1. WON THE OFFENSE AS CHARGED HAD INDEED BEEN COMMITTED?
2. WON THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT FAJARDO WAS INDEED
THE MANAGER OR PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE IMMORAL AND
INDECENT ACT OR SHOW?
The customers not provided with tickets actually paid P3 at the entrance to defendant Ernesto
Reyes. He also collected tickets. In all, there were about ninety paying customers, while about
sixteen were allowed to enter free, presumably friends of the management. Defendant-Appelant
Fajardo was clearly the manager of the show. He was at the door to see to it that the customers
either were provided with tickets or paid P3 entrance fee. He even asked them from whom they
had bought the tickets. He ordered that an army steel bed be placed at the center of the floor,
covered with an army blanket and provided with a pillow. Besides, as found by the trial court and
as shown by some of the tickets collected from the spectators, submitted as exhibits, said tickets
while bearing on one side superimposed with rubber stamped name "Pepe Fajardo," which
defendant Fajardo admits to be his name.
Considering all the above circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Jose Fajardo is the
most guilty of the four, for he was the one who conducted the show and presumably derived the
most profit or gain from the same.
Final Ruling: The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court.
-

By: Eldren
HELD: Yes. This is the first time that the courts in this jurisdiction, have been called upon to
take cognizance of an offense against morals and decency of this kind. We have had occasion
to consider offenses like the exhibition of still moving pictures of women in the nude, which we
have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In those cases, one might yet claim
that there was involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and
sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body
exhibited in sheer nakedness.

