Lahore Grammar School

Final Internal Examination – Mocks 2020

A-2

History – 9389/42

1 Hour 30 Minutes

Depth Study 3: International History

9. An example of the Containment policy in action. How valid is this assessment of American
involvement in the Korean War?

Ans: There are two dominant theories that seek to explain American motives in dealing with
communist threats during the Cold War: “containment” and “roll-back”. Containment refers to the
need to prevent the spread of communism by keeping it contained to areas where it is already
present. Roll-back, on the other hand, is a more aggressive foreign policy doctrine which revolves
around reclaiming land and territory from communist governments and democratizing them by
military force if necessary. The American decision to involve itself in the Korean War was more than
mere “containment” in action, as there were definitely some elements of “roll-back” involved as
well, especially in the middle phase of the War. While the war may have started and ended on
“containment” related notes, there was definitely a desire to completely knock communism out of
the Korean Peninsula in light of foreign policy shifts in strategy (NSC-68 in 1950), pressure from
Republicans and Truman’s reading of history. Thus, while representing containment to some extent,
it can be effectively argued that the Americans instead wanted roll-back at a certain point in the War
and fell back on containment when roll-back seemed unlikely to succeed in anything but escalating
US hostilities with China and Russia.

As soon as Kim’s forces crossed the 38 th Parallel into the South, the USA managed to mobilize a wide
international coalition through the platform of the UNO. Not only was North Korea condemned as a
clear aggressor, UN resolutions were also passed to mandate action in supporting the sovereignty of
South Korea. It is quite clear that the US had been caught relatively unawares in Korea and didn’t
want it to represent a blueprint for communist aggression in the future, especially with relations to
areas like Japan and the Philippines in Asia, and more closely, West Germany and other parts of
Western Europe that faced a threat from the other parts of the Iron Curtain. In 1950, the US had
overhauled its national security strategy and had also mounted a review of its security needs in Asia.
Kennan’s replacement by Nitze as head of the State Department’s policy planning staff had ushered
in an era where the more “military” aspects of containment had come to the fore in American
foreign policy. Nitze was the main author of NSC-68 that had been approved by Truman as well. The
document had determined that the Americans simply couldn’t allow for the loss of any further
resources or territory to the Communists in any of its many global spheres of interest. In addition,
there was a lot of pressure from republicans like Joseph McCarthy whose hints at a communist
conspiracy within the US made headlines after the Korean Affair. While late historians have
suggested that the Korean War should be seen as less a case of Soviet-sponsored Communist
insurgence and more as an ethnic civil war, Truman was too afraid of the ghosts of appeasement
that had haunted Europe and wanted to learn from the lessons of the past. Thus, under the
command of McArthur, UN forces and South Korean forces fought back and pushed the North
Koreans backwards. With the landings at Inchon, the road to Pyongyang was now open if the
Americans wanted to push Northwards.

This marks the point where containment turned into roll-back. Douglas MacArthur, the commander
of the combined UN forces in Korea was of the view that a march up North would be quick, decisive
and uncontroversial. Despite the Chinese threatening intervention in the case where the Yalu river
was crossed by South Korean and UN forces, Truman decided not to take these warnings seriously.
In the international climate of the time, with the Cold War being considered the coldest it would
ever get, this was too golden an opportunity to station a democratic watchdog on the borders of
communist China, while also depriving the USSR of a key proxy in the region. The Americans had not
calculated that Stalin had played a very cautious role in the North’s aggression because of his fears
of nuclear escalation between the USSR and the USA. Therefore, they deemed the entire affair as a
Soviet orchestration. In addition, elections loomed nearby and Truman decided to take an important
electoral talking point away from the Republicans by boosting his own anti-communist credentials.
Truman’s own thought process at the time was decidedly anti-communist and he was constantly
egged on by Syngman Rhee (the leader of South Korea) to reunify the Peninsula under him. It should
be kept in mind that while the British and the other coalition partners were wary of venturing
Northwards, the US made the fateful decision of giving McArthur the green signal. Containment had
now transformed into ambitious roll-back.

