SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA, married to and assisted by PEDRO MAG-
ISA, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria filed a complainet for Annulment of

Document and Damages against private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa
claiming that he, together with his wife, Nonita A. Briboneria, are the owners
of a parcel of land. Among the improvements on this parcel of land is plaintiff’s
residential house.

The plaintiff was surprised that his with Nonita A. Briboneria sold to defendant
the house and lot by means of a Deed of Absolute sale although he never
authorized or empowered her to enter into any transaction regarding the sale,
transfer or conveyance of the above described house and lot. As a result of
the unauthorized sale, plaintiff was denied the use and enjoyment of his
properties since defendant had even leased the premises to another who in
turn had prohibited plaintiff from entering the premises.

After issues had been joined, petitioner served on the private respondent Mag-
sa a request for admission the material facts and material documents. After
Private respondents filed with the court a quo their Answer to Request for
Admission, the petitioner filed a Motion for Summary judgment claiming that
the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private respondents beyond
the ten day period fixed in the request and that the answer was not under
oath; that, consequently, the private respondents are deemed to have
admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request of
admission. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding the
matter of fact and documents requested to be admitted are mere reiterations
and/or reproductions of those alleged in the complaint?

RULING: No. A cursory reading of the petitioner’s complaint and his request
for admission clearly shows, as found by respondent appellate court, that "the
material matters and documents set forth in the request for admission are the
same as those set forth in the complaint which private respondents either
admitted or denied in their answer."

A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by

his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required
to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the
complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or
reiterate the allegations of the requesting party’s pleading but should set forth
relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited

0
with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party’s cause of action or
defense.

Under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the request for admission must
be served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is
directed cannot be deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any relevant
document described in and exhibited with the request or relevant matters of
fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request for
admission. Section 1 of Rule 23 (now Section 1, Rule 26) of the Rules of Court
which expressly states that ‘a party may serve upon any other party a written
request’ should receive no other construction than that the request for
admission must be served directly on the party and not on his counsel.
Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court does not
control the mode of service or request for admission. It should be observed
that the orders, motions and other papers mentioned in said section have this
property in common: they have to be filed with the court. A request for
admission, on the other hand, need not be filed with the court; it was intended
to operate extra-judicially and courts are not burdened with the duty to
determine the propriety or impropriety of the request for admission.

In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was not
served upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty.
Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa, therefore, cannot be deemed to
have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission
for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the
request.

1
 VICENTE YU, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EMILIO MAPAYO, defendant-appellee.

FACTS: The case originally started in the City Court of Davao, Branch II,
where appellant therein had filed suit to recover from defendant Emilio
Mapayo the sum of P2,800, representing the unpaid balance of the purchase
price of a Gray Marine Engine sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, plus
attorney’s fees. The answer admitted the transaction and the balance due but
contended that by reason of hidden defects of the article sold, the defendant
had been forced to spend P2,800 for repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had
agreed to waive the balance due on the price of the engine, and
counterclaimed for damages and attorneys’ fees.

The Court ordered plaintiff to present his evidence, and from the unchallenged
stenographic notes, the Court ordered the plaintiff to present his evidence.
Plaintiff’s counsel refused to comply with said order Instead of calling his
witnesses, he moved the Court to present them after the defendant had
presented their evidence. The court asked said counsel twice whether he
would present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do so
and stacked to his demand that he would introduce his witnesses only in
rebuttal. The trial court dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was proper?

2
RULING: No. We find, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Since the answer admitted
defendant’s obligation as stated in the complaint, albeit special defenses
were pleaded, plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for defendant to
come forward with evidence in support of his special defenses.

Plaintiffs counsel refused to comply with the order of the trial court requiring
plaintiff to present his evidence. Instead of calling his witnesses, he moved
the court to present them after the defendant had presented their evidence.
Such a stand is supported by Section 2 of the Revised Rule of Court 129.

Where the answer admits defendant’s obligation as stated in the complaint,

albeit special defenses are pleaded, plaintiff has every right to insist that it is
for defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his special
defenses. Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the dismissal
of the case for failure to prosecute on the part of counsel for the plaintiff was
manifestly untenable and contrary to law.

While this appeal is not a complaint against the presiding judge, We cannot
refrain from observing that the trial judge’s despotic and outrageous
insistence that plaintiff should present proof in support of allegations that
were not denied but admitted by the adverse party was totally unwarranted,
and was made worse by the trial judge’s continual interrupting of the
explanations of counsel, in violation of the rules of judicial ethics.

SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and ERLITO LORCA, petitioners vs.

HON. LUIS L. VICTOR, Judge Presiding over Branch XVI of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, TIMOTEA T. MORALDE, CAYETANO T. MORALDE, JR.,
ALEXANDER T. MORALDE, EMMANUEL T. MORALDE, and JOCELYN MORALDE
ABELLANA, respondents.

FACTS: On December 19, 1982, Bus No. 3008 of the Pantranco South Express,
Inc., Pantranco for short, driven by Rogelio Dillomas, collided with Bus No. 331
of the Superlines Transportation Co., Inc., Superlines for short, then driven by
Erlito Lorca along the highway at Lumilang, Calauag, Quezon, resulting in the
instantaneous death of Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., a passenger in the Pantranco

3
bus. On January 4, 1983, Superlines instituted an action for damages before
the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Gumaca Branch, against Pantranco
and Rogelio Dillomas, driver of said Pantranco Bus No. 3008. On February 11,
1983, private respondents Timotea T. Moralde, widow of the deceased
Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., and her children, all surnamed Moralde, and Jocelyn
M. Abellana, filed a complaint for damages of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City, against Superlines and its driver, Erlito Lorca, as well as
Pantranco and its driver, Rogelio Dillomas. On February 28, 1983, herein
petitioners Superlines and its driver Erlito Lorca filed a motion to dismiss in
Civil Case No. N-4338 on the ground of pendency of another action, obviously
referring to Civil Case No. 1671-G pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon, Gumaca Branch. The court denied the motion to dismiss. The
Intermediate Appellate Court likewise denied due course resorted to by
Superlines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Gumaca case and the Cavite Case should be
consolidated?

