Safety Instrumentation - Including Safety Integrity Levels (Sils)

Engineering Institute of Technology (EIT) 7/4/2014
Safety
Instrumentation –
including Safety
Integrity Levels (SILs)
by
Steve Mackay
www.eit.edu.au
www.idc-online.com www.eit.edu.au
EIT Micro-Course Series

• Every two weeks we present a 35
to 45 minute interactive course
• Practical, useful with Q&A

throughout
• PID loop Tuning / Arc Flash

Protection, Functional Safety,
Troubleshooting conveyors
presented so far
• Go to http://www.eit.edu.au/free-
courses
• You get the recording and slides
Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 1

Where are we now ….…

Safety wise
It can’t possibly
happen to us ………..
Flixborough, England, June 1, 1974: "It was a still,

warm, sunlit afternoon. One moment the teacups were
tinkling and the kettles whistling. The next moment, a
blast of nightmarish intensity as the giant plant blew
up and blotted out the sun."--Humberside Police
Report

Nypro Chemical
Works, Flixborough,
UK: 1 June, 1974
Cyclohexane vapour
cloud ignited
Blast equivalent to
15 tons of TNT
28 killed
CAUSE:
Faulty temporary piping design by poorly qualified design team
Accident led to the Control of Industrial Major Accident (CIMAH) Regulations - now superseded by COMAH.
Lcmesa, Seveso, Italy

10 July 1976
1976 LOMBARDY
Trichlorophenol (TCP) is an intermediate used to
produce the disinfectant hexachlorophene. Seveso
Unexpected exothermic reaction caused pressure Milan
build-up and release of Dioxin by-product.
1983
41 barrels containing the toxic residues go missing
and are eventually found and incinerated in late 1985
1995
Civil lawsuits still proceeding Lombardy
CAUSE:
Management failure by all parties in the post-accident phase
Resulted in the Seveso I Directive that has influenced much subsequent legislation.

Three Mile Island,

Pennsylvania
28 March 1979
#2 Reactor
No deaths or injuries
CAUSE:
Inadequate control room instrumentation and poor emergency response
The term ‘cognitive overload’ was born. Raised awareness of HMI issues.
Bhopal, India
Union Carbide
3 December, 1984
Dangerous chemical reaction occurred when a large
amount of water got into the MIC storage tank #610
Exothermic reaction exploded the storage tank
40 tons of methyl isocyanate spread for 2 hours 8km Bhopal

down wind over the city of 900,000 inhabitants
More than 3,800 died and 11,000 disabled
CAUSE:
Management Failures + Disabled safety systems
Resulted in several governments passing legislation that required better accounting and disclosure of
chemical inventories

Milford Haven, UK
24 July, 1994
Texaco Refinery
CAUSE:
Operators lacked adequate information on which to make decisions following
an earlier incident. Contribution from Alarm Overload
Refer to the HSE report on this incident - ISBN 0 7176 1413 1
Sonat Exploration Company

(Now El Paso Production Co.)
Louisiana,
4 March, 1998
Catastrophic Vessel
over-pressurisation
4 killed
CAUSE:
Maloperation of the plant, no plant operating procedures, inadequate vessel relief devices,
and absence of any process hazard analysis (PHA) on the original plant design.
Source Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

BP Refiner, Texas City,

Tx: 23 March, 2005
During the startup of the Isomerization Unit on Wednesday, March 23, 2005,
explosions and fires occurred, killing fifteen and harming over 170 persons in the
Texas City Refinery, operated by BP Products North America Inc.
BP Refinery, Texas City Tx:

Tx: 23 March 2005
It can’t possibly happen to us?


Safety System Basics
The Safety Instrumented System

General abbreviation: SIS
AKA: Trip system, shutdown system, instrumented protection system (IPS)
The SIS is an example of a Functional Safety System

Meaning: Safety depends on the correct functions being performed
Functional safety: Part of the overall safety relating to the process and the BPCS
which depends on the correct functioning of the SIS and other protection layers.
(IEC 61511 clause: 3.2.25)
Hardware components
of a Control Loop
Input devices Output devices/

(e.g. sensors / PLC/Controller final elements
transmitters) (e.g. valves)

Process Control Versus

Safety Control
Separation of safety controls from process controls
DCS
Control
System
Operating
Equipment
Protection
System
SIS
Scope of a Safety Instrumented System
Logic solver
Sensor Logic Solver Actuator

(Hardware and Software)

Definition of a Safety Fig 1.3
Instrumented System
SIS User Basic Process
Interface Control System
Sensors Logic Actuators

Solver
3 Sub-systems: Each subsystem must meet SIL target

Safety System Basics

• All types of safety measures are intended to
reduce risk of harm to people, the environment
and assets.
• The risks are due to the presence of
HAZARDS:
Hazardous Process or Procedure
HAZARD:
An Inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the potential
for causing harm to people, property or the environment

What Is Hazard and

What Is Risk?
Hazard
An inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the
potential for causing harm to people, property, or the
environment.
Risk
The combination of the severity and probability of an event.
Risk = frequency x consequence of hazard.

hazard.
Vapour Hazard
Simple Shutdown System: Example 1
PSV
LC
1
I/P
Fluid
Feed
FC
LT
1
Basic tank level control with overflow hazard