But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no
redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. The four or five witnesses who testified for the
Government when asked about their reaction to what they saw, frankly admitted that they were
excited beyond description. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity,
indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and
lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land.
G.R. No. 169364               September 18, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as Michelangelo
painted, or Beethoven composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep streets
so well that all the hosts of Heaven and Earth will pause to say, here lived a great street
sweeper who did his job well.
– Martin Luther King, Jr.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order1 of Branch 11, Davao
City Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting respondents’ Petition
for Certiorari and declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code
unconstitutional.
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy
pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated
November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and
raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City. The Informations, read:
That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any
visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.2
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability
to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of
support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and
those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code,
shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another
without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished
by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from
200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to
Quash3 on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
In an Order4 dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed
respondents anew to file their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also
declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power and justified
by the Latin maxim "salus populi est suprem(a) lex," which calls for the subordination of
individual benefit to the interest of the greater number, thus:
Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An authority on
police power, Professor Freund describes laconically police power "as the power of promoting
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." (Citations omitted).
In fact the person’s acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by the police power of the state. The
justification found in the Latin maxim, salus populi est supreme (sic) lex" (the god of the people
is the Supreme Law). This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the
greater number.In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA
with Annex "A" lucidly shows that there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports
that vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the two accused (among other
women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male customer. Thus, on
that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case. Thus, in the interest of
substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must be given their day in Court: the
prosecution proof of the crime, and the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the
accused in the indictment can’t be categorized as a crime.5
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay
Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area
reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Hence, the
prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the crime, and the defense to rebut the
evidence.1avvphi1
Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City,6 directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming
that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results
as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its
coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed
that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it
discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable
classification.
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the Court’s ruling
in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,7 the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free
speech cases and not to penal statutes. It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be presumed
valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome this presumption.
On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared
unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo, dated April 28, 2004, denying the petitioners’
Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is ordered to dismiss the subject criminal cases
against the petitioners pending before it.
SO ORDERED.8
In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is vague and it
violated the equal protection clause. It held that the "void for vagueness" doctrine is equally
applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville,9 where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of the United States, the trial court ruled:
The U.S. Supreme Court’s justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy Ordinance
are equally applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being "found loitering about public or
semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without
visible means of support" offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to who should
be arrested and who should not.
Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these times of
recession when there are many who are "without visible means of support" not by reason of
choice but by force of circumstance as borne out by the high unemployment rate in the entire
country.
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason than the
fact that he cannot find gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to injury.10
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, the trial court declared:
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs
afoul of the equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable classification
between those covered by the law and those who are not.
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or
inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case
offending.
Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised
Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who
have no visible means of support by force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about
and bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial
scrutiny of its constitutionality.11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE12
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,13 the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only and
are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that respondents failed to overcome
the presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set
out by the Courts; and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public
welfare in the exercise of its police power.
On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face violates the constitutionally-
guaranteed rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws; that the due process
vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to
declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional and void on its face; and that the presumption of
constitutionality was adequately overthrown.
The Court finds for petitioner.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature
and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police
power. The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and
lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged.14 However, in exercising its
power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with
reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain
understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid.15 This requirement has
come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law."16
In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,17 the Court recognized the application of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriate cases. The Court therein held:
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring
to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be
deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition
should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No.
8189 – the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law
covering provisions which are alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment
that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.18
The first statute punishing vagrancy – Act No. 519 – was modeled after American vagrancy
statutes and passed by the Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870
which was in force in this country up to December 31, 1931 did not contain a provision on
vagrancy.19 While historically an Anglo-American concept of crime prevention, the law on
vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised Penal
Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:
ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. – The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability
to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of
support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps and
those who habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code,
shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another
without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished
by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from
200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any
person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible means of support. This provision was based on
the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined "vagrant" as "every person found
loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the
country without visible means of support." The second clause was essentially retained with the
modification that the places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in
general terms – public or semi-public places.
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support
mainly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville20 case,
which in essence declares:
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are
entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.
Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of the
offending conduct. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391;
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the
field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow
category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337;
United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S.
1.
The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and not alerted
to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding
of their meaning and impact if they read them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the
vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws
v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra.
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards, are normally
innocent. "Nightwalking" is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one night's
wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at 855, only the "habitual" wanderer or, as the
ordinance describes it, "common night walkers." We know, however, from experience that
sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.
Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that "loafing" was a
national virtue in his Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in
Jacksonville.
xxxx
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and
Vachel Lindsay. The qualification "without any lawful purpose or object" may be a trap for
innocent acts. Persons "neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served" would literally embrace
many members of golf clubs and city clubs.
Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or
loiterers may be "casing" a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family
matter, and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for
numerous crimes.
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known
them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten
amenities have been, in part, responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and
self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent, and
have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have
encouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.
xxxx
Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, those
convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority:
"The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before the
magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction' for
almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and
convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to have no other immediate solution."
Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.
xxxx
Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack of notice
given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of
the Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote, an early student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-
type law as offering "punishment by analogy." Such crimes, though long common in Russia, are
not compatible with our constitutional system.
xxxx
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where
liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are to
become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these
generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in the bud -- is too extravagant to
deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course,
they are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies
equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the
scales of justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The
rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is
the great mucilage that holds society together.21
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance "fails
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute;" and 2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory
law enforcement.
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2)
in this case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application
here because under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.22 This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal
conduct in this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule
that admits of exceptions.23
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific
provisions thereof, which are not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance
Code § 257) provided, as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common gamblers,
persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or
strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers,
disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or
served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor
children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished
as provided for Class D offenses.
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because
such activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful
purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which are
otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities
not found in Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) – "any person found loitering about
public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the
streets without visible means of support" – from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be "persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object." But
these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by "without visible means of
support" while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering or strolling "without any lawful
purpose or object," which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a "trap for innocent
acts."
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.24 Thus, as with any other act or offense, the
requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that
may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating
Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the respondents, echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered
discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged
by the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but
more than suspicion or possibility.25
Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain
of punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense,
is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the
arrest.26
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their to assert their claims.31 Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially
houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same,
impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury.32
sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents
him from being irreversibly cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most
Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts – from public indecencies and
unhappy in some measure agreeable.27
immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts punished are made illegal by
their offensiveness to society’s basic sensibilities and their adverse effect on the quality of life of
As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting the people of society. For example, the issuance or making of a bouncing check is deemed a
previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this public nuisance, a crime against public order that must be abated.33 As a matter of public policy,
satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not the failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to
moved by respondents’ trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse return said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
in their case. sanctions.34 Thus, public nuisances must be abated because they have the effect of interfering
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by members of a community.
Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the
constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against
streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing "watch-your- the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status,
car" boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to
performing acts that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets and endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or
parks have become the training ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened and unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
battle-scarred criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking
people being robbed, swindled, harassed or mauled – if not killed – by the scourge of the
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a
streets. Blue collar workers are robbed straight from withdrawing hard-earned money from the
public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and
ATMs (automated teller machines); students are held up for having to use and thus exhibit
time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and
publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-seeking gangs; innocent
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
passers-by are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men walking the streets; fair-looking or pretty
ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of
women are stalked and harassed, if not abducted, raped and then killed; robbers, thieves,
members of the community.
pickpockets and snatchers case streets and parks for possible victims; the old are swindled of
their life savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly
pester and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law- Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should
abiding drivers and citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the streets and in train its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives
public places, day or night. difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs work the streets in the wee hours of the morning,
dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-
abiding citizens late at night and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets. Rugby-
The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them each day, or
sniffing individuals crowd our national parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes wait for
else we can never say that we have performed our task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid
customers by the roadside all around the metropolis, some even venture in bars and
the streets of the scourge of humanity, and restore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in
restaurants. Drug-crazed men loiter around dark avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens.
them.
Dangerous groups wander around, casing homes and establishments for their next hit. The
streets must be made safe once more. Though a man’s house is his castle,35 outside on the
This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws streets, the king is fair game.
were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human
society. These laws may be traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also
The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
come to be associated with the struggle to improve the citizens’ quality of life, which is
guaranteed by our Constitution.28 Civilly, they are covered by the "abuse of rights" doctrine
embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations, to the end,
in part, that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.29 This
provision is, together with the succeeding articles on human relations, intended to embody
certain basic principles "that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order."30

In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal
disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled
to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court
Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be
presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is
elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing
in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in
favor of its constitutionality.36 The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is
based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and
the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be
in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.37

It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been
defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast
and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals,
and the general welfare.38 As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore
be viewed in a constitutional light.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus continue.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.