RULING: Yes. There is a more pragmatic solution to the cotroversy at bar; and
that is to consolidate the Gumaca case with the Cavite case. Considerations
of judicial economy and administration, as well as the convenience of the
parties for which the rules on procedure and venue were formulated, dictate
that it is the Cavite court, rather than the Gumaca court, which serves as the
more suitable forum for the determination of the rights and obligations of the
parties concerned. As observed by both the trial and appellate courts, to
require private respondents who are all residents of Kawit, Cavite, to litigate
their claims in the Quezon Court would unnecessarily expose them to
considerable expenses. On the other hand, no like prejudice would befall the
defendants transportation companies if they were required to plead their
causes in Cavite, for such change of venue would not expose them to
expenses which are not already liable to incur in connection with the Gumaca
case.

The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court
fully and completely available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can
be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect
exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural
justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity
for the powers of the count to transmute themselves into concrete acts of
justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not
to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it
effective facility in righteous action. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart
justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the
thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is

4
a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made
effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes
on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and
unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PHILIPPINE LEATHER CO.

INC. ET. AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS: The plaintiff alleges that the defendant Philippine Leather Co., Inc.
applied for a commercial credit in favor of the Turner Tanning Machinery Co.
to cover the full invoice value of certain machineries and their accessories.
After the draft had matures, the plaintiff maide numerous demands upon the
defendants to pay the amount of the draft and the charges due thereon by the
defendants failed and refused to pay. It further alleges that defendant
Philippine Leather Co. Inc applied for a commercial credit in favor of Bay State
Chemical Co., to pay for the importation of color dye. Thereafter, the draft
drawn by the Bay State Chemical Co., was presented by the plaintiff to the
defendants for payment and that the defendants failed and refused to pay the
amount of the draft and the charged due thereon. The plaintiff filed an action
for collection of sum of money. In their answer, the defendants admit the
plaintiff’s averments except to the correctness of the amounts. The plaintiff
filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since the defendants
admitted the material averments of its complaint except as to the correctness
of the amounts due, the defendant’s answer did not tender a genuine issue.
The court granted the motion. The defendants appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The latter certified the case to this court for the reason that only
questions of law are raised.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment?

RULING: No. In their answer, the defendants admit the plaintiff’s averments
excepts as to the correctness of the amounts due, the correctness of which
they were still checking, and for that reason lacking sufficient knowledge or
information to form a belief as to the truth and veracity of the amounts due,
they deny the amounts claimed by the plaintiff to be due them. Hence, plaintiff
is entitled to summary judgment. Furthermore, Rule 36 provides: virtual 1aw
library

Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking to

recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto
has been served, move with affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof.

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. --The motion shall be served at

least ten days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The

5
 judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions or file, together with the affidavits, show
that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as
to any of the material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.

GREGORIO APELARIO, doing business under the style “GREGORIO TRADING,”

plaintiff-appellee, vs. INES CHAVEZ & COMPANY, LTD., doing business under
the style “FIDELITY MOTOR SUPPLY COMPANY, LTD., and INES CHAVEZ,
defendants-appellants.

FACTS: Plaintiff Gregorio Apelario filed a complaint againes Ines Chaves &
Company, Td and its general partner. The defendant partnership purchased on
credit from plaintiff ten sets of axle assemblies to which the defendant
delivered in payment to the plaintiff two postdated cash checks. When the
cash checks were presented for payment, they were dishonored for lack of
funds, whereupon the defendant took back the checks and replaced them with
two other checks, also postdated. Plaintiff demanded payment in cash but
defendant refused to pay. Plaintiff then moved and duly obtained a writ of
attachment. Defendant obtained the lifting of the attachment by filing a
counter bond and thereafter filed an answer admitting the allegation of the
paragraphs but pleaded that defendants could not pay the plaintiff because
they have so many accounts receivables which have not yet been paid to
them, of which fact the defendant was duly informed by the plaintiff and
thereby requested to wait a while. The trial court rendered judgment on the
pleadings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in rendering judgment on the
pleadings because the issues raised are material?

RULING: No. The defendants-appellants admitted all the material allegations

of the complaint concerning the existence of the debt and its non-payment.
The pleaded excuse, that they had requested plaintiff to wait because
appellants’ many accounts receivable had not yet been collected, is no

6
defense, for a debtor can not delay payment due just to suit its convenience,
and the creditor is not an underwriter of his debtor’s business unless so
stipulated. The denial of the averments concerning the stipulated fees of
plaintiff’s attorney tendered no genuine issue, for even without such
allegation, it was discretionary in the court to allow reasonable attorney;s eed
by way of damages, if it found it just and equitable to allow their recovery
(Civil Code, Article 2208). Nor does the denial of the complaint’s averments
concerning the fraudulent removal and disposition of defendant’s property
constitute a bar to a judgment on the pleadings, since the defendant neither
claimed nor asked for any damages in account of the issuance and levy of the
writ of attachment. Under the circumstances, judgment of the pleadings was
proper.