Fig 1.4
Simple Shutdown System
HS LAHH
Reset 2 2 Tripped Alarm
Logic Solver
LI PSV
2
AS LC
1
I/P
Fluid
Feed
FC FC
LT LT
1 2
FC = fails closed on loss of air pressure
Typical multiple stage plant trip and ESD system
Stage 1 Plant Emergency Shutdown Command

high pressure
Stage 1
low level
Stage 3 tripped
Stage 1 Trip
Stage 2
high temperature
Stage 2
high level
Stage 3
high level
Stage 2 Trip
Time delay Stage 3 Trip

Risk reduction: the fast bowler

Fig 1.5
If we can’t take away the hazard we shall have to reduce the risk.
Reduce the frequency and /or reduce the consequence.
Example:
Brett Lee is the bowler: He is the Hazard
You are the batsman: You are at risk
Frequency = 6 times per over. Consequence = Ouch!
Risk = 6 x Ouch!
Risk reduction: Limit bouncers to 2 per over. Wear more pads.
Risk = 2x ouch!
Measurement of Risk
Qualitative: High, Low, Moderate
An effective measure if we all have the same

understanding of the terms
Quantitative: 1 in 10 years x 5 people hurt
Effective if you can guess the numbers

Risk = Frequency of Event x Consequence
Fatal Serious Minor

injury injury
Risk
Consequences
Frequency
To Reduce Risk:
Reduce Frequency or Consequence or do both
Fatal Serious Minor

injury injury
Consequences
Risk
Frequency

Risk Reduction:
Design Principles
Hazard Identified
Risk Tolerable Risk

Estimated/Calculated Established
Risk Reduction
Requirement
Safety Function Defined

SIL Target Defined
Safety Control systems act independently of

the process or its control system to try to
prevent a hazardous event.
Control
System
Operating
Equipment
SIS

The SIS achieves risk reduction by reducing

Fig 1.7 the
frequency (likelihood) of the hazardous event
Control
System
Operating
Equipment
SIS
The amount of risk reduction achieved is

indicated by the risk reduction factor: RRF
Control
System
Operating
Equipment
SIS

The amount of risk reduction allocated to

the SIS determines its “target Safety
Integrity Level” i.e. SIL
Control
System
Operating
Equipment
SIS
Safety Integrity Levels

Fig 1.8
SIL RRF Probability of Failure

on Demand
4 >10 000 to < 100 000 >10-5 to <10-4

3 >1000 to < 10 000 >10-4 to <10-3
2 >100 to < 1 000 >10-3 to <10-2
1 >10 to < 100 >10-2 to <10-1
Safety Integrity Level defines the degree of confidence placed in the ability of a
system to provide functional safety. SIL values also indicate the quality of care and
attention taken to avoid systematic errors in design and maintenance.

Intuitively what does SIL mean?

• Statistical representations of integrity of SIS
• For example: SIL 1….
– SIS with availability of 90% is acceptable
– High level trip in a liquid tank
– Availability of 90% (10% chance of failure)
– One out of every 10 times the high level was
reached, there would be a failure
– Subsequent overflow 1 out of every 10 times.
Thank You For Your Interest

If you are interested in further training, please visit:
The Engineering Institute of Technologies

Online Certificate and
Advanced Diploma programs:
www.eit.edu.au
IDC Technologies
1, 2 & 3 day practical workshops, technical manuals,
onsite training & International conferences:
www.idc-online.com

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Engineering Institute of Technology (EIT) 7/4/2014

EIT Micro-Course Series

• Practical, useful with Q&A

• PID loop Tuning / Arc Flash

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 1

Where are we now ….…

Flixborough, England, June 1, 1974: "It was a still,

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 2

Lcmesa, Seveso, Italy

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 3

Three Mile Island,

Exothermic reaction exploded the storage tank

40 tons of methyl isocyanate spread for 2 hours 8km Bhopal

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 4

Refer to the HSE report on this incident - ISBN 0 7176 1413 1

Sonat Exploration Company

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 5

BP Refiner, Texas City,

BP Refinery, Texas City Tx:

It can’t possibly happen to us?

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 6

Safety System Basics

The Safety Instrumented System

The SIS is an example of a Functional Safety System

Input devices Output devices/

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 7

Process Control Versus

Scope of a Safety Instrumented System

Sensor Logic Solver Actuator

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 8

Definition of a Safety Fig 1.3

Sensors Logic Actuators

3 Sub-systems: Each subsystem must meet SIL target

Safety System Basics

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 9

What Is Hazard and

Risk = frequency x consequence of hazard.

Basic tank level control with overflow hazard

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 10

Typical multiple stage plant trip and ESD system

Stage 1 Plant Emergency Shutdown Command

Time delay Stage 3 Trip

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 11

Risk reduction: the fast bowler

An effective measure if we all have the same

Quantitative: 1 in 10 years x 5 people hurt

Effective if you can guess the numbers

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 12

Risk = Frequency of Event x Consequence

Fatal Serious Minor

Fatal Serious Minor

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 13

Risk Tolerable Risk

Safety Function Defined

Safety Control systems act independently of

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 14

The SIS achieves risk reduction by reducing

The amount of risk reduction achieved is

Tutorial on Safety Instrumentation and SILs Webinar 15

The amount of risk reduction allocated to

Safety Integrity Levels

SIL RRF Probability of Failure