Yet, Truman had not accounted for the ruthlessness of the Chinese response. Once the Chinese got
promised Soviet air support, they launched a devastating counter-offensive through a “volunteer”
force, as the PLA couldn’t directly be involved against the US for fear of inevitable escalation. The
coalition lost thousands of troops in face of this response. Truman was caught teetering and
recognized that roll-back could lead to another world-war. Despite MacArthur’s advice of using
nuclear weapons on China (which was discarded), Truman shifted the policy to one of containment
especially when after reaching the 38 th parallel, the Chinese decided that they also wanted to clear
the Peninsula of their enemies. With limited air support, they were likely to fail, and over the next
two years, the war transitioned to one of holding positions in which the front generally stabilized
along the 38th parallel. Macarthur was replaced by another general for insubordination, and Truman
tried to win a moral victory by taking an inflexible posture on prisoners through asserting that no
prisoners could be repatriated against their wishes. With time, the Americans also realized that the
War was proving too costly and needed to be ended at all cost. The final nail in the War’s coffin was
the ascension of Khrushchev and Eisenhower after the death and stepping down of Stalin and
Truman respectively in 1953. With the signing of the Armistice at Panmunjon, it became clear that
containment had succeeded at great cost, with the status quo being largely restored.

In conclusion, thereby, it can be seen that the Korean War was a war of phases, in terms of American
commitments to containment and roll-back. The War started as one of containment, threatened to
become one of roll-back till the Chinese got involved, and thereafter, reverted to being one of
containment. In light of these realities, it would, thus, be inaccurate to label the War as simply being
an example of containment.

10. To what extent was Gorbachev’s decision to end the Brezhnev Doctrine responsible for the
collapse of the Soviet Union?

Ans: The Brezhnev Doctrine categorically made clear to Soviet Satellites that once a country had
adopted communism, it could not be allowed to renounce it. The implications were clear. Just like in
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union would respond with force if communist
political hegemony was challenged in such countries. However, the rise of Gorbachev as the General
Secretary of the Communist party led to the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine, amongst other
policy reforms such as Glasnost and Perestroika. Some modern historians credit the abandonment of
the Brezhnev doctrine as the major reason for the fall of Soviet influence in its satellite states and
the loss of Eastern Europe to Communism. However, they fail to see it as a symptom of existing
weaknesses and tensions, as opposed to being their primary cause. Be that as it may, this does not
mean that the abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine had the same causal effect on the fall of the
USSR. On the contrary, it can be argued while the actions of individuals such as Gorbachev, Reagan
and Thatcher all had an impact on the manner in which the USSR fell, the primary reason for its fall
was the structural weaknesses that it suffered from: economic instability, the failure in the popular
appeal of communism for ordinary people and the inability to match the pressure exerted by the US
militarily. While a complex set of reasons explain the end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR,
structural reasons must take priority over individual agency and actions, however significant it may
seem to appear.

In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December 1988, Gorbachev sent a clear
message to the political elites of Central and Eastern Europe that they could transform their political
and economic systems without fear of Soviet intervention. In the same speech, he announced
considerable troop withdrawals from the territories of the USSR’s Warsaw Pact allies. This speech
clearly did have an impact in terms of political perceptions in Eastern Europe. Parties like Solidarity
now knew that they could push for an overhaul of the political process without having to fear
massive political pushback. In 1989, they managed to win elections and come into power. In Sept
1989 Hungary opened its borders with Austria leading East Germans to flee to the West severely
undermining East Germany. One lone day saw 125,000 Germans crossing into Austria. Poland had
free elections resulting in solidarity led govt coming to power as a result of reforms being introduced
in response to Gorbachev. The Berlin Wall symbolically fell in Nov 1989 marking a fall of the divisions
that had marked the essential character of the Cold War – the ideological split between capitalism
and communism. In November 1989, the Communist regime in the Czech Republic was also forced
to make concessions. In December, the Ceausescu dictatorship in Romania was overthrown. The
trend continued throughout Eastern Europe, with each fall spurring the next on in an ironic domino-
theory throwback. By the end of 1989, every pro-Soviet Communist government in Eastern Europe
had disintegrated. It has been additionally argued that the same setbacks spilled over into the USSR
with many nationalities pushing from independence from Russian chauvinism. The Communist Party
had no option but to station forces inside hot nationalist beds such as Latvia, Estonia, Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabach. As a result, as the argument goes, the USSR detonated from within.