POLICARPIO, LUCIO, JULIAN, CATALINO, BONIFACIO, CONRADA, DOMINGO,

PACQUITA, AND LILIA, ALL SURNAMED GALICIA, petitioners vs. THE HON.
WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, CFI, Branch V,
Samar (Calbayog City, ZOSIMA PALAJOS, TITING LISTOJAS, ALFREDO
PALAJOSE, MANUELITO RODIALDA, respondents.

FACTS: A complaint for forcible entry was filed in the Municipal Court of
Almagro, Samar, alleging that Amancio Palajos is the owner and in actual
possession of the parcel of land which he acquired by way of donation from
his father. It is further alleged that defendants (petitioners herein) forcibly
entered the northeastern portion of the said property covering an area of
about 1 ½ hectares. For the 5th time, neither the defendants nor their counsel
appeared. The court granted a trial ex parte on motion of plaintiff’s counsel.
The municipal trial court rendered judgment against defendants (petitioners
herein). Over14 months after the execution sale, petitioners filed a complaint

7
for Ownership and Damages against respondents alleging that they are co-
owners of a certain parcel of agricultural land (subject the auction sale) which
they inherited from their father Pedro Galicia.

The complaints further alleged that pursuant to the forcible entry case,
respondents were able to take possession of the land in question as said case
was heard ex-parte and that a decision was rendered in respondents’ favor
and said decision was executed sometime in 1976. The issues having been
enjoined, the case was set for pre-trial by respondent judge Hon. Wenceslao
M. Polo. At the pre-trial, counsel for private respondents moved for time within
which to file a motion for summary judgment which was granted by
respondent judge in his order dated June 28, 1978. Defendants' (private
respondents herein) motion for summary judgment was filed alleging that no
genuine issue exists in the case at bar after the pre-trial was conducted and
admission of facts were had, while plaintiffs (petitioners herein) filed their
opposition to the motion for summary judgment dated July 17, 1978 alleging
among others, that genuine issues exist. On August 11, 1978, the court
a quo rendered the assailed summary judgment dismissing petitioners'
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred when it decided Civil Case No 758-
CC by summary judgment?

RULING: No. The Rules of Court authorized the rendition of summary judgment
if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file together with the
affidavits, show that, excepts as to the amount of damages, there is no issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law (Sec. 3, Rule 34). Summary judgment is not proper where the
pleading tender vital issues the resolution of which call for the presentation of
evidence.

Summary judgment "is a device for weeding out sham claims or defenses at
early stage of litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial. The very object is "to separate what is formal or pretended
in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so that only the
latter may subject a suitor to the burden of trial.' The test, therefore, a motion
for summary judgment is — whether the pleadings, affidavits, exhibits in
support of the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to
justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no defense to the action or the
claim is clearly meritorious".

There is no question that the land in dispute is that parcel described, a portion
of which was a subject in a forcible entry case which culminated in the public
auction sale of the parcel of land now sought to be recovered. Having failed to
redeem the property sold at the public auction sale within the reglementary
period of twelve (12) months (Sec. 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court),
petitioners cannot now claim that they still own said property. Petitioners'

8
complainant for Ownership and Damages is but a belated and disguised
attempt to revive a judgment debtors' right of redemption which has long
expired. There being no issue as to any material fact raised in the pleadings,
summary judgment may be rendered.

Well-settled in this jurisdiction, is the rule that issues not raised and/or
ventilated in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The
validity of the execution sale not having been raised and/or litigated in the
case subject of the present appeal, the Court, at this stage, cannot pass upon
the same for the purpose of determining the propriety of the summary
judgment. Objections to the execution sale cannot be considered in the
Supreme Court inasmuch as it was not raised in the lower court.

9
 LUCIA S. PAJARITO, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO V. SEÑERIS, Presiding
Judge of Branch II, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga; JOSELITO AIZON,
and FELIPE AIZON, respondents.

FACTS: Upon his plea of guilty, a bus driver was convicted of the crime of
Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence and sentenced to indemnify
the victim’s heirs. When the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied
because of his insolvency, the victim’s mother moved for issuance of
subsidiary writ of execution in the same criminal case against the employer.
The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the employer was not a
party in the criminal case, and therefore a separate civil action must be filed
to enforce his subsidiary liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employer is subsidiarily liable?

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the employer’s subsidiary liability under
the Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case where the
award was made, and the validity of his claim that he is no longer the operator
of the bus is a matter that could be litigated and resolved within the same
proceeding because the execution of the judgment is a logical and integral
part of the case itself.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. As a consequence, the institution of the criminal
action carries with it the institution of the civil action arising therefrom,
except when there is a separate civil action or reservation of the latter on the
part of the complainant. Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of
the Revised Penal Code, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the
employee’s civil liability in a criminal action when: (1) the employer is
engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties; (3) he is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil
liability. The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after
conviction of the employee in the criminal case.

A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay an

indemnity, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the
offended party, is binding and conclusive upon the employer in an action for

10
the enforcement of the latter’s subsidiary liability, not only with regard to the
civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an
employer cannot be separated from but follows that of his employee. To allow
an employer to dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would be to
amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
Considering that the judgment of conviction, sentencing a defendant
employee to pay an indemnity under Article 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the latter’s
liability but also with regard to its amount, it was held that in an action to
enforce the employer’s subsidiary liability, the court has no other function
than to render a decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal
case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has
been committed in the decision.

Where the employer does not deny that he was the registered operator of the
bus but only claims that he sold the bus to the father of the accused, it would
serve no important purpose to require the heirs of the victim to file a separate
and independent action against the employer for the enforcement of the
latter’s subsidiary civil liability. Under the circumstances, it would not only
prolong the litigation but would require the heirs of the deceased victim to
incur unnecessary expenses. At any rate, the proceeding for the enforcement
of subsidiary liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the
execution of judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is
regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are
proceedings in the suit. The validity of the claim of an employer that he is no
longer the owner and operator of the ill-fated bus, as he had sold it to the
father of the accused, is a matter that could be litigated and resolved in the
same criminal case. In support of the employer’s opposition to the motion for
the purpose of enforcement of his subsidiary liability, the employer may
adduce all the evidence necessary for that purpose. Indeed, the enforcement
of the employer’s subsidiary liability may be litigated within the same
proceeding because the execution of the judgment is a logical and integral
part of the case itself. This would facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of the contending parties.

11
 VIRGILIO D. IMSON, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOLIDAY
HILLS STOCK AND BREEDING FARM CORPORATION, FNCB FINANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS: The case at bench arose from a vehicular collision on December 11,
1983, involving petitioner's Toyota Corolla and a Hino diesel truck registered
under the names of private respondents FNCB Finance Corporation and
Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation. The collision seriously
injured petitioner and totally wrecked his car. The beneficial owner and the
driver were declared in default. Compromise was reached with the insurer.
Owners now seek dismissal of the claims against them as well.

ISSUE: Whether or not the insurer is an indispensable party?

RULING: No. The insurer is not an indispensable party to the case. The only
indispensable party here is the driver of the truck. All the others are mere
necessary parties. The case should proceed. The rule is dismissal of the case

12
against an indispensable party results in dismissal of the case against the
other indispensable parties. The insurer is merely a necessary party.
Dismissal of the case against him will only result to dismissal of the claim
against the other defendants.

Defendants in Civil Case No. 248-R are not all indispensable parties. An
indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's
action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case
can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the
relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his
legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his
absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the
court, which is effective, complete, or equitable.

It is true that all of petitioner's claims in Civil Case No. 248-R is premised on
the wrong committed by defendant truck driver. Concededly, the truck driver
is an indispensable party to the suit. The other defendants, however, cannot
be categorized as indispensable parties. They are merely proper parties to the
case. Proper parties have been described as parties whose presence is
necessary in order to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests
are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without
affecting them. 17 It is easy to see that if any of them had not been impleaded
as defendant, the case would still proceed without prejudicing the party not
impleaded. Thus, if petitioner did not sue Western Guaranty Corporation, the
omission would not cause the dismissal of the suit against the other
defendants. Even without the insurer, the trial court would not lose its
competency to act completely and validly on the damage suit. The insurer,
clearly, is not an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 248-
R.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Furthrermore, for Lim Tanhu  to apply to the case at bench, it must be

established that: (1) petitioner has common cause of action against private
respondents and the other defendants in Civil Case No. 248-R; and (2) all the
defendants are indispensable parties to the case. Cause of action is the delict
or wrong by which the right of the plaintiff is violated by the defendant. Quite
clearly then, Lim Tanhu will not apply to the case at bench for there is no
showing that petitioner has a common cause of action against the defendants
in Civil Case No. 248-R.

HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO J. HABALUYAS, petitioners, vs.

JUDGE MACIMO M. JAPZON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, SHUGO
NODA & CO., LTD and SHUYA NODA, respondents.

13
FACTS: On October 1, 1984, the plaintiffs received an order denying their
motion for execution based on a compromise. On the fifteenth day, the
plaintiffs filed a motion for extension of twenty days within which to submit
their motion for reconsideration. On October 23, the plaintiffs filed their
motion for new trial and their “notice of appeal (conditional)”. The court
granted the motion for new trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a
motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court
may be extended?

RULING: No. The trial court erred in granting the motion for new trial. The
fifteen-day period for appealing or from filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended. The Judiciary Revamp Law is designed to avoid the
procedural delays which plagued the administration of justice under the rules
of court which were originally intended to assist the parties in obtaining a
just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. Petition is granted.

14
 MARCELINO BELAMIDE, ALFREDO BELAMIDE (deceased and herein
substituted by his children Rodolfo, Reynaldo, Lilian and Alfredo, Jr., all
surnamed Belamide), JOSE BELAMIDE, ANTONIO BELAMIDE, MARIA
BELAMIDE, LEONISA BELAMIDE and SALUD BELAMIDE, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BIENVENIDO MONTOYA, FRANCISO
MONTOYA and GREGORIO MONTOYA, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners herein were the applicants for the registration of the
parcel of land involved in this case. The private respondents were the
oppositors allowed on Motion for a New Trial, to file an opposition even after a
decision has already been rendered by then Judge Felix V. Makasiar, after
hearing, following the issuance of a general default order.

The oppositors allege that the acquisition was made during the first marriage
of Vicenta Montoya to Martin Montoya, whereas the applicants maintain that
such land was acquired during the marriage (second marriage) of Vicenta
Montoya to Jose Velardo. Both contentions are not supported by any
document. However, the fact that Susana Velardo Belamide sold a portion of
the land in question to the Municipality of Silang, Cavite (for (widening of the
street) on May 1933 without the intervention of, or opposition from, Hilarion
Montoya who died on December 2, 1955, coupled with the fact that Susana
Velardo Belamide has possession of the property since the death of her
mother (Vicenta Montoya) in 1931 after she sold the same to the herein
applicants on July 20, 1951, convince the Court that said property was
acquired during the coverture of Jose Velardo and Vicenta Montoya.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the amended decision of the Court of First
Instance and denied a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners
herein on June 29, 1971, as well as a Motion for a New Trial. The ground for
the Motion for New Trial was that Exhibit 8 of the oppositors (private
respondents herein), which was allegedly relied upon by both the Court of
First Instance, and the Court of Appeals is a falsified document.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

discretion by denying petitioners’ Motion for New Trial?