However, it is often overlooked that the major reason for why Gorbachev even abandoned the
Brezhnev doctrine was because of his hand having been forced by structural factors such as the
unsustainable and overstretched economy of the USSR that could no longer afford to control Eastern
Europe without causing massive and uncontrollable discontent inside the Union itself. The ideational
school of Cold War historians argues that the conclusion of the Cold War had already been decided
far before the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine and even the Arms programme of the US. The
USSR faced mounting economic problems with very low living standards largely due to the diversion
of resources away from consumer goods into the military. Alongside this were the huge sums of
money used to support its communist allies: Vietnam received over $1 billion a year and Cuba $4
billion - $40 billion annually on propping up communist govts. Nearly ¾ of the hard currency earned
by Soviet Union went on aid and arms to its allies. Rigid planning required of the communist system
made the economy very inflexible and easily disrupted by unforeseen events such as the oil crisis of
1973. Sense of impending economic crisis was helped by the slowdown in the rate of growth in
industrial production. By 1985 all of the socialist economies of the Eastern bloc had growth rates
that were virtually negligible. All in all, the economy itself seemed virtually unsustainable until and
unless its focus was shifted and diverted. In the context of Eastern Europe, these problems were
made even starker by the images of prosperity apparent in the life and style of the Western bloc. On
the borders of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, West German television stations could be
received, with images of life under capitalism. The influence of western music, cinema and fashion
had influence on the people of E Europe as it offered a sharp contrast to the living standards in the
East a proved the failure of socialism. This changed the expectations of people leading to calls for
political reform.

Another important structural factor was the pressure piled on the USSR by the US’s commitment to
firm action – a position that is also echoed by the triumphalist school of thought. Reagan helped in
undermining the USSR through his policy of militarised counter-revolution. This marked a change
towards a more aggressive, strident anti-communist approach indicating he would pursue the ‘2nd
Cold War’ with vigour. There was increased military spending on a scale unprecedented in American
history. It increased by 13% in 1982. New methods of deploying nuclear missiles were produced e.g.
trident submarines and stealth bombers. Central to this arm build up was SDI announced in 1983 –
also known as the Star Wars programme. It sanctioned the development of anti-ballistic missile
systems in space, the huge cost of which would bankrupt the USSR if it were to try and keep pace.
The aim behind the programme was to regain military supremacy to the extent that USSR would not
be able to continue fighting the Cold War. The Reagan Doctrine involved measures to try and halt
the growth of Soviet influence in the 3rd world involving sending aid to anti-communist insurgents
often through CIA operations. This was designed to weaken Soviet Union at the edges and to supply
counter-revolutionaries with enough support to ensure Soviet support for revolutionary regimes
would entail a much greater economic cost. In Europe radio broadcasts such as ‘Voice of America’
and ‘Radio free Europe’ were used to encourage those living in E Europe to protest against
communist governments. In Nicaragua, doctrine was used to send military aid to the Contras, a
right-wing guerrilla group fighting against the communist govt of the Sandinistas. All in all, it has
been suggested by veterans of the Gorbachev Regime that the decision to abandon the Brezhnev
Doctrine, amongst other decisions supposedly linked to being the main reasons for downfall of the
Soviet Union, was caused by this sustained military pressure, that together with the economic
pressures of sustaining a bloated economy made Gorbachev surrender to the writing on the wall.

If seen through this light, Glasnost and Perestroika were basically necessary diversions for the
sustained health of the economy and political life in Russia. Gorbachev had to continue these
policies out of fear of avoiding stagnation within Russian political life, but he didn’t calculate that
creating such a liberal perception would create even greater demands for reform, and hence,
straitjacket the regime. In conclusion, one can argue that the fall of the Soviet Union was pre-
destined in the pressures that its ambition and policy had created. The nudge was Gorbachev’s, but
that’s what it was – just a nudge.