RULING: No. There can be no grave abuse of discretion by the Court of

Appeals in denying petitioners’ Motion for New Trial. The document alleged to
be falsified was presented in the trial in the lower court. Petitioners should
have attacked the same as falsified with competent evidence, which could
have been presented, if they had exercised due diligence in obtaining said
evidence, which is Annex "A" 1 to the Motion for New Trial. It is, therefore, not
a newly discovered evidence that could justify a new trial (Rule 37 [1-b], Rules
of Court). The new evidence would neither change the result as found by the
decision. It might prove that Hilarion Montoya was registered at birth without

15
his father having been given, but from the testimony of Marcelino Belamide,
one of the applicants (now petitioners), Vicenta Montoya was married twice,
although he did not know the first husband. Likewise, in the opposition of
private respondents, it is there alleged that the land originally belonged to the
spouses Martin Montoya and Vicenta Montoya. This allegation was never
contradicted.

The document sought to be presented by petitioners, as stated in their Motion

for New Trial in the Court of Appeals, cannot effectively destroy this
allegation, first, because the marriage between Martin Montoya and Vicenta
Montoya could have taken place after the birth of Hilarion Montoya who was
thus legitimized, and second, Martin Montoya and Vicenta Montoya evidently
lived together as husband and wife, and are, therefore, presumed to have been
legally married (Section 5, par. [bb], Rule 131, Rules of Court). This Court held
that a man and a woman who are living under the same roof are presumed to
be legitimate spouses (Que Quay v. Collector of Customs, 33 Phil. 128), and in
the instant case, no less than one of the herein petitioners, Marcelino
Belamide, testified that Vicenta Montoya married twice. The records suggest
no other husband by the first marriage than Martin Montoya, who then could
have been the father of Hilarion Montoya who, undisputedly, is the son of
Vicenta Montoya. With the law and the evidence showing with reasonable
sufficiency that Hilarion Montoya from whom private respondents would
derive hereditary rights over the land in question, is the legitimate son of
Vicenta Montoya, the adjudication of said land by the lower court, as specified
in its decision, is in accordance with law.

16
 EMILIANO J. VALDEZ, petitioners, vs. FERNANDO JUGO, Judge of First
Instance of Manila, Et. Al., respondents.

FACTS: Emiliano J. Valdez filed his motion for new trial on November 22, 1941,
and set it for hearing almost one month thereafter, i.e., on December 20, 1941.

Valdez argued that such delayed hearing was because he wanted to have time
to study the transcript of the testimony of witnesses and find out reasons in
support of the grounds alleged in his motion. Unquestionably, therefore, he
filed his motion without knowing whether the grounds therefor were or were
not good, and wanted to delay the proceedings to gain time for study.

Again, asked as to why, when he was already in Manila and the Manila courts
were already open, he failed to inquire as to the result of his motion for new
trial, he candidly answered that he was not interested in speeding up the
proceedings because he was the defeated party.

The court denied the relief prayed for by Valdez.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of Petitioner’s motion interrupts the period for
appeal

RULING:
Petitioner’s motion for new trial did not and could not interrupt the period for
appeal, it having failed to state in detail as required by the rules, the reasons

17
in support of the grounds alleged therein. Under Rule 37, section 2, third
paragraph, it is now required to "point out specifically the findings or
conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or
which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or
documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to
such findings or conclusions." And when, as in the instant case, the motion
fails to make the specification thus required, it will be treated as a motion pro-
forma intended merely to delay the proceedings, and as such, it shall be
stricken out as offensive to the new rules.

Petitioner’s case justifies indeed the full rigor of the new rules, there being
circumstances showing a deliberate attempt on his part to delay the
proceedings for his own convenience. He filed his motion for new trial on
November 22, 1941, and set it for hearing almost one month thereafter, i. e.,
on December 20, 1941. The reason he gave in his oral argument to justify such
delayed hearing was that he wanted to have time to study the transcript of the
testimony of witnesses and find out reasons in support of the grounds alleged
in his motion. Unquestionably, therefore, he filed his motion without knowing
whether the grounds therefor were or were not good, and wanted to delay the
proceedings to gain time for study. Again, asked as to why, when he was
already in Manila and the Manila courts were already open, he failed to inquire
as to the result of his motion for new trial, he candidly answered that he was
not interested in speeding up the proceedings because he was the defeated
party. With such an attitude this Court cannot be moved to grant an equitable
relief.

JOSEPPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge of The Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Branch VI), petitioners, vs. BRAULIO STO. DOMINGO
and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS: In the local elections in San Juan, Rizal, candidates for Mayor were
then incumbent Mayor Nicanor Ibuna, Nacionalista Party official candidate;
respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo, Liberal Party official candidate; petitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, independent; and Enrique Lenon, also independent.
On December 31, 1967, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Braulio
Sto. Domingo as elected Mayor with 7,926 votes as against Joseph Ejercito
Estrada with 7,882, or a plurality of 44 votes. Nicanor Ibuna ran third with
6,775 votes. Enrique Lenon obtained 55 votes. In due course, petitioner
Estrada lodged an election protest, and respondent Sto. Domingo counter-

18
protested, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. the Court hereby annuls and
sets aside the proclamation of the protestee, Dr. Braulio Sto. Domingo and
hereby proclaims and declares the protestant, Joseph Ejercito Estrada as the
Mayor duly elected for the Municipality of San Juan. Sto. Domingo's counsel
was served with copy of the decision on October 30, 1968.

On the last day of the five-day period to appeal statutorily fixed by Section
178, Revised Election Code, Sto. Domingo filed a motion to reconsider the
decision. Copy of the motion was sent to Estrada's counsel by registered
special delivery mail and with notice that the motion would be heard on the
following Saturday. Sto. Domingo therein averred that the trial judge erred.

Came November 9, 1968. Sto. Domingo and his counsel appeared in court.
Absent were Estrada and his counsel, both of whom until then had not
received copy of the motion. For lack of proof that Estrada had received
notice of the motion for reconsideration, the hearing thereof was reset.

In the afternoon of the same day Estrada, who got wind of what took place in
the trial court that morning, filed an "omnibus motion" alleging that Sto.
Domingo's motion for reconsideration was not legally sanctioned flimsy and
frivolous, a mere scrap of paper, and intended for delay. He prayed that motion
be stricken out and that the judgment be immediately executed as it had
become final and executory. Parenthetically, Estrada's counsel was personally
served a copy of the motion for reconsideration only on November 11, 1968
upon the court's verbal order given on the 9th of November. At the November
12 hearing, the judge advised the parties to submit memoranda of authorities
and reset both the omnibus motion and the motion to reconsider on November
16, 1968.

It was on the scheduled hearing of November 16 that Sto. Domingo completed

proof of service by mail of his motion for reconsideration by the presentation
of the registry return card postmarked November 13. Estrada's counsel orally
moved for the immediate resolution of the pending incidents. The judge was
ready to rule on the motions. Sto. Domingo demurred, pleaded that his
memorandum and opposition to the omnibus motion be first considered; that
in the event of an adverse resolution he be allowed at least five (5) days from
receipt to enable him to procure extraordinary relief from the Court of
Appeals. The judge thereupon declared that he would promulgate the
resolution in open court.

On November 19, 1968, Sto. Domingo filed a cautionary notice of appeal,

manifesting that he would appeal to the Court of Appeals in the event his
motion for reconsideration be thwarted. Admittedly, however, he withdrew the
cautionary notice of appeal later. This withdrawal was granted by the court.
On November 20, 1968, upon Sto. Domingo's urgent motion, the judge
calendared the promulgation of the resolution for November 25, 1968, at 8:30
a.m. A hectic day, November 25, began at 7 :30 a.m. when Sto Domingo's
counsel saw the judge to ask for a copy of the order. The judge told him to

19
wait until the order shall have been read in open court. An hour later, 8:30
a.m., when the case was called, Sto. Domingo's counsel requested that the
case be called again at 10:00 a.m. purportedly on the ground that he would
first ask for the postponement of another case in Caloocan City. The court
granted the request.

Upon the other hand, with equal dispatch, Estrada tried to fend off Sto.
Domingo's move when he filed with the Court of Appeals, although belatedly,
at 10:43 a.m., a 5 page opposition to the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus attaching thereto his oath of office. At 10:52 a.m. before the trial
court adjourned, a bailiff of the Court of Appeals served on then Judge Andres
Reyes, presiding over the trial court, the summons and restraining order; and
at 11:50 a.m. likewise served the summons and restraining order upon
Estrada. After hearing, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the disputed
decision of February 13, 1969, mentioned at the start of this opinion.
Reconsideration thereof was denied by said court on May 22, 1969.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said trial court's order of November 25, 1968 which
held final and executory the decision aforementioned declaring petitioner the
winner in the election contest for the mayoralty of San Juan, Rizal is void?

RULING: The merits of the election protest are not before us in these
proceedings. But as this decision will have the effect of affirming the finality
of the judgment of the trial court upholding the protest of petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, we have gone over the records of the Court of First Instance
and the Court of Appeals

which have been elevated to this Court. And we are satisfied that our decision
here does not defeat the expressed will of the electorate of San Juan, Rizal.
For the reason given —

(1) the judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated on February 13, 1969 is
hereby set aside; and(2) the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Election Case No. 10545 entitled "Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Protestant, versus
Braulio Sto. Domingo, Protestee", declaring Joseph Ejercito Estrada as the
duly elected Mayor for the Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal in the
elections held on November 14, 1967 with a plurality of 192 votes, with costs
against protestee, is hereby declared final and executory as of November 5,
1968.

20
 SPOUSED CARLOS DAVID and TERESITS DAVID, and JESUS B. PASION,
petitioners, vs. HON. OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan Branch w, Baliuag, Bulacan,
(now the Regional Trial Court, Baliuag Branch), FRANCISCA LAGMAN
MANANGHAYA, in her own behalf and as natural guardian of her minor
children NOEL, NOLLY and JOY, all surnamed MANGHAYA, respondents.

FACTS: On March 7, 1980, a gravel and sand truck driven by petitioner Jesus
B. Pasion and owned and operated by his co-petitioners, Spouses Carlos David
and Teresita David, hit Paulino Mananghaya in front of Mantrade Building,
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila, resulting in the latter's
death. Subsequently on May 25, 1980, Paulino's wife, Francisca Lagman
Mananghaya, in her own behalf and as natural guardian of her minor children
Noel, Nolly and Joy,(hereinafter private respondents) filed before the then
Court of First Instance (CPI) of Bulacan an action for damages docketed as
Civil Case No. 1136-B against petitioners.

For failure to file their answer despite service of summons, petitioners as

defendants in said Civil Case No. 1136-B were declared in default. Private
respondents as plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte,
after which a decision was rendered on April 10, 1981 ordering petitioners to
pay private respondents jointly and severally the amount of P100,000.00 as
moral damages; P80, 000.00 as exemplary damages; P100,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages; P1,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs.

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial, which was denied in the lower court's
order for having been filed one day late. In the same Order, the court granted
private respondents' prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution. A Writ of
Execution dated June 10, 1981 was correspondingly issued directing the
Provincial Sheriff of San Fernando, Pampanga to cause to be made of the
goods and chattels of petitioners the sums awarded to private respondents in
respondent court's decision of April 10, 1981. Consequently, some personal
properties of the spouses David were levied upon and sold at public auction,
the proceeds of which amounting to P12,000.00 were subsequently delivered
to private respondents.

21
Having received a copy of the Order, petitioners filed on the same day a
motion for reconsideration of the Order and a motion to quash the writ of
execution dated, calling the attention of the lower court to the fact that the
30th day of the reglementary period for the filing of an appeal fell on a Sunday
so that the filing of the motion on the 31st day was nevertheless still within
the reglementary period for appeal. The lower court issued an order
reconsidering its previous order of June 5, 1981, granting petitioners' motion
for new trial and recalling the writ of execution dated June 10, 1981.
Resultantly, petitioners were allowed to file their Answer with Counterclaim
for damages against private respondents, who countered with a Motion to
Dismiss Counterclaim and Reply to Answer. The latter's motion to dismiss was
denied by the lower court.

On June 5, 1982, petitioners filed a Motion for Restitution which was resolved
by respondent lower court in its assailed that defendants' properties levied in
execution are hereby ordered to be returned to them pending new trial. In the
event that this could not be done, dependants may, in the event of favorable
judgment, go after plaintiffs' bond.

In their motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted Order, petitioners

manifested that they are in accord with the first paragraph of said order but
seek a reconsideration of the second paragraph by setting the same aside and
ordering the return of the proceeds of P12,000.00 obtained from the sale of
their personal properties considering that private respondents have not
posted a bond as a condition precedent to the taking of said properties as the
same was done pursuant to a decision believed by the private respondents to
be final and executory but which later turned out not to be so in view of the
allowance of petitioners' motion for new trial by the respondent lower court.

Respondent court denied petitioners' aforesaid motion for reconsideration in

its second assailed Order dated December 1, 1982 on the ground that a new
trial had been ordered as early as February 8, 1982. cdphilHence this petition
seeking to annul and set aside the two aforementioned Orders of respondent
judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Hon. Respondent Court acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction?

RULING: We rule for the petitioners. "The law is unmistakably clear that once
a new trial is granted under aforesaid Rule, the original judgment is vacated.
The phrase "to vacate" applied to a judgment means "to annul, to render void."

As petitioners' motion for new trial was subsequently granted by the

respondent court, this resulted in the nullification of its judgment by default
dated April 10, 1981 against petitioners in said civil case, including all the

22
consequential effects thereof, to wit: the Writ of Execution, the corresponding
levy on the personal properties of petitioners and the public auction sale. The
Court thus finds validity and strength in petitioners' claim for restitution of the
P12,000.00 proceeds of the sale on execution of petitioners' personal
properties levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution which was
subsequently recalled due to the granting of a new trial in the subject civil
case.

Considering that the motion for restitution was filed while the subject civil
case was still undergoing trial, a stage wherein the rights and obligations of
the parties have not yet been determined, it would be unfairly enriching the
private respondents, even temporarily, if they are allowed to keep possession
of the proceeds of the sale of petitioners' personal properties in the amount of
P12,000.00. As Civil Case No. 1136-B then stood, there has yet been no
adjudication of rights and obligations between the parties. Furthermore, there
was never a plaintiffs bond to speak of in the first place against which
petitioners may proceed in case of a favorable judgment since the writ of
execution was issued pursuant to a judgment then thought to be final and
executory.

ADALIA B. FRANCISCO, ZENAIDA FRANCISCO, ESTER FRANCISCO, ADELUISA

FRANCISCO and ELIZABETH FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. HON. BENIGNO M.
PUNO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II,
Lucena City and JOSEFINA F. LAGAR, respondents.

FACTS: Before the lower court, private respondent filed a civil case for
reconveyance of property and damages. The complaint was dismissed
notwithstanding defendant's having been declared in default on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence to sustain the cause of action alleged. Subsequently,
private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration which
was likewise denied for having been filed out of time, 32 days after the copy of
the decision was served on her counsel-of-record. A petition for relief under

23
Rule 38 was then resorted to. Petitioners maintained that aside from the fact
that no excusable negligence has been alleged, the petition was filed out of
time. The respondent Judge granted the petition ruling that it is the date when
private respondent actually learned of the decision from which she seeks
relief that should be considered incomputing the 60 days prescribed for
purposes of determining the timeliness of the petition and not the date of
service to counsel.

ISSUES: Whether or not the judge acted beyond his jurisdiction?

RULING: A party who has filed a timely motion for new trial cannot file a
petition for relief after his motion has been denied. These two remedies are
exclusive of each other. It is only in appropriate cases where a party
aggrieved by a judgment has not been able to file a motion for new trial that a
petition for relief can be filed.

The petition for relief of private respondent was filed out of time. We cannot
sanction respondent court's view that the period should be computed only
from March 17, 1980 when she claims self-servingly that she first knew of the
judgment because she signed and even swore to the truth of the allegations in
her motion for new trial filed by her lawyer on Feb. 16, 1980 or a month earlier.
To give way to her accusations of incompetency against the lawyer who
handled her case at the pre-trial, which resulted in a decision adverse to her
despite the absence of petitioners, and charge again later that her new
counsel did not inform her properly of the import of her motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration is to strain the quality of mercy beyond the breaking
point and could be an unwarranted slur on the members of the bar.

Notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Sec. 3
of Rule 38. The principle that notice to party, when he is represented by a
counsel of record, is not valid is applicable here in the reverse for the very
same reason that it is the lawyer who is supposed to know the next
procedural steps or what ought to be done in law henceforth for the protection
of the rights of the client, and not the latter.

Respondent judge acted beyond his jurisdiction in taking cognizance of

private respondent's petition for relief and, therefore, all his actuations in
connection therewith are null and void, with the result that his decision of
January 8, 1980 should be allowed to stand, the same having become final and
executory.

24
 MAURICIO GORDULAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAREO GORDULAN,
defendant-appellant.

FACTS: A Civil suit for the recovery of land, the defendant therein, Cesareo
Gordulan, although duly summoned, failed to file his answer in due time. Upon
motion of the plaintiff, the defendant was declared in default. After reception
of evidence for the plaintiff, the lower court rendered judgment against
defendant (now appellant). Availing himself of the provisions of Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court, the defendant

Cesareo Gordulan sought to set the judgment aside, claiming that he had good
and valid defenses against plaintiff's complaint and that it was excusable
negligence on his part that his counsel failed to file an answer. His petition
having been denied, the defendant interposed this appeal.

The questioned order should not be disturbed. Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 38 of

the Rules of Court are explicit, and require not only a sworn statement of the
facts constituting petitioner's good and substantial defense, but likewise a
showing that the failure to file an answer was by reason of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. While appellant's petition for relief contains
a recital of facts, duly sworn to by him, that the lot in dispute is owned in
common by the plaintiff and the defendant in equal shares, nothing is,
however, offered to show that there was fraud, mistake, accident or
excusable negligence in the failure of the lawyer to timely join issues with the
plaintiff.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to petition for relief?

RULING: Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a special remedy and the

requirements therein set forth are considered as conditions sine qua non to
the proper allowance of relief. Section 2 and 3 thereof are explicit, and require
not only a sworn statement of the facts constituting petitioner's good and
substantial defense, but likewise a showing that the failure to file an answer
was by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, while in
the case at bar, appellant's petition for relief contains a recital of facts, duly
sworn to by him, that the lot in dispute is owned in common by the plaintiff
and the defendant in equal shares, nothing is offered to show that there was
fraud, mistake, accident or excusable negligence in the failure of the lawyer
to timely join issues with the plaintiff. Hence, the petition was correctly
denied.

A client is bound by the acts, even by the mistakes and negligence, of his

25
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. Of course, the door is open for
him to seek redress against the erring lawyer for the wrong suffered (Isaac vs.
Mendoza, 89 Phil., 279).

LAUREANO ARCILLA, petitioner, vs. BASILISA ARCILLA, SERAPIA ARCILLA,

MARCELLA ARCILLA, DIONISIA ARCILLA, ZACARIAS ARCILLA, GAVINO MOLO
VDA. DE ARCILLA, CSAR M. ARCILLA, GLORIA M. ARCILLA, ANTONIO M.
ARCILLA, POMPEY M. ARCILLA, ERNESTO M. ARCILLA, ELENA M. ARCILLA,
ASUNCION M. ARCILLA, RANULFO M. ARCILLA, IGLESERIA A. CAÑETE,
ROSABELLA A. CAÑETE, and HONORABL FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, Presiding
Judge of Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner was among the several defendants in an action for

Annulment of Sale with Damages filed by herein private respondents before
the CFI of Cebu. Defendants, petitioner being one of them, was declared in
default for failure to appear. Judgement was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.
The court ordered the deed of sale as null and void and declaring the 8
children of Seguna Arcilla, including defendant Laureano, as co-owners.Copy
of the decision was sent to and received by defendants’ counsel of record on
November 8, 1976.

On March 25, 1977, herein petitioner Laureano filed a motion to lift order of
default and set aside the decision dated October 27, 1976 which was denied
by respondent Judge in his order dated April 12, 1997.

Petitioner filed a petition for Relief from Judgment on April 16, 1977 saying he
knew only of the October 27, 1976 decision on March 24, 1997. He seeks to
set aside and lift the effects of the said decision on mistake and/or excusable
neglect for their failure to inquire from their lawyer.

Respondent Judge issued the assailed order denying petitioner’s Petition for
Relief premised on the opposition of the plaintiff (herein respondents) that the
contention of the respondents that they only came to know of the decision on
March 24, 1997 cannot be given weight because notice to counsel is deemed
notice to the client.

26
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Relief was filed out of time?

RULING: The rule, therefore, is that in order for a petition for relief filed under
Rule 38 to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show
that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of said Rule 38.
Consequently, in assailing the lower court's dismissal of his petition for relief
for having been filed out of time, it is incumbent upon herein petitioner to
show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified
in Section 3, Rule 38. He has failed to do so, instead he argues on the merits
of his petition for relief, without first showing that the same was filed on time
in the court below. On this ground alone, the instant case should be
dismissed.

Arguing on the merits of his petition for relief, petitioner's main contention is
that the order of default was illegally and improperly issued because he was
not notified of the pre-trial on October 2, 1975, consequently, all subsequent
proceedings including the judgment by default were all null and void.

Moreover, We agree with the respondent Judge that the petition for relief was
filed late. We note that the decision sought to be set aside was rendered on
October 27, 1976. Petitioner, through counsel, received a copy of the said
decision on November 8, 1976, and he filed his petition for relief from
judgment only on April 18, 1977. Clearly, the same was filed beyond the period
allowed by Section 3 of Rule 38. As in previous cases, this Court holds and so
rules that the instant petition filed after the lapse of the reglementary period
cannot be entertained